TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: Court procedures or under G.L.1956 §§ 16-19-1 and 16-19-6 as to the number of absences from school that were necessary to incur possible liability as a truant. However, the administrative order specifies a threshold number of ten days of absence before a child may be referred either to the Diversion Program or to the formal juvenile calendar. Indeed, administrative order 2010-2 states that “[t]he Intake Department may refer cases to the Truancy calendar if the petition: * * * [h]as at least 10 days of absences and/or states that a student is habitually late or absent from school.” We are confident that a person of average intelligence need neither guess nor speculate about the number of absences that will result in a referral to the Truancy Diversion Program. See Moreau, 15 A.3d at 583 (<HOLDING>). Administrative order 2010-2 also details how 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute defining drug paraphernalia and  564403cl were not unconstitutionally vague for want of certainty and definiteness because they give a person of ordinary intelligence notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden (B) holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague (C) holding that a statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it gives a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly (D) holding flag contempt statute unconstitutionally vague (E) holding that essentially equivalent is unconstitutionally vague

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: in this sense, inasmuch as he has alleged an imminent violation of his statutory right to personal privacy within the trial court’s power to enjoin. “Standing” can also refer to various judicially-created limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction, such as “the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). It is not, however, standing in this so-called prudential sense with wh out the phrase, in Rector v. City of Bowling Green, 594 S.W.2d 891 (Ky.1979) (<HOLDING>). The question thig case presents is who, aside 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that nonindustrial property owners did not have standing under the asserted statute to challenge an annexation (B) holding that representation by state officials that they have no present plan to enforce a statute does not divest plaintiffs of standing to challenge the statute because the states position could well change (C) holding that petitioners who asserted neither a property interest nor a possessory interest in property searched or seized were not entitled to assert a constitutional challenge to the search (D) holding annexation ordinance void (E) holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: of fraud on the court. In this regard, the district court recognized that under binding Tenth Circuit precedent “[ijntent to defraud is an absolute prerequisite to a finding of fraud on the court.” Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 553 (10th Cir.1996). The district court then proceeded to set out at length its reasoning for concluding that McVeigh had not demonstrated a reasonable probability that given additional time he could present a viable claim of fraud on the court. Second, McVeigh is simply wrong in trying to compartmentalize the questions of fraud on the court and Brady materiality. If the evidence in question was not material, a fundamental requirement for fraud on the court would be absent. See United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47, 118 S.Ct. 1862, 141 L.Ed.2d 32 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the fact that only non-material 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that motion filed under fedrcivp 60b properly construed as successive  2255 motion (B) holding that a motion to vacate a judgment under fedrcivp 60b is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court   citations omitted (C) holding that while a district court lacks jurisdiction to deny a 60b motion while an appeal is pending it can certify that it will grant a 60b motion if the court of appeals remands the case for that purpose (D) holding without extended discussion that even if the district court should have construed the petitioners motion under 18 usc  3582c2 as a rule 60b motion the court would nonetheless have had to recharacterize the rule 60b motion as an sshp (E) holding that fedrcivp 60b motion premised on fraud on the court is available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice

SOLUTION:
(E)

