Background Federal agencies and our nation’s critical infrastructures—such as  energy, transportation systems, communications networks, and financial  services—are dependent on computerized (cyber) information systems  and electronic data to process, maintain, and report essential information,  and to operate and control physical processes. Virtually all federal  operations are supported by computer systems and electronic data, and  agencies would find it difficult, if not impossible, to carry out their missions  and account for their resources without these information assets. Hence,  the security of these systems and data is vital to public confidence and  the nation’s safety, prosperity, and well-being. Ineffective security controls  to protect these systems and data could have a significant impact on a  broad array of government operations and assets. Yet, computer networks and systems used by federal agencies are often  riddled with security vulnerabilities—both known and unknown. These  systems are often interconnected with other internal and external systems  and networks, including the Internet, thereby increasing the number of  avenues of attack and expanding their attack surface. Furthermore, safeguarding federal computer systems has been a long- standing concern. This year marks the 21st anniversary of when GAO  first designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area  in 1997. We expanded this high-risk area to include safeguarding the  systems supporting our nation’s critical infrastructure in 2003 and  protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information in 2015. Over the last several years, we have made about 2,500  recommendations to agencies aimed at improving the security of federal  systems and information. These recommendations identified actions for  agencies to take to strengthen their information security programs and  technical controls over their computer networks and systems.  Nevertheless, many agencies continue to be challenged in safeguarding  their information systems and information, in part because they have not  implemented many of these recommendations. As of March 2018, about  885 of our prior information security-related recommendations had not  been implemented. Federal Law and Policy  Provide DHS with Broad  Authorities to Improve and  Promote Cybersecurity DHS has broad authorities to improve and promote cybersecurity of  federal and private-sector networks. The federal laws and policies that  underpin these authorities include the following: The Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of  2014 clarified and expanded DHS’s responsibilities for assisting with  the implementation of, and overseeing, information security at federal  agencies. These responsibilities include requirements to: develop, issue, and oversee agencies’ implementation of binding  operational directives to agencies, including directives for incident  reporting, contents of annual agency reports, and other  operational requirements; monitor agencies’ implementation of information security policies provide operational and technical assistance to agencies,  including by operating the federal information security incident  center, deploying technology to continuously diagnose and  mitigate threats, and conducting threat and vulnerability  assessments of systems. Act of 2014, among other things, requires DHS to assess its  cybersecurity workforce. In this regard, the Secretary of Homeland  Security is to identify all positions in DHS that perform cybersecurity  functions and to identify cybersecurity work categories and specialty  areas of critical need. The National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 codified the  role of the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration  Center (NCCIC)—a center established by DHS in 2009—as the  federal civilian interface for sharing information concerning  cybersecurity risks, incidents, analysis, and warnings to federal and  non-federal entities, including owners and operators of information  systems supporting critical infrastructure. The Cybersecurity Act of 2015, among other things, sets forth  authority for enhancing the sharing of cybersecurity-related  information among federal and non-federal entities. The act gives  DHS’s NCCIC responsibility for implementing this information sharing  authority. The act also requires DHS to:  Jointly develop with other specified agencies and submit to  Congress, procedures for sharing federal cybersecurity threat  information and defensive measures with federal and non-federal  entities. Deploy, operate, and maintain capabilities to prevent and detect  cybersecurity risks in network traffic traveling to or from an  agency’s information system. DHS is to make these capabilities  available for use by any agency. In addition, the act requires DHS  to improve intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, as  appropriate, by regularly deploying new technologies and  modifying existing technologies. Long-standing federal policy as promulgated by a presidential  policy directive, executive orders, and the National Infrastructure  Protection Plan have designated DHS as a lead federal agency for  coordinating, assisting, and sharing information with the private-sector  to protect critical infrastructure from cyber threats. DHS Has Acted to  Improve and Promote  the Cybersecurity of  Federal and Private- Sector Computer  Systems, but Further  Improvements Are  Needed We have reviewed several federal programs and activities implemented  by DHS that are intended to mitigate cybersecurity risk for the computer  systems and networks supporting federal operations and our nation’s  critical infrastructure. These programs and activities include deploying the  National Cybersecurity Protection System, providing continuous  diagnostic and mitigation services, issuing binding operational directives,  