Background BRAC 2005 Goals The Secretary of Defense established goals for BRAC 2005 in a  November 2002 memorandum issuing initial guidance for BRAC 2005  and again in a March 2004 report to Congress certifying the need for a  BRAC round. Specifically, the Secretary reported that the BRAC 2005  round would be used to (1) dispose of excess facilities, (2) promote force  transformation, and (3) enhance jointness. Although DOD did not  specifically define these three goals, we have generally described them in  prior reports as follows. Dispose of excess facilities: Eliminating unneeded infrastructure to  achieve savings. Promote force transformation: Correlating base infrastructure to the  force structure and defense strategy. In the late 1990s, DOD  embarked on a major effort to transform its business processes,  human capital, and military capabilities. Transformation is also seen  as a process intended to provide continuous improvements to military  capabilities. For example, the Army used the BRAC process to  transform the Army’s force structure from an organization based on  divisions to more rapidly deployable, brigade-based units and to  accommodate rebasing of overseas units. Enhance jointness: Improving joint utilization to meet current and  future threats. According to DOD, “joint” connotes activities,  operations, and organizations, among others, in which elements of  two or more military departments participate. BRAC Phases Congress established clear time frames in the BRAC statute for many of  the milestones involved with base realignments and closures. The BRAC  2005 process took 10 years from authorization through implementation.  Congress authorized the BRAC 2005 round on December 28, 2001. The  BRAC Commission submitted its recommendations to the President in  2005 and the round ended on September 15, 2011—6 years from the  date the President submitted his certification of approval of the  recommendations to Congress. The statute allows environmental cleanup  and property caretaker and transfer actions associated with BRAC sites  to exceed the 6-year time limit and does not set a deadline for the  completion of these activities. Figure 1 displays the three phases of the  BRAC 2005 round—analysis, implementation, and disposal—and key  events involving Congress, DOD, and the BRAC Commission. During the analysis phase, DOD developed selection criteria, created a  force structure plan and infrastructure inventory, collected and analyzed  data, and proposed recommendations for base realignments and  closures. The BRAC statute authorizing the BRAC 2005 round directed  DOD to propose and adopt selection criteria to develop and evaluate  candidate recommendations, with military value as the primary  consideration. The BRAC statute also required DOD to develop a force  structure plan based on an assessment of probable threats to national  security during a 20-year period beginning with fiscal year 2005. Based  on the statute’s requirements, the selection criteria were adopted as final  in February 2004, and the force structure plan was provided to Congress  in March 2004. To help inform its decision-making process during the analysis phase, the  three military departments and the seven joint cross-service groups  collected capacity and military value data that were certified as accurate  by senior leaders. In testimony before the BRAC Commission in May  2005, the Secretary of Defense said that DOD collected approximately 25  million pieces of data as part of the BRAC 2005 process. Given the  extensive volume of requested data, we noted in July 2005 that the data- collection process was lengthy and required significant efforts to help  ensure data accuracy, particularly from joint cross-service groups that  were attempting to obtain common data across multiple military  components. We reported that, in some cases, coordinating data  requests, clarifying questions and answers, controlling database entries,  and other issues led to delays in the data-driven analysis DOD originally  envisioned. As time progressed, however, these groups reported that  they obtained the needed data, for the most part, to inform and support  their scenarios. We ultimately reported that DOD’s process for conducting  its analysis was generally logical, reasoned, and well documented. After taking these plans and accompanying analyses into consideration,  the Secretary of Defense was then required to certify whether DOD  should close or realign military installations. The BRAC Commission  assessed DOD’s closure and realignment recommendations for  consistency with the eight selection criteria and DOD’s Force Structure  Plan. Ultimately, the BRAC Commission accepted over 86 percent of  DOD’s proposed internal recommendations; rejected, modified, or added  additional recommendations; and adjusted some costs of BRAC  recommendations. Implementation Phase After the BRAC Commission released its recommendations, and the  recommendations became binding, the implementation phase started.  During this phase, which started on November 9, 2005, and continued to  September 15, 2011 (as required by the statute authorizing BRAC), DOD  took steps to implement the BRAC Commission’s 198 recommendations.  Also during this phase, the military departments were responsible for  completing environmental impact studies to determine how to enact the  BRAC Commission’s relevant recommendations. The military  departments implemented their respective recommendations to close and  realign installations, establish joint bases, and construct new facilities. The large number and variety of BRAC actions resulted in DOD requiring  BRAC oversight mechanisms to improve accountability for  implementation. The BRAC 2005 round had more individual actions (813)  than the four prior rounds combined (387). Thus, in the BRAC 2005  round, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the first time required the  military departments to develop business plans to better inform the Office  of the Secretary of Defense of the status of implementation and financial  details for each of the BRAC 2005 recommendations. These business  plans included: (1) information such as a listing of all actions needed to  implement each recommendation, (2) schedules for personnel relocations  between installations, and (3) updated cost and savings estimates by  DOD based on current information. This approach permitted senior-level  intervention if warranted to ensure completion of the BRAC  recommendations by the statutory completion date. Disposal Phase The disposal phase began soon after the BRAC recommendations  became binding and has continued to today. During the disposal phase,  DOD’s policy was to act in an expeditious manner to dispose of closed  properties. Such disposal actions included transferring the property to  other DOD components and federal agencies, homeless-assistance  providers, or local communities for the purposes of job generation, among  other actions. In doing so, DOD has incurred caretaker and environmental  cleanup costs. For example, DOD reported to Congress that, as of  September 2016, the military departments had spent $735 million on  environmental cleanup associated with BRAC 2005 sites, and had $482  million left to spend on BRAC 2005 sites. Overall, the military  departments reported that they had disposed of 59,499 acres and still  needed to dispose of 30,239 acres from BRAC 2005 as of September 30,  2016. DOD Components  Generally Did Not  Measure the  Achievement of  BRAC 2005 Goals ASD (EI&E), the military services, and 25 of the 26 military units or  organizations we met with did not measure the achievement of the BRAC  2005 goals—reducing excess infrastructure, transforming the military, and  promoting jointness. Specifically, a senior ASD (EI&E) official stated that  no performance measures existed to evaluate the achievement of goals  and the office did not create baselines to measure performance. Air Force  officials stated that they did not measure the achievement of goals but  that it would have been helpful to have metrics to measure success,  especially as DOD had requested from Congress another BRAC round.  