DOD Has Made  Limited Progress  since June 2018 in  Addressing  Remaining Statutory  Requirements and Is  Reducing the Number  of Cross-Functional  Teams It Considers  Responsive to  Section 911 DOD Has Addressed One  Statutory Requirement  since June 2018, but Has  Not Addressed Five  Remaining Requirements DOD has addressed one additional statutory requirement of section 911  of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 since our June 2018 report. However,  DOD has still not addressed five other requirements, including (1) issuing  its organizational strategy, (2) issuing guidance on cross-functional  teams, (3) providing training on cross-functional teams for team members  and their supervisors, (4) providing training for presidential appointees,  and (5) taking actions to streamline the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, as shown in table 1. DOD addressed one of the statutory requirements in section 911 by  submitting a report to Congress on the establishment of cross-functional  teams on June 21, 2018. The report described the number of cross- functional teams established to date and the design and function of those  teams, consistent with the requirements in section 911. OCMO officials told us that DOD plans to address three of the five  remaining requirements by March 2019. Specifically, the department  plans to take the following actions. Issue DOD’s organizational strategy. DOD has drafted, but not issued,  its organizational strategy, which section 911 required to be issued by  September 1, 2017. In June 2018, we reported that OCMO officials  had revised the draft strategy to address the recommendation from  our February 2018 report, including identifying potential action steps  for the department that align with our leading practices for mergers  and organizational transformations. OCMO officials have again  revised the draft organizational strategy, incorporating, among other  things, the criteria that distinguish cross-functional teams established  under section 911 from other cross-functional working groups,  committees, integrated product teams, and task forces, as required by  section 918 the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2019. The officials said they  expect the Secretary of Defense to issue the strategy in March  2019—18 months later than required by section 911. Take actions to streamline the Office of the Secretary of Defense. OCMO officials have revised the draft organizational strategy to  identify the actions the department has taken that it views as  responsive to this requirement. For example, the draft strategy states  that DOD has delegated authority to approve certain global force  management actions to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and  certain acquisition oversight functions to the military departments.  Section 911 required DOD to take these actions by June 23, 2018. As  noted above, however, the organizational strategy has not been  finalized. We will assess these actions against the requirements of  section 911 after the organizational strategy has been issued. Issue guidance on cross-functional teams. DOD has drafted, but not  issued, guidance on cross-functional teams, which section 911  required to be issued by September 30, 2017. In June 2018, we  reported that OCMO officials had revised the draft guidance to  address the recommendation from our February 2018 report. OCMO  officials stated that they have no other planned revisions and that they  expect the Secretary of Defense to issue the guidance in March  2019—18 months later than required by section 911. Further, OCMO officials told us that DOD plans to finalize the draft  curricula and provide training to fulfill two additional section 911  requirements after the organizational strategy is issued. Training for cross-functional team members and their supervisors. OCMO has not provided the required training to cross-functional team  members and their supervisors. OCMO officials stated that they plan  to send the draft training curriculum for cross-functional team  members and their supervisors to the Secretary after they send the  strategy. In February 2018, we reported that the draft training  curriculum addressed the section 911 requirements; OCMO officials  told us they plan no further revisions to the curriculum. After the  Secretary approves the curriculum, the officials stated, they plan to  offer the training to cross-functional team members. Some cross- functional team members we met with stated that receiving training on  cross-functional teams earlier would have been helpful for them to  understand how to operate in a cross-functional team environment,  such as reporting to both the team leader and to their home  organization. Training for presidential appointees. OCMO has not provided the  required training to individuals filling presidentially-appointed, Senate- confirmed positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Section  911 requires these individuals to complete the training within 3  months of their appointment, or for DOD to request waivers. However,  as of January 2, 2019, 23 of 35 such officials had been in their  positions for more than 3 months, and none had received the training  or been granted a training waiver. In our February 2018 report, we  found that the draft curriculum met only one of the four required  elements in section 911. We recommended, and DOD concurred,  that the CMO should either (1) provide training that includes all of the  required elements in section 911 or (2) develop criteria for obtaining a  waiver and have the Secretary of Defense request such a waiver from  the President for these required elements. In October 2018, an  OCMO official stated that OCMO had revised the draft training  curriculum for presidential appointees to include all of the required  elements in section 911. The official also stated that OCMO plans to  send the draft training