Background FSA seeks to ensure that all eligible individuals enrolled in postsecondary  education can benefit from federal financial aid for education. It is  responsible for implementing and managing programs authorized under  the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended. Specifically, Title IV of  the act authorizes the federal student assistance programs for which FSA  is responsible. These programs (Title IV programs) provide loans,  grants, and work-study funds to students attending college or career  school. In fulfilling its program obligations, FSA is responsible for  managing and overseeing almost $1.4 trillion in outstanding loans. In administering Title IV programs, FSA performs a variety of functions  across the student aid life cycle. These include educating students and families about the process of obtaining processing millions of student aid applications; disbursing billions of dollars in aid; enforcing financial aid rules and regulations;  servicing millions of student loans and helping borrowers avoid  default;  securing repayment from borrowers who have defaulted on loans; partnering with schools, lenders, and guaranty agencies to prevent  fraud, waste, and abuse; and  insuring billions of dollars in guaranteed student loans previously  issued by financial institutions. In carrying out these functions, FSA collects, maintains, and shares a  large amount of information, including sensitive personal information from  students and their families. The office also relies on various automated  systems to assist with student aid functions. Further, FSA works with  various entities, such as loan servicers, guaranty agencies, private  collection agencies, and lenders, to carry out loan servicing and collection  activities. Federal Student Financial  Aid Programs The three main categories of federal student financial aid are loans,  grants, and federal work-study. Loans are student aid funds that are  borrowed to help pay for eligible education programs and must be repaid  with interest. FSA administers loans under the William D. Ford Direct  Loan Program (Direct Loan) and the Federal Family Education Loan  (FFEL) Program, along with other programs, such as Perkins Loans, for  students demonstrating financial need. Direct Loans are loans for which the Department of Education is the  lender. They include subsidized loans made to undergraduate students based on  financial need, for which the government does not generally charge  interest while the student is in grace or deferment status; unsubsidized loans made to undergraduate and graduate students  for which the borrower is fully responsible for paying interest  regardless of loan status; PLUS loans made to graduate or professional students and parents  of dependent undergraduate students for which the borrower is fully  responsible for paying the interest regardless of the loan status; and consolidation loans, which allow the borrower to combine existing  federal student loans into a single new loan. FFEL loans are loans that were obtained through private lenders, with  federal subsidies ensuring that private lenders earned a certain yield on  the loans they made. Under this program, the Department of Education  entered into agreements with guaranty agencies to insure the private  lenders against losses due to a borrower’s default. Federal law ended the  origination of these loans as of July 1, 2010; however, FSA, lenders, and  guaranty agencies continue to service (i.e., handle billing and other  activities related to loan repayment) and collect outstanding FFEL loans.  According to FSA, borrowers’ eligibility is the same under both the Direct  Loan and FFEL programs. The department also administers student aid through grants, such as Pell  grants, which are student aid funds that generally do not have to be  repaid. It also administers the federal work-study program, which provides  part-time jobs for students with financial need, allowing them to earn  money to help pay educational expenses. In fiscal year 2017, FSA reported disbursing about $122.5 billion in aid to  students through its various programs. In addition, the portfolio of  outstanding FFEL loans totaled approximately $305.8 billion, as of  September 30, 2017. Table 1 provides details on the amounts of  financial aid disbursed to students in fiscal year 2017 across all financial  aid programs. Overview of the Financial  Aid Process The federal financial aid process is complex and consists of four phases:  school eligibility determination, student application and eligibility  determination, disbursement of funds, and repayment and collection of  loans. Each phase of the process is supported by automated FSA  information systems that collect and process student aid information. The  information is then used by FSA, schools, and other stakeholders to  determine the type and amount of aid a student is eligible to receive, and  to support the distribution and repayment of loans. See figure 1 for an  overview of the four phases. Federal Requirements for  Protecting Information and  Systems Federal laws and guidance specify requirements for protecting federal  systems and data. This includes systems used or operated by a  contractor or other organization on behalf of a federal agency. FISMA is intended to provide a comprehensive framework for ensuring  the effectiveness of security controls over information resources that  support federal operations and assets, as well as the effective oversight  of information security risks. The act requires each agency to develop,  document, and implement an agency-wide information security program  to provide risk-based protections for the information and information  systems that support the operations and assets of the agency, including  those provided or managed by another entity. The primary laws that provide privacy protections for personal information  accessed or held by the federal government are the Privacy Act of 1974  and the E-Government Act of 2002. These laws describe, among other  things, agency responsibilities with regard to protecting PII. The Privacy Act places limitations on agencies’ collection, disclosure, and  