In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: the defendant’s applicable guideline range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment).” Id., app. note 1(A). In November 2007, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 706, which reduced the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses under § 2Dl.l(c) by two levels. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007). The Commission later made the amendment retroactively applicable. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 713 (Supp. May 1, 2008). As indicated, Jefferson sought to have his sentence reduced as result of those amendments. However, they do not apply here because Jefferson was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence required by statute. See United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 311-12 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Because the District Court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum  not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures  and thus them ultimate sentences  were based (B) holding that a defendant whose original sentence was based upon the careeroffender guideline and not  2d11 could not receive a sentence reduction based on amendment 706 because it did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range (C) holding that while amendment 706 was applicable to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline (D) holding that amendment 706 did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range where the defendants received statutory mandatory minimum sentences and thus the defendants were not eligible for relief under  3582 (E) holding that while amendment 706 was applica ble to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline
[A]: (D)


[Q]: although incorporated or approved in the decree, is not merged therein, the parties may enforce it by s clear that "jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought, and that after vesting, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events.” Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1112, 1 L.Ed.2d 1205 (1957) (citation omitted). 18 . Courts in this district have long recognized that "a coiporation is an indispensable party in a shareholder derivative action suit.” See Gibson v. BoPar Dock Co. Corp., 780 F.Supp. 371, 373 (W.D.Va.1991) (citing Tower Hill Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 33 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir.1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 607, 50 S.Ct. 157, 74 L.Ed. 650 (1930)); Bates v. Cekada, 130 F.R.D. 52, 59 (E.D.Va.1990) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); Taylor v. Swirnow, 80 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to maintain a derivative cause of action a shareholder must maintain a continuous ownership interest in the corporation (B) recognizing that a corporation is properly aligned as a defendant in a shareholder derivative suit when the corporation is in antagonistic hands (C) recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action (D) holding that a shareholder who disposes of his shares loses standing to bring a derivative action no longer a shareholder in the corporation the defendant cannot maintain a derivative action on its behalf (E) recognizing that the corporation is always deemed to be an indispensable party in a shareholder derivative action
[A]: (E)


[Q]: but execution of the sentence was stayed until August 6, 1996, then again until September 16, 1996, in order to afford Appellant the opportunity to pay the $360 purge amount. Appellant failed to purge herself of contempt and ultimately served thirty days in jail. No appeal was taken from that order. Appellant was again held in civil contempt on May 20, 1997, for failing to make any payments towards the court-ordered restitution. This second contempt proceeding is the subject of- the instant appeal. The trial court sentenced Appellant to thirty days in jail with a purge provision in the amount of $320, but failed to make a finding that Appellant had the present ability to pay the purge amount. This, as the State concedes, was error. See Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274, 1277 (Fla.1985)(<HOLDING>). Although the record supports the trial 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that incarceration for civil contempt cannot be imposed absent a finding by the trial court that the eontemnor has the present ability to purge himself of contempt (B) holding that father being held in jail based on presumption of ability to comply could not have been incarcerated for civil contempt of child support order after failing to appear at contempt hearing without affirmative finding based on evidence that he had present ability to pay purge amount (C) holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive (D) recognizing that no warning to a contemnor is necessary when contempt is flagrant the aoc also argues that williamss use of the term bullshit justifies a separate contempt finding particularly in light of the warning provided by the initial contempt citation17 assuming without deciding that certain forms of contempt are so selfevident that they excuse a court from complying with the plain terms of the statute we disagree that the record before us presents such circumstances regarding the trial courts initial contempt finding we decline the aocs invitation to speculate that williamss inaudible comment to the court was contemptuous on its face williamss comment may have been a patent obscenity or an innocuous comment taken out of context by the court or anything in between further the trial courts failure to make findings deprives us of any other relevant cireumstances not apparent in the bare transcript such circumstances might include williamss body language gestures or even a general air of defiance while these circumstances when combined with williamss actual comment may well have supported a contempt citation we cannot uphold the contempt finding based on mere conjecture therefore we conclude that the first finding of contempt is insupportable on the facts present in the recordt18 whether williamss use of the term bullshit independently supports a contempt finding presents a closer question the record reveals that williams used that term to describe either the sentence the trial court had just imposed or the trial courts initial contempt citation more troubling however than the language itself is the apparent challenge to the courts authority and decorum see utah code ann  783211 defining contempt as inter alia dlisorderly contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding the court tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding see also haton v tulsa 415 us 697 698 94 sct 1228 39 led2d 693 1974 a single isolated usage of street vernacular not directed at the judge or any officer of the court cannot constitutionally support the conviction of criminal contempt emphasis added (E) holding that because civil contempt is only to obtain compliance it must be used only where the contemnor has the present ability to comply with the court order and the trial court specifically finds that the contemnor has that ability
[A]:
(A)


