Background The federal government plans to invest about $96 billion in fiscal year  2018 for IT that is critical to the health, economy, and security of the  nation. However, prior IT expenditures have often resulted in significant  cost overruns, schedule delays, and questionable mission-related  achievements. For example, The Department of Health and Human Services’ website,  Healthcare.gov, and its supporting systems, which were to facilitate  the establishment of a federal health insurance marketplace by  January 2014, encountered significant cost increases, schedule slips,  and delayed functionality. In a series of reports, we identified  numerous planning, oversight, security, and system development  challenges faced by this program. For almost two decades, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has  undertaken numerous initiatives with the Department of Defense  (DOD) that were intended to advance the ability of the two  departments to share electronic health records. In our report of the  departments’ efforts in 2015, we reported that the departments had  not identified outcome-oriented goals and metrics to clearly define  what they aimed to achieve from their interoperability efforts, resulting  in numerous failures. During most of the last 20 years, VA has also  been planning to modernize its system separately from DOD.  Recently, the Secretary of VA announced that the department plans to  use the same electronic health record system that DOD is in the  process of acquiring. However, the significant challenges that have  confronted VA in its efforts contributed to our designation of VA health  care as a high risk area. The Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Services’ Transformation Program, which was initiated to  address processing inefficiencies and transform the agency’s current  paper-based system into an electronic account-based system, has  faced continual management and development challenges, limiting its  progress and ability to achieve its goals of enhanced national security  and system integrity, better customer service, and operational  efficiency. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services estimates  that the program’s cost increased by approximately $1 billion and its  schedule was delayed by over 4 years from its initial approved  baseline. The Office of Personnel Management’s Retirement Systems  Modernization program, which was intended to improve the efficiency  and effectiveness of its retirement claims processing, was canceled in  February 2011 after the agency had spent approximately $231 million  on a third attempt to automate the processing of federal employee  retirement claims. As previously stated, due to the challenges associated with acquiring IT  across the federal government, in 2015, we added improving the  management of IT acquisitions and operations to our list of high-risk  areas. We recently issued an update to our high-risk report and  determined that, while progress has been made in addressing the high- risk area of IT acquisitions and operations, significant work remains to be  completed. For example, as of May 2017, OMB and federal agencies  had implemented 380 (or about 47 percent) of the 803 recommendations  that we had made from fiscal years 2010 through 2015 related to IT  acquisitions and operations. OMB’s Mission and  Oversight of Federal IT  Programs By law, OMB is to oversee federal agencies’ management of information  and information technology. Within OMB, primary responsibility for  oversight of federal IT has been given to the Administrator of the Office of  Electronic Government and Information Technology, who is also called  the Federal Chief Information Officer (Federal CIO). According to OMB,  this oversight responsibility covers about 800 major and nearly 5,700  non-major IT investments across the federal government. As a part of  the oversight, the E-Gov office develops policy and reviews federal  agencies’ IT strategic plans. In addition, OMB establishes processes to  analyze, track, and evaluate the risks and results of IT investments made  by executive agencies, and issues guidance on processes for selecting  and overseeing agency privacy and security protections for information  and information systems. OMB has also implemented a series of initiatives to improve the oversight  of underperforming investments and more effectively manage IT. These  initiatives include the following: Federal IT Dashboard. In June 2009, to further improve the  transparency into and oversight of federal agencies’ IT investments,  OMB deployed the Federal IT Dashboard, a public website with  information on the performance of these investments. OMB provided  guidance to the agencies on the information they should maintain and  update on the dashboard. Currently, the dashboard displays  information on the cost, schedule, and performance of close to 800  major IT investments at 26 federal agencies. In addition, agencies are  to submit ratings from their CIOs to the dashboard, which, according  to OMB’s instructions, should reflect the level of risk facing an  investment relative to that investment’s ability to accomplish its goals.  