In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir.1978); Novelty Textile Mills v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 n. 3 (2d Cir.1977). 7 .The rationale for this rule, as Judge Aldrich stated, is that "to permit copyrighting [in that case] would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms [of expression], could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance ... [and thus] the subject matter would be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its expression. We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated.” Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.1967). 8 . As an example of where dissection was improperly used, see Apple Barrel Productions Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 387-88 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). 9 .For example, the court may find that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that consideration supports the agreement as a whole (B) holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm (C) holding district court erroneously failed to consider copyrighted show as a whole (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole

Output: (C)


Input: Consider Input: policy, (DE 50, pg. 35), count 6 of the amended complaint is a claim for rescission of the life insurance policies based on “the brokers” fraudulent actions allegedly committed in violation of the brokerage agreements. (DE 50, pg. 33-34). This Court therefore RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT the Mo tion to Compel Arbitration as to Defendants Richardson and LBEG. See Provident Bank, 141 F.Supp.2d at 313-314 (granting motion to compel arbitration of claims including fraud, breach of fiduciary-duty, negligence, and rescission where arbitration clause provided that all disputes ‘arising out of the agreement were to be settled by arbitration, and because all the claims arose out of alleged breaches of duty imposed by the parties’ loan agreement); Sease, 697 F.Supp. at 1192-1193 (<HOLDING>) (citing Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 671 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that claims of breach of fiduciary duty negligence and fraud were subject to arbitration in light of broad arbitration clause which called for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of or relating to this agreement breach thereof or any aecounts   (B) holding that trial court properly denied motion to compel arbitration of claims for fraud and unfair and deceptive trade practices because arbitration clause in agreement only applied to indemnification claims and there were no other arbitration clauses in agreement (C) holding that a clause covering any controversy or claim  related directly or indirectly to this agreement was a broad arbitration clause (D) holding that a clause requiring arbitration of any controversy or claim that shall arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof was sufficiently broad to cover a 1934 securities act claim involving fraudulent misrepresentation (E) holding that the language of the arbitration clause   any controversy or claim arising out of     was broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs claim alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: financially secure couples from unnecessarily obtaining Medicaid assistance. Morris, 685 F.3d at 929 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 100-105, pt. 2, at 65 (1987), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 857); see also Lopes v. Dep’t of Soc. Seros., 696 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir.2012). Congress directed that a couple’s combined resources are counted in determining Medicaid eligibility for an institutionalized spouse, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(2)(A), but the income of the community spouse is not included, id. § 1396r-5(b)(l). See Morris, 685 F.3d at 930. Further, “a couple may convert joint resources—which may affect Medicaid eligibility — into income for the community spouse—which does not impact eligibility — by purchasing certain types of [income generating investments].” Id. at 928; see also Lopes, 696 F.3d at 188 (<HOLDING>); James v. Richman, 547 F.3d 214, 218-19 (3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a spouse was bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party because of her knowledge and acquiescence to the conveyance (B) recognizing the right of a former spouse to seek contribution for payment of community debts not allocated by the divorce decree (C) holding that absent an actionable injury to one spouse the other spouse cannot recover for loss of consortium (D) holding that the employer did not have a plan under erisa where no administrative scheme was required to pay the annuity benefit (E) holding nontransferable annuity for community spouse was not countable resource


Output: (E)