curriculum to the Secretary of Defense for  review after OCMO sends the organizational strategy. Once the  curriculum is approved, the official stated that OCMO plans to  recommend to the Secretary of Defense that all presidential  appointees in the Office of the Secretary of Defense receive the  training and does not plan to request waivers. As described above, we have previously recommended that DOD take  actions to improve its implementation of the section 911 requirements  related to the organizational strategy, guidance, and training. As we have  reported before, addressing our recommendations and fully implementing  the remaining requirements would better position DOD to effectively  implement its cross-functional teams and advance a collaborative culture,  as required by the NDAA. We will continue to monitor DOD’s progress in  addressing these statutory requirements and our related  recommendations. DOD Plans to Establish  One Cross-Functional  Team, Disestablish  Another, and Will No  Longer Consider Nine  Business Reform Teams  as Responsive to Section  911 DOD is establishing a new cross-functional team to address growing  challenges in the electronic warfare mission area. Section 918 of the  NDAA for Fiscal Year 2019 requires DOD to establish this cross- functional team by November 11, 2018, to identify gaps in electronic  warfare and joint electromagnetic spectrum operations, capabilities, and  capacities within the department across personnel, procedural, and  equipment areas. In January 2019, an OCMO official stated that the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment  had drafted the team's charter and that it had been sent to the Secretary  of Defense for review and approval. In addition, DOD plans to disestablish the first cross-functional team  established in response to section 911 to address challenges with  personnel vetting and background investigations. This team was  responsible for managing the transfer of background investigations for  certain DOD personnel from the Office of Personnel Management to  DOD. However, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence officials stated that DOD plans to subsume the roles and  responsibilities of the team into a new Personnel Vetting Transformation  Office. According to the officials, the new office will be responsible for  managing the administration’s proposed transfer of background  investigations for all executive branch personnel from the Office of  Personnel Management to DOD. As a result, the cross-functional team’s  roles and responsibilities would overlap with those of the Personnel  Vetting Transformation Office, the officials stated. The officials expect to  formally disestablish the cross-functional team in the first quarter of fiscal  year 2019 after DOD issues the charter for the Personnel Vetting  Transformation Office. Last, DOD continues to implement its nine cross-functional teams  dedicated to reforming and improving business operations, but plans to  no longer consider these teams as responsive to section 911. The  National Defense Business Operations Plan for Fiscal Years 2018-2022,  issued in May 2018, stated that these teams were established pursuant to  section 911. As of October 2018, however, DOD’s draft organizational  strategy states that these teams were not established in response to  section 911. Instead, it describes them as a second layer of cross- functional coordination that will aid in ensuring broader implementation of  collaborative and team-oriented practices in the department. We describe  these teams’ efforts to improve DOD’s enterprise business operations  below and in appendix III. DOD’s Enterprise  Business Reform Is  Largely Driven by  Nine Cross- Functional Teams, but  Progress Has Been  Uneven Nine Cross-Functional  Teams Are Key to DOD’s  Enterprise Business  Reform The National Defense Business Operations Plan for Fiscal Years 2018- 2022 highlights nine cross-functional teams as key mechanisms for  implementing the plan’s strategic objective to improve and strengthen  business operations through a move to enterprise or shared services.  From October 2017 through January 2018, the Deputy Secretary of  Defense, at the direction of the Secretary, established these nine teams  to implement initiatives intended to improve the quality and productivity of  the department’s business operations, including moving toward more use  of enterprise services. According to memoranda appointing the team  leaders, the teams support the Secretary of Defense’s focus on creating a  more lethal and effective force by allowing the department to reallocate  resources from business operations to readiness and to recapitalization of  the combat force. These nine teams—hereafter referred to as business  reform teams and whose leaders report to the CMO—address community  services management, financial management, health care management,  human resources, information technology and business systems, real  property management, service contracts and category management,  supply chain and logistics, and testing and evaluation. They are  described in more detail in appendix III. The Fiscal Year 2019 DOD Annual Performance Plan identifies  performance goals and measures to achieve the strategic goals and  objectives described in the National Defense Business Operations Plan,  including the goal of reforming the department’s business practices. It  designates several business reform team leaders as responsible for  meeting the performance goals and associated performance measures.  