The public display of these data is intended to allow OMB, other  oversight bodies, and the general public to hold agencies accountable  for mission-related outcomes. Over the past 7 years, we have issued  a series of reports that have noted both significant steps OMB has  taken to enhance the oversight, transparency, and accountability of  federal IT investments by creating the dashboard, as well as issues  with the accuracy and reliability of the data it contains. TechStat reviews. In January 2010, the Federal CIO began leading  TechStat reviews—face-to-face meetings to discuss whether to  terminate or turn around IT investments that are in danger of failing or  are not producing results. These meetings involved OMB and agency  leadership and were intended to increase accountability and improve  performance. OMB reported that federal agencies achieved over $3  billion in cost savings or avoidances as a result of these reviews in  2010. Subsequently, it empowered agency CIOs to begin holding  their own TechStat reviews by June 2012. OMB’s 2015 guidance  specified that the TechStat reviews were to be held with agency  leadership, not led by OMB as in the past, and that agencies were  only required to notify OMB of the meetings’ occurrence and report  the results. In November 2015, we testified that OMB had conducted only one  TechStat review between March 2013 and October 2015, and had not  listed any related savings in its quarterly reporting to Congress since  June 2012. In April 2017, OMB reported that it had not led a  TechStat review since 2015. A report issued by the Federal CIO  Council in January 2017, entitled The State of Federal Information  Technology, noted that shifting TechStat reviews from OMB to  agencies had diminished the executive scrutiny and impact of the  initiative. PortfolioStat sessions. To better manage existing IT systems, in  2012, OMB launched the PortfolioStat initiative, which required  agencies to conduct an annual, agency-wide portfolio review to,  among other things, reduce commodity IT spending and demonstrate  how their investments aligned with the agency’s mission and business  functions. These reviews were to be held between the Federal CIO  and agency leadership. In 2014 and 2015, OMB’s PortfolioStat  guidance also called for it and agencies to identify high impact IT  programs that merited additional support and oversight by OMB  and/or agency leadership, and for these programs to be discussed  during a PortfolioStat session. The 2015 guidance also changed the  frequency of the PortfolioStat sessions from annually to quarterly, and  the level of participation to no longer require attendance by the  Federal CIO or the agency’s Deputy Secretary. The Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform provisions  (commonly referred to as FITARA) enacted as a part of the Carl Levin  and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for  Fiscal Year 2015 aimed to improve federal IT acquisition and operations  and recognized the importance of these OMB initiatives by incorporating  certain requirements into the law. For example, among other things, the  act requires OMB to publicly display investment performance information  and review federal agencies’ IT investment portfolios. Further, as previously mentioned, the December 2014 explanatory  statement for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2015, stated that OMB  was to identify the top 10 high priority IT programs under development in  the federal government and report on their status quarterly. Additionally,  in December 2015, in the explanatory statement for the Consolidated  Appropriations Act, 2016, Congress stated that USDS, an OMB  component, was to provide a quarterly status report on its current  projects, including the top 10 high priority programs. USDS’s Mission and  Organization The current mission of USDS is to deliver better government services to  the American people through technology and design. USDS is focused  on, among other things, improving the nation’s most important digital  services used by the public, and modernizing procurement processes and  practices for the digital era. To execute its mission, USDS recruits  private sector experts, such as IT engineers and designers and leading  civil servants, and deploys small teams to federal agencies. It selects  which projects it will apply resources to and generally initiates the effort  with the federal agency that owns the IT projects. In August 2016, we  reported that USDS had developed procedures and criteria for selecting  and prioritizing projects to work on. Current Administration’s  Efforts to Improve Federal  IT The current administration has initiated additional efforts aimed at  improving federal IT, including digital services. Specifically, in March  2017, the administration established the Office of American Innovation,  which has a mission to, among other things, make recommendations to  the President on policies and plans aimed at improving federal  government operations and services and modernizing federal IT. In doing  so, the office is to consult with both OMB and the Office of Science and  