Background NASA’s Commercial Crew Program is a multi-phased effort that began in  2010. Across the five phases, NASA has engaged several companies  using both agreements and contract vehicles to develop and demonstrate  crew transportation capabilities. As the program has passed through  these phases, NASA has generally narrowed down the number of  participants. The early phases of the program were under Space Act  agreements, which is NASA’s other transaction authority. These types of  agreements are generally not subject to the Federal Acquisition  Regulation (FAR) and allow the government and its contractors greater  flexibility in many areas. Under these Space Act agreements, NASA  relied on the commercial companies to propose specifics related to their  crew transportation systems, including their design, the capabilities they  would provide, and the level of private investment. In these phases,  NASA provided technical support and determined if the contractors met  certain technical milestones. In most cases, NASA also provided funding. For the final two phases of the program, NASA awarded FAR-based  contracts. By using FAR-based contracts, NASA gained the ability to levy  specific requirements on the contractors and procure missions to the ISS,  while continuing to provide technical expertise and funding to the  contractors. Under these contracts, NASA will also evaluate whether  contractors have met its requirements and certify their final systems for  use. In September 2014, NASA awarded firm-fixed-price contracts to Boeing  and SpaceX, valued at up to $4.2 billion and $2.6 billion, respectively, for  the Commercial Crew Transportation Capability phase. Under a firm- fixed-price contract, the contractor must perform a specified amount of  work for the price negotiated by the contractor and government. This is in  contrast to a cost-reimbursement contract, in which the government  agrees to pay the contractor’s reasonable costs regardless of whether  work is completed. Thus, under the fixed-price contracts, the contractors  must generally bear the risk of cost overruns or schedule delays. During this phase, the contractors will complete development of crew  transportation systems that meet NASA requirements, provide NASA with  the evidence it needs to certify that those systems meet its requirements,  and fly initial crewed missions to the ISS. Under the contracts, NASA and  the companies originally planned to complete the certification review for  each system by 2017. Figure 1 shows the spacecraft and launch vehicles  for Boeing and SpaceX’s crew transportation systems. The Commercial Crew Transportation Capability phase contracts include  three types of services: Contract Line Item 001 encompasses the firm-fixed-price design,  development, test, and evaluation work needed to support NASA’s  final certification of the contractor’s spacecraft, launch vehicle, and  ground support systems. Contract Line Item 002 covers any service missions that NASA  orders to transport astronauts to and from the ISS. Under this  indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity line item, NASA has ordered six  missions from each contractor. Each service mission is its own firm- fixed-price task order. NASA must certify the contractors’ systems  before they can fly these missions. Contract Line Item 003 is an indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity  line item for any special studies, tests, and analyses that NASA may  request. These tasks do not include any work necessary to  accomplish the requirements under contract line item 001 and 002. As  of July 2017, NASA had issued four orders under this contract line  item to Boeing, worth approximately $1.8 million, including an  approximately $180,000 study of the spacecraft’s seat incline. NASA  has issued one order under this contract line item to SpaceX, which  did not affect the value of this line item. The maximum value of this  contract line item is $150 million. NASA divided the certification work under contract line item 001 into two  acceptance events: the design certification review and the certification  review. An acceptance event occurs when NASA approves a contractor’s  designs and acknowledges that the contractor’s work is complete and  meets the requirements of the contract. The design certification review  verifies the contractor’s crew transportation system’s capability to safely  approach, dock, mate, and depart from the ISS, among other  requirements. After the contractor has successfully completed all of its  flight tests, as well as various other activities, the certification review  determines whether the crew transportation system meets the  Commercial Crew Program’s requirements. The contractors must  complete both acceptance events to receive NASA certification. NASA and the contractors also identified discrete performance-based  events, called interim milestones, which occur as the contractors progress  toward the two acceptance events. Each interim milestone has pre- determined entrance and exit criteria that establish the work that must be  completed in order for the contractor to receive payment. The interim  milestones serve several functions, allowing the government to finance  work from development to completion, review the contractors’ progress,  and provide approval to proceed with key demonstrations and tests. The  program also uses these milestones to inform its annual budget request.  Since the contracts were awarded, the Commercial Crew Program and  the contractors have agreed to split several of the interim milestones. The  contractors have also added new milestones, in part to capture changes  in their development plans. NASA has also made changes to the contracts that have increased their  value. While the contracts are fixed-price, their values can increase if  NASA adds to the scope of the work or otherwise changes requirements.  