For example, the leader of the information technology and business  systems reform team is responsible for the performance goal to transform  how the department delivers secure, stable, and resilient information  technology infrastructure in support of warfighter lethality. This goal is  consistent with the team’s overarching objective to plan and execute the  transformation of all business systems affecting support areas within the  department. The Annual Performance Plan’s objectives and timeframes related to the  business reform teams, however, do not fully align with some of the  initiatives that the teams are pursuing. For example, according to the  plan, the leader of the community services management team is  responsible for developing a strategic plan for armed forces retirement  home reform by the second quarter of 2018. However, according to a list  of the team’s current initiatives as of September 2018, the team was not  pursuing this initiative. In October 2018, OCMO officials stated that  Washington Headquarters Service is currently leading the armed forces  retirement home reform effort. When we asked these officials how they  view the relationship between performance measures in the plan and  those of the business reform teams’ initiatives, they acknowledged that  the teams’ initiatives have evolved since the plan’s development and that  the teams have identified additional initiatives that may not be reflected in  the plan. They also noted that OCMO drafted the content for the Fiscal  Year 2019 DOD Annual Performance Plan before most of the teams were  fully staffed and operational. As of October 2018, the officials stated that  OCMO was coordinating with the team leaders to review the Fiscal Year  2019 DOD Annual Performance Plan and, as appropriate, to modify or  develop new performance measures and targets for the Fiscal Year 2020  DOD Annual Performance Plan. Given DOD’s efforts to address this  issue, we are not making a recommendation at this time, but will continue  to monitor their efforts as part of our ongoing work on the high-risk nature  of DOD’s business transformation efforts. The Progress of the  Business Reform Teams  Has Been Uneven, and  Some Teams Lack  Resources to Fully  Implement Their Initiatives DOD has made some progress establishing and organizing the business  reform teams, but implementation of the teams’ initiatives has been  uneven. We found that implementation of the business reform teams has  demonstrated some key characteristics of leading practices for  implementing effective cross-functional teams that we have identified in  our prior work. For example, across all the teams we spoke with,  members were responsible for leading the development of their team’s  initiatives and communicating with their home organizations to obtain  input, demonstrating a well-defined team structure. In addition, the  business reform teams are structured to facilitate open and regular  communication, another leading practice. For example, the teams are  generally co-located with each other, which enables direct communication  among team members and between teams, members stated. Further,  members from most of the teams we spoke with were supportive of their  team leaders and viewed them as effective in their roles, demonstrating  an inclusive team environment. Team leaders across all teams also  stated that they regularly interact with senior management, such as  through weekly one-on-one meetings with the CMO or Deputy CMO. This  engagement reflects a key characteristic that states team leaders should  regularly interact with senior management. However, we found that the business reform teams’ efforts have not  proceeded according to early plans outlined by the department. DOD’s  August 2017 report to Congress on restructuring the CMO organization  stated that the teams were intended to help modify processes to move  toward enterprise service delivery. According to the report, the  department would transition to DOD enterprise services by the end of  fiscal year 2018. In July 2018, OCMO officials acknowledged that they  were behind schedule, but told us they expected to catch up to this  deadline by the end of fiscal year 2018, as originally planned. That  deadline was not realized. According to OCMO officials, the teams are  identifying new milestones for implementing initiatives, some of which will  contribute to a move toward enterprise services. In addition, the business reform teams vary in the number of initiatives  they are pursuing. As of September 2018, OCMO reported that the teams  were pursuing a total of 135 initiatives and that the number of initiatives  per team ranged from 2 to 38. For example, the community services  management team was developing 2 initiatives—1 to examine the  feasibility of merging DOD’s three military exchange services and the  Defense Commissary Agency into a single resale enterprise, and the  other to streamline the inventory of DOD lodging. In contrast, the supply  chain and logistics team was developing 21 short- and long-term  initiatives, such as reducing the footprint of underutilized warehouses and  developing better data interoperability throughout the supply chain and  logistics enterprise. Further, the teams’ progress in advancing their initiatives to the  implementation and monitoring phase has varied. The Reform  Management Group oversees the business reform teams. The Deputy  Secretary of Defense chairs the Reform Management Group, and the  CMO facilitates regular meetings of the group. The Reform  Management Group authorizes the business reform teams to proceed  with their initiatives through five gates—0 through 4. These gates trace  initiatives from conception to implementation and monitoring. Before  proceeding from one gate to the next, the teams must submit certain  deliverables to the Reform Management Group for review and approval.  