Background Personal Identity  Verification Cards Developed in response to HSPD-12, Personal Identity Verification (PIV)  cards are a common authentication mechanism used across the federal  government, and are a component of physical access control systems.  PIV cards are used to securely identify federal government employees  and contractor personnel seeking access to valuable and sensitive  federal resources, including facilities and information systems. Also  known as a “smart card,” a PIV card is similar in size to a credit card and  contains information that is either printed on the outside or stored on the  card’s integrated circuit chip (see fig. 1 below). PIV cards are required to  be interoperable with all GSA-approved physical access control system  equipment included on the Approved Products List, regardless of that  equipment’s manufacturer. Likewise, GSA-approved physical access  control system equipment is required to be interoperable with all PIV  cards. Access to Controlled  Areas Physical access control systems are used to manage access to controlled  areas, such as a building or a room in a building. Physical access control  products include devices such as card readers and the ID cards used to  validate an individual’s authorization to enter a building (see fig.2 below).  This report focuses on physical access and does not address logical  (computer network) access. A physical access control system works as follows. When employees or  contractors who are PIV cardholders attempt to enter a controlled area  managed by a physical access control system, they will encounter the  physical access control system at the “front end.” At this point, depending  on the controlled area’s level of security, the cardholder will  scan their PIV cards via a card reader,  insert their PIV cards and enter personal identification numbers (PIN)  via an input device such as a keypad, or  insert their PIV cards, enter PINs, and provide biometric identification  (such as a fingerprint) via an input device. After the cardholders present their identification information, the  cardholders’ identification information from a PIV card’s integrated circuit  chip is transmitted to the physical access control system’s “back end,”  which consists of physical and logical access control systems and  authorization data. At the back end, the physical access control system  determines the validity of the cardholder’s access authorization. The  cardholder will be able to access the area only if the authorization is valid. When deciding which access control mechanisms to implement, agencies  must first understand the level of risk associated with the facility. The  higher the risk level, the greater the need there is for agencies to  implement a high-assurance-level access control system. Physical  access control systems can be electronically connected in different ways,  including within a given building or across an agency or department. The  level of interoperability determines the level at which PIV cards and  access authorization will be accepted. For example, a PIV card and  corresponding access authorization may be accepted within a single  building, across an agency, or potentially across the federal government.  In this report, we describe a system in which a PIV card works in multiple  physical access control systems as “interoperable”. In order to realize the  full security benefit of PIV cards, physical access control systems must  have a network connection that enables them to validate a given  cardholder’s access credentials. Federal Requirements Homeland Security Protection Directive-12: HSPD-12 is a 2004  presidential directive establishing the requirement for a mandatory,  government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of identification  (PIV cards) issued by the federal government to its employees and  contractors. It specified that the standard must include criteria  authenticating employees’ identities and permissions at graduated levels  of security, depending on the agency environment and the sensitivity of  facilities and data accessed. Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 201: The  Department of Commerce’s NIST initially published the Federal  Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 201 in 2005 to support HSPD- 12. The FIPS 201 standard established the PIV card as a common  authentication mechanism across the federal government. FIPS 201 set  standards for PIV systems in three areas: (1) identity proofing and  registration, (2) card issuance and maintenance, and (3) protection of  card applicants’ privacy. In addition, the standard provides technical  specifications for the implementation and use of interoperable smart  cards in physical access control systems. An update to FIPS 201 (called  FIPS 201-2), was released in August 2013. Among other things, it made  the collection of a facial image mandatory for PIV cards and changed the  maximum lifespan of a card from 5 to 6 years. Approved Products List – The Approved Products List is a list of all  physical access control system equipment that is compliant with FIPS  identification standards. Agencies must acquire federally-approved  products and services from this list in order to help ensure government- wide interoperability of physical access control systems. All products on  the Approved Product List have gone through end-to-end testing and  evaluation, as part of a complete physical access control system.  