Army officials similarly stated it did not measure the achievement of  goals, noting that measuring excess capacity would have been important  to help DOD get authorization for another BRAC round. Navy and Marine  Corps officials said that they did not track performance measures or  otherwise measure the achievement of the BRAC 2005 goals. Moreover,  25 of the 26 military units or organizations we met with stated that they  did not measure the achievement of BRAC 2005 goals. The one  exception in our selected sample was the command at Joint Base  Charleston, which stated that it measured jointness through common  output or performance-level standards for installation support, as required  for installations affected by the BRAC 2005 recommendation on joint  basing. By measuring jointness, officials were able to identify that the  base met 86 percent of its common output level standards in the second  quarter of fiscal year 2017, and it has identified recommendations to  improve on those standards not met. Instead of measuring the achievement of BRAC 2005 goals, officials with  ASD (EI&E) and the military departments stated that they tracked  completion of the BRAC recommendations by the statutory deadline of  September 2011 and measured the cost savings associated with the  recommendations. Senior ASD (EI&E) officials stated that the primary  measure of success was completing the recommendations as detailed by  the implementation actions documented in the business plans. In  addition, officials from the Army, Navy, and Air Force stated that they  measured the savings produced as a result of BRAC 2005. For example,  Army officials stated that closing bases in BRAC 2005 significantly  reduced base operations support costs, such as by eliminating costs for  trash collection, utilities, and information technology services. However,  tracking completion of the recommendations and measuring savings did  not enable the department to determine the success of the BRAC round  in achieving its goals. For example, tracking completion of the  recommendations establishing joint training centers did not give DOD  insight into whether the military departments achieved the jointness goal  by conducting more joint activities or operations. Similarly, measuring  savings did not allow DOD to know whether it achieved the goal of  reducing excess infrastructure, and in reviewing DOD’s data we found  that the department ultimately did not have the needed data to calculate  excess infrastructure disposed of during BRAC 2005. Key practices on  monitoring performance and results highlight the importance of using  performance measures to track an agency’s progress and performance,  and stress that performance measures should include a baseline and  target; should be objective, measurable, and quantifiable; and should  include a time frame. The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government emphasizes that an agency’s management should track  major agency achievements and compare these to the agencies’ plans,  goals, and objectives. During BRAC 2005, DOD was not required to identify appropriate  measures of effectiveness and track achievement of its goals. As a result,  in March 2013, we recommended that, in the event of any future BRAC  round, DOD identify appropriate measures of effectiveness and develop a  plan to demonstrate the extent to which the department achieved the  results intended from the implementation of the BRAC round. DOD did  not concur with our recommendation, stating that military value should be  the key driver for BRAC. However, we noted at the time that our  recommendation does not undermine DOD’s reliance on military value as  the primary selection criteria for DOD’s base realignment and closure  candidate recommendations, and DOD can still prioritize military value  while identifying measures that help determine whether DOD achieved  the military value that it seeks. As of October 2017, DOD officials stated  that no action to implement our recommendation is expected. We continue to believe that, if any future BRAC round is authorized, the  department would benefit from measuring its achievement of goals.  Further, this information would assist Congress in assessing the  outcomes of any future BRAC rounds. Given that DOD did not concur  with our 2013 recommendation and does not plan to act upon it, DOD is  not currently required to identify appropriate measures of effectiveness  and track achievement of its BRAC goals in future rounds. Without a  requirement to identify and measure the achievement of goals for a  BRAC round, DOD cannot demonstrate to Congress whether the  implementation of any future BRAC round will improve efficiency and  effectiveness or otherwise have the effect that the department says its  proposed recommendations will achieve. If Congress would like to  increase its oversight for any future BRAC round, requiring DOD to  identify appropriate measures of effectiveness and track achievement of  its goals would provide it with improved visibility over the expected  outcomes. DOD Has Addressed  Many but Not All Prior  GAO  Recommendations on  BRAC 2005 and Has  Further Opportunities  to Improve  Communications and  Monitoring in Any  Future BRAC Round DOD has implemented 33 of the 65 prior recommendations that we  identified in our work since 2004, and it has the opportunity to address  additional challenges regarding communications and monitoring to  improve any future BRAC round. Specifically, for the BRAC analysis  phase, DOD implemented 1 of 12 recommendations, and it has agreed to  implement another 7 recommendations should Congress authorize any  future BRAC round. Additionally, we found that DOD can improve its  communications during the analysis phase. For the implementation  phase, DOD implemented 28 of 39 recommendations, and it has agreed  to implement another 3 recommendations. Further, we found it can  improve monitoring of mission-related changes. For the disposal phase,  DOD implemented 4 of 14 recommendations, and it has agreed to  implement another 8 recommendations. DOD Plans to Address  Some Prior GAO  Recommendations about  BRAC’s Analysis Phase,  but Can Improve  Communication during  Data Collection DOD Plans to Address Some  Prior GAO Recommendations  If Congress Authorizes a  Future BRAC Round Of the 12 recommendations we made from 2004 to 2016 to help DOD  improve the BRAC analysis phase, DOD generally agreed with 6 of them  and, as of October 2017, DOD had implemented 1. Specifically, DOD  implemented our May 2004 recommendation to provide a more detailed  discussion on assumptions used in its May 2005 report on BRAC  recommendations. In addition, DOD stated it would address seven  recommendations—the other five recommendations it agreed with and  two it had previously nonconcurred with—affecting BRAC’s analysis  phase in the event of any future BRAC round. These recommendations  included better estimating information technology costs and improving  ways of describing and entering cost data. DOD reported that the  department is awaiting authorization of a future BRAC round prior to  implementing these recommendations. Appendix III provides more  information on our recommendations, DOD’s response, and DOD’s  actions to date concerning the BRAC analysis phase. DOD Officials Cited  Challenges with  Communications during Data  Collection DOD officials cited an additional challenge with communications during  the BRAC 2005 analysis phase. Specifically, some military organizations  we met with stated that they could not communicate to BRAC decision  makers information outside of the data-collection process, which  ultimately hindered analysis. For example: Officials from the Army Human Resources Command in Fort Knox,  Kentucky, said that facilities data submitted during the data-collection  process did not convey a complete picture of excess capacity at the  installation, and officials at Fort Knox were unable to share the  appropriate context or details because nondisclosure agreements  prevented communication. Specifically, they stated that the data  showed an overall estimate of Fort Knox’s excess capacity, but the  data did not detail that the excess was not contiguous but rather  based on space at 40 buildings spread throughout the installation.  The officials stated that there was no way to communicate to decision  makers during the data collection process that the facilities were ill- suited for relocating the Human Resources Command and would  require significant renovation costs to host the command’s information  technology infrastructure. The officials said that, because the needed  details on the facility data were not communicated, the relocation  moved forward without full consideration of alternatives for using  better-suited excess space at other locations that would not require  significant costs to renovate. As a result, the Army ultimately  constructed a new headquarters building for the Human Resources  Command at Fort Knox and DOD spent approximately $55 million  more than estimated to complete this action. Officials at the Naval Consolidated Brig Charleston, South Carolina,  told us that the lack of communication outside of the data-collection  process resulted in decision makers not taking into account declining  numbers of prisoners, leading to the construction of a new, oversized  building in which to house prisoners. The officials said that the  decision makers analyzing the facilities data did not consider the  current correctional population; rather, the decision makers  considered a correctional model based on the type of military fielded  in World War II and the Korean and Vietnam wars—a force comprised  of conscripted personnel that served longer tours and had higher  correctional needs. Further, the officials said the decision makers did  not consider that, in the 2000 