Technology Policy. Further, in May 2017, the administration established  the American Technology Council, which has a goal of helping to  transform and modernize federal agency IT and how the federal  government uses and delivers digital services. The Federal CIO and the  USDS Administrator are members of this council. OMB Identified High  Priority IT Programs,  but Did Not Ensure  Federal CIO  Oversight or  Continued and Timely  Reporting OMB reported that it undertook a structured approach to identifying the  top 10 high priority IT programs it reported to Congress in June 2015 and  June 2016. Specifically, staff in the E-Gov office, including the Unit Chief  for the Agency Oversight and Implementation team, stated that they  chose the top 10 programs from a list of high impact programs that OMB  separately maintains. They added that their approach was not guided by  any documented procedures or scoring techniques to distinguish the  programs. Analysts in the E-Gov office told us that, to identify the high impact  programs from which the top 10 high priority programs were selected,  they used program information from IT portfolio summaries, monthly IT  dashboard updates, and quarterly integrated data collection submissions  that OMB receives from agencies. They also considered several  additional factors, such as risk exposure, public impact, public use,  criticality to agency mission, size, and cost. In addition, they considered  input from USDS leadership and OMB budget examiners, as well as our  reports, inspectors general reports, and CIO risk ratings. Further, the analysts stated that OMB sought input from officials of the 24  Chief Financial Officers Act agencies to gain a better understanding of  the importance of each program. In the end, based on all of the  information considered, E-Gov staff made a judgment call regarding  which of the agencies’ programs to identify as being high impact.  According to these staff, on average, two high impact programs are  identified for each of the 24 agencies, with at least one program being  identified for each agency, and as many as four programs being identified  for some larger agencies. Further, according to the staff, the Federal CIO  approved the process for selecting the high impact programs. In addition, in determining the top 10 high priority programs, the E-Gov  staff stated that they identified on the high impact list those programs that  they believed were representative of the most important IT programs  across federal agencies. They also considered other factors, such as  whether a program had generated legislative interest or had performance  issues. They added that the Federal CIO then approved the list of top 10  programs that they had selected. OMB subsequently issued two reports to Congress—in June 2015 and  June 2016—that identified the top 10 high priority programs. Along with  the status of each program, the reports identified the IT investments that  were a part of each program as well as total IT spending, average CIO  risk rating, major milestones, and the level of involvement USDS has with  the program. Table 1 lists the programs that OMB identified in the two  reports. As shown in the table, OMB made two changes to the top 10 list in 2016.  Specifically, it replaced the Social Security Administration’s Service  Modernization program with the agency’s Disability Case Processing  System due to a change in focus within the agency. In addition, it  replaced VA’s Medical Appointment Scheduling System with VA’s  Medical 21st Century Development Core program, which is a larger effort  that encompasses the scheduling system. OMB Oversight Efforts Did  Not Ensure Federal CIO  Involvement E-Gov staff reported that the high priority programs were already  receiving greater oversight than what was provided to the other major  programs due to their high impact designation. Specifically, the staff  stated that OMB provides additional oversight to high impact IT programs  by regularly communicating about them through quarterly, monthly,  weekly, or daily meetings with agency CIOs and program staff, depending  on the risk and profile of the program. In contrast, communication is much  less frequent for other major IT systems. The staff added they also  discuss high impact programs with agencies during quarterly PortfolioStat  meetings. Further, they stated that they can request that agencies  perform a TechStat review, if needed, for a troubled high impact program. Most agencies that owned the high priority programs identified in the June  2016 report confirmed that OMB had already provided increased  oversight for the high priority programs when they were originally  designated as high impact programs. Specifically, officials from six of the  eight agencies stated that the programs were discussed during quarterly  PortfolioStat sessions, and officials from five agencies stated that OMB  had provided action items for them to address with regard to their  programs. Further, officials from six agencies stated that OMB’s  oversight included periodic meetings (e.g., daily, weekly, or bi-weekly). Its  oversight also included participation in a TechStat review of a high impact  program performed by the Social Security Administration. Nevertheless, while additional OMB oversight of the high impact  programs (and, accordingly, the identified high priority programs) is a  positive step, the Federal CIO was not directly involved in this oversight.  