In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: carrying it during and in relation to such a crime, with additional penalties attaching if the firearm was brandished or discharged. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Whether the defendant was accountable for one firearm or ten, however, is completely irrelevant to the commission of the § 924(c) offense. Thus, because § 924(c) pertains to particular unlawful uses of a firearm while § 2K2.1(b)(l) pertains to the number of firearms involved, these two enhancements punish different types of conduct. We therefore conclude that enhancing a defendant’s offense level based on the number of weapons involved in the offense underlying his § 924(c) conviction does not constitute impermissible double counting under the Guidelines. Accord United States v. Terrell, 608 F.3d 679, 683-84 (10th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Vincent, 20 F.3d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that trading drugs for a gun violates the in furtherance of prong of  924c (B) holding that evidence is sufficient for  924c conviction where it shows weapons proximity to drugs and its accessibility (C) holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a  924c sentence for the same firearm (D) holding that because the number of weapons involved in the underlying offense to a  924c conviction is a separate type of offense conduct than that punished by  924c itself the district court did not engage in doublecounting  when it applied an  increase under  2k21bla in conjunction with the sentence for violating  924c (E) holding without discussion that the district court erred by applying the numberofweapons enhancement to an offense underlying the defendants  924c conviction

A: (D)
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Q: bankruptcy trustee from selling or administering the homestead, even for the benefit of joint creditors. The legal effect of the non-debtor spouse’s right to assert the Florida constitutional exemption meant that the debtor spouse was still “receiving the benefits” of the Florida constitutional exemption, even though he had not claimed that exemption in his bankruptcy case. Consequently, the debtor was ruled ineligible for the wildcard exemption. The court noted that a different outcome would have obtained if the non-debtor spouse had affirmatively waived the right to claim the homestead protection. No such waiver existed, however, either in Hernandez or in this case. Other courts have also reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., In re Watford, 427 B.R. 552, 559 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2010) (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Bennett, 395 B.R. 781, 790 (Bankr. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding despite contrary authority that husband debtor with a mere possessoiy interest was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption and stating it is a fundamental tenet of the law of exemptions that the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before an exemption may be claimed a long line of illinois cases has required that a debtor have title or some ownership interest in property in order to claim a homestead exemption other courts deciding the issue under the federal exemption scheme have held that the key word is interest and that an interest in real property up to a specified amount implies a monetary interest more than just one spouses right to reside with the other (B) holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a selfsettled revocable trust even though the settlor and the beneficiary as well as the bankruptcy debtor were the same person (C) holding that where a married debtor files an individual bankruptcy case and claims the  522b3b tbe exemption the debtor indirectly obtains the benefit of floridas constitutional homestead protection by virtue of the nondebtor spouses ability to claim the homestead exemption (D) holding that the general homestead exemption may not be invoked to defeat claims against the holder for taxes and assessments against the homestead property (E) holding even though debtor would have been entitled to iowa homestead exemption but for former spouses iowa code section 59821 lien debtor could not avoid the lien because it attached to the homestead prior to or simultaneously with debtors acquisition of the interest in the homestead

A: (C)
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Q: erred by failing to instruct the jury that a confidential informant’s testimony must be corroborated, in conformity with article 38.141. We agree. Our holding that there was some “other evidence” to satisfy the statutory corroboration requirement does not eliminate the need for an instruction. See Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (noting court “might disagree” with court of appeals’s holding that there was no evidence ten o the trial court’s failure to charge the jury on the requirements of article 38.141 here, but asserts that the trial court’s error resulted in harm under the “egregious harm standard” of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (applying egregious harm analysis to unobjected-to charge error). See Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632 (<HOLDING>); Saunders, 817 S.W.2d at 692 (holding 
 Holding statements: (A) holding egregious harm standard applied where appellant failed to object to lack of instruction on accomplice witness testimony (B) holding egregious harm resulted from erroneous jury instruction authorizing conviction based on legally inadequate theory (C) holding that it was prejudicial error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even where the defendant did not object at trial to the lack of such an instruction when the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated (D) holding that where appellant failed to present either expert or lay testimony as to the appropriate standard of care to be used appellant failed to present any evidence indicating the existence of an issue of fact thus summary judgment was proper (E) holding that a party waived an allegation that an instruction was erroneous where the party failed to object at trial to the instruction on those grounds

A:
(A)
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