Input: The inhabited history of the Las Vegas Valley stretches to 23,000 b.c. , when much of the area was covered by a prehistoric lake. During this period, the indigenous people lived in caves, hunting the mammals that gathered at the shoreline. The landscape of the valley changed dramatically over the next 200 centuries. The glaciers feeding the lake melted away and the lake evaporated. Fossils tell an obscure story of man's slow and sporadic development. Around 3000 b.c. , native Archaic Indians began to develop a lasting hunting and gathering culture. By this time, the valley was in much the same geographic state as it exists in today, with one exception — the presence of artesian springs that bubbled to the surface in several areas. These springs fed a network of streams draining through the Las Vegas Wash to the Colorado River. The areas surrounding the springs were desert oases: sprawling collections of grasses, trees, and wildlife. Many springs lay in areas that would eventually become the center of the modern Las Vegas metropolis. For about 4000 years, the Archaics thrived in a culture that included many signs of early civilization. Signs of even more advancement appeared halfway through the first millennium a.d. , when the Anasazi Indians inhabited the valley. Far more progressive than the Archaics, the Anasazi utilized such formal agricultural techniques as irrigation to assist their harvest. This permitted the Anasazi to achieve a benchmark of advanced society — the ability to live in permanent shelters year-round without need to follow wildlife. Mysteriously, the Anasazi vanished from the valley around a.d. 

Does the response "The arid desert" correctly answer the question "Where were animals commonly found for food in Las Vegas dating back to 23,000bc?"?

OPTIONS:
- no
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***
Output: no
After the August missile strikes, diplomatic options to press the Taliban seemed no more promising than military options. The United States had issued a formal warning to the Taliban, and also to Sudan, that they would be held directly responsible for any attacks on Americans, wherever they occurred, carried out by the  Bin Laden network as long as they continued to provide sanctuary to it. For a brief moment, it had seemed as if the August strikes might have shocked the Taliban into thinking of giving up  Bin Laden. On August 22, the reclusive Mullah Omar told a working-level State Department official that the strikes were counterproductive but added that he would be open to a dialogue with the United States on  Bin Laden's presence in Afghanistan. Meeting in Islamabad with William Milam, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Taliban delegates said it was against their culture to expel someone seeking sanctuary but asked what would happen to  Bin Laden should he be sent to Saudi Arabia. Yet in September 1998, when the Saudi emissary, Prince Turki, asked Mullah Omar whether he would keep his earlier promise to expel  Bin Laden, the Taliban leader said no. Both sides shouted at each other, with Mullah Omar denouncing the Saudi government. Riyadh then suspended its diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime. (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates were the only countries that recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.) Crown Prince Abdullah told President Clinton and Vice President Gore about this when he visited Washington in late September. His account confirmed reports that the U.S. government had received independently. Other efforts with the Saudi government centered on improving intelligence sharing and permitting U.S. agents to interrogate prisoners in Saudi custody. The history of such cooperation in 1997 and 1998 had been strained. Several officials told us, in particular, that the United States could not get direct access to an important al Qaeda financial official, Madani al Tayyib, who had been detained by the Saudi government in 1997.67Though U.S. officials repeatedly raised the issue, the Saudis provided limited information. In his September 1998 meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah, Vice President Gore, while thanking the Saudi government for their responsiveness, renewed the request for direct U.S. access to Tayyib. The United States never obtained this access. An NSC staff-led working group on terrorist finances asked the CIA in November 1998 to push again for access to Tayyib and to see "if it is possible to elaborate further on the ties between Usama bin Ladin and prominent individuals in Saudi Arabia, including especially the  Bin Laden family." One result was two NSC-led interagency trips to Persian Gulf states in 1999 and 2000. During these trips the NSC, Treasury, and intelligence representatives spoke with Saudi officials, and later interviewed members of the  Bin Laden family, about Usama's inheritance. 

Question: "Who told President Clinton that Riyadh had suspended relations with the Taliban regime?"

OPTIONS:
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- yes

Answer: "Madani al Tayyib"

Response: no
In early March, the administration postponed action on proposals for increasing aid to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks. Rice noted at the time that a more wide-ranging examination of policy toward Afghanistan was needed first. She wanted the review very soon. Rice and others recalled the President saying, "I'm tired of swatting at flies." The President reportedly also said,"I'm tired of playing defense. I want to play offense. I want to take the fight to the terrorists." President Bush explained to us that he had become impatient. He apparently had heard proposals for rolling back al Qaeda but felt that catching terrorists one by one or even cell by cell was not an approach likely to succeed in the long run. At the same time, he said, he understood that policy had to be developed slowly so that diplomacy and financial and military measures could mesh with one another. Hadley convened an informal Deputies Committee meeting on March 7, when some of the deputies had not yet been confirmed. For the first time, Clarke's various proposals-for aid to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks and for Predator missions-went before the group that, in the Bush NSC, would do most of the policy work. Though they made no decisions on these specific proposals, Hadley apparently concluded that there should be a presidential national security policy directive (NSPD) on terrorism. Clarke would later express irritation about the deputies' insistence that a strategy for coping with al Qaeda be framed within the context of a regional policy. He doubted that the benefits would compensate for the time lost. The administration had in fact proceeded with Principals Committee meetings on topics including Iraq and Sudan without prior contextual review, and Clarke favored moving ahead similarly with a narrow counterterrorism agenda. But the President's senior advisers saw the al Qaeda problem as part of a puzzle that could not be assembled without filling in the pieces for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Rice deferred a Principals Committee meeting on al Qaeda until the deputies had developed a new policy for their consideration. 

Question: "What was the name of the terrorist group President Bush and his administration concentrated on developing a strategy to defeat?"

Response: "Taliban"
OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

A:
no