Background Chemical attacks have emerged as a prominent homeland security risk  because of recent attacks abroad using chemical agents and the interest  of ISIS in conducting and inspiring chemical attacks against the West.  DHS’s OHA officials have stated that nationwide preparedness for a  chemical attack is critical to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to,  and recover from such an attack because it could occur abruptly, with  many victims falling ill quickly, and with a window of opportunity of a few  hours to respond effectively. Also, recent incidents in Malaysia and the  United Kingdom demonstrate that chemical agents can be used to target  individuals and can contaminate other individuals near the attack area.  Chemicals that have been used in attacks include chlorine, sarin, and  ricin, all of which can have deadly or debilitating consequences for  individuals exposed to them; see figure 1. Laws and Presidential  Directives Guiding DHS’s  Chemical Defense Efforts Various laws guide DHS’s efforts to defend the nation from chemical  threats and attacks. For example, under the Homeland Security Act of  2002, as amended, the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the  Under Secretary for Science and Technology, has various  responsibilities, to include conducting national research and developing,  testing, evaluating, and procuring technology and systems for preventing  the importation of chemical and other weapons and material; and  detecting, preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist  attacks. Under former Section 550 of the DHS Appropriations Act, 2007,  DHS established the CFATS program to, among other things, identify  chemical facilities and assess the security risk posed by each, categorize  the facilities into risk-based tiers, and inspect the high-risk facilities to  ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. DHS’s responsibilities with regard to chemical defense are also guided by  various presidential directives promulgated following the September 11,  2001, terror attacks against the United States; see table 1. Our Work on Duplication,  Overlap, and  Fragmentation of Federal  Programs In 2010, Public Law 111-139 included a provision for us to identify and  report annually on programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives—either  within departments or government-wide—with duplicative goals and  activities. In our annual reports to Congress from 2011 through 2018 in  fulfillment of this provision, we described areas in which we found  evidence of duplication, overlap, and fragmentation among federal  programs, including those managed by DHS. To supplement these  reports, we developed a guide to identify options to reduce or better  manage the negative effects of duplication, overlap, and fragmentation,  and evaluate the potential trade-offs and unintended consequences of  these options. In this report, we use the following definitions: Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are  engaged in the same activities or provide the same services to the  same beneficiaries. Overlap occurs when multiple programs have similar goals, engage in  similar activities or strategies to achieve those goals, or target similar  beneficiaries. Overlap may result from statutory or other limitations  beyond the agency’s control. Fragmentation occurs when more than one agency (or more than one  organization within an agency) is involved in the same broad area of  national interest and opportunities exist to improve service delivery. DHS Has Several  Chemical Defense  Programs and  Activities Intended to  Prevent and Protect  Against Chemical  Attacks DHS manages several programs and activities designed to prevent and  protect against domestic chemical attacks. Prior to December 2017, for  example, three DHS components—OHA, S&T, and NPPD—had specific  programs and activities focused on chemical defense. In December 2017,  DHS created the CWMD Office, which, as discussed later in this report,  consolidated the majority of OHA and some other DHS programs and  activities intended to counter weapons of mass destruction such as  chemical weapons. Other DHS components—such as CBP, the Coast  Guard, and TSA—have chemical defense programs and activities as part  of their broader missions. These components address potential chemical  attacks as part of an all-hazards approach to address a wide range of  threats and hazards. Appendix I discusses in greater detail DHS’s  programs and activities that focus on chemical defense, and appendix II  discusses DHS components that have chemical defense responsibilities  as part of an all-hazards approach. Table 2 identifies the chemical  defense responsibilities of each DHS component, and whether that  component has a specific chemical defense program or an all-hazards  approach to chemical defense. Figure 2 shows that fiscal year 2017 funding levels for three of the  programs that focus on chemical defense totaled $77.3 million.  