In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
the sophisticated user defense, a supplier has no duty to warn the ultimate user if it has reason to believe that the user will realize its dangerous condition. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 276 (Minn.2004); see also Ritchie v. Glidden, 242 F.3d 713, 724 (7th Cir.2001) (stating, under Indiana law, that the sophisticated purchaser defense to a failure-to-warn claim brought under negligence or strict liability theories provides that product suppliers do not have a duty to warn employees or customers of knowledgeable industrial purchasers as to product-related hazards). In addition to limiting a supplier’s duty, the “sophisticated user” concept also affects the element of proximate cause. Crook v. Kaneb Pipe Line Operating P’ship, L.P., 231 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Strong, 667 F.2d at 688 (“Even if [the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury (B) holding in a negligence action that the air traffic controllers failure to warn of an impending danger cannot be the proximate cause of an injury after the pilot himself discovered its presence appreciated the danger and decided to fly ahead into it (C) holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible (D) holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury (E) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury

Ex Output:
(D)


Ex Input:
strengthen, not displace, any existing remedies employees may. have at law.” Id. It is clear from these excerpts that the STAA was not enacted to completely preempt state law remedies for retaliation against an employee who refuses to violate safety provisions. See Todd v. Frank’s Tong Service, Inc., 784 P.2d 47, 49-50 (Okla.1989) (noting that Congressional intent surrounding enactment of the STAA demonstrates that state law claims are not preempted); see also Parten v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 923 F.2d 580, 583 (8th Cir.1991) (conclude ing that the Minnesota public policy statute was not an obstacle to the STAA and that Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field of interstate motor carriers); Whitworth v. TNT Bestway Transp., Inc., 914 F.Supp. 1434, 1436 (E.D.Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>); Dobberowsky v. Cryogenic Transp., Inc., 989 
 Holding statements: (A) holding texas exemption law was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause (B) holding that texas whistleblowers act was not preempted by the staa (C) holding a claim of a violation of the texas dtpa is preempted by the carmack amendment (D) holding that the age discrimination in employment act was not preempted by the nlra (E) holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied

Ex Output:
(B)


Ex Input:
Inc., No. 08 Civ. 5653(PAC), 2011 WL 3874821 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2011) ("NJ v. DLJ"); NJ Carpenters, 272 F.R.D. 160 (finding Rule 23(a) requirements were met, but not Rule 23(b)(3) requirements). 59 . DI 294, at 30-33. 60 . Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., 714 F.Supp.2d 475, 484 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (stating Section 12(a)(2) standing is limited to “persons who have directly purchased the securities from underwriting defendants in the subject public offering(s), and not in the secondary market”); In re Sterling Foster & Co., Inc., Sec. Litig., 222 F.Supp.2d 216, 244 (E.D.N.Y.2002) ("[P]urchasers in private or secondary market offerings are precluded from bringing actions under Section 12(a)(2).”). 61 . DI 294, at 30; DI 300, at 17. 62 . See IndyMac I, 718 F.Supp.2d at 513 (<HOLDING>). 63 . This of course means that it does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a party waived the claims she failed to pursue in her merit brief (B) holding that because  544b1 provides only the power of avoidance it does not confer authority on the trustee to pursue state law damage claims but that the trustee could pursue such claims under  544a1 or 2 if the claims could have been asserted by the debtor corporation (C) holding pinter analysis to apply to claims arising under  12a2 (D) holding that a trustee had no standing to pursue claims of fraud against the debtors accountant because under connecticut law those claims belonged to investors (E) holding wyoming only had standing to pursue section 12a2 claims as to indx 2006ar11

Ex Output:

(E)


