Background Marine Corps  Organizational Structure The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, organizes itself  into different Marine Air Ground Task Forces. Each Marine Air Ground  Task Force consists of a command element that includes a ground  combat element, air combat element, and logistics combat element that  can conduct operations across a broad range of crisis and conflict  situations. As shown in figure 1, there are four types of Marine Air Ground  Task Forces: Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), Marine Expeditionary  Brigades, Marine Expeditionary Units, and Special Purpose Marine Air  Ground Task Forces. The MEF is the principal warfighting organization  for the Marine Corps and consists of one or more divisions, including  subordinate units such as regiments and battalions. There are three  MEFs in the active component of the Marine Corps: I MEF—Camp  Pendleton, California; II MEF—Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; and III  MEF—Okinawa, Japan. Headquarters Marine Corps consists of the Commandant of the Marine  Corps (Commandant) and the staff organizations, which are responsible  for advising and assisting the Commandant to carry out duties. For  example, the Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources is  responsible for developing, defending, and overseeing the Marine Corps’  financial requirements and the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies,  and Operations is responsible for establishing policy, procedures,  training, and guidance on unit readiness reporting. Marine Corps Unit-Level  Training Marine Corps units train to their core missions—the fundamental missions  a unit is organized or designed to perform—and their assigned  missions—those missions which an organization or unit is tasked to carry  out. Units train to a list of Mission Essential Tasks that are assigned  based on the unit’s required operational capabilities and projected  operational environments. For example, the Mission Essential Tasks for  a Marine Corps infantry battalion include amphibious operations,  offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability operations.  Marine Corps Training and Readiness manuals describe the training  events, frequency of training required to sustain skills, and the conditions and standards that a unit must accomplish to be certified in a Mission  Essential Task. Marine Corps Readiness Unit commanders are responsible for their units’ readiness, including  assessing and reporting their units’ capabilities to accomplish Mission  Essential Tasks to specified conditions and standards. Unit readiness  assessments are tracked in the Defense Readiness Reporting System– Marine Corps. This information provides Marine Forces Command,  Headquarters Marine Corps, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint  Staff, and Combatant Commands, among others, a means to assess  ground combat forces’ readiness trends and to assist with strategic and  operational planning. Marine Corps O&M  Budget The Marine Corps’ O&M budget funds a wide range of activities, including  the recruiting, organizing, training, sustaining, and equipping of the  service. The Department of Defense (DOD) uses the Planning,  Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process to allocate  resources to provide capabilities necessary to accomplish the  department’s missions. In this report, we refer to the PPBE process as  the budget cycle. The budget cycle includes the following phases: The planning phase of the budget cycle examines the military role and  defense posture of the United States and DOD in the world  environment and considers enduring national security objectives, as  well as the need for efficient management of defense resources. The programming phase of the budget cycle involves developing  proposed programs consistent with planning, programming, and fiscal  guidance, reflecting, among other things, the effective allocation of  resources. The budgeting phase of the budget cycle refers to developing and  submitting detailed budget estimates for programs. The execution phase of the budget cycle involves spending funds. The Marine Corps’ Office of Programs and Resources has multiple  divisions that support Program Objective Memorandum (POM)  development, strategy, independent analysis, budget justification and  legislative coordination, among others. Two key divisions that have  responsibilities regarding Marine Corps resources are: The Budget and Execution Division is responsible for leading  development and submission of the POM, providing quality control  over programmatic and financial data, and allocating funds to major  commands. According to a Marine Corps official, the division also  assists with defending the Marine Corps’ budget request to Congress  and others. The Program Analysis and Evaluation Division is responsible for  providing Marine Corps senior leaders with independent and objective  analysis to inform resource allocation decisions and assessing  institutional risk. The Program Budget Information System (PBIS) is the primary  information system used by the Navy and Marine Corps in the  programming and budgeting phases of the budget cycle to develop and  submit financial plans (i.e., the POM and the budget) to the Office of the  Secretary