Question:
Sam Farragut is a sociopathic business executive in Southern California who forces a team of advertising agency employees to embark on a dangerous dirtbike trip to the Baja California desert in order to compete for his business .  The men are Warren Summerfield , a suicidal middle-aged ad executive who has been fired from the agency ; the straightlaced Paul McIlvain who is inattentive to his wife , and brash art designer Maxon who feels suddenly trapped after his girlfriend announces she is pregnant .  There are numerous long sequences of motorcycle riding on desert backroads .  Summerfield has been having an affair with McIlvian's wife .  He has not told his wife that he was fired and is simply serving out his tenure at the agency while looking for a new position .  His wife is actually aware of the affair .  Farragut convinces the ad men to make the motorcycle journey on the pretext of looking for a location to shoot a commercial .  In reality , Farragut is reckless and looking to involve the men in spontaneous edgy adventure of his own manipulation .  After they leave , McIlvain's wife suspects that Summerfield is planning to kill himself for the insurance money , but she can not convince Summerfield's wife to instigate a search .  The four men travel deeper into Mexico on isolated dirt roads .  At one point Summerfield contemplates plunging off a cliff .  After being humiliated by a young American couple in a Baja bar , Farragut tracks them down on the beach while accompanied by Maxon .  After reading the above, is "Because he wants to explore the Baja desert since one of their advertising clients asked them to" the correct answer to the question "What are the real reasons Frarrugut has planned this trip?"? OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer:
no


Question:
In March 2001, Rice asked the CIA to prepare a new series of authorities for covert action in Afghanistan. Rice's recollection was that the idea had come from Clarke and the NSC senior director for intelligence, Mary McCarthy, and had been linked to the proposal for aid to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks. Rice described the draft document as providing for "consolidation plus," superseding the various Clinton administration documents. In fact, the CIA drafted two documents. One was a finding that did concern aid to opponents of the Taliban regime; the other was a draft Memorandum of Notification, which included more open-ended language authorizing possible lethal action in a variety of situations. Tenet delivered both to Hadley on March 28. The CIA's notes for Tenet advised him that "in response to the NSC request for drafts that will help the policymakers review their options, each of the documents has been crafted to provide the Agency with the broadest possible discretion permissible under the law." At the meeting, Tenet argued for deciding on a policy before deciding on the legal authorities to implement it. Hadley accepted this argument, and the draft MON was put on hold. As the policy review moved forward, the planned covert action program for Afghanistan was included in the draft presidential directive, as part of an "Annex A" on intelligence activities to "eliminate the al Qaeda threat." The main debate during the summer of 2001 concentrated on the one new mechanism for a lethal attack on  Bin Laden-an armed version of the Predator drone. In the first months of the new administration, questions concerning the Predator became more and more a central focus of dispute. Clarke favored resuming Predator flights over Afghanistan as soon as weather permitted, hoping that they still might provide the elusive "actionable intelligence" to target  Bin Laden with cruise missiles. Learning that the Air Force was thinking of equipping Predators with warheads, Clarke became even more enthusiastic about redeployment. The CTC chief, Cofer Black, argued against deploying the Predator for reconnaissance purposes. He recalled that theTaliban had spotted a Predator in the fall of 2000 and scrambled their MiG fighters. Black wanted to wait until the armed version was ready. "I do not believe the possible recon value outweighs the risk of possible program termination when the stakes are raised by the Taliban parading a charred Predator in front of CNN," he wrote.  After reading the above, is "He wanted time to assess the situation and make a decision later" the correct answer to the question "In the debate over the use of armed Predator drones what position did Clarke favor?"? OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer:
no


Question:
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. It appears they supported themselves. KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot. After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money. Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.  After reading the above, is "Hamburg cell members" the correct answer to the question "Who supported themselves before Al Qaeda began giving them funding in late 1999?"? OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer:

yes