In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: removal purposes. Instead, for complete preemption to apply, the cause of action not only must be preempted by ERISA but also must fall within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). See Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209, 124 S.Ct. 2488 (“[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore preempted. The preemptive force of ERISA § 502(a) is still stronger.... Hence, causes of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) [are] removable to federal court.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 62-63, 67, 107 S.Ct. 1542 (<HOLDING>); Da-Ponte v. Manfredi Motors Inc., 157 Fed. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that action to recover erisa benefits under the subject plan are legal in nature and that plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to trial by jury on any claim raised under  1132a1b (B) holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself (C) holding that because an erisa plan is not a participant beneficiary or fiduciary subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under  502e of erisa over a suit brought by such a plan (D) holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court (E) holding that suit by a beneficiary to recover benefits from a covered plan  falls directly under  502a1b of erisa and therefore was necessarily federal in character and subject to removal to federal court

Output: (E)


Input: Consider Input: his personal belief that the officer was not lying. The prosecutor stated: “He came in here and told you the truth about what happened” and later reiterated, “This officer didn’t commit perjury. He came in here and told you the truth about what happened.” This was improper vouching by “placing the prestige of the government behind a witness through personal assurances of the witness’s veracity ...” United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). Contrary to the government’s assertion, the prosecutor need not invoke the name of the federal government in offering his personal belief — it is sufficient that the personal statement of belief came from the government’s attorney. See, e.g., Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 482 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Second, the prosecutor vouched for Officer 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment (B) holding that it was improper for prosecutor to state he did not lie to you he is a lot of things but he is not a liar (C) holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present (D) holding that the defendant could not appeal a jury instruction where he did not object to the challenged instruction but in fact requested it and stated he was satisfied with it (E) holding there was enough evidence to find the defendant abandoned his child when he claimed to have knowledge of cpss involvement he admitted that for periods of two years and six months he did not attempt any contact with his child and from the date he canceled a home study until the petition was filed he did not attempt to contact the child or cps or provide support even when he was out of jail

Output: (B)


Input: Consider Input: require a common scheme or plan. See Pollock, 117 N.M. at 191, 870 P.2d at 153. A common scheme or plan may imply use restrictions, and that common scheme or plan may place purchasers on inquiry notice when the land has a uniform appearance and the property demonstrates a general plan or common scheme of development. Id. at 192, 870 P.2d at 154; Walters, 107 N.M. at 416, 759 P.2d at 208. However, in Defendants’ case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants had actual, personal notice of the restrictions before they bought lot 224, and therefore the appearance of other lots in the subdivision was immaterial to the question of notice. When a party has actual notice, there is no legal need to imply notice from the existence of a common scheme or plan. io App.2d 45, 429 N.E.2d 1191, 1195 (1980) (<HOLDING>). 18. Most jurisdictions, however, recognize 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient (B) holding that a statute relates to erisa plans for the purposes of preemption if it requires the plans to purchase the  benefits specified in the statute when they purchase a certain kind of common insurance policy (C) holding that when guidelines contradict the plans requirements denial of benefits pursuant to guidelines was arbitrary and capricious (D) holding that absent written or de facto guidelines to give notice to lot owners as to the kind of fence that would qualify for consent a statement that plans were not pleasing enough was insufficient ground to sustain an injunction (E) holding that a motion for a preliminary injunction and a hearing on that motion were insufficient to prevent the plaintiff from dismissing by notice


Output: (D)


