In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: not issue a permit to install” a waste disposal system unless that system “[m]eets all applicable county zoning and land use requirements .... ” Taken together, these provisions indicate a clear intent on the part of the General Assembly to locate environmental permitting with the MDE, and zoning with local government. There is no reasonable way to construe these provisions of the Maryland Code as doing anything other than complementing local government’s role in planning and zoning. If we held otherwise, we would be reading an over-broad preemptive intent into an otherwise clear statutory scheme. MRA’s preemption argument fails because it does not account for the dual nature of this process. See Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Comm’rs of Queen Anne’s County, 307 Md. 307, 513 A.2d 893 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Preemption Based on Legislative Changes to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state (B) holding that the relevant body of state law did indeed regulate many aspects of sewage sludge utilization but was not so comprehensive that the acceptance of the doctrine of preemption by occupation is compelled (C) holding that a party did not waive its preemption defense where its answer did not specifically mention preemption but contained a broader defense that was capable of encompassing preemption (D) recognizing that although there was no property in a dead body at common law  the one whose duty it is to care for the body of the deceased is entitled to possession of the body as it is when death comes and that it is an actionable wrong for another to interfere with that right by withholding the body or mutilating it in any way (E) recognizing that the artful pleading doctrine in practice is subsumed by the complete preemption doctrine
[A]: (B)


[Q]: 26 Ariz.App. 265, 270-71, 547 P.2d 1065, 1070-71 (1976), which held that a party is precluded from raising for the first time on appeal the trial court’s failure to make findings when specifically required to do so by Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). 179 Ariz. at 301, 878 P.2d at 657. Accordingly, I perceive that Trantor’s waiver rule applies with as much vigor to statutes or rules that specifically require findings as it does when the requirement is imposed by case law. Cf. Galloway v. Vanderpool, 205 Ariz. 252, 256, ¶ 17, 69 P.3d 23, 27 (2003) (“Once published, our interpretation [of a statute] becomes part of the statute.”); Local 266, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, A.F. of L. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 43, 275 P.2d 393, 402 (1954) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 31 One further point. Because my colleagues 
 Holding statements: (A) holding principle of statutory construction is to give effect to every clause and word of a statute (B) holding that the courts in the absence of ambiguity should as a general rule confine themselves to a construction of a statute as written and not attempt under the guise of construction to supply omissions or remedy possible defects in the statute or to insert exceptions not made by the legislature (C) recognizing rule of statutory construction that statutes must be read as a whole and sections which are part of the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given effect if it can be done by any reasonable construction (D) recognizing that unreversed statutory construction is to be held part of the statute as if originally so written (E) holding that the term shall is mandatory for purposes of statutory construction when the statute is unambiguous
[A]: (D)


[Q]: In the instant case, Petitioner’s conviction became final on September 21, 1995, ninety-days after the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 575, 578 (3d Cir.1999); see Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir.1999). However, because Petitioner’s conviction became final prior to the effective date of the AEDPA, the limitations period did not begin to run until April 24, 1996. See Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir.1998)(allowing one-year grace period to petitioner’s whose convictions became final prior to the enactment of the AEDPA). Applying the one-year limitations period from that date, Petitioner was required to file his Petition by April 24, 1997. See Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 662-63 (3d Cir.2005)(<HOLDING>). Petitioner did not file the instant Petition 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that federal rule of civil procedure rule 6a applies to the calculation of the aedpas oneyear limitations period (B) holding that the aedpa oneyear statute of limitations applies to amendments to  2255 motions (C) holding that aedpas oneyear period of limitations does not support a delay of filing of habeas petition by capital defendant (D) holding that aedpas oneyear limitations period is not tolled during the pendency of a petition for certiorari to the united states supreme court that seeks review of a state courts denial of postconviction relief (E) holding that former federal rule of civil procedure 6a and e applies to federal habeas petitions
[A]:
(A)