According to the E-Gov staff, the Federal CIO does not typically get  involved with overseeing individual IT programs due to the large number  of programs. However, the results of past CIO-led TechStat reviews  suggest that the Federal CIO’s involvement in overseeing such programs  does have significantly positive results. Specifically, as previously  mentioned, CIO-led TechStat reviews of IT investments performed in  2010 resulted in $3 billion in savings and cost avoidance. Further, during a September 2016 Comptroller General forum to explore  challenges and opportunities for improving federal IT acquisitions and  operations, current and former CIOs and other participants pointed to the  importance of OMB’s oversight and guidance, and specifically, to the role  of the Federal CIO in helping to ensure effective IT governance. The  participants cited specific OMB initiatives undertaken by the Federal CIO,  including the TechStat reviews that had resulted in greater accountability  and positive results. Thus, without the involvement of the Federal CIO  more directly and regularly in the oversight of high impact and high  priority programs, including leading TechStat reviews for the programs,  OMB is likely to miss significant opportunities to improve accountability for  and achieve positive results from the federal government’s IT  investments. OMB Has Stopped  Reporting on High Priority  IT Programs OMB issued two reports on the high priority programs—one in 2015 and  another in 2016. While these reports provided the requested information  they were not issued quarterly. According to the E-Gov staff, OMB was  not able to report quarterly on the programs because of other competing  reporting requirements, limited resources available to draft the report, and  the amount of time it takes to get its reports fully reviewed. Moreover, the staff stated that they stopped issuing the high priority  reports in 2016 because they believe the explanatory statement to the  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, no longer directed them to  continue reporting on the programs. Specifically, the explanatory  statement directed USDS to provide a quarterly report to the Committees  on Appropriations of the House and Senate describing the status of  current USDS teams and projects, including the top 10 high priority  programs, a list of USDS accomplishments, and agency project  proposals. Both E-Gov staff and USDS staff said they determined this to  mean that OMB should report on the USDS projects considered to be  high priority given USDS’s responsibilities. In addition, USDS staff stated  that they did not receive any feedback from congressional stakeholders  indicating otherwise. However, continued identification and reporting on the top ten high priority  programs, and not just USDS projects, would further enhance  congressional oversight by providing congressional stakeholders with  information on high priority programs that is not readily available. Such  information could also be useful for current administration IT governance  entities such as the Office of American Innovation and the American  Technology Council, to assist them with prioritizing their efforts to  modernize federal agency IT. USDS Has a Defined  Project Selection  Process, but its  Reporting Did Not  Address High Priority  Programs As  Requested and Was  Not Timely USDS has developed a process for identifying and prioritizing the IT  projects to which it provides support. Moreover, as we have previously  reported, its project selection process is consistent with best practices,  which state that organizations should establish and implement  procedures for prioritizing projects that include identifying selection  criteria to help consistently select projects based on their contributions to  the strategic goals of the organization. In explaining the process used to identify projects, USDS staff stated that  they obtained input from various sources, including the Federal IT  Dashboard, leadership of the relevant federal agency, E-Gov analysts,  and GAO reports. In addition, the staff said they considered the high  impact programs identified by the E-Gov office; they also coordinated with  E-Gov analysts through monthly meetings to incorporate issues of  significance to E-Gov into their selection process. To further facilitate the selection process, the USDS staff established  three questions as criteria for prioritizing agencies’ IT projects, in the  following order of importance: (1) What will do the greatest good for the  greatest number of people in the greatest need? (2) How effective and  cost efficient will the USDS investment be? (3) What potential exists to  scale or reuse a technological solution across the government? The staff  said they used the criteria to create a list of all potential projects, including  their descriptions and