Specifically, about $1.3 million in appropriated funds was available for  OHA for its Chemical Defense Program activities and S&T had access to  about $6.4 million in appropriated funds for its Chemical Security Analysis  Center activities. The CFATS program had access to about $69.6 million  in appropriated funds—or 90 percent of the $77.3 million for the three  programs—to regulate high-risk facilities that produce, store, or use  certain chemicals. OHA officials stated that their efforts regarding  weapons of mass destruction over the last few years had focused mostly  on biological threats rather than chemical threats. For example, $77.2  million in fiscal year 2017 appropriated funds supported OHA’s BioWatch  Program to provide detection and early warning of the intentional release  of selected aerosolized biological agents in more than 30 jurisdictions  nationwide. By contrast, as stated above, OHA and S&T had access to  about $7.7 million in fiscal year 2017 appropriated funds for chemical  defense efforts. We could not determine the level of funding for components that treated  chemical defense as part of their missions under an all-hazards approach  because those components do not have chemical defense funding that  can be isolated from funding for their other responsibilities. For example,  among other things, CBP identifies and interdicts hazardous chemicals at  and between ports of entry as part of its overall mission to protect the  United States from threats entering the country. A Chemical Strategy  and Implementation  Plan Would Enhance  DHS Efforts to  Integrate and  Coordinate Its  Chemical Defense  Programs and  Activities DHS’s chemical defense programs and activities have been fragmented  and not well coordinated, but DHS recently created the CWMD Office to,  among other things, promote better integration and coordination among  these programs and activities. While it is too early to tell the extent to  which this new office will enhance this integration and coordination,  developing a chemical defense strategy and related implementation plan  would further assist DHS’s efforts. DHS’s Efforts to Address  Chemical Attacks Have  Been Fragmented and Not  Well Coordinated DHS’s chemical defense programs and activities have been fragmented  and not well coordinated across the department. As listed in table 2  above, we identified nine separate DHS organizational units that have  roles and responsibilities that involve conducting some chemical defense  programs and activities, either as a direct mission activity or as part of  their broader missions under an all-hazards approach. We also found  examples of components conducting similar but separate chemical  defense activities without DHS-wide direction and coordination. OHA and S&T—two components with specific chemical defense  programs—both conducted similar but separate projects to assist  local jurisdictions with preparedness. Specifically, from fiscal years  2009 to 2017, OHA’s Chemical Defense Program conducted chemical  demonstration projects in five jurisdictions—Baltimore, Maryland;  Boise, Idaho; Houston, Texas; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Nassau  County, New York—to assist the jurisdictions in enhancing their  preparedness for a large-scale chemical terrorist attack. According to  OHA officials, they worked with local officials in one jurisdiction to  install and test chemical detectors without having department-wide  direction on these detectors’ requirements. Also, according to S&T  officials, the Chemical and Biological Defense Division worked with  three jurisdictions in New York and New Jersey to help them purchase  and install chemical detectors for their transit systems beginning in  2016 again without having department-wide direction on chemical  detector requirements. The Secret Service, CBP, and the Coast Guard—three components  with chemical defense activities that are part of their all-hazards  approach—also conducted separate acquisitions of chemical  detection or identification equipment, according to officials from those  components. For example, according to Secret Service officials, the  agency has purchased chemical detectors that agents use for  personal protection of protectees and assessing the safety of  designated fixed sites and temporary venues. Also, according to CBP  officials, CBP has purchased chemical detectors for identifying  chemical agents at ports of entry nationwide. Finally, according to  Coast Guard officials, the agency has purchased chemical detectors  for use in maritime locations subject to Coast Guard jurisdiction. Officials from OHA, S&T, and the CWMD Office acknowledged that  chemical defense activities had been fragmented and not well- coordinated. They stated that this fragmentation occurred because DHS  had no department-wide leadership and direction for chemical defense  activities. We recognize that equipment, such as chemical detectors, may be  designed to meet the specific needs of components when they carry out  their missions under different operating conditions, such as an enclosed  space by CBP or on open waterways by the Coast Guard. Nevertheless,  when fragmented programs and activities that are within the same  department and are responsible for the same or similar functions are  executed without a mechanism to coordinate them, the department may  miss opportunities to leverage resources and share information that leads  to greater effectiveness. DHS Has Begun to  Consolidate Some  Chemical Defense  Programs and Activities As discussed earlier, DHS has taken action to consolidate some chemical  defense programs and activities. Specifically, in December 2017, DHS  consolidated some of its chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear  defense programs and activities under the CWMD Office. The CWMD  Office consolidated the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office; the majority of  OHA; selected elements of the Science and Technology Directorate, such  as elements involved in chemical, biological, and integrated terrorism risk  assessments and material threat assessments; and certain personnel  from the DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans and the Office of  Operations Coordination with expertise on