In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: bankruptcy trustee from selling or administering the homestead, even for the benefit of joint creditors. The legal effect of the non-debtor spouse’s right to assert the Florida constitutional exemption meant that the debtor spouse was still “receiving the benefits” of the Florida constitutional exemption, even though he had not claimed that exemption in his bankruptcy case. Consequently, the debtor was ruled ineligible for the wildcard exemption. The court noted that a different outcome would have obtained if the non-debtor spouse had affirmatively waived the right to claim the homestead protection. No such waiver existed, however, either in Hernandez or in this case. Other courts have also reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., In re Watford, 427 B.R. 552, 559 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2010) (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Bennett, 395 B.R. 781, 790 (Bankr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding despite contrary authority that husband debtor with a mere possessoiy interest was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption and stating it is a fundamental tenet of the law of exemptions that the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before an exemption may be claimed a long line of illinois cases has required that a debtor have title or some ownership interest in property in order to claim a homestead exemption other courts deciding the issue under the federal exemption scheme have held that the key word is interest and that an interest in real property up to a specified amount implies a monetary interest more than just one spouses right to reside with the other (B) holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a selfsettled revocable trust even though the settlor and the beneficiary as well as the bankruptcy debtor were the same person (C) holding that where a married debtor files an individual bankruptcy case and claims the  522b3b tbe exemption the debtor indirectly obtains the benefit of floridas constitutional homestead protection by virtue of the nondebtor spouses ability to claim the homestead exemption (D) holding that the general homestead exemption may not be invoked to defeat claims against the holder for taxes and assessments against the homestead property (E) holding even though debtor would have been entitled to iowa homestead exemption but for former spouses iowa code section 59821 lien debtor could not avoid the lien because it attached to the homestead prior to or simultaneously with debtors acquisition of the interest in the homestead
[A]: (C)


[Q]: position and whether the party would receive “an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.” Id. at 751, 121 S.Ct. 1808. The doctrine is designed to prevent “intentional self-contradiction” and is improperly applied “when the former position was the result of inadvertence or mistake.” Lampi Corp. v. Am. Power Prod., 228 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2000). Thus, the court does no disservice to the important purposes underlying holding parties to judicial admissions by acknowledging that a response to an injunctive action is an evolving position, and the facts and legal positions should be taken in view of the emerging facts as they become known to the litigating parties. See SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prod., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). It is also necessary to note that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text superfluous (B) holding that a transferee federal court should apply its interpretations of federal law not the constructions of federal law of the transferor circuit (C) holding that courts should not use doctrine of judicial estoppel to prevent evolution of arguments but should permit preliminary constructions made without full development of the record or issues to remain open to revision (D) holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact (E) holding courts should apply statutory constructions that make practical sense and do not frustrate legislative intent
[A]: (C)


[Q]: 211, 36 S.Ct. 595, 60 L.Ed. 961 (1916). Access to the courts is also not a fundamental right unless the denial of that access itself impinges on a recognized fundamental right. See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 658-60, 93 S.Ct. 1172, 1172-75, 35 L.Ed.2d 572, 76 (1973) (access to courts to seek welfare relief not a fundamental right). Being grounded in the common law, not the constitution, the right to receive compensation for tortious injury is simply not fundamental. See, e.g., Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 882, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 407, 506 P.2d 212, 231 (1973). Those few states which have applied strict scrutiny in a similar context are simply outside the mainstream of state constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 83, 688 P.2d 961, 973 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Under Texas case law, as in most states, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that right of access to recover damages for bodily injury was fundamental but noting that numerous other states have held otherwise (B) recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings (C) holding that the right to vote is fundamental (D) holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right (E) holding right to be fundamental
[A]:
(A)


