In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

676 F.2d 969, 975 (3d Cir. 1982); Carty v. Schneider, 986 F. Supp. 933, 38 V.I. 213 (D.V.I. 1997). In contrast, a fine is a criminal contempt sanction if the amount of the fine is fixed and imposed unconditionally as a punishment for past disobedience. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632-33 (“An unconditional penalty is criminal in nature because it is solely and exclusively punitive in character.” (citations and quotations omitted)); see also Latrobe Steel Co., 545 F.2d at 1343 (“[T]he penalties arising out of adjudications of criminal contempt are generally an absolute fine of a specific amount . . . .”). Criminal fines are retroactive, and may not be avoided by purging the contemptuous conduct. See Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590, 67 S. Ct. 918, 921, 91 L. Ed. 1117 (1947) (<HOLDING>). Here, the June 13, 2006, order was phrased in 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that because a district courts determination of the appropriate fine involves factual issues including the defendants ability to pay the fine imposedthe district courts calculation of the fine is entitled to deference and can be reversed on appeal only for clear error (B) holding that where the language of the statute required the imposition of both confinement of which a portion could not be suspended and a fine the court had the ability to impose a fine and then suspend it (C) holding that a flat unconditional fine for 50 was a criminal sanction because the contemnor had no subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through compliance (D) holding that a fiftytwo million dollar fine could not be imposed as a sanction for criminal contempt except through a jury trial (E) holding that the failure to impose a mandatory fine requires that the matter be remanded for imposition of that fine
(C)

Under section 22.011(c), a “child” is a person “younger than 17 years of age who is not the spouse of the actor.” Id. 22.011(c)(1). A “spouse” means a person who is legally married to another. Id. 22.011(c)(2). Legal marriage in Texas requires a marriage license or proof of an informal marriage. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 2.001(b), 2.401 (Vernon 2006). A marriage license may not be issued for the marriage of persons of the same sex. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 2.001(b). An informal marriage is solely recognized between a man and a woman. Id. § 2.401. Here, because the State clearly showed that J.B. is a male and that appellant is male, the evidence is legally sufficient to prove that appellant was not married to J.B. See Jacques v. State, 579 S.W.2d 247, 248-49 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (<HOLDING>); Henson v. State, 638 S.W.2d 504, 505 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that money invested in voluntary investment plan during marriage was marital property because it was property acquired during marriage (B) holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of  an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred (C) recognizing that basis for deportation was aliens misrepresentation about his marriage not the validity of his marriage (D) holding husband could not have marriage annulled because wife was pregnant by him at time of marriage (E) holding that appellants substantive rights were not prejudiced by omission in indictment that complainant was not the spouse of the defendant because it had been clearly shown that both appellant and complainant were male and that they could not have obtained marriage license nor entered into commonlaw marriage
(E)

a recent unpublished decision, United States v. Seals, this court held that Johnson was properly applied retroactively to the defendant’s original conviction, which occurred in 1992. The court stated that “[i]f a judicial construction of a criminal statute is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue, it must not be given retroactive effect.” Because a circuit-split existed prior to Johnson and at the time of the defendant’s original conviction and sentencing, the court concluded that Johnson’s construc t. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004) (distinguishing between rules that are jurisdictional and rules that are merely inflexible claim-processing rules); see also United States v. Leijano-Cruz, 473 F.3d 571, 573-74 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). 4 . - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that issue exhaustion is a mandatory although not jurisdictional requirement (B) recognizing the two lines of child custody cases but declining to resolve conflict (C) recognizing authority but declining to issue writ (D) holding that kontrick and eberhart require the conclusion that rule 59e is a claimprocessing rule (E) recognizing that eberhart and kontrick suggest that rule 4b is not jurisdictional but declining to resolve the issue

(E)

