In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: the terms of the agreement as to the status of the donor in writing. After the mother and her partner ended their relationship, the sperm donor filed suit to adjudicate his parental rights. The court looked to the plain language of the Texas statute and determined that the sperm donor lacked standing to pursue the paternity action. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 160.702 (Vernon Supp.2006) (“A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”). The “do-it-yóurself” manner in which the artificial insemination was conducted does not alter the fact that B.O.C. was a sperm donor under section 742.14. The statute does not require that the artificial insemination be performed in a clinical setting to apply. Compare McIntyre v. Crouch, 98 Or.App. 462, 780 P.2d 239 (1989) (<HOLDING>), with C.O. v. W.S., 64 Ohio Misc.2d 9, 639 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where the donor nonpaternity statute did not explicitly reference physician involvement the statute applied even though the sperm was not provided to a physician (B) holding that writ was explicitly abolished by statute (C) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (D) holding that where first amendment freedoms are not infringed by the statute a vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of the case (E) holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause

A: (A)
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Q: and the prosecutor, the Court finds, one, there is a factual basis for the entry of the plea[.]” We conclude that the summary of the facts presented by the prosecutor and Defendant’s stipulations are sufficient to establish a factual basis for Defendant’s guilty plea. Specifically, the prosecutor’s statements that the victim “is 80 years of age” and “is crippled in her knees with arthritis and requires a crutch to walk” and that Defendant “told his mother that he would kill her and cut her heart out[,]” “grabbed the victim[,]” and “slung her across the room twice and then hit her with her crutch” provided a sufficient factual basis to support Defendant’s guilty plea. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.1(a) & (e); see also State v. May, 159 N.C. App. 159, 166, 583 S.E.2d 302, 306 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude this argument has no 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea (B) holding that district court abused discretion in denying motion to withdraw plea based on intervening supreme court decision that may have rendered factual basis of plea insufficient (C) holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed (D) holding that although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari (E) holding that district court properly considered a police report that the defendant had stipulated contained a factual basis for his plea

A: (C)
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Q: by well-reasoned medical opinion notwithstanding the presence of negative x-ray evidence under § 718.202(a)(4). See Newell v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 933 F.2d 510, 511 n. 2 (7th Cir.1991). Specifically, he cited the opinions of Dr. Robert Avena, Mr. Hubbell’s treating physician for his final three years who diagnosed pneumoconiosis; Dr. Frederick Ridge, who listed the disease as one of the causes of death; and Dr. Anand Bhuptani, who suspected that Mr. Hubbell had COPD, and hinted that it was related to his exposure to coal dust. Peabody does not contest that Mr. Hub-bell had pneumoconiosis; instead, it takes issue with the ALJ’s conclusion that Mr. Hubbell’s pneumoconiosis hastened his death under 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c)(2). See Peabody Coal Co., 972 F.2d at 183-84 (<HOLDING>); see also Livermore, 297 F.3d at 671. In doing 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute (B) holding a wrongful death action may not be maintained for the death of an unborn child (C) recognizing that any condition that hastens death qualifies as a substantially contributing cause or factor leading to death under  718205c2 (D) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (E) holding applicable the directors interpretation of 20 cfr  718205c2 to mean anything that has an actual or real share in producing an effect and that any condition which hastens death fits this description 

A:
(C)
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