In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Petitioner Jaswinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we grant the petition for review. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s order without discussion, thus we review the substance of the immigration judge’s order. Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845 (9th Cir.2003). The IJ erred when she found Singh’s testimony inconsistent and implausible, and therefore the record compels finding Singh’s testimony, credible. Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). First, the IJ erred when she found that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an adverse credibility determination is overturned only if each proffered reason for the determination fails (B) holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination (C) holding that an adverse credibility determination must be supported by a true inconsistency (D) holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum (E) holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
See Lorber 675 F.2d at 1067. The court noted that the classification of the surcharge as a non-tax fee was “a close question,” but concluded that because the surcharge was triggered by “voluntary” choice, the surcharge was possessed more of the character of a service fee than that of a tax. See id. The Lorber court also held that extending priority status to the surcharge was contrary to the trend of then-recent amendments to § 64 of the old Bankruptcy Act, which tended toward the erosion of the preferred status of taxes. See id., 675 F.2d at 1067-68. The court explained that, following the grant by Congress of priority status to claims for taxes, the federal government and its state and local counterparts began to increase the types and levels of taxation. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. (<HOLDING>). Even courts in the Ninth Circuit, purporting 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber (B) holding that ohios reimbursement claims met the lorber criteria but were not excise taxes because they were not universally applicable to similarly situated entities and in addition disadvantaged private creditors with like claims (C) holding west virginias reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber suburban ii and the chateaugay district court decision (D) holding reimbursement claims were excise taxes under the lorber test without addressing the bankruptcy codes central policy of equal distribution (E) holding that michigan reimbursement claims were excise taxes under both lorber and suburban ii

Ex Output:
(E)


Ex Input:
judgment, a party must obtain leave of the court to amend a pleading. Tex.R. Civ. P. 63; Austin v. Countrywide Homes Loans, 261 S.W.3d 68, 75 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (“Once the hearing date for a motion for summary judgment has passed, the mov-ant must secure a written order granting leave in order to file an amended pleading.”). A pleading filed after the summary judgment hearing without leave of court cannot be considered by the trial court. See Taylor v. Sunbelt Mgmt., Inc., 905 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) (stating “we cannot consider appellants’ pleadings which were admittedly filed after the motion for summary judgment hearing”); W. Tex. Gas, Inc. v. 297 Gas Co., 864 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Because an amendment that is not timely and 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even where postconviction petitioner reserved the option to file an amended petition in his opening petition simply filing an amended petition is insufficient to request leave to file an amended petition a motion for leave to file an amended petition was required before it was necessary for the district judge to consider the amended petition (B) holding trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on motion for reinstatement when appellants failed to call to the trial courts attention the need for a hearing (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding trial court did not err in failing to define manufacture (E) holding trial court did not err by failing to consider amended petition filed after hearing without leave of court

Ex Output:

(E)


