In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: all of the requested documents meet that definition however. That is an issue for the trial court to resolve when it reconsiders Gulfcoast’s objections. We next address the issue of the trial court’s failure to perform a balancing test or conduct an in camera review. “When a party asserts the need for protection against disclosure of a trade secret, the court must first determine whether, in fact, the disputed information is a trade secret [which] usually requires the court to conduct an in camera review.” Summitbridge Nat’l Invs. v. 1221 Palm Harbor, L.L.C., 67 So.3d 448, 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (citing Ameritrust Ins. v. O’Donnell Landscapes, 899 So.2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)); see also Westco, Inc. v. Scott Lewis’ Gardening & Trimming, 26 So.3d 620, 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>). This court has previously held that internal 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a party claims a document is privileged and the trial court fails to conduct an in camera review or balancing test the trial court has departed from the essential requirements of the law (B) holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial (C) holding that the proper test for balancing national security interests with a persons due process rights is the mathews balancing test (D) recognizing that a party cannot complain on appeal that the trial court considered an issue that that party consented to submit to the trial court (E) holding that in eases where the state fails to disclose to the defendant prior to trial the substance of any oral statement allegedly made by the defendant then the state has committed a discovery violation and the trial court must conduct a richardson hearing upon learning of the possible violation
[A]: (A)


[Q]: that is presumptively constitutional). The only case of which I am aware construing DeFillippo and denying qualified immunity is Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Board, 279 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2002). But in that case “two Ninth Circuit cases [were] directly on point” because they had declared parallel statutes of other States — permitting an arrest for refusing to identify oneself — unconstitutional. Id. at 881. That of course does not remotely describe today’s case. Nor does Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250 (6th Cir.1997), offer any refuge to Leonard. It dealt not with the question whether an officer could be denied qualified immunity for failing to predict a judicial ruling declaring a statute unconstitutional but with whether the statute covered the plaintiffs conduct. See id. at 1256 (<HOLDING>). In the end, Leonard not only asks us to take 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arrest to retrieve car keys where ownership of the car was in dispute was not supported by probable cause (B) holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same (C) holding that shouting epithets from a moving car did not provide probable cause to arrest the plaintiff under a disorderlyconduct statute (D) holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest (E) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment
[A]: (C)


[Q]: F.Supp. 842 (E.D.Pa.1974): To be sure, there are reasons for requiring the defendant to carry the burden of coming forward and alleging a substantial change. In many cases, the alleged substantial change is perceived only by the defendant who should, therefore, . 219, 491 N.E.2d 33, 36 (1986) (stating that “there is no duty upon plaintiffs in making a prima facie product liability case to eliminate all possible causes of the incident other than the one they alleged” (citation omitted)); Kuhnke v. Textron, Inc., 140 Ariz. 587, 684 P.2d 159, 162 (1984) (ruling that “once a defendant comes forward with some evidence of substantial change, the burden is on the plaintiff to show no substantial change” (citing Southmre)); Hiller v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A, 671 P.2d 369, 372 (Alaska 1983) (<HOLDING>); cf. Dutsch v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 845 P.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding there is no authority that provides that the mere sale of a consumer electronics product in california can create a duty to disclose any defect that may occur during the useful life of the product (B) holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury (C) holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control (D) holding that the plaintiff must first establish that the product left the sellers hands in a defective condition after which the seller may introduce evidence that its product was substantially altered after leaving its possession which evidence may rebut or overcome the plaintiffs showing that his injuries were a result of the products defect (E) holding that a cause of action does not arise in negligence when a product malfunctions or is defective and the malfunction or defect results in damage only to the product itself and produces only economic loss
[A]:
(D)