chemical, biological,  radiological, and nuclear issues. According to officials from the CWMD  Office, the fiscal year 2018 funding for the office is $457 million. Of this  funding, OHA contributed about $121.6 million and the Domestic Nuclear  Detection Office contributed about $335.4 million. Figure 3 shows the  initial organizational structure of the CWMD Office as of June 2018. As of July 2018, according to the Assistant Secretary of CWMD, his office  supported by DHS leadership is working to develop and implement its  initial structure, plans, processes, and procedures. To guide the initial  consolidation, officials representing the CWMD Office said they plan to  use the key practices for successful transformations and reorganizations  identified in our past work. For example, they noted that they intend to  establish integrated strategic goals, consistent with one of these key  practices—establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to  guide the transformation. These officials stated that the goals include  those intended to enhance the nation’s ability to prevent attacks using  weapons of mass destruction, including toxic chemical agents; support  operational components in closing capability gaps; and invest in and  develop innovative technologies to meet technical requirements and  improve operations. They noted that the latter might include networked  chemical detectors that could be used by various components to help  them carry out their mission responsibilities in the future. However, the  officials stated that all of the new office’s efforts were in the initial planning  stages and none had been finalized. They further stated that the initial  setup of the CWMD Office covering the efforts to consolidate OHA and  the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office may not be completed until the  end of fiscal year 2018. It is still too early to determine the extent to which the creation of the  CWMD Office will help address the fragmentation and lack of coordination  on chemical defense efforts that we have identified. Our prior work on key  steps for assisting mergers and transformations shows that  transformation can take years to complete. One factor that could  complicate this transformation is that the consolidation of chemical  defense programs and activities is limited to certain components within  DHS, such as OHA, and not others, such as some parts of S&T and  NPPD. Officials from the CWMD Office stated that they intend to address  this issue by coordinating the office’s chemical security efforts with other  DHS components that are not covered by the consolidation, such as  those S&T functions that are responsible for developing chemical detector  requirements. These officials also stated that they intend to address  fragmentation by coordinating with and supporting DHS components that  have chemical defense responsibilities as part of their missions under an  all-hazards approach, such as the Federal Protective Service, CBP, TSA,  the Coast Guard, and the Secret Service. Furthermore, the officials stated  that they plan to coordinate DHS’s chemical defense efforts with other  government agencies having chemical programs and activities at the  federal and local levels. DHS’s Prior Efforts and  Recent Reorganization  Offer an Opportunity for  More Strategic  Coordination In October 2011, the Secretary of Homeland Security designated FEMA  to coordinate the development of a strategy and implementation plan to  enhance federal, state, local, tribal and territorial government agencies’  ability to respond to and recover from a catastrophic chemical attack. In  November 2012, DHS issued a chemical response and recovery strategy  that examined core capabilities and identified areas where improvements  were needed. The strategy identified a need for, among other things, (1)  a common set of catastrophic chemical attack planning assumptions, (2)  a formally established DHS oversight body responsible for chemical  incident response and recovery, (3) a more rapid way to identify the wide  range of chemical agents and contaminants that comprise chemical  threats, and (4) reserve capacity for mass casualty medical care. The  strategy also identified the principal actions needed to fill these gaps. For example, with regard to identifying the range of chemical agents and  contaminants that comprise chemical threats, the strategy focused on the  capacity to screen, search for, and detect chemical hazards (and noted  that this area was cross-cutting with prevention and protection). The  strategy stated that, among other things, the Centers for Disease Control  and Prevention, the Department of Agriculture and Food and Drug  Administration, the Department of Defense, the Environmental Protection  Agency, and DHS components, including the Coast Guard, provide  screening, search, and detection capabilities. However, the strategy  noted that “DHS does not have the requirement to test, verify, and  validate commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) chemical detection equipment  purchased and fielded by its various constituent agencies and  components, nor by the first responder community.” According to a November 2012 memorandum transmitting the response  and recovery strategy to DHS employees, the distribution of the strategy  was only to be used for internal discussion purposes and was not to be  distributed outside of DHS because it had not been vetted by other  federal agencies and state, local, tribal, and territorial partners. The  memorandum and the strategy further stated that DHS was developing a  companion strategy focused on