In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

but clear, as a matter of law, that the “military exception” applies only to the person who served in the armed forces — not his or her children. As I read Cuevas-Gaspar, no one in that case, much less the mother whose residency status was imputed, served in the United States military. The principle behind the Cuevas-Gaspar imputation rule is to avoid separating children from their permanent resident parents with whom they have resided for a significant period of time in the United States. See Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1024 (“[W]e are instructed ... that our immigration statutes and regulations are replete with provisions ‘giving a high priority to the relation between permanent resident parents and their children.’ ”); see also Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The so-called “military exception” of 8 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child (B) recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children (C) recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children (D) recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children (E) holding in the primary case on which cuevasgaspar relied imputation of a parents residency status to a child may be justified where deportation would sever the bonds between parents and their children who had resided legally in the united states for the better part of their lives
holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child

of G.D.’s older sibling, C.D., based on the abuse of G.D. The court may not terminate parental rights based on the abuse of a sibling without a finding of a nexus between the abuse and the prospective abuse. O.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re G.C.A.), 863 So.2d 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing R.F. v. Dep’t of Children & Families (In re M.F.), 770 So.2d 1189 (Fla.2000)); see also C.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families (In re C.M.), 844 So.2d 765, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“Children who have not been abused may be adjudicated dependent based on abuse inflicted upon their siblings; however, the evidence must demonstrate a nexus between the abuse and any prospective abuse to another sibling.”). But see T.P. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 860 So.2d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). “Generally, this nexus is established when 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parental rights may be terminated based on the egregious abuse of a sibling without a showing of a nexus but providing that the parent should be afforded the opportunity to show a lack of a nexus (B) holding that in order to support a termination of parental rights based on prospective abuse it is necessary to show that the behavior of the parent was beyond the parents control likely to continue and placed the child at risk and citing as an example the parents mental illness (C) holding the parental rights of a child may not be terminated unless that parent has been represented by counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings (D) recognizing that a court is not limited in what it may consider in determining whether parental rights should be terminated (E) recognizing petitioners must be afforded the opportunity to show good cause for filing a longer petition
holding that in order to support a termination of parental rights based on prospective abuse it is necessary to show that the behavior of the parent was beyond the parents control likely to continue and placed the child at risk and citing as an example the parents mental illness

2001) (describing the denial of a jury trial as a structural defect requiring automatic reversal). Similarly, every Florida district court of appeal has issued a decision reversing a conviction obtained without a valid waiver of a jury trial. See, e.g., Montero v. State, 780 So.2d 917, 917 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because the record failed to show that the defendant validly waived his right to a jury trial); Hyler v. State, 732 So.2d 1208, 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (concluding that a conviction must be reversed where the record contained no written waiver and did not reflect an inquiry by the trial court that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial); Gamble v. State, 696 So.2d 420, 420 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); Sansom v. State, 642 So.2d 631, 631 (Fla. 1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a failure to inform the defendant of the minimum possible sentence meant that the defendant did not fully understand the consequences of his plea and his rights were therefore automatically substantially affected (B) holding that the failure to inform the defendant of his right to a sixperson jury and the failure to consult the defendant as to his wishes was an error for which a new trial was the only remedy (C) holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error (D) holding that failure to inform the defendant of the constitutionally mandated right to a sixperson jury when one juror became ill after the jury had been sworn but before trial had begun and the defendants attorney waived his rights without consulting defendant mandates a new trial (E) holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence

holding that a failure to inform the defendant of the minimum possible sentence meant that the defendant did not fully understand the consequences of his plea and his rights were therefore automatically substantially affected

