Background IT systems supporting federal agencies and our nation’s critical  infrastructures are inherently at risk. These systems are highly complex  and dynamic, technologically diverse, and often geographically dispersed.  This complexity increases the difficulty in identifying, managing, and  protecting the numerous operating systems, applications, and devices  comprising the systems and networks. Compounding the risk, federal systems and networks are also often  interconnected with other internal and external systems and networks,  including the Internet. This increases the number of avenues of attack  and expands their attack surface. As systems become more integrated,  cyber threats will pose an increasing risk to national security, economic  well-being, and public health and safety. Advancements in technology, such as data analytics software for  searching and collecting information, have also made it easier for  individuals and organizations to correlate data (including PII) and track it  across large and numerous databases. For example, social media has  been used as a mass communication tool where PII can be gathered in  vast amounts. In addition, ubiquitous Internet and cellular connectivity  makes it easier to track individuals by allowing easy access to information  pinpointing their locations. These advances—combined with the  increasing sophistication of hackers and others with malicious intent, and  the extent to which both federal agencies and private companies collect  sensitive information about individuals—have increased the risk of PII  being exposed and compromised. Cybersecurity incidents continue to impact entities across various critical  infrastructure sectors. For example, in its 2018 annual data breach  investigations report, Verizon reported that 53,308 security incidents  and 2,216 data breaches were identified across 65 countries in the 12  months since its prior report. Further, the report noted that cybercriminals  can often compromise a system in just a matter of minutes—or even  seconds, but that it can take an organization significantly longer to  discover the breach. Specifically, the report stated nearly 90 percent of  the reported breaches occurred within minutes, while nearly 70 percent  went undiscovered for months. These concerns are further highlighted by the number of information  security incidents reported by federal executive branch civilian agencies  to DHS’s U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT). For  fiscal year 2017, 35,277 such incidents were reported by the Office of  Management and Budget (OMB) in its 2018 annual report to Congress,  as mandated by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act  (FISMA). These incidents include, for example, web-based attacks,  phishing, and the loss or theft of computing equipment. Different types of incidents merit different response strategies. However,  if an agency cannot identify the threat vector (or avenue of attack), it  could be difficult for that agency to define more specific handling  procedures to respond to the incident and take actions to minimize similar  future attacks. In this regard, incidents with a threat vector categorized as  “other” (which includes avenues of attacks that are unidentified) made up  31 percent of the various incidents reported to US-CERT. Figure 1 shows  the percentage of the different types of incidents reported across each of  the nine threat vector categories for fiscal year 2017, as reported by  OMB. These incidents and others like them can pose a serious challenge to  economic, national, and personal privacy and security. The following  examples highlight the impact of such incidents:  In March 2018, the Mayor of Atlanta, Georgia, reported that the city  was victimized by a ransomware cyberattack. As a result, city  government officials stated that customers were not able to access  multiple applications that are used to pay bills or access court related  information. In response to the attack, the officials noted that they  were working with numerous private and governmental partners,  including DHS, to assess what occurred and determine how best to  protect the city from future attacks. In March 2018, the Department of Justice reported that it had indicted  nine Iranians for conducting a massive cybersecurity theft campaign  on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. According to the  department, the nine Iranians allegedly stole more than 31 terabytes  of documents and data from more than 140 American universities, 30  U.S. companies, and five federal government agencies, among other  entities. In March 2018, a joint alert from DHS and the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI) stated that, since at least March 2016, Russian  government actors had targeted the systems of multiple U.S.  government entities and critical infrastructure sectors. Specifically, the  alert stated that Russian government actors had affected multiple  organizations in the energy, nuclear, water, aviation, construction, and  critical manufacturing sectors. In July 2017, a breach at Equifax resulted in the loss of PII for an  estimated 148 million U.S. consumers. According to Equifax, the  hackers accessed people’s names, Social Security numbers (SSN),  birth dates, addresses and, in some instances, driver’s license  numbers. In April 2017, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service  (IRS) testified that the IRS had disabled its data retrieval tool in early  March 2017 after becoming concerned about the misuse of taxpayer  data. Specifically, the agency suspected that PII obtained outside the  agency’s tax system was used to access the agency’s online federal  student aid application in an attempt to secure tax information through  the data retrieval tool. In April 2017, the agency began notifying  taxpayers who could have been affected by the breach. In June 2015, OPM reported that an intrusion into its systems had  affected the personnel records of about 4.2 million current and former  federal employees. Then, in July 2015, the agency reported that a  separate, but related, incident had compromised its systems and the  files related to background investigations for 21.5 million individuals.  In total, OPM estimated 22.1 million individuals had some form of PII  stolen, with 3.6 million being a victim of both breaches. Federal Information  Security Included on  GAO’s High-Risk List  Since 1997 Safeguarding federal IT systems and the systems that support critical  infrastructures has been a long-standing concern of GAO. Due to  increasing cyber-based threats and the persistent nature of information  security vulnerabilities, we have designated information security as a  government-wide high-risk area since 1997. In 2003, we expanded the  information security high-risk area to include the protection of critical  cyber infrastructure. At that time, we highlighted the need to manage  critical infrastructure protection activities that enhance the security of the  cyber and physical public and private infrastructures that are essential to  national security, national economic security, and/or national public health  and safety. We further expanded the information security high-risk area in 2015 to  include protecting the privacy of PII. Since then, advances in technology  have enhanced the ability of government and private sector entities to  collect and process extensive amounts of PII, which has posed  challenges to ensuring the privacy of such information. In addition, high- profile PII breaches at commercial entities, such as Equifax, heightened  concerns that personal privacy is not being adequately protected. Our experience has shown that the key elements needed to make  progress toward being removed from the High-Risk List are top-level  attention by the administration and agency leaders grounded in the five  criteria for removal, as well as any needed congressional action. The five  criteria for removal that we identified in November 2000 are as follows: Leadership Commitment. Demonstrated strong commitment and top  leadership support. Capacity. The agency has the capacity (i.e., people and resources) to  resolve the risk(s). Action Plan. A corrective action plan exists that defines the root  cause, solutions, and provides for substantially completing corrective  measures, including steps necessary to implement solutions we  recommended. Monitoring. A program has been instituted to monitor and  independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of  corrective measures. Demonstrated Progress. Ability to demonstrate progress in  implementing corrective measures and in resolving the high-risk area. These five criteria form a road map for efforts to improve and ultimately  address high-risk issues. Addressing some of the criteria leads to  progress, while satisfying all of the criteria is central to removal from the  list. Figure 2 shows the five criteria and illustrative actions taken by  agencies to address the criteria. Importantly, the actions listed are not  “stand alone” efforts taken in isolation from other actions to address high- risk issues. That is, actions taken under one criterion may be important to  meeting other criteria as well. For example, top leadership can  demonstrate its commitment by establishing a corrective action plan  including long-term priorities and goals to address the high-risk issue and  using data to gauge progress—actions which are also vital to monitoring  criteria. As we reported in the February 2017 high-risk report, the federal  government’s efforts to address information security deficiencies had fully  met one of the five criteria for removal from the High-Risk List— leadership commitment—and partially met the other four, as shown in  figure 3. We plan to update our assessment of this high-risk area against  the five criteria in February 2019. Ten Critical Actions  Needed to Address  Major Cybersecurity  Challenges Based on our prior work, we have identified four major cybersecurity  challenges: (1) establishing a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy and  performing effective oversight, (2) securing federal systems and  information, (3) protecting cyber critical infrastructure, and (4) protecting  privacy and sensitive data. To address these challenges, we have  identified 10 critical actions that the federal government and other entities  need to take (see figure 4). The four challenges and the 10 actions  needed to address them are summarized following the table. In addition,  we also discuss in more detail each of the 10 actions in appendices II  through XI. Establishing a  Comprehensive  Cybersecurity Strategy  and Performing Effective  Oversight The federal government has been challenged in establishing a  comprehensive cybersecurity strategy and in performing effective  oversight as called for by federal law and policy. Specifically, we have  previously reported that the federal government has faced challenges in  establishing a comprehensive strategy to provide a framework for how the  United States will engage both domestically and internationally on  cybersecurity related matters. We have also reported on challenges in  performing oversight, including monitoring the global supply chain,  ensuring a highly skilled cyber workforce, and addressing risks  associated with emerging technologies. The federal government can take  four key actions to improve the nation’s strategic approach to, and  oversight of, cybersecurity. Develop and execute a more comprehensive federal strategy for  national cybersecurity and global cyberspace. In February 2013  we reported that the government had issued a variety of strategy- related documents that addressed priorities for enhancing  cybersecurity within the federal government as well as for  encouraging improvements in the cybersecurity of critical  infrastructure within the private sector; however, no overarching  cybersecurity strategy had been developed that articulated priority  actions, assigned responsibilities for performing them, and set time  frames for their completion. In October 2015, in response to our recommendation to develop an  overarching federal cybersecurity strategy that included all key  elements of the desirable characteristics of a national strategy, the  Director of OMB and the Federal Chief Information Officer issued a  Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan for the Federal  Civilian Government. The plan directed a series of actions to  improve capabilities for identifying and detecting vulnerabilities and  threats, enhance protections of government assets and information,  and further develop robust response and recovery capabilities to  ensure readiness and resilience when incidents inevitably occur. The  plan also identified key milestones for major activities, resources  needed to accomplish milestones, and specific roles and  responsibilities of federal organizations related to the strategy’s  milestones. Since that time, the executive branch has made progress toward  outlining a federal strategy for confronting cyber threats. For example,  a May 2017 presidential executive order required federal agencies to  take a variety of actions, including better manage their cybersecurity  risks and coordinate to meet reporting requirements related to  cybersecurity of federal networks, critical infrastructure, and the  nation. Additionally, the December 2017 National Security Strategy  cites cybersecurity as a national priority and identifies related needed  actions, such as including identifying and prioritizing risk, and building  defensible government networks. Further, DHS