In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: background nor his current offense can support the conclusion that he is a worst offender. The maximum sentence was therefore not justified. In deciding to impose the maximum sentence, Judge Michalski relied primarily on his conclusion that Skrepich was incapable of rehabilitation and could not personally be deterred. The judge thus gave primary emphasis to the need to protect the public by isolating Skrepich from the community. While the judge also indicated that a lengthy sentence would serve the sentencing goals of general deterrence and community condemnation, it seems clear that these goals could not, in themselves, support the imposition of a maximum, ten-year term for a first offender convicted of a class B felony. See Pears v. State, 698 P.2d 1198, 1204-05 (Alaska 1985) (<HOLDING>). The appropriateness of the maximum term 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts failure to explain the effect of supervised release was harmless where the maximum term of incarceration under the actual sentence of imprisonment and supervised release less than six years as well as his worstcase scenario less than nine years was less than the maximum term of incarceration twenty years al lowed by law (B) holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony (C) holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder (D) holding that a term of substantially less than twenty years would serve the objectives of general deterrence and community condemnation in the case of a first offender convicted of seconddegree murder an unclassified felony (E) holding that twenty years was not excessive for second felony offender convicted of simple burglary
[A]: (D)


[Q]: That decision will not be disturbed on appeal even in cases in which the record does not reflect that the issue was ever considered by the parties or the trial court. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 671. As appellee points out, Wilson was a case in which the defendant appealed after the trial court denied his motion to suppress, and did not involve a State’s appeal. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (noting at the time Wilson was decided that the State did not have the right to appeal the granting of a motion to suppress); Flores, 871 S.W.2d at 720. Although distinguishable in this respect, the reasoning of Wilson is still applicable to the instant case and the observations made in Wilson remain true regardless of which party originally initiates the appellate process. Cf. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (<HOLDING>); State v. Brady, 763 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex.App. — 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing though not relying upon the line of cases which hold the government may raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal regardless of whether the motion to suppress was granted or denied (B) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal (C) holding that standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised for the first time on appeal (D) holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal (E) holding defendants argument the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress was reviewable as a constitutional issue even though defendant failed to raise the issue in a written posttrial motion
[A]: (A)


[Q]: omitted). Accordingly we concluded that because misdemeanor battery could be violated through the “least touching,” the statute did not require the use of violent force and thus was not a crime of violence under the federal generic statute. Id. Ortegar-Mendez, however, is readily distinguishable because a conviction under § 273.5(a) requires more than a simple battery. Unlike § 242, which criminalizes the use of “force or violence,” § 273.5(a) contains no differentiating provision. California Penal Code § 273.5(a) requires that the defendant “willfully inflict ... corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition.” (emphasis added). The commonsense reading of this language is that § 273.5(a) requires the use of violence. See United States v. Jimenez, 258 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Unlike simple battery, which requires 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that marital communications which arise from an act of violence by a spouse committed against the children of either spouse should constitute an exception to the marital privilege because such communications fail to satisfy the conditions underlying the creation of the privilege (B) holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor (C) holding that absent an actionable injury to one spouse the other spouse cannot recover for loss of consortium (D) holding that a defendant could not reasonably  dispute that inflicting corporal injury on his spouse involved the use of violence (E) holding that knowledge of prohibited activities is not necessarily the same as fraudulent intent and that the code does not allow attribution of intent from spouse to spouse
[A]:
(D)