improving the national capacity to  prevent, protect against, and mitigate catastrophic chemical threats and  attacks and noted that once this document was complete, DHS would  engage with its partners to solicit comments and feedback. The strategy  also stated that DHS intended to develop a separate implementation plan  that would define potential solutions for any gaps identified, program any  needed budget initiatives, and discuss programs to enhance DHS’s core  capabilities and close any gaps. DHS officials representing OHA and S&T told us that DHS had intended  to move forward with the companion strategy and the accompanying  implementation plan but the strategy and plan were never completed  because of changes in leadership and other competing priorities within  DHS. At the time of our discussion and prior to the establishment of the  CWMD Office, OHA officials also noted that DHS did not have a singular  entity or office responsible for chemical preparedness. An official  representing S&T also said that the consolidation of some chemical,  biological, radiological, and nuclear efforts may help bring order to  chemical defense efforts because DHS did not have an entity in charge of  these efforts or a strategy for guiding them. Now that DHS has established the CWMD Office as the focal point for  chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear programs and activities,  DHS has an opportunity to develop a chemical defense strategy and  related implementation plan to better integrate and coordinate the  department’s programs and activities to prevent, protect against, mitigate,  respond to, and recover from a chemical attack. The Government  Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), as updated by the GPRA  Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), includes principles for agencies to  focus on the performance and results of programs by putting elements of  a strategy and plan in place such as (1) establishing measurable goals  and related measures, (2) developing strategies and plans for achieving  results, and (3) identifying the resources that will be required to achieve  the goals. Although GPRAMA applies to the department or agency level,  in our prior work we have reported that these provisions can serve as  leading practices for strategic planning at lower levels within federal  agencies, such as planning for individual divisions, programs, or  initiatives. Our past work has also shown that a strategy is a starting point and basic  underpinning to better manage federal programs and activities such as  DHS’s chemical defense efforts. A strategy can serve as a basis for  guiding operations and can help policy makers, including congressional  decision makers and agency officials, make decisions about programs  and activities. It can also be useful in providing accountability and guiding  resource and policy decisions, particularly in relation to issues that are  national in scope and cross agency jurisdictions, such as chemical  defense. When multiple agencies are working to address aspects of the  same problem, there is a risk that duplication, overlap, and fragmentation  among programs can result in wasting scarce funds, confuse and  frustrate program customers, and limit overall program effectiveness. A  strategy and implementation plan for DHS’ chemical defense programs  and activities would help mitigate these risks. Specifically, a strategy and  implementation plan would help DHS further define its chemical defense  capability, including opportunities to leverage resources and capabilities  and provide a roadmap for addressing any identified gaps. By defining  DHS’s chemical defense capability, a strategy and implementation plan  may also better position the CWMD Office and other components to work  collaboratively and strategically with other organizations, including other  federal agencies and state, local, tribal, and territorial jurisdictions. Officials from the CWMD Office agreed that the establishment of the new  office was intended to provide leadership to and help guide, support,  integrate, and coordinate DHS’s chemical defense efforts and that a  strategy and implementation plan could help DHS better integrate and  coordinate its fragmented chemical defense programs and activities. Conclusions Recent chemical attacks abroad and the threat of ISIS to use chemical  weapons against the West have sparked concerns about the potential for  chemical attacks occurring in the United States. DHS components have  developed and implemented a number of separate chemical defense  programs and activities that, according to DHS officials, have been  fragmented and not well coordinated within the department. In December  2017, DHS consolidated some of its programs and activities related to  weapons of mass destruction, including those related to chemical  defense, by establishing the new CWMD Office. It is too early to tell  whether and to what extent this office will help address fragmentation and  the lack of coordination across all DHS’s weapons of mass destruction  efforts, including chemical efforts. However, as part of its consolidation,  the CWMD Office would benefit from developing a strategy and  implementation plan to guide, support, integrate, and coordinate DHS’s  programs and activities to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to,  and recover from a chemical attack. A strategy and implementation plan  would also help the CWMD Office guide DHS’s efforts to address  fragmentation and coordination issues and would be consistent with the  office’s aim to establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals. Recommendation