Input: Mr. Neville ( ( ( Anthony Higgins , a young and arrogant artist and something of a Byronic hero , is contracted to produce a series of 12 landscape drawings of an estate by Mrs. Virginia Herbert for her absent and estranged husband .  Part of the contract is that Mrs. Herbert agrees `` to meet Mr. Neville in private and to comply with his requests concerning his pleasure with me . ''  Several sexual encounters between them follow , each of them acted in such a way as to emphasise reluctance or distress on the part of Mrs Herbert and sexual aggression or insensitivity on the part of Mr Neville .  Meanwhile , whilst living on the estate , Mr. Neville gains quite a reputation with its dwellers , especially with Mrs. Herbert's son-in-law , Mr. Talmann .  Mrs. Herbert , wearied of meeting Mr. Neville for his pleasure , tries to terminate the contract before all of the drawings are completed and orders Mr. Neville to stop .  But he refuses to void the contract and continues as before .  Then Mrs. Herbert's married , but as yet childless , daughter , Mrs. Talmann , who has apparently become attracted to Mr. Neville , seems to blackmail him into making a second contract in Which he agrees to comply with what is described as her pleasure , rather than his a reversal of the position in regard to her mother .  A number of curious objects appear in Neville's drawings , Which point ultimately to the murder of Mr. Herbert , whose body is discovered in the moat of the house .  Mr. Neville completes his twelve drawings and leaves the house . 
"What was Mr. Herbert contracted to do and did he finish his work?" is "Produce a series of 12 landscape drawings of an estate by Mrs. Virginia Herbert for her absent and estranged husband"?

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Output: yes
Input: Clarifying the Record The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols. It was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction. As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had nine minutes' notice on the first hijacked plane, no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth. We do not believe that the true picture of that morning reflects discredit on the operational personnel at NEADS or FAA facilities. NEADS commanders and officers actively sought out information, and made the best judgments they could on the basis of what they knew. Individual FAA controllers, facility managers, and Command Center managers thought outside the box in recommending a nationwide alert, in ground-stopping local traffic, and, ultimately, in deciding to land all aircraft and executing that unprecedented order flawlessly. More than the actual events, inaccurate government accounts of those events made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of the hijackings, raising questions about the adequacy of the response. Those accounts had the effect of deflecting questions about the military's capacity to obtain timely and accurate information from its own sources. In addition, they overstated the FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information that morning. In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA. This statement was incorrect. There was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time. In this same public testimony, NORAD officials stated that at 9:24, NEADS received notification of the hijacking of American 77. This statement was also incorrect. The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington, D.C. In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77,178 United 93, or both. These statements were incorrect as well. The fighters were scrambled because of the report that American 11 was heading south, as is clear not just from taped conversations at NEADS but also from taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records. 
"Who needed to clarify the record of the U.S. defense of 9/11?" is "NEADS"?

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Output: no
Input: The Principals Committee had its first meeting on al Qaeda on September 4. On the day of the meeting, Clarke sent Rice an impassioned personal note. He criticized U.S. counterterrorism efforts past and present. The "real question" before the principals, he wrote, was "are we serious about dealing with the al Qida threat? Is al Qida a big deal? Decision makers should imagine themselves on a future day when the CSG has not succeeded in stopping al Qida attacks and hundreds of Americans lay dead in several countries, including the US," Clarke wrote. "What would those decision makers wish that they had done earlier? That future day could happen at any time." Clarke then turned to the Cole." The fact that the USS Cole was attacked during the last Administration does not absolve us of responding for the attack," he wrote. "Many in al Qida and the Taliban may have drawn the wrong lesson from the Cole: that they can kill Americans without there being a US response, without there being a price." 
"When Clarke sent Rice the note, who was having a meeting?" is "The Captain of the USS Cole"?

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Output:
no