Federal agencies are required to use the Approved Products List when  purchasing physical access control system equipment. The Approved  Products List is intended to provide assurance to federal agencies that  listed vendors’ products comply with the various federal standards and  requirements. Government-wide Roles  and Responsibilities Office of Management and  Budget (OMB) HSPD-12 designates OMB as the lead entity with responsibility for  ensuring that federal government departments and agencies implement  this directive in a manner consistent with ongoing government-wide  activities and existing OMB policies and guidance. General Services  Administration (GSA) GSA supports OMB by administering product testing through a contractor,  managing the Approved Products List, and making the physical access  control system’s products and services available to federal agencies via  GSA’s Federal Acquisition Service. The Federal Acquisition Service  manages a large portion of GSA’s Federal Supply Schedules program  (GSA Schedule), which establish long-term government-wide contracts  with commercial firms to provide federal agencies access to millions of  commercial products and services at volume discount pricing.  Further,  GSA’s Office of Government-wide Policy (OGP) provides tools and  support for identity, credential, and access management activities across  the federal government, including for physical access control systems.  GSA also has a government-wide landlord role through its Public  Buildings Service and installs physical access control systems in many  GSA-owned and leased buildings that it manages. Interagency Security  Committee The ISC is chaired by DHS and consists of 60 federal departments and  agencies. ISC’s mission is to develop security standards, best practices,  and guidelines for nonmilitary federal facilities in the United States. Each  of the five selected agencies included in our report, or their home  departments, is a member of the ISC. The ISC has the authority to  convene working groups from its member agencies to produce  documents, which are task-based and provide ISC’s members with a  forum for information sharing to address a wide range of issues related to  physical security at federal buildings. ISC also produces standards and  best practices guidance for agencies to use when addressing security  issues. For example, in December 2015 ISC released Best Practices for  Planning and Managing Physical Security Resources: An Interagency  Security Committee Guide. This document is intended to identify  practices most beneficial for physical security programs, determine the  extent to which federal agencies currently use these practices, and  compile and circulate best practices agencies can use as a supplement to  the ISC’s existing security standards. OMB and GSA Have  Taken Steps to Fulfill  Their Responsibilities  to Implement Physical  Access Control  Systems, but  Oversight Is Limited OMB and GSA Have  Supported Implementing  Physical Access Control  Systems OMB and GSA have taken steps to help agencies procure and implement  secure and interoperable GSA-approved physical access control systems  across the federal government. For example, OMB has issued three  guidance memorandums to clarify agency responsibility to use GSA’s  Approved Products List.  1.  In 2005, OMB designated GSA as the “executive agent for  government-wide acquisitions of information technology” for the  products and services required for physical access control and  delineated agency responsibilities with regard to implementing HSPD- 12. Also, to ensure government-wide interoperability, all agencies  must acquire products and services that are compliant with standards  and included on the Approved Products List.  2.  In 2006, OMB reiterated that agencies must purchase physical access  control systems from GSA’s Approved Products List and that GSA will  make approved products and services available through acquisition  vehicles (Schedules) that are available to federal agencies.  3.  In 2011 OMB issued a memo that cited DHS guidance that stated  effective in fiscal year 2012 agencies must upgrade existing physical  and logical access control systems to use PIV credentials prior to  using relevant funds for other activities. The memorandum further  stated that the upgrades must be in accordance with NIST standards. In addition, GSA, as the lead agency for government-wide acquisition of  information technology, has undertaken a number of efforts to promote  the implementation of GSA-approved physical access control systems:  1)  Testing and evaluation: GSA administers and conducts testing and  evaluation to develop an Approved Products List. Testing is  performed by either third-party accredited testing labs or GSA- managed testing labs. GSA tests a variety of products and services  including smart cards; physical access control systems; which include  card readers and infrastructure for example; and integrators which  provide or install access control services. According to GSA officials,  GSA has fully tested all physical access control system equipment  included on the Approved Products List and evaluated and approved  the suitability of vendors and system integrators. GSA shares  information about vendors, system integrators and Approved Products  List equipment with federal agencies.  2)  Guidance and support: GSA has taken several actions to improve  guidance and facilitate the implementation of physical access control  systems. First, GSA manages IDManagement.gov, which guides  federal agencies through the process of identifying Approved  Products List-compliant physical access control system equipment.  