In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: fact that the oil traversed part of Transocean’s vessel before entering the Gulf of Mexico. We recognize that the aforementioned incidents involved blameless third parties, whereas here the owner or operator of the Deepwater Horizon might have contributed to the discharge. By all accounts, if the vessel’s blowout preventer had functioned properly, the oil would not have entered navigable waters in violation of the Clean Water Act. The defendants therefore reason that liability is properly imposed upon the owner or operator of the Deepwater Horizon. Yet it is well estab lished that this section of the Clean Water Act leaves no room for civil-penalty defendants to shift liability via allegations of third-party fault. See United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1314 (7th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Early in the implementation of the Act’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant assumed risk that third party would consent to search of storage locker where defendant instructed third party to rent locker under third partys name and allowed third party to keep possession of lease papers and to occasionally retain the keys (B) holding exculpatory statements by a third party should have been admitted in the punishment phase notwithstanding the hearsay rule (C) holding principal liable to third party for tort of agent despite lack of privity between principal and third party (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding defendant liable for penalty notwithstanding fault of a third party
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: a particularized need. 4. Seriousness of the Litigation and Issues Holmes maintains that the gravity of her allegations — namely, that IPRA “concealed] its widespread efforts to cover-up unlawful shootings by police officers,” Pl.’s Reply Br. at 3 — warrants disclosing the draft summary reports. In other words, Holmes asserts that the privilege is overcome because IPRA’s deliberative process, which includes the back-and-forth exchange of draft summary reports between supervisors and investigators, is “part of the code of silence.” Id. Where a plaintiff directly challenges a government agency’s deliberative process, courts routinely find that there is a particularized need for disclosure. See, e.g., Smentek v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 2013 WL 2588709, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2013) (<HOLDING>); Ferrell, 177 F.R.D. at 430-31 (finding a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county (B) holding that mandatory visual strip search policy in county jail was unconstitutional (C) holding that public employees working for the office of cook county assessor and receiving their compensation from cook county had no vested right in the expectation of the continuance of this compensation (D) holding that plaintiffs had a particularized need for cook county jail prebudget documents after observing that the plaintiffs theory is that the county allegedly approved the dental services budget despite knowing that it might create unconstitutional conditions at the jail accordingly  the countys deliberative process is directly at issue in this case (E) holding that employees of county jail that housed federal prisoners pursuant to contract with the federal government were not federal employees even though county jail had to comply with federal rules and regulations
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: be effected in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section. 5 . For clarity, the first “final denial” refers to the April 28; 1995 letter. The second “final denial" refers to the USPS inaction on BOND’S June 28, 1995 request for reconsideration. It should be noted the USPS has never denied BOND’S request for reconsideration. The USPS did not send a second "final denial” by certified mail. Six months passed since the request for reconsideration, and BOND, at the veiy least, has six months from that date to file an action against USPS. At the earliest, BOND’S claim against the USPS would run afoul of the statute of limitations on either June 28 or July 3, 1996. But see. Conn v. U.S., 867 F.2d 916 (6th Cir.1981); Taumby v. United States, 919 F.2d 69 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Pascale v. United States, 998 F.2d 186 (3rd 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional (B) holding that a time limit for filing a complaint as a creditor in bankruptcy proceedings is not jurisdictional (C) recognizing that there is no time limit for filing ftca action when administrative claim is deemed denied due to agencys inaction (D) holding that the time limit for filing a petition for review of a final order of deportation is jurisdictional (E) holding that a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies when his claim is deemed denied because of failure of administrator to respond in a timely manner
[EX A]:
(C)

