Background Key Stakeholders in the  Federal Criminal Justice  Process Various DOJ and federal judiciary stakeholders play key roles in the  federal criminal justice process, and as such, they can also have key  roles in considering whether to use incarceration alternatives for a given  offender or inmate. For example, in the course of the federal criminal  justice process, a U.S. attorney is involved in the process of investigating,  charging and prosecuting an offender, among other responsibilities.  Federal defenders are called upon to represent defendants who are  unable to financially retain counsel in federal criminal proceedings. The  U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services Office (PPSO), an office within the  judiciary, also has responsibilities including supervising an offender  pretrial or after conviction. Federal judges are responsible for determining  an offender’s sentence, and, in the case of incarceration, BOP is  responsible for caring for the inmate while in custody. Federal Criminal Justice  Process Federal laws and guidelines determine what, if any, incarceration is  appropriate for offenders. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984  established the independent U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC) within  the judicial branch and charged it with, among other things, developing  federal sentencing guidelines. The guidelines specify sentencing  guideline ranges—a range of time (in months) that offenders should serve  given the nature of their offense and other factors—but also permit  sentences to depart upward or downward from guideline ranges because  of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In 2005, the Supreme Court  found the sentencing guidelines, which had previously been binding for  federal judges to follow in sentencing criminal defendants, to be advisory  in nature. Regardless of the guidelines’ advisory nature, judges are still  required to calculate sentences properly and to consider the guideline  ranges as well as the nature and circumstances of the offense, the  defendant’s history, and the need for deterrence, among other sentencing  goals. As we reported in June 2016, alternatives to incarceration were available  at various steps in the federal criminal justice process, from charging and  prosecution through incarceration (see figure 1). For instance, at the front-end of the criminal justice process, there are  pretrial diversion programs that can provide offenders an opportunity to  avoid prosecution or incarceration if they satisfy program requirements. In  addition, toward the end of inmates’ periods of incarceration, BOP may  place inmates in residential reentry centers (RRC, also known as halfway  houses), in which inmates are housed outside of a prison environment  prior to their release in the community. During their time in RRCs, inmates  are authorized to leave for approved activities, such as work; are  monitored 24 hours a day, such as through sign-out procedures; are  required to work or be actively seeking work; and are required to pay a  percentage of their salaries as a subsistence fee to cover some of their  expenses at the RRC. In addition, BOP may place inmates in home confinement toward the end  of their sentences. While in home confinement, inmates are required to  remain in their homes when not involved in approved activities, such as  employment, and are supervised and monitored, such as through  curfews, random staff visits, or electronic monitoring. RRC staff may  provide the supervision of inmates in home confinement. Through an  interagency agreement, BOP and the PPSO also established the Federal  Location Monitoring Program, through which PPSO officers provide  supervision for BOP inmates on home confinement under certain  conditions. Among other things, to qualify inmates ordinarily must be  classified as minimum security level; seek and maintain employment; and  pay for all or part of the costs of the Federal Location Monitoring  Program. Overview of BOP’s  Institutions and Role in  Transitioning Offenders  into Society BOP is responsible for the custody and care of federal inmates. As of  December 2017, there were a total of about 184,000 federal inmates,  according to BOP. According to BOP data, 83 percent of these inmates  are in the 122 institutions managed by BOP. The remainder are confined  in secure privately managed or community-based facilities, local jails, or  in home confinement. BOP has a role to help ensure that offenders properly transition into  society and avoid a return to prison or criminal behavior (recidivism) after  they have completed their terms of incarceration. Among other activities,  BOP provides reentry services to inmates within federal prisons that may  include drug treatment programs, education and vocational training, and  psychology services. BOP also is to facilitate the transfer of inmates into  RRCs, which provide assistance as inmates transition into communities,  to include home confinement. RRCs provide employment counseling and  job placement assistance, financial management assistance, and  substance abuse treatment or counseling as well as other services, which  may vary by facility. According to BOP, approximately 180 RRCs provide  housing for over 7,500 federal offenders prior to release into their  communities. Federal Collateral  Consequences Can Affect  Reentry As we reported in September 2017, individuals convicted of a crime may  have limitations placed upon them that can affect their reentry.  