to 2005 period, DOD increased the use  of administrative separations from military service rather than  incarcerate service members convicted of offenses, such as drug- related crimes or unauthorized absence, further reducing correctional  needs. The officials said they did not have a mechanism to  communicate this information outside of the data-collection process  when decision makers were analyzing the facilities data. As a result,  the BRAC Commission recommendation added 680 beds throughout  the corrections system, increasing the Navy’s total confinement  capacity to 1,200 posttrial beds. Specifically at Naval Consolidated  Brig Charleston, the BRAC recommendation added 80 beds at a cost  of approximately $10 million. However, the facility already had excess  capacity prior to the 2005 BRAC recommendation, and its excess  capacity further increased after adding 80 beds (see fig. 2). Air National Guard officials said that the lack of communication  outside of the data-collection process in the BRAC analysis phase  meant that they could not identify the specific location of excess  facilities. Specifically, they said the facilities data showed that  Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, had sufficient preexisting space to  accept units relocating from Kulis Air Guard Station, Alaska, a base  slated for closure. However, without communicating with base  officials, Air National Guard officials did not know that the space was  not contiguous. As a result, officials stated that DOD ultimately  needed to complete additional military construction to move the  mission from Kulis Air Guard Station. The BRAC Commission  increased the Air Force’s initial cost estimate by approximately $66  million in additional funds to implement the BRAC recommendation. U.S. Army Central officials stated that there was no communication  outside of the data-collection process to allow DOD to fully consider  workforce recruitment-related issues in deciding to move the U.S.  Army Central headquarters to Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina.  While other criteria, such as military value, enhancing jointness, and  enabling business process transformation, were considered in  developing the recommendation, the officials stated that they were  unable to communicate concerns regarding civilian hiring and military  transfers. The officials said that since the headquarters’ move to  Shaw Air Force Base from Fort McPherson, Georgia, they have had  difficulties recruiting civilian employees, such as information  technology personnel, to their facility because of its location. They  also said that it has been harder to encourage Army personnel to  move to Shaw Air Force Base due to a perception that there is a lack  of promotional opportunities at an Army organization on an Air Force  base. As a result, U.S. Army Central officials said morale surveys  have indicated that these workforce issues have negatively affected  mission accomplishment. The military departments and organizations we met with said that these  concerns regarding the BRAC 2005 analysis phase were because DOD  did not establish clear and consistent communications throughout  different levels of authority in the department during data collection.  According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,  management should use relevant data from reliable sources and process  these data into quality information that is complete and accurate.  Further, management should communicate quality information down,  across, up, and around reporting lines to all levels of the department. Given the unclear and inconsistent communications in the department  during data collection, DOD decision makers had data that may have  been outdated or incomplete. Additionally, the outdated and incomplete  data hindered the BRAC 2005 analysis and contributed to additional costs  and recruitment problems at some locations affected by BRAC 2005, as  previously discussed. Officials stated that clear and consistent  communications would have improved the flow of information between  on-the-ground personnel and decision makers and could have better  informed the BRAC decision-making process. For example, Army officials  said that nondisclosure agreements hindered their ability to call personnel  at some installations to confirm details about buildings and facilities in  question. The Air Force’s Lessons Learned: BRAC 2005 report stated  that site surveys could have communicated additional detail and  generated more specific requirements than those generated in an  automated software tool that the Air Force used for BRAC-related  analysis. Navy officials said that, with limited communication, there were  shortfalls in the decision-making process. Overall, officials from ASD  (EI&E) and the military departments agreed that communication could be  improved in the analysis phase of any future BRAC round. They also  cited improved technology, such as geographic information system  software and a new base stationing tool, as well as an increase in the  amount of data collected as factors that may mitigate any effects of  reduced communication if Congress authorizes any future BRAC round.  Without taking steps to establish clear and consistent communication  throughout the department during data collection, DOD risks collecting  outdated and incomplete data in any future BRAC rounds that may hinder  its analysis and the achievement of its stated goals for BRAC. DOD Has Addressed the  Majority of Prior GAO  Recommendations  Affecting the BRAC  Implementation Phase but  Can Improve Monitoring DOD Has Implemented 28 of  39 Recommendations to  Address Challenges To improve the implementation phase of the BRAC 2005 round, we made  39 recommendations between 2005 and 2016. DOD generally agreed  with 32 and did not concur with 7 recommendations. As of October 2017,  DOD had implemented 28 of these recommendations. DOD stated that it  does not plan on implementing 8 of the recommendations, and action on  3 of the recommendations is pending. Our previous recommendations  relate to issues including providing guidance for consolidating training,  refining cost and performance data, and periodic reviews of installation- support standards, among others. Appendix IV provides more information  on our recommendations, DOD’s response, and DOD’s actions to date  concerning the BRAC implementation phase. DOD Officials Cited  Challenges with Monitoring  Mission-Related Changes  during Implementation DOD officials identified challenges related to monitoring mission-related  changes during the implementation of the BRAC 2005 recommendations,  specifically when unforeseen circumstances developed that affected  units’ ability to carry out their missions following implementation or added  difficulties to fulfilling the intent of the recommendation. For example: During the implementation process, a final environmental impact  statement at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, contributed to the decision  that only a portion of the initial proposed aircraft and operations would  be established to fulfill the Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint Training Site  recommendation. Marine Corps officials stated that as a result of this  environmental impact statement and the subsequent limitations, the  Marine Corps decided to eventually move its training from Eglin Air  Force Base to Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina.  Despite these limitations, the Air Force constructed infrastructure for  the Marine Corps’ use at Eglin Air Force Base in order to fulfill the  minimum legal requirements of the recommendation. Specifically, the  BRAC 2005 recommendation realigned the Air Force, Navy, and  Marine Corps portions of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint  Training Site to Eglin Air Force Base. The Air Force’s goal and the  initial proposal for the Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint Training Site at  Eglin Air Force Base was to accommodate 107 F-35 aircraft, with  three Air Force squadrons of 24 F-35 aircraft each, one Navy  squadron with 15 F-35 aircraft, and one Marine Corps squadron of 20  F-35 aircraft. In 2008, after the implementation phase began, DOD  completed an environmental impact statement for the proposed  implementation of the BRAC recommendations at Eglin Air Force  Base. Based on the environmental impact statement and other  factors, a final decision was issued in February 2009, stating that the  Air Force would only implement a portion of the proposed actions for  the recommendation, with a limit of 59 F-35 aircraft and reduced  planned flight operations due to potential noise impacts, among other  factors. This decision stated that the subsequent operational  limitations would not be practical for use on a long-term basis but  would remain in place until a supplemental environmental impact  statement could be completed. After the final supplemental  environmental impact statement was released, in