In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

removal of the access can result in a taking under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution, if the state’s use is for a purpose other than a road purpose. But, in Judge Armstrong’s view, any modification of a road for road purposes that denies a landowner’s access does not give rise to a compensable taking. In so concluding, Judge Armstrong discounts as “dictum” the Supreme Court rationale in Burk that an abutter’s right of access to a conventional Highway “can be divested only by condemnation of the easement appurtenant to the abutting property.” 200 Or at 231. Judge Armstrong explains that the court’s conclusion in Burk cannot be reconciled with the court’s analysis in more recent cases in the context of regulations that affect road access. See, e.g., Schrunk, 242 Or at 73 (<HOLDING>). If, Judge Armstrong’s concurrence reasons, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that inverse condemnation claim challenging as a regulatory taking the states placement of a guard rail that blocked former access was not ripe for adjudication where owners had failed to apply for permit for alternative approach and it therefore was not possible to assess whether a taking had occurred as a result of a deprivation of all reasonable access (B) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking (C) holding ripe a claim for a pre1987 taking because prior to first english california law did not permit landowners to seek compensation for a regulatory taking through an action in inverse condemnation (D) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (E) holding that regulatory restrictions on abutting landowners right of ingress and egress are not compensable when landowner has adequate alternative means to access property
(B)

to recall the mandate discussed in Calderon, by comparison, seek the adjudication of constitutional claims; they do not constitute collateral attacks on the integrity of the court of appeals’s judgment. Hence, they differ from true Rule 60(b) motions and must be denied. D. Having distinguished between SSHPs and Rule 60(b) motions, I nonetheless share the majority’s general concern that petitioners will disguise the former as the latter to avoid AEDPA’s restrictions. We must craft a holding that curtails this abuse. We do not write on a blank slate here, as virtually all of our sister circuits have addressed this issue. Some circuits have held that all Rule 60(b) motions are SSHPs, regardless of the nature of the claims presented. See Lopez v. Douglas, 141 F.3d 974, 975 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Gee v. Shillinger, 1998 WL 43155, *1-*2, 1998 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court erred in failing to recharacterize a rule 60b motion as an sshp and reversing with the instruction to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (B) holding that defenses under rule 60b may be waived (C) holding without specifying exceptions that rule 60b motions are sshps under aedpa (D) holding without extended discussion that even if the district court should have construed the petitioners motion under 18 usc  3582c2 as a rule 60b motion the court would nonetheless have had to recharacterize the rule 60b motion as an sshp (E) holding without extended discussion that the peti tioners rule 60b motion was an sshp under aedpa
(E)

him from filing his petition on time. To be eligible for equitable tolling, a petitioner must “demonstrate a causal relationship between the extraordinary circumstances on which the claim for equitable tolling rests and the lateness of his filing, a demonstration that cannot be made if the petitioner, acting with reasonable diligence, could have filed on time notwithstanding the extraordinary circumstances.” Valverde, 224 F.3d at 134. The district court observed that Rivera still had a couple of weeks to file before his § 2255 motion was due once he received the requested documents. The court acted within its discretion in concluding that this was enough time for Rivera to have filed a timely, even if unpolished, petition. See Belot v. Burge, 490 F.3d 201, 207-08 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). [2] The district court did not abuse its 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that it was within the courts reasonable discretion to conclude that a petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling because he ought reasonably to have begun his preparation earlier and filed an unpolished  but timely  petition rather than wait to file his more polished petition until the week that the deadline expired  internal quotation marks and alterations omitted (B) holding equitable tolling was not warranted where counsel misadvised client as to the deadline to file a habeas petition (C) holding that a petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling where he waited six months to file a federal petition after any state misconduct ended (D) holding that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling where he filed his habeas petition more than two months late (E) holding that the habeas petition did not qualify for equitable tolling because the petitioner discovered that his attorney had lied about filing a petition in early 2008 and yet the petitioner did not file one himself until nearly two years later

(A)