sharing information through the National Cybersecurity and  Communications Integration Center, promoting adoption of a  cybersecurity framework, and assisting private-sector partners with cyber  risk mitigation activities. We also examined DHS’s efforts to assess its  cybersecurity workforce. DHS has made important progress in  implementing these programs and activities. However, the department  needs to take additional actions to ensure that it successfully mitigates  cybersecurity risks on federal and private-sector computer systems and  networks. DHS Needs to Enhance  Capabilities, Improve  Planning, and Support  Greater Adoption of Its  National Cybersecurity  Protection System DHS is responsible for operating its National Cybersecurity Protection  System (NCPS), operationally known as EINSTEIN. NCPS is intended to  provide intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to entities across  the federal government. It also is intended to provide DHS with  capabilities to detect malicious traffic traversing federal agencies’  computer networks, prevent intrusions, and support data analytics and  information sharing. In January 2016, we reported that the NCPS was partially, but not fully,  meeting most of its stated four system objectives:  Intrusion detection: We noted that NCPS provided DHS with a  limited ability to detect potentially malicious activity entering and  exiting computer networks at federal agencies. Specifically, NCPS  compared network traffic to known patterns of malicious data, or  “signatures,” but did not detect deviations from predefined baselines  of normal network behavior. In addition, the system did not monitor  several types of network traffic and its “signatures” did not address  threats that exploited many common security vulnerabilities and, thus  was not effective in detecting certain types of malicious traffic. Intrusion prevention: The capability of NCPS to prevent intrusions  (e.g., blocking an e-mail determined to be malicious) was limited to  the types of network traffic that it monitored. For example, the  intrusion prevention function monitored and blocked e-mail. However,  it did not address malicious content from other types of network traffic. Analytics: NCPS supports a variety of data analytical tools, including  a centralized platform for aggregating data and a capability for  analyzing the characteristics of malicious code. In addition, DHS had  further enhancements to this capability planned through 2018. Information sharing: DHS had not developed most of the planned  functionality for NCPS’s information-sharing capability, and  requirements had only recently been approved. Moreover, we noted  that agencies and DHS did not always agree about whether  notifications of potentially malicious activity had been sent or received,  and agencies had mixed views about the usefulness of these  notifications. Further, DHS did not always solicit—and agencies did  not always provide—feedback on the notifications. We recommended that DHS take nine actions to enhance NCPS’s  capabilities for meeting its objectives, better define requirements for  future capabilities, and develop network routing guidance. The  department agreed with our recommendations; however, as of April 2018,  it had not fully implemented 8 of the 9 recommendations. As part of a  review mandated by the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of  2015, we are currently examining DHS’s efforts to improve its intrusion  detection and prevention capabilities. DHS Needs to Continue to  Advance CDM Program to  Protect Federal Systems The Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program was  established to provide federal agencies with tools and services that have  the intended capability to automate network monitoring, correlate and  analyze security-related information, and enhance risk-based decision  making at agency and government-wide levels. These tools include  sensors that perform automated scans or searches for known cyber  vulnerabilities, the results of which can feed into a dashboard that alerts  network managers and enables the agency to allocate resources based  on the risk. DHS, in partnership with, and through the General Services  Administration, established a government-wide acquisition vehicle for  acquiring CDM capabilities and tools. The CDM blanket purchase  agreement is available to federal, state, local, and tribal government  entities for acquiring these capabilities. There are three phases of CDM implementation and the dates for  implementing Phase 2 and Phase 3 appear to be slipping:  Phase 1: This phase involves deploying products to automate hardware  and software asset management, configuration settings, and common  vulnerability management capabilities. According to the Cybersecurity  Strategy and Implementation Plan, DHS purchased Phase 1 tools and  integration services for all participating agencies in fiscal year 2015. Phase 2: This phase intends to address privilege management and  infrastructure integrity by allowing agencies to monitor users on their  networks and to detect whether users are engaging in unauthorized  activity. According to the Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation  Plan, DHS was to provide agencies with additional Phase 2 capabilities  throughout fiscal year 2016, with the full suite of CDM phase 2  capabilities delivered by the end of that fiscal year. However, according to  the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) FISMA Annual Report to  Congress for Fiscal Year 2017, the CDM program began deploying  Phase 2 tools and sensors during fiscal year 2017. Phase 3: According to DHS, this phase is intended to address boundary  protection and event management throughout the security life cycle. It  focuses on detecting unusual activity inside agency networks and alerting  security personnel. The agency had planned to provide 97 percent of  