issued a cybersecurity strategy in May 2018, which  articulated seven goals the department plans to accomplish in support  of its mission related to managing national cybersecurity risks. The  strategy is intended to provide DHS with a framework to execute its  cybersecurity responsibilities during the next 5 years to keep pace  with the evolving cyber risk landscape by reducing vulnerabilities and  building resilience; countering malicious actors in cyberspace;  responding to incidents; and making the cyber ecosystem more  secure and resilient. These efforts provide a good foundation toward establishing a more  comprehensive strategy, but more effort is needed to address all of  the desirable characteristics of a national strategy that we have  previously recommended. The recently issued executive branch  strategy documents did not include key elements of desirable  characteristics that can enhance the usefulness of a national strategy  as guidance for decision makers in allocating resources, defining  policies, and helping to ensure accountability. Specifically, the  documents generally did not include milestones and performance  measures to gauge results, nor did they describe the resources  needed to carry out the goals and objective. Further, most of the  strategy documents lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities  for key agencies, such as DHS, the Department of Defense (DOD),  and OMB, who contribute substantially to the nation’s cybersecurity  programs. Ultimately, a more clearly defined, coordinated, and comprehensive  approach to planning and executing an overall strategy would likely  lead to significant progress in furthering strategic goals and lessening  persistent weaknesses. For more information on this action area, see  appendix II. Mitigate global supply chain risks. The global, geographically  disperse nature of the producers and suppliers of IT products is a  growing concern. We have previously reported on potential issues  associated with IT supply chain and risks originating from foreign- manufactured equipment. For example, in July 2017, we reported that  the Department of State had relied on certain device manufacturers,  software developers, and contractor support which had suppliers that  were reported to be headquartered in a cyber-threat nation (e.g.,  China and Russia). We further pointed out that the reliance on  complex, global IT supply chains introduces multiple risks to federal  agencies, including insertion of counterfeits, tampering, or installation  of malicious software or hardware. In July 2018, we testified that if such global IT supply chain risks are  realized, they could jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and  availability of federal information systems. Thus, the potential exists  for serious adverse impact on an agency’s operations, assets, and  employees. These factors highlight the importance and urgency of  federal agencies appropriately assessing, managing, and monitoring  IT supply chain risk as part of their agency-wide information security  programs. For more information on this action area, see appendix III. Address cybersecurity workforce management challenges. The  federal government faces challenges in ensuring that the nation’s  cybersecurity workforce has the appropriate skills. For example, in  June 2018, we reported on federal efforts to implement the  requirements of the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act  of 2015. We determined that most of the Chief Financial Officers  (CFO) Act agencies had not fully implemented all statutory  requirements, such as developing procedures for assigning codes to  cybersecurity positions. Further, we have previously reported that  DHS and DOD had not addressed cybersecurity workforce  management requirements set forth in federal laws. In addition, we  have reported in the last 2 years that federal agencies (1) had not  identified and closed cybersecurity skills gaps, (2) had been  challenged with recruiting and retaining qualified staff, and (3) had  difficulty navigating the federal hiring process. A recent executive branch report also discussed challenges  associated with the cybersecurity workforce. Specifically, in response  to Executive Order 13800, the Department of Commerce and DHS led  an interagency working group exploring how to support the growth  and sustainment of future cybersecurity employees in the public and  private sectors. In May 2018, the departments issued a report that  identified key findings, including:  the U.S. cybersecurity workforce needs immediate and sustained  improvements;  the pool of cybersecurity candidates needs to be expanded  through retraining and by increasing the participation of women,  minorities, and veterans; a shortage exists of cybersecurity teachers at the primary and  secondary levels, faculty in higher education, and training  instructors; and  comprehensive and reliable data about cybersecurity workforce  position needs and education and training programs are lacking. The report also included recommendations and proposed actions to  address the findings, including that private and public sectors should  (1) align education and training with employers’ cybersecurity  workforce needs by applying the National Initiative for Cybersecurity  Education Cybersecurity Workforce Framework; (2) develop  cybersecurity career model paths; and (3) establish a clearinghouse  of information on cybersecurity workforce development education,  training, and workforce development programs and initiatives. In addition, in June 2018, the executive branch issued a government  reform plan and reorganization recommendations that included,  among other things, proposals for solving the federal cybersecurity  workforce shortage. In particular, the plan notes that the  administration intends to prioritize and accelerate ongoing efforts to  reform the way that the federal government recruits, evaluates,  selects, pays, and places cyber talent across the enterprise. The plan  further states that, by the end of the first quarter of fiscal year 2019, all  CFO Act agencies, in coordination with DHS and OMB, are to develop  a critical list of vacancies across their organizations. Subsequently,  OMB and DHS are to analyze these lists and work with OPM to  develop a government-wide approach to identifying or recruiting new  employees or reskilling existing employees. Regarding cybersecurity  training, the plan notes that OMB is to consult with DHS to  standardize training for cybersecurity employees, and should work to  develop an enterprise-wide training process for government  cybersecurity employees. For more information on this action area,  see appendix IV. Ensure the security of emerging technologies. As the devices  used in daily life become increasingly integrated with technology, the  risk to sensitive data and PII also grows. Over the last several years,  we have reported on weaknesses in addressing vulnerabilities  associated with emerging technologies, including:  IoT devices, such as fitness trackers, cameras, and thermostats,  that continuously collect and process information are potentially  vulnerable to cyber-attacks;  IoT devices, such as those acquired and used by DOD employees  or that DOD itself acquires (e.g., smartphones), may increase the  security risks to the department;  vehicles that are potentially susceptible to cyber-attack through  technology, such as Bluetooth;  the unknown impact of artificial intelligence cybersecurity; and advances in cryptocurrencies and blockchain technologies. Executive branch agencies have also highlighted the challenges  associated with ensuring the security of emerging technologies.  Specifically, in a May 2018 report issued in response to Executive  Order 13800, the Department of Commerce and DHS issued a report  on the opportunities and challenges in reducing the botnet threat.  The opportunities and challenges are centered on six principal  themes, including the global nature of automated, distributed attacks;  effective tools; and awareness and education. The report also  provides recommended actions, including that federal agencies  should increase their understanding of what software components  have been incorporated into acquired products and establish a public  campaign to support awareness of IoT security. For more information  on this action area, see appendix V. In our previously discussed reports related to this cybersecurity  challenge, we made a total of 50 recommendations to federal agencies to  address the weaknesses identified. As of August 2018, 48  recommendations had not been implemented. These outstanding  recommendations include 8 priority recommendations, meaning that we  believe that they warrant priority attention from heads of key departments  and agencies. These priority recommendations include addressing  weaknesses associated with, among other things, agency-specific  cybersecurity workforce challenges and agency responsibilities for  supporting mitigation of vehicle network attacks. Until our  recommendations are fully implemented, federal agencies may be limited  in their ability to provide effective oversight of critical government-wide  initiatives, address challenges with cybersecurity workforce management,  and better ensure the security of emerging technologies. In addition to our prior work related to the federal government’s efforts to  establish key strategy documents and implement effective oversight, we  also have several ongoing reviews related to this challenge. These  include reviews of:  the CFO Act agencies’ efforts to submit complete and reliable  baseline assessment reports of their cybersecurity workforces;  the extent to which DOD has established training standards for cyber  mission force personnel, and efforts the department has made to  achieve its goal of a trained cyber mission force; and  selected agencies’ ability to implement cloud service technologies and  notable benefits this might have on agencies. Securing Federal Systems  and Information The federal government has been challenged in securing federal systems  and information. Specifically, we have reported that federal agencies  have experienced challenges in implementing government-wide  cybersecurity initiatives, addressing weaknesses in their information  systems and responding to cyber incidents on their systems. This is  particularly concerning given that the emergence of increasingly  sophisticated threats and continuous reporting of cyber incidents  underscores the continuing and urgent need for effective information  security. As such, it is important that federal agencies take appropriate  steps to better ensure they have effectively implemented programs to  protect their information and systems. We have identified three actions  that the agencies can take. Improve implementation of government-wide cybersecurity  initiatives. Specifically, in January 2016, we reported that DHS had  not ensured that the National Cybersecurity Protection System  (NCPS) had fully satisfied all intended system objectives related to  intrusion detection and prevention, information sharing, and  analytics. In addition, in February 2017, we reported that the DHS  National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center’s  (NCCIC) functions were not being performed in adherence with the  principles set forth in federal laws. We noted that, although NCCIC  was sharing information about cyber threats in the way it should, the  center did not have metrics to measure that the information was  timely, relevant and actionable, as prescribed by law. For more  information on this action area, see appendix VI. Address weaknesses in federal information security programs.  