Individuals convicted of a crime generally face a sentence, which can  include fines, probation, and incarceration in jail or prison. In addition to  the sentence, individuals may also face collateral consequences— penalties and disadvantages, other than those associated with a  sentence, which can be imposed upon an individual as a result of a  conviction. For example, collateral consequences may prohibit people  who committed crimes involving a sex offense or offense involving a child  victim from working in a child care facility. Collateral consequences can  be contained in federal and state laws and regulations. Notably, federal  collateral consequences can serve various functions, such as enhancing  public safety or protecting government interests. In 2012, the American  Bar Association began compiling the first nationwide inventory of  collateral consequences, known as the National Inventory of the  Collateral Consequences of Conviction (NICCC). As of December 31,  2016, the NICCC contained roughly 46,000 collateral consequences  established through federal and state laws and regulations. We reported on collateral consequences contained in federal laws and  regulations (i.e., federal collateral consequences) that can be imposed  upon individuals with nonviolent drug convictions (NVDC). Our review of  the NICCC found that, as of December 31, 2016, there were 641  collateral consequences in federal laws and regulations that can be  triggered by NVDC. The NICCC data indicated that these 641 collateral  consequences can limit many aspects of an individual’s life, such as  employment, business licenses, education, and government benefits. For  example, individuals may be ineligible for certain professional licenses,  federal education loans, or federal food assistance. Moreover, we found  that the NICCC identified that 78 percent of these 641 collateral  consequences can potentially last a lifetime. We also reported on selected stakeholders’ views. We spoke to 14  individuals who were leaders of organizations representing judges,  victims of crime, and states, among others—on actions the federal  government could consider to mitigate these collateral consequences.  Most of the stakeholders that we interviewed—13 of 14—said it was  important for the federal government to take action to mitigate federal  collateral consequences for NVDC. Thirteen stakeholders said that  mitigating federal collateral consequences could potentially reduce the  likelihood that individuals with NVDC reoffend. Similarly, 11 stakeholders  said that mitigation could potentially increase the likelihood that  individuals with NVDC successfully reenter the community after jail or  prison. The text box below identifies some of the statements made by  stakeholders during our interviews from our prior work regarding federal  collateral consequences for NVDC. Stakeholder Perspectives on Federal Collateral Consequences for Nonviolent Drug Convictions, as Reported in GAO-17-691 “The breadth of federal collateral consequences for nonviolent drug convictions is so massive and affects so many aspects of a  person’s life, such as family life, immigration, jury service, housing, employment, and voting, that they contribute to an underclass  of people.”   “Many instances wherein the federal collateral consequences for nonviolent drug convictions end up making it hard for people to  live a law abiding life. For example, they may not be able to live in public housing or may be barred from getting an occupational  license or doing a particular job. This may push them to turn back to committing crimes to make some money.”   “…some federal collateral consequences for nonviolent drug convictions are sensible and appropriate. If we abolish  exist  you could imperil public safety…”   “We can’t just say we’re going to err on the side of public safety and implement a wide range of collateral consequences strictly  across the board. The problem is that public safety is undermined by making it impossible for individuals to move on from the  criminal offense.”   “It is important not to assume that nonviolent means that there is no victim.” Since 1980, the federal prison population increased from about 25,000 to  about 184,000, as of December 2017. In June 2015 and June 2016, we  reported that in part to help address challenges associated with  overcrowding in certain institutions and related costs of incarceration,  DOJ had taken steps to reduce the prison population by pursuing  initiatives to: use alternatives to incarceration for low-level nonviolent  crimes; prioritize prosecutions to focus on serious cases; and commute,  or reduce, sentences of qualified federal inmates. In these reports, we  highlighted potential areas for continued oversight of these initiatives and  made six recommendations. DOJ concurred with five of these  recommendations and partially concurred with the other. As of December  2017, DOJ has implemented two of the six recommendations and had not  fully addressed the remaining four. DOJ could better measure effectiveness of pretrial diversion  alternatives. In June 2016, we reported that DOJ had taken steps to  pursue alternatives to incarceration for certain offenders, but could  improve data collection and efforts to measure outcomes resulting from  the use of pretrial diversion alternatives. Our review examined two  pretrial diversion programs on the front-end of the criminal justice process  that provided offenders an opportunity to avoid incarceration if they satisfy  program requirements. Title 9 of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual permits U.S.  