federal agencies the services they need for CDM Phase 3 in fiscal year  2017. However, according to OMB’s FISMA report for fiscal year 2017,  the CDM program will continue to incorporate additional capabilities,  including Phase 3, in fiscal year 2018. In May 2016, we reported that most of the 18 agencies covered by the  CFO Act that had high-impact systems were in the early stages of  implementing CDM. All 17 of the civilian agencies that we surveyed  indicated they had developed their own strategy for information security  continuous monitoring. Additionally, according to the survey responses,  14 of the 17 civilian agencies had deployed products to automate  hardware and software asset configuration settings and common  vulnerability management. Further, more than half of these agencies noted that they had leveraged  products/tools provided through the General Services Administration’s  acquisition vehicle. However, only 2 of the 17 agencies reported that they  had completed installation of agency and bureau/component-level  dashboards and monitored attributes of authorized users operating in  their agency’s computing environment. Agencies noted that expediting the implementation of the CDM phases could be of benefit to them in  further protecting their high-impact systems. Subsequently, in March 2017, we reported that the effective  implementation of the CDM tools and capabilities can assist agencies in  overcoming the challenges of securing their information systems and  information. We noted that our audits often identify insecure  configurations, unpatched or unsupported software, and other  vulnerabilities in agency systems. Thus, the tools and capabilities  available under the CDM program, when effectively used by agencies,  can help them to diagnose and mitigate vulnerabilities to their systems.  We reported that, by continuing to make these tools and capabilities  available to federal agencies, DHS can also have additional assurance  that agencies are better positioned to protect their information systems  and information. Other DHS Services Are  Available to Help Protect  Systems but Are Not  Always Used by Agencies Beyond the NCPS and CDM programs, DHS also provides a number of  services that could help agencies protect their information systems. Such  services include, but are not limited to: US-CERT monthly operational bulletins, which are intended to provide  senior federal government information security officials and staff with  actionable information to improve their organization’s cybersecurity  posture based on incidents observed, reported, or acted on by DHS  and US-CERT. CyberStat reviews, which are in-depth sessions attended by National  Security Staff, as well as officials from OMB, DHS, and an agency to  discuss that agency’s cybersecurity posture and opportunities for  collaboration. According to OMB, these interviews are face-to-face,  evidence-based meetings intended to ensure agencies are  accountable for their cybersecurity posture. The sessions are  intended to assist the agencies in developing focused strategies for  improving their information security posture in areas where there are  challenges. DHS Red and Blue Team exercises that are intended to provide  services to agencies for testing their systems with regard to potential  attacks. A Red Team emulates a potential adversary’s attack or  exploitation capabilities against an agency’s cybersecurity posture.  The Blue Team defends an agency’s information systems when the  Red Team attacks, typically as part of an operational exercise  conducted according to rules established and monitored by a neutral  group. In May 2016, we reported that, although participation in these services  varied among the 18 agencies we surveyed, most of those that chose to  participate reported that they generally found these services to be useful  in aiding the cybersecurity protection of their high-impact systems.  Specifically, 15 of 18 agencies reported that they participated in US-CERT monthly  operational bulletins, and most said they found the service very or  somewhat useful. All 18 agencies reported that they participated in the CyberStat  reviews, and most said they found the service very or somewhat  useful. 9 of 18 agencies reported that they participated in DHS’ Red/Blue  team exercises, and most said they found the exercises to be very or  somewhat useful. Half of the 18 agencies in our survey reported that they wanted an  expansion of federal initiatives and services to help protect their high- impact systems. For example, these agencies noted that expediting the  implementation of CDM phases, sharing threat intelligence information,  and sharing attack vectors, could be of benefit to them in further  protecting their high-impact systems. We believe that by continuing to  make these services available to agencies, DHS will be better able to  assist agencies in strengthening the security of their information systems. DHS Has Issued Binding  Operational Directives to  Federal Agencies FISMA authorizes DHS to develop and issue binding operational  directives to federal agencies and oversee their implementation by  agencies. The directives are compulsory and require agencies to take  specific actions that are intended to safeguard federal information and  information systems from a known threat, vulnerability, or risk. In September 2017, we reported that DHS had developed and issued  four binding operational directives as of July 2017, instructing agencies  to: mitigate critical vulnerabilities discovered by DHS’s NCCIC through its  scanning of agencies’ Internet-accessible systems; participate in risk and vulnerability assessments as well as DHS  security architecture assessments conducted on agencies’ high-value  assets; address several urgent vulnerabilities in network infrastructure  devices identified in a NCCIC analysis report within 45 days of the  directive’s issuance; and  