use of personal information maintained in systems of records. It  requires, among other things, that agencies issue system of records  notices to notify the public when the agencies establish or make changes  to a system of records. System of records notices are to identify, among  other things, the types of data collected, the types of individuals about  whom information is collected, the intended “routine” uses of the data,  and procedures that individuals can use to review and correct personal  information. In addition, the E-Government Act of 2002 requires agencies to conduct  assessments of the impact on privacy from using information systems to  collect, process, and maintain PII. A privacy impact assessment is an  analysis of how personal information is collected, stored, shared, and  managed in a federal system. In accordance with FISMA, OMB is responsible for the oversight of  agencies’ information security policies and practices. OMB establishes  requirements for federal information security programs and assigns  agency responsibilities to fulfill the requirements of statutes such as  FISMA. OMB requires agencies to oversee the implementation of security and  privacy controls by contractors and other non-federal entities that collect,  use, process, store, maintain, and disseminate federal information on  behalf of a federal agency. OMB notes that agencies are ultimately  responsible for ensuring that federal information is adequately protected,  commensurate with the risk resulting from the unauthorized access, use,  disclosure, modification, or destruction of such information. Accordingly,  OMB guidance states that, when sharing PII with contractors or other  non-federal entities, agencies should establish requirements for the  protection of their data in written agreements with these entities. For  specific technical direction, OMB requires agencies to implement  standards and guidelines established by NIST. FISMA also assigns certain responsibilities to NIST, including to develop  standards and guidelines for systems other than national security  systems. These standards and guidelines include (1) standards for  categorizing agency information and systems to provide appropriate  levels of information security, according to a range of risk levels; (2)  guidelines for the types of information and systems to be included in each  category; and (3) minimum information security requirements for  information and systems in each category. Accordingly, NIST has developed a series of information security  standards and guidelines for agencies to follow in managing information  security risk. NIST guidance provides steps that agencies can take to  identify appropriate security and privacy controls and establish specific  requirements for implementing those controls to ensure consistency both  internally and externally to the agency. NIST guidance also outlines  requirements for protecting the confidentiality of controlled unclassified  information (which includes PII) when it resides in a non-federal system or  organization. Relevant publications include the following: Federal Information Processing Standard 199, Standards for Security  Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems,  requires agencies to categorize their information systems as low- impact, moderate-impact, or high-impact for the security objectives of  confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The potential impact values  assigned to the respective security objectives are the highest values  from among the security categories that the agency identifies for each  type of information residing on those information systems. NIST Special Publication 800-53, Security and Privacy Controls for  Federal Information Systems and Organizations, provides a catalog  of security and privacy controls for federal information systems and  organizations. It also provides a process for selecting controls to  protect organizational operations, assets, individuals, other  organizations, and the nation from a diverse set of threats. These  threats include hostile cyber attacks, natural disasters, structural  failures, and human errors. The guidance includes privacy controls to  be used in conjunction with the specified security controls to achieve  comprehensive security and privacy protection. According to NIST,  the privacy controls are based on the Fair Information Practice  Principles embodied in the Privacy Act of 1974, the E-Government  Act of 2002, and OMB policies. NIST Special Publication 800-37, Guide for Applying the Risk  Management Framework to Federal Information Systems: A Security  Life Cycle Approach, explains how to apply a risk management  framework to federal information systems, including security  categorization, security control selection and implementation, security  control assessment, information system authorization, and security  control monitoring. NIST Special Publication 800-171, Protecting Controlled Unclassified  Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations, provides  federal agencies with recommended security guidance for protecting  the confidentiality of controlled unclassified information when it  resides in a non-federal system and organization. The Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,  serves as a baseline for protecting critical information assets. It is  intended to help organizations apply the principles and best practices  of risk management to improve the security and resilience of critical  infrastructure. The framework outlines a risk-based approach to  managing cybersecurity that is composed of three major parts: a  framework core, profile, and implementation tiers. Subsequent to the issuance of the NIST cybersecurity framework, a May  2017 executive order required agencies to use the framework to manage  cybersecurity risks. It also outlined actions to enhance cybersecurity  across federal agencies and critical infrastructure to improve the nation’s  cyber posture and capabilities against cybersecurity threats to digital and  physical security. In addition, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires financial institutions— companies