In this task, you will be presented with a context passage, a question about that paragraph, and a possible answer to that question. The task is to check the validity of the answer. Answer with "Yes" or "No".

While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful. As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists." In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on  Bin Laden. They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed  Bin Laden. President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding  Bin Laden." I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get  Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two." The U.S. effort continued. <sep>Who was for President Clinton visiting Pakistan and who was against it?<sep>State department was for and CIA and Secret Service were against
Yes

Still untaken are several steps that required goodwill from local bar associations and others who had opposed the combination. "[I am] not a fan of Neal's," admitted John Peck, a former board member of the San Gabriel-Pomona Valley program and a Pasadena Bar Association board member. Peck says bad feelings still linger among Ailies of the old program who feel left out. "They really screwed us. We had a good program," Peck said. An observer familiar with the reconfiguration debate who requested anonymity wondered why Dudovitz had not spent more time mending fences. "He ought to be bending over backwards for reconciliation, but if you want to do impact work and people in the San Gabriel Valley want direct services, you have to accommodate that or change your approach," the observer said. "Neal would never consider doing that." More than a year after he officially incorporated the San Gabriel-Pomona Valley, Dudovitz had not placed a local resident on the board of Neighborhood Legal Services or made the rounds of the private legal community to recruit the volunteer lawyers. "Our emphasis has been on having our potential clients know about us and deliver services to them," Dudovitz said. "We have done that spectacularly." He did not hire any of the old program's nine lawyers and has yet to permanently place any of his 18 new hires in the San Gabriel-Pomona Valley. The lack of a legal aid presence in Pomona prompted the bar association and court officials to start their own once-monthly family law clinic. After learning of the effort, Dudovitz sent personnel to staff the clinic for three hours per week and is helping to write a grant application to fund a self-help kiosk for Pomona patterned on the center he pioneered in Van Nuys. The help, although late, has earned Dudovitz some appreciation. "There has been a transition and [the clinic] has helped to fill some void," said Deni Butler, administrator for the Eastern District Superior Court. "But we are working together quite nicely contrary to what the other side issue is." Scott Wheeler, president of the Eastern Bar Association of Los Angeles and an ally of the old program, said he mobilized his 200 members to staff the clinic after watching the ranks of unserved poor grow over the past year. <sep>What did Dudovitz feel he had done spectacularly?<sep>Successfully made amends to John Peck
No

In chapters 3 and 4 we described how the U.S. government adjusted its existing agencies and capacities to address the emerging threat from Usama  Bin Laden and his associates. After the August 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Bill Clinton and his chief aides explored ways of getting  Bin Laden expelled from Afghanistan or possibly capturing or even killing him. Although disruption efforts around the world had achieved some successes, the core of  Bin Laden's organization remained intact. President Clinton was deeply concerned about  Bin Laden. He and his national security advisor, Samuel "Sandy" Berger, ensured they had a special daily pipeline of reports feeding them the latest updates on  Bin Laden's reported location. In public, President Clinton spoke repeatedly about the threat of terrorism, referring to terrorist training camps but saying little about  Bin Laden and nothing about al Qaeda. He explained to us that this was deliberate-intended to avoid enhancing  Bin Laden's stature by giving him unnecessary publicity. His speeches focused especially on the danger of nonstate actors and of chemical and biological weapons. As the millennium approached, the most publicized worries were not about terrorism but about computer breakdowns-the Y2K scare. Some government officials were concerned that terrorists would take advantage of such breakdowns. On November 30, 1999, Jordanian intelligence intercepted a telephone call between Abu Zubaydah, a longtime ally of  Bin Laden, and Khadr Abu Hoshar, a Palestinian extremist. Abu Zubaydah said, "The time for training is over." Suspecting that this was a signal for Abu Hoshar to commence a terrorist operation, Jordanian police arrested Abu Hoshar and 15 others and informed Washington. One of the 16, Raed Hijazi, had been born in California to Palestinian parents; after spending his childhood in the Middle East, he had returned to northern California, taken refuge in extremist Islamist beliefs, and then made his way to Abu Zubaydah's Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, where he learned the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare. He and his younger brother had been recruited by Abu Hoshar into a loosely knit plot to attack Jewish and American targets in Jordan. After late 1996, when Abu Hoshar was arrested and jailed, Hijazi moved back to the United States, worked as a cabdriver in Boston, and sent money back to his fellow plotters. After Abu Hoshar's release, Hijazi shuttled between Boston and Jordan gathering money and supplies. With Abu Hoshar, he recruited inTurkey and Syria as well as Jordan; with Abu Zubaydah's assistance, Abu Hoshar sent these recruits to Afghanistan for training. <sep>What type of breakdowns were some officials concerned terrorist would take advantage of?<sep>Chemical and biological weapons

No

