In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). In Landgraf, the Court noted that a statute only truly operates retroactively if applying it would “impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.” Id. 114 S.Ct. at 1505; see also RTC v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 30 F.3d 1384, 1387-88 (11th Cir.1994)(analyzing retroactivity of lease repudiation damage limitation provision of FIRREA). Thus, like other courts that have analyzed similar FIRREA provisions, we must address prior banking law to determine whether application of the damage limitation provisions of § 1821(e)(3) would have the retroactive effect defined in Landgraf. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit, 30 F.3d at 1388 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that, in the Crafts’ case, it 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is not retroactive (B) holding that firreas damage limitations for repudiation of leases worked no substantive change in the law and thus their application was not retroactive (C) holding retroactive application (D) holding no retroactive application (E) recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary
[A]: (B)


[Q]: statute and provides for a specific penalty of a fine of $1250. Id. § 321 J.2(2)(a)(2); see State v. Daniel, 574 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Iowa 1998) (“[T]he district court may not use the penalty provisions provided in section 903.1(1) if a specific penalty is provided in another statute.”). Because section 903.1 is only applicable “if a specific penalty is not provided fo'd’ and section 321J.2 does provide for a specific penalty, section 903.1 is not applicable as to the fine portion of the sentence. Iowa Code § 903.1(1) (emphasis added). Furthermore, as we noted above, we read general and specific statutes together, but if an irreconcilable conflict exists between the general and specific statutes, then the specific statute prevails. Lutgen, 606 N.W.2d at 314; see Lee, 561 N.W.2d at 354-55 (<HOLDING>); Sandifer, 570 N.W.2d at 257 (same). In this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1001 controls over the limitations provision of the wrongful death statute (B) holding a specific sentencing statute controls over the general sentencing provisions of section 9031 (C) recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one (D) holding that specific statutory provisions take priority over general statutory provisions (E) holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls
[A]: (B)


[Q]: in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination. The Declaratory Judgment Statute is applicable only where there is a present actual controversy, and all interested persons are made parties, and only where justiciable issues are presented. It does not undertake to decide the legal effect of laws upon a state of facts which is future, contingent or uncertain. A declaratory judgment will not be granted unless the danger or dilemma of the plaintiff is present, not contingent on the happening of hypothetical future events; the prejudice to his position must be actual and genuine and not merely possible, speculative, contingent, or remote. Id. (quoting Anderson on Declaratory Judgments (2d. ed. 1951)); see also Cummings v. City of Fayetteville, 294 Ark. 151, 741 S.W.2d 638 (1987) (<HOLDING>). In the case brought to us for decision, I 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that under 28 usc  1292b the appellate courts may review only matters in the order not all issues in the case (B) holding that although a state may be free to develop its own laws of search and seizure to meet law enforcement needs such laws may not authorize police conduct which trenches upon fourth amendment rights regardless of the labels which it attaches to such conduct (C) recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice (D) holding that there was no justiciable controversy and that while many laws may be easily subject to challenge we may only review such matters in a proper law suit (E) holding that the summoned party may in an enforcement proceeding challenge the  7609f2 determination that there is a reasonable basis for believing there may be a violation of a revenue law
[A]:
(D)