We have previously identified a number of weaknesses in agencies’  protection of their information and information systems. For example,  over the past 2 years, we have reported that: most of the 24 agencies covered by the CFO Act had weaknesses  in each of the five major categories of information system controls  (i.e., access controls, configuration management controls,  segregation of duties, contingency planning, and agency-wide  security management);  three agencies—the Securities Exchange Commission, the  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Food and Drug  Administration—had not effectively implemented aspects of their  information security programs, which resulted in weaknesses in  these agencies’ security controls;  information security weaknesses in selected high-impact systems  at four agencies—the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, OPM, and  the Department of Veterans Affairs—were cited as a key reason  that the agencies had not effectively implemented elements of  their information security programs; DOD’s process for monitoring the implementation of cybersecurity  guidance had weaknesses and resulted in the closure of certain  tasks (such as completing cyber risk assessments) before they  were fully implemented; and agencies had not fully defined the role of their Chief Information  Security Officers, as required by FISMA. We also recently testified that, although the government had acted to  protect federal information systems, additional work was needed to  improve agency security programs and cyber capabilities. In  particular, we noted that further efforts were needed by agencies to  implement our prior recommendations in order to strengthen their  information security programs and technical controls over their  computer networks and systems. For more information on this action  area, see appendix VII. Enhance the federal response to cyber incidents. We have  reported that certain agencies have had weaknesses in responding to  cyber incidents. For example, as of August 2017, OPM had not fully implemented controls to  address deficiencies identified as a result of its 2015 cyber  incidents; DOD had not identified the National Guard’s cyber capabilities  (e.g., computer network defense teams) or addressed challenges  in its exercises; as of April 2016, DOD had not identified, clarified, or implemented  all components of its support of civil authorities during cyber  incidents; and as of January 2016, DHS’s NCPS had limited capabilities for  detecting and preventing intrusions, conducting analytics, and  sharing information. For more information on this action area, see appendix VIII. In the public versions of the reports previously discussed for this  challenge area, we made a total of 101 recommendations to federal  agencies to address the weaknesses identified. As of August 2018, 61  recommendations had not been implemented. These outstanding  recommendations include 14 priority recommendations to address  weaknesses associated with, among other things, the information security  programs at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, OPM,  and the Security Exchange Commission. Until these recommendations  are implemented, these federal agencies will be limited in their ability to  ensure the effectiveness of their programs for protecting information and  systems. In addition to our prior work, we also have several ongoing reviews  related to the federal government’s efforts to protect its information and  systems. These include reviews of: Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP)  implementation, including an assessment of the implementation of the  program’s authorization process for protecting federal data in cloud  environments;  the Equifax data breach, including an assessment of federal oversight  of credit reporting agencies’ collection, use, and protection of  consumer PII;  the Federal Communication Commission’s Electronic Comment Filing  System security, to include a review of the agency’s detection of and  response to a May 2017 incident that reportedly impacted the system; DOD’s efforts to improve the cybersecurity of its major weapon DOD’s whistleblower program, including an assessment of the  policies, procedures, and controls related to the access and storage of  sensitive and classified information needed for the program;  IRS’s efforts to (1) implement security controls and the agency’s  information security program, (2) authenticate taxpayers, and (3)  secure tax information; and  the federal approach and strategy to securing agency information  systems, to include federal intrusion detection and prevention  capabilities and the intrusion assessment plan. Protecting Cyber Critical  Infrastructure The federal government has been challenged in working with the private  sector to protect critical infrastructure. This infrastructure includes both  public and private systems vital to national security and other efforts, such  as providing the essential services that underpin American society. As the  cybersecurity threat to these systems continues to grow, federal agencies  have millions of sensitive records that must be protected. Specifically, this  critical infrastructure threat could have national security implications and  more efforts should be made to ensure that it is not breached. To help address this issue, the National Institute of Standards and  Technology (NIST) developed the cybersecurity framework—a voluntary  set of cybersecurity standards and procedures for industry to adopt as a  means of taking a risk-based approach to managing cybersecurity. However, additional action is needed to strengthen the federal role in  protecting the critical infrastructure. Specifically, we have reported on  other critical infrastructure protection issues that need to be addressed.  For example: DHS did not track vulnerability reduction from the implementation and  verification of planned security measures at the high-risk chemical  facilities that engage with the department, as a basis for assessing  performance. Entities within the 16 critical infrastructure sectors reported  encountering four challenges to adopting the cybersecurity  framework, such as being limited in their ability to commit necessary  resources towards framework adoption and not having the necessary  knowledge and skills to effectively implement the framework. DOD and the Federal Aviation Administration identified a variety of  operations and physical security risks that could adversely affect DOD  missions. Major challenges existed to securing the electricity grid against cyber  threats. These challenges included monitoring implementation of  cybersecurity standards, ensuring security features are built into smart  grid systems, and establishing metrics for cybersecurity. DHS and other agencies needed to enhance cybersecurity in the  maritime environment. Specifically, DHS did not include cyber risks in  its risk assessments that were already in place nor did it address  cyber risks in guidance for port security plans. Sector-specific agencies were not properly addressing progress or  metrics to measure their progress in cybersecurity. For more information on this action area, see appendix IX. We made a total of 21 recommendations to federal agencies to address  these weaknesses and others. These recommendations include, for  example, a total of 9 recommendations to 9 sector-specific agencies to  develop methods to determine the level and type of cybersecurity  framework adoption across their respective sectors. As of August 2018,  all 21 recommendations had not been implemented. Until these  recommendations are implemented, the federal government will continue  to be challenged in fulfilling its role in protecting the nation’s critical  infrastructure. In addition to our prior work related to the federal government’s efforts to  protect critical infrastructure, we also have several ongoing reviews  focusing on:  the physical and cybersecurity risks to pipelines across the country  responsible for transmitting oil, natural gas, and other hazardous  liquids;  the cybersecurity risks to the electric grid; and  the privatization of utilities at DOD installations. Protecting Privacy and  Sensitive Data The federal government has been challenged in protecting privacy and  sensitive data. Advances in technology, including powerful search  technology and data analytics software, have made it easy to correlate  information about individuals across large and numerous databases,  which have become very inexpensive to maintain. In addition, ubiquitous  Internet connectivity has facilitated sophisticated tracking of individuals  and their activities through mobile devices such as smartphones and  fitness trackers. Given that access to data is so pervasive, personal privacy hinges on  ensuring that databases of PII maintained by government agencies or on  their behalf are protected both from inappropriate access (i.e., data  breaches) as well as inappropriate use (i.e., for purposes not originally  specified when the information was collected). Likewise, the trend in the  private sector of collecting extensive and detailed information about  individuals needs appropriate limits. The vast number of individuals  potentially affected by data breaches at federal agencies and private  sector entities in recent years increases concerns that PII is not being  properly protected. Federal agencies should take two types of actions to address this  challenge area. In addition, we have previously proposed two matters for  congressional consideration aimed toward better protecting PII. Improve federal efforts to protect privacy and sensitive data. We  have issued several reports noting that agencies had deficiencies in  protecting privacy and sensitive data that needed to be addressed.  For example: The Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Centers  for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and external entities  were at risk of compromising Medicare Beneficiary Data due to a  lack of guidance and proper oversight. The Department of Education’s Office of Federal Student Aid had  not properly overseen its school partners’ records or information  security programs. HHS had not fully addressed key security elements in its guidance  for protecting the security and privacy of electronic health  information. CMS had not fully protected the privacy of users’ data on state- based marketplaces. Poor planning and ineffective monitoring had resulted in the  unsuccessful implementation of government initiatives aimed at  eliminating the unnecessary collection, use, and display of  SSNs. For more information on this action area, see appendix X. Appropriately limit the collection and use of personal information  and ensure that it is obtained with appropriate knowledge or  consent. We have issued a series of reports that highlight a number  of the key concerns in this area. For example: The emergence of IoT devices can facilitate the collection of  information about individuals without their knowledge or consent; Federal laws for smartphone tracking applications have not  generally been well enforced; The FBI has not fully ensured privacy and accuracy related to the  use of face recognition technology. For more information on this action area, see appendix XI. We have previously suggested that Congress consider amending laws,  such as the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act of 2002,  because they may not consistently protect PII. Specifically, we found  that while these laws and guidance set minimum requirements for  agencies, they may not consistently protect PII in all circumstances of its  collection and use throughout the federal government and may not fully  adhere to key privacy principles. However, revisions to the Privacy Act  and the E-Government Act have not yet been enacted. Further, we also suggested that Congress consider strengthening the  consumer privacy framework and review issues such as the adequacy  of consumers’ ability to access, correct, and control their personal  information; and privacy controls related to new technologies such as web  tracking and mobile devices. However, these suggested changes have  not yet been enacted. We also made a total of 29 recommendations to federal agencies to  address the weaknesses identified. As of August 2018, 28  recommendations had not been implemented. These outstanding  recommendations include 6 priority recommendations to address  weaknesses associated with, among other things, publishing privacy  impact assessments and improving the accuracy of the FBI’s face  recognition services. Until these recommendations are implemented,  federal agencies will be challenged in their ability to protect privacy and  sensitive data and ensure that its collection and use is appropriately  limited. In addition to our prior work, we have several ongoing reviews related to  protecting privacy and sensitive data. These include reviews of:  IRS’s taxpayer authentication efforts, including what steps the agency  is taking to monitor and improve its authentication methods;  the extent to which the Department of Education’s Office of Federal  Student Aid’s policies and procedures for overseeing non-school  partners’ protection of federal student aid data align with federal  requirements and guidance; data security issues related to credit reporting agencies, including a  review of the causes and impacts of the August 2017 Equifax data  breach;  the extent to which Equifax assessed, responded to, and recovered  from its August 2017 data breach;  federal agencies’ efforts to remove PII from shared cyber threat  indicators; and how the federal government has overseen Internet privacy, including  the roles of the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal  Trade Commission, and strengths and weaknesses of the current  oversight authorities. Continued Implementation  of Our Recommendations  Is Needed to Address  Cybersecurity  Weaknesses In conclusion, since 2010, we have made over 3,000 recommendations to  agencies aimed at addressing the four cybersecurity challenges.  Nevertheless, many agencies continue to be challenged in safeguarding  their information systems and information, in part because many of these  recommendations have not been implemented. Of the roughly 3,000  recommendations made since 2010, nearly 1,000 had not been  implemented as of August 2018. We have also designated 35 as priority  recommendations, and as of August 2018, 31 had not been implemented. The federal government and the nation’s critical infrastructure are  dependent on IT systems and electronic data, which make them highly  vulnerable to a wide and evolving array of cyber-based threats. Securing  these systems and data is vital to the nation’s security, prosperity, and  well-being. Nevertheless, the security over these systems and data is  inconsistent and urgent actions are needed to address ongoing  cybersecurity and privacy challenges. Specifically, the federal  government needs to implement a more comprehensive cybersecurity  strategy and improve its oversight, including maintaining a qualified  cybersecurity workforce; address security weaknesses in federal systems  and information and enhance cyber incident response efforts; bolster the  protection of cyber critical infrastructure; and prioritize efforts to protect  individual’s privacy and PII. Until our recommendations are addressed  and actions are taken to address the four challenges we identified, the  federal government, the national critical infrastructure, and the personal  information of U.S. citizens will be increasingly susceptible to the  multitude of cyber-related threats that exist. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO  website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  Nick Marinos at (202) 512-9342 or marinosn@gao.gov or Gregory C.  Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or wilshuseng@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to  this report are listed in appendix XII. Appendix I: Related GAO Reports Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Should Take Actions to Measure  Reduction in Chemical Facility Vulnerability and Share Information with  First Responders. GAO-18-538. Washington, D.C.: August 8, 2018. High-Risk Series: Urgent Actions Are Needed to Address Cybersecurity  Challenges Facing the Nation. GAO-18-645T. Washington, D.C.: July 25,  2018. Information Security: Supply Chain Risks Affecting Federal Agencies.  GAO-18-667T. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2018. Information Technology: Continued Implementation of High-Risk  Recommendations Is Needed to Better Manage Acquisitions, Operations,  and Cybersecurity. GAO-18-566T. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2018. Cybersecurity: DHS Needs to Enhance Efforts to Improve and Promote  the Security of Federal and Private-Sector Networks, GAO-18-520T.  Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2018. Electronic Health Information: CMS Oversight of Medicare Beneficiary  Data Security Needs Improvement. GAO-18-210. Washington, D.C.:  March 6, 2018. Technology Assessment: Artificial Intelligence, Emerging Opportunities,  Challenges, and Implications. GAO-18-142SP. Washington, D.C.: March  28, 2018. GAO Strategic Plan 2018-2023: Trends Affecting Government and  Society. GAO-18-396SP. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2018. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Additional Actions Are Essential for  Assessing Cybersecurity Framework Adoption. GAO-18-211.  Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2018. Cybersecurity Workforce: Urgent Need for DHS to Take Actions to  Identify Its Position and Critical Skill Requirements. GAO-18-175.  Washington, D.C.: February 6, 2018. Homeland Defense: Urgent Need for DOD and FAA to Address Risks and  Improve Planning for Technology That Tracks Military Aircraft.  GAO-18-177. Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2018. Federal Student Aid: Better Program Management and Oversight of  Postsecondary Schools Needed to Protect Student Information.  GAO-18-121. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2017. Defense Civil Support: DOD Needs to Address Cyber Incident Training  Requirements. GAO-18-47. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2017. Federal Information Security: Weaknesses Continue to Indicate Need for  Effective Implementation of Policies and Practices. GAO-17-549.  Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2017. Information Security: OPM Has Improved Controls, but Further Efforts Are  Needed. GAO-17-614. Washington, D.C.: August 3, 2017. Defense Cybersecurity: DOD’s Monitoring of Progress in Implementing  Cyber Strategies Can Be Strengthened. GAO-17-512. Washington, D.C.:  August 1, 2017. State Department Telecommunications: Information on Vendors and  Cyber-Threat Nations. GAO-17-688R. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2017. Internet of Things: Enhanced Assessments and Guidance Are Needed to  Address Security Risks in DOD. GAO-17-668. Washington, D.C.: July 27,  2017. Information Security: SEC Improved Control of Financial Systems but  Needs to Take Additional Actions. GAO-17-469. Washington, D.C.: July  27, 2017. Information Security: Control Deficiencies Continue to Limit IRS’s  Effectiveness in Protecting Sensitive Financial and Taxpayer Data.  GAO-17-395. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2017. Social Security Numbers: OMB Actions Needed to Strengthen Federal  Efforts to Limit Identity Theft Risks by Reducing Collection, Use, and  Display. GAO-17-553. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2017. Information Security: FDIC Needs to Improve Controls over Financial  Systems and Information. GAO-17-436. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2017. Technology Assessment: Internet of Things: Status and implications of an  increasingly connected world. GAO-17-75. Washington, D.C.: May 15,  2017. Cybersecurity: DHS’s National Integration Center Generally Performs  Required Functions but Needs to Evaluate Its Activities More Completely.  GAO-17-163. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2017. High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-17-317. Washington, D.C.: February  2017. IT Workforce: Key Practices Help Ensure Strong Integrated Program  Teams; Selected Departments Need to Assess Skill Gaps. GAO-17-8.  Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2016. Electronic Health Information: HHS Needs to Strengthen Security and  Privacy Guidance and Oversight. GAO-16-771. Washington, D.C.:  September 26, 2016. Defense Civil Support: DOD Needs to Identify National Guard’s Cyber  Capabilities and Address Challenges in Its Exercises. GAO-16-574.  Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2016. Information Security: FDA Needs to Rectify Control Weaknesses That  Place Industry and Public Health Data at Risk. GAO-16-513. Washington,  D.C.: August 30, 2016. Federal Chief Information Security Officers: Opportunities Exist to  Improve Roles and Address Challenges to Authority. GAO-16-686.  Washington, D.C.: August 26, 2016. Federal Hiring: OPM Needs to Improve Management and Oversight of  Hiring Authorities. GAO-16-521. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2016. Information Security: Agencies Need to Improve Controls over Selected  High-Impact Systems. GAO-16-501. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2016. Face Recognition Technology: FBI Should Better Ensure Privacy and  Accuracy. GAO-16-267. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2016. Smartphone Data: Information and Issues Regarding Surreptitious  Tracking Apps That Can Facilitate Stalking. GAO-16-317. Washington,  D.C.: May 9, 2016. Vehicle Cybersecurity: DOT and Industry Have Efforts Under Way, but  DOT Needs to Define Its Role in Responding to a Real-world Attack.  GAO-16-350. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2016. Civil Support: DOD Needs to Clarify Its Roles and Responsibilities for  Defense Support of Civil Authorities during Cyber Incidents. GAO-16-332.  Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2016. Healthcare.gov: Actions Needed to Enhance Information Security and  Privacy Controls. GAO-16-265. Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2016. Information Security: DHS Needs to Enhance Capabilities, Improve  Planning, and Support Greater Adoption of Its National Cybersecurity  Protection System. GAO-16-294. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2016. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector-Specific Agencies Need to Better  Measure Cybersecurity Progress. GAO-16-79. Washington, D.C.:  November 19, 2015. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Cybersecurity of the Nation’s Electricity  Grid Requires Continued Attention. GAO-16-174T. Washington, D.C.:  October 21, 2015. Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Enhance Efforts  to Address Port Cybersecurity. GAO-16-116T. Washington, D.C.: October  8, 2015. Cybersecurity: National Strategy, Roles, and Responsibilities Need to Be  Better Defined and More Effectively Implemented. GAO-13-187.  Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2014. Information Resellers: Consumer Privacy Framework Needs to Reflect  Changes in Technology and the Marketplace. GAO-13-663. Washington,  D.C.: September 25, 2013. Privacy: Alternatives Exist for Enhancing Protection of Personally  Identifiable Information. GAO-08-536. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2008. Appendix II: Action 1—Develop and Execute  a More Comprehensive Federal Strategy for  National Cybersecurity and Global  Cyberspace Federal law and policy call for a risk-based approach to managing  cybersecurity within the government, as well as globally. We have  previously reported that the federal government has faced challenges in  establishing a comprehensive strategy to provide a framework for how the  United States will engage both domestically and internationally on  cybersecurity related matters. More specifically, in February 2013, we reported that the government had  issued a variety of strategy-related documents that addressed priorities  for enhancing cybersecurity within the federal government as well as for  encouraging improvements in the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure  within the private sector; however, no overarching cybersecurity strategy  had been developed that articulated priority actions, assigned  responsibilities for performing them, and set time frames for their  completion. Accordingly, we recommended that the White House  Cybersecurity Coordinator in the Executive Office of the President  develop an overarching federal cybersecurity strategy that included all  key elements of the desirable characteristics of a national strategy  including, among other things, milestones and performance measures for  major activities to address stated priorities; cost and resources needed to  accomplish stated priorities; and specific roles and responsibilities of  federal organizations related to the strategy’s stated priorities. In response to our recommendation, in October 2015, the Director of  OMB and the Federal Chief Information Officer, issued a Cybersecurity  Strategy and Implementation Plan for the Federal Civilian Government. The plan directed a series of actions to improve capabilities for identifying  and detecting vulnerabilities and threats, enhance protections of  government assets and information, and further develop robust response  and recovery capabilities to ensure readiness and resilience when  incidents inevitably occur. The plan also identified key milestones for  major activities, resources needed to accomplish milestones, and specific  roles and responsibilities of federal organizations related to the strategy’s  milestones. Since that time, the executive branch has made progress toward outlining  a federal strategy for confronting cyber threats. Table 1 identifies these  recent efforts and a description of their related contents. These efforts provide a good foundation toward establishing a more  comprehensive strategy, but more effort is needed to address all of the  desirable characteristics of a national strategy that we recommended.  The recently issued executive branch strategy documents did not include  key elements of desirable characteristics that can enhance the usefulness  of a national strategy as guidance for decision makers in allocating  resources, defining policies, and helping to ensure accountability.  Specifically: Milestones and performance measures to gauge results were  generally not included in strategy documents. For example, although  the DHS Cybersecurity Strategy stated that its implementation would  be assessed on an annual basis, it did not describe the milestones  and performance measures for tracking the effectiveness of the  activities intended to meet the stated goals (e.g., protecting critical  infrastructure and responding effectively to cyber incidents). Without  such performance measures, DHS will lack a means to ensure that  the goals and objectives discussed in the document are accomplished  and that responsible parties are held accountable. According to officials from DHS’s Office of Cybersecurity and  Communications, the department is developing a plan for  implementing the DHS Cybersecurity Strategy and expects to issue  the plan by the end of calendar year 2018. The officials stated that the  plan is expected to identify milestones, roles, and responsibilities  across DHS to inform the prioritization of future efforts. The strategy documents generally did not include information  regarding the resources needed to carry out the goals and objectives.  For example, although the DHS Cybersecurity Strategy identified a  variety of actions the agency planned to take to perform their  cybersecurity mission, it did not articulate the resources needed to  carry out these actions and requirements. Without information on the  specific resources needed, federal agencies may not be positioned to  allocate such resources and investments and, therefore, may be  hindered in their ability meet national priorities. Most of the strategy documents lacked clearly defined roles and  responsibilities for key agencies, such as DHS, DOD, and OMB.  