In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: v. Eggleston, 202 Ariz. 523, 527, ¶ 16, 47 P.3d 1161, 1165 (App.2002). Second, a statute should be construed in conjunction with other statutes that relate to the same subject or purpose, giving effect to all statutes involved. Id. Third, in furtherance of such harmonization, courts should review the history of the various sections in order to ascertain the intent of the legislature and thereby construe the statutes to further that intent. State v. Thomason, 162 Ariz. 363, 366, 783 P.2d 809, 812 (App.1989). After reviewing the history of the relevant statutory scheme, we conclude that the legislature never intended that the acquisition of land for park purposes be subject to the public auction requirement. See State v. Cornish, 192 Ariz. 533, 537, ¶ 16, 968 P.2d 606, 610 (App.1998) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 12 As part of its comprehensive statutory 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that courts should look to other sources of legislative intent if the statutory language does not convey a clear meaning (B) holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law (C) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (D) holding courts should apply statutory constructions that make practical sense and do not frustrate legislative intent (E) holding that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text superfluous

A: (D)
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Q: March 23, 2005, the court held a hearing and, by order bearing the same date, denied the motion, based on the Board’s untimeliness. Discussion Appellant, asserting the interests of the Director and the Animal Services Division, the latter a party to the administrative proceeding and a part of County government, contends the circuit court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for reconsideration without applying the usual standard of review applicable to decisions of administrative agencies. Appellee has not filed a brief on appeal. The standard for judicial review of administrative decisions is well settled. As summarized by the Court of Appeals in Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 729 A.2d 376 (1999). A court’s role i 5, 406, 880 A.2d 1118 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Dep’t of Labor v. Boardley, 164 Md. App. 404, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in reviewing a gaming commission decision the court will examine the record to determine if there is any evidence to support the commissions order (B) holding that a reviewing courts task is to determine whether there was substantial evidence before the administrative agency on the record as a whole to support the agencys conclusions (C) holding that a courts role in reviewing an administrative agency decision is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agencys findings and conclusions and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law (D) holding that under the substantial evidence standard the reviewing court must decide whether on this record it would have been possible for a reasonable jury to reach the agencys conclusion (E) holding the courts scope of review is  limited to determining whether the commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the commissioners findings of fact 

A: (B)
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Q: L.Ed.2d 554 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). The Associations claim that serving as an official proponent is protected by the Free Speech Clause, and thus that they have a right to associate for the purpose of serving as official proponents. Thus, if serving as an official proponent is not an aspect of free speech, the condition imposed by the elector requirement does not violate the associational rights of the First Amendment. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446 (“To determine whether a group is protected by the First Amendment’s expressive associational right, we must determine whether the group engages in ‘expressive association.’”); City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 104 L.Ed.2d 18 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Because the Associations’ claim regarding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the first amendment does not protect a certain activity there can be no first amendment right of association to engage in that activity (B) holding that the first amendment does not protect true threats against the president (C) recognizing first amendment retaliation right (D) holding first amendment does not protect nonexpressive conduct (E) holding that there is no first amendment right of access to presentence reports

A:
(A)
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