June 2014 DOD  decided to continue the limited operations established in the February  2009 decision. Marine Corps officials stated that, as a result of the February 2009  decision, the Marine Corps decided that it would eventually move its  F-35 aircraft from Eglin Air Force Base to Marine Corps Air Station  Beaufort. According to Marine Corps officials, by September 2009  the Marine Corps had developed a concept to prepare Marine Corps  Air Station Beaufort to host its F-35 aircraft. A September 2010 draft  supplemental environmental impact statement included updated  operational data and found that the Marine Corps total airfield  operations at Eglin Air Force Base would be reduced by 30.7 percent  from the proposals first assessed in the 2008 final environmental  impact statement. However, to abide by the BRAC recommendation,  Marine Corps officials stated that the Marine Corps temporarily  established an F-35 training squadron at Eglin Air Force Base in April  2010. Using fiscal year 2010 military construction funding, DOD spent  approximately $27.7 million to create a landing field for use by the  new Marine Corps F-35 training squadron mission at Eglin Air Force  Base. Marine Corps officials stated that this construction occurred  during the same period as the decision to relocate the F-35 training  squadron to Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort. However, ASD  (EI&E) officials stated that they did not know about this mission- related change, adding that they expected any change to be reported  from the units to the responsible military department through the chain  of command. However, the military departments did not have  guidance to report in the business plans to ASD (EI&E) these mission- related changes during implementation; without this guidance, the  changes related to the Marine Corps F-35 mission were not relayed to  ASD (EI&E) through the Air Force. Officials from the Joint Strike  Fighter training program at Eglin Air Force Base stated that this  construction was finished in June 2012 and that it was never used by  the Marine Corps. In February 2014, the Marine Corps F-35 training  squadron left Eglin Air Force Base and was established at Marine  Corps Air Station Beaufort. The Marine Corps does not plan on  returning any F-35 aircraft from Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort to  Eglin Air Force Base for joint training activities. Additionally, officials from the Armed Forces Chaplaincy Center stated  that studies undertaken during the implementation phase determined  that it would be difficult to fulfill the intent of a recommendation  creating a joint center for religious training and education, yet the  recommendation was implemented and included new construction  with significantly greater costs than initial estimates. The BRAC 2005  recommendation consolidated Army, Navy, and Air Force religious  training and education at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, establishing a  Joint Center of Excellence for Religious Training and Education. Prior  to the construction of facilities to accommodate this recommendation,  the Interservice Training Review Organization conducted a study  published in November 2006 that assessed the resource  requirements and costs of consolidating and colocating the joint  chaplaincy training at Fort Jackson. This study identified limitations in  the feasibility of consolidating a joint training mission for the chaplains,  including differences within the services’ training schedules and the  limited availability of specific administrative requirements for each  service, as well as limited instructors and curriculum development  personnel. Despite the results of this study, in 2008 an  approximately $11.5 million construction project began to build  facilities for the Joint Center of Excellence for Religious Training and  Education. However, ASD (EI&E) officials stated that they did not  know about the results of the study. The military departments did not  have guidance to report these mission-related changes, which  ultimately were not relayed from the units to ASD (EI&E). Officials  from the Armed Forces Chaplaincy Center stated that following the  start of construction to accommodate the recommendation, the  services completed additional studies in 2008 and 2011 that further  identified limitations to the feasibility of joint training for the services’  chaplains. Overall, the services discovered that 95 percent of the  religious training could not be conducted jointly. Moreover, the military  departments have faced additional impediments to their respective  missions for religious training and education. For example, the Army  stated it could not house its junior soldiers alongside the senior Air  Force chaplaincy students, and both the Navy and Air Force had to  transport their chaplains to other nearby bases to receive service- specific training. Due to these challenges, officials from the Armed  Forces Chaplaincy Center stated that the Air Force chaplains left Fort  Jackson and returned to Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, in 2017,  and the Navy has also discussed leaving Fort Jackson and returning  to Naval Station Newport, Rhode Island. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government emphasizes the  importance of monitoring the changes an entity faces so that the entity’s  internal controls can remain aligned with changing objectives,  environment, laws, resources, and risks. During the implementation  phase of BRAC 2005, DOD did not have specific guidance for the military  services to monitor mission-related changes that added difficulties to  fulfilling the intent of BRAC recommendations. The Office of the Secretary  of Defense required BRAC recommendation business plans to be  submitted every 6 months and include information such as a listing of all  actions needed to implement each recommendation, schedules for  personnel movements between installations, updated cost and savings  estimates based on better and updated information, and implementation  completion time frames. In addition, in November 2008, the Deputy Under  Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) issued a  memorandum requiring the military departments and certain defense  agencies to present periodic status briefings to the Office of the Secretary  of Defense on implementation progress and to identify any significant  issues impacting the ability to implement BRAC recommendations by the  September 15, 2011, statutory deadline. The 6-month business plan  updates and the memorandum on periodic briefings focused primarily on  changes affecting the ability to fully implement the BRAC  recommendations and on meeting the statutory deadline, but they did not  provide specific guidance to inform ASD (EI&E) of mission-related  changes that arose from unforeseen challenges during the  implementation phase. According to a senior official with ASD (EI&E), if the organization  responsible for a business plan identified a need to change the plan to  fulfill the legal obligation of the recommendation by the statutory deadline,  ASD (EI&E) reviewed any proposed changes through meetings with  stakeholders involved in implementation. According to this official, the  office typically only got involved with the implementation if the business  plan was substantively out of line with the intent of the recommendation  or if there was a dispute between two DOD organizations, such as two  military departments. The official stated that any installation-level  concerns had to be raised to the attention of ASD (EI&E) through the  responsible military department’s chain of command. If a mission-related  change was not raised through the military department’s chain of  command, then ASD (EI&E) officials were not always aware of the details  of such changes. ASD (EI&E) officials acknowledged that they did not  know about all mission-related changes during implementation, such as  with the Joint Strike Fighter recommendations, and they stated that there  was no explicit guidance informing the military departments to report  challenges and mission-related changes to ASD (EI&E). Senior officials  from ASD (EI&E) stated that additional guidance would be appropriate in  the event of any future BRAC round. This lack of specific guidance to  monitor and report mission-related changes that arose during BRAC 2005  implementation ultimately resulted in inefficient use of space and extra  costs for DOD. Without providing specific guidance to monitor and report  mission-related changes that require significant changes to the  recommendation business plans, DOD will not be able to effectively  monitor the efficient use of space and the costs associated with  implementing any future BRAC recommendations. Furthermore, DOD  may not be able to effectively make adjustments in its plans to ensure  that the department achieves its overall goals in any future BRAC rounds. DOD Has Addressed  Some Prior  Recommendations  Related to the BRAC  Disposal Phase and Plans  to Address More  Recommendations If  Congress Authorizes a  Future BRAC Round Of the 14 recommendations we made from 2007 to 2017 to help DOD  address challenges affecting BRAC’s disposal phase, DOD generally  agreed with 12 of them. As of October 2017, DOD had implemented 4 of  the recommendations, with actions on 8 others pending. Our previous  recommendations relate to three primary issues: guidance for  communities managing the effects of the reduction or growth of DOD  installations, the environmental cleanup process for closed properties,  and the process for reusing closed properties for homeless assistance.  