information on resource needs; they updated the  list when they identified additional projects that met the criteria. This list  was subsequently used by USDS leadership to make decisions about  which projects to pursue. According to the staff, an important  consideration when selecting a project was whether there was executive  sponsorship from the agency. They added that executive sponsorship  ensures that USDS has the help it needs to make changes to the  projects, and it affects the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of USDS’s  investment. Projects that were not selected went into a backlog that is to  be used to select a project when a team becomes available to work on a  new engagement. USDS has issued two reports to Congress on the status of its projects— one in December 2016 and the other in July 2017. The report issued in  December 2016 summarized the status of 11 projects that USDS is  engaged in at federal agencies, and 3 broader initiatives that are intended  to improve the performance and cost-effectiveness of government digital  services. According to USDS staff, the 11 projects had broad impact and  had made the most significant progress. For example, these included the  VA’s Vets.gov project, which is intended to assist the department in  developing a new digital application for healthcare, and DOD’s Defense  Travel System, a system that facilitates travel for all DOD employees.  Further, USDS reported on the status of their efforts for these three  initiatives: modernizing procurement processes, development of federal  shared services, and hiring top technical talent. The July 2017 report included summaries for 10 projects, including 5 new  projects. Specifically, the new projects were the General Service  Administration’s Login.gov project, the Small Business Administration’s  effort to modernize small business certification for government  contractors, DOD’s Advisor Network system, DOD’s Defense Personal  Property System, and transforming federal IT procurement through digital  acquisition training. In addition, 6 projects that were discussed in the  December 2016 report were not included in the July 2017 report. Table 2 provides a complete list of the projects identified in the two  reports. Our analysis determined that four of the projects identified in USDS’s  reports were among the high priority programs that OMB’s E-Gov office  had identified in its June 2015 and June 2016 reports to Congress. These  projects were Healthcare.Gov, Disability Claim Processing, modernizing  the immigration system at the Department of Homeland Security, and  improving the Visa program at the Department of State. However,  USDS’s report does not specify this or provide an update on the status of  the other high priority programs. USDS staff stated that they did not  address all of the top 10 high priority programs because, as stated earlier  in this report, they interpreted Congress’s 2016 request as being focused  on USDS’s priority projects and not on the programs previously identified  by E-Gov. As mentioned earlier, however, continuing to identify and  report on the top 10 high priority IT programs while also reporting on  USDS’s projects would further enhance congressional oversight and  current administration IT governance entities’ efforts by providing  stakeholders with information on high priority programs and USDS  projects that is not readily available. Further, although USDS was directed to report quarterly, it did not do so.  Instead, it issued a report in December 2016, nearly a year after  Congress’s direction, and in July 2017, nearly 7 months after its first  report. In discussing this matter, USDS staff said they were not able to  report quarterly due to the time and effort needed to prepare and review a  report. As a result, USDS’s reporting did not provide congressional  stakeholders with the timely information needed to support their oversight  responsibilities. Conclusions While OMB’s 2015 and 2016 reports to Congress on the top 10 high  priority programs included the status of the programs, their total IT  spending, and other information to assist Congress in monitoring the  progress of critical programs, OMB did not issue the reports quarterly as  directed in the explanatory statement. In addition, OMB does not plan on  continuing to issue the top 10 high priority reports because it believes  that, in 2016, Congress directed the agency to instead focus on providing  a status of USDS’s most important projects. Further, OMB’s December  2016 and July 2017 reports on USDS’s projects did not address the top  10 high priority programs across the government. However, continued  reporting on the top 10 high priority programs would further enhance  congressional oversight by providing congressional stakeholders with  information that is not readily available on those programs in the greatest  need of attention. Reporting on the top 10 high priority programs could  also be useful for IT governance entities such as the Office of American  Innovation and the American Technology Council, to assist them with  prioritizing their efforts to modernize federal agency IT. Moreover, OMB did not issue the high priority programs and USDS  reports on a quarterly basis as requested. Without OMB’s quarterly  reporting on the progress of both the top 10 high priority programs and  the status of the USDS projects, congressional stakeholders and others  may lack the timely information they need to support their oversight and  other responsibilities. Finally, while additional OMB oversight of the high impact programs (and,  accordingly, the identified high priority programs) is a positive step, the  Federal CIO was not directly involved in the oversight of these programs.  