Second, GSA established the U.S. Access program to enable federal  civilian agencies to issue common HSPD-12 approved credentials to  their employees and contractors. Finally, GSA developed a list of  system integrators that can be used to install physical access control  systems that have been approved for the Approved Products List.  These integrators (there are 25 as of November 2018) are listed on  the GSA’s IDManagement.gov website.  3)  Information sharing: According to GSA officials, GSA responds to  email questions from agencies about the Approved Products List, and  GSA makes subject matter experts available to any agency  representatives with questions.  4)  Procurement support: According to GSA officials, GSA provides  standard procurement language for agencies to include in statements  of work before their requests for proposal go out for physical access  control systems. However, according to officials, GSA has no control  over whether agencies decide to include the language that it provides. Stakeholders including agencies and manufacturers that we interviewed  generally considered the Approved Products List to have achieved its  intent. For example, government and industry officials said that they  believe the list provides assurance to government agencies that physical  access control systems will work as intended and will help facilitate a  more interoperable system government-wide, thereby enhancing security.  Moreover, stakeholders we interviewed said they generally thought the  associated costs and burdens of going through GSA’s testing and  evaluation have been worth the effort. Without the Approved Products  List, these stakeholders believe that the quality and interoperability of  products would diminish. According to some stakeholders, prior to the  current end-to-end testing of products, companies submitted products to  the Approved Products List that either did not work as intended or were  not compatible with other products. Stakeholders also commented on the  improvements to the Approved Products List since GSA took over the  certification testing, noting that use of manufacturer self-testing prior to  2012 was not successful. In addition, the cost to industry to do self-testing  was high, according to vendors, and some companies did not do it well,  according to GSA, EPA, and TSA officials. OMB Lacks Necessary  Information to Conduct  Oversight We found that neither OMB nor GSA currently collect data on agency  efforts to implement physical access control system requirements,  including use of the Approved Products List. This is significant because  our interviews with physical access control systems’ manufacturers,  integrators, and selected agencies indicate that government-wide  implementation of physical access control systems may be limited and  raises questions about government-wide progress. Officials from four of  the five selected agencies we reviewed told us that, since 2013, when  physical access control system end-to-end testing requirements began,  they had only purchased GSA-approved physical access control system  equipment for a limited number of their facilities. Moreover, they said that  where purchasing occurred, it was sometimes for physical access control  systems that required replacement because they were nearing the end of  their useful life. For the five selected agencies, we found the following: General Services Administration: According to GSA officials, a  limited number of GSA facilities have physical access control systems  that fully adhere to the latest requirements. According to GSA  officials, GSA has met federal physical access control system  requirements for 70 out of approximately 340 of its non-courthouse  buildings with another 90 being partially in line with requirements  (e.g., PIV access credentials are used). The remaining facilities do not  yet meet federal physical access control system requirements. GSA  staff also told us that GSA administers the public spaces in  approximately 360 courthouse buildings and is developing a security  implementation plan for these spaces. GSA officials told us that GSA  also administers about 8,000 leased buildings where the tenants in  these spaces are generally responsible for setting up physical access  control systems and GSA does not track this information. Environmental Protection Agency: According to EPA officials, none  of EPA’s 72 facilities (including, for example, its headquarters building  in the District of Columbia and 10 regional headquarters buildings)  currently adhere to the latest physical access control system  requirements. Specifically, EPA officials told us that the agency used  GSA’s Approved Products List to purchase physical access control  system equipment in the past. However, because requirements have  changed over time, the 72 buildings where EPA is responsible for  physical access control need to be upgraded to the latest  requirements. To do so, EPA officials said they will procure these  systems using the Approved Products List and prioritize  implementation in the future to those facilities with the highest  assessed risk. EPA officials said that in August 2013, changes to  physical access control systems’ standards required the agency to  purchase and install complete physical access control systems that  GSA has tested end-to-end and that adhere to the latest  requirements. EPA officials said they expect the end-to-end tested  physical access control systems to lead to systems that are more  secure and interoperable. Bureau of Prisons: The Bureau of Prisons has implemented  Approved Products List-compliant physical access control system  equipment in regional and central offices according to agency officials  we interviewed. According to officials, the Bureau of Prisons  purchased