In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

use of low-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle. While we recognize that drivers may be accustomed to quickly flashing their high-beam headlights at an oncoming vehicle as a signal to dim headlights, there is no evidence in this case that the officer was driving with his high-beam headlights. Furthermore, the statute does not provide any exceptions for the momentary flashing of high-beam headlights. Thus, we must conclude the statute prohibits the use of high-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle, for any length of time and for any purpose. [¶ 12] We recognize that at least one other appellate court has interpreted similar statutory language and reached the opposite conclusion. See Waukesha County v. Meinhardt, 2001 WI App 146, ¶¶ 9-10, 630 N.W.2d 277 (<HOLDING>). In another case involving a similar statute, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that meinhardt did not commit a violation by flashing his highbeam headlights two times at an oncoming vehicle because the plain language of the statute did not prohibit the quick flashing of highbeam headlights (B) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect (C) holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute (D) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (E) holding the trial judge did not commit reversible error through the chosen method of remedying the batson violation
(A)

that, although the trial court was initially prepared to suppress based solely on the deputies’ conduct in providing Gomez’s name, the court ultimately applied the Neil factors and, finding that the identification was unreliable, ruled the state failed to establish that the witness’ recollection was independent of the suggestive identification. On these facts, the trial court could properly conclude that it was unnecessarily suggestive for the victims to be provided the defendant’s name and resulting access to his photo on the website before having any opportunity to identify him, thus giving rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See generally Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 518 (Fla.2005)(quoting Washington v. State, 653 So.2d 362, 365 (Fla.1994)) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. State, 566 So.2d 888, 890 (Fla. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that showup identification proce dure was not unduly suggestive where officer said to eyewitness we got two guys in the car similar to the ones you told us about (B) holding that unprovoked flight is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing but it is certainly suggestive of such (C) holding showing of a single photo is unduly suggestive (D) holding that showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive where defendant was handcuffed and placed under police spotlight (E) holding due process requires suppression of testimony regarding pretrial identification when procedure employed is impermissibly suggestive
(C)

to and including a present violation, so that it is the cumulative effect of the discriminatory practice, rather than any discrete occurrence, that gives rise to the cause of action. Cooper-Day v. RME Petroleum Co., 121 S.W.3d 78, 87 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied); see also Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 239 (5th Cir.1998). In Davis, the Austin Court of Appeals held that in some instances “equitable considerations may require that the filing period not begin until acts supportive of a civil rights action are, or should be, apparent to a reasonably prudent person in the same or a similar position.” Id. The “focus is on what event should, in fairness and logic, have alerted the average layperson to act to protect his or her rights.” Id.; see also Huckabay, 142 F.3d at 239 (<HOLDING>). Appellees respond that all of Davis’s 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that in determining whether a discovery violation warrants the sanction of exclusion of evidence a court must look to whether the violation was substantial the timing of the violation the reason for the violation the degree of prejudice to the parties whether such prejudice may be cured by a postponement and the desirability of a continuance (B) holding the touchstone of determining existence of erisa plan is whether an administrative scheme is required (C) holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  (D) holding that touchstone in determining whether one act is part of continuing violation is whether employee was put on notice that his rights had been violated (E) holding that in determining whether a state officer is entitled to qualified immunity for  1983 purposes courts may not consider whether the constitutional right was clearly established before determining first that a constitutional right was violated

(D)