Attorneys’ Offices to divert, at the discretion of a U.S. Attorney, certain  federal offenders from prosecution into a program of supervision and  services administered by the PPSO. Under the Title 9 diversion program,  if the offender fulfills the terms of the program, the offender will not be  prosecuted, or, if the offender has already been charged, the charges will  be dismissed. In addition to the Title 9 Pretrial Diversion Program, federal criminal  justice stakeholders within some judicial districts have voluntarily  established court-involved pretrial diversion practices. Court-involved  pretrial diversion allows certain federal offenders the opportunity to  participate in supervised programs or services, such as a drug court to  address criminal behavior that may be linked to addiction to drugs or  alcohol. Program participants are to meet regularly with court officials  including a judge and pretrial services officer to discuss their progress in  the program. If the offender satisfies program requirements, the offender  may not be prosecuted, charges may be dismissed, or the participant  may receive a reduced sentence. While DOJ had collected some data on the use of pretrial diversion, we  found that the data were of limited usefulness and reliability because its  case management system did not distinguish between the different types  of diversion and DOJ had not provided guidance to U.S. Attorneys’  Offices as to when and how pretrial diversion cases are to be entered into  the system. In addition, we found that DOJ had not measured the  outcomes or identified the cost implications of its pretrial diversion  programs. To address these deficiencies, we made four  recommendations to DOJ. The first two relate to tracking and entering  pretrial diversion data, while the second two relate to assessing outcomes  based on the data. Specifically, we recommended that DOJ (1) separately  identify and track the different types of pretrial diversion programs, (2)  provide guidance to its attorneys on the appropriate way to enter data, (3)  identify, obtain, and track data on the outcomes and costs of pretrial  diversion programs, and (4) develop performance measures to assess  diversion program outcomes. DOJ concurred with all four of our  recommendations. In October 2016, DOJ took actions to fully implement the first two  recommendations. Specifically, in September 2016, DOJ provided  guidance to staff in its U.S. Attorneys’ Offices that outlines (1) the use of  two new pretrial diversion codes—one for Title 9 pretrial diversion and  another for court-involved diversion and (2) the appropriate entries to  create and dispose of each type of pretrial diversion. Attorneys were  instructed to use the codes starting on October 1, 2016. However, as of  December 2017, DOJ has not implemented the third and fourth  recommendations. We continue to believe that by obtaining data on the  costs and outcomes of pretrial diversion programs and establishing  performance measures, DOJ would gain multiple advantages in its ability  to manage these programs and optimize their outcomes and cost  implications. DOJ could better assess initiatives to address prison overcrowding  and costs. In June 2015, we reported that DOJ could better measure the  efficacy of two incarceration initiatives designed to address challenges  related to overcrowding and rising costs. One of these was the Smart on  Crime initiative, announced in August 2013 as a comprehensive effort to: prioritize prosecutions to focus on the most serious cases;  reform sentencing to eliminate unfair disparities and reduce  overburdened prisons; pursue alternatives to incarceration for low-level nonviolent crimes;  improve reentry to curb repeat offenses and re-victimization; and  surge resources to prevent violence and protecting most vulnerable  populations. In our report, we found that DOJ had established indicators that were  well-linked to these goals; however, the indicators lacked other key  elements of successful performance measurement systems, such as  clarity, a measurable target, or context. For example, none of the  indicators had numerical targets by which to assess whether overall goals  and objectives are achieved. To address this deficiency, we  recommended that DOJ modify its Smart on Crime indicators to  incorporate key elements of successful performance measurement  systems. DOJ partially concurred with the recommendation, and agreed  to continually refine and enhance the indicators to improve their clarity  and context. However, DOJ did not agree that establishing measurable  targets for its indicators was appropriate. We recognized that it might not  be appropriate to create targets for every indicator. Nevertheless, we  maintained that measurable performance targets that are properly  developed, communicated, and managed, can aid Department leadership  in the admittedly challenging task of assessing progress in the Smart on  Crime Initiative. In March 2017, DOJ noted that, due to a change in administration, the  status of the Smart on Crime Initiative was uncertain. In May 2017, the  Attorney General issued a new charging and sentencing policy to all  federal prosecutors that effectively rescinded any previous policy of DOJ  that is inconsistent with the new charging and sentencing policy, including  certain aspects of the Smart on Crime Initiative. In December 2017,  DOJ stated it would start to collect data on and monitor the  implementation of this new policy. However, DOJ did not provide  information on how it plans to modify its indicators to incorporate key  elements of successful performance measurement systems. To the  extent that DOJ continues to implement other aspects of the Smart on  Crime initiative, such as improving reentry and surging resources to  prevent violence we continue to believe this recommendation is valid. The second initiative we addressed in our June 2015 report was the  Clemency Initiative, which encourages nonviolent, low-level federal  offenders to petition to have their sentences commuted, or reduced, by  the President. Commutation of sentence, as we reported, has long been  considered to be an extraordinary remedy that is rarely granted.  According to DOJ, in 2013, then-President Obama expressed a desire to  review more petitions, and DOJ pledged to expedite the review of such  petitions in order to provide them to the President for consideration.  