Appendix V provides more information on our recommendations, DOD’s  response, and DOD’s actions to date concerning the BRAC disposal  phase. During our review, we identified an additional example of challenges in  the disposal phase related to the environmental cleanup process.  Specifically, officials representing Portsmouth, Rhode Island, stated that  the city had issues with the environmental cleanup process resulting from  BRAC 2005 changes at Naval Station Newport, Rhode Island. According  to the site’s environmental impact statement, the land Portsmouth is to  receive is contaminated and requires cleanup prior to transfer, and  officials from the community stated that the Navy has not provided them  with a clear understanding of a time frame for the environmental cleanup  process needed to transfer the property. However, a senior official from  the Navy stated that uncertainties in available funds and unforeseen  environmental obstacles are common and prevent the Navy from  projecting specific estimates for environmental cleanup time frames. The  officials representing Portsmouth stated that, due to the lack of  information from the Navy on a projected time frame for cleaning and  transferring the property, representatives in the community have begun to  discuss not wanting to take over the land and letting the Navy hold a  public sale. We had previously recommended in January 2017 that DOD  create a repository or method to record and share lessons learned about  how various locations have successfully addressed environmental  cleanup challenges. DOD concurred and actions are pending. Moreover, during our review we identified additional examples of  challenges in the disposal phase related to the homeless assistance  program. For example, officials representing the community of  Wilmington, North Carolina, stated that they had issues with the  homeless-assistance process regarding a closed Armed Forces Reserve  Center. According to the officials, they did not know that there were legal  alternatives to providing on-base property for homeless assistance.  Wilmington officials stated that the city would have been willing to  construct a homeless-assistance facility in a nonbase location, and use  the closed property for a different purpose, which would have expedited  the overall redevelopment process. According to the officials, the  organization that took over the property for homeless-assistance  purposes lacks the financial means to complete the entire project plan,  and as of July 2017 it remains unfinished. We had previously  recommended that DOD and the Department of Housing and Urban  Development—which, with DOD, develops the implementing regulations  for the BRAC homeless-assistance process—include information on legal  alternatives to providing on-base property to expedite the redevelopment  process, but DOD did not concur and stated no action is expected.  Additionally, officials from New Haven, Connecticut, stated that the  process of finding land suitable for a homeless assistance provider and  converting an Army Reserve Center into a police academy took an  undesirably long amount of time to complete. The officials stated that the  process of preparing its redevelopment plan and transferring the property  from DOD to the community lasted roughly 5 years from 2008 to 2013,  and they suggested streamlining or expediting this process. As a result of these types of delays, many properties have not yet been  transferred from DOD to the communities, and undisposed properties  continue to increase caretaker costs. As of September 30, 2016, DOD  had received approximately $172 million in payments for transfers, and it  had spent approximately $275 million for caretaker costs of buildings and  land prior to transferring property on closed installations during BRAC  2005. Implementing our prior recommendations related to the BRAC  environmental cleanup and homeless-assistance process could help  DOD expedite the disposal of unneeded and costly BRAC property,  reduce its continuing fiscal exposure stemming from continuing to hold  these properties, and ultimately improve the effectiveness of the disposal  phase. Conclusions DOD has long faced challenges in reducing unneeded infrastructure, and  on five different occasions DOD has used the BRAC process to reduce  excess capacity and better match needed infrastructure to the force  structure and to support military missions. In addition to using BRAC to  reduce excess capacity, DOD also sought to promote jointness across  the military departments and realign installations in the 2005 round,  making the round the biggest, costliest, and most complex ever. While  DOD finished its implementation of BRAC 2005 in September 2011 and  continues to prepare some remaining sites for disposal, it did not  measure whether and to what extent it achieved the round’s goals of  reducing excess infrastructure, transforming the military, and promoting  jointness. Because it did not measure whether the BRAC actions  achieved these goals, DOD cannot demonstrate whether the military  departments have improved their efficiency or effectiveness as a result of  the BRAC 2005 actions. In October 2017, DOD officials stated the  department does not plan to take action on our March 2013  recommendation to measure goals for any future BRAC round. Congress  can take steps to improve its oversight of any future BRAC round,  specifically by requiring DOD to identify and track appropriate measures  of effectiveness. Congress would have enhanced information to make  decisions about approving any future BRAC rounds, while DOD would be  in a stronger position to demonstrate the benefits it achieves relative to  the up-front implementation costs incurred for holding any future BRAC  rounds. In addition, challenges in the analysis, implementation, and disposal  phases of BRAC 2005 led to unintended consequences, such as  increases in costs, workforce recruitment issues, and delayed disposal of  closed properties. Limited or restricted communications throughout  different levels of authority in the department during data collection  hampered the ability of decision makers to receive as much relevant  information as possible during BRAC 2005. If Congress authorizes any  future BRAC round, ASD (EI&E) can encourage clear and consistent  communication throughout DOD during the analysis phase, thereby  helping personnel to address any potential problems that may arise. In  addition, without specific guidance to monitor mission-related changes  during the BRAC implementation phase, DOD did not fulfill the intent of  some recommendations and spent millions of dollars to build  infrastructure that was ultimately unused or underutilized. This lack of  specific guidance meant that ASD (EI&E) was not aware of all mission- related changes. By instituting improvements to the analysis,  implementation, and disposal phases in any future BRAC round, DOD  could better inform decision making, better ensure that its infrastructure  meets the needs of its force structure, and better position itself to gain  congressional approval for additional rounds of BRAC in the future. Matter for  Congressional  Consideration Congress should consider, in any future BRAC authorization, a  requirement for DOD to identify appropriate measures of effectiveness  and to track the achievement of its goals. (Matter for Consideration 1) Recommendations for  Executive Action We are making the following two recommendations to the Secretary of  Defense. In the event of any future BRAC round, the Secretary of Defense should  ensure that ASD (EI&E) and the military departments take steps to  establish clear and consistent communications throughout the department  during data collection. (Recommendation 1) In the event of any future BRAC round, the Secretary of Defense should  ensure that ASD (EI&E) provides specific guidance for the military  departments to monitor and report on mission-related changes that  require significant changes to the recommendation business plans.  (Recommendation 2) Agency Comments  and Our Evaluation We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to DOD. In  written comments, DOD objected to our matter for congressional  consideration and concurred with both recommendations. DOD’s  comments are summarized below and reprinted in their entirety in  appendix VI.  