As of July 2017, NASA had increased the value of contract line item 001  for Boeing by approximately $48 million for hardware and software  requirement changes, and contract line item 001 for SpaceX by  approximately $91 million for a hardware requirement change and the  addition of cargo during an ISS test flight. In our February 2017 report, we found the following: Both of the Commercial Crew Program’s contractors have made  progress developing their crew transportation systems, but both also  have aggressive development schedules that are increasingly under  pressure. Both Boeing and SpaceX had determined that they would  not be able to meet their original 2017 certification dates, and both  expected certification to be delayed until 2018. We found that the  schedule pressures were amplified by NASA’s need to provide a  viable crew transportation option to the ISS before its current contract  with Russia’s space agency runs out in 2019. If NASA needs to  purchase additional seats from Russia, the contracting process  typically takes 3 years. Without a viable contingency option for  ensuring uninterrupted access to the ISS in the event of further  Commercial Crew delays, we found that NASA was at risk of not  being able to maximize the return on its multibillion dollar investment  in the space station. The Commercial Crew Program was using mechanisms laid out in its  contracts to gain a high level of visibility into the contractors’ crew  transportation systems, but maintaining the current level of visibility  through certification could add schedule pressures. For example, due  to NASA’s acquisition strategy for this program, its personnel are less  involved in the testing, launching, and operation of the crew  transportation system. And while the program has developed  productive working relationships with both contractors, the level of  visibility that the program had required thus far had also taken more  time than the program or contractors anticipated. Ultimately, the  program has the responsibility for ensuring the safety of U.S.  astronauts, and its contracts give it deference to determine the level of  visibility required to do so. Moving forward though, we found that the  program office could face difficult choices about how to maintain the  level of visibility it feels it needs without adding to the program’s  schedule pressures. In order to ensure that the United States had continued access to the ISS  if the Commercial Crew Program’s contractors experienced additional  schedule delays, we recommended that the NASA Administrator develop  a contingency plan for maintaining a presence on the ISS beyond 2018,  including options to purchase additional Russian Soyuz seats, and report  to Congress on the results. NASA concurred with this recommendation,  and in February 2017, NASA executed a contract modification to procure  an option for three crewmember seats from Boeing on the Russian Soyuz  vehicle. Our analysis found that these seats represented a contingency  plan for U.S. access to the ISS through 2019. In April 2017, NASA  informed the Congress of this action. Both Contractors  Have Made Progress  but Continue to  Experience Schedule  Delays Contractors Continue to  Advance Development of  Their Crew Transportation  Systems Both Boeing and SpaceX have continued to make progress finalizing their  designs and building hardware as they work toward final certification of  their crew transportation systems, since we last reported in February  2017. Each contractor’s system includes a spacecraft and a launch  vehicle with supporting ground systems. The contractors are also  manufacturing test articles and flight spacecraft to support the uncrewed  and crewed flight tests. The contractors plan to use the test articles to  demonstrate system performance and the flight spacecraft to  demonstrate their ability to meet contract requirements. As table 1 shows, these test articles and flight spacecraft are currently in  varying stages of completion—some are completed and in testing while  others are still early in the manufacturing phase. Should any issues arise  during integration and test or the flight tests planned for 2018, the  contractors may have to complete rework on the spacecraft already under  construction. Schedule Delays  Continue, and Risks  Remain to Final  Certification Dates The contractors have notified NASA that final certification dates have  slipped to the first quarter of calendar year 2019 and, through our ongoing  work, we have identified three key risk areas that could further delay  certification of each contractor’s crew transportation system. These areas  are (1) the contractors’ aggressive schedules, (2) programmatic and  safety risks, and (3) Commercial Crew Program’s workload. These are  consistent with the challenges we found facing the contractors and  program in our February 2017 report. Aggressive schedules. Since the award of the current Commercial Crew  contracts in September 2014, the program, Boeing, and SpaceX have all  identified the contractors’ delivery schedules as aggressive. Program  officials told us that, from the outset, they knew delays were likely due to  the developmental nature of the program. Multiple independent review  bodies—including the program’s standing review board, the Aerospace  Safety Advisory Panel, and the NASA Advisory Council-Human  Exploration and Operations committee—also noted the aggressiveness of  the contractors’ schedules as they move toward certification. In February 2017, we found that both contractors had notified NASA that  they would not be able to meet the 2017 final certification dates originally  established in their contracts and expected final certification to be delayed  until 2018. Based on our ongoing work, we found that the contractors  have notified NASA that these dates have slipped further to the first  quarter of calendar year 2019. Figure 2 shows the original Boeing and  SpaceX contract schedule and the current proposed schedule for each  contractor. However, the extent to which these schedules represent an accurate  estimate of each contractor’s final certification date is unclear for the  following two reasons:  1.  