In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: did not arise out of her employment, given that she was no longer employed at Riverside when she was injured. Respondents counter that, for purposes of the NIIA, the employment relationship continues for a reasonable amount of time after an employee quits or is fired, so that Fanders was still considered an employee when she was injured, and thus, the NILA applied and was Fanders’ sole remedy. The NIIA only covers injuries that arise out of and in the course of the injured claimant’s employment. NRS 616C. 150(1). An in jury occurs within the course of employment when there is a causal connection between the injury and the nature of the work or the workplace. Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment (B) holding employees under age discrimination in employment acts adea parallel retaliation provision includes former employees as long as the alleged discrimination is related to or arises out of the employment relationship (C) holding that it is the claimants burden to show that the injury was the result of an accident that not only arose in the course of the employment but that it also grew out of or resulted from the employment (D) holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment (E) holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill  was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: policy becomes a composite of factors that bear on a better answer to the question, ‘How shall the losses be distributed?’ ”). Slain and Kripke argued that “[t]he situation with which we are concerned involves two risks: (1) the risk of business insolvency from whatever cause; and (2) the risk of illegality in securities issuance.” Slain & Kripke, supra, at 286. Analyzing the first risk — that of business insolvency-Slain and Kripke observed that the absolute priority rule allocates this risk to shareholders. Under the absolute priority rule, “stockholders seeking to recover their investments cannot be paid before provable creditor claims have been satisfied in full.” Id. at 261; see generally Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 520-21, 61 S.Ct. 675, 85 L.Ed. 982 (1941) (<HOLDING>); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims raised in later litigation were barred because they could have been fully litigated in chapter 11 reorganization process (B) holding that stockholders cannot participate in a plan of reorganization unless creditors claims have been satisfied in full (C) holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions (D) holding that remedies provided in the bankruptcy code for enforcing a chapter 11 plan of reorganization are not exclusive (E) holding that debtor whose plan of reorganization had been confirmed by bankruptcy court could not later bring lender liability claims against creditors where those claims could have been raised in bankruptcy proceeding
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: 7 . 502 U.S. 478, 482-83, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). 8 . See Jukic v. INS, 40 F.3d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Jukic has failed to demonstrate that he will be persecuted by either people based on his political opinion or social group, ‘rather than because of his refusal to fight with them.' ”). 9 . See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483, 112 S.Ct. 812. Petitioners must provide "some evidence of ... [motive], direct or circumstantial.” Id. 10 . See also Chun v. INS, 40 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1994) (Under the substantial evidence standard, "the alien must show that the evidence was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could conclude against it”). 11 . Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483, 112 S.Ct. 812. 12 . Id. at 480, 112 S.Ct. 812. 13 . See id. at 483, 112 S.Ct. 812 (<HOLDING>). 14 . Petitioners argued in their appeal to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence which suggests but does not prove a discriminatory motive is circumstantial evidence by definition (B) holding that since the statute makes motive critical a petitioner must provide some evidence of it direct or circumstantial (C) holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent (D) holding circumstantial evidence has equivalent standing to direct evidence in criminal prosecution (E) holding that the applicant must provide some evidence direct or circumstantial that the persecutor was or would be motivated to persecute him because of a protected ground
[EX A]:
(B)