DOD also provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate. DOD objected to our matter for congressional consideration that  Congress should consider, in any future BRAC authorization, a  requirement for DOD to identify appropriate measures of effectiveness  and to track the achievement of its goals. DOD stated that, as advised by  BRAC counsel, it believes this requirement would subvert the statutory  requirement that military value be the priority consideration. However, as  we noted when we originally directed this recommendation to the  department in March 2013, our recommendation does not undermine  DOD’s reliance on military value as the primary selection criteria for  DOD’s BRAC candidate recommendations, and DOD can still prioritize  military value while identifying measures that help determine whether  DOD achieved the military value that it seeks. Congress enacting a  requirement for DOD to identify appropriate measures of effectiveness  and to track the achievement of its goals, alongside the requirement to  prioritize military value, would address DOD’s concern about subverting a  statutory requirement related to military value. Moreover, the department  will likely have a better understanding of whether it achieved its intended  results while still continuing to enhance military value. DOD concurred with our first recommendation that, in the event of any  future BRAC round, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that ASD  (EI&E) and the military departments take steps to establish clear and  consistent communications throughout the department during data  collection. In its letter, however, DOD stated it did not agree with our  assertion that the perceptions of lower-level personnel are necessarily  indicative of the process as a whole. We disagree with DOD’s statement  that we relied on the perceptions of lower-level personnel. We obtained  perceptions from senior personnel in the various military organizations  deemed by DOD leadership to be the most knowledgeable. We then  corroborated these perceptions with those from senior officials from the  military departments, along with evidence obtained from the Air Force and  Army lessons-learned reports. Moreover, DOD stated that the ability to  gather data was not limited by the nondisclosure agreements or an  inability to communicate with those participating in the BRAC process.  While DOD concurred with our recommendation, we continue to believe it  should consider the perceptions obtained from knowledgeable personnel  that data gathering was limited by nondisclosure agreements or an  inability to communicate throughout different levels of authority in the  department during data collection. DOD also concurred with our second recommendation that, in the event  of any future BRAC round, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that  ASD (EI&E) provides specific guidance for the military departments to  monitor and report on mission-related changes that require significant  changes to the recommendation business plans. In its letter, DOD stated  it would continue to provide guidance, as it did in the 2005 BRAC round,  to encourage resolution at the lowest possible level, with Office of the  Secretary of Defense involvement limited to review and approval of any  necessary changes to the business plans. However, as we reported, if a  mission-related change was not raised through the military department’s  chain of command, ASD (EI&E) officials stated that they were not always  aware of the details of such changes, hence the need for our  recommendation. By providing specific guidance to monitor and report  mission-related changes that require significant changes to the  recommendation business plans, DOD may be able to more effectively  make adjustments in its plans to ensure that the department achieves its  overall goals in any future BRAC rounds. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 15 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of  the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine  Corps. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix VII. Appendix I: Selected Local Economic Data  for Communities Affected by the 2005 BRAC  Round Closures Selected economic indicators for the 20 communities surrounding the 23  Department of Defense (DOD) installations closed in the 2005 Base  Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round vary compared to national  averages. In our analysis, we used annual unemployment and real per  capita income growth rates compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Labor  Statistics and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis as broad indicators  of the economic health of those communities where installation closures  occurred. Our analyses of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics annual  unemployment data for 2016, the most recent data available, showed that  11 of the 20 closure communities had unemployment rates at or below  the national average of 4.9 percent for the period from January through  December 2016. Another seven communities had unemployment rates  that were higher than the national average but at or below 6.0 percent.  Only two communities had unemployment rates above 8.0 percent (see  fig. 3). Of the 20 closure communities, Portland-South Portland, Maine  (Naval Air Station Brunswick) had the lowest unemployment rate at 3.0  percent and Yukon-Koyukuk, Alaska (Galena Forward Operating  Location) had the highest rate at 17.2 percent. We also used per capita income data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic  Analysis between 2006 and 2016 to calculate annualized growth rates  and found that 11 of the 20 closure communities had annualized real per  capita income growth rates that were higher than the national average of  1.0 percent (see fig. 4). The other 9 communities had rates that were  below the national average. Of the 20 communities affected, Yukon- Koyukuk, Alaska (Galena Forward Operating Location) had the highest  annualized growth rate at 4.6 percent and Gulfport-Biloxi-Pascagoula,  Mississippi (Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant and Naval Station  Pascagoula) had the lowest rate at -0.1 percent. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and  Methodology The objectives of our review were to assess the extent that the  Department of Defense (DOD) (1) measured the achievement of goals for  reducing excess infrastructure, transforming the military, and promoting  jointness for the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round and  (2) implemented prior GAO recommendations and addressed any  additional challenges faced in BRAC 2005 to improve performance for  any future BRAC round. In addition, we describe how current economic  indicators for the communities surrounding the 23 closed bases in BRAC  2005 compare to national averages. For all objectives, we reviewed the 2005 BRAC Commission’s September  2005 report to the President, policy memorandums, and guidance on  conducting BRAC 2005. We also reviewed other relevant documentation  such as supporting BRAC analyses prepared by the military services or  units related to the development of BRAC 2005 recommendations. We  interviewed officials with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  for Energy, Installations, and Environment; the Army; the Navy; the Air  Force; the Marine Corps; the U.S. Army Reserve Command; and the  National Guard Bureau. We also conducted site visits to Connecticut,  Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and  South Carolina. We met with 26 military units or organizations, such as  Air Force wings and Army and Navy installations’ Departments of Public  Works, and 12 communities involved with BRAC 2005 recommendations.  These interviews provide examples of any challenges faced by each  individual party, but information obtained is not generalizable to all parties  involved in the BRAC process. We selected locations for site visits based  on ensuring geographic diversity and a mix of types of BRAC  recommendations (closures, transformation, or jointness), and having at  least one installation from or community associated with each military  department. To assess the extent that DOD measured the achievement of goals for  reducing excess infrastructure, transforming the military, and promoting  jointness for BRAC 2005, we met with officials to discuss measurement of  goals and requested any related documentation. We compared DOD’s  efforts to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, which  emphasizes that an agency’s management should track major agency  achievements and compare these to the agencies’ plans, goals, and  objectives. We also tried to calculate the excess infrastructure disposed  of during BRAC 2005; however, DOD’s data were incomplete.  