For example, before an initiative can proceed to gate 1, OCMO requires  the teams to submit a charter for the initiative, which can identify, among  other things, the problem or opportunity statement, the project scope,  expected outcomes and risk analysis, and preliminary performance  measures. Figure 1 provides an overview of the five gates and the  status of initiatives by gate, as of September 2018. As shown in figure 1, while some teams have successfully advanced  several initiatives to gate 4, others have not yet progressed initiatives past  gate 2. Specifically, as of September 2018, DOD reported that 104 of the  teams’ 135 initiatives had not yet reached gate 3, the implementation  phase. According to the teams we interviewed, several factors may affect  the progress of an initiative, such as its complexity or a team’s approach  to developing initiatives. For example, the community services  management team leader stated that the team is primarily focused on the  consolidation of the defense commissaries and exchanges, an initiative  that is relatively large in scope and complexity. According to the team  leader, this initiative involves a number of internal stakeholders, including  all of the military services, as well as outreach to external stakeholders,  such as veterans’ organizations. In addition, the leader stated that the  team would need legislative changes to fully implement the initiative. As a  result of the large scope and complexity, the leader expects the initiative  to take longer to implement than others. Some teams have pursued a  proof-of-concept approach to developing their initiatives, which involves  pilots to test initiatives to prove their value prior to department-wide  implementation. For example, the health care management team is  conducting a regional pilot to test the feasibility of consolidating the  purchasing of services across the military health system. DOD has asserted that some of its initiatives have produced benefits  through savings or efficiencies. For example, according to a September  2018 DOD report on the department’s investments in support of the  National Defense Strategy, the department achieved $1.61 billion in  benefits by implementing private-sector best practices in purchasing  goods and service contracts in the Air Force and defense agencies. In  addition, DOD reported that the department saved $297 million through  commercial information technology solutions, department-wide network  management, and optimized data centers. Further, according to the  report, consolidating four health care enterprises improved patient care  and medical readiness, with an estimated savings of more than $2.5  billion annually by 2023. OCMO officials stated that they are still in the  process of working with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Comptroller to document savings generated from the business reform  teams’ initiatives. Given that OCMO officials stated they are taking steps  to document savings generated from the teams’ initiatives, we are not  making a recommendation at this time, but will continue to monitor their  efforts as part of our ongoing work on the high-risk nature of DOD’s  business transformation efforts. One senior DOD official involved in the reform effort acknowledged that  the teams’ progress has been uneven. He cited a number of factors that  can affect teams’ implementation, including the degree to which the  teams have support from the highest levels of department leadership to  operate independently and advance changes that may be unpopular with  internal or external stakeholders, and the ability of teams to tackle  longstanding systemic challenges, such as inaccurate cost data  throughout the department. This official and several teams we met with  cited the importance of the team leader’s commitment to driving team  success. We found that uncertainty with funding for initiatives may be an additional  factor inhibiting some teams’ progress. In some cases, the business  reform teams need funding to further develop and implement their  initiatives, such as the supply chain and logistics team’s requirement for  $2.4 million to conduct a pilot project that included conducting three site  visits for warehouse and labor assessments in support of one of its  initiatives. According to OCMO officials, the business reform teams can  request funding from OCMO to further develop their initiatives, or if  funding is not available from OCMO, the teams can seek funding from  functional organizations. However, even in the early stages of their  implementation, some teams told us that they did not have access to  sufficient funding to fully develop and implement some of their approved  initiatives or that the process for obtaining the funding was uncertain.  For example, in June 2018, one team leader told us that the team did not  have sufficient funding to implement four initiatives. The leader also  stated that the team was not alerted to the lack of funding until  immediately prior to its planned implementation of these initiatives.  Members from another team stated that the Reform Management Group  wanted the team to implement its initiatives more quickly, which increased  the amount of funding the team needed for implementation. When the  team requested additional funding, however, OCMO did not have it  available. Further, OCMO officials told us that the teams submitted nine  requests for funding in fiscal year 2018, but OCMO did not have funding  to support four of these requests as of the end of fiscal year 2018. As the teams continue to develop and implement their initiatives, the  number of requests for funding may increase in the future. Our prior work  on efficiency initiatives has found that up-front investments may often be  required to realize long-term efficiencies and savings. In this regard,  OCMO officials told us that, as of September 2018, the nine teams had  planned investments of about $6.7 billion to implement their initiatives  from fiscal years 2018 through 2024. OCMO officials stated that this  amount is a projection from the teams, and DOD has not yet identified  sources for this funding. In addition, officials stated that more investment  could be needed as the teams continue to develop initiatives and more  enter the implementation phase. However, according to DOD’s budget  materials for fiscal year 2019, requested