However, we found that DOJ had not adequately assessed the extent to  which the Clemency Initiative is expeditiously identifying meritorious  petitions because it had not tracked how long it takes for petitions to clear  each step in its review process or identified and addressed any processes  that may contribute to unnecessary delays. We made a recommendation  to DOJ to address this deficiency. DOJ concurred, but in March 2017  DOJ stated that it had no standard review process to evaluate. In  December 2017, DOJ reported to us that it has taken steps to accelerate  the review of commutation cases, such as assigning two attorneys to  spend additional time on commutation cases. Although DOJ’s actions are  consistent with our recommendation, DOJ has not tracked how long it  takes for petitions to clear each step in its review process. This makes it  unclear whether DOJ’s actions are addressing the processes that  contribute to unnecessary delays. DOJ Has Addressed  Two of Four GAO  Recommendations  Related to its Reentry  Programs As part of its mission to protect public safety, BOP provides reentry  programming that aims to facilitate offenders’ successful return to the  community and reduce recidivism. These reentry efforts include programs  offered in BOP facilities, as well as RRC and home confinement services  that allow inmates to serve the final months of their sentences in the  community. In our February 2012, June 2015, and June 2016 reports we  highlighted potential areas for continued oversight and made four  recommendations to BOP. As of December 2017, BOP has implemented  two of the four recommendations and has taken action to address one  other recommendation. BOP has developed a plan to evaluate its reentry programs. In June  2015, we reported that BOP had 18 reentry programs available to  inmates in BOP institutions in the areas of inmate treatment and  education. We found that while BOP had plans to evaluate the  performance of some of its reentry programs, it did not have a plan in  place to prioritize evaluations across all of these programs. As a result,  we recommended that BOP include, as part of its current evaluation plan,  all 18 of BOP’s national reentry programs, and prioritize its evaluations by  considering factors such as resources required for conducting  evaluations. In May 2016, BOP provided to us an evaluation plan that  was consistent with our recommendation. BOP has continued to update  the evaluation plan to reflect changes in priority. For example, the most  recent plan, updated in July 2017, lists BOP’s Mental Health Step Down  Unit program as its top priority, with a target evaluation date of fiscal year  2018. According to BOP, this reflects the need for analysis of services for  seriously mentally ill inmates. BOP has taken steps to assess costs of home confinement services.  In February 2012, we reported that BOP did not know the actual cost of  home confinement services. To facilitate inmates’ reintegration into  society, BOP may transfer eligible inmates to community corrections  locations for up to the final 12 months of their sentences. Inmates may  spend this time in a RRC and in confinement in their homes for up to 6  months. BOP contracts with private organizations to manage the RRCs  and monitor inmates in home confinement. At the time of our review,  BOP was paying a rate of 50 percent of the overall per diem rate  negotiated with the RRC for each inmate in home confinement. For  example, if BOP paid a contractor the average community corrections per  diem rate of $70.79 for each inmate housed in a RRC, BOP would pay  $35.39 per day for that contractor’s supervision of each inmate in home  confinement. However, according to BOP, the agency did not require  contractors to provide the actual costs for home confinement services as  part of their contract and therefore did not know the cost of home  confinement. To help BOP better manage its costs, we recommended  that BOP establish a plan for requiring contractors to submit separate  prices of RRC beds and home confinement services. BOP implemented  this recommendation and determined that all new solicitations as of  February 1, 2013, will have separate line items for RRC in-house beds  and home confinement services. According to BOP, as of November  2017, 184 solicitations with separate RRC bed and home confinement  service line items have been issued since February 2013. BOP could better measure the outcomes of RRCs and home  confinement. In June 2016, we reported that BOP was not positioned to  track the information it would need to help measure the outcomes of  inmates placed in RRCs and home confinement and did not have  performance measures in place. Specifically, we found that, as part of  its strategic plan, BOP had two measures—one to track the number of  inmates placed into RRCs, and another to track the number of inmates  placed in home confinement. However, these measures did not help  assess the outcomes of RRCs and home confinement, such as how  these programs may or may not affect the recidivism rates of inmates. To  address this deficiency, we made two recommendations to BOP to (1)  identify, obtain, and track data on the outcomes of the RRC and home  confinement programs; and (2) develop performance measures by which  to help assess program outcomes. DOJ concurred with these  recommendations. As of December 2017, BOP has taken steps to implement our  recommendation to identify, obtain, and track data on the outcomes of  RRCs and home confinement. In particular, BOP reported to us that it has  developed a revised Statement of Work for use with its RRC contractors  that requires the contractors to track and report quarterly to BOP on,  among other things, the number of placements into and releases from  RRCs and home confinement; revocations from RRCs or home  confinement; and RRC and home confinement residents that have  secured full, part-time, or temporary employment. BOP plans to compile  these data to track contractor performance and program outcomes.  