In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

the ammunition charge from the gun charges. II. DISCUSSION A. Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Unregistered Firearm Count Under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), it is unlawful for any person to “possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.” For purposes of this provision, the definition of “firearm” includes a shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches in length or with an overall length less than twenty-six inches. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). In order to obtain a conviction under § 5861(d), the government must demonstrate that the defendant knew the barrel’s length was less than eighteen inches or the overall length was less than twenty-six inches. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the government must prove the defendant knew of the features of the firearm that brought it within the scope of the act (B) holding the government must demonstrate the defendant knew of the characteristics of the firearm that required it to be registered (C) holding that while the government was required to prove that the defendants phone call crossed a state line  the government did not need to prove that the defendant knew of the interstate nexus (D) holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation (E) holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time
(A)

have pleaded that the 2007 Agreement was terminated, and the Court is required to accept that fact as true at this stage of the litigation. Therefore the continued use of Plaintiffs’ trademarks by Defendant as alleged would be without the benefit of a license. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the trademark infringement claim is DENIED. C. Breach of Contract Plaintiffs claim that Big Time Toys breached the parties’ contracts when it failed to cure its default on the royalty payments. Am. Compl. ¶ 88. As an initial matter, the continued use of a licensed trademark after termination of a license agreement can be actionable as both breach of contract and trademark infringement. See, e.g., Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co. v. D & L Ice Cream Co., 576 F.Supp. 1055, 1060 (E.D.N.Y.1983) (<HOLDING>); Ryan v. Volpone Stamp Co., 107 F.Supp.2d 369, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that contributory trademark infringement requires some predicate act of infringement (B) holding that although the underlying action is one for trademark infringement the infringement occurred as a result of the underlying defendants use of the trademark in their advertising (C) holding that proof of unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish the likelihood of confusion prong (D) holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract (E) holding that continued use of trademark after termination of franchise for nonpayment of royalties constitutes lanham act violation
(D)

from liability for injury proximately caused by his own negligent or wrongful act or omission.” Id. Defendants argue that the Supervisory Defendants (Blasnek, Cruz, McGrattan, Onhemus, and Washington) cannot be liable for their subordinates’ alleged use of excessive force under § 52.1 pursuant to § 820.8. However, each of the Supervisory Defendants was found liable for her own actions under § 52.1, including witnessing and directing their subordinates to violate Plaintiffs’ rights. {See Docket Nos. 592-601 (verdict forms).) Therefore immunity under § 820.8 does not apply. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir.1978) (“California law expressly imposes liability on a public employee for his own act or omission”); Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); McKay v. City of Hayward, 949 F.Supp.2d 971, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a municipality cannot be held liable for an official policy or custom if it has been determined that the individual defendants did not violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights (B) holding that a superior can be held liable in his individual capacity if he participated in the deprivation of a plaintiffs constitutional rights (C) holding that liability under  1983 can be established by showing that the defendants either personally participated in a deprivation of the plaintiffs rights or caused such a deprivation to occur (D) holding plaintiff stated claim in his individual capacity (E) holding that a state officer sued in his individual capacity may be held personally liable for damages under 42 usc  1983 based upon actions taken in his official capacity

(B)