report cyber incidents and comply with annual FISMA reporting  requirements. Since July 2017, DHS has issued two additional binding operational  directives instructing agencies to:  identify and remove the presence of any information security products  developed by AO Kaspersky Lab on their information systems and  discontinue the use of such products; and enhance e-mail by, among other things, removing certain insecure  protocols, and ensure public facing web sites provide services through  a secure connection. We plan to initiate work later this year to identify and assess DHS’s  process for developing and overseeing agencies’ implementation of  binding operational directives. DHS’s National Integration  Center Generally Performs  Required Functions but  Needs to Evaluate Its  Activities More Completely In February 2017, we reported that NCCIC had taken steps to perform  each of its 11 statutorily required cybersecurity functions, such as being  a federal civilian interface for sharing cybersecurity-related information  with federal and nonfederal entities. NCCIC managed several programs  that provided data used in developing 43 products and services that the  center made available to its customers in the private-sector; federal,  state, local, tribal and territorial government entities; and other partner  organizations. For example, NCCIC issued indicator bulletins, which  could contain information related to cyber threat indicators, defensive  measures, and cybersecurity risks and incidents, and helped to fulfill its  function to coordinate the sharing of such information across the  government. Respondents to a survey that we administered to NCCIC’s  customers varied in their reported use of NCCIC’s products but had  generally favorable views of the center’s activities. The National Cybersecurity Protection Act also required NCCIC to carry  out its functions in accordance with nine implementing principles, to the  extent practicable. However, as we reported, the extent to which NCCIC  adhered to the 9 principles when performing the functions was unclear  because the center had not yet determined the applicability of the  principles to all 11 functions. It also had not established metrics and  methods by which to evaluate its performance against the principles. We also identified several impediments to NCCIC performing its  cybersecurity functions more efficiently. For example, the center did not  have a centralized system for tracking security incidents and, as a result,  could not produce a report on the status of all incidents reported to the  center. In addition, the center did not keep current and reliable customer  information and was unable to demonstrate that it had contact information  for all owners and operators of the most critical cyber-dependent  infrastructure assets. We made nine recommendations to DHS for enhancing the effectiveness  and efficiency of NCCIC. Among other activities, these recommendations  called for the department to determine the applicability of the  implementing principles and establish metrics and methods for evaluating  performance; and address identified impediments. DHS agreed with the  recommendations; however, as of April 2018, all nine recommendations  remained unimplemented. Additional Actions by DHS  Are Needed for Promoting  and Assessing Private- Sector Adoption of the  Cybersecurity Framework An executive order issued by the President in February 2013 (E.O.  13636) states that sector-specific agencies (SSA), which include DHS,  are to review the National Institute of Standards and Technology  Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity  (cybersecurity framework)  and, if necessary, develop implementation  guidance or supplemental materials to address sector-specific risks and  operating environments. In February 2014, DHS launched the Critical Infrastructure Cyber  Community Voluntary Program to assist the enhancement of critical  infrastructure cybersecurity and to encourage adoption of the framework  across the critical infrastructure sectors. In addition, DHS, as the SSA  and co-SSA for 10 critical infrastructure sectors, had developed  framework implementation guidance for some of the sectors it leads. Nevertheless, we reported weaknesses in DHS’s efforts to promote the  use of the framework across the sectors and within the sectors it leads.  Specifically, in December 2015, we reported that DHS did not measure  the effectiveness of cyber community voluntary program to encourage  use of the Cybersecurity Framework. In addition, DHS and GSA, which  are the co-SSAs for the government facilities sector, had yet to determine  if sector implementation guidance should be developed for the  government facilities sector. Further, in February 2018, we reported that  none of the SSAs, to include DHS, had measured the cybersecurity  framework’s implementation by entities within their respective sectors, in  accordance with the nation’s plan for national critical infrastructure  protection efforts. We made two recommendations to DHS to better facilitate adoption of the  Cybersecurity Framework across the critical infrastructure sectors and  within the government facilities sector. We also recommended that DHS  develop methods for determining the level and type of framework  adoption by entities across their respective sectors. DHS concurred with  the three recommendations. As of April 2018, only the recommendation  related to the government facilities sector has been implemented. DHS Needs to Better  Measure Effectiveness of  Cyber Risk Mitigation  Activities with Critical  Infrastructure Sector  Partners Presidential Policy Directive-21 issued by the President in February 2013,  states that SSAs are to collaborate with critical infrastructure owners and  operators to strengthen the security and resiliency of the nation’s critical  infrastructure. In November 2015, we reported that the