TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. However, courts faced with this issue have refused to apply this provision to government employees testifying in criminal trials based on the rationale that no individual can bind the sovereign. See United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1246 (7th Cir.1979) ("Because the agents of the Government are supposedly disinterested in the outcome of a trial and are traditionally unable to bind the sovereign, their statements seem less the product of the adversary process and hence less appropriately described as admissions of a party.” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954, 100 S.Ct. 2923, 64 L.Ed.2d 812 (1980); United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Durrani, 659 F.Supp. 1183 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible (B) holding inconsistent out of court statements otherwise admissible not admissible against government in criminal prosecution (C) holding in a criminal case that a statement by an unavailable declarant was not admissible as a declaration against his penal interest and was not admissible under rule 804b5 either (D) holding statements by coconspirator nontestimonial and thus admissible (E) holding alford plea admissible in burglary prosecution

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: background nor his current offense can support the conclusion that he is a worst offender. The maximum sentence was therefore not justified. In deciding to impose the maximum sentence, Judge Michalski relied primarily on his conclusion that Skrepich was incapable of rehabilitation and could not personally be deterred. The judge thus gave primary emphasis to the need to protect the public by isolating Skrepich from the community. While the judge also indicated that a lengthy sentence would serve the sentencing goals of general deterrence and community condemnation, it seems clear that these goals could not, in themselves, support the imposition of a maximum, ten-year term for a first offender convicted of a class B felony. See Pears v. State, 698 P.2d 1198, 1204-05 (Alaska 1985) (<HOLDING>). The appropriateness of the maximum term 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts failure to explain the effect of supervised release was harmless where the maximum term of incarceration under the actual sentence of imprisonment and supervised release less than six years as well as his worstcase scenario less than nine years was less than the maximum term of incarceration twenty years al lowed by law (B) holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony (C) holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder (D) holding that a term of substantially less than twenty years would serve the objectives of general deterrence and community condemnation in the case of a first offender convicted of seconddegree murder an unclassified felony (E) holding that twenty years was not excessive for second felony offender convicted of simple burglary

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: not apply, and Holland was required to object in order to preserve the double-jeopardy issue. 2 . Holland has also argued, in vain, that his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim should fall within a Wicks exception. We have rejected a similar argument before. See Rackley v. State, 371 Ark. 438, 441, 267 S.W.3d 578, 581 (2007) ("Our research has not revealed a single case where this court has considered an ineffective-assistance, conflict-of-interest argument on direct appeal in the absence of a proper objection in the trial court.”). And as far as we can tell, there is nothing that will prevent Holland from raising this issue, and developing a much more complete record, during Rule 37 proceedings. 3 . See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 739, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire (B) holding that though judge did not question juror individually note from juror to judge requesting private meeting to ask legal question did not suggest juror would not base verdict on evidence (C) holding that it was permissible to ask whether a juror would consider death sentence if juror determined aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances (D) holding that a court must allow the defendant to ask in voir dire whether a potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty and suggesting that such a juror should be disqualified for cause (E) holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated

SOLUTION:
(D)

