In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: improperly determined that the “neither expected nor intended” language in the CGL policy constitutes an exclusion. This conclusion alone, however, does not bar coverage for Ribi; it merely imposes on it the burden of establishing an “occurrence.” ¶21 The CGL policy’s core provision defines “occurrence” by reference to those accidents or conditions that result in damage that was “neither expected nor intended.” This provision contains no temporal component and focuses instead on the insured’s expectations regarding damages. Thus, acts that take place over a significant period of time, but cause unexpected damage fall within the definition of an “occurrence” and are entitled to coverage. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer (1983), 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 overruled on other grounds (<HOLDING>). ¶22 Here the District Court found that Ribi 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended (B) holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence (C) holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution (D) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (E) holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended
[A]: (A)


[Q]: Court held that a federal court should not enjoin a state criminal prosecution begun prior to the institution of the federal suit except upon a “showing of bad faith, har-rassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54, 91 S.Ct. at 754-55. In later cases, the Court has held that the Younger doctrine is “fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved.” Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); see Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423, 99 S his lower court view, at least by negative inference. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 467 U.S. 229, 237-39, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 2327-29, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Since the Commonwealth began this eminent 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because debtor retained control of property a transfer had not yet occurred (B) holding that where the dispositive issue in an administrative proceeding was whether an accident occurred as the plaintiff alleged it did collateral estoppel did not bar litigation of whether the accident was workrelated because that issue had not yet been litigated (C) holding voluntary dismissal permissible because trial court had not yet reached a decision on the merits (D) holding that younger abstention was not appropriate because eminent domain proceeding had not yet begun when plaintiffs began their federal court action (E) holding that debt collector violated fdcpa when it held debtor liable for court costs that had not yet been awarded
[A]: (D)


[Q]: it was unnecessary to the outcome of the case. Id. at 507 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597. Clarifying its precedent, the Supreme Court stated an ex post facto violation does not rest on an inmate’s lost opportunity to reduce prison time but, rather, only upon a finding that legislation retroactively modified the definition of or increased the penalty for an inmate’s crime: After Collins, the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ nor ... on whether an amendment affects a prisoner’s ‘opportunity to take advantage of provisions for early release,’ but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the. penalty by which a crime is punishable. Id. See also id. at 514, 115 S.Ct. 1597 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Supreme Court has never 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause (B) holding the application of change in law regarding the timetable for being eligible for parole board hearings was not an increase in punishment violative of the ex post facto clause (C) holding change in ultimate parole decisionmaker from board to governor does not violate ex post facto clause (D) holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation (E) holding that a change in parole law violates the ex post facto clause if the change in the law created a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes
[A]:
(B)


