In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: or creating documents with mistakes on them and signing my name to them to make me appear as if I had been inaccurate .... ” Paragraph 25: The sentence “I confidentially complained about this behavior to Bruce Smith, who, instead of taking action to prevent Burchfield from continuing her pattern of behavior toward me, apparently told Burchfield to counsel me.” Paragraph 32: The sentence “I believe that this move was the beginning point of a concerted effort to remove me from the workplace based on my age.” Paragraph 36: The sentence “I believe that Albertson’s did not provide all of the time sheets from all vendors of temporary help.” Paragraph 37: The sentence “I believe that my combination of formal college education and experience, even though I did not obtain a co h Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). With respect to paragraphs 22, 28, 34, 39, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a single conversation to be sufficient evidence of dissolution to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that mere conclusion of affiant without some supporting facts are insufficient to raise fact issue necessary to preclude summary judgment (C) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal (D) recognizing that the plaintiffs mere assertions that the defendant had a discriminatory intent were inadequate without substantial factual evidence to raise an issue to preclude summary judgment (E) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party
[A]: (D)


[Q]: case because in Revenue Cabinet, as here, the sales tax statute did not impose a test for passage of title, and an administrative rule did impose a test for passage of title. Id. at 738-39. Here, Hales makes no claim that the impermanence of its materials results in a generally understood, implicit agreement to pass title at some point before delivery. Moreover, our statute requires an explicit agreement on passage of title before the statutory presumption can be rebutted; there is no obvious provision in this statute for an implicit understanding, which the Kentucky court thought sufficient. Consequently, the facts of Revenue Cabinet aré inapposite and its result is inapplicable to the case at bar. See also Kurtz Concrete, Inc. v. Spradling, 560 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo.1978) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the Commission applied the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that title insurer not in business of supplying information in issuing either title commitment or policy of title insurance for purposes of exception to moorman prohi bition against recovery of economic losses in tort further holding that contract defines title insurers liability (B) holding that title passes on mixture of readymix concrete because of usage of trade (C) recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim (D) holding in a slander of title action that attorneys fees are recoverable as part of the costs of removing the cloud from the title (E) holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title
[A]: (B)


[Q]: be brought by means of a motion for post-conviction relief. In doing so, the state acknowledges the court departed from the essential requirements of law and requests we reverse the portion of the appealed order which dismissed the mandamus petition. Massey has exhausted his administrative remedies with the DOC. He correctly sought mandamus relief in the circuit court. See Taylor v. State, 780 So.2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(affirming trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief motion filed to challenge DOC’s reduction of his gain time because it had to first be entertained in the DOC; if defendant was not satisfied with the DOC’s ruling, then he could file a petition for writ of mandamus with the appropriate circuit court); see also Bedford v. State, 775 So.2d 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(<HOLDING>). We, therefore, quash the order and remand for 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that this court may issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to compel the doc to comply with a district court order directing the doc to grant a prisoner credit for time spent in presentence confinement (B) holding that a mandamus petition rather than motion for postconviction relief was appropriate remedy to have doc honor amount of jail credit awarded in each of defendants sentences (C) holding that circuit court should have treated the habeas petition as a motion for postconviction relief (D) holding that a claim is proeedurally barred where it was not raised in the defendants motion for postconviction relief (E) holding statute of limitations for filing petition for postconviction relief not tolled by general savings statute tolling limited to reasons enumerated in state postconviction relief act
[A]:
(B)


