In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: resource. Power that is not exercised is not management or control even though in a legal sense the resource may belong in part or appertain to that party. While the Government is correct in their argument that there is not a double recovery until the total value of the damaged or injured resource has been recovered, a given trustee cannot recover more than what its stewardship is determined to be. To allow otherwise would create the undesirable situation of a race to the courthouse between co-trustees with the first in time being the first in right. Moreover, once a state, federal or other public trustee recovers such damages, res judicata would prevent a second trustee from recovering the same public losses. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, settlement would be discouraged by 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims to the vsf benefits under various theories were barred by the res judicata effect of the state court judgment in castellano iii (B) holding that the plaintiffs earlier claims of infringement by possession and its later claims of infringement by use of its source code arose from the same nucleus of operative facts and therefore the later claims were barred by res judicata (C) holding that a trustees claim was barred by res judicata and stating that the trustee could have asked the bankruptcy court to reserve his fraud claims for later adjudication which would have avoided his claims being barred (D) holding that the plaintiffs claims were barred by res judicata when the federal courts judgment was finalized by denial of his petition for certiorari (E) holding that the united states and the state of alaska as public trustees under the cwa and cercla could recover all lost use damages caused by the spill and that private claims for lost recreational use were barred under res judicata

A: (E)
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Q: removal of the access can result in a taking under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution, if the state’s use is for a purpose other than a road purpose. But, in Judge Armstrong’s view, any modification of a road for road purposes that denies a landowner’s access does not give rise to a compensable taking. In so concluding, Judge Armstrong discounts as “dictum” the Supreme Court rationale in Burk that an abutter’s right of access to a conventional Highway “can be divested only by condemnation of the easement appurtenant to the abutting property.” 200 Or at 231. Judge Armstrong explains that the court’s conclusion in Burk cannot be reconciled with the court’s analysis in more recent cases in the context of regulations that affect road access. See, e.g., Schrunk, 242 Or at 73 (<HOLDING>). If, Judge Armstrong’s concurrence reasons, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inverse condemnation claim challenging as a regulatory taking the states placement of a guard rail that blocked former access was not ripe for adjudication where owners had failed to apply for permit for alternative approach and it therefore was not possible to assess whether a taking had occurred as a result of a deprivation of all reasonable access (B) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking (C) holding ripe a claim for a pre1987 taking because prior to first english california law did not permit landowners to seek compensation for a regulatory taking through an action in inverse condemnation (D) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (E) holding that regulatory restrictions on abutting landowners right of ingress and egress are not compensable when landowner has adequate alternative means to access property

A: (B)
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Q: Dr. Brewer’s reports addressed the conduct of OGA’s employees, Drs. Jacobs and Gunn, the reports identified Dr. Gunn as OGA’s employee, and McCoy’s original petition alleged that OGA was vicariously liable for the conduct of Jacobs and Gunn under the doctrine of respondeat superior and the requirements of the Texas Professional Association Act. See Troeger v. Myklebust, 274 S.W.3d 104, 110 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (rejecting claim that conduct of dentist, who was sole defendant, was not implicated because her name was omitted from expert report and holding that dentist waived challenges to expert report by failing to raise objections within twenty-one days after service); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Dale, 188 S.W.3d 877, 879 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet) (<HOLDING>). In response, OGA disputes that its conduct 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that medical center was not required to be named in expert report addressing its residents conduct because plaintiffs alleged no directliability claims against it and noting that medical center was implicated in report and so waived all its objections when it failed to object to sufficiency of report within twentyone days after service (B) holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report (C) holding expert report requirement fulfilled in claim against nurse by providing expert report of nurse as to standard of care and expert report of medical doctor as to causation (D) holding that expert report addressing hospitals conduct was not required when plaintiffs sole theory against hospital was vicarious liability based on ostensible agency and explaining that the conduct by the hospital on which the agency relationship depends is not measured by a medical standard of care these are principles of agency law on which no expert report is required (E) holding that a complaint that a report was not timely served was not subject to the twentyone day deadline to object to the sufficiency of a report under former section 74351a

A:
(A)
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