of Defense. Once appropriated, funds are passed via allocation  and allotment to subordinate units and executed via the Standard  Accounting, Budgeting, and Reporting System (SABRS). SABRS is  used to (1) record and report financial information; (2) provide an  accounting and reporting system for the execution of appropriations; and  (3) record financial transactions that originate from source systems. The Marine Corps  Cannot Fully Track All  Unit-Level Training  Funds for Ground  Combat Forces  through the Budget  Cycle Our analysis of data from the three MEFs for fiscal year 2017 funds  shows that the MEFs had some data available that could be used to track  some training funds from budget request to obligation. According to the  Marine Corps’ Financial Guidebook for Commanders, as part of the  budget cycle, commanders should determine the cost involved in meeting  requirements, among other things. To help develop a sound budget,  commanders need to know what they were and were not able to  accomplish as a result of funding in previous years. However, Marine  Corps officials told us they faced limitations tracking training funds, as  discussed below. Specifically, as shown in table 1, we found that I MEF  and II MEF were able to provide data on their fiscal year 2017 budget  request, allotment, and obligations for training exercises directed at the  MEF and division level, but data on exercises at smaller unit levels, such  as regiments and battalions, were not consistently available because  officials at those levels do not always track funds for these exercises. We  found that III MEF was able to provide obligations data for fiscal year  2017 training exercises at all unit levels, but was not able to provide data  on funds requested and allotted by training exercise. Officials at III MEF  stated that these data were not available because III MEF incurs several  large one-time expenses that contribute to training, but allocating those  costs across specific training exercises is difficult. One of the primary reasons that the Marine Corps cannot fully track all  training funds through the budget cycle is that the Office of Programs and  Resources has not established the consistent use of fiscal codes to  provide greater detail about the use of funds across the budget cycle  phases, and the accuracy of these fiscal codes is sometimes  questionable. The Marine Corps uses a variety of fiscal codes to track  funds in the programming and execution phases of the budget cycle in  the PBIS and SABRS systems, respectively. Some of these codes are  used across DOD, while others are specific to the Marine Corps. Two key  fiscal codes that officials identified as relevant to efforts to track funds for  unit-level training are the Marine Corps Programming Code (MCPC) and  the Special Interest Code (SIC). However, we identified limitations with  how these fiscal codes are applied, as detailed below. MCPCs are used to program funds for intended use, but are not  clearly linked to executed funds. When the Marine Corps programs  funds for intended use, it uses MCPCs to identify the funds; however,  when it executes those funds, it uses a different set of fiscal codes to  identify them. As a result, the Marine Corps cannot link the  programmed intent of the funds to the execution of the funds, making  it difficult to track funds through the budget cycle. In fiscal years 2011,  2012, and 2013, the Marine Corps found in a series of reports that it  faced challenges tracking funds through the budget cycle, in part  because MCPCs were used to program funds, but not to track them in  the execution phase. According to the fiscal year 2012 report, such  tracking would enable the Marine Corps to improve financial  traceability and add consistently reliable program execution data that  would promote an understanding of the current fiscal environment to  Marine Corps financial managers, comptrollers and others. In 2014, the Marine Corps implemented a process to include MCPCs  in the execution phase of the budget cycle. The process enabled  SABRS to automatically generate MCPCs for executed funds, based  on the fiscal codes already used in the execution phase of the budget  cycle. According to officials in the Office of Programs and Resources,  this process increased the amount of executed funding that could be  linked to an MCPC. However, Marine Corps officials told us that the  mapping of MCPCs used in the programming phase to those used in  the execution phase were not cleanly aligned, causing uncertainty  about their linkage. The MCPCs associated with executed funds are  estimates based on subject matter expert and working group mapping  of fiscal codes to an MCPC and require continuous manual validation  to ensure their accuracy. Additionally, the data quality of the multiple  execution fiscal codes that are used to generate MCPCs is  questionable because the data quality of the various underlying  systems that feed data into SABRS is poor, according to officials in  the Office of Programs and Resources. Senior Marine Corps officials  from the Office of Programs and Resources told us that due to these  limitations, analysts cannot be certain that executed funds associated  with an MCPC as reflected in SABRS correspond to the purpose for  which the funds associated with the same MCPC were programmed  in the Program Budget Information System. This limits the Marine  Corps’ ability to assess the extent to which funds were executed  consistent with their programmed intent and track funds through the  budget cycle. SICs are not used consistently across units. The Marine Corps uses  SICs to track funds associated with individual training exercises.  