In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Ill 1997). AirTouch alleges that the City’s denial will in effect prohibit it from providing personal wireless services because alternative sites leave “gaps” in its service or will be too costly to provide. a. Gap In Coverage AirTouch has presented evidence of a gap in coverage in its wireless services on the Fanita Drive-Highway 125 corridor from Navajo Drive to the Highway 52 Connector. (Tifft Decl. at ¶ 11.) Air-Touch argues that if a decision leaves “significant gaps” in wireless services, § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) has been violated. The City argues that a mere gap is not sufficient; there must be a general ban for that provision to apply. AirTouch is supported by recent decisions of the Second and Third Circuit. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 640-41 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d at 70 (3rd Cir.) (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that  332c7biii applies only to blanket prohibitions and general bans or policies and not to individual zoning decisions (B) holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law (C) holding that  332c7b iii does not apply only to general bans and stating that prohibiting only general bans would 1 require a court to wait for a series of denied applications and 2 lead to the untenable result that once personal wire services are available within the jurisdiction of a state or local government  the state or local government could deny any further applications with impunity (D) holding that state bans on samesex marriage are unconstitutional (E) holding that a district court cannot require a unit of state or local government to abide by a consent decree that does not serve any federal interest
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: The agency reasonably found that unfulfilled threats, which were the only individualized harm Yang alleged he had suffered, did not rise to the level of persecution. See Ci Pan v. United States Atty. General, 449 F.3d 408, 412-13 (2d Cir.2006). This is so, even when considered in conjunction with his father’s alleged beating, because, as the IJ noted, Yang did not allege that this incident resulted in any injuries to his father or caused Yang any continuing harm. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir.2007) (“the statutory scheme unambiguously dictates that applicants can become candidates for asylum relief only based on persecution that they themselves have suffered or must suffer”); see also Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141-42 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the agency did not err in finding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an asylum applicant cannot claim past persecution based solely on the harm that was inflicted on a family member on account of that family members political opinion or other protected characteristic (B) recognizing that an applicant may be able to demonstrate persecution based on persecution of family members where the applicant shares  the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family member was in the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident citing jorgetzoc v gonzales 435 f3d 146 150 2d cir2006 (C) holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution (D) recognizing that the harm suffered by family members in combination with other factors  would presumably only be persecution where  the applicant not only shares or is perceived to share the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family members but was also within the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident (E) holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: offense committed as to violate the Constitution” (emphasis added)). In this case, however, Howerin presented no evidence that a fine was imposed as part of his Florida sentence. Relatedly, the fact that a forfeiture within the congressionally mandated range of fines is presumptively constitutional does not mean that a forfeiture outside of that range is presumptively unconstitutional. Congress has authorized both a fine and forfeiture as part of the punishment for many offenses, thus suggesting that it does not consider a punishment somewhat above the statutory fine range to be excessive. A forfeiture far in excess of the statutory fine range, however, is likely to violate the Excessive Fines Clause. See United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1498-99 & n. 6 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>) 10 . Howerin, in his deposition in this case, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (B) holding that forfeiture of property valued at 150000 was excessive where the maximum statutory fine was 20000 (C) holding in a case where the maximum time of imprisonment was extended because an indigent defendant was unable to pay a fine and court costs that a state may not constitutionally imprison beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute a defendant who is financially unable to pay a fine (D) holding that forfeiture of 357144 in currency was excessive where the maximum statutory fine was 250000 and the maximum fine under the sentencing guidelines was 5000 (E) holding that forfeiture of property valued at 65000 was not excessive where the maximum fine under the sentencing guidelines was 40000
[EX A]:
(B)

