Problem: On the previous evening,--March 12th,--the monotony of the camp had been unexpectedly disturbed by the arrival, from the direction of Salt Lake City, of a horseman completely exhausted by fatigue and cold, who proved to be no other than Mr. Kane, whose mission to the Mormons by way of California was at that time totally unknown to the army. The next morning he introduced himself to the Governor, was received as his guest, and remained in conference with him throughout the day. What was the character of their communication is unknown, except by inference from its results. When presented to Judge Eckels, on the following day, Mr. Kane exhibited to him the letters he bore from the President, and other letters, also, from Brigham Young, accrediting him as a negotiator in the existing difficulties. To General Johnston he showed nothing; nor did the Governor, to the knowledge of the camp, acquaint either that officer or any other person with the purport of his business. It was evident to everybody, however, that the Mormon leaders, conscious of their inability to resist the force by which they would be assailed so soon as the snow should melt upon the mountains, were engaged in an effort, of which Mr. Kane was the agent, to secure through the Governor, if possible, indemnity for their past offences, in consideration of acknowledgment of his authority. 

Question: "Was the public explicitly made aware of the mission or business of Mr. Kane at any point?"

Answer: "No"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Answer: yes
Question:
While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful. As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists." In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on  Bin Laden. They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed  Bin Laden. President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding  Bin Laden." I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get  Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two." The U.S. effort continued.  After reading the above, is "President Clinton" the correct answer to the question "Who was the first president to visit Pakistan since 1969?"? OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer:
yes
Input: Iwasaki's careful respect for the Long Beach program and its lawyers earned him the political capital he needed to complete his takeover in a matter of weeks. "The Long Beach program had strong support in the community so in a situation like that, one has to recognize that it's not like a takeover where I have all the answers and I know best," Iwasaki said. "The people in the community who are working there have the contacts and the knowledge that will allow service to continue." Things have gone less smoothly across town. There, Dudovitz, a longtime poverty lawyer and executive director of the San Fernando Valley's 36-year-old legal aid program, continues to struggle with his hostile takeover of the neighboring San Gabriel-Pomona Valleys service area one year after it was accomplished. On the bright side, Dudovitz has extended his respected program to clients in the San Gabriel-Pomona Valley, and he now operates on a much larger budget, $6.5 million last year. However, his clash with the old San Gabriel program resulted in litigation, bitter feelings and a mission that some say is not clearly focused on serving poor people. "It was a difficult situation that was probably mishandled by everyone," a longtime observer of the public interest community said of the San Fernando Valley-San Gabriel-Pomona Valley merger. "There are very few people who come out as the heroes. Personalities got involved when they shouldn't have. Things were said that caused bad feelings and couldn't be unsaid." Iwasaki's merger with the smaller, 48-year-old Long Beach program was friendly and fast, and no one - not even Long Beach board members - lost a job. When it was over, Iwasaki had $1 million more in federal dollars and two new offices. Long Beach clients regained services they had lost years ago when federal budget cuts and dwindling grants reduced the staff of 15 lawyers to five and cut immigration and consumer law programs. Iwasaki said, "[I judged the transition] better than I could have hoped for." 
"What is the budget Dudovitz now operates on?" is "$6.5 million"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Output:
yes