However, units, including the MEF and its subordinate units, do not  consistently use SICs in identifying funds associated with all training  exercises. Specifically, officials at all three MEFs told us that units  generate SICs for large-scale training exercises directed at the MEF  or division level, but may not generate SICs to track expenses for  small-scale exercises at lower unit levels such as the regiment and  battalion, making it difficult to track those funds. Officials at I MEF and II MEF stated that tracking costs associated with small-scale  exercises is less consistent because units are not required to use  SICs to track funds associated with exercises at those levels, and  SICs associated with each exercise may change from year to year.  Further, officials at I MEF and II MEF stated that supply officers are  responsible for financial management at units below the division level,  and they may not prioritize use of SICs. Officials at III MEF stated that  tracking costs associated with specific exercises was difficult because  officials could not attribute several large one-time training expenses to  specific training exercises. Officials at all three MEFs stated that there  is currently no systematic way to ensure that SICs are used  accurately to associate funds executed with training exercises, which  means they do not have complete or consistent data on costs  associated with individual training exercises. As a result, commanders  may lack accurate data for making resource decisions about training  exercises needed to complete Mission Essential Tasks and improve  units’ training readiness. In 2014, the Marine Corps issued Marine Corps Order 5230.23,  Performance Management Planning, with the mission of linking resources  to readiness and requiring the Deputy Commandant for the Office of  Programs and Resources to ensure visibility and traceability of funds  through the budget cycle and accounting systems for all organizational  units and programs. Officials in the Office of Programs and Resources cited one effort to align  inconsistent fiscal codes, but this effort will not directly address the  challenges we have identified. According to officials in the Office of  Programs and Resources, the Marine Corps is currently conducting a  fiscal code alignment effort to address inconsistent use of fiscal codes,  but this effort is in its early stages, and the Marine Corps has not yet  developed clear guidance for implementation of the effort. Further, while  the Marine Corps uses a variety of fiscal codes to track funds in the  programming and execution phases of the budget cycle, an official from  the Budget and Execution division told us that this effort will focus on  fiscal codes that are used across DOD due to manpower limitations.  However, MCPCs are unique to the Marine Corps and not recognized in  larger DOD budgeting systems. As a result, the fiscal code alignment  effort will not include aligning MCPCs across the programming and  execution phases of the budget cycle, even though the Marine Corps will  continue to use MCPCs. Additionally, although an official told us that SIC  codes will be a part of this effort, implementation guidance for the effort  was still under development and as a result, it is unclear whether the  effort will address the inconsistent use of SICs across unit-level training  exercises. Without the ability to track unit-level training funds through the  budget cycle, including aligning MCPCs and ensuring consistent use of  SIC codes, the Marine Corps lacks data to assess the extent to which  funds were obligated consistent with their programmed intent and to  adequately forecast and defend budget requests for training. As a result,  commanders may face challenges making informed resource decisions. The Marine Corps  Has Made Limited  Progress Establishing  a Link between  Training Funds for  Ground Combat  Forces and  Readiness The Marine Corps  Identified a Need to Link  Training Funds to  Readiness, but Did Not  Designate Responsibility  to Meet That Need Although internal Marine Corps assessments and guidance state that the  Marine Corps needs an enterprise-wide process to link resources to  readiness, the Marine Corps has made little progress fulfilling this need.  