SSAs, including DHS, generally  used multiple public-private mechanisms to facilitate the sharing of  cybersecurity related information. For example, DHS used coordinating  councils and working groups of federal and nonfederal stakeholders to  facilitate coordination with each other. In addition, the department’s  NCCIC received and disseminated cyber-related information for public  and private-sector partners. Nevertheless, we identified deficiencies in critical infrastructure partners’  efforts to collaborate to monitor progress towards improving cybersecurity  within the sectors. Specifically, the SSAs for 12 sectors, including DHS  for 8 sectors, had not developed metrics to measure and report on the  effectiveness of their cyber risk mitigation activities or their sectors’  cybersecurity posture. This was because, among other reasons, the  SSAs rely on their private-sector partners to voluntarily share information  needed to measure efforts. We made two recommendations to DHS—one recommendation based on  its role as the SSA for 8 sectors and one recommendation based on its  role as the co-SSA for 1 sector—to collaborate with sector partners to  develop performance metrics and determine how to overcome challenges  to reporting the results of their cyber risk mitigation activities. DHS  concurred with the two recommendations. As of April 2018, DHS has not  demonstrated that it has implemented these recommendations. DHS has taken Steps to  Identify its Workforce  Gaps; However, It  Urgently Needs to Take  Actions to Identify Its  Position and Critical Skill  Requirements In February 2018, we reported that DHS had taken actions to identify,  categorize, and assign employment codes to its cybersecurity positions,  as required by the Homeland Security Cybersecurity Workforce  Assessment Act of 2014. However, its actions had not been timely and  complete. For example, DHS had not met statutorily defined deadlines  for completing actions to identify and assign codes to cybersecurity  positions or ensured that its procedures to identify, categorize, and code  its cybersecurity positions addressed vacant positions, as required by the  act. The department also had not (1) identified the individual within each  DHS component agency who was responsible for leading and overseeing  the identification and coding of the component’s cybersecurity positions or  (2) reviewed the components’ procedures for consistency with  departmental guidance. In addition, DHS had not yet completed its efforts to identify all of the  department’s cybersecurity positions and accurately assign codes to all  filled and vacant cybersecurity positions. In August 2017, DHS reported to  the Congress that it had coded 95 percent of the department’s identified  cybersecurity positions. However, we determined that the department  had, at that time, coded approximately 79 percent of the positions. DHS  overstated the percentage of coded positions primarily because it  excluded vacant positions, even though the act required the department  to report such positions. Further, although DHS had taken steps to identify its workforce capability  gaps, it had not identified or reported to the Congress on its department- wide cybersecurity critical needs that align with specialty areas. The  department also had not annually reported its cybersecurity critical needs  to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), as required; and it had  not developed plans with clearly defined time frames for doing so. We recommended that DHS take six actions, including ensuring that its  cybersecurity workforce procedures identify position vacancies and  responsibilities; reported workforce data are complete and accurate; and  plans for reporting on critical needs are developed. DHS concurred with  the six recommendations and stated that it plans to take actions to  address them by June 2018. In conclusion, DHS is unique among federal civilian agencies in that it is  responsible for improving and promoting the cybersecurity of not only its  own internal computer systems and networks but also those of other  federal agencies and the private-sector owners and operators of critical  infrastructure. Consistent with its statutory authorities and responsibilities  under federal policy, the department has acted to assist federal agencies  and private-sector partners in bolstering their cybersecurity capabilities. However, the effectiveness of DHS’s activities has been limited or not  clearly understood because of shortcomings with its programs and a lack  of useful performance measures. DHS needs to enhance its capabilities;  expedite delivery of services; continue to provide guidance and  assistance to federal agencies and private-sector partners; and establish  useful performance metrics to assess the effectiveness of its  cybersecurity-related activities. In addition, developing and maintaining a  qualified cybersecurity workforce needs to be a priority for the  department. Until it fully and effectively performs its cybersecurity  authorities and responsibilities, DHS’s ability to improve and promote the  cybersecurity of federal and private-sector networks will be limited. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, and Members of the  Committee, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond  to your questions. GAO Contacts and  Staff  Acknowledgments If you or your staffs have any questions about this testimony, please  contact Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or  wilshuseng@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional  Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this  statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Nabajyoti  Barkakati, Chris Currie, Larry Crosland, Tammi Kalugdan, David Plocher,  Di’Mond Spencer, and Priscilla Smith. Related GAO Products GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Additional Actions Are Essential  for Assessing Cybersecurity Framework Adoption, GAO-18-211  (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2018). GAO, Cybersecurity Workforce: Urgent Need for DHS to Take Actions to  Identify Its Position and Critical Skill Requirements, GAO-18-175  (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6, 2018). GAO, Federal Information Security: Weaknesses Continue to Indicate  Need for Effective Implementation of Policies and Practices, GAO-17-549  (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2017). GAO, Cybersecurity: Federal Efforts Are Under Way That May Address  Workforce Challenges, GAO-17-533T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2017). GAO, Information Security: DHS Needs to Continue to Advance Initiatives  to Protect Federal Systems, GAO-17-518T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28,  2017). GAO, High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While  Substantial Efforts Needed on Others, GAO-17-317 (Washington, D.C.:  Feb. 15, 2017). GAO, Cybersecurity: Actions Needed to Strengthen U.S. Capabilities,  GAO-17-440T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2017). GAO, Cybersecurity: DHS’s National Integration Center Generally  Performs Required Functions but Needs to Evaluate Its Activities More  Completely, GAO-17-163 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2017). GAO, Information Security: DHS Needs to Enhance Capabilities, Improve  Planning, and Support Greater Adoption of Its National Cybersecurity  Protection System, GAO-16-294 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2016). GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Measures Needed to Assess  Agencies’ Promotion of the Cybersecurity Framework, GAO-16-152  (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2015). GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector-Specific Agencies Need to  Better Measure Cybersecurity Progress, GAO-16-79 (Washington, D.C.:  Nov. 19, 2015). This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. 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The emergence of increasingly sophisticated threats and continuous reporting of cyber incidents underscores the continuing and urgent need for effective information security. GAO first designated information security as a government-wide high- risk area in 1997. GAO expanded the high-risk area to include the protection of cyber critical infrastructure in 2003 and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information in 2015. Federal law and policy provide DHS with broad authorities to improve and promote cybersecurity. DHS plays a key role in strengthening the cybersecurity posture of the federal government and promoting cybersecurity of systems supporting the nation's critical infrastructures. This statement highlights GAO's work related to federal programs implemented by DHS that are intended to improve federal cybersecurity and cybersecurity over systems supporting critical infrastructure. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on a body of work issued since fiscal year 2016 that highlighted, among other programs, DHS's NCPS, national integration center activities, and cybersecurity workforce assessment efforts. In recent years, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has acted to improve and promote the cybersecurity of federal and private-sector computer systems and networks, but further improvements are needed. Specifically, consistent with its statutory authorities, DHS has made important progress in implementing programs and activities that are intended to mitigate cybersecurity risks on the computer systems and networks supporting federal operations and our nation's critical infrastructure. For example, the department has: issued cybersecurity related binding operational directives to federal agencies; served as the federal-civilian interface for sharing cybersecurity related information with federal and nonfederal entities; Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity ; and Nevertheless, the department has not taken sufficient actions to ensure that it successfully mitigates cybersecurity risks on federal and private-sector computer systems and networks. For example, GAO reported in 2016 that DHS's National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) had only partially met its stated system objectives of detecting and preventing intrusions, analyzing malicious content, and sharing information. GAO recommended that DHS enhance capabilities, improve planning, and support greater adoption of NCPS. In addition, although the department's National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center generally performed required functions such as collecting and sharing cybersecurity related information with federal and non-federal entities, GAO reported in 2017 that the center needed to evaluate its activities more completely. For example, the extent to which the center had performed its required functions in accordance with statutorily defined implementing principles was unclear, in part, because the center had not established metrics and methods by which to evaluate its performance against the principles. Further, in its role as the lead federal agency for collaborating with eight critical infrastructure sectors including the communications and dams sectors, DHS had not developed metrics to measure and report on the effectiveness of its cyber risk mitigation activities or on the cybersecurity posture of the eight sectors. GAO reported in 2018 that DHS had taken steps to assess its cybersecurity workforce; however, it had not identified all of its cybersecurity positions and critical skill requirements. Until DHS fully and effectively implements its cybersecurity authorities and responsibilities, the department's ability to improve and promote the cybersecurity of federal and private-sector networks will be limited.