In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

677 F.3d 519, 543 (3d Cir.2012). Under the specific circumstances presented in this case, Lewis did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his telephone conversation with White. Lewis knew where White was incarcerated when White called Lewis, as he had agreed to send Shavers and White mail there. Furthermore, Lewis was previously incarcerated at the same prison. Thus, he would have received a handbook alerting him that all telephone calls were recorded and been exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded. In these circumstances, Lewis should have known that all outgoing prisoner telephone calls were monitored and recorded. See United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1329 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Harrison, 986 F.Supp. 280, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells (B) holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company (C) holding that a nonprisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking to a prisoner on the telephone because as a frequent visitor to the prison she was well aware of the strict security measures in place and that the code of federal regulations puts the public on notice that prison officials are authorized to monitor prisoners telephone calls (D) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth (E) holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a prison visitor room where conversations took place between brothers and were surreptitiously recorded by state officials
(C)

grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action. Id. (emphasis added). A defendant must also “file a copy of the notice with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” Id. § 1446(d). The removal statutes are construed narrowly. Pritchett v. Off its, including the District of Kansas, have also followed this approach. See, e.g., Berbig v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Inc., 568 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1039 n. 9 (D.Minn.2008) (stating that “a failure to comply with the requirements of [Section 1446(a) ] ordinarily is not grounds to deny removal”); Riggs v. Fling Irrigation, Inc., 535 F.Supp.2d 572, 579 (W.D.N.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Yellow, 406 F.Supp.2d at 1215; In re Methyl 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under alabama law the law of the forum applies to procedural matters and that in most instances the statute of limitations is considered to be a procedural rule (B) recognizing that the procedural defect could be corrected through a reinstatement of the termination proceedings (C) holding that if the states criminal complaint against defendant had a jurisdictional defect the prosecution had the right to attempt to correct the defect and a motion to dismiss is one method of doing this (D) holding that notice of a defect could not be imputed to a defendant inasmuch as it created the defect (E) holding while there may be some case law to support plaintiffs argument the majority approach is that the failure to attach process defect is merely procedural and that this particular procedural defect may be cured
(E)

7 or 8 of the NLRA: At times it has not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the States was governed by § 7 or § 8 or was, perhaps, outside both these sections. But courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the Act that these determinations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations Board.... ^ ^ ^ ^ In the absence of the Board’s clear determination that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited or of compelling precedent applied to essentially undisputed facts, it is not for this Court to decide whether such activities are subject to state jurisdiction. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244-46, 79 S.Ct. 773 (emphasis added). See also Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa, 45 F.3d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Both Wasden and amicus suggest that even if 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arbitration agreement between a charging party and an employer precludes the eeoc from seeking purely monetary relief in federal court on behalf of the charging party but not from seeking broad injunctive relief (B) holding that a private party may bring an action in a federal district court seeking injunctive relief on the basis of garmon preemption for only arguably protected or prohibited activity (C) holding that garmon preemption provides no basis for removal jurisdiction in federal court and observing that the lower courts are uniform in finding that garmon preemption under the nlra does not completely preempt state laws so as to provide removal jurisdiction (D) holding that garmon preemption is inapplicable in eases involving the americans with disabilities act (E) holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer

(B)

