In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

26 Ariz.App. 265, 270-71, 547 P.2d 1065, 1070-71 (1976), which held that a party is precluded from raising for the first time on appeal the trial court’s failure to make findings when specifically required to do so by Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). 179 Ariz. at 301, 878 P.2d at 657. Accordingly, I perceive that Trantor’s waiver rule applies with as much vigor to statutes or rules that specifically require findings as it does when the requirement is imposed by case law. Cf. Galloway v. Vanderpool, 205 Ariz. 252, 256, ¶ 17, 69 P.3d 23, 27 (2003) (“Once published, our interpretation [of a statute] becomes part of the statute.”); Local 266, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, A.F. of L. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 43, 275 P.2d 393, 402 (1954) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 31 One further point. Because my colleagues 
 Holding statements: (A) holding principle of statutory construction is to give effect to every clause and word of a statute (B) holding that the courts in the absence of ambiguity should as a general rule confine themselves to a construction of a statute as written and not attempt under the guise of construction to supply omissions or remedy possible defects in the statute or to insert exceptions not made by the legislature (C) recognizing rule of statutory construction that statutes must be read as a whole and sections which are part of the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given effect if it can be done by any reasonable construction (D) recognizing that unreversed statutory construction is to be held part of the statute as if originally so written (E) holding that the term shall is mandatory for purposes of statutory construction when the statute is unambiguous
(D)

Inc., and therefore, had standing. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Appellants’ motion for a directed verdict on this ground. VII. Directed Verdict on Negligence Appellants contend the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on negligence. Specifically, they maintain the existence and scope of a duty are legal questions, and no evidence was presented pertaining to duties owed by Appellants to the Association. We find this issue is not preserved for our review. Although Appellants moved for a directed verdict at the close of all testimony, they did not move for a directed verdict on the specific basis that no evidence indicated they owed a duty to the Association. Creech v. S.C. Wildlife & Marine Res. Dep’t. 328 S.C. 24, 34, 491 S.E.2d 571, 576 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Rule 50(a), SCRCP (“A motion for a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue (B) holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue (C) holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review (D) holding the appellants failure to raise a particular issue in its directed verdict motion precludes appellate review of that issue (E) holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus waived appellate review of that issue
(D)

contends that the application of the primary-jurisdiction doctrine to Plaintiffs’ RICO claims would require the dismissal of those claims, such a contention is incorrect. (Cassens Br. at 20-21.) The principal issue underlying the application of that doctrine is simply whether a federal court should postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction in deference to an administrative agency; it does not divest the Court of its subject-matter jurisdiction. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 10 L.Ed.2d 915(1963). 2 . At least one federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction has applied the primary-jurisdiction doctrine in favor of a state administrative agency. See Northwinds Abatement, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 69 F.3d 1304, 1311 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). It is unclear, however, whether that federal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the parties choiceoflaw agreement as relating to workers compensation was appropriately avoided where it offended state public policy as reflected in express provisions of the pennsylvania workers compensation act (B) holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act (C) holding the retaliation claim did arise under states workers compensation laws (D) holding that because maryland law expressly creates right to file workers compensation claim action exists for wrongful discharge for termination based solely on the filing of a workers compensation claim (E) holding that under the doctrine the district court should have stayed the diversityjurisdiction case pending the state workers compensation commissions final decision on whether the defendant properly paid certain workers compensation claims

(E)

