In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Court procedures or under G.L.1956 §§ 16-19-1 and 16-19-6 as to the number of absences from school that were necessary to incur possible liability as a truant. However, the administrative order specifies a threshold number of ten days of absence before a child may be referred either to the Diversion Program or to the formal juvenile calendar. Indeed, administrative order 2010-2 states that “[t]he Intake Department may refer cases to the Truancy calendar if the petition: * * * [h]as at least 10 days of absences and/or states that a student is habitually late or absent from school.” We are confident that a person of average intelligence need neither guess nor speculate about the number of absences that will result in a referral to the Truancy Diversion Program. See Moreau, 15 A.3d at 583 (<HOLDING>). Administrative order 2010-2 also details how 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute defining drug paraphernalia and  564403cl were not unconstitutionally vague for want of certainty and definiteness because they give a person of ordinary intelligence notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden (B) holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague (C) holding that a statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it gives a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly (D) holding flag contempt statute unconstitutionally vague (E) holding that essentially equivalent is unconstitutionally vague
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C), 1182(a)(2)(A), 1227(a)(2)(A)®. Furthermore, § 1252(a)(2)(B) precludes judicial review of: (i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under [INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) ] or (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security® 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2). However, despite the jurisdictional limitations in § 1252(a)(2)(C) and (a)(2)(B), we are not precluded from reviewing constitutional claims or questions of law raised in a properly filed petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Balogun, 425 F.3d at 1359 (<HOLDING>); see also Frech v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law (B) holding no jurisdiction to review order raising amount of bail and questioning jurisdiction to review denial of motion to reduce bond (C) holding that the real id act leaves this court deprived of jurisdiction to review discretionary and factual determinations (D) holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review (E) holding that a habeas petition filed more than 30 days after the effective date of the real id act cannot be transferred to the court of appeals as a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: the trial judge had seen the videotape of James Eas-ley impheating Woodard, the trial court’s conclusion, without explanation or a hearing, that there was no “deceit or trickery” appears unsupported by the bare record before us. Whether the government indeed threatened Woodard with a murder charge if he did not testify before the grand jury, or diverted him from consulting with his attorney before he did so, or misled him into thinking he was not a target, are open questions of fact that must be tested at a hearing. Whether all or some of those alleged facts, even if true, undercut the voluntariness of his grand jury testimony despite the Miranda waiver, is a question that only a hearing can begin to answer. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) (<HOLDING>)”. I’m sure that the government will object to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under 28 usc  2254d the ultimate question of the admissibility of a confession merits treatment as a legal inquiry requiring plenary  review (B) recognizing the possibility that 28 usc  1331 supplies jurisdiction for violations of international law but not reaching the ultimate merits of the issue (C) holding that the ninth circuits decision exceeded the limits imposed on federal habeas review by 28 usc  2254d (D) holding that a claim brought in a pro se brief that the state court did not address was not adjudicated on the merits as required by  2254d (E) recognizing that the ultimate question of the voluntariness of consent is one of law
[EX A]:
(A)