that offer consumers financial products or services like loans,  financial or investment advice, or insurance—to explain their information- sharing practices to their customers and to safeguard sensitive data. As  part of its implementation of the act, the Federal Trade Commission  (FTC) issued the Safeguards Rule, which requires financial institutions  under FTC’s jurisdiction to have measures in place to keep customer  information secure. Specifically, the rule requires financial institutions to develop a  documented information security program that describes the  administrative, technical, or physical safeguards used to protect customer  information. The program must be appropriate to the company’s size and  complexity, the nature and scope of its activities, and the sensitivity of the  customer information it handles. As part of its program, each company  must designate one or more employees to coordinate its information  identify and assess the risks to customer information in each relevant  area of the company’s operation, and evaluate the effectiveness of  the current safeguards for controlling these risks; design and implement information safeguards to control risks and  regularly monitor and test their effectiveness;  select service providers that can maintain appropriate safeguards,  require them to maintain safeguards, and oversee their handling of  customer information; and evaluate and adjust the program in light of relevant circumstances,  including changes in the firm’s business or operations, or the results  of security testing and monitoring. GAO Previously  Highlighted the Need to  Improve Policies and  Procedures for the  Protection of Student Aid  Data We recently reported on aspects of FSA’s protection of student aid data,  noting that weaknesses existed in key processes. Specifically, in  November 2017, we reported, among other things, that FSA needed to  improve its policies and procedures for the management and protection of  student aid data. For example, while the agency had established  policies and procedures for key privacy requirements, such as publishing  notices to describe how personal information is to be maintained, used,  and accessed, it did not always ensure that privacy impact assessments  for its information systems included an analysis of privacy risks and  mitigation steps. In addition, we reported that FSA’s information security policies and  procedures were not always up to date. Further, we noted that the agency  needed to strengthen its oversight of schools’ implementation of federal  information security requirements to help ensure student aid information  was adequately protected. We recommended that the Secretary of Education take seven actions to  strengthen FSA’s management and protection of federal student aid  records and enhance its oversight of schools. For example, we  recommended that the agency incorporate information security program  requirements in its reviews of postsecondary schools, and that the  Department of Education update its regulation to include protections of  personal information as an element of a school’s ability to demonstrate its  administrative capability. FSA concurred or generally concurred with five  of our seven recommendations, partially concurred with one  recommendation, and did not concur with another. Non-School Partners  Play Key Roles in the  Federal Student Aid  Process and Have  Access to Large  Amounts of  Personally Identifiable  Information to  Facilitate Their  Activities FSA’s non-school partners play key roles in the federal student financial  aid program, particularly with regard to the servicing, repayment, and  collection of student loans. These partners include FFEL lenders, Title IV  loan servicers, guaranty agencies, and private collection agencies. FSA  shares a variety of PII with the non-school partners to assist them in  carrying out their functions. FSA’s Non-School  Partners Perform Key  Roles Related to Loan  Servicing, Repayment,  and Collection Non-school partners are involved primarily in the loan servicing,  repayment, and collection phases of the federal student aid process. FFEL lenders: During the administration of the FFEL program, these  lenders were involved primarily in the disbursement of funds. As part  of the program, students and parents obtained federal loans through  non-federal lenders, such as the borrower’s school, a bank, credit  union, or other lending institution. Generally, lenders provided the loan  proceeds to a student’s school, which then credited the student’s  account and disbursed the residual amount, if any, to the student. After a loan was disbursed, lenders chose to either service the loan,  contract with an outside organization for servicing, or sell the loan.  According to FSA, the majority of lenders have third-party servicers  that perform servicing, billing, and reporting on their behalf. The  lenders also work closely with guaranty agencies, which insure FFEL  loans in case of default, and oversee certain aspects of the lenders’  activities. As of June 2018, there were 1,079 lenders participating in  the FFEL program. Although FSA purchased a portion of the FFEL loans as a result of  disruptions in financial markets during the financial crisis of 2007 and  2008, the majority of the FFEL portfolio continues to be owned and  serviced by private lenders. These lenders are required to report  quarterly on their portfolios and are to sign participation agreements  with FSA requiring that electronic data submitted by the lenders be  accurate and conform to applicable laws, regulations, and policies.  