Specifically, in reviewing the square footage and plant replacement value  data from DOD’s Cost of Base Realignment Actions model, we found that  data from several bases were not included. Additionally, a senior official  with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy,  Installations, and Environment stated the data provided were not the most  current data used during BRAC 2005 and the office did not have access  to the complete data. We also tried to corroborate the square footage and  plant replacement value data from the Cost of Base Realignment Actions  model to DOD’s 2005 Base Structure Report, but we found the data to be  incomparable. As such, we determined that the incomplete and outdated  data were not sufficiently reliable to calculate the excess infrastructure  disposed of during BRAC 2005. To assess the extent that DOD implemented prior GAO recommendations  on BRAC 2005 and addressed any additional challenges faced in BRAC  2005 to improve performance for any future BRAC round, we reviewed  our prior reports and testimonies on BRAC 2005 to identify  recommendations made and determined whether those  recommendations applied to the analysis, implementation, or disposal  phase of BRAC 2005. We then identified whether DOD implemented  recommendations we made by discussing the status of recommendations  with agency officials and obtaining copies of agency documents  supporting the recommendations’ implementation. We also met with  officials to identify what challenges, if any, continue to be faced and what  opportunities exist to improve the analysis, implementation, and disposal  phases for any future BRAC round. For the analysis phase, we reviewed  military service lessons-learned documents. For the implementation  phase, we reviewed business plans supporting the implementation of the  BRAC 2005 recommendations and other applicable documentation, such  as a workforce planning study and an environmental impact statement  affecting the implementation of some recommendations. For the disposal  phase, we analyzed DOD’s caretaker costs for closed bases that it has  not yet transferred. We compared information about challenges in the  analysis, implementation, and disposal phases to criteria for  communications, monitoring, and risk assessments in Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government. To describe how current economic indicators for the communities  surrounding the 23 closed bases in BRAC 2005 compare to national  averages, we collected economic indicator data on the communities  surrounding closed bases from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the  Bureau of Economic Analysis in order to compare them with national  averages. To identify the communities surrounding closed bases, we  focused our review on the 23 major DOD installations closed in the BRAC  2005 round and their surrounding communities. For BRAC 2005, DOD  defined major installation closures as those that had a plant replacement  value exceeding $100 million. We used information from our 2013 report,  which identified the major closure installations. We then defined the  “community” surrounding each major installation by (1) identifying the  economic area in DOD’s Base Closure and Realignment Report, which  linked a metropolitan statistical area, a metropolitan division, or a  micropolitan statistical area to each installation, and then (2) updating  those economic areas based on the most current statistical areas or  divisions, as appropriate. Because DOD’s BRAC report did not identify  the census area for the Galena Forward Operating Location in Alaska or  the Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach Detachment in Concord,  California, we identified the town of Galena as within the Yukon-Koyukuk  Census Area and the city of Concord in the Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley,  CA Metropolitan Division, and our analyses used the economic data for  these areas. See table 1 for a list of the major DOD installations closed in  BRAC 2005 and their corresponding economic areas. To compare the economic indicator data of the communities surrounding  the 23 major DOD installations closed in the BRAC 2005 round to U.S.  national averages, we collected and analyzed calendar year 2016  unemployment data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and  calendar year 2006 through 2016 per capita income growth data, along  with data on inflation, from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis which  we used to calculate annualized real per capita income growth rates.  Calendar year 2016 was the most current year for which local area data  were available from these databases. We assessed the reliability of these  data by reviewing U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. Bureau of  Economic Analysis documentation regarding the methods used by each  agency in producing their data and found the data to be sufficiently  reliable to report 2016 annual unemployment rates and 2006 through  2016 real per capita income growth. We used unemployment and  annualized real per capita income growth rates as key performance  indicators because (1) DOD used these measures in its community  economic impact analysis during the BRAC location selection process  and (2) economists commonly use these measures in assessing the  economic health of an area over time. While our assessment provides an  overall picture of how these communities compare with the national  averages, it does not isolate the condition, or the changes in that  condition, that may be attributed to a specific BRAC action. We conducted this performance audit from April 2017 to March 2018 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix III: GAO Reviews Related to the  BRAC 2005 Analysis Phase, Related  Recommendations, and DOD Actions To improve the analysis phase of the 2005 Base Realignment and  Closure (BRAC) round, we made 12 recommendations between 2004  and 2016. The Department of Defense (DOD) fully concurred with 4,  partially concurred with 2, and did not concur with 6 recommendations. It  implemented 1 of the 12 recommendations (see table 2). According to  DOD officials, DOD will be unable to take actions on 7 recommendations  unless Congress authorizes any future BRAC round. Appendix IV: GAO Reviews Related to the  BRAC 2005 Implementation Phase, Related  Recommendations, and DOD Actions To improve the implementation phase of the 2005 Base Realignment and  Closure (BRAC) round, we made 39 recommendations between 2005  and 2016. The Department of Defense (DOD) fully concurred with 17,  partially concurred with 15, and did not concur with 7 recommendations.  DOD implemented 28 of them (see table 3). Appendix V: GAO Reviews Related to the  BRAC 2005 Disposal Phase, Related  Recommendations, and DOD Actions To improve the disposal phase of the 2005 Base Realignment and  Closure (BRAC) round, we made 14 recommendations between 2007  and 2017. The Department of Defense (DOD) fully concurred with 7,  partially concurred with 5, and did not concur with 2 recommendations.  DOD implemented 4 of them with 8 recommendations pending further  action (see table 4). According to DOD officials, DOD will be unable to  take actions on 5 of the 8 pending recommendations until another BRAC  round is authorized. Appendix VI: Comments from the  Department of Defense Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff  Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff  Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Gina Hoffman (Assistant  Director), Tracy Barnes, Irina Bukharin, Timothy Carr, Amie Lesser, John  Mingus, Kevin Newak, Carol Petersen, Richard Powelson, Clarice  Ransom, Jodie Sandel, Eric Schwab, Michael Silver, and Ardith Spence  made key contributions to this report. Related GAO Products High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial  Efforts Needed on Others. GAO-17-317. Washington, D.C.: February 15,  2017. Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Has Improved  Environmental Cleanup Reporting but Should Obtain and Share More  Information. GAO-17-151. Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2017. Military Base Realignments and Closures: More Guidance and  Information Needed to Take Advantage of Opportunities to Consolidate  Training. GAO-16-45. Washington, D.C.: February 18, 2016. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Process for Reusing Property  for Homeless Assistance Needs Improvements. GAO-15-274.  Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2015. DOD Joint Bases: Implementation Challenges Demonstrate Need to  Reevaluate the Program. GAO-14-577. Washington, D.C.: September 19,  2014. Defense Health Care Reform: Actions Needed to Help Realize Potential  Cost Savings from Medical Education and Training. GAO-14-630.  Washington, D.C: July 31, 2014. Defense Infrastructure: DOD’s Excess Capacity Estimating Methods  Have Limitations. GAO-13-535. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2013. Defense Infrastructure: Communities Need Additional Guidance and  Information to Improve Their Ability to Adjust to DOD Installation Closure  or Growth. GAO-13-436. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2013. Military Bases: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment  and Closure Rounds. GAO-13-149. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2013. DOD Joint Bases: Management Improvements Needed to Achieve  Greater Efficiencies. GAO-13-134. Washington, D.C.: November 15,  2012. Military Base Realignments and Closures: The National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency’s Technology Center Construction Project.  GAO-12-770R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2012. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Updated Costs and Savings  Estimates from BRAC 2005. GAO-12-709R. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2012. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Key Factors Contributing to  BRAC 2005 Results. GAO-12-513T. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2012. Excess Facilities: DOD Needs More Complete Information and a Strategy  to Guide Its Future Disposal Efforts. GAO-11-814. Washington, D.C.:  September 19, 2011. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Review of the Iowa and Milan  Army Ammunition Plants. GAO-11-488R. Washington, D.C.: April 1,  2011. Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is  Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the  Defense Access Roads Program. GAO-11-165. Washington, D.C.:  January 26, 2011. Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to  Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs.  GAO-10-725R. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010. Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning  Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant Growth.  GAO-10-602. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2010. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have  Increased While Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year  2009. GAO-10-98R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transportation Impact of  Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but Long-Term Costs Are  Uncertain and Direct Federal Support Is Limited. GAO-09-750.  Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009. Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings  Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating Supply- Related Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations. GAO-09-703.  Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2009. Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support  Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of  Facility Sustainment Funding Uses. GAO-09-336. Washington, D.C.:  March 30, 2009. Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in  Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently  Updating Savings Estimates. GAO-09-217. Washington, D.C.: January  30, 2009. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to  Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen  Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-1010R.  Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2008. Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help  Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth.  GAO-08-665. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008. Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road  Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R.  Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower  Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC  Recommendations. GAO-08-315. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008. Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations  Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. GAO-08-244R.  Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have  Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T.  Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2007. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have  Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159.  Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2007. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating,  Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of  Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage,  and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics  Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007. Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely  Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial  Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13,  2007. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor  Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve  Centers. GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the  2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007. Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers  Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and  Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29,  2007. Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate  Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely  Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641.  Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007. Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental  Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.  GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007. Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and  Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905.  Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005. Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and  Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785.  Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005. Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC  Rounds. GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005. Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need  for a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington,  D.C.: May 17, 2004.
The 2005 BRAC round was the costliest and most complex BRAC round ever. In contrast to prior rounds, which focused on the goal of reducing excess infrastructure, DOD's goals for BRAC 2005 also included transforming the military and fostering joint activities. GAO was asked to review DOD's performance outcomes from BRAC 2005. This report examines the extent to which DOD has (1) measured the achievement of its goals for BRAC 2005 and (2) implemented prior GAO recommendations on BRAC 2005 and addressed any additional challenges to improve performance for any future BRAC round. GAO reviewed relevant documents and guidance; met with a nongeneralizable selection of 26 military organizations and 12 communities involved with BRAC 2005; and interviewed DOD officials. The Department of Defense (DOD) components generally did not measure the achievement of goals—reducing excess infrastructure, transforming the military, and promoting joint activities among the military departments—for the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. In March 2013, GAO recommended that, for any future BRAC round, DOD identify measures of effectiveness and develop a plan to demonstrate achieved results. DOD did not concur and stated that no action is expected. Without a requirement for DOD to identify measures of effectiveness and track achievement of its goals, Congress will not have full visibility over the expected outcomes or achievements of any future BRAC rounds. Of the 65 recommendations GAO has made to help DOD address challenges it faced in BRAC 2005, as of October 2017 DOD had implemented 33 of them (with 18 pending DOD action). DOD has not addressed challenges associated with communication and monitoring mission-related changes. Specifically: Some military organizations stated that they could not communicate to BRAC decision makers information outside of the data-collection process because DOD did not establish clear and consistent communications. For example, Army officials at Fort Knox, Kentucky, stated that there was no way to communicate that excess facilities were ill-suited for relocating the Human Resources Command and moved forward without full consideration of alternatives for using better-suited excess space at other locations. As a result, DOD spent about $55 million more than estimated to construct a new building at Fort Knox. DOD implemented BRAC recommendations that affected units' ability to carry out their missions because DOD lacked specific guidance to monitor and report on mission-related changes. For example, DOD spent about $27.7 million on a landing field for a Marine Corps F-35 training squadron at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, even though it had been previously decided to station the F-35 aircraft and personnel at another base. By addressing its communication and monitoring challenges, DOD could better inform decision making, better ensure that its infrastructure meets the need of its force structure, and better position itself to achieve its goals in any future BRAC round.