In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: terms, “pending” refers to the status of an action before a final decision on the merits. Beetham v. Georgia-Pacific, 87 Or App 592, 743 P2d 755 (1987); see also Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, 1669 (unabridged ed 1993) (pending means “not yet decided”). Although that meaning is useful in determining whether an action remains pending, it does not fully resolve the problem before us, which is to determine when an action becomes pending. The solution to that problem, however, is readily apparent from relevant contextual sources. ORCP 3 provides that an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint rather than by service of summons. An action becomes pending when it is commenced. See Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Corbett, 66 Or App 668, 672, 675 P2d 1097, rev den 297 Or 340 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, after a complaint is filed, an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a complaint which will not support a claim against the specific property at issue cannot provide a basis for tying it up by a filing of notice of lis pendens (B) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (C) holding that under orcp 3 lis pendens attaches upon the filing of a complaint because the action is pending (D) holding that action of filing a complaint and notice of lis pendens based on a contract without simultaneously requesting a stay and an order compelling arbitration waives that partys contractual right to arbitrate (E) holding that filing of an administrative complaint did not meet the requirement that the employee seek counseling prior to filing
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: may give such retroactive effect to these legal clarifications because “where ... a court is addressing transactions that occurred at a time when there was no clear agency guidance, it would be absurd to ignore the agency’s current authoritative pronouncement of what the statute means.” Id. Therefore, unless the new regulation “replaces a prior agency determination,” this Court may find that the amendment merely provides an explanation for what the law always has been. Id. In order to determine if the amendments to Regulation E marked a change in the rules or served as an interpretation of existing law, this Court will first look to the stated intent of the Board in proffering the amendments. See First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Standard Bank & Trust, 172 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). If an agency plainly states that it is merely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the drastic sanction of preclusion of expert witnesses was not warranted based on failure to furnish discovery by the discovery deadline when the deadline could have been shifted (B) holding that a bankruptcy rule equivalent to rule 6a ala r civ p should be construed to give the benefit of extending the deadline for submission to the day after the holiday regardless of whether the deadline is expressed as the last day of a period of days or as a date certain (C) holding regulatory amendment extending a banks deadline for returning checks could be given retroactive effect (D) holding that where a legislative amendment changed the exemption provisions of a tax statute defining those eligible for certain exemptions and refunds the amendment could only be applied to tax years after its effective date even where the legislature expressly stated the amendment should have retroactive effect and looked to the law in place during the taxable events to determine if the taxpayer was eligible for a refund (E) holding random traffic stops for license and registration checks are contrary to fourth amendment
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: litigation. The district court can correct any abuses at the fees for fees stage under the “reasonableness” standard. The presumptive cap mostly takes away the discretion afforded to the district court in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs... .”). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in § 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for “[t]ime spent litigating a fee application”); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment (B) holding that time entries such as preparation for hearing or preparation for school visit were too vague and reducing overall fee award by twentyfive percent (C) holding that fee application must be sufficiently detailed to allow court to make an independent evaluation as to what fees are actual and necessary and finding that failure to keep contemporaneous records does not automatically result in denial of the fees but the lack thereof justifies a reduction of the fee to the level proven (D) holding that attorneys fees for the preparation of the fee application are compensable (E) holding that the independent counsel reauthorization act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application
Example Output:
(E)