FSA also noted that lenders are regulated by a variety of entities,  such as the FTC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal  Reserve, Department of the Treasury, and, in some cases, state  agencies. Title IV loan servicers: These organizations are primarily involved in  the repayment and collection phase of the aid process. Under the  Direct Loan program, after the loan is disbursed, the Department of  Education contracts with loan servicers to perform a variety of  administrative functions. Loan servicers are responsible for  collecting payments on a loan, advising borrowers on resources and  benefits to better manage their federal student loan obligations,  responding to customer service inquiries, and performing other  administrative tasks associated with maintaining a loan on behalf of  the Department of Education. In addition, once a Direct Loan becomes delinquent (i.e., the first day  after a borrower fails to make a scheduled monthly payment), loan  servicers may take several actions pending the loan entering default,  such as reaching out to past-due borrowers and entering into  repayment arrangements for loans. As of July 2018, FSA contracted  with 11 loan servicers. The contracts between FSA and the servicers establish the servicers’  responsibilities in the aid process. The contracts lay out requirements  for servicers with regard to financial reporting, internal controls,  accounting, and other areas. Guaranty agencies: These agencies are state or private non-profit  entities that are primarily involved in the repayment and collection  phase of the aid process. As part of the FFEL program, they receive  federal funds to play the lead role in administering aspects of the  program. These agencies’ functions include insuring private lenders  against losses due to a borrower’s default or other losses (the  guaranty agencies are, in turn, reinsured by the federal  government); providing assistance in preventing delinquent  borrowers from going into default; working with defaulted student and  parent borrowers to rehabilitate their defaulted loans, restore their  credit, and provide them with a fresh start; and reporting actions to  credit bureaus. Prior to July 2010, when the origination of FFEL loans stopped,  guaranty agencies also were involved in verifying student eligibility for  loans and notifying lenders, who would send a promissory note to  lenders for their signature and disburse the funds. According to FSA,  guaranty agencies continue to work closely with holders of FFEL  loans, including supporting them in default aversion activities and  overseeing aspects of their operations through monitoring, auditing,  and ensuring compliance with regulations. As of July 2018, 24  guaranty agencies were administering FFEL loans. FSA uses participation agreements to govern the agencies’  responsibilities in the aid process. The agreements lay out reporting  requirements, records retention periods, and other requirements. For  example, guaranty agencies are required to report to the Department  of Education on the loans they insure. They are also required to keep  records and have them available for inspection by the federal  government. Private collection agencies: Private collection agencies are also  primarily involved in the repayment and collection phase of the aid  process. If borrowers default on their loans after entering the  repayment phase, private collection agencies will attempt to enter into  voluntary repayment agreements, while ensuring that defaulted  borrowers are aware of both the consequences of their failure to  repay and the options available to help them get out of default. Other debt resolution functions performed by private collection  agencies include determining whether a borrower’s account is eligible  for administrative resolutions, such as discharge due to death or total  and permanent disability; determining whether a borrower’s account is  eligible for involuntary payment methods such as administrative wage  garnishment; preparing accounts for litigation; and returning accounts  to FSA for failure to convert the account to active repayment status.  As of July 2018, FSA had contracts with 18 private collection  agencies. These contracts describe the private collection agencies’  responsibilities in the aid process. FSA Shares Extensive  Amounts of Personally  Identifiable Information  about Borrowers with Non- School Partners In administering the federal student aid program, FSA shares a large  amount of PII that it collects from students and parents with its non-school  partners. This is particularly significant in that FSA directly manages or  oversees more than 203 million student loans made to approximately 43  million borrowers. PII collected when students or their parents apply for  financial aid includes, but is not limited to the following: Student demographics: Name, address, Social Security number,  telephone numbers, email address, marital status, driver’s license  number, etc. Student eligibility: Citizenship status, dependency status, high  school completion status, selective service registration (if applicable),  and whether the student has a drug conviction, among other  information. Student finances: Tax return filing status; adjusted gross income;  cash, savings, and checking account balances; untaxed income; and  current net worth of student’s assets. Parent demographics (if applicable): Name, Social Security  number, email address, and marital status. Parent finances: Tax return filing status, adjusted gross income, tax  exemptions, and asset information. After the borrower’s eligibility is determined or the funds are disbursed,  the PII that the agency collected as part of the process is stored on  several of FSA’s internal IT systems. FSA shares the PII stored on its systems with its non-school partners to  assist them in carrying out their respective functions. This sharing occurs  when the agency grants non-school partners access to specific systems.  According to FSA, the data that non-school partners have access to  depends on the non-school partner’s relationship with the individual  holding the loan. Table 2 provides a description of the FSA systems from  which non-school partners receive student aid data, as well as the types  of PII they contain. To gain access to FSA systems and data, non-school partners must  submit an application to use FSA’s Student Aid Internet Gateway (SAIG).  