In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: of the statute, the FDA’s regulations, the FDA’s internal interpretation, and precedent all demonstrate that a sterilizer for dental hand-pieces is a “device” as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321(h). That being so, both SteriSafe and its accessory SteriDot are within the jurisdiction of the FFDCA. Defendant nevertheless posits three reasons why SteriSafe and SteriDot are not devices. First, defendant argues that the government failed to prove that dental handpieces transmit disease and, thus, that SteriSafe actually prevents disease. Such proof is not required. Congress had two purposes in enacting' the FFDCA: (1) to regulate products that actually prevent disease, and (2) to regulate products that falsely claim that they prevent disease. Because of those d 1006 (9th Cir.1952) (<HOLDING>). Defendant next argues that the Steri-Safe is 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because the doctor who submitted an expert report did not demonstrate knowledge of cancer treatment he was not qualified to offer an opinion that an earlier diagnosis could have produced a better outcome for the plaintiff (B) holding that a machine that allegedly eliminated lumps from womens breasts was governed by the ffdca even though expert witnesses expressed the unanimous belief that appellants instruments are useless for diagnosis or treatment of any human ailment (C) holding the expert witnesses were protected by witness immunity to ensure expert objectivity (D) holding in a case where there was no evidence that the expert was incompetent or that the petitioners lawyers had any reason to question the experts professional qualifications that it was objectively reasonable for  trial counsel to rely upon the experts diagnosis (E) holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law
[A]: (B)


[Q]: from representing plaintiffs “in either this or similar actions.” Id. at 1196. Likewise here, Yanny would be prohibited from representing the interests of any party against his former client, the Church of Scientology organization. However, I see no basis for precluding Berry or the Musick, Peeler firm from representing F.A.C.T.Net based on the fact that they formerly represented Yanny in defending him against charges made by the Church of Scientology. Moreover, in suing Yanny as it did, Plaintiffs waived any privilege with respect to any information relevant to the issues raised by their claims and released Yanny from his obligation of secrecy with respect to that information. See Carlson, Collins, Gordon & Bold v. Banducci, 257 Cal.App.2d 212, 228, 64 Cal-Rptr. 915 (Cal.App.1967) (<HOLDING>) That principle of California professional 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (B) holding that authorization cards are privileged from disclosure to employer (C) holding an attorney is released from those obligations of secrecy which the law places upon him whenever the disclosure of a communication otherwise privileged becomes necessary to the protection of the attorneys own rights (D) holding that a document which is given to an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice is privileged in the hands of the attorney only if it was privileged in the hands of the client (E) holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense
[A]: (C)


[Q]: that he or she possesses all the constitutional and statutory requirements of the office for which the candidate has filed. Subsection (2) clearly requires the petition to be sworn to by the candidate and not less than two registered voters. Subsection (3) requires, by its plain language, the candidate to swear that he meets the requirements for the office. We do not believe the statute should be interpreted as requiring the registered voters to also swear that the candidate meets the requirements of the office. Such interpretation is inconsistent with the language of subsection (3) and does not reflect a liberal interpretation in favor of allowing the candidate (Waterman) to continue on the ballot under these circumstances. See Heleringer v. Brown, Ky., 104 S.W.3d 397 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Rather, we interpret subsection (2) as merely 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that courts should liberally construe the requirements of rule 3 (B) holding that coas should be construed liberally (C) recognizing the rule of statutory interpretation that laws are to be liberally construed so as to reach a substantially correct result and the court should to every reasonable extent interpret such provisions as directory rather than mandatory (D) holding that statutes should not be interpreted so as to render any of its provisions nugatory (E) holding that election laws should be liberally interpreted so as to allow the candidate to stand for election
[A]:
(E)


