In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

terms, “pending” refers to the status of an action before a final decision on the merits. Beetham v. Georgia-Pacific, 87 Or App 592, 743 P2d 755 (1987); see also Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, 1669 (unabridged ed 1993) (pending means “not yet decided”). Although that meaning is useful in determining whether an action remains pending, it does not fully resolve the problem before us, which is to determine when an action becomes pending. The solution to that problem, however, is readily apparent from relevant contextual sources. ORCP 3 provides that an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint rather than by service of summons. An action becomes pending when it is commenced. See Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Corbett, 66 Or App 668, 672, 675 P2d 1097, rev den 297 Or 340 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, after a complaint is filed, an 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a complaint which will not support a claim against the specific property at issue cannot provide a basis for tying it up by a filing of notice of lis pendens (B) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (C) holding that under orcp 3 lis pendens attaches upon the filing of a complaint because the action is pending (D) holding that action of filing a complaint and notice of lis pendens based on a contract without simultaneously requesting a stay and an order compelling arbitration waives that partys contractual right to arbitrate (E) holding that filing of an administrative complaint did not meet the requirement that the employee seek counseling prior to filing
(C)

put forth anything to convince the Court that further discovery could rectify this issue. Accordingly, the Court sees no reason to deny or defer Defendant’s Motion as premature. 4. Contractual Limitations on Time to Bring Suit A. How does KRS § 304.14-370 affect contractual limitation provisions? Kentucky law has long recognized “the validity of insurance contract provisions requiring as a condition to sue that the action must be ‘commenced within the time specified by the policy.’ ” Edmondson v. Penn. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 781 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Ky.1989) (internal citations omitted). Courts typically enforced such provisions unless they unreasonably limited the time in which parties could sue. See Ashland Finance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 474 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Ky. 1971) (<HOLDING>). However, KRS § 304.14-370 does place 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a delay approaching one year is presumptively unreasonable (B) holding that discovery was appropriately tailored as it limited the request to information within a six year time period relating to one specific contract and the deposition of a person most knowledgeable (C) holding that section 10b and rule 10b5 suits must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation (D) holding that cogsa claims must be brought within one year from the time at which the loss occurred (E) holding that a blanket bond contract provision requiring a party to bring suit within one year after discovery of the loss was not unreasonable
(E)

counterclaim. See, e.g., Wassail v. DeCaro, 91 F.3d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that the plaintiff agreed to drop claims where the defendant agreed to drop counterclaim); Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C.Cir.1984) (noting that the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss claims where the defendants agreed to dismiss counterclaims). The economies argument ultimately devolves into an argument about the manageability of the counterclaims in the context of the class action, a concern addressed both by Rule 13 and by Rule 23. Rule 13 (i), through its reference to Rule 42(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that, to further convenience and to avoid prejudice, a court may order separate trials of the counterclaims. See FDIC v. Selaiden Builders, Inc., 973 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1051, 113 S.Ct. 1944, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the surname of the child where the court made factual findings that the name change would be in the best interest of the child (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the juiy trial waiver (D) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial based on a 250000 award for a mental distress claim (E) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a separate trial for the counterclaims where the convenience of the parties would be served

(E)