physical access control systems using the Approved  Products List for its headquarters complex (three buildings) and six  regional offices beginning in 2009 and made upgrades to this  equipment in 2015 to adhere to federal physical access control  system requirements at the time. However, Bureau of Prisons officials  told us that the agency has not implemented physical access control  systems at its institutions (prisons). Bureau of Prisons officials told us  that physical security and screening procedures at prisons are more  stringent than those that occur with typical building-access procedures  as persons and belongings are scanned and searched. Physical  access control system equipment at these prisons may in fact be  problematic because, according to Bureau of Prisons officials, doors  should not automatically be opened based on a PIV card without  manual checks to ensure staff are not under duress or fraudulent  access is being attempted. Bureau of Prisons officials said that at the  prisons, identification credentials are first visually examined by prison  personnel before access is granted, and all gates and points of entry  are controlled by prison personnel. Transportation Security Administration: According to TSA officials,  since 2013, 64 TSA facilities have implemented some physical access  control system upgrades using products from the Approved Products  List, while an additional 75 leased facilities have been upgraded by  GSA.  While the 139 facilities are not fully compliant, the only item  missing to make these facilities compliant, according to TSA officials,  is the capability for interoperable, secure identification checks among  federal agencies. This would allow TSA’s physical access control  systems to recognize revoked PIVs from any federal agency.  TSA  told us that it plans to roll out this capability in fiscal year 2019.  Our  review of TSA’s 2015 plan to meet the latest physical access control  system requirements indicates that the agency is taking steps toward  full compliance. TSA’s implementation plan was developed in  response to DHS’s 2012 Modernization Strategy for Physical Access  Control Systems, which provides guidance to DHS for implementing  secure and compliant end-to-end physical access control systems  from GSA’s Approved Products List. Over the next 5 years, TSA plans  to spend about $73 million in physical access control system  implementation with the bulk of these funds ($51 million) going toward  the acquisition of new systems from the Approved Products List. United States Coast Guard: Coast Guard officials told us that none  of the agency’s 1,400 facilities where it has security responsibilities  fully adhere to the latest federal physical access control system  requirements. However, 53 of these facilities have been prioritized for  physical access control system implementation. In addition, since  2013, four Coast Guard locations have begun to implement GSA- approved physical access control systems using the Approved  Products List. These locations are Jacksonville, FL; New York, NY;  Corpus Christi, TX; and the Coast Guard’s Security Center in  Chesapeake, VA. Decisions about physical access control system  equipment are made on a facility-by-facility basis, according to Coast  Guard officials. These officials said that due to the decentralized  nature of Coast Guard’s decision-making process for physical access  control systems, it is difficult to say where purchases have been  made, and there is no systematic tracking. The Coast Guard does not  have a formal plan for upgrading its physical access control systems,  but Coast Guard officials told us that they continue to pursue  opportunities to upgrade facilities with physical access control system  equipment using the Approved Products List. For example, Coast  Guard officials told us that they currently emphasize system upgrades  for those systems that reach the end of their useful life or otherwise  necessitate replacement. These five selected agencies are illustrative of the oversight difficulties  that OMB faces because it does not have baseline information about  agencies’ efforts to implement physical access control systems, including  implementation of GSA-approved systems. This lack of information  hampers OMB’s efforts to (1) meaningfully track and monitor agencies’  adherence to physical access control system requirements, or (2) provide  an incentive for agencies to be more accountable with regard to where  their physical access control systems stand in terms of their ability to  prevent security breaches. Federal internal-control standards state that  establishing a baseline is an internal control that can be used to perform  monitoring activities. Baseline data allow organizations to identify and  address performance issues and deficiencies. Establishing a baseline to  understand the current status of physical access control system  implementation could improve efforts to evaluate progress federal  agencies are making and could also provide an incentive to agencies to  further improve. Moreover, federal internal-control standards also direct  agencies to hold organizations accountable for their assigned  responsibilities. OMB staff said that OMB oversees physical access control systems’  requirements as part of its normal process of reviewing agencies’ budget  submissions but does not conduct oversight outside of this process. This  approach, however, does not allow OMB to identify or monitor the extent  to which agencies are purchasing physical access control systems that  meet the latest requirements or take action if agencies lag in this area. Selected Agencies  