The SAIG application enables the enrolling organization (i.e., the non- school partner) to select services to receive, submit, view, and/or update  student financial aid data online, or receive or send information by batch  exchange. To gain access to services allowing them to receive, submit,  view, and update student aid data, each non-school partner must  designate a Primary Data Point Administrator, who is responsible for  determining which staff within the non-school partner’s organization are to  be given access to FSA’s systems and data. The primary Data Point  Administrator is also responsible for ensuring the privacy of the  information obtained or provided via the SAIG. According to FSA officials, enrollment for access to borrower data via the  SAIG varies based on the type of non-school partner and the functions it  performs. Further, the officials stated that non-school partners can only  access information about the borrowers with whom they are directly  involved. The services that non-school partners can access via the SAIG  include the following: Central Processing System data: Processed data from the Free  Application for Federal Student Aid are reported to institutions on the  Institutional Student Information Record, and corrections to data can  be made. Common Origination and Disbursement System data: Origination,  disbursement, and other required reporting information for the Direct  Loan program can be exchanged electronically between FSA and  non-school partners. National Student Loan Data System: Title IV, enrollment history  information, and federal grant information can be viewed and updated  by non-school partners. Financial Management System: Financial reporting information can  be sent by non-school partners to FSA. FSA’s Oversight of  Non-School Partners’  Protection of Student  Aid Data Is  Inconsistent As noted previously, OMB and NIST guidance calls for agencies to  oversee third-party entities with which they share PII to ensure that  appropriate security and privacy controls are in place. This guidance  identifies key practices for overseeing the protection of data by such  entities. These practices include the following, among others: Require the implementation of risk-based security and privacy  controls: NIST guidance states that agencies should categorize their  information and systems based on their risk impact level and require  the implementation of security controls that include one of three  baseline sets of controls that correspond to the impact level, tailored  to the system and organization as appropriate. Independently assess the implementation of security controls:  Security control assessments determine the extent to which controls  are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the  desired outcome. For external entities that store or process federal  information, NIST guidance states that agencies can verify that  controls have been implemented through independent, third-party  assessments or attestations. Develop and implement corrective actions: As part of the process  for conducting security control assessments, organizations should  develop remedial actions to address identified weaknesses and track  them to closure. Monitor the implementation of controls on an ongoing basis:  Ongoing monitoring includes ensuring that technical, management,  and operational security controls are tested at an organization-defined  frequency and results are provided to officials on an ongoing basis.  NIST guidance notes that agencies should monitor security control  compliance by external entities on an ongoing basis. This can be  achieved through reporting the security status of the system and  security controls on an ongoing basis. FSA has established policies and procedures for overseeing its non- school partners’ protection of the PII that it shares with the partners.  These policies and procedures vary in the extent to which they address  the key practices for overseeing the protection of PII. For example, FSA’s  policies and procedures for Title IV loan servicers and private collection  agencies fully address three of the four key practices. For guaranty  agencies, FSA’s procedures require onsite assessments but do not  require monitoring controls on an ongoing basis. Finally, for FFEL  lenders, FSA has minimal oversight procedures. FSA Established Security  Requirements for Loan  Servicers and Private  Collection Agencies FSA established policies and procedures for overseeing Title IV loan  servicers and private collection agencies that generally address the key  selected practices for overseeing the protection of data. Specifically, by  applying its standard contractor oversight processes, the agency has  addressed three of the four key practices that pertain to loan servicers  and private collection agencies. FSA partially addressed one practice  related to ensuring that the implementation and effectiveness of all  controls is monitored on an ongoing basis. Table 3 summarizes the extent  to which FSA’s processes address the key practices for loan servicers  and private collection agencies. FSA required loan servicers and private collection agencies to  implement risk-based security and privacy controls: FSA established  security requirements and guidance for loan servicers and private  collection agencies. These requirements are communicated through  provisions in the contracts that FSA has with the loan servicers and  private collection agencies. Specifically, FSA requires loan servicers and  private collection agencies to implement security controls in accordance  with NIST’s Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information  Systems and Organizations. The contracts also require loan servicers and private collection agencies  to adhere to applicable Department of Education and FSA security  policies and procedures. For example, the Department of Education’s  policy for security system categorization, which applies to contractor- owned systems (such as those owned by loan servicers and private  collection agencies), requires that systems containing PII be categorized  as, at a minimum, “moderate impact.” This categorization reflects an  assessment of the risks associated with a compromise of the information  and determines the selection of appropriate security controls for the  information system. In addition, FSA developed a standard operating procedure for  implementing security requirements based on