In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: But he claims that release at age 60 is a geriatric release and the functional equivalent of life without parole in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also argues that such release violates the principles in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery because release at age 60 provides only grim prospects for any meaningful future outside prison. [¶12.] Even if Charles’s 92-year sentence is equivalent to a sentence of life without parole, that alone does not mean his sentence is unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment precedent. The United States Supreme Court bars mandatory life sentences without parole against juvenile homicide offenders, not discretionary sentences of life without parole. See Miller, 567 U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2469; State v. Springer, 2014 S.D. 80, ¶ 15, 856 N.W.2d 460, 466 (<HOLDING>). [¶13.] In response, Charles asks this Court 
 Holding statements: (A) holding sentences of life without parole unique in their severity (B) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (C) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences (D) holding that consecutive fixedterm sentences for juveniles who committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are not clearly unconstitutional under graham even when they amount to the practical equivalent of life without parole (E) holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: For example, courts have allowed individuals judicially to enforce treaties that govern the rights of foreign nationals to inherit property, despite the absence of explicit treaty wording providing for such individual enforcement, most likely because the right-granting wording in those treaties makes sense only if it is read to confer an individually enforceable right. See, e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 US 503, 507-08, 67 S Ct 1431, 91 L Ed 1633 (1947) (dealing with such a treaty). On the other hand, an individual right of judicial enforcement will not be Inferred from the mere fact that a treaty sets out substantive rules of conduct that, if honored, would benefit individuals. See, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 US 428, 442, 109 S Ct 683, 102 L Ed 2d 818 (1989) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that united states admiralty jurisdiction extended not only to the high seas but also to american vessels in foreign waters (B) holding that a purchase agreement for a foreign corporations stock is not subject to section 10b even if the closing occurred in the united states (C) holding inter alia that a united states court retains jurisdiction over persons arrested on a foreign ship beyond the us navigable waters when said arrest violates a treaty to which the united states and the foreign country are parties (D) holding that section 4625bc does not create a private right of action for money damages (E) holding that geneva convention on the high seas which provides that illegally boarded merchant ship shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been sustained does not create private right of action for foreign corporations to recover compensation in united states courts
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: 147 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir.1998) (observing that a thorough examination of the evidence "should be particularly true when the Board is determining supervisory status because of the inconsistency in the Board’s application of the statutory definition and of the factors to be used in determining such application”); Spentonbush/Red Star Cos. v. NLRB, 106 F.3d 484, 492 (2d Cir.1997) (finding the "Board's biased mishandling of cases involving supervisors increasingly has called into question our obeisance to the Board's decisions in this area”); Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 961 F.2d 700, 704 (8th Cir.1992) ("[S]crutiny is particularly appropriate in cases where the Board determines supervisory status.”). But cf. Passavant Retirement & Health Ctr. v. NLRB, 149 F.3d 243, 246 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations and citations omitted); 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an arbitrators interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement (B) holding that because of the boards special competence in the field of labor relations its interpretation of the act is accorded special deference and noting that whether a bargaining unit is appropriate involves a large measure of informed discretion vested in the board and is rarely to be disturbed (C) holding that an issue is a matter of substantial public importance where it involves the use of property in a large subdivision and involves the rights of a large number of people (D) holding that the courts conclusion that transfer was appropriate is to be accorded great deference (E) holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation
[EX A]:
(B)