Have Faced Various  Challenges in  Meeting Physical  Access Control  Systems’  Requirements and  May Benefit from  Additional  Government-wide  Support Selected federal agencies face cross-cutting, as well as agency-specific,  challenges to acquiring and integrating physical access control system  equipment, according to agency representatives and industry  stakeholders we spoke to. These challenges include cost, confusion  regarding GSA Schedule’s use, lack of trained agency officials, adapting  legacy systems, and security concerns about integrating physical access  control systems. Cost: Officials from most of the five selected agencies, from physical  access control system manufacturers, and from integrators we  interviewed told us that the cost of buying GSA-approved physical  access control systems using the Approved Products List and  installing them in adherence to federal physical access control system  requirements is a challenge in the current budget environment.  Agency representatives also told us they view the regulatory and  OMB requirement to upgrade physical access control systems as a  costly unfunded mandate that these agencies have difficulty meeting.  For example, TSA officials estimate that TSA will need over $14  million per year to continue implementing GSA-approved physical  access control systems using the Approved Products List in its 625  facilities, an expense for which the agency receives no additional  funds. However, OMB staff told us that agencies have had 13 years in  which to replace physical access control systems’ technology with  products that meet federal requirements, and that the issue may be  agencies’ training and planning, rather than cost. OMB staff told us  that the expectation was, that over time, agencies would implement  physical access control systems that used equipment that was  exclusively from the APL and compliant with FIPS. Confusion regarding GSA Schedules: Officials from some of the  five selected agencies and some stakeholders told us that there is  some uncertainty in government and industry about which GSA  contracting Schedule should be used to acquire GSA-approved  physical access control system equipment and services. For example,  some stakeholders are unsure which GSA Schedule they should use  to provide their services. GSA Schedule 70 is generally used for  information technology purchases. GSA Schedule 84 is generally used for physical security equipment  purchases, including products such as security alarms and  surveillance equipment. However, some stakeholders told us they  found federal guidance unclear as to whether Schedule 70 or 84  should be used for GSA-approved physical access control system  purchases. For example, some integrators told us that it was not  always clear for what Schedule they should seek approval to be on to  sell their services. Federal regulations and an OMB memo both  mention Schedule 70 as being the appropriate Schedule for  purchasing physical access control systems, but do not explicitly  exclude the use of Schedule 84. Complicating matters, some stakeholders told us some companies  are only approved for Schedule 84 because getting approved for both  Schedules was time-consuming and costly, and not worth the effort  given the lack of clarity regarding which Schedule is required.  According to OMB staff, guidance is clear that Schedule 70 should be  used to purchase physical access control equipment because this  equipment is considered to be information technology. OMB staff  explained that their memo on this subject was not intended to  introduce ambiguity on the issue of what Schedule is appropriate for  use, but to accommodate practices at the Department of Defense,  which performs some of its own product testing separate from GSA’s  testing program. According to GSA’s Office of Government-wide  Policy (OGP), GSA is aware of the confusion among GSA’s federal  customers regarding GSA Schedule use. To address this situation,  GSA convened a “reverse industry” training event in September 2018,  at which industry representatives provided feedback to GSA on the  acquisition process and ways that it could be improved, including  issues pertaining to acquisitions related to physical access control  systems. According to federal officials, one point of emphasis by  industry was that purchasing physical access control equipment from  the Approved Products List was not sufficient for having a functioning  physical access control system; system integration was also  necessary. During this event, GSA officials took the position that both  Schedule 70 and Schedule 84 could be used to purchase physical  access control systems, but OMB staff maintain that Schedule 70 is  preferred. OMB staff explained that Schedule 84 does not have the  testing and evaluation requirements for PACS equipment on it that  Schedule 70 does.  According to OMB, this frustrates industry  vendors that follow the Schedule 70 approval process because these  vendors are spending time and money to get approved for Schedule  70, while others are still selling their equipment on Schedule 84 and  skirting this process because GSA allows the sale of physical access  control system equipment on both Schedules.  Schedule 84 has  historically been used for security hardware while Schedule 70 is used  for information technology.  