this determination, which  applies to loan servicers and private collection agencies. This process for  categorizing systems and selecting and implementing controls is based  on NIST’s risk management framework, including steps for selecting,  implementing, and assessing controls, and authorizing the information  system to operate. FSA required independent assessments of the implementation of  security controls: To help ensure that loan servicers and private  collection agencies meet minimum security standards, FSA developed  procedures for assessing the implementation of security controls based  on applicable federal guidance. Specifically, FSA’s security authorizations  process includes procedures for an independent assessor to review  security controls implemented on the loan servicers’ and private collection  agencies’ systems. This includes, among other things, developing a test  plan; executing the plan, to include observing security controls; running  automated scans; and collecting artifacts and evidence. The independent  assessor then is to document the issues, findings, and recommendations  for remediation. According to FSA’s procedures, once the assessment of the loan  servicer’s or private collection agency’s system is completed, issues have  been identified, and a plan of action and milestones (POA&M) has been  developed, an FSA authorizing official is to review key documentation and  make a decision on whether to authorize the system to operate. This  decision is to be based on a determination as to whether the residual risk  to agency operations, agency assets, resources, or individuals resulting  from the operation of the system is acceptable. Once approved, the  authorization to operate the system is valid for 3 years, provided that the  conditions, if any, specified in the POA&M are met. FSA established a process for developing and implementing  corrective actions: FSA requires loan servicers and private collection  agencies to follow a standard operating procedure for documenting and  implementing corrective actions to address weaknesses identified during  security assessments. This procedure requires the owners of the systems  to work with their agencies’ information system security officers and  FSA’s internal independent validation and verification teams to document  deficiencies and remediation plans in the FSA’s POA&M management  tool, review and document evidence to close deficiencies, and provide  monthly updates on the status of POA&Ms, along with reasons for any  overdue items. FSA officials added that they are reviewing ways to further  automate the process for flagging overdue items. In addition, the procedure specifies time frames for system owners to  remediate weaknesses based on their criticality. To confirm that a  weakness has been addressed, the procedure requires FSA’s  independent validation and verification team to review submitted plans  and evidence and determine if they are sufficient to close the deficiency. FSA did not fully establish a process for monitoring all controls on  an ongoing basis: To monitor security controls between the independent  assessments supporting the authorization to operate process, FSA’s  contracts with loan servicers require the servicers to have a continuous  monitoring program, as defined by NIST SP 800-37. Similarly, FSA’s  contracts with private collection agencies require these agencies to enroll  their systems in FSA’s Continuous Security Authorization program, which  is intended to oversee and monitor the security controls in FSA’s  information systems on an ongoing basis. In addition, the contracts require the private collection agencies to ensure  that independent testing and monitoring of system security controls is  performed on an ongoing basis. The contracts require these tests to  cover a subset of the system security controls quarterly so that all  controls are tested at least once during a 3-year period. However, according to FSA Technology Office officials, neither loan  servicers nor private collection agencies have been enrolled in FSA’s  Continuous Security Authorization program, as required. The officials  added that they had not established a time frame to incorporate loan  servicers and private collection agencies into the agency’s continuous  monitoring program. According to the officials, both loan servicers and private collection  agencies rely on their own continuous monitoring programs to oversee  their systems; however, only the private collection agencies report the  results of their monitoring activities to FSA (on a quarterly basis). In  addition, FSA does not specify which controls the loan servicers and  private collection agencies are to test; rather, it leaves this determination  to the non-school partners. FSA policy also requires that loan servicers and private collection  agencies respond to an annual self-assessment questionnaire concerning  their implementation of NIST security and privacy controls. According to  the FSA officials, if deficiencies are noted in the agencies’ responses,  FSA works with the non-school partners to create POA&Ms and track  remediation efforts through closure. Officials in FSA’s Technology Office added that loan servicers participate  in FSA’s Web Application Surveillance Program, in which FSA conducts  vulnerability scans of the servicers’ systems and shares findings with the  servicers for remediation on a monthly or quarterly basis, depending on  the environment being tested. Nevertheless, while these processes can provide helpful information  about the loan servicers’ and private collection agencies’ security posture  on an ongoing basis, they do not ensure that all security controls  implemented on these partners’ systems are tested on a regular basis.  