Input:  We drove about a great deal--the country at the back of Deauville, going away from the sea, is lovely--very like England--charming narrow roads with high banks and hedges on each side--big trees with spreading branches meeting overhead--stretches of green fields with cows grazing placidly and horses and colts gambolling about.  It is a great grazing and breeding country.  There are many haras (breeding stables) in the neighbourhood, and the big Norman posters are much in demand.  I have friends who never take their horses to the country.  They hire for the season a pair of strong Norman horses that go all day up and down hill at the same regular pace and who get over a vast amount of country.  We stopped once or twice when we were a large party, two or three carriages, and had tea at one of the numerous farmhouses that were scattered about.  Boiling water was a difficulty--milk, cider, good bread and butter, cheese we could always find--sometimes a galette, but a kettle and boiling water were entirely out of their habits.  They used to boil the water in a large black pot, and take it out with a big spoon.  However, it amused us, and the water really did boil. 

Does the response "They have coins jingling in their pocket" correctly answer the question "What makes us think the speaker is a person of the upper class?"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
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Output: no


Input: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of  Bin Laden's finances. A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that  Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering. 

Does the response "Bin Laden's finances" correctly answer the question "What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000?"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
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Output: yes


Input: Jenny was a 13 year old girl with blond hair and blue eyes. She had gotten out of her last day of school and was free for the summer. Two of her friends were going to the nearby beach to do some swimming and enjoy the sun. Jenny went with them and when they got there the beach was very full and there were people everywhere. They changed into their bathing suits and went to the water. The water was very cold. They chose not swim and walked to the sand. Then they laid down on some towels and enjoyed the sun. After several hours Jenny and her friends fell asleep. They woke up and the sun was beginning to set. When Jenny sat up she found that it was painful to touch her skin. When she looked down she saw that she had a very bad sunburn. Her friends were also very badly sunburned so they went home. Jenny's mother gave her a cream to put on the sunburn. Afterwards she felt a lot better and went to sleep. 

Does the response "Jenny was free from school on summer break and 2 of her friends were going to the beach" correctly answer the question "Why did Jenny go the beach?"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
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Output: yes


Input: Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but  Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by  Bin Laden. He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment. Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with  Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras. Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. In September 2000,  Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to  Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden. 

Does the response "Around ten months" correctly answer the question "How long was it between the failed suicide mission and the successful attack on the USS Cole?"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
***
Output:
yes