Since physical access control systems are  essentially information technology systems today, OMB believes that  Schedule 70 should be used exclusively for physical access control  system equipment. Adapting legacy systems: According to officials at most of the five  selected agencies, most manufacturers, and all integrators we spoke  to, integrating new physical access control systems’ equipment with  existing legacy systems can be challenging. Some stakeholders told  us that integrating new physical access control systems with old  equipment is often more difficult and more costly than starting from  scratch. As an illustration of this difficulty, TSA officials told us that  integrating new physical access control system equipment with legacy  systems has contributed to delays in the integration of TSA’s newly  installed physical access control system equipment. Partly as a result,  only one TSA region is currently integrated into DHS’ agency-wide  network. Security concerns about integrating physical access control  systems: Officials at two of the selected agencies and one system  integrator we spoke to told us that some agency officials are reluctant  to more fully integrate their physical access control systems. This  reluctance is due to concern about a perceived increase in security  risks resulting from more broadly networking physical access control  systems’ equipment and access credentials like PIV cards. However,  other federal officials told us that this concern is unfounded. According  to these officials, integrating agencies’ physical access control  systems will enhance security, increase government efficiency,  reduce identity fraud, and protect personal privacy by electronically  authenticating the validity of access credentials. Lack of trained agency officials: Stakeholders told us they believe  that some federal agency officials have limited knowledge of physical  access control system requirements. According to most physical  access control systems’ manufacturers and integrators we spoke to,  federal agencies’ contracting officers commonly lack sufficient  understanding of federal physical access control system  requirements. This insufficient understanding of physical access  control system requirements may lead contracting officers to award  contracts for the installation of physical access control systems to  under-qualified integrators, which can lead to systems being  improperly deployed or integrated. These experts said that this  situation could lead to security vulnerabilities at these agencies and  expensive future costs. OMB staff told us that it may be desirable to  raise agencies’ awareness of federal physical access control system  requirements, and a DHS official told us that this issue could be  addressed by the training of program staff by GSA who support  contracting officers. OMB staff and officials from ISC and GSA indicated that they are aware  of some of the challenges described above, as well as the possibility that  some may be more broadly present across the federal government. Staff  said that OMB and GSA are working with ISC to develop a consolidated  guidance document concerning federal identification credentials.  However, OMB staff told us that this guidance is primarily intended to  consolidate and replace existing guidance documents, and does not  contain new information related to the challenges identified by the  selected agencies or other stakeholders we spoke to. Best practices that  we have previously identified indicate that an interagency mechanism,  such as an interagency group led by component or program-level staff,  can help federal agencies address policy and program challenges. The  guidance of such an interagency group could help agencies to address  the challenges that we identified and that are related to implementing  physical access control systems. ISC, with its unique role in addressing interagency security issues, is well- positioned to assess how the physical security community can help to  address the government-wide challenges with physical access control  system implementation. For example, ISC is well-positioned to determine  through its membership the extent to which the challenges we identified  are present across the federal government. In addition, ISC may be able  to harness recent interagency efforts, such as the interagency information  sharing and collaboration that produced ISC’s guidance on planning and  managing security resources, to develop guidance addressing agencies’  cost issues through the mechanisms that we have previously identified,  such as leveraging resources. Further, working with GSA, ISC could help  to resolve confusion about which Schedule is the appropriate contracting  vehicle, to the extent that this lack of clarity persists. ISC may also be  positioned to provide a venue for information sharing to allow agencies to  address training needs, such as those related to technical challenges,  associated with legacy equipment and establish compatible policies to  address this challenge. Finally, ISC’s experience with interagency  communication and collaboration could also facilitate agencies’ response  to concerns about the benefits of interoperable physical access control  systems, and could work to reach consensus on the matter. According to  a senior ISC official, the ISC has updated its countermeasures standard  to assist the physical security community to better understand the  references and policies associated with procuring and installing physical  access control systems. Additionally, an ISC official told GAO that the ISC  has approved commissioning a working group to assess what additional  guidance related to physical access control would be beneficial for to the  federal physical security community. However, without a government- wide review of the challenges we have identified, those challenges will be  difficult to overcome. If these issues are not addressed, the