Each contractor provides schedule updates to the Commercial Crew  Program at quarterly status reviews, and the dates frequently change.  The program has held 12 quarterly reviews since each contract was  awarded. Boeing has reported a delay six times and SpaceX has  reported a delay nine times that included at least one key event  identified in the timeline above at these quarterly reviews.  2.  The Commercial Crew Program is tracking risks that both contractors  could experience additional schedule delays and, based on our  ongoing work, we found that the program’s own analysis indicates that  certification is likely to slip into December 2019 for SpaceX and  February 2020 for Boeing. Each month, the program updates its  schedule risk analysis, based on the contractors’ internal schedules  as well as the program’s perspectives and insight into specific  technical risks. The Commercial Crew Program manager stated that  differences between the contractors’ proposed schedules and the  program’s schedule risk analysis include the following: The contractors are aggressive and use their schedule dates to  motivate their teams, while NASA adds additional schedule  margin for testing. Both contractors assume an efficiency factor in getting to the  crewed flight test that NASA does not factor into its analysis. The program manager explained further that the program meets with  each contractor monthly to discuss schedules and everyone agrees to  the relationships between events in the schedule even if they disagree  on the length of time required to complete events. The program  manager added, however, that she relies on her prior experience for a  better sense of schedule timeframes as opposed to relying on the  contractors’ schedules. While NASA has a fixed-price contract with both SpaceX and Boeing,  there are consequences to the delays to date and the lack of certainty  surrounding the final certification date. The United States has spent tens  of billions of dollars to develop, assemble, and operate the ISS over the  past two decades, and NASA relies on uninterrupted crew access to help  maintain and operate the station itself and conduct the research required  to enable human exploration in deep space and eventually Mars, among  other science and research goals. To ensure uninterrupted access to the  ISS through 2019, which includes launch and return of the astronauts,  NASA purchased five seats on the Soyuz spacecraft through Boeing for  an undisclosed value. Boeing obtained these seats though a legal  settlement with the Russian firm, RSC Energia, which manufactures the  Soyuz. The NASA Office of Inspector General found in its annual report  on NASA’s top management and performance challenges that if the  Commercial Crew Program experiences additional delays, NASA may  need to buy additional seats from Russia to ensure a continued U.S.  presence on the ISS. Further, the ISS is planned to be operational  through 2024. Unless there is a decision to extend the ISS’s operational  life, additional delays by Boeing and SpaceX may lessen NASA’s return  on investment with the contractors. We will continue to monitor this as  part of our ongoing work. Programmatic and safety risks. In addition to challenges facing Boeing  and SpaceX’s aggressive schedules, both contractors face other risks  that will need to be addressed to support their certification. This includes  the contractors’ ability to meet the agency’s requirements related to the  safety of their systems. These risks are not unusual; there are inherent  technical, design, and integration risks in all NASA’s major acquisitions,  as these projects are highly complex and specialized and often push the  state of the art in space technology. The Commercial Crew Program  monitors risks through two lenses—programmatic risks potentially affect  the program’s cost and schedule or the performance of the crew  transportation system, and safety risks could elevate the potential for the  loss of crew. SpaceX Risks Similar to our findings in February 2017, our ongoing work indicates that  the Commercial Crew Program’s top programmatic and safety risks for  SpaceX, are in part, related to ongoing launch vehicle design and  development efforts. SpaceX must close several of the program’s top risks related to its  upgraded launch vehicle design, the Falcon 9 Block 5, before it can be  certified for human spaceflight. Included in this Block 5 design is  SpaceX’s redesign of the composite overwrap pressure vessel. SpaceX  officials stated the new design aims to eliminate risks identified in the  older design, which was involved in an anomaly that caused a mishap in  September 2016. Separately, SpaceX officials told us that the Block 5  design also includes design changes to address cracks in the turbine of  its engine identified during development testing. NASA program officials told us that they had informed SpaceX that the  cracks were an unacceptable risk for human spaceflight. SpaceX officials  told us that they have made design changes, captured in this Block 5  upgrade, that did not result in any cracking during initial life testing.  