In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: background nor his current offense can support the conclusion that he is a worst offender. The maximum sentence was therefore not justified. In deciding to impose the maximum sentence, Judge Michalski relied primarily on his conclusion that Skrepich was incapable of rehabilitation and could not personally be deterred. The judge thus gave primary emphasis to the need to protect the public by isolating Skrepich from the community. While the judge also indicated that a lengthy sentence would serve the sentencing goals of general deterrence and community condemnation, it seems clear that these goals could not, in themselves, support the imposition of a maximum, ten-year term for a first offender convicted of a class B felony. See Pears v. State, 698 P.2d 1198, 1204-05 (Alaska 1985) (<HOLDING>). The appropriateness of the maximum term 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts failure to explain the effect of supervised release was harmless where the maximum term of incarceration under the actual sentence of imprisonment and supervised release less than six years as well as his worstcase scenario less than nine years was less than the maximum term of incarceration twenty years al lowed by law (B) holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony (C) holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder (D) holding that a term of substantially less than twenty years would serve the objectives of general deterrence and community condemnation in the case of a first offender convicted of seconddegree murder an unclassified felony (E) holding that twenty years was not excessive for second felony offender convicted of simple burglary
[A]: (D)


[Q]: the interests of the group of claimants as .a whole necessitates the setting of deadlines to dislodge claims stalled in the claims resolution process. Finally, the Court notes that this conclusion is completely consistent with prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, the Court has, on several occasions, upheld Trust deadlines. See Almalich v. Dalkon Shield Claimant’s Trust, Docket No. 19103 (July 29,1994) (deadline regarding submission of claims material within day-to-day operations); Gunnell, Docket No. 19331 (ADR deadlines within day-to-day operations). Moreover, the Court has affirmed the Trust’s disallowance authority. See e.g., Almalich, Docket No. 19103 (affirming disallowance of claims for failure to submit final claim materials by the stated deadline); Mantush, Docket No. 18298 (<HOLDING>); Besag, Docket No. 19492 (affirming Trust 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust (B) holding that statutory grounds for recusal can be waived both by failing to object and by failing to assert error on appeal (C) recognizing where naked trust created the division of naked legal title and equitable title which may be united at option of cestui que trust (D) recognizing trust authority to disallow claims for failing to select an option by july 1 1991 deadline (E) holding that a third party who receives trust property on inquiry notice that a trustee has misappropriated trust funds is also liable for breach of trust
[A]: (D)


[Q]: to arbitration the question of whether the successor has somehow assumed any of the obligations of the old bargaining agreement.”), with Stardyne, Inc. v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 141, 145 n. 3 (3d Cir.1994) (stating that a "successor [is] not bound by its predecessor’s collective bargaining agreement”), NLRB v. Rockwood Energy and Mineral Corp., 942 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir.1991) ("[A] successor is not bound by the substantive terms of its predecessor's labor agreement.”), and United Steelworkers of Am. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 828 F.2d 1001, 1010 (3d Cir.1987) ("[A] successor employer is not automatically re quired to adopt its predecessor’s collectively bargained agreements, see NLRB v. Burns.”). 4 . Compare Stotter Div. of Graduate Plastics Co. v. District 65, 991 F.2d 997, 1001 (2nd Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), and Boeing Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a successor corporation had a duty to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under its predecessors cba because there was substantial continuity in the business enterprise (B) holding that the operation of a competitive business enterprise which was expected to provide a financial return that would be of benefit to the municipal corporation was proprietary (C) holding that the employer had a protectible interest in its good will where the employee had direct contact with its customers and much of the employers business was repeat business (D) holding  substantial continuity is untenable as a basis for successor liability under cercla (E) holding that in the context of erisa successor liability is not an independent cause of action but simply a theory for imposing liability based on a predecessors erisa violation
[A]:
(A)