fully  interoperable, physical access control system network envisioned post  September 11, 2001, and the increased security and efficiency that it  would entail, will be difficult to attain. Conclusions OMB and GSA have taken various actions to help federal agencies  implement GSA-approved physical access control systems. However,  selected agencies have made limited progress, and have faced  challenges that impede their progress. Lacking a baseline level of  information on adherence to physical access control system requirements  prevents OMB from gauging the level of progress being made by  agencies. Likewise, an increased understanding of the extent and nature  of the challenges that federal agencies may face as they implement  physical access control systems may help enhance adherence to physical  access control system requirements. This two-pronged approach, the  establishment of a baseline and a better understanding of the challenges  agencies face as they implement physical access control systems, could  prove beneficial in achieving the vision of secure, interoperable systems  across departments and agencies. Recommendations for  Executive Action We are making one recommendation to OMB, and one recommendation  to DHS. The Director of OMB should determine a government-wide baseline  level of progress in meeting physical access control system  requirements, including implementation of GSA-approved systems,  and should monitor progress in meeting these requirements.  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the ISC, in  collaboration with member agencies, to assess the extent of, and  develop strategies to address, government-wide challenges to  implementing physical access control systems. (Recommendation 2) Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Commerce,  Justice, and Homeland Security, EPA, GSA, and OMB for their review  and comment. DHS, GSA, and OMB provided technical comments, which  we incorporated as appropriate. DHS provided written comments and  concurred with our recommendation.  DHS’s comments are reprinted in  appendix II. OMB staff told us that they did not have a comment on our  recommendation. The Departments of Commerce and Justice and EPA  did not have any comments on our report. We will send copies of this report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee  on Oversight and Management Efficiency, Committee on Homeland  Security, House of Representatives and the Secretaries of Commerce  and Homeland Security, the Assistant Attorney General for the  Department of Justice, the Administrator of the General Services  Administration, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and  the Acting Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.  In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-2834 or rectanusl@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and  Methodology Our objectives were: (1) to assess the steps the Office of Management  and Budget (OMB) and the General Services Administration (GSA) have  taken to fulfill their government-wide responsibilities related to physical  access control system implementation requirements and (2) to identify  challenges selected federal agencies face in adhering to federal physical  access control system requirements. To assess the steps OMB and GSA have taken to fulfill their government- wide efforts to implement Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12’s  (HSPD-12) requirements, and to assess progress in these efforts, we  interviewed OMB and GSA about their efforts to ensure that agencies  meet the requirement to use GSA’s Approved Products List. We also  asked them to provide data, if available, on agencies’ Approved Products  List usage. We interviewed seven physical access control system  manufacturers (AMAG, Gallagher Group, HID Global, Identiv, Lenel,  Software House, and XTec), five integrators (contractors that install the  equipment and connect it to agency networks with software) (Convergint  Technologies, Chenega Corporation, MC Dean, Parsons, and Systems  Engineering, Inc.), as well as other industry organizations—GSA  Schedules Inc., the Secure Technology Alliance, and CertiPath— based  on multiple recommendations from previous interviews. To identify illustrative examples of the progress that individual agencies  have made in using the Approved Products List and implementing other  HSPD-12 requirements, as well as the challenges that they have faced in  doing so, we selected five executive branch agencies. These included (1)  U.S. Coast Guard in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); (2)  Bureau of Prisons in the Department of Justice; (3) Transportation  Security Agency in DHS; (4) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and  (5) GSA. We interviewed officials from these agencies about the  Approved Products List and collected data on agencies’ purchases of  GSA-approved physical access control system equipment using the  Approved Products List since 2013. Our criteria for agency selection  included agencies with facilities (1) held by non-defense executive branch  agencies; (2) located in the United States; (3) totaling 200 or more  buildings; and, (4) that are geographically dispersed (having buildings in  10 or more states). We also gave consideration to agencies with large  numbers of buildings (choosing four larger, one smaller) and selected at  least two agencies with homeland security responsibilities. We limited our  scope to non-defense agencies because we have ongoing work related to  these issues at the Department of Defense. We also requested and  reviewed documents concerning Approved