In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

fact that the oil traversed part of Transocean’s vessel before entering the Gulf of Mexico. We recognize that the aforementioned incidents involved blameless third parties, whereas here the owner or operator of the Deepwater Horizon might have contributed to the discharge. By all accounts, if the vessel’s blowout preventer had functioned properly, the oil would not have entered navigable waters in violation of the Clean Water Act. The defendants therefore reason that liability is properly imposed upon the owner or operator of the Deepwater Horizon. Yet it is well estab lished that this section of the Clean Water Act leaves no room for civil-penalty defendants to shift liability via allegations of third-party fault. See United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1314 (7th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Early in the implementation of the Act’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding defendant assumed risk that third party would consent to search of storage locker where defendant instructed third party to rent locker under third partys name and allowed third party to keep possession of lease papers and to occasionally retain the keys (B) holding exculpatory statements by a third party should have been admitted in the punishment phase notwithstanding the hearsay rule (C) holding principal liable to third party for tort of agent despite lack of privity between principal and third party (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding defendant liable for penalty notwithstanding fault of a third party
(E)

use of low-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle. While we recognize that drivers may be accustomed to quickly flashing their high-beam headlights at an oncoming vehicle as a signal to dim headlights, there is no evidence in this case that the officer was driving with his high-beam headlights. Furthermore, the statute does not provide any exceptions for the momentary flashing of high-beam headlights. Thus, we must conclude the statute prohibits the use of high-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle, for any length of time and for any purpose. [¶ 12] We recognize that at least one other appellate court has interpreted similar statutory language and reached the opposite conclusion. See Waukesha County v. Meinhardt, 2001 WI App 146, ¶¶ 9-10, 630 N.W.2d 277 (<HOLDING>). In another case involving a similar statute, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that meinhardt did not commit a violation by flashing his highbeam headlights two times at an oncoming vehicle because the plain language of the statute did not prohibit the quick flashing of highbeam headlights (B) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect (C) holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute (D) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (E) holding the trial judge did not commit reversible error through the chosen method of remedying the batson violation
(A)

upon ‘counsel’s investigation.’ ” (plf. memo in opp. at 9). Thus, they conclude, plaintiffs are not subject to the heightened pleading standard established by § 78u — 4(b)(1)(B). Several courts have held that when pleadings are based on counsel’s investigation of SEC filings, securities analyst’s reports, and information obtained from former employees, they are not pleading “based on information and belief’ and are therefore not subject to final provision of § 78u-4(b)(1)(B). See Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F.Supp. 910, 915 (N.D.Cal.1997); Warman v. Overland Data, Inc., 1998 WL 110018, *3 (S.D.Cal.). Other courts have held that a general statement regarding “investigation of counsel” is insufficient to avoid PSLRA requirements. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 997 F.Supp. 425, 431 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (<HOLDING>). These holdings are not necessarily 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that single paragraph asserting that plaintiffs based their information and belief on investigation of sec filings analysts reports press releases and discussions with consultants neither provided required facts underlying complaints allegations nor directed court to where facts could be found (B) holding that plaintiffs need only allege that defendants provided information to the securities analysts upon which the reports were based (C) holding that underlying complaints filed by several plaintiffs all contained express allegations of property damage and that because all complaints arose from the same set of circumstances the allegations in any single complaint can be inferred in the other complaints (D) holding that plaintiffs may plead on information and belief if matters are not within their personal knowledge (E) holding that scienter had not adequately been pled where the plaintiffs provided none of the required facts underlying the complaints allegations as to the information that was supposedly available to the individual defendants

(A)