The Marine Corps has been aware for years of the challenges it faces in  explaining its resource needs in its budget estimates to Congress. As  stated in its 2009 Financial Guidebook for Commanders, “Many of the  congressional cuts the Marine Corps receives are because of an inability  to explain why we spent the money the way we did.” From fiscal years  2009 through 2014, the Marine Corps Office of Programs and Resources  issued a series of classified and unclassified reports—referred to as the  Marine Corps Strategic Health Assessments—that evaluated the health of  the Marine Corps. The reports cited a number of factors inhibiting the  Marine Corps’ ability to link funding to readiness, including stove-piped  efforts, lack of an analytical framework, limited data availability, and poor  data quality. For example, the fiscal year 2013 and 2014 reports found  that the lack of a comprehensive model to connect the output of  institutional processes to readiness measures hindered the Marine Corps’  ability to link funding to readiness. Table 2 below summarizes some of  the key related findings in the reports. In fiscal year 2014, the Marine Corps stopped issuing the Marine Corps  Strategic Health Assessments, in part, because the person responsible  for preparing the analyses moved to another position. A senior Marine  Corps official also told us that the reports were discontinued because  producing them was no longer a priority for Marine Corps leadership.  However, the Marine Corps also issued guidance in August 2014 calling  for an enterprise-wide effort to link institutional resources to readiness.  Specifically, Marine Corps Order 5230.23 called for the development and  implementation of an enterprise-wide performance management process  that links resources to institutional readiness via a robust analytic  framework. The order included requirements to, among other things,  identify readiness goals, develop strategic performance indicators, and  improve data and business processes to include ensuring the visibility  and traceability of funds. While implementing this order could address a number of the findings in  the Marine Corps Strategic Health Assessments, Marine Corps officials  told us that the service had not prioritized implementation of this order.  Specifically, the Marine Corps did not designate a single oversight entity  with the authority to enforce the order and directly oversee and coordinate  efforts to link training funds to readiness. For example, although the order  directed the Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources to  organize a quarterly coordination event of key stakeholders to synchronize activities within each major line of effort, officials from this  office told us that they have not been given the authority to direct the  various efforts. As a result, problems identified in the Marine Corps  Strategic Health Assessments have persisted, and the Marine Corps  does not have a comprehensive model to connect the output of  institutional processes to readiness measures, as called for in the fiscal  year 2013 Marine Corps Strategic Health Assessment. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,  management should establish an organizational structure, assign  responsibility, and delegate authority to achieve its objective. Marine  Corps officials told us the benefits of having a single entity to oversee  efforts to tie funds to readiness include having one authority responsible  for ensuring a consistent data architecture—how data will be collected,  stored and transferred across the Marine Corps—and data quality.  Further, having a single entity would help ensure a unified approach that  would help analysts better answer questions about how funds affect  readiness. Marine Corps Has Not  Assessed Its Current  Initiative to Link Dollars to  Readiness In the absence of a single entity responsible for overseeing the Marine  Corps’ efforts to link training funds to readiness, two different  organizations within the Marine Corps developed separate and  overlapping initiatives. First, in 2012, the Commanding General of II MEF  directed the development of C2RAM, a tool that attempts to link funding  to readiness for ground combat forces by capturing and correlating  resources and requirements associated with specific unit-level training  exercises. C2RAM was developed in response to our recommendation  that the Marine Corps develop results-oriented performance metrics that  can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of its training management  initiatives. The tool, a complex excel-based spreadsheet, is used to  capture day-to-day operating costs for training exercises to meet a unit’s  core and assigned Mission Essential Tasks for training readiness  requirements. For example, unit operations and resource officials enter  data on training exercise costs and the Mission Essential Tasks expected to be accomplished by each exercise, and the tool uses this data to  project the unit’s expected training readiness levels. Further,  commanders can use the tool to project the expected effect of decreases  in funding on training readiness levels. According to Marine Corps  officials, they spent approximately $11 million on the C2RAM initiative  from fiscal years 2012 through 2017. Second, in 2015, the Headquarters Marine Corps Office of Programs and  Resources adopted and made adjustments for Marine Corps purposes to  the Air Force’s Predictive Readiness Assessment system and test-piloted  it with Marine Corps units. The Marine Corps’ system was known as the  Predictive Readiness Model (PRM). PRM was designed to evaluate the  complex interactions between resources and readiness to help inform  decisions about resource allocations and readiness outcomes. According  to Headquarters Marine Corps officials, PRM attempted to map  approximately 500 causal factors related to readiness ratings. The effort  involved input from more than 70 subject matter experts from multiple  Marine Corps organizations. In