In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
that is presumptively constitutional). The only case of which I am aware construing DeFillippo and denying qualified immunity is Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Board, 279 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2002). But in that case “two Ninth Circuit cases [were] directly on point” because they had declared parallel statutes of other States — permitting an arrest for refusing to identify oneself — unconstitutional. Id. at 881. That of course does not remotely describe today’s case. Nor does Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250 (6th Cir.1997), offer any refuge to Leonard. It dealt not with the question whether an officer could be denied qualified immunity for failing to predict a judicial ruling declaring a statute unconstitutional but with whether the statute covered the plaintiffs conduct. See id. at 1256 (<HOLDING>). In the end, Leonard not only asks us to take 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arrest to retrieve car keys where ownership of the car was in dispute was not supported by probable cause (B) holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same (C) holding that shouting epithets from a moving car did not provide probable cause to arrest the plaintiff under a disorderlyconduct statute (D) holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest (E) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment

Ex Output:
(C)


Ex Input:
so restricted. Rather, ... the doctrine is an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our adversary system. One of those realities is that attorneys often must rely on the assistance of investigators and other agents in the compilation of materials in preparation for trial. It is therefore necessary that the doctrine protect materials prepared by agents for the attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney himself. Id. at 238-39, 95 S.Ct. 2170. Accordingly, federal courts have consistently ruled that the work product doctrine is not inapplicable merely because the material was prepared by or for a party’s insurer or agents of the insurer. See Railroad Salvage of Conn. Inc. v. Japan Freight Consolidators (U.S.A.), Inc., 97 F.R.D. 37, 41 (E.D.N.Y.1983) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 779 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.1985); Home Ins. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that correspondence between defendant and its liability carriers was protected (B) holding that the prohibition of inmatetoinmate correspondence was not an unconstitutional infringement of prisoners first amendment rights (C) recognizing correspondence appeared to establish a settlement relationship between the parties given the letters presented an attempt to curb further litigation (D) recognizing first amendment and fourteenth amendment interests in inmate correspondence (E) holding that a sixmonth gap between the protected activity and the employees termination was insufficient to infer that the protected activity was a contributing factor

Ex Output:
(A)


Ex Input:
that during the recess, Corenthia bawled and screamed for between three and five minutes “at the top of her voice, ‘He didn’t have to do it. She had so much to live for.’ ” Defense counsel stated that although the jury was not present in the courtroom during this outburst, the conduct occurred in the area of the courtroom adjacent to the jury room, and that, therefore, the jury was very likely to have heard what transpired. The trial judge promptly denied the motion for mistrial. The jury then returned to the courtroom, and Corenthia’s testimony continued. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the judge charged the jury on, inter alia, murder and involuntary manslaughter. At defense counsel’s request, he also gave a King charge. See State v. King, 158 S.C. 251, 155 S.E. 409 (1939) (<HOLDING>). After the jury had been deliberating for just 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court should instruct the jury that if they had any reasonable doubt as to whether unlawful killing was murder or manslaughter it was jurys duty to convict defendant of the lesser offense manslaughter (B) holding that where jury had opportunity to convict defendant of manslaughter but convicted of greater offense of second degree murder refusing to give instruction on negligent homicide was if error harmless (C) holding that due process does not require a lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter where not requested (D) holding that the defendant who was charged with felony murder was not entitled to a lesser included instruction on manslaughter because manslaughter is neither a lesser included offense nor an inferior degree crime with respect to felony murder (E) holding that aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of manslaughter

Ex Output:

(A)