However, this risk will not be closed until SpaceX successfully completes  qualification testing in accordance with NASA’s standards without any  cracks. SpaceX officials stated they expect this testing to be completed in  first quarter calendar year 2018. Finally, both the program and a NASA advisory group consider SpaceX’s  plan to fuel the launch vehicle after the astronauts are on board the  spacecraft to be a potential safety risk. SpaceX’s perspective is that this  operation may be a lower risk to the crew. To better understand the  propellant loading procedures, the program and SpaceX agreed to  demonstrate the loading process five times from the launch site in the  final crew configuration prior to the crewed flight test. Boeing Risks Our ongoing work indicates that Boeing is mitigating several risks in order  to certify its crew transportation system, including challenges related to its  abort system performance, parachutes, and its launch vehicle. Boeing is addressing a risk that its abort system, which it needs for  human spaceflight certification, may not meet the program’s requirement  to have sufficient control of the vehicle through an abort. In some abort  scenarios, Boeing has found that the spacecraft may tumble and that  could pose a threat to the crew’s safety. To validate the effectiveness of  its abort system, Boeing has conducted extensive wind tunnel testing and  plans to complete a pad abort test in April 2018. Boeing is also addressing a risk that during re-entry to the Earth’s  atmosphere, a portion of the spacecraft’s forward heat shield may  reconnect and damage the parachute system. NASA’s independent analysis indicates that this may occur if both parachutes that pull the  forward heat shield away from the spacecraft deploy as expected.  Boeing’s analysis indicates the risk exists only if one of two parachutes  does not deploy as expected. If the program determines this risk is  unacceptable, Boeing would need to redesign the parachute system,  which the program estimates could result in at least a 6-month delay.  Finally, one of the program’s top programmatic and safety concerns is  that it may not have enough information from Boeing’s launch vehicle  provider, United Launch Alliance, to assess if the launch vehicle prevents  or controls cracking that could lead to catastrophic failures. The program  and Boeing are in the process of negotiating next steps. Program Safety Risk The Commercial Crew Program has identified the ability of it and its  contractors to meet a crew safety requirement as one of its top risks.  NASA established the “loss of crew” metric as a way to measure the  safety of a crew transportation system. The metric captures the  probability of death or permanent disability to one or more crew members.  Under each contract, the current loss of crew requirement is 1 in 270,  meaning that the contractors’ systems must carry no more than a 1 in 270  probability of incurring loss of crew. Near the end of the Space Shuttle  program, the probability of loss of crew was approximately 1 in 90. As  part of our ongoing work, we continue to work with NASA to understand  how the loss of crew requirement was established for the Commercial  Crew Program. Program officials told us that Commercial Crew is the first NASA program  that the agency will evaluate against a probabilistic loss of crew  requirement. They said that if the contractors cannot meet the loss of  crew requirement at 1 in 270, NASA could still certify their systems by  employing operational mitigations. They said this would entail a  potentially increased level of risk or uncertainty related to the level of risk  for the crew. Program officials told us their main focus is to work with the contractors to  ensure that the spacecraft designs are robust from a safety perspective.  The loss of crew metric and the associated models used to measure it are  tools that help achieve that goal. For example, Boeing told us that in early  2016, it needed to identify ways to reduce the mass of its spacecraft. As  Boeing found opportunities to reduce the spacecraft mass, the program  stated that it had to consider how implementing those design changes  would affect its loss of crew analysis in addition to compliance with other  performance and safety requirements. According to the program, it is  working with both contractors to address the factors that drive loss of  crew risk through design changes or additional testing to gain more  information on the performance and reliability of systems. As part of our  ongoing work, we will continue to assess the extent to which the  contractors are meeting this requirement and what tools the program and  NASA will use to determine if the contractors meet the requirement. Program office workload. In February 2017, we found that the  Commercial Crew Program was using contractually defined mechanisms  to gain a high level of visibility into the contractors’ crew transportation  systems, but also found that the Commercial Crew Program’s workload  was an emerging schedule risk. At that time, program officials told us  that one of their greatest upcoming challenges will be to keep pace with  the contractors’ schedules so that the program does not delay  certification. Specifically, they told us they are concerned about an  upcoming “bow wave” of work because the program must complete two  oversight activities—phased safety reviews and verification closure  notices—concurrently in order to support the contractors’ design  certification reviews, uncrewed and crewed flight test missions, and final  certification. The Commercial Crew Program is working to complete its three-phased  safety review, which will ensure that the contractors have identified all  safety-critical hazards and implemented associated controls, but it is  behind schedule. Both the contractors and the program have contributed  to these delays. In phase one, Boeing and SpaceX identified risks in their designs and  developed reports on potential hazards, the controls they put in place  to mitigate them, and explanations for how the controls will mitigate  the hazards. In phase two, which is ongoing, the program reviews and approves  the contractors’ hazard reports, and develops strategies to verify and  validate that the controls are effective. In phase three, the contractors plan to conduct the verification  activities and incrementally close the reports. The Commercial Crew Program’s review and approval of the contractors’  hazard reports have taken longer than planned. The program originally  planned to complete phase two in early 2016, but through our ongoing  work, we have found that as of October 2017, neither contractor had  completed this phase. At that time, Boeing had completed 90 percent and  SpaceX had completed 70 percent of the Phase 2 reports. The Commercial Crew Program’s verification closure