funding for OCMO—a source  used to fund the development of some of the teams’ initiatives—will  decrease from about $48 million in fiscal year 2018, to about $36 million  in fiscal year 2019. Leading practices for implementing effective cross-functional teams  highlight the importance of senior management providing teams with  access to resources. These leading practices also state that teams  should have well-defined team operations with established rules and  procedures. Further, the findings from a study contracted by DOD in  August 2017 to determine how best to implement effective cross- functional teams identified actions for DOD to consider for supporting the  implementation of its cross-functional teams, including identifying funding  mechanisms to fully support cross-functional teams. The study  suggested that language outlining the preferred mechanisms and  authorities for this purpose can be included in cross-functional team  guidance. OCMO officials told us that the office maintains a list of funding requests  from the teams and prioritizes which initiatives to fund based on several  factors including estimated yield, feasibility, and available resources for  implementation. However, OCMO did not have a process for identifying  and prioritizing available funding for implementing the initiatives planned  by the business reform teams for fiscal year 2018, and has not  established one for fiscal year 2019. According to OCMO officials, the  department initially planned to use available funding from OCMO or the  savings generated by the initiatives to fund the development and  implementation of other initiatives. However, OCMO officials have since  recognized that funding is needed and they are in the early stages of  developing an approach to do so. Specifically, OCMO officials said they  are working with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Comptroller to identify funding for initiatives in fiscal year 2020. While  there will likely be initiatives that cannot be funded given limited  resources, OCMO and the reform teams could benefit from a clear  process for identifying and prioritizing available funding. Without such a  process, OCMO and the reform teams may not be able to adequately  plan for and execute their initiatives. Conclusions Section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 called for organizational  and management reforms to assist DOD in addressing challenges that  have hindered collaboration and integration across the department. While  the department has taken some steps to implement the section 911  requirements, it has still not met statutory due dates for implementing key  requirements intended to support its cross-functional teams and to  advance a more collaborative culture within the department. We continue  to believe it is important for senior leadership to demonstrate their  commitment to fulfilling section 911 by addressing our prior related  recommendations and by completing the remaining requirements. Further, section 921 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2019 requires DOD to  reform its enterprise business operations to increase the effectiveness  and efficiency of mission execution. DOD has highlighted its nine cross- functional teams dedicated to improving the department’s business  operations as key to achieving enterprise business reform. However, this  effort has been marked by a slow start and uneven progress, and teams  face a number of challenges. One key challenge is the teams’ lack of  resources to drive their initiatives forward. OCMO has not established a  process for identifying and prioritizing available funding for the  development and implementation of the teams’ initiatives, which has  hampered the success of some of the enterprise reform efforts. Recommendation for  Executive Action The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Chief Management  Officer establishes a process for identifying and prioritizing available  funding to develop and implement initiatives from the cross-functional  reform teams. (Recommendation 1) Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its  written comments, which are reproduced in Appendix V, DOD concurred  with our recommendation and described ongoing and planned actions to  address it. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Acting Secretary of Defense, and DOD’s Acting Chief  Management Officer. In addition, the report is available at no charge on  our website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2775 or fielde1@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix VI. Appendix I: Prior GAO Reports on the Department  of Defense’s (DOD) Implementation of Section 911  of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)  for Fiscal Year 2017 Section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for  us—every 6 months after the date of enactment on December 23, 2016,  through December 31, 2019—to submit to the defense committees a  report. Each report is to set forth a comprehensive assessment of the  actions that DOD has taken pursuant to section 911 during each 6-month  period and cumulatively since the NDAA’s enactment. We issued our first  report in June 2017, and did not make recommendations. We issued our  second report in February 2018, and made four recommendations to  improve DOD’s implementation of section 911. We issued our third report  in June 2018, and did not make recommendations. Table 2 identifies our  three prior reports on DOD’s implementation of section 911 and the status  of the four recommendations from our February 2018 report. Appendix II: Summary of Requirements in  Section 911 of the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 Section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  2017 requires the Secretary of Defense to take several actions. Table 3  summarizes these requirements, the due date, and the date completed, if  applicable, as of December 2018. Appendix III: Overview of the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) Nine Cross-Functional  Teams Implementing Business Reform  Initiatives The Deputy Secretary of Defense has established nine cross-functional  teams since October 2017 to implement reform initiatives intended to  improve the quality and productivity of the department’s business  operations, including moving toward more use of enterprise services.  