for  Executive Action The Assistant Secretary for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction  should develop a strategy and implementation plan to help the  Department of Homeland Security, among other things, guide, support,  integrate and coordinate its chemical defense programs and activities;  leverage resources and capabilities; and provide a roadmap for  addressing any identified gaps. (Recommendation 1) Agency Comments  and GAO Evaluation We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS  provided comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix III and  technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS  concurred with our recommendation and noted that the Assistant  Secretary for CWMD will coordinate with the DHS Under Secretary for  Strategy, Policy, and Plans and other stakeholders to develop a strategy  and implementation plan that will better integrate and direct DHS  chemical defense programs and activities. DHS estimated that it will  complete this effort by September 2019. These actions, if fully  implemented, should address the intent of this recommendation. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of  this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the  report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate  congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other  interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report  are listed in appendix IV. Appendix I: Department of Homeland  Security Chemical Defense Programs At the time our review began, the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) had three headquarters components with programs and activities  focused on chemical defense. These were the Office of Health Affairs’  (OHA) Chemical Defense Program; the Science and Technology  Directorate’s (S&T) Chemical and Biological Defense Division and  Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC); and the National Protection  and Programs Directorate’s (NPPD) Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism  Standards (CFATS) program and Sector Outreach and Programs  Division. Each component had dedicated funding to manage the  particular chemical defense program or activity (with the exception of the  Sector Outreach and Programs Division because this division funds DHS  activities related to all critical infrastructure sectors, including the chemical  sector). On December 7, 2017, DHS established the Countering  Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, which incorporated most  of OHA and selected elements of S&T, together with other DHS programs  and activities related to countering chemical, biological, radiological, and  nuclear threats. According to DHS, the CWMD Office was created to,  among other things, elevate and streamline DHS’s efforts to prevent  terrorists and other national security threat actors from using harmful  agents, such as chemical agents, to harm Americans and U.S. interests. Office of Health Affairs,  Chemical Defense  Program OHA, which was subsumed by the CWMD Office in December 2017, was  responsible for enhancing federal, state, and local risk awareness and  planning and response mechanisms in the event of a chemical incident  through the Chemical Defense Program. This program provided medical  and technical expertise to OHA leadership and chemical defense  stakeholders including DHS leadership, DHS components, the  intelligence community, federal interagency partners, and professional  and academic preparedness organizations. The program’s efforts focused  on optimizing local preparedness and response to chemical incidents that  exceed the local communities’ capacity and capability to act during the  first critical hours by providing guidance and tools for first responders and  supporting chemical exercises for preparedness. DHS’s Chief Medical  Officer was responsible for managing OHA. The Chemical Defense Program expended about $8.3 million between  fiscal years 2009 and 2017 in chemical demonstration projects and  follow-on funding to assist five jurisdictions in their chemical  preparedness: Baltimore, Maryland; Boise, Idaho; Houston, Texas; New  Orleans, Louisiana; and Nassau County, New York. For example, in  Baltimore, OHA assisted the Maryland Transit Administration with the  selection and installation of chemical detection equipment to integrate  new technology into community emergency response and planning. In the  other four locales, OHA assisted these partners in conducting multiple  scenarios specific to each city based on high-risk factors identified by the  Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment (CTRA), which is a risk  assessment produced by CSAC every 2 years. Such scenarios included  indoor and outdoor scenarios in which persons were “exposed” to either  an inhalant or a substance on their skin. Figure 4 summarizes the  scenarios conducted in each city and some of the lessons learned. According to OHA summary documentation, a key finding from this work  was that timely decisions and actions save lives and manage resources in  response to a chemical incident. Since the completion of the five-city  project, OHA has been working to, among other things, continue to  develop a lessons learned document based on the project, as well as a  related concept of operations, that state and local jurisdictions could use  to respond to chemical incidents. As of December 7, 2017, OHA was consolidated into the CWMD Office  and its functions transferred to the new office, according to officials from  the CWMD Office. The Chief Medical Officer is no longer responsible