These agencies contribute substantially to the nation’s cybersecurity  programs. For example, although the National Security Strategy  discusses multiple priority actions needed to address the nation’s  cybersecurity challenges (e.g., building defensible government  networks, and deterring and disrupting malicious cyber actors), it does  not describe the roles, responsibilities, or the expected coordination of  any specific federal agencies, including DHS, DOD, or OMB, or other  non-federal entities needed to carry out those actions. Without this  information, the federal government may not be able foster effective  coordination, particularly where there is overlap in responsibilities, or  hold agencies accountable for carrying out planned activities. Ultimately, a more clearly defined, coordinated, and comprehensive  approach to planning and executing an overall strategy would likely lead  to significant progress in furthering strategic goals and lessening  persistent weaknesses. Appendix III: Action 2—Mitigate Global  Supply Chain Risks The exploitation of information technology (IT) products and services  through the supply chain is an emerging threat. IT supply chain-related  threats can be introduced in the manufacturing, assembly, and  distribution of hardware, software, and services. Moreover, these threats  can appear at each phase of the system development life cycle, when an  agency initiates, develops, implements, maintains, and disposes of an  information system. As a result, the compromise of an agency’s IT supply  chain can degrade the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its  critical and sensitive networks, IT-enabled equipment, and data. Federal regulation and guidance issued by the National Institute of  Standards and Technology (NIST) set requirements and best practices  for mitigating supply chain risks. The Federal Acquisition Regulation  established codification and publication of uniform policies and  procedures for acquisition by all executive branch agencies. Agencies are  required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation to ensure that contracts  include quality requirements that are determined necessary to protect the  government’s interest. In addition, the NIST guidance on supply chain risk  management practices for federal information systems and organizations  intends to assist federal agencies with identifying, assessing, and  mitigating information and communications technology supply chain risks  at all levels of their organizations. We have previously reported on risks to the IT supply chain and risks  originating from foreign-manufactured equipment. For example:  In July 2018, we testified that if global IT supply chain risks are  realized, they could jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and  availability of federal information systems. Thus, the potential exists  for serious adverse impact on an agency’s operations, assets, and  employees. We further stated that in 2012 we determined that four  national security-related agencies—the Departments of Defense,  Justice, Energy, Homeland Security (DHS)—varied in the extent to  which they had addressed supply chain risks. We recommended that  three agencies take eight actions, as needed, to develop and  document policies, procedures, and monitoring capabilities that  address IT supply chain risk. The agencies generally concurred with  the recommendations and subsequently implemented seven  recommendations and partially implemented the eighth  recommendation. In July 2017, we reported that, based on a review of a sample of  organizations within the Department of State’s telecommunications  supply chain, we were able to identify instances in which device  manufacturers, software developers and contractor support were  reported to be headquartered in a leading cyber-threat nation. For  example, of the 52 telecommunications device manufacturers and  software developers in our sample, we were able to identify 12 that  had 1 or more suppliers that were reported to be headquartered in a  leading cyber-threat nation. We noted that the reliance on complex,  global IT supply chains introduces multiple risks to federal agencies,  including insertion of counterfeits, tampering, or installation of  malicious software or hardware. Figure 5 illustrates possible  manufacturing locations of typical network components. Although federal agencies have taken steps to address IT supply chain  deficiencies that we previously identified, this area continues to be a  potential threat vector for malicious actors to target the federal  government. For example, in September 2017, DHS issued a binding  operating directive which calls on departments and agencies to identify  any use or presence of Kaspersky products on their information systems  and to develop detailed plans to remove and discontinue present and  future use of the products. DHS expressed concern about the ties  between certain Kaspersky officials and Russian intelligence and other  government agencies, and requirements under Russian law that allow  Russian intelligence agencies to request or compel assistance from  Kaspersky and to intercept communications transiting Russian networks. Appendix IV: Action 3—Address  Cybersecurity Workforce Management  Challenges On May 11, 2017, the President issued an executive order on  strengthening the cybersecurity of federal networks and critical  infrastructure. The order makes it the policy of the United States to  support the growth and sustainment of a workforce that is skilled in  cybersecurity and related fields as the foundation for achieving our  objectives in cyberspace. It directed the Secretaries of Commerce and  Homeland Security (DHS), in consultation with other federal agencies, to  assess the scope and sufficiency of efforts to educate and train the  American cybersecurity workforce of the future, including cybersecurity- related education curricula, training, and apprenticeship programs, from  primary through higher education. Nevertheless, the federal government continues to face challenges in  addressing the nation’s cybersecurity workforce. Agencies had not effectively conducted baseline assessments of  their cybersecurity workforce or fully developed procedures for  coding positions. In June 2018, we reported that 21 of the 24  agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officer’s Act had conducted  and submitted to Congress a baseline assessment identifying the  extent to which their cybersecurity employees held professional  certifications, as required by the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce  Assessment Act of 2015. However, we found that the results of these  assessments may not have been reliable because agencies did not  address all of the reportable information and agencies were limited in  their ability to obtain complete and consistent information about their  cybersecurity employees and the certifications they held. We  determined that this was because agencies had not yet fully identified  all members of their cybersecurity workforces or did not have a  consistent list of appropriate certifications for cybersecurity positions. Further, 23 of the agencies reviewed had established procedures for  identifying and assigning the appropriate employment codes to their  civilian cybersecurity positions, as called for by the act. However, 6 of  the 23 did not address one or more of 7 activities required by OPM in  their procedures, such as reviewing all filled and vacant positions and  annotating reviewed position descriptions with the appropriate  employment code. Accordingly, we made 30 recommendations to 13  agencies to fully implement two of the act’s requirements on baseline  assessments and coding procedures. The extent to which these  agencies agreed with the recommendations varied. DHS and the Department of Defense (DOD) had not addressed  cybersecurity workforce management requirements set forth in  federal laws. In February 2018, we reported that, while DHS had  taken actions to identify, categorize, and assign employment codes to  its cybersecurity positions, as required by the Homeland Security  Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2014, its actions were  not timely and complete. For example, DHS did not establish timely  and complete procedures to identify, categorize, and code its  cybersecurity position vacancies and responsibilities. Further, DHS  had not yet completed its efforts to identify all of its cybersecurity  positions and accurately assign codes to all filled and vacant  cybersecurity positions. Table 2 shows DHS’s progress in  implementing the requirements of the Homeland Security  Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2014, as of December  2017. Accordingly, we recommended that DHS take six actions, including  ensuring that its cybersecurity workforce procedures identify position  vacancies and responsibilities; reported workforce data are complete  and accurate; and plans for reporting on critical needs are developed.  DHS agreed with our six recommendations, but had not implemented  them as of August 2018. Regarding DOD, in November 2017, we reported that instead of  developing a comprehensive plan for U.S. Cyber Command, the  department submitted a report consisting of a collection of documents  that did not fully address the required six elements set forth in Section  1648 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016.  More specifically, DOD’s 1648 report did not address an element  related to cyber incident training. In addition to not addressing the  training element in the report, DOD had not ensured that staff were  trained as required by the Presidential Policy Directive on United  States Cyber Incident Coordination or DOD’s Significant Cyber  Incident Coordination Procedures. Accordingly, we made two recommendations to DOD to address  these issues. DOD agreed with one of the recommendations and  partially agreed with the other, citing ongoing activities related to  cyber incident coordination training it believed were sufficient.  However, we continued to believe the recommendation was  warranted. As of August 2018, both recommendations had not yet  been implemented. Agencies had not identified and closed cybersecurity skills gaps. In November 2016, we reported that five selected agencies had  made mixed progress in assessing their information technology (IT)  skill gaps. These agencies had started focusing on identifying  cybersecurity staffing gaps, but more work remained in assessing  competency gaps and in broadening the focus to include the entire IT  community. Accordingly, we made a total of five recommendations to  the agencies to address these issues. Four agencies agreed and one,  DOD, partially agreed with our recommendations citing progress  made in improving its IT workforce planning. However, we continued  to believe our recommendation was warranted. As of August 2018, all  five of the recommendations had not been implemented. Agencies had been challenged with recruiting and retaining  qualified staff. In August 2016, we reported on the current authorities  chief information security officers (CISO) at 24 agencies. Among  other things, CISOs identified key challenges they faced in fulfilling  their responsibilities. Several of these challenges were related to the  cybersecurity workforce, such as not having enough personnel to  oversee the implementation of the number and scope of security  requirements. In addition, CISOs stated that they were not able to  offer salaries that were competitive with the private sector for  candidates with high-demand technical skills. Furthermore, CISOs  stated that certain security personnel lacked the skill sets needed or  were not sufficiently trained. To assist CISOs in carrying out their  responsibilities and better define their roles, we made a total of 34  recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)  and 13 agencies in our review. Agency responses to the  recommendations varied; as of August 2018, 18 of the 34  recommendations had not been implemented. Agencies have had difficulty navigating the federal hiring  process. In August 2016, we reported on the extent to which federal  hiring authorities were meeting agency needs. Although competitive  hiring has been the traditional method of hiring, agencies can use  additional hiring authorities to expedite the hiring process or achieve  certain public policy goals. Among other things, we noted that  agencies rely on a relatively small number of hiring authorities (as  established by law, executive order, or regulation) to fill the vast  majority of hires into the federal civil service. Further, while OPM collects a variety of data to assess the federal  hiring process, neither it nor agencies used this information to assess  the effectiveness of hiring authorities. Conducting such assessments  would be a critical first step in making more strategic use of the  available hiring authorities to more effectively meet their hiring needs.  Accordingly, we made three recommendations to OPM to work with  agencies to strengthen hiring efforts. OPM generally agreed with the  recommendations; however, as of August 2018, two of them had not  been implemented. Appendix V: Action 4—Ensure the Security  of Emerging Technologies The emergence of new technologies can potentially introduce security  vulnerabilities for those technologies which were previous unknown. As  we have previously reported, additional processes and controls will need  to be developed to potentially address these new vulnerabilities. While  some progress has been made to address the security and privacy issues  associated with these technologies, such as the Internet of Things (IoT)  and vehicle networks, there is still much work to be done. For example:  IoT devices that continuously collect and process information  are potentially vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In May 2017, we  reported that the IoT has become increasingly used to communicate  and process vast amounts of information using “smart” devices (such  as fitness trackers, cameras, and thermostats). However, we noted  that this emerging technology also presents new issues in areas such  as information security, privacy, and safety. For example, IoT devices,  networks, or the cloud servers where they store data can be  compromised in a cyberattack. Table 3 provides examples of cyber- attacks that could affect IoT devices and networks. IoT devices may increase the security risks to federal agencies.  