According to the memoranda appointing the team leaders, these teams  support the Secretary of Defense’s focus on creating a more lethal and  effective force by allowing the department to reallocate resources from  business operations to readiness and to recapitalization of the combat  force. As of September 2018, these nine cross-functional teams varied in size,  ranging from 5 to 31 members. According to OCMO officials, the size of  the teams can vary based on the knowledge and expertise needed to  implement the teams’ initiatives. The team leaders are either presidential  appointees or members of the Senior Executive Service. In addition, the  Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the military departments and  functional organizations to appoint reform team members, and the teams  include representatives from the military departments, functional  organizations relevant to the reform topic, and external experts. At the  time we met with the teams, most reported that they were the appropriate  size and had the right skills and expertise represented on the team.  Figure 2 provides additional details on the composition of these nine  cross-functional teams, as of September 2018. Appendix IV: Leading Practices for  Implementing Effective Cross-Functional  Teams In February 2018, we reported on eight leading practices for  implementing effective cross-functional teams. Table 4 identifies these  leading practices and their related key characteristics. Appendix V: Comments from the Department  of Defense Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff  Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff  Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Margaret Best (Assistant  Director), Tracy Barnes, Arkelga Braxton, William Carpluk, Michael  Holland, William Lamping, Chad Johnson, Matthew Kienzle, Amie Lesser,  Ned Malone, Judy McCloskey, Sheila Miller, Sally Newman, Richard  Powelson, Daniel Ramsey, Ron Schwenn, Jared Sippel, Susan Tindall,  and Sarah Veale made key contributions to this report.
DOD continues to confront organizational challenges that hinder collaboration. To address these challenges, section 911 of the NDAA for FY 2017 directed the Secretary of Defense to issue an organizational strategy that identifies critical objectives that span multiple functional boundaries; establish cross-functional teams to support this strategy and provide related guidance and training; and take actions to streamline the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Further, section 921 of the NDAA for FY 2019 calls for the Secretary of Defense to reform the department's enterprise business operations. The NDAAs for FY 2017 and 2019 also included provisions for GAO to assess DOD's actions in response to sections 911 and 921, respectively. This report assesses the extent to which DOD has made progress in (1) addressing the requirements of section 911, and (2) reforming the department's enterprise business operations under section 921. GAO reviewed documentation on DOD's implementation of sections 911 and 921; interviewed cross-functional team leaders, members, and other DOD officials; and compared DOD's implementation of its cross-functional teams to GAO's key practices. The Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented four statutory requirements in section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, but has not addressed five requirements intended to support cross-functional teams and promote department-wide collaboration (see table). For two of these requirements, DOD has missed the statutory deadline by more than a year. GAO previously recommended that DOD take actions to improve its implementation of section 911, and DOD reported it is doing so, such as revising its draft cross-functional team guidance to address statutory requirements. Fully implementing GAO's prior recommendations and the remaining statutory requirements would better position DOD to effectively implement its cross-functional teams and advance a collaborative culture, as required by the NDAA. Nine cross-functional teams are driving DOD's enterprise business reform efforts under section 921 of the FY 2019 NDAA, but the teams' progress has been uneven. As of September 2018, DOD reported that these nine teams were pursuing a total of 135 business reform initiatives. However, 104 of these initiatives have not reached the implementation phase. A key challenge facing the teams is that some lack resources to fully implement their approved initiatives. For example, DOD officials stated that the department did not fulfill four of nine funding requests from the teams in fiscal year 2018 to implement their initiatives. As of September 2018, DOD officials estimated that the teams need about $6.7 billion to implement their initiatives from FYs 2018 through 2024, but DOD has not identified sources for this funding. GAO's prior work on efficiency initiatives found that up-front investments may be required to realize long-term savings. In addition, GAO's prior work on leading practices for implementing effective cross-functional teams highlights the importance of providing teams with access to resources and having well-defined team operations with established rules and procedures. However, DOD has not established a process for identifying and prioritizing available funding for implementing the teams' initiatives. Without such a process, DOD and the teams may not be able to adequately plan for and execute their reform initiatives.