Responding to a wave of public dismay over the first designs for rebuilding Lower Manhattan, Gov. George Pataki has sent word that it's time to go back to the drawing board. It is the right message, sent while it is still early enough to do something constructive about the disappointing quality of the work so far. The governor, like Mayor Michael Bloomberg, now seems committed to creating a better mix of uses for ground zero, and a 24-hour community in Manhattan's downtown. While rethinking the plans will delay the original rebuilding schedule slightly, it does not need to stall progress if the governor keeps the pressure on the Lower Manhattan Development Corp. and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. New York cannot afford to have a gaping hole that mocks the city and its process for rebuilding what was destroyed. Pataki openly questioned the Port Authority's requirement that any plan for the site replace all the office, hotel and retail square footage lost in the attack on Sept. 11. More than anything else, that specification limited the designs to the undistinguished options presented two weeks ago. Renegotiating that issue with the World Trade Center leaseholders should begin immediately. Opening the process to other designers, both here and internationally, will help separate this urban plan from the ordinary. The city also needs to begin openly discussing what happens underground, in particular with the transportation network. At this point, planners have focused on short-term repair of PATH and subway lines, with medium-range proposals being shopped in Washington that could untangle the disorganized web of subway lines downtown. Within the next few weeks the Lower Manhattan Development Corp. and the Port Authority should offer some bigger ideas about how to connect the downtown area better to the rest of the region. Lowering West Street alongside the World Trade Center site and building a park or esplanade on top is another option that has been popular with those reviewing the first six public proposals. But it would be expensive, and the governor, the mayor and their friends in Washington will have to look at long-range ways to pay the bill. Pataki's recent remarks are a sign that he understands how central the rebuilding of Lower Manhattan will be to his own political legacy. Now he needs to follow through with action, to keep demonstrating that his core concern is coming up with the best possible plan, not simply keeping the issue on hold until after this fall's election. 
What question would one ask from this paragraph?

QUESTION: What was the gaping hole that mocked the city from?

After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of  Bin Laden's finances. A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that  Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering. 
What question would one ask from this paragraph?

QUESTION: What different possible funding sources for  Bin Laden were considered?

The Glory of Melaka: In the early days, if you were not a pirate or a mosquito, Melaka was not much of a place to live. The land was infertile, just a swampy plain, the river small and sluggish. But it had a sheltered harbor, protected from the monsoons by neighboring Sumatra. Later, the strategic location and deep-water channel close to the coast brought in the bigger vessels of the trade-wind traffic crossing the Indian Ocean. The first to realize the larger commercial potential, as so often throughout the country's subsequent history, were the Chinese. In 1409, under a new directive from Emperor Chu Ti to pursue trade in the South Seas and the Indian Ocean, a Chinese fleet of 50 ships headed by Admiral Cheng Ho called in at Melaka. They made Parameswara an offer he could not refuse: port facilities and an annual financial tribute in exchange for Chinese protection against the marauding Thais. In 1411, Parameswara took the money to Beijing himself, and the emperor gratefully made him a vassal king. Twenty years later, the Chinese withdrew again from the South Seas trade. The new ruler of Melaka, Sri Maharajah, switched his allegiance to the Muslim trading fraternity by marrying into the Muslim faith, wedding the daughter of a sultan in Sumatra. Islam won its place in Malaya not by conquest — as had been the case in North Africa and Europe — but by trade, dynastic alliances, and peaceful preaching. Bengali peddlers had already brought the faith to the east coast. In Melaka and throughout the peninsula, Islam thrived as a strong, male-dominated religion of individuality, offering dynamic leadership and preaching brotherhood and self-reliance — all qualities ideally suited to the coastal trade. At the same time, Sufi mystics synthesized Islamic teaching with local Malay traditions of animistic magic and charisma, though Islam did not become the state religion until Muzaffar Shah became sultan of Melaka (1446–1459). But the key figure in the sultanate was Tun Perak, bendahara (prime minister) and military commander. He expanded Melaka's power along the west coast and down to Singapore and the neighboring Bintan islands. He also had orang laut pirates patrolling the seas to extort tribute from passing ships. After Ailied district chiefs had repelled assaults from Thai-controlled armies from Pahang, Tun Perak personally led a famous victory over a Thai fleet off Batu Pahat in 1456. 
What question would one ask from this paragraph?

QUESTION:
Why did Parameswara take money to Beijing in 1411?