addition, data input into PRM was  obtained from various authoritative sources, including readiness,  financial, and training systems of record, as well as other unauthoritative  sources, including C2RAM. According to Marine Corps officials, as of  June 2018, the Corps had spent approximately $4 million to develop  PRM. In March 2019, while responding to a draft of this report, the Marine  Corps stated that it decided to discontinue development of PRM because  the model did not meet its objectives. While these initiatives were both designed to help the Marine Corps link  dollars to readiness, each had its own particular use and design. For  example, unlike C2RAM, which focuses only on the training pillar of  readiness for ground combat forces, PRM focused on all pillars of  readiness tracked by the Marine Corps for ground combat forces and air  combat forces. In addition, while PRM attempted to capture all training  data, C2RAM does not. For example, it does not capture data on  individual training. Moreover, while C2RAM is primarily used at the MEF  level and below to help inform commanders’ decisions about how much  training funding to request and identify the effect of funding on readiness,  PRM was designed to help officials in Marine Corps Headquarters make  service-wide decisions about budget development and resource  allocation. During our review, we found data quality and classification challenges  faced by both PRM and C2RAM, as discussed below. Data quality limitations. Some Headquarters Marine Corps officials  questioned the accuracy and reliability of some of the data planned for  use in PRM because the data had to be aggregated from multiple  sources that have varying degrees of internal control. In addition,  officials told us that existing data were insufficient or are not currently  collected, so, in some cases, PRM had to rely on the opinion of  subject matter experts to determine how causal factors affect  readiness. According to Marine Corps officials at various levels,  C2RAM data quality is questionable because data is manually input  by various sources with varying degrees of expertise. This is  exacerbated by weak processes for conducting quality checks of the  data. Moreover, officials stated that cost data may be inaccurate  because units may neglect to update cost estimates with actual costs  after a training event is completed. Further, C2RAM is not  consistently used across all three MEFs. For example, when we  visited II MEF, we learned that their resource management officials do  not use C2RAM to build their budgets because of concerns about  data quality. Classification of Data. Another challenge that both efforts faced is  the classification of aggregated data. Readiness data are classified;  budget data are generally not. When these data are combined, the  resulting data are classified, potentially making the tool less useful  and available to officials seeking to make informed decisions about  resource allocation. For example, C2RAM is currently an unclassified  system that captures fiscal and training data, but not readiness data.  However, officials at I Marine Expeditionary Force told us that if  readiness data were incorporated into the tool, it could become  classified, which would limit its availability and usefulness to lower unit  levels. As the Marine Corps found in its Fiscal Year 2012 Strategic Health  Assessment, its stove-piped processes often require integration at the  senior leadership level to develop a comprehensive view of issues,  including the effect of dollars on readiness. Development of C2RAM and  PRM, however, was not integrated, resulting in two separate systems— each devoted to tackling the same problem, but in different ways and with  similar weaknesses, such as data quality limitations. Moreover, there was  some overlap between the two systems. For example, C2RAM was one  of the many data sources for PRM. In addition, both PRM and C2RAM  used some of the same data sources. For instance, both systems relied  on information captured in the Marine Corps Training Information  Management System as well as on data captured in SABRS. The Marine Corps assessed the feasibility of moving forward with the  PRM tool and, in March 2019, while responding to a draft of this report,  the Marine Corps stated that they decided to discontinue its development.  However, the Marine Corps has not assessed C2RAM as part of an  enterprise wide performance management process that links resources to  readiness. For example, the Marine Corps could learn from the  experience of commanders at the MEF level who find C2RAM useful and  consider the extent to which those usability considerations could and  should be brought into a service-wide model. Without conducting this  analysis, the Marine Corps is unlikely to make headway in tackling the  challenges posed by trying to link resources to readiness. Conclusions To meet the demands of its missions, the future security environment will  require military forces to train across the full range of military operations,  according to DOD. While the Marine Corps continues to ask for increased  funding, according to a congressional report, the Marine Corps is unable  to provide sufficient detail in its O&M budget estimates for training that  would allow Congress to determine the benefits gained from additional  funding. The Marine Corps has been aware for many years of the  importance of providing accurate budget justifications to Congress. A  number of factors have made it challenging for the Marine Corps to  provide Congress the information it needs. First, the Marine Corps cannot  fully track training funds through the budget cycle, making it difficult for  the Marine Corps to, among other things, show that training funds were  spent as planned. Second, the Marine Corps has not prioritized tackling  the longstanding problem of how to link training resources to readiness.  