For example, according to FSA policy, the Web Application Surveillance  Program is intended to simulate the scanning and probing of a web  application that might be useful to intruders. However, the program is not  intended to ensure that management, operational, and technical controls  have been implemented. Without fully establishing policies and procedures for ongoing monitoring  of security controls implemented by loan servicers and private collection  agencies, FSA has less assurance that these controls are effectively  implemented and operating as intended. Further, FSA has a limited ability  to ensure that risks associated with these non-school partners’ use of PII  have been adequately mitigated. FSA Established Security  Requirements for  Guaranty Agencies, but  Lacks a Process for  Ongoing Monitoring of  Controls FSA policies and procedures requires guaranty agencies to implement  security and privacy controls to protect student aid data, and the agency  has recently enhanced its processes to include independent, on-site  assessments of those controls and the development of corrective actions  for identified weaknesses. However, it lacks processes for monitoring  guaranty agencies’ implementation of controls on an ongoing basis. Table  4 summarizes the extent to which FSA’s processes address the four key  practices for overseeing the protection of data by guaranty agencies. FSA did not fully specify a required baseline of risk-based security  and privacy controls for guaranty agencies: FSA requires, through  written agreements, that guaranty agencies participating in the federal  student aid program comply with federal security requirements.  Specifically, these agreements include an amendment that requires the  guaranty agencies to ensure that any information systems that include PII  about borrowers implement security and privacy controls specified in  NIST guidance. In addition, when applying for access to FSA systems and information  through the SAIG, guaranty agencies agree to protect the privacy of all  information that has been provided by the Department of Education. In  particular, guaranty agencies are required to affirm that administrative,  operational, and technical security controls are in place and operating as  intended. FSA provides guidance to guaranty agencies on implementing security  controls, in the form of a template to be used in completing an annual  self-assessment (discussed in more detail below). This template identifies  security and privacy controls to be used in the self-assessment, based on  the NIST control baseline for moderate-impact systems. The guaranty  agencies are expected to inform FSA as to whether they have  implemented these controls. However, the agreements FSA has established with guaranty agencies  do not specify that information must be maintained at a specific impact  level or that guaranty agencies are to implement a particular baseline set  of security controls that correspond to an agency established risk-based  impact level. As noted previously, once agencies determine the impact  level of their information or systems, they should select one of three  baselines of security controls (low, moderate, or high) that correspond to  the impact level. This baseline can then be tailored based on risk and the  specific organizational and system environment. According to FSA officials, the agreements allow the guaranty agencies to  determine whether their systems are low, moderate, or high impact. The  officials also added that guidance provided to guaranty agencies, such as  self-assessment questionnaires—are based on the NIST 800-53  moderate baseline. However, allowing guaranty agencies to determine the specific  designation could result in inconsistent implementation of security  controls if guaranty agencies choose varying impact levels for their  systems. OMB guidance states that agencies should require third parties  with whom PII is shared to maintain security at a specified impact level.  By not specifying in written agreements the impact level of the information  it shares with guaranty agencies, and a corresponding set of minimum  security requirements, FSA jeopardizes its ability to ensure that the PII it  shares with guaranty agencies will be adequately and consistently  protected. FSA established a process for on-site assessment of guaranty  agencies’ security and privacy controls: Prior to fiscal year 2018, FSA  relied on a self-assessment process, wherein guaranty agencies  completed annual questionnaires about their implementation of security  and privacy controls. The completed questionnaires were reviewed by  FSA staff, who then met with guaranty agency staff over the telephone to  discuss any identified weaknesses. As part of this process FSA staff did  not collect or review documentation to independently verify whether  controls had been appropriately implemented, or conduct on-site reviews  to obtain first-hand evidence of the implementation of the controls.  However, according to FSA officials, they also conducted targeted, on- site visits to selected guaranty agencies in 2016 and 2017 to verify  security control implementation. FSA has recently enhanced its process for assessing guaranty agencies’  implementation of security and privacy controls. FSA officials stated that,  in March 2018, they began a series of on-site assessments of guaranty  agencies which are to be completed by the end of September 2018. FSA  provided the guaranty agencies with a security plan template that outlines  roles and responsibilities, methodology, controls to be tested, and the test  plan approach for these assessments. In addition, the list of evidence  includes required artifacts to demonstrate compliance with NIST  requirements. FSA officials stated that they plan to alternate between on-site  assessments and self-assessments each year. By enhancing its  approach to assessing guaranty agencies’ implementation of security  requirements, FSA should be better positioned to ensure that the data  shared with these entities are being adequately protected. FSA processes include monitoring of guaranty agency corrective  actions: As part of the guaranty agency self-assessment process, FSA  established procedures for documenting weaknesses identified during the  self-assessments and corrective action plans for addressing the  weaknesses. FSA Deputy Chief Information Officer officials stated that  they track the corrective action plans in a system that provides weekly  status reports that include notifications of overdue corrective actions. The  officials added that all actions to correct weaknesses identified during the  self-assessments were to be taken within 12 months of identifying the  corrective actions. In April 2018, FSA officials stated that they intended to follow a procedure  similar to the one used for the self-assessments to document and monitor  corrective actions for weaknesses identified during the on-site  assessments of guaranty agencies’ security and privacy controls.  