In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision.  Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: but clear, as a matter of law, that the “military exception” applies only to the person who served in the armed forces — not his or her children. As I read Cuevas-Gaspar, no one in that case, much less the mother whose residency status was imputed, served in the United States military. The principle behind the Cuevas-Gaspar imputation rule is to avoid separating children from their permanent resident parents with whom they have resided for a significant period of time in the United States. See Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1024 (“[W]e are instructed ... that our immigration statutes and regulations are replete with provisions ‘giving a high priority to the relation between permanent resident parents and their children.’ ”); see also Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The so-called “military exception” of 8 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child (B) recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children (C) recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children (D) recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children (E) holding in the primary case on which cuevasgaspar relied imputation of a parents residency status to a child may be justified where deportation would sever the bonds between parents and their children who had resided legally in the united states for the better part of their lives

A: holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child
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Q: even if the 1993 judgment was final and appealable, they may challenge the merits of the 1993 judgment in this appeal from the 1995 order. This appeal is untimely only if the District Court’s 1993 decision — which ordered only that ISP submit a plan to remedy the constitutional flaws in its policy — was a final judgment, appealable to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We believe that the District Court’s 1993 order was no more final under § 1291 than the one at issue in Sherpell v. Humnoke School Dist., 814 F.2d 538 (8th Cir.1987), which held that a district court order to a school district to submit a plan to remedy an unconstitutional atmosphere of racial hostility was not an appealable final judgment. Id. at 539; see also Hendrickson v. Griggs, 856 F.2d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The November 1995 judgment is, therefore, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (B) holding that the modification or dissolution of an injunction in a limitation of liability proceeding is appealable as a matter of right under  1292a1 (C) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (D) holding injunction ordering prison to submit plan for reformation of unconstitutional prison conditions not appealable as interlocutory order under 28 usc  1292a1 (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable

A: holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable
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Q: v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir.2001) (discussing § 1983 liability for a municipality based on “governmental ‘custom’ ”). Therefore, the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Count VII is also due to be affirmed. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. 1 . Hawk filed a motion to dismiss Klaetsch with prejudice after Klaetsch filed a petition in bankruptcy court. 2 . Only two of the incidents cited by Hawk involve tasers, and none of them recount the actual tasing of an arrestee. And although all three incidents recount aggressive arrests by Klaetsch, this circuit requires something more to transform aggressive force into excessive force. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (11th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where an officer grabbed plaintiffs arm twisted it around plaintiffs back jerking it up high to the shoulder and then handcuffing the plaintiff as plaintiff fell to his knees screaming did not constitute excessive force (B) holding that fact that plaintiffs arm was broken during tackle did not constitute excessive force (C) holding that there was evidence of grossly excessive force where the defendant shot the victim once in the arm and then in the base of the skull (D) holding that officer was liable as an integral participant for his help in handcuffing plaintiff because it was instrumental in the officers gaining control of him which culminated in excessive force (E) holding that officers knocking the plaintiff to the ground rolling him over and pinning him with their knees on his neck back and legs so he could be handcuffed did not constitute excessive force and noting that the plaintiffs offer to return to custody after his escape attempt did not eliminate the need for force

A:
holding that fact that plaintiffs arm was broken during tackle did not constitute excessive force
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