In July 2017, we reported that IoT devices, such as those acquired  and used by Department of Defense (DOD) employees or that DOD  itself acquires (e.g., smartphones), may increase the security risks to  the department. We noted that these risks can be divided into two  categories, risks with the devices themselves, such as limited  encryption, and risks with how they are used, such as unauthorized  communication of information. The department has also identified  notional threat scenarios, based on input from multiple DOD entities,  which exemplify how these security risks could adversely impact DOD  operations, equipment, or personnel. Figure 6 highlights a few  examples of these scenarios. In addition, we reported that DOD had started to examine the security  risks of IoT devices, but that the department had not conducted  required assessments related to the security of its operations. Further,  DOD had issued policies and guidance for these devices, but these  did not clearly address all of the risks relating to these devices. To  address these issues, we made two recommendations to DOD. The  department agreed with our recommendations; however, as of August  2018, they had not yet been implemented. Vehicles are potentially susceptible to cyber-attack through  networks, such as Bluetooth. In March 2016, we reported that many  stakeholders in the automotive industry acknowledge that in-vehicle  networks pose a threat to the safety of the driver, as an external  attacker could gain control to critical systems in the car. Further,  these industry stakeholders agreed that critical systems and other  vehicle systems, such as a Bluetooth connection, should be separate  in-vehicle networks so they could not communicate or interfere with  one another. Figure 7 identifies the key interfaces that could be  exploited in a vehicle cyber-attack. To enhance the Department of Transportation’s ability to effectively  respond in the event of a real-world vehicle cyberattack, we made one  recommendation to the department to better define its roles and  responsibilities. The department agreed with the recommendation but,  as of August 2018, had not yet taken action to implement it. Artificial intelligence holds substantial promise for improving  cybersecurity, but also posed new risks. In March 2018, we  reported on the results of a forum we convened to discuss emerging  opportunities, challenges, and implications associated with artificial  intelligence. At the forum, participants from industry, government,  academia, and nonprofit organizations discussed the potential  implications of this emerging technology, including assisting with  cybersecurity by helping to identify and patch vulnerabilities and  defending against attacks; creating safer automated vehicles;  improving the criminal justice system’s allocation of resources; and  improving how financial services govern investments. However, forum participants also highlighted a number of challenges  and risks related to artificial intelligence. For example, if the data used  by artificial intelligence are biased or become corrupted by hackers,  the results could be biased or cause harm. Moreover, the collection  and sharing of data needed to train artificial intelligence systems, a  lack of access to computing resources, and adequate human capital  were also challenges facing the development of artificial intelligence.  Finally, forum participants noted that the widespread adoption raises  questions about the adequacy of current laws and regulations. Cryptocurrencies provide an alternative to traditional  government-issued currencies, but have security implications. In  February 2018, we reported on trends affecting government and  society, including the increased use of cryptocurrencies—digital  representations of value that are not government-issued—that  operate online and verify transactions using a public ledger called  blockchain. We highlighted the potential benefits of this technology,  such as anonymity and lower transaction costs, as well as drawbacks,  including making it harder to detect money laundering and other  financial crimes. Because of these capabilities and others, we noted  the potential for virtual currencies and blockchain technology to  reshape financial services and affect the security of critical financial  infrastructures. Lastly, we pointed out that the use of blockchain  technology could have more security vulnerabilities as computing  power increases as a result of new advancements in quantum  computing, an area of quantum information science. Appendix VI: Action 5—Improve  Implementation of Government-wide  Cybersecurity Initiatives In January 2008, the President issued National Security Presidential  Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23. The directive  established the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, a set of  projects with the objective of safeguarding federal executive branch  government information systems by reducing potential vulnerabilities,  protecting against intrusion attempts, and anticipating future threats  against the federal government’s networks. Under the initiative, the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was to lead several projects to  better secure civilian federal government networks. Specifically, the  agency established the National Cybersecurity and Communications  Integration Center (NCCIC), which functions as the 24/7 cyber monitoring,  incident response, and management center. Figure 8 depicts the Watch  Floor, which functions as a national focal point of cyber and  communications incident integration. The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT),  one of several subcomponents of the NCCIC, is responsible for operating  the National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS), which provides  intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to entities across the  federal government. Although DHS is fulfilling its statutorily required mission by establishing  the NCCIC and managing the operation of NCPS, we have identified  challenges in the agency’s efforts to manage these programs: DHS had not ensured that NCPS has fully satisfied all intended  system objectives. In January 2016, we reported that NCPS had a  limited ability to detect intrusions across all types of network types. In  addition, we reported that the system’s intrusion prevention capability  was limited and its information-sharing capability was not fully  developed. Furthermore, we reported that DHS’s current metrics did  not comprehensively measure the effectiveness of NCPS.  Accordingly, we made nine recommendations to DHS to address  these issues and others. The department agreed with our  recommendations and has taken action to address one of them.  However, as of August 2018, eight of these recommendations had not  been implemented. DHS had been challenged in measuring how the NCCIC was  performing its functions in accordance with mandated  implementing principles. In February 2017, we reported instances  where, with certain products and services, NCCIC had implemented  its functions in adherence with one or more of its principles, as  required by the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 and  Cybersecurity Act of 2015. For example, consistent with the principle  that it seek and receive appropriate consideration from industry  sector-specific, academic, and national laboratory expertise, NCCIC  coordinated with contacts from industry, academia, and the national  laboratories to develop and disseminate vulnerability alerts. However, we also identified instances where the cybersecurity  functions were not performed in adherence with the principles. For  example, NCCIC is to provide timely technical assistance, risk  management support, and incident response capabilities to federal  and nonfederal entities, but it had not established measures or other  procedures for ensuring the timeliness of these assessments. Further,  we reported that NCCIC faces impediments to performing its  cybersecurity functions more efficiently, such as tracking security  incidents and working across multiple network platforms. Accordingly,  we made nine recommendations to DHS related to implementing the  requirements identified in the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of  2014 and the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. The department agreed with  our recommendations and has taken action to address two of them.  However, as of August 2018, the remaining seven recommendations  had not been implemented. Appendix VII: Action 6—Address  Weaknesses in Federal Agency Information  Security Programs The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA)  requires federal agencies in the executive branch to develop, document,  and implement an information security program and evaluate it for  effectiveness. The act retains many of the requirements for federal  agencies’ information security programs previously set by the Federal  Information Security Management Act of 2002. These agency programs  should include periodic risk assessments; information security policies  and procedures; plans for protecting the security of networks, facilities,  and systems; security awareness training; security control assessments;  incident response procedures; a remedial action process, and continuity  plans and procedures. In addition, Executive Order 13800 states that the President will hold  agency heads accountable for managing cybersecurity risk to their  enterprises. In addition, according to the order, it is the policy of the  United States to manage cybersecurity risk as an executive branch  enterprise because risk management decisions made by agency heads  can affect the risk to the executive branch as a whole, and to national  security. Over the past several years, we have performed numerous security  control audits to determine how well agencies are managing information  security risk to federal information systems and data through the  implementation of effective security controls. These audits have resulted  in the identification of hundreds of deficiencies related to agencies’  implementation of effective security controls. Accordingly, we provided  agencies with limited official use only reports identifying technical security  control deficiencies for their respective agency. In these reports, we made  hundreds of recommendations related to improving agencies’  implementation of those security control deficiencies. In addition to systems and networks maintained by federal agencies, it is  also important that agencies ensure the security of federal information  systems operated by third party providers, including cloud service  providers. Cloud computing is a means for delivering computing services  via information technology networks. Since 2009, the government has  encouraged agencies to use cloud-based services to store and process  data as a cost-savings measure. In this regard, the Office of Management  and Budget (OMB) established the Federal Risk and Authorization  Management Program (FedRAMP) to provide a standardized approach to  security assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring for cloud  products and services. FedRAMP is intended to ensure that cloud  computing services have adequate information security, eliminate  duplicative efforts, and reduce costs. Although there are requirements and government-wide programs to assist  with ensuring the security of federal information systems maintained by  federal agencies and third party providers, we have identified  weaknesses in agencies’ implementation of information security  programs. Federal agencies continued to experience weaknesses in  protecting their information and information systems due to  ineffective implementation of information security policies and  practices. In September 2017, we reported that most of the 24  agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act had  weaknesses in each of the five major categories of information system  controls (i.e., access controls, configuration management controls,  segregation of duties, contingency planning, and agency-wide security  management). Weaknesses in these security controls indicate that  agencies did not adequately or effectively implement information  security policies and practices during fiscal year 2016. Figure 9  identifies the number of agencies with information security  weaknesses in each of the five categories. In addition, we found that several agencies had not effectively  implemented some aspects of its information security program, which  resulted in weaknesses in these agencies’ security controls. In July 2017, we reported that the Security Exchange Commission did  not always keep system security plans complete and accurate or fully  implement continuous monitoring, as required by agency policy. We  made two recommendations to the Security Exchange Commission to  effectively manage its information security program. The agency  agreed with our recommendations; however, as of August 2018, they  had not been implemented. In another July 2017 report, we noted that the Internal Revenue  Service (IRS) did not effectively support a risk-based decision to  accept system deficiencies; fully develop, document, or update  information security policies and procedures; update system security  plans to reflect changes to the operating environment; perform  effective tests and evaluations of policies, procedures, and controls;  or address shortcomings in the agency’s remedial process.  