In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person’s detention.” Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381, 97 S.Ct. 1224, 51 L.Ed.2d 411 (1977); see also St 06 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (same). Whether RIDA created an adequate substitute for habeas corpus for those aliens to whom a petition for review is available, however, is different from whether RIDA created any adequate substitute for those aliens for whom it is no longer available. Unlike in previous cases where we have upheld RIDA against Suspension Clause challenges, Singh never had the ability to obtain judicial review of the merits of his removal through a petition for review filed within 30 days of his removal order. Cf. Puri, 464 F.3d at 1043; Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). By the time RIDA created jurisdiction in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law (B) holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (C) holding that  109g2 does not apply when the creditor seeking relief in the first case received the requested relief (D) holding that a rule 60b motion that presents grounds entitling a petitioner to habeas corpus relief or seeks to add a new ground for relief requires authorization (E) holding that ridas elimination of habeas corpus does not violate the suspension clause where the petitioner had a means for seeking relief direct review  and simply failed to pursue the relief that the statutory scheme allows
(E)

complaint’s allegations are sufficient if they put a reasonable person on notice as to why a plaintiff sues.” Id. Here, a reasonable person would be put on notice that Weatherford’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not solely based on the false arrest or false imprisonment claims. Weatherford’s claim is premised on the officers’ alleged intentional retaliation and abuse of power and process when they violated standard police procedure, disregarded Chief Leonard’s instructions and conspired to intentionally and publicly humiliate Weatherford. Furthermore, we note that Indiana now recognizes a separate cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, without the need for an accompanying tort. See Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 30-31 (Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find that Weatherford 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotion distress for the first time in indiana (B) recognizing that the indiana tort claims act grants broad immunity to governmental employees from suit for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress (C) holding that claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotion distress fail as matter of law where challenged arrest is supported by probable cause (D) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury tort
(A)

held that the MVFRL mandated that the driver be covered, up to the MVFRL limits, by the owner’s policy issued to Metro Ford from Universal. Id. at 283. Hargrave and Rader teach that the insured exclusion in NCC’s owner’s policy is invalid to the extent it would deny coverage, up to the MVFRL limits, for Bough’s permissive use of the Cougar. See § 303.190.7; Halpin v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Mo. banc 1992). Therefore, the NCC policy provides Bough with the mandatory MVFRL liability insurance coverage of $25,000 per person. The insured exclusion in the NCC policy, however, is enforceable to bar any additional liability insurance coverage for Bough beyond that mandated by the MVFRL. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zumwalt, 825 S.W.2d 906, 909 (Mo.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). Appellant’s first point is granted. Point III 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a household exclusion in the policy was void insofar as it denied coverage in the amount required by  3031902 but it was valid as to any coverage exceeding that amount (B) holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy (C) holding location of named driver exclusion in endorsement did not make it ambiguous exclusion applied to all coverage afforded by the policy including the um coverage (D) holding that a hospital may not assert a statutory lien in an amount exceeding the amount it agreed to accept from the patients insurer (E) holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage

(A)

