In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

personally waive the rights to testify at trial, to have the prosecution witnesses testify in defend other settings. One such case arose when a defendant charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct stipulated to the element that he was more than 36 months older than the victim without waiving his right to a jury trial on that element. State v. Wright, 679 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn.App.2004), review denied (Minn. June 29, 2004). In Wright, we applied a harmless-error analysis to the district court’s failure to obtain appellant’s personal waiver. Id. at 191. In part, we reasoned that proving the age element to the jury would have had “a more prejudicial effect than- the stipulation” because appellant was significantly older than the victim. Id.; see also Hinton, 702 N.W.2d at 281-82 (<HOLDING>). Also, both Wright and Hinton involved 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that stipulation of the appellants undisputed prior convictions was harmless error and reasoning that blakely v washington which does not require a jury determination of prior convictions provides implicit support for the conclusion that a harmless error analysis is appropriate (B) recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding blakely errors are subject to harmless error analysis (D) holding that the trial courts error in not allowing defendant to testify on direct examination as to nature and circumstances of prior convictions was not harmless error where credibility of the defendant was critical to the deliberations of the jury (E) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error
(A)

is correct. We will also assume that the court’s erro umed error prejudiced him is that other evidence supports the finding that he was a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy. In the district court, Vasquez did not object to the PSR’s statement that he “recruited Wornick and Sella” into the conspiracy. Although the district court did not explicitly find that Vasquez recruited two of his co-conspirators, “[i]t is the law of this circuit that a failure to object to allegations of fact in a[PSR] admits those facts for sentencing purposes.” United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.2006). And we have held many times that a defendant’s recruitment of co-conspirators supports a § 3B1.1 enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 n. 2 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1304 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer leader manager or supervisor under  3bllc in part because the defendant actively recruited two individuals to transport drugs (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was a manager or supervisor under  3bllb in part because he recruited accomplices (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer or leader under  3blla in part because he recruited coconspirators
(E)

is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent when no evidence indicates that he was aware of a state statute requiring the court to impose a life sentence if the sentencing jury failed to reach a unanimous decision. The California statute at issue here provides that “[i]f the trier of fact [at the sentencing stage] is a jury and has been unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court shall dismiss the jury and impose a punishment of confinement in state prison for life without possibility of parole.” 1977 Cal. Stats., ch. 316, §12. State high courts faced with the issue whether a defendant must be aware of similar capital sentencing provisions have reached differing conclusions. Compare Harris v. State, 295 Md. 329, 339-340, 455 A. 2d 979, 984 (1983) (<HOLDING>), with People v. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d 111, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal (B) holding prelitigation waiver of jury trial must be made knowingly and voluntarily and courts will indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver of that right (C) holding that an effective notice of appeal must be filed for this court to have jurisdiction to hear the case (D) holding that where the record showed neither that the trial court explained to the defendant his right to a jury trial nor an effective waiver of the right structural error occurred (E) holding that a court must explain the effect of a jury deadlock for a waiver to be effective

(E)

