In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Thus, CERC-LA specifically provides for a private right of action to institute civil actions to recover the costs involved in the cleanup of hazardous wastes from those responsible for their creation. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir.1989); 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 917, 111 S.Ct. 2014, 114 L.Ed.2d 101 (1991). Moreover, an entity that is responsible for the remediation of a hazardous waste site under CERCLA may assert a claim for contribution against other responsible parties under § 9613(f). New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1122 (3d Cir.1997). See also SC Holdings, Inc. v. AAA Realty Co., 935 F.Supp. 1354, 1362 (D.N.J.1996)(<HOLDING>). In its reply papers, the Novak Group does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the michigan department of natural resources liable under cercla for remedial actions which exacerbated the contamination at a site (B) recognizing a right to contribution (C) holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla (D) holding that parties liable for at least a portion of the costs of remediating a hazardous site are limited to the contribution scheme under section 9613f of cercla (E) holding that site control alone is an improper basis for imposition on lessees of owner liability under cercla
(D)

testified that Gollapudi admitted that he prepared and signed the W-2 forms and that they were false. Additionally, although Gollapudi presented evidence that the withholding amounts were true based on his “gross up” method, the District Court found this theory to be without merit based on the testimony of another IRS agent who demonstrated that no withholding was actually made. Moreover, it was established that the alleged withholding was never submitted to the IRS, but rather, was maintained in Gollapudi’s corporate checking account. Furthermore, Gollapudi’s reliance on Reynolds and Borman is misguided. Both of those cases involved § 7206(1) charges for filing the wrong tax form. Reynolds, 919 F.2d at 437 (“Using the wrong form does not violate § 7206(1).”); Borman, 992 F.2d at 126 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, in Reynolds, the theory in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that materiality is not an element of  1542 because any false statement is sufficient (B) holding that plaintiff failed to prove reasonable reliance on a false statement (C) holding that form 4790 is not an administrative rule but is merely incidental to the statute and regulations and therefore false statements on the form can lead to criminal prosecution (D) holding that filing of improper form is not enough to establish false statement for  72061 purposes (E) holding that a false schedule c is an integral part of a tax return and is incorporated therein by reference thus giving rise to liability under  72061
(D)

automobiles are likewise per se reasonable given probable cause, then by the same logic any search or seizure could be carried out without a warrant, and we would simply have read the Fourth Amendment out of the Constitution”). The Court cannot allow law enforcement to emasculate well settled constitutional protections in order to cure their own mistake. 9 . The Court notes that the Supreme Court has implied that exigent circumstances are never necessary to justify a warrantless search, but has never expressly stated such a conclusion without first noting that the vehicle in question was somehow readily mobile. See Search And Seizure, supra at 477-81, 91 S.Ct. 2022. As a result, lower courts have split when interpreting its meaning. See United States v. Reed, 26 F.3d 523 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Reis, 906 F.2d 284 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that among the circumstances accepted as providing exigent circumstances for a warrantless search are those where a true emergency exists (B) holding that officers cannot base a warrantless search on an exigent circumstance of their own creation (C) holding that the searehincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest (D) holding that camey notwithstanding the fact that a car is moveable alone is not sufficiently exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search (E) holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee

(D)