for  managing OHA but serves as an advisor to the Assistant Secretary for  Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction and as the principal advisor to  the Secretary and the Administrator of FEMA on medical and public  health issues related to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other  man-made disasters, among other things. Science and Technology  Directorate, Chemical  Defense Activities S&T’s Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency includes  the Chemical and Biological Defense Division, which supports state and  local jurisdictions by, for example, providing them help in modeling  potential chemical attacks. The Chemical and Biological Defense Division  worked with the City of New York to develop chemical detection modeling  by simulating a chemical attack. As a result of the simulation, New York  City officials wanted to implement mechanisms to prevent the potential  consequences of a chemical attack in a large city. S&T’s Office of National Laboratories includes the CSAC, which identifies  and characterizes the chemical threat against the nation through analysis  and scientific assessment. CSAC is responsible for producing, among  other things, the CTRA, a comprehensive evaluation of the risks  associated with domestic toxic chemical releases produced every 2  years. CSAC officials chair the Interagency Chemical Risk Assessment  Working Group that meets to develop the CTRA, identify chemical  hazards, and produce a list of priority chemicals. This working group is  comprised of DHS components, federal partners, and private industry  officials that share industry information to ensure accurate and timely  threat and risk information is included in the CTRA. To complement the  CTRA, CSAC developed a standalone CTRA desktop tool that DHS  components can use to conduct risk-based modeling of a potential  chemical attack and provide results to DHS components, such as the  U.S. Secret Service, for advance planning of large-scale events. In addition, CSAC conducts tailored risk assessments addressing  emerging threats such as fentanyl, a synthetic opioid that has caused  numerous deaths across the United States. CSAC sends these  assessments, along with other intelligence and threat information, to  relevant DHS components, federal agencies, state and local partners,  and private entities so this information can be used in planning and  decision making. Officials from eight DHS components we spoke with  said they use CSAC information in their work and that CSAC products are  useful. CSAC conducted two exercises, known as Jack Rabbit I and II, to  experimentally characterize the effects of a large-scale chemical release  and to understand the reason for the differences seen between real-world  events and modeling predictions. These exercises were intended to  strengthen industry standards in chemical transportation, as well as  response and recovery plans. Outputs and data from these exercises  have been used to write first responder guidelines for these types of  events and are being taught in nationwide fire and hazmat courses. The  fiscal year 2018 President’s Budget request did not ask for an  appropriation to fund CSAC. However, the Consolidated Appropriations  Act, 2018, did provide funding for CSAC. Furthermore, in May 2018, the  Secretary delegated responsibility for conducting the non-research and  development functions related to the Chemical Terrorism Risk  Assessment to the CWMD Office. National Protection and  Programs Directorate,  Chemical Facility Anti- Terrorism Standards  (CFATS) Program and  Other Chemical Facility  Security Activities The CFATS program uses a multitiered risk assessment process to  determine a facility’s risk profile by requiring facilities in possession of  specific quantities of designated chemicals of interest to complete an  online questionnaire. CFATS program officials said they also use CSAC  data as part of the process for making decisions about which facilities  should be covered by CFATS, and their level of risk. If CFATS officials  make a determination that a facility is high-risk, the facility must submit a  vulnerability assessment and a site security plan or an alternative security  program for DHS approval that includes security measures to meet risk- based performance standards. We previously reported on various  aspects of the CFATS program and identified challenges that DHS was  experiencing in implementing and managing the program. We made a  number of recommendations to strengthen the program to include, among  other things, that DHS verify that certain data reported by facilities is  accurate, enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all  elements of risk, conduct a peer review of the program to validate and  verify DHS’s risk assessment approach, and document processes and  procedures for managing compliance with site security plans. DHS  agreed with all of these recommendations and has either fully  implemented them or taken action to address them. The Sector Outreach and Programs Division works to enhance the  security and resilience of chemical facilities that may or may not be  considered high-risk under the CFATS program and plays a  nonregulatory role as the sector-specific agency for the chemical sector.  