Accordingly, we made 10 recommendations to IRS to more effectively  implement security-related policies and plans. The agency neither  agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations; as of August 2018,  all 10 recommendations had not been implemented. In May 2017, we reported that the Federal Deposit Insurance  Corporation did not include all necessary information in procedures for  granting access to a key financial application; fully address its  Inspector General findings that security control assessments of  outsourced service providers had not been completed in a timely  manner; fully address key previously identified weaknesses related to  establishing agency-wide configuration baselines and monitoring  changes to critical server files; or complete actions to address the  Inspector General’s finding that the Federal Deposit Insurance  Corporation had not ensured that major security incidents are  identified and reported in a timely manner. We made one  recommendation to the agency to more fully implement its information  security program. The agency agreed with our recommendation and  has taken steps to implement it. In August 2016, we reported that the Food and Drug Administration  did not fully implement certain security practices involved with  assessing risks to systems; complete or review security policies and  procedures in a timely manner; complete and review system security  plans annually; always track and fully train users with significant  security responsibilities; fully test controls or monitor them; remediate  identified security weaknesses in a timely fashion based on risk; or  fully implement elements of its incident response program.  Accordingly, we issued 15 recommendations to the Food and Drug  Administration to fully implement its agency-wide information security  program. The agency agreed with our recommendations. As of  August 2018, all 15 recommendations had been implemented. In May 2016, we reported that a key reason for the information  security weaknesses in selected high-impact systems at four  agencies—National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Nuclear  Regulatory Commission, the Office of Personnel Management, and  Department of Veterans Affairs—was that they had not effectively  implemented elements of their information security programs. For  example, most of the selected agencies had conducted information  security control assessments for systems, but not all assessments  were comprehensive. We also reported that remedial action plans  developed by the agencies did not include all the required elements,  and not all agencies had developed a continuous monitoring strategy.  Table 4 identifies the extent to which the selected agencies  implemented key aspects of their information security programs. Accordingly, we made 19 recommendations to the four selected  agencies to correct these weaknesses. Agency responses to the  recommendations varied. Further, as of August 2018, 16 of the 19  recommendations had not been implemented. DOD’s monitoring of progress in implementing cyber strategies  varied. In August 2017, we reported that the DOD’s progress in  implementing key strategic cybersecurity guidance—the DOD Cloud  Computing Strategy, DOD Cyber Strategy, and DOD Cybersecurity  Campaign—has varied. More specifically, we determined that the  department had implemented the cybersecurity objectives identified in  the DOD Cloud Computing Strategy and had made progress in  implementing the DOD Cyber Strategy and DOD Cybersecurity  Campaign. However, the department’s process for monitoring  implementation of the DOD Cyber Strategy had resulted in the closure  of tasks as implemented before the tasks were fully implemented. In  addition, the DOD Cybersecurity Campaign lacked time frames for  completion and a process to monitor progress, which together provide  accountability to ensure implementation. We made two recommendations to improve DOD’s process of  ensuring its cyber strategies are effectively implemented. The  department partially concurred with these recommendations and  identified actions it planned to take to address them. We noted that, if  implemented, the actions would satisfy the intent of our  recommendations. However, as of August 2018, DOD had not yet  implemented our recommendations. Agencies had not fully defined the role of their Chief Information  Security Officers (CISO), as required by FISMA. In August 2016,  we reported that 13 of 24 agencies covered by the CFO Act had not  fully defined the role of their CISO. For example, these agencies did  not always identify a role for the CISO in ensuring that security  controls are periodically tested; procedures are in place for detecting,  reporting, and responding to security incidents; or contingency plans  and procedures for agency information systems are in place. Thus,  we determined that the CISOs’ ability to effectively oversee these  agencies’ information security activities can be limited. To assist CISOs in carrying out their responsibilities and better define  their roles, we made a total of 34 recommendations to OMB and 13  agencies in our review. Agency responses to the recommendations  varied; as of August 2018, 18 of the 34 recommendations had not  been implemented. Appendix VIII: Action 7—Enhance the  Federal Response to Cyber Incidents Presidential Policy Directive-41 sets forth principles governing the  federal government’s response to any cyber incident, whether involving  government or private sector entities. According to the directive, federal  agencies shall undertake three concurrent lines of effort when responding  to any cyber incident: threat response; asset response; and intelligence  support and related activities. In addition, when a federal agency is an  affected entity, it shall undertake a fourth concurrent line of effort to  manage the effects of the cyber incident on its operations, customers,  and workforce. We have reviewed federal agencies’ preparation and response to cyber  incidents and have identified the following weaknesses: The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had not fully  implemented controls to address deficiencies identified as a  result of a cyber incident. In August 2017, we reported that OPM did  not fully implement the 19 recommendations made by the Department  of Homeland Security’s (DHS) United States Computer Emergency   Readiness Team (US-CERT) after the data breaches in 2015.  Specifically, we noted that, after breaches of personnel and  background investigation information were reported, US-CERT  worked with the agency to resolve issues and develop a  comprehensive mitigation strategy. In doing so, US-CERT made 19  recommendations to OPM to help the agency improve its overall  security posture and, thus, improve its ability to protect its systems  and information from security breaches. In our August 2017 report, we determined that OPM had fully  implemented 11 of the 19 recommendations. For the remaining 8  recommendations, actions for 4 were still in progress. For the other 4  recommendations, OPM indicated that it had completed actions to  address them, but we noted further improvements were needed.  Further, OPM had not validated actions taken to address the  recommendations in a timely manner. As a result of our review, we made five other recommendations to  OPM to improve its response to cyber incidents. The agency agreed  with four of these and partially concurred with the one related to  validating its corrective action. The agency did not cite a reason for its  partial concurrence and we continued to believe that the  recommendation was warranted. As of August 2018, three of the five  recommendations had not been implemented. The Department of Defense (DOD) had not identified the National  Guard’s cyber capabilities (e.g., computer network defense  teams) or addressed challenges in its exercises. In September  2016, we reported that DOD had not identified the National Guard’s  cyber capabilities or addressed challenges in its exercises. Specifically, DOD had not identified and did not have full visibility into  National Guard cyber capabilities that could support civil authorities  during a cyber incident because the department has not maintained a  database that identifies National Guard cyber capabilities, as required  by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. In  addition, we identified three types of challenges with DOD’s cyber  exercises that could limit the extent to which DOD is prepared to  support civilian authorities in a cyber incident:  limited access because of classified exercise environments;  limited inclusion of other federal agencies and critical  infrastructure owners; and  inadequate incorporation of joint physical-cyber scenarios. In our September 2016 report, we noted that DOD had not addressed  these challenges. Furthermore, we stated that DOD had not  addressed its goals by conducting a “tier 1” exercise (i.e., an exercise  involving national-level organizations and combatant commanders  and staff in highly complex environments), as stated in the DOD  Cyber Strategy. Accordingly, we recommended that DOD (1) maintain a database that  identifies National Guard cyber capabilities and (2) conduct a tier 1  exercise to prepare its forces in the event of a disaster with cyber  effects. The department partially agreed with our recommendations,  stating that its current mechanisms and exercises are sufficient to  address the issues highlighted in our report. However, we continued  to believe the recommendations were valid. As of August 2018, our  two recommendations had not been implemented. DOD had not identified, clarified, or implemented all components  of its incident response program. In April 2016, we also reported  that DOD had not clarified its roles and responsibilities for defense  support of civil authorities during cyber incidents. Specifically, we  found that DOD’s overarching guidance about how it is to support civil  authorities as part of its Defense Support of Civil Authorities mission  did not clearly define the roles and responsibilities of key DOD  entities, such as DOD components, the supported command, or the  dual-status commander, if they are requested to support civil  authorities in a cyber incident. Further, we found that, in some cases,  DOD guidance provides specific details on other types of Defense  Support of Civil Authorities-related responses, such as assigning roles  and responsibilities for fire or emergency services support and  medical support, but does not provide the same level of detail or  assign roles and responsibilities for cyber support. Accordingly, we recommended that DOD issue or update guidance  that clarifies DOD roles and responsibilities to support civil authorities  in a domestic cyber incident. DOD concurred with the  recommendation and stated that the department will issue or update  guidance. However, as of August 2018, the department had not  implemented our recommendation. DHS’s NCPS had limited capabilities for detecting and preventing  intrusions, conducting analytics, and sharing information. In  January 2016, we reported that NCPS had a limited ability to detect  intrusions across all types of network types. In addition, we reported  that the system’s intrusion prevention capability was limited and its  information-sharing capability was not fully developed. Furthermore,  we reported that DHS’s current metrics did not comprehensively  measure the effectiveness of NCPS. Accordingly, we made nine  recommendations to DHS to address these issues and others. The  department agreed with our recommendations and has taken action to  address one of them. However, as of August 2018, eight of these  recommendations had not been implemented. Appendix IX: Action 8—Strengthen the  Federal Role in Protecting the Cybersecurity  of Critical Infrastructure The nation’s critical infrastructure include both public and private systems  vital to national security and other efforts including providing the essential  services, such as banking, water, and electricity—that underpin American  society. The cyber threat to critical infrastructure continues to grow and  represents a national security challenge. To address this cyber risk, the  President issued Executive Order 13636 in February 2013 to enhance  the security and resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure and  maintain a cyber environment that promotes safety, security, and privacy. In accordance with requirements in the executive order which were  enacted into law in 2014, the National Institute of Standards and  Technology (NIST) facilitated the development of a set of voluntary  standards and procedures for enhancing cybersecurity of critical  infrastructure. This process, which involved stakeholders from the public  and private sectors, resulted in NIST’s Framework for Improving Critical  Infrastructure Cybersecurity. The framework is to provide a flexible and  risk-based approach for entities within the nation’s 16 critical  infrastructure sectors to protect their vital assets from cyber-based  threats. Since then, progress has been made to protect the critical  infrastructure of the nation but we have reported that challenges to  ensure the safety and security of our infrastructure exist. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had not measured  the impact of its efforts to support cyber risk reduction for high- risk chemical sector entities. In August 2018, we reported that DHS  had strengthened its processes for identifying high-risk chemical  facilities and assigning them to tiers under its Chemical Facility Anti- Terrorism Standards program. However, we found that DHS’s new  performance measure methodology did not measure reduction in  vulnerability at a facility resulting from the implementation and  verification of planned security measures during the compliance  inspection process. We concluded that doing so would provide DHS  an opportunity to begin assessing how vulnerability is reduced—and  by extension, risk lowered—not only for individual high-risk facilities  but for the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program as a  whole. We also determined that, although DHS shares some Chemical  Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program information, first  responders and emergency planners may not have all of the  information they need to minimize the risk of injury or death when  responding to incidents at high-risk facilities. This was due to first  responders at the local level not having access or widely using a  secure interface that DHS developed (known as the Infrastructure  Protection Gateway) to obtain information about high-risk facilities and  the specific chemicals they process. To address the weaknesses we identified, we recommended that  DHS take actions to (1) measure reduction in vulnerability of high-risk  facilities and use that data to assess program performance, and (2)  encourage access to and wider use of the Infrastructure Protection  Gateway among first responders and emergency planners. DHS  concurred with both recommendations and outlined efforts underway  or planned to address them. The federal government had identified major challenges to the  adoption of the cybersecurity framework. In February 2018, we  reported that there were four different challenges to adopting the  cybersecurity framework, including limited resources and competing  priorities, reported by entities within their sectors. We further reported  that none of the 16 sector-specific agencies were measuring the  implementation by these entities, nor did they have qualitative or  quantitative measures of framework adoption. While research had  been done to determine the use of the framework in the sectors, these  efforts had yielded no real results for sector wide adoption. We  concluded that, until sector-specific agencies understand the use of  the framework by the implementing entities, their ability to understand  implementation efforts would be limited. Accordingly, we made a total  of nine recommendations to nine sector-specific agencies to address  these issues. Five agencies agreed with the recommendations, while  four others neither agreed nor disagreed; as of August 2018, all five  recommendations had not been implemented. Agencies had not addressed risks to their systems and the  information they maintain. In January 2018, we reported that the  Department of Defense (DOD) and Federal Aviation Administration  (FAA) identified a variety of operations and physical security risks  related to Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out  technology that could adversely affect DOD missions. These risks  came from information broadcast by the system itself, as well as from  potential vulnerabilities to electronic warfare- and cyber-attacks, and  from the potential divestment of secondary-surveillance radars.  However, DOD and FAA had not approved any solutions to address  the risks they identified to the system. Accordingly, we recommended  that DOD and FAA, among other things, take action to approve one or  more solutions to address Automatic Dependent Surveillance- Broadcast Out-related security risks. DOD and FAA generally agreed  with our recommendations; however, as of August 2018, they had not  been implemented. Major challenges existed to securing the electricity grid against  cyber threats. In October 2015, we testified on the status of the  electricity grid’s cybersecurity, reporting that entities associated with  the grid have encountered several challenges. We noted that these  challenges included implementation monitoring, built-in security  features in smart grid systems, and establishing metrics for  cybersecurity. We concluded that continued attention to these issues  and cyber threats in general was required to help mitigate these risks  to the electricity grid. DHS and other agencies needed to enhance cybersecurity in the  maritime environment. In October 2015, we testified on the status of  the cybersecurity of our nation’s ports, concluding that steps needed  to be taken to enhance their security. Specifically, we noted that  DHS needed to include cyber risks in its risk assessments that are  already in place as well as addressing cyber risks in guidance for port  security plans. We concluded that, until DHS and the other  stakeholders take steps to address cybersecurity in the ports, risk of a  cyber-attack with serious consequences are increased. Sector-specific agencies were not properly addressing progress  or metrics to measure their progress in cybersecurity. In  November 2015, we reported that sector-specific agencies were not  comprehensively addressing the cyber risk to the infrastructure, as 11  of the 15 sectors had significant cyber risk. Specifically, we noted  that these entities had taken actions to mitigate their cyber risk;  however, most had not identified incentives to promote cybersecurity  in their sectors. We concluded that while the sector-specific agencies  have successfully disseminated the information they possess, there  was still work to be done to properly measure cybersecurity  implementation progress. Accordingly, we made seven  recommendations to six agencies to address these issues. Four of  these agencies agreed with our recommendation, while two agencies  did not comment on the recommendations. As of August 2018, all  seven recommendations had not been implemented. Appendix X: Action 9—Improve Federal  Efforts to Protect Privacy and Sensitive Data Advancements in technology, such as new search technology and data  analytics software for searching and collecting information, have made it  easier for individuals and organizations to correlate data and track it  across large and numerous databases. In addition, lower data storage  costs have made it less expensive to store vast amounts of data. Also,  ubiquitous Internet and cellular connectivity make it easier to track  individuals by allowing easy access to information pinpointing their  locations. the effectiveness of these procedures. Based on a survey of the  schools, the majority of the schools had policies in place for records  retention but the way these policies were implemented was highly  varied for paper and electronic records. We also found that the  oversight of the school’s programs was lacking, as Federal Student  Aid conducts reviews but does not consider information security as a  factor for selecting schools. out provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. We  made three recommendations to CMS related to defining procedures  for overseeing the security of state-based marketplaces and requiring  continuous monitoring of state marketplace controls. HHS concurred  with our recommendations. As of August 2018, two of the  recommendations had not yet been implemented. Poor planning and ineffective monitoring had resulted in the  unsuccessful implementation of government initiatives designed  to protect federal data. In July 2017, we reported that government  initiatives aimed at eliminating the unnecessary collection, use, and  display of Social Security numbers (SSN) have had limited success.  Specifically, in agencies’ response to our questionnaire on SSN  reduction efforts, the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial  Officers Act reported successfully curtailing the collection, use, and  display of SSNs. Nevertheless, all of the agencies continued to rely on  SSNs for important government programs and systems, as seen in  figure 10. Appendix XI: Action 10—Appropriately Limit  the Collection and Use of Personal  Information and Ensure That It Is Obtained  with Appropriate Knowledge or Consent Given that access to data is so pervasive, personal privacy hinges on  ensuring that databases of personally identifiable information (PII)  maintained by government agencies or on their behalf are protected both  from inappropriate access (i.e., data breaches) as well as inappropriate  use (i.e., for purposes not originally specified when the information was  collected). Likewise, the trend in the private sector of collecting extensive  and detailed information about individuals needs appropriate limits. The  vast number of individuals potentially affected by data breaches at federal  agencies and private sector entities in recent years increases concerns  that PII is not being properly protected. The emergence of IoT devices can facilitate the collection of  information about individuals without their knowledge or  consent. In May 2017, we reported that the IoT has become  increasingly used to communicate and process vast amounts of  information using “smart” devices (such as a fitness tracker connected  to a smartphone). However, we noted that this emerging technology  also presents new issues in areas such as information security,  privacy, and safety. Smartphone tracking apps can present serious safety and  privacy risks. In April 2016, we reported on smartphone applications  that facilitated the surreptitious tracking of a smartphone’s location  and other data. Specifically, we noted that some applications could  be used to intercept communications and text messages, essentially  facilitating the stalking of others. While it is illegal to use these  applications for these purposes, stakeholders differed over whether  current federal laws needed to be strengthened to combat stalking.  We also noted that stakeholders expressed concerns over what they  perceived to be limited enforcement of laws related to tracking apps  and stalking. In particular, domestic violence groups stated that  additional education of law enforcement officials and consumers  about how to protect against, detect, and remove tracking apps is  needed. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has not ensured  privacy and accuracy related to the use of face recognition  technology. In May 2016, we reported that the Department of  Justice had not been timely in publishing and updating privacy  documentation for the FBI’s use of face recognition technology.  Publishing such documents in a timely manner would better assure  the public that the FBI is evaluating risks to privacy when  implementing systems. Also, the FBI had taken limited steps to  determine whether the face recognition system it was using was  sufficiently accurate. We recommended that the department ensure  required privacy-related documents are published and that the FBI  test and review face recognition systems to ensure that they are  sufficiently accurate. Of the six recommendations we made, the  Department of Justice agreed with one, partially agreed with two, and  disagreed with three. We continued to believe all the  recommendations made were valid. As of August 2018, the six  recommendations had not been implemented. Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff  Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Staff  Acknowledgments In addition to the contacts named above, Jon Ticehurst, Assistant  Director; Kush K. Malhotra, Analyst-In-Charge; Chris Businsky; Alan  Daigle; Rebecca Eyler; Chaz Hubbard; David Plocher; Bradley Roach;  Sukhjoot Singh; Di’Mond Spencer; and Umesh Thakkar made key  contributions to this report.
Federal agencies and the nation's critical infrastructures—such as energy, transportation systems, communications, and financial services—are dependent on information technology systems to carry out operations. The security of these systems and the data they use is vital to public confidence and national security, prosperity, and well-being. The risks to these systems are increasing as security threats evolve and become more sophisticated. GAO first designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area in 1997. This was expanded to include protecting cyber critical infrastructure in 2003 and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information in 2015. This report provides an update to the information security high-risk area. To do so, GAO identified the actions the federal government and other entities need to take to address cybersecurity challenges. GAO primarily reviewed prior work issued since the start of fiscal year 2016 related to privacy, critical federal functions, and cybersecurity incidents, among other areas. GAO also reviewed recent cybersecurity policy and strategy documents, as well as information security industry reports of recent cyberattacks and security breaches. GAO has identified four major cybersecurity challenges and 10 critical actions that the federal government and other entities need to take to address them. GAO continues to designate information security as a government-wide high-risk area due to increasing cyber-based threats and the persistent nature of security vulnerabilities. GAO has made over 3,000 recommendations to agencies aimed at addressing cybersecurity shortcomings in each of these action areas, including protecting cyber critical infrastructure, managing the cybersecurity workforce, and responding to cybersecurity incidents. Although many recommendations have been addressed, about 1,000 have not yet been implemented. Until these shortcomings are addressed, federal agencies' information and systems will be increasingly susceptible to the multitude of cyber-related threats that exist.