Although the Marine Corps has a standing order to develop an enterprise- wide performance management framework that links resources to  readiness via a robust analytical framework, no single entity has been  assigned the authority to enforce this order. In the absence of that  leadership, certain components of the Marine Corps have developed their  own, independent initiatives that were designed to achieve the same  objective of linking funding to readiness, but had their own specific  approaches and intended uses. Moreover, the Marine Corps has not  assessed whether C2RAM provides an enterprise-wide performance  management process linking resources to readiness. Until the Marine  Corps assigns the authority needed to oversee development and  implementation of a methodologically sound approach and assesses the  degree to which C2RAM could be used, it will continue to face challenges  making fully informed decisions about how much money it needs for  training purposes and what it can reasonably expect to deliver for that  money in terms of readiness gains. Recommendations for  Executive Action We are making the following three recommendations:  The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Deputy Commandant  for the Office of Programs and Resources oversee development and  implementation of an approach to enable tracking of unit-level training  funds through the budget cycle. This approach should include aligning  MCPCs across the Marine Corps and ensuring consistent use of SIC  codes. (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Commandant of the  Marine Corps designates a single entity responsible for directing,  overseeing, and coordinating efforts to achieve the objective of  establishing an enterprise-wide performance management process that  links resources to readiness. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Commandant of the  Marine Corps assesses C2RAM to determine the extent to which this  system, or elements of this system, should be adapted for use in an  enterprise-wide performance management process linking resources to  readiness. (Recommendation 3) Agency Comments  and Our Evaluation We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In  written comments, DOD concurred with all three of the recommendations  in the draft report and stated that the Marine Corps would take actions to  track unit-level training funds, link resources to readiness, and examine  C2RAM, as discussed below. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix  II. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as  appropriate. DOD concurred with the third recommendation in the draft report that the  Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Commandant of the Marine  Corps assesses C2RAM and PRM and determine the extent to which  these systems or elements of these systems could and should be  adapted for use in the enterprise-wide performance management process  linking resources to readiness. In its comments, the Marine Corps stated  that work to develop PRM had been discontinued because the model did  not satisfy the Marine Corps objectives. Given that the Marine Corps’  decision to stop development of PRM mitigates the potential for  overlapping initiatives moving forward, we revised the report and  recommendation to focus on the Marine Corps assessing C2RAM for use  in the enterprise-wide performance management process linking  resources to readiness. The Marine Corps stated in its written response  that C2RAM has potential utility for supporting an understanding of  resources to readiness and it will examine the system further. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Acting Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy,  and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In addition, the report is  available at no charge on our website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2775 or FieldE1@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix III. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and  Methodology This report evaluates the extent to which the Marine Corps (1) tracks unit- level Operations and Maintenance (O&M) training funds for ground  combat forces through the budget cycle; and (2) links unit-level training  funds for ground combat forces to readiness. This report focuses on  ground combat forces which conduct a myriad of training at the Marine  Expeditionary Forces (MEF). For our first objective, we requested and analyzed budget request,  allocation, and obligations training exercise data for fiscal year 2017 from  I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), II MEF, and III MEF. We collected  data for this fiscal year because it was the most recently completed fiscal  year for which actual obligated amounts could be obtained. We used this  data request to determine the Marine Corps’ ability to provide the data as  well as determine the source or sources they used to provide the data.  