Products List usage and  physical access control systems’ deployment from each of these five  selected agencies. Our use of the term stakeholders may include  agencies, physical access control manufacturers, integrators, and  knowledgeable organizations or officials. Results from our interviews with  the selected agencies cannot be generalized. To identify the challenges  most frequently cited by agencies, manufacturers, integrators, and other  stakeholders, we conducted an analysis of our interviews, reviewed  documents provided by agencies, and performed a literature review. In  addition to considering the range of federal requirements related to  physical access control, we considered relevant internal control standards  from federal standards for internal-control in the areas of monitoring,  enforcement, planning, and training and collaboration best practices  identified in prior GAO work. Further, we reviewed other relevant  documents including GAO reports, GSA documentation, OMB  memorandums, National Institute of Standards and Technology  standards, Interagency Security Committee guidance, a report from the  DHS Office of the Inspector General, and additional federal guidance  related to physical access control systems. We conducted this performance audit from October 2017 to December  2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing  standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to  obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for  our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe  that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings  and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix II: Comments from the Department  of Homeland Security Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff  Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Staff  Acknowledgments In addition to the individual name above, Dave Sausville (Assistant  Director); Kieran McCarthy (Analyst in Charge); Adam Gomez; Cam  Flores; Elizabeth Wood; Josh Ormond; and Melissa Bodeau made key  contributions to this report.
A 2004 federal directive and the related standard set forth a vision for using information technology to verify the identity of individuals accessing federal buildings. The vision calls for secure and reliable forms of identification that work in conjunction with access control systems. Interoperability of these systems across departments and agencies is part of the vision. OMB and GSA have government-wide responsibilities related to this effort. ISC provides guidance to non-military executive branch agencies on physical security issues. GAO was asked to examine PACS implementation efforts. This report discusses (1) steps OMB and GSA have taken to fulfill their government-wide responsibilities related to PACS and (2) challenges selected federal agencies face in meeting current requirements. For review, GAO analyzed documents from Commerce, GSA, ISC, and OMB. GAO selected five non-military agencies based on factors including number of buildings and geographic location. GAO reviewed relevant requirements and key practices. GAO also interviewed federal agency officials, PACS vendors, and knowledgeable industry officials. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the General Services Administration (GSA) have taken steps to help agencies procure and implement secure, interoperable, GSA-approved “physical access control systems” (PACS) for federal buildings. PACS are systems for managing access to controlled areas within buildings. PACS include identification cards, card readers, and other technology that electronically confirm employees' and contractors' identities and validate their access to facilities (see figure). Steps taken include the following: OMB issued several memos to clarify agencies' responsibilities. For example, OMB issued a 2011 memo citing Department of Homeland Security (DHS) guidance that agencies must upgrade existing PACS to use identity credentials before using relevant funds for other activities. But, GAO found OMB's oversight efforts are hampered because it lacks baseline data on agencies' implementation of PACS. Without such data, OMB cannot meet its responsibility to ensure agencies adhere to PACS requirements or track progress in implementing federal PACS requirements and achieving the vision of secure, interoperable systems across agencies. GSA developed an Approved Products List that identifies products that meet federal requirements through a testing and evaluation program. Federal agencies are required to use the Approved Products List to procure PACS equipment. GSA also has provided procurement guidance to agencies through its identity management website. Officials from the five selected agencies that GAO reviewed identified a number of challenges relating to PACS implementation including cost, lack of clarity on how to procure equipment, and difficulty adding new PACS equipment to legacy systems. Officials from OMB, GSA, and industry not only confirmed that these challenges exist but also told GAO that they were most likely present across the federal government. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC), chaired by the DHS and consisting of 60 federal departments and agencies, has a mission to develop security standards for non-military agencies. In this capacity the ISC is well-positioned to determine the extent that PACS implementation challenges exist across its membership and to develop strategies to address them. An ISC official told GAO that the ISC has taken steps to do so including setting up a working group to assess what additional PACS guidance would be beneficial.