In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: erred in denying without a hearing his claim that trial counsel were ineffective because they “were under a conflict of interest in this case because counsels’ interest in spending the minimum amount of time on a case for which they were receiving no money conflicted with [Movant’s] desire that his case be fully litigated and investigated.... ” The State counters that the trial court did not clearly err in denying this claim because Movant failed to plead facts not refuted by the record demonstrating an actual conflict. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest, a movant must show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected counsel’s performance. Conger v. State, 356 S.W.3d 217, 221 (Mo.App.E.D. 2011) (quotation omitted) (<HOLDING>). “In order to prove a conflict of interest, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel on the strength of gonzalezs sworn responses at the pleataking that no one was threatening him or forcing him to plead where the defendant alleged that his attorney forced him to plead guilty  and threatened him if he did not take the plea (B) holding that defendant failed to plead sufficient facts and instructing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff from the case (C) holding that right to appeal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel alleging that counsel failed to convey plea negotiations timely and adequately inform of consequences of pleading guilty to jury for sentencing waived because plea of guilty to jury was independent of and not supported by alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claims (D) holding no coercion where counsel told movant his conviction was likely because movant stated he understood full range of punishment and no one threatened him to plead guilty (E) holding that the movant failed to establish that plea counsel coerced him to plead guilty to avoid taking the case to trial
[A]: (E)


[Q]: See Lorber 675 F.2d at 1067. The court noted that the classification of the surcharge as a non-tax fee was “a close question,” but concluded that because the surcharge was triggered by “voluntary” choice, the surcharge was possessed more of the character of a service fee than that of a tax. See id. The Lorber court also held that extending priority status to the surcharge was contrary to the trend of then-recent amendments to § 64 of the old Bankruptcy Act, which tended toward the erosion of the preferred status of taxes. See id., 675 F.2d at 1067-68. The court explained that, following the grant by Congress of priority status to claims for taxes, the federal government and its state and local counterparts began to increase the types and levels of taxation. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. (<HOLDING>). Even courts in the Ninth Circuit, purporting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber (B) holding that ohios reimbursement claims met the lorber criteria but were not excise taxes because they were not universally applicable to similarly situated entities and in addition disadvantaged private creditors with like claims (C) holding west virginias reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber suburban ii and the chateaugay district court decision (D) holding reimbursement claims were excise taxes under the lorber test without addressing the bankruptcy codes central policy of equal distribution (E) holding that michigan reimbursement claims were excise taxes under both lorber and suburban ii
[A]: (E)


[Q]: parties, Herman v. Herman, 335 Ark. 36, 977 S.W.2d 209 (1998), and the burden of showing a change in circumstances is always upon the party seeking the change in the amount of alimony. (Emphasis added.) Weeks v. Wilson, 95 Ark. App. 88, 234 S,W.3d 333 (2006) (citing Hass v. Hass, 80 Ark. App. 408, 97 S.W.3d 424 (2003)). The majority opinion specifically states that, “There is no evidence in the record to suggest that appellee needed alimony then or that she needs alimony now.” (Emphasis added.) Apparently, the majority is attempting to go behind the order to determine whether or not the trial court erred in its first award of alimony. There is no authority for that proposition, and the premise is untenable. See Taylor, supra (citing Lively v. Lively, 222 Ark. 501, 261 S.W.2d 409 (1953) (<HOLDING>)). This last distinct flaw, the shifting of the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statutory grounds for vacatur and modification of arbitration awards may not be supplemented by contract (B) holding that the statement of specific grounds in a motion for a new trial waives all other grounds not specified (C) holding that prison term following revocation of probation is a modification and part of the actual sentence imposed for the original offense (D) holding that the liberality of the original allowance cannot afford grounds for modification (E) holding that notice must state the specific grounds for the departure
[A]:
(D)