The Sector Outreach and Programs Division works with the chemical  sector through the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council, the Chemical  Government Coordinating Council, and others in a public-private  partnership to share information on facility security and resilience. In  addition, the division and the coordinating councils help enhance the  security and resilience of chemical facilities that may or may not be  considered high-risk under the CFATS program. The division and  councils are to collaborate with federal agencies, chemical facilities, and  state, local, tribal, and territorial entities to, among other things, assess  risks and share information on chemical threats and chemical facility  security and resilience. Further, the Protective Security Coordination  Division in the Office of Infrastructure Protection works with facility owners  and operators to conduct voluntary assessments at facilities. Appendix II: Department of Homeland  Security Components’ Chemical Defense  Responsibilities as Part of an All-Hazards  Approach Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components conduct various  prevention and protection activities related to chemical defense. These  activities are managed by individual components as part of their overall  mission under an all-hazards approach. U.S. Coast Guard - The Coast Guard uses fixed and portable  chemical detectors to identify and interdict hazardous chemicals as  part of its maritime prevention and protection activities. It also  responds to hazardous material and chemical releases in U.S.  waterways. The Coast Guard also staffs the 24-hour National  Response Center, which is the national point of contact for reporting  all oil and hazardous materials releases into the water, including  chemicals that are discharged into the environment. The National  Response Center also takes maritime reports of suspicious activity  and security breaches at facilities regulated by the Maritime  Transportation Security Act of 2002. Under this act, the Coast Guard  regulates security at certain chemical facilities and other facilities  possessing hazardous materials. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) - CBP interdicts  hazardous chemicals at U.S. borders and ports of entry as part of its  overall mission to protect the United States from threats entering the  country. Among other things, CBP has deployed chemical detectors to  point of entry nationwide that were intended for narcotics detection,  but can also be used by CBP officers to presumptively identify a  limited number of chemicals. Also, CBP’s National Targeting Center  helps to screen and identify high-risk packages that may contain  hazardous materials at ports of entry. In addition, CBP’s Laboratories  and Scientific Services Directorate manages seven nationally  accredited field laboratories, where staff detect, analyze, and identify  hazardous substances, including those that could be weapons of  mass destruction. When CBP officers send suspected chemical  weapons, narcotics, and other hazardous materials to the labs, the  labs use various confirmatory analysis technologies, such as infrared  spectroscopy and mass spectrometry, to positively identify them. Also,  the Directorate has a 24-hour Teleforensic Center for on-call scientific  support for CBP officers who have questions on suspected chemical  agents. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) - FEMA provides  preparedness grants to state and local governments for any type of  all-hazards preparedness activity, including chemical preparedness.  According to FEMA data, in fiscal year 2016, states used about $3.5  million, local municipalities used about $48.5 million, and tribal and  territorial municipalities used about $80,000 in preparedness grant  funding for chemical defense including prevention and protection  activities, as well as mitigation, response, and recovery efforts related  to a chemical attack. Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) - I&A gathers intelligence  information on all homeland security threats including chemical  threats. Such threat information is compiled and disseminated to  relevant DHS components and federal agencies. For example, I&A  works with CSAC to provide intelligence information for the CTRA and  writes the threat portion of that assessment. I&A also receives  information from CSAC on high-risk gaps in intelligence to help better  inform chemical defense intelligence reporting. Also, the Under  Secretary of I&A serves as the Vice-Chair of the Counterterrorism  Advisory Board. This board is responsible for coordinating, facilitating,  and sharing information regarding DHS’s activities related to  mitigating current, emerging, perceived, or possible terrorist threats,  including chemical threats; and providing timely and accurate advice  and recommendations to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of  Homeland Security on counterterrorism issues. NPPD’s Federal Protective Service (FPS) - FPS secures federally- owned and leased space in various facilities across the country.  Federal facilities are assigned a facility security level determination  ranging from a Level 1 (low risk) to a Level 5 (high risk). As part of its  responsibility, FPS is to conduct Facility Security Assessments of the  buildings and properties it protects that cover all types of hazards  including a chemical release, in accordance with Interagency Security  Committee standards and guidelines. FPS is to conduct these  assessments at least once every 5 years for Level 1 and 2 facilities,  and at least once every 3 years for Level 3, 4, and 5 facilities. FPS  conducts the assessments using a Modified Infrastructure Survey  Tool. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) - TSA efforts to  address the threat of chemical terrorism have been focused on the  commercial transportation of bulk quantities of hazardous materials  and testing related to the release of commercially transported  chemicals that could be used as weapons of mass destruction. TSA’s  activities with respect to hazardous materials transportation aim to  reduce the vulnerability of shipments of certain hazardous materials  through the voluntary implementation of operational practices by  motor carriers and railroads, and ensure a secure transfer of custody  of hazardous materials to and from rail cars at chemical facilities.  Also, in May 2003, TSA began requiring that all commercial motor  vehicle operators licensed to transport hazardous materials, including  toxic chemicals, must successfully complete a comprehensive  background check conducted by TSA. According to TSA documents,  approximately 1.5 million of the nation’s estimated 6 million  commercial drivers have successfully completed the vetting process.  Additionally, TSA has also recently partnered with five mass transit  and passenger rail venues, together with other DHS components such  as DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate and the U.S. Secret  Service, to test chemical detection technologies for such venues. In  addition, TSA is responsible for the Transportation Sector Security  Risk Assessment, which examines the potential threat, vulnerabilities,  and consequences of a terrorist attack involving the nation’s  transportation systems. This assessment’s risk calculations for  several hundred specific risk scenarios, including chemical weapons  attacks, are based on the elements of threat, vulnerability and  consequence using a combination of subject matter expert judgments  and modeling results. U.S. Secret Service - The Secret Service is responsible for protecting  its protectees and designated fixed sites and temporary venues from  all threats and hazards, including chemical threats. For example, the  Secret Service conducts security assessments of sites, which may  involve chemical detection, and coordinates with other agencies for  preparedness or response to threats and hazard incidents. In addition,  the Secret Service has a Hazardous Agent Mitigation Medical  Emergency Response team, dedicated to responding to numerous  hazards, including chemical threats and incidents. Appendix III: Comments from the  Department of Homeland Security Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff  Acknowledgements GAO Contacts Staff  Acknowledgements In addition to the contact named above, John Mortin (Assistant Director),  Juan Tapia-Videla (Analyst-in-Charge), Michelle Fejfar, Ashley Grant,  Imoni Hampton, Eric Hauswirth, Tom Lombardi, Sasan J. “Jon” Najmi,  Claire Peachey, and Kay Vyas made key contributions to this report.
Recent chemical attacks abroad and the threat of using chemical weapons against the West by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have raised concerns about the potential for chemical attacks occurring in the United States. DHS's chemical defense responsibilities include, among others, managing and coordinating federal efforts to prevent and protect against domestic chemical attacks. GAO was asked to examine DHS's chemical defense programs and activities. This report examines (1) DHS programs and activities to prevent and protect against domestic chemical attacks and (2) the extent to which DHS has integrated and coordinated all of its chemical defense programs and activities. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from relevant DHS offices and components and reviewed DHS strategy and planning documents and federal laws and directives related to chemical defense. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages several programs and activities designed to prevent and protect against domestic attacks using chemical agents (see figure). Some DHS components have programs that focus on chemical defense, such as the Science and Technology Directorate's (S&T) chemical hazard characterization. Others have chemical defense responsibilities as part of their broader missions, such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which interdicts chemical agents at the border. DHS recently consolidated some chemical defense programs and activities into a new Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office. However, GAO found and DHS officials acknowledged that DHS has not fully integrated and coordinated its chemical defense programs and activities. Several components—including CBP, U.S. Coast Guard, the Office of Health Affairs, and S&T—have conducted similar activities, such as acquiring chemical detectors or assisting local jurisdictions with preparedness, separately, without DHS-wide direction and coordination. As components carry out chemical defense activities to meet mission needs, there is a risk that DHS may miss an opportunity to leverage resources and share information that could lead to greater effectiveness addressing chemical threats. It is too early to tell the extent to which the new CWMD Office will enhance the integration of DHS's chemical defense programs and activities. Given the breadth of DHS's chemical defense responsibilities, a strategy and implementation plan would help the CWMD Office (1) mitigate the risk of fragmentation among DHS programs and activities, and (2) establish goals and identify resources to achieve these goals, consistent with the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010. This would also be consistent with a 2012 DHS effort, since abandoned, to develop a strategy and implementation plan for all chemical defense activities, from prevention to recovery. DHS officials stated the 2012 effort was not completed because of leadership changes and competing priorities.