Dubai's Crown Prince Sheikh Mohamed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum inaugurated a free zone for e-commerce today, called Dubai Internet City. The preliminary stages of the project, the only one of its kind according to its designers, are estimated at $200 million. Sheikh Mohamed, who is also the Defense Minister of the United Arab Emirates, announced at the inauguration ceremony that "we want to make Dubai a new trading center." The minister, who has his own website, also said: "I want Dubai to be the best place in the world for state-of-the-art technology companies." He said companies engaged in e-commerce would be able to set up offices, employ staff and own equipment in the open zone, including fully-owned foreign companies. The e-commerce free zone is situated in north Dubai, near the industrial free zone in Jebel Ali, the top regional and tenth international leading area in container transit. The inauguration of Dubai Internet City coincides with the opening of an annual IT show in Dubai, the Gulf Information Technology Exhibition (Gitex), the biggest in the Middle East. 

Where is Dubai Internet City located?


He continued to lie in place, still breathing heavily. I tried to keep myself calm. Then, with a sigh, he said, "I have need of a certain stone that I once possessed. It would allow me to leave this bed, despite my current illness. My problem is that it was not made in this realm, but by a human, and only a human may handle it. The herb vendor will tell you where you can find it. If you would fetch me this stone, I would tell you what I can." "Of course we will fetch you the stone," Nepthys assured him. "You have our thanks." Outside, the thing at the herb cart nodded when we mentioned the stone. He told Nepthys the name of a woman who lived on a certain street, and we set off. When we reached the street, I expected some sort of temple, or a row of antiquaries, or at least a sleazy, black-market relics merchant. Instead, it looked like we were in the red-light district: women who probably wanted more than our money eyed us from the alleys. Nepthys didn't need to warn me not to speak to them. He took us to the door of a building like a short pagoda that had a sign hanging over it showing a face with hands uplifted, like a saint under G d's light, and handcuffed. Inside, the entrance room was hung with bright silks and scattered with velvet cushions. Sails of obscene orange and a green that insulted springtime hung draped across reds that might have been sensual elsewhere but here were only offensive. A large woman, similarly decorated, quickly drifted up to us. "Good evening, gentlemen," she said. "May I invite you to have a cup of tea?" "No, thank you," said Nepthys, "we regret that we cannot take up your kind offer. Are you the proprietor of this shop?" "Yes," answered the woman. "I am Madame Entera, at your service. 

What color were the drapes at the short pagoda building?


The second major point on which the principals had agreed on March 10 was the need to crack down on terrorist organizations and curtail their fund-raising. The embassy bombings of 1998 had focused attention on al Qaeda's finances. One result had been the creation of an NSC-led interagency committee on terrorist financing. On its recommendation, the President had designated  Bin Laden and al Qaeda as subject to sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. This gave theTreasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) the ability to search for and freeze any  Bin Laden or al Qaeda assets that reached the U.S. financial system. But since OFAC had little information to go on, few funds were frozen. In July 1999, the President applied the same designation to the Taliban for harboring  Bin Laden. Here, OFAC had more success. It blocked more than $34 million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks. Another $215 million in gold and $2 million in demand deposits, all belonging to the Afghan central bank and held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, were also frozen. After October 1999, when the State Department formally designated al Qaeda a "foreign terrorist organization," it became the duty of U.S. banks to block its transactions and seize its funds. Neither this designation nor UN sanctions had much additional practical effect; the sanctions were easily circumvented, and there were no multilateral mechanisms to ensure that other countries' financial systems were not used as conduits for terrorist funding. Attacking the funds of an institution, even the Taliban, was easier than finding and seizing the funds of a clandestine worldwide organization like al Qaeda. Although the CIA's  Bin Laden unit had originally been inspired by the idea of studying terrorist financial links, few personnel assigned to it had any experience in financial investigations. Any terrorist-financing intelligence appeared to have been collected collaterally, as a consequence of gathering other intelligence. This attitude may have stemmed in large part from the chief of this unit, who did not believe that simply following the money from point A to point B revealed much about the terrorists' plans and intentions. As a result, the CIA placed little emphasis on terrorist financing. Nevertheless, the CIA obtained a general understanding of how al Qaeda raised money. 


Why was it easier to attack the funds of an institution, even the Taliban, than to find and seize the funds of a clandestine worldwide organization like al Qaeda?