In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: to recall the mandate discussed in Calderon, by comparison, seek the adjudication of constitutional claims; they do not constitute collateral attacks on the integrity of the court of appeals’s judgment. Hence, they differ from true Rule 60(b) motions and must be denied. D. Having distinguished between SSHPs and Rule 60(b) motions, I nonetheless share the majority’s general concern that petitioners will disguise the former as the latter to avoid AEDPA’s restrictions. We must craft a holding that curtails this abuse. We do not write on a blank slate here, as virtually all of our sister circuits have addressed this issue. Some circuits have held that all Rule 60(b) motions are SSHPs, regardless of the nature of the claims presented. See Lopez v. Douglas, 141 F.3d 974, 975 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Gee v. Shillinger, 1998 WL 43155, *1-*2, 1998 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court erred in failing to recharacterize a rule 60b motion as an sshp and reversing with the instruction to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (B) holding that defenses under rule 60b may be waived (C) holding without specifying exceptions that rule 60b motions are sshps under aedpa (D) holding without extended discussion that even if the district court should have construed the petitioners motion under 18 usc  3582c2 as a rule 60b motion the court would nonetheless have had to recharacterize the rule 60b motion as an sshp (E) holding without extended discussion that the peti tioners rule 60b motion was an sshp under aedpa
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: judge is provided for in Ind. P-C.R. 1, § 4(b), it is not automatic as Barclay asserts. Instead, “the rule requires the judge to examine the affidavit, treat the historical facts recited in the affidavit as true, and determine whether these facts support a rational inference of bias or prejudice.” Jackson v. State, 643 N.E.2d 905, 907 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied (citing State ex rel. Whitehead v. Madison County Circuit Court, 626 N.E.2d 802, 803 (Ind.1993)). Barclay’s affidavit presents the fact that the trial court judge accepted his guilty plea without an adequate factual basis as his evidence of bias. Even taking this assertion as true, it does not support a rational inference of bias or prejudice. See Smith v. State, 613 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ind.1993), reh’g denied, cert, denied (<HOLDING>); Jackson, 643 N.E.2d at 907 (holding that the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced (B) holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion (C) holding that the fact that the judge received adverse publicity for granting postconviction relief in another case did not require the judge to recuse herself (D) holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith (E) holding that counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to recuse the judge who presided at trial when the judge had also prosecuted a prior case that was used to enhance the current case
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: we next ask whether the City offered a nondiscriminatory reason for his termination and, if so, whether Adair has showed that the City’s non-retaliatory reason is pretext. As previously discussed, the City has offered ample evidence that Adair was physically unable to perform his duties as a firefighter given his lifting restrictions. Indeed, his own doctors concluded that he could not perform the duties of a firefighter. Adair’s inability to perform a firefighter’s duties constitutes a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for his termination. See Buckner, 760 P.2d at 806-07 (offering “the employee’s inability to perform the assigned duties” as an example of a non-retaliatory reason for discharge); Keddington v. City of Bartlesville, 42 P.3d 293, 298 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the City satisfied its burden. At this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that once the employees temporarytotaldisability period has ended and the employee is determined to suffer some permanent physical disability which prevents the discharge of assigned duties for the employer the employer bears no  341 liability for then terminating the employee under  341c (B) holding that an employee whose disability is related to his ability to perform the duties of his position is not disabled under the act and therefore an employer has no duty to accommodate (C) holding that an employer who has determined that the employee had not been under a disability can discipline that employee for subsequent unexcused absences and not violate section 510 (D) holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury (E) holding that after the employer determined the employee was not disabled the employer had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to terminate the employee for unexcused absences under section 510
[EX A]:
(A)