notice process,  which is used to verify that the contractors have met all requirements, is  one of the other key oversight activities and potential workload challenges  for the program. The program is completing that process concurrently  with the phased safety reviews. The verification closure process is  initiated by the contractor when it provides the program with data and  evidence to substantiate that it has met each requirement, and is  completed when the program has reviewed and approved the contractor’s  evidence to verify that each requirement has been met. The Commercial  Crew Program must also approve a subset of verification closure notices  before key tests or milestones can occur. For example, the ISS  requirements and a portion of the Commercial Crew Program  requirements must be met before Boeing and SpaceX’s uncrewed flights  to the ISS, which are currently planned for the third quarter of 2018. The  program’s ability to smooth its workload is limited because the contractors  generally control their development schedules. In February 2017, we  found, however, that proposed changes to the Boeing and SpaceX  schedules could help alleviate some of the concurrency between the  program’s phased safety reviews and verification closure process. We  will continue to monitor the efforts as part of our ongoing work. In conclusion, Boeing and SpaceX continue to make progress developing  crew transportation systems to help the United States re-establish its  domestic ability to provide crew access to the ISS. But, when the current  phase of the Commercial Crew Program began, there was widespread  acknowledgment that the contractors’ development and certification  schedules were aggressive and the anticipated schedule risks have now  materialized. Further, programmatic and safety risks remain with  schedules that frequently change making a final certification date  uncertain. Delays and uncertain final certification dates raise questions  about whether the United States will have uninterrupted access to the  International Space Station beyond 2019, and may lessen NASA’s return  on investment with the contractors. We look forward to continuing to work  with NASA and this subcommittee as we assess the contractors’ and  program’s progress to final certification. Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Bera, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. GAO Contact and  Staff  Acknowledgments If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please  contact Cristina T. Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing  Management at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions  to this statement include Molly Traci, Assistant Director; Susan Ditto; Lisa  Fisher; Laura Greifner; Juli Steinhouse; Roxanna Sun; and Kristin Van  Wychen. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Since the Space Shuttle was retired in 2011, the United States has been relying on Russia to carry astronauts to and from the space station. NASA's Commercial Crew Program is facilitating private development of a domestic system to meet that need safely, reliably, and cost-effectively before the seats it has contracted for on a Russian spacecraft run out in 2019. In 2014, NASA awarded two firm-fixed-price contracts to Boeing and SpaceX worth a combined total of up to $6.8 billion to develop crew transportation systems and conduct initial missions to the space station. In February 2017, GAO found that both contractors had made progress, but their schedules were under mounting pressure. This statement provides preliminary observations on the extent to which the contractors and the program are making progress toward meeting NASA's standards for human spaceflight, a process called certification. This statement is based on ongoing work and information contained in GAO's February 2017 report on this program ( GAO-17-137 ). To do this work, GAO analyzed contracts, schedules, and other documentation. Both Boeing and Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) are making progress toward their goal of being able to transport American astronauts to and from the International Space Station (ISS). However, both continue to experience schedule delays. Such delays could jeopardize the ability of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Commercial Crew Program to certify either company's option—that is, to ensure that either option meets NASA standards for human spaceflight—before the seats the agency has contracted for on Russia's Soyuz spacecraft run out in 2019. (See figure.) GAO's ongoing work has identified three key risks, which are consistent with challenges reported in February 2017 that could further delay certification of each contractor's crew transportation system: Aggressive schedules —NASA, Boeing, SpaceX, and independent review bodies have all noted that the contractors' schedule plans are aggressive. The anticipated schedule risks have since materialized. Programmatic and safety risks —SpaceX and Boeing are addressing technical risks, which is not uncommon for NASA projects as they often push the state of the art in space technology. In addition, the contractors' systems must meet a standard for crew safety. Additional work remains to determine whether the contractors will meet this requirement. Program office workload —Program officials told GAO that one of their greatest upcoming challenges will be to complete two oversight activities—conducting phased safety reviews and verifying that contractors meet requirements—concurrently. The program's ability to smooth its workload is limited, as the contractors generally control their development schedules. In February 2017, GAO found that proposed schedule changes could alleviate some overlap. Delays and uncertain final certification dates raise questions about whether the United States will have uninterrupted access to the ISS after 2019, and may lessen NASA's return on investment with the contractors. GAO will continue to assess the contractors' and program's progress.