Based on the positive impact of direct Federal CIO involvement in leading  investment reviews in the past, such involvement could significantly  improve program outcomes. Recommendations for  Executive Action We are making the following three recommendations to OMB: The Director of OMB should continue to identify and report to  Congress on the status of the top 10 high priority IT programs and the  extent to which USDS is involved in the programs, as was done in  June 2015 and June 2016. In doing so, the Director should ensure  that these reports are issued quarterly. (Recommendation 1) The Director of OMB should ensure that the Federal CIO is directly  involved in the oversight of high priority programs. (Recommendation  2) The Director of OMB should continue to report on the status of USDS  projects. In doing so, the Director should ensure that the reports are  issued quarterly. (Recommendation 3) Agency Comments  and Our Evaluation We received comments on our draft report via e-mail from the OMB  liaison to GAO. In the comments, OMB did not specifically state whether it  agreed or disagreed with our recommendations. Rather, OMB stated that  it has concerns with GAO’s alternative interpretations of law and that  GAO’s findings and conclusions are rooted in an incorrect legal  interpretation of OMB’s annual appropriation. Specifically, it stated that  GAO considers reporting requirements specific to an annual appropriation  to apply for all future annual appropriations. However, OMB’s characterization is incorrect, as we did not assert this  legal conclusion. As stated in our report, in the explanatory statement  accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations  Act, 2015, Congress directed OMB to identify the 10 highest priority IT  investment programs (referred to in our report as the top 10 high priority  programs) that are under development across federal agencies and  report on their status each quarter. Subsequently, the explanatory  statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016,  directed USDS to provide a quarterly status report on, among other  things, current USDS projects, including the top 10 high priority programs.  Our report does not conclude that the language of either explanatory  statement establishes a legally binding requirement, whether applicable  only to the subject fiscal year or beyond. GAO’s conclusions are based on the view that continued identification  and reporting on the top 10 high priority programs, and not just USDS  projects, would help to enhance congressional oversight. Identifying and  reporting on the top 10 high priority programs is important because such  information is not readily available. We have revised relevant statements  in the report to clarify our message in this regard. Further, while GAO did  not assert a legal conclusion, we have, nonetheless, removed all  references to our “interpretation” of the explanatory statement so as to  avoid the inference that we are making legal conclusions. OMB also said our conclusion that it has stopped reporting altogether is  incorrect. However, our report does not state that OMB has stopped  reporting altogether. Rather, our report states that OMB stopped issuing  reports on the top 10 high priority IT programs due to its interpretation of  the 2016 explanatory statement and, instead, switched to reporting on the  status of USDS’s projects. In addition, OMB stated that, while it agreed that the reports have not  been submitted on a quarterly basis, it provided Congress with the  requested information for the four quarters of the relevant fiscal years. In  addition, OMB stated that USDS is currently discussing with  congressional stakeholders whether providing quarterly briefings, instead  of reports, would address the quarterly reporting requirement. As noted in  our report, timely (i.e., quarterly) information would enhance  congressional and other stakeholders’ oversight responsibilities.  Therefore, we maintain that our recommendation for reporting quarterly is  appropriate. Finally, OMB stated that it disagreed with our conclusion that the lack of  personal Federal CIO involvement in high priority IT programs had  resulted in inadequate oversight. While we state that the Federal CIO was  not directly involved in overseeing the high priority programs, we did not  conclude that this resulted in inadequate oversight. Rather, we stated that  the results of past CIO-led TechStat reviews suggest that more direct and  regular involvement of the Federal CIO would improve accountability and  achieve positive results for the federal government’s investments. Thus,  we continue to believe that our recommendation to ensure that the  Federal CIO is directly involved in overseeing high priority programs is  appropriate. OMB also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into  the report as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional  committees, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and  other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no  charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix I. Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff  Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff  Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Sabine Paul (Assistant Director),  Scott Borre (Analyst in Charge), Nancy Glover, Lori Martinez, Bradley  Roach, and Marshall Williams, Jr. made key contributions to the report.
The federal government plans to spend almost $96 billion on IT investments in fiscal year 2018; however, as GAO has previously found, too often these investments have cost overruns and schedule delays. To enhance oversight of IT programs, for 2015, Congress directed OMB to identify the 10 highest priority IT programs that are under development across federal agencies and report on their status each quarter. Further, for 2016, Congress directed USDS to provide a quarterly report of current USDS projects, including the top 10 high priority programs. GAO was asked to review OMB's oversight of high priority programs. This review evaluated (1) OMB's process for identifying, overseeing, and reporting on the high priority IT investment programs and (2) USDS's process for identifying and prioritizing its projects, including its consideration of the high priority programs, and its reporting on the projects. GAO analyzed OMB memorandums and reports to Congress and interviewed OMB staff, including from USDS. In addition, GAO compared USDS's processes with IT management best practices. The Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of E-Government and Information Technology (E-Gov) reported that it undertook a structured approach to identify the top 10 high priority IT programs in reports to Congress in June 2015 and June 2016. Specifically, OMB staff stated that they chose the top 10 programs from a longer list of agency programs requiring additional oversight (referred to as high impact programs). E-Gov staff reported that the high priority programs were already receiving greater oversight than what was provided to the other major programs due to their high impact designation. This additional oversight included frequent meetings with agency Chief Information Officer (CIO) leadership and quarterly meetings with OMB staff. However, the Federal CIO was not directly involved in this oversight. According to E-Gov staff, the Federal CIO does not typically get involved in individual programs due to the large number of programs. However, past experience has shown that Federal CIO involvement has had a significant impact. For example, Federal CIO-led reviews of troubled projects, known as TechStat reviews, resulted in $3 billion in savings in 2010. Until OMB ensures that the Federal CIO is more directly involved in the oversight of these high priority programs, it may be missing a key opportunity to improve accountability and achieve positive results. OMB's 2015 and 2016 reports to Congress on the top 10 high priority programs identified the status of the programs and major milestones. However, the reports were not issued on a quarterly basis, as directed. E-Gov staff stated that they were unable to do so because of other competing reporting requirements and the limited resources available to draft and fully review the report on a quarterly basis. In addition, OMB stopped issuing the reports on the top 10 high priority IT programs after June 2016. OMB stated that Congress' 2016 direction to the U.S. Digital Service (USDS)—an OMB component—to provide a quarterly report that described the status of USDS teams and projects, including the top 10 high priority programs, meant that OMB should only report on USDS projects considered to be high priority. However, continued identification and reporting on the top 10 high priority programs, and not just USDS projects, would further enhance congressional oversight by providing congressional stakeholders information that is not readily available on those programs in the greatest need of attention. USDS issued reports to Congress on the status of its key projects in December 2016 and July 2017; however, the reports did not address the top 10 high priority programs as directed by Congress, according to OMB staff, because of OMB's interpretation of Congress's direction. In addition, the reports were not issued quarterly, as directed. USDS staff attributed this to the time and effort needed to review and prepare the report. However, continuing to identify and report on the top 10 high priority programs while also reporting on USDS's projects would help to enhance congressional oversight and current administration IT governance entities' efforts by providing stakeholders with information that is not readily available.