In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech.” Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct.” See R.A.V., — U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 (C) holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 (E) holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: 238 (2) (367 SE2d 786) (1988). 41 Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 302 Ga. App. 726, 730 (2) (b) (691 SE2d 633) (2010) (punctuation omitted). 42 Id. at 731 (2) (b) (punctuation omitted). 43 Fla. Int’l Indem. Co. v. Osgood, 233 Ga. App. 111, 115 (3) (503 SE2d 371) (1998) (punctuation omitted). 44 Griffin, 302 Ga. App. at 731 (2) (b) (punctuation omitted). 45 See Roland v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 265 Ga. 776, 778(2) (462 SE2d 623) (1995) (affirming trial court’s directed verdict in favor of insured on coverage claim but, nonetheless, also affirming court’s directed verdict in favor of insurer on insured’s bad-faith claim in light of the fact that insured’s coverage, despite ultimately succeeding, was based on a doubtful question of law); Griffin, 302 Ga.App. at 731 (2) (b) (<HOLDING>); Assurance Co. of Am. v. BBB Serv. Co., Inc., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because insurers nonpayment was based on contention that insured did not have a covered loss under the policy because the value of the property was the same regardless of whether it was serviced by an easement nonpayment was reasonable and not subject to a badfaith claim (B) holding that regardless of the subjective belief of the insured the record established a basis to believe that the insured had committed an act that could give rise to a claim under the policy (C) holding that an insurers obligation to defend an insured was a property interest subject to prejudgment attachment (D) holding in a case involving a multiplevehicle policy that a new offer of uninsured motorist coverage was not required for the addition of a new vehicle which was comparable to the renewal or supplementation of an existing policy events that did not trigger the statutory requirement of a new offer the courts holding was based in part upon the principle that an insurance contract is personal to the insured because it insures the risk of loss to the insured and does not attach to specific vehicles (E) holding that the employer was not the insurers agent

Output: (A)


Input: Consider Input: v. Gray, 726 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CHOOSE COUNSEL The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to be represented by the retained counsel he prefers. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 158-60, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). An accused is, in fact, entitled to “counsel of his own selection, and as many as he may see proper to employ, to defend him.” Jackson v. State, 55 Tex.Crim. 79, 115 S.W. 262, 264 (1908). This right is not absolute, however, but can be overridden by important considerations relating to the integrity of the judicial process and the fair and orderly administration of justice. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 158-60, 108 S.Ct. at 1697; Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (<HOLDING>). However, the court must indulge a presumption 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the case should be reopened where the cause has not proceeded so far that the ends of justice would be defeated or the orderly process of the court disturbed (B) holding that the right to choose counsel cannot be manipulated so as to obstruct the orderly procedure in the courts or to interfere with the fair administration of justice (C) holding court may raise procedural default sua sponte if doing so will further the interests of judicial efficiency conservation of scarce judicial resources and orderly and prompt administration of justice (D) recognizing the courts inherent sua sponte powers in certain circumstances to allow it to manage its own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases in the furtherance of justice quotation marks omitted (E) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel


Output: (B)


