In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: put forth anything to convince the Court that further discovery could rectify this issue. Accordingly, the Court sees no reason to deny or defer Defendant’s Motion as premature. 4. Contractual Limitations on Time to Bring Suit A. How does KRS § 304.14-370 affect contractual limitation provisions? Kentucky law has long recognized “the validity of insurance contract provisions requiring as a condition to sue that the action must be ‘commenced within the time specified by the policy.’ ” Edmondson v. Penn. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 781 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Ky.1989) (internal citations omitted). Courts typically enforced such provisions unless they unreasonably limited the time in which parties could sue. See Ashland Finance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 474 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Ky. 1971) (<HOLDING>). However, KRS § 304.14-370 does place 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a delay approaching one year is presumptively unreasonable (B) holding that discovery was appropriately tailored as it limited the request to information within a six year time period relating to one specific contract and the deposition of a person most knowledgeable (C) holding that section 10b and rule 10b5 suits must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation (D) holding that cogsa claims must be brought within one year from the time at which the loss occurred (E) holding that a blanket bond contract provision requiring a party to bring suit within one year after discovery of the loss was not unreasonable
[A]: (E)


[Q]: 616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code § 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a “line of ... cars” for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier
[A]: (C)


[Q]: a result, he had assented to the Estate’s producing the letters. Despite their lack of objection prior to producing the documents, the Opposing Parties contend the Estate “inadvertently” produced the documents and, further, that the stipulated protective order in this ease (the “Protective Order”) requires KFI to return the documents. KFI argues the Estate voluntarily produced the documents. As detailed herein, this court finds the documents were not inadvertently disclosed. When parties stipulate to a protective order requiring the return of inadvertently produced documents, the agreement is enforceable if the proponent actually produced the document(s) inadvertently and otherwise complies with the terms of the order. See VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8, 11-12 (D.Mass.2000) (<HOLDING>). Absent an agreement, courts have applied 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in agency adjudications in which the government has not claimed privilege written reports made at the time of an event must be produced when the credibility of the witness on matters discussed in the report is in question (B) holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply fully against the government because the possibility of harm to a private party is often if not always grossly outweighed by the public interest in enforcement of congressionally mandated public policy (C) holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing (D) holding that where the district court decided two issues in the certified order but identified only the damages issue as the controlling question of law the court of appeals could nonetheless address the other issue (E) holding stipulated protective order mandated return of two documents inadvertently produced with approximately 25000 intentionally produced pages proponents established that the production of the materials at issue was not a considered or grossly negligent decision but the result of inattention ie inadvertence
[A]:
(E)


