Problem: (CNN) -- Shain Gandee, one of the stars of the MTV reality show "Buckwild," has been found dead along with two other people in Kanawha County, West Virginia, authorities said Monday. "This is a very sad and tragic event," Kanawha County Commissioner Kent Carper said. "We live in a very small community. Our thoughts and prayers are with the Gandee family." Gandee, 21, was found dead in a vehicle along with his uncle, David Dwight Gandee, 48, and Donald Robert Myers, 27, authorities said. 'Buckwild' producer talks about the show "Earlier this day after releasing information Shain Gandee was missing, the Kanawha County Sheriff's Office received word of a disabled vehicle in a wooded area near Thaxton Hollow, Sissonville, Kanawha County WV," said a statement from the Sheriff's Office. "Deputies and members of the Sissonville Volunteer Fire Department used all terrain vehicles to access that vehicle, a 1984 Ford Bronco belonging to the Gandee family. The vehicle was in a muddy area along a worn path. Inside were the bodies of three people." In a subsequent release, the Sheriff's Office said the vehicle was partially submerged in mud. It was uneven but upright; its muffler was below the surface. Mud covered the lower part of the Bronco's passenger side door, but the driver's side, where the younger Gandee sat, was free, the Sheriff's Office said. Gandee was happy with life before death He was one of the nine cast members of "Buckwild." The show follows a group of young adults trying to have fun in Sissonville, West Virginia, pulling stunts such as turning a dump truck into a swimming pool or just riding around the woods on their all-terrain vehicles. Gandee was billed as a former high school prom king who had done "every job from coal mining to being a garbage man." 

Question: "Who was Shain Gandee?"

Answer: "Shain Gandee was one of the stars of the reality show "Buckwild""
Answer: yes

Problem: Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all. After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport. Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second. NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. The flight never turned off its transponder. NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta 1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed in Cleveland. But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an aircraft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93. United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming. 

Question: "What type of plane was the FAA's Cleveland Center asked to watch?"

Answer: "With sounds of screaming"
Answer: no

Problem: The second major point on which the principals had agreed on March 10 was the need to crack down on terrorist organizations and curtail their fund-raising. The embassy bombings of 1998 had focused attention on al Qaeda's finances. One result had been the creation of an NSC-led interagency committee on terrorist financing. On its recommendation, the President had designated  Bin Laden and al Qaeda as subject to sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. This gave theTreasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) the ability to search for and freeze any  Bin Laden or al Qaeda assets that reached the U.S. financial system. But since OFAC had little information to go on, few funds were frozen. In July 1999, the President applied the same designation to the Taliban for harboring  Bin Laden. Here, OFAC had more success. It blocked more than $34 million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks. Another $215 million in gold and $2 million in demand deposits, all belonging to the Afghan central bank and held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, were also frozen. After October 1999, when the State Department formally designated al Qaeda a "foreign terrorist organization," it became the duty of U.S. banks to block its transactions and seize its funds. Neither this designation nor UN sanctions had much additional practical effect; the sanctions were easily circumvented, and there were no multilateral mechanisms to ensure that other countries' financial systems were not used as conduits for terrorist funding. Attacking the funds of an institution, even the Taliban, was easier than finding and seizing the funds of a clandestine worldwide organization like al Qaeda. Although the CIA's  Bin Laden unit had originally been inspired by the idea of studying terrorist financial links, few personnel assigned to it had any experience in financial investigations. Any terrorist-financing intelligence appeared to have been collected collaterally, as a consequence of gathering other intelligence. This attitude may have stemmed in large part from the chief of this unit, who did not believe that simply following the money from point A to point B revealed much about the terrorists' plans and intentions. As a result, the CIA placed little emphasis on terrorist financing. Nevertheless, the CIA obtained a general understanding of how al Qaeda raised money. 

Question: "Who blocked more than $34 million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks, and froze $215 million in gold and $2 million in demand deposits belonging to the Afghan central bank?"

Answer: "US Banks"
Answer:
no