We discussed the systems—Cost to Run a Marine Expeditionary Force  (C2RAM) and Standard Accounting, Reporting, and Budgeting System  (SABRS)—used to provide this data with knowledgeable Marine Corps  officials, including discussion of the data reliability concerns with these  systems which are identified in this report. We interviewed knowledgeable  officials about the systems, reviewed the user guide for one of the  systems, and observed how data was input and extracted to form reports.  Although we found the data to be insufficient to consistently identify and  fully track unit-level O&M training funding data though the budget cycle,  we determined that the data we obtained were sufficiently reliable to  provide information about the availability of fiscal year 2017 funding  amounts requested, allotted, and obligated for unit-level training  exercises, as discussed in this report. We also reviewed and analyzed data from a series of classified and  unclassified reports that were issued by the Marine Corps from fiscal year  2009 through fiscal year 2014. These reports, known as the Marine Corps  Strategic Health Assessment (MCSHA), evaluated the health of the  Marine Corps, including its use of fiscal codes, through an enterprise- wide study of resource investments, organizational activities, and  readiness outcomes. We also reviewed data about Marine Corps  Programming Codes (MCPC) and Special Interest Codes (SIC) in Marine  Corps documents such as the MCSHAs as well as the Standard  Accounting, Budgeting, and Reporting System (SABRS) Customer  Handbook. We assessed this information against Marine Corps Order  5230.23, Performance Management Planning, which requires the Deputy  Commandant for Programs and Resources to ensure visibility and  traceability of funds through the budget cycle and accounting systems for  all organizational units and programs, as well as Standards for Internal  Control in the Federal Government, which states that management  should design an entity’s information system to ensure, among other  things, that data is readily available to users when needed. For our second objective, we reviewed reports and supporting  documentation on Marine Corps efforts to evaluate readiness levels  achieved from O&M obligations for ground combat forces training and  observed the operation of systems used to track training funds and  readiness. Specifically, we reviewed and analyzed the MCSHAs to  identify challenges that the Marine Corps reported facing in attempting to  link training funds to readiness. As a part of our review of supporting  documentation, we reviewed and analyzed the MCSHAs from fiscal years  2011 through 2014 issued by the Marine Corps Office of Program  Analysis and Evaluation to summarize some of the key findings identified  by the Marine Corps related to linking training funds to readiness. We  reviewed these reports because they intended to provide a  comprehensive overview of the health of the Marine Corps. From these  reports, we identified and summarized key findings related to our review.  Specifically, one GAO analyst reviewed the four reports to identify  reported findings that prevent the Marine Corps from linking resources to  readiness, such as stove-piped processes and inconsistent data  management processes, while a second analyst confirmed the summary  from this review. We shared our summary of key findings with Marine  Corps officials and they concurred. In addition, we reviewed guidance and other related documents on the  Predictive Readiness Model (PRM) and Cost to Run a Marine  Expeditionary Force (C2RAM). We were briefed on and observed data  being input into the C2RAM model and queries being run from that data.  We were able observe the summary reports that resulted from the queries  which helped to enhance our understanding of the Marine Corps efforts to  link training funds to readiness. In addition, we reviewed previously  issued GAO reports related to the issue. We assessed this information  against Marine Corps Order 5230.23, Performance Management  Planning, which calls for the development and implementation of an  enterprise-wide performance management process that links resources to  institutional readiness via a robust analytic framework, as well as  Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, which states  that management should establish an organizational structure, assign  responsibility, and delegate authority to achieve its objective. To answer the two objectives for this review, we interviewed  knowledgeable officials from the following offices: Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Personnel and Readiness, Force Readiness Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. Office of Programs and Resources Budget and Execution Division Program Analysis and Evaluation Division Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Marine Forces Command – Norfolk, Virginia Marine Corps Training and Education Command – Quantico, Virginia  I Marine Expeditionary Force – Camp Pendleton, California  II Marine Expeditionary Force – Camp Lejeune, North Carolina  III Marine Expeditionary Force – Okinawa, Japan. We conducted this performance audit from August 2017 to April 2019 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix II: Comments from the Department  of Defense Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff  Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff  Acknowledgments In addition to the contact name above, Margaret Best, Assistant Director;  William J. Cordrey; Pamela Davidson; Angela Kaylor; Amie Lesser;  Tamiya Lunsford; Samuel Moore, III; Shahrzad Nikoo; Clarice Ransom;  Cary Russell; Matthew Ullengren; and Sonja Ware made key  contributions to this report.