Further, BOP reported to us that it has developed a voluntary survey that  asks RRC residents about their RRC experiences, including the amount  of help they received in finding and keeping a job, and finding a place to  live. These actions are in line with our recommendation and we will  continue to monitor their implementation. However, as of December 2017,  BOP has not provided evidence to us that it has developed performance  measures by which to help assess program outcomes. We continue to  believe BOP should do so. Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings, and Members of the  Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to  respond to any questions that you may have. GAO Contacts and  Staff  Acknowledgments For further information about this statement, please contact Diana Maurer  at (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Other individuals who made key contributions to this  statement include Brett Fallavollita (Assistant Director), David Alexander,  Pedro Almoguera, Joy Booth, Billy Commons, III, Tonnye’ Connor-White,  Jessica Du, Lorraine Ettaro, Michele Fejfar, Christopher Hatscher, Susan  Hsu, Tom Jessor, Matt Lowney, Heather May, and Jill Verret. Key  contributors for the previous work on which this testimony is based are  listed in each product. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
BOP's rising costs and offender recidivism present incarceration challenges to both DOJ and the nation. For example, BOP's operating costs have generally increased over time, and in fiscal year 2017 amounted to more than $6.9 billion, or 24 percent of DOJ's total discretionary budget. In addition, from 1980 through 2013, BOP's prison population increased by almost 800 percent, from 24,640 to 219,298. While the prison population began to decline in 2013, DOJ has continued to identify prison crowding as a critical issue. GAO has examined a number of DOJ efforts to slow the growth of the prison population and to reduce recidivism through the use of reentry programs to help offenders successfully return to the community. This statement summarizes findings and recommendations from recent GAO reports that address (1) DOJ's incarceration reduction initiatives, and (2) BOP reentry programs. This statement is based on prior GAO products issued from February 2012 through June 2016, along with updates on the status of recommendations obtained as of December 2017. For the updates on DOJ's progress in implementing recommendations, GAO analyzed information provided by DOJ officials on actions taken and planned. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has fully addressed two of six GAO recommendations related to its incarceration reduction initiatives . In June 2015 and June 2016, GAO reported that to help address challenges associated with incarceration, DOJ had, among other things, taken steps to reduce the prison population by pursuing initiatives to use alternatives to incarceration for low-level nonviolent crimes. GAO made six recommendations to DOJ related to these efforts. As of December 2017, DOJ has implemented two of the six recommendations and has not fully addressed the remaining four. Specifically, to enhance efforts to measure program outcomes, DOJ issued guidance on proper data entry and began tracking data on different types of pretrial diversion programs that allow certain offenders to avoid incarceration if they satisfy program requirements. In addition, as of December 2017, DOJ has taken steps to partially implement GAO's recommendation to address unnecessary delays in reviewing inmates' petitions to commute their sentences. DOJ has not taken action to address recommendations to better assess the results of pretrial diversion programs or another effort to prioritize prosecutions and reform sentencing to eliminate unfair disparities, among other goals. Further, in December 2017, DOJ noted there had been policy changes since GAO made a recommendation related to enhancing measures to monitor prioritizing prosecution and sentencing reform. Although DOJ reported taking some actions to implement GAO's recommendation, these actions did not include establishing measures that incorporate key elements of successful performance measurement systems. DOJ has addressed two of four GAO recommendations related to its reentry programs . As part of its mission to protect public safety, DOJ's Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) provides reentry programming that aims to facilitate offenders' successful return to the community and reduce recidivism (a return to prison or criminal behavior).  These reentry efforts include programs offered in BOP facilities as well as contractor-managed residential reentry centers (RRC)—also known as halfway houses—and home confinement services that allow inmates to serve the final months of their sentences in the community.  GAO issued three reports in February 2012, June 2015, and June 2016 and made four recommendations to BOP in this area. As of December 2017, DOJ has implemented two of the four recommendations and has begun to take action to address one of the remaining two. Specifically, to implement one of GAO's recommendations, DOJ established a plan to evaluate the effectiveness of all the 18 reentry programs it offers to inmates in BOP facilities. To implement another GAO recommendation to improve cost management, DOJ began requiring contractors to submit separate prices for RRC beds and home confinement services. As of December 2017, DOJ noted it has taken initial steps to address a recommendation to track outcome data for its RRC and home confinement programs; however, it has not taken action to develop measures to assess the performance of these programs.