Training is key to building readiness—the military's ability to fight and meet the demands of its missions. Through the Department of Defense (DOD) budget cycle, the Marine Corps estimates or programs its funding needs for training and spends funds to accomplish its training mission. Questions have been raised about whether the Marine Corps' training budget estimates are sufficiently detailed to determine training costs at the unit level or the expected readiness generated by those costs. House Report 115-200 included a provision for GAO to examine the military services' budgeting processes to build unit-level training readiness. This report examines the extent to which the Marine Corps (1) tracks unit-level training funds for ground combat forces through the budget cycle, and (2) links ground combat forces' unit-level training funds to readiness. GAO analyzed budget data and studies conducted by the Marine Corps and others, examined tools used by units to link training funds with readiness, and interviewed knowledgeable officials at various levels in the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps cannot fully track all unit-level training funds for ground combat forces through the budget cycle. According to GAO's analysis of data provided by the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), the principal warfighting organization for the Marine Corps, units can track some, but not all, funds for training exercises from the budget request through use of the funds. The Marine Corps cannot fully track all training funds through the budget cycle, in part, because it has not established the consistent use of fiscal codes. Two key fiscal codes that officials identified as relevant to track funds for unit-level training are the Marine Corps Programming Code (MCPC) and the Special Interest Code (SIC). The Marine Corps uses MCPCs to program funds, but GAO found that when the Marine Corps spends those funds, it uses a different set of fiscal codes. This makes it difficult to link the programmed intent of funds to the execution of those funds. The Marine Corps uses SICs to track funds associated with training exercises, but GAO found that units do not use SICs consistently. For example, officials at all three MEFs told GAO that units generate SICs for large-scale training exercises, but may not do so for small-scale exercises. The Marine Corps is taking steps to align fiscal codes across the budget cycle, but this effort is in its early stages and will not include MCPCs, and may not address the inconsistent use of SICs. Without the ability to track unit-level training funds through the budget cycle, the Marine Corps lacks readily available data to assess whether funds were obligated consistent with their programmed intent and to adequately forecast and defend budget requests for training. Although internal Marine Corps assessments and guidance state that the Marine Corps needs an enterprise-wide process to link resources to readiness, the Marine Corps has made little progress establishing a link between training funds for ground combat forces and readiness. The Marine Corps identified challenges with linking funds to readiness in a series of reports from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, citing factors such as stove-piped efforts and limited data availability and quality. Guidance directed that the Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources organize quality coordination events with key stakeholders to synchronize activities within major lines of effort, but officials from this office stated that they have not been given the authority to direct the various efforts. Therefore, challenges have persisted, in part, because the Marine Corps has not designated a single entity with authority to oversee and coordinate efforts to link training funds to readiness. In the absence of a single oversight entity, two separate and overlapping tools were developed—the Cost to Run a MEF (C2RAM) tool and the Predictive Readiness Model (PRM). Although each tool had its own particular use and design, both were intended to link resources to readiness. Moreover, both faced similar challenges, such as data quality limitations, and relied on some of the same data sources. The Marine Corps recently assessed and discontinued development of PRM, however, it has not assessed C2RAM and how it could support an enterprise wide performance management process linking resources to readiness. Without dedicating a single entity with authority, and conducting an assessment of C2RAM, the Marine Corps is unlikely to make headway in addressing the challenges posed by trying to link resources to readiness.