Specifically, the officials noted that all findings of weaknesses during the  on-site assessments are to be turned into POA&Ms, assigned an  expected completion date, and tracked to completion by FSA. This  procedure, if effectively implemented, should help FSA ensure that gaps  in security controls are remediated in a timely manner. FSA did not establish a process for monitoring all guaranty agency  controls on an ongoing basis: To monitor guaranty agencies’  compliance between assessments, FSA officials stated that they hold  weekly teleconferences with officials from guaranty agencies during which  they discuss new security requirements or other issues. FSA Information  Technology officials stated that they follow up with guaranty agencies  after these calls to ensure that they implement new requirements. In  addition, FSA issued guidance to guaranty agencies in January 2018 on  conducting vulnerability scans of these agencies’ systems. This guidance  addresses vulnerability testing guidelines and scanning requirements, as  well as guidance on security control testing. However, FSA does not monitor all security controls by requiring guaranty  agencies to report regularly on the status of security controls between on- site assessments. Neither the weekly teleconferences nor the  vulnerability scans include testing the implementation of all security and  privacy controls on a defined, periodic basis or reporting results to FSA. FSA officials stated that they rely on the on-site and self-assessments to  oversee guaranty agencies’ security control implementation because FSA  does not have a contractual relationship with guaranty agencies and does  not own the guaranty agencies’ systems. However, OMB and NIST note  that agencies have a responsibility for ensuring that their information is  protected at a consistent level even when such information is shared with  non-federal partners. Without fully establishing procedures for ongoing  monitoring of guaranty agencies, FSA cannot fully ensure that risks to the  student aid data containing PII that it shares with guaranty agencies have  been adequately mitigated. FSA Exercises Minimal  Oversight of FFEL  Lenders’ Protection of  Student Aid Data FSA established high-level requirements for FFEL lenders to protect  student aid data, but it exercises minimal oversight to ensure  implementation of security and privacy protections for these data. Table 5  summarizes the extent to which FSA’s processes for overseeing lenders  address key practices for overseeing the protection of data. FSA did not fully specify risk-based security and privacy controls  for FFEL lenders: Like other non-school partners, lenders must complete  FSA’s SAIG application when applying for access to FSA data and  systems. The SAIG application outlines general requirements for ensuring  the security and privacy of the data that FSA shares with the lenders. In addition, FFEL lenders enter into participation agreements with FSA  which include requirements related to data exchange, such as ensuring  that data lenders share with FSA are correct. Also, FSA officials told us  that security requirements are communicated to the lenders’ staff via  “dear colleague” letters and the security notices that appear when users  log on to the agency’s Access and Identity Management System to  access PII and other data. However, neither the SAIG application nor the participation agreement  requires the FFEL lenders to implement a baseline set of risk-based  security and privacy controls based on the impact level of the affected  information and systems. FSA Information Technology and Business  Operations officials said that they plan to add security and privacy  requirements to the FFEL lender participation agreements as part of their  next update during the 2018 revision cycle, but they did not specify what  requirements would be included in these revised agreements. Until FSA  establishes specific requirements for lenders’ protection of data, it will  lack assurance that information it shares is being protected in a manner  consistent with FSA’s determination of its sensitivity. FSA did not require independent assessments of FFEL lenders’  implementation of controls: FSA does not have policies or procedures  for independently assessing lenders’ implementation of protections for  student aid data. The SAIG application does not require an independent  assessment of the non-school partners’ information security and privacy  controls to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented  correctly, operating as intended, or producing the desired outcome with  respect to security. According to FSA officials, by accepting the terms of use displayed when  logging on to FSA systems, users agree to comply with security and  privacy requirements. The officials added that FSA monitors activity on  the National Student Loan Data System and can remove a user’s access  if a case of improper usage is identified. However, FSA’s procedures for  monitoring system usage do not include an independent assessment of  lenders’ implementation of security controls. Further, while FFEL lenders may be required to undergo various  compliance audits and program reviews, FSA has not determined the  extent to which these audits or reviews address security and privacy  protections; it also does not review the results of such reviews to gain  assurance that security and privacy protections are in place. Without  requiring evidence of such assessments, FSA does not have a basis for  ensuring that lenders are implementing adequate security and privacy  protections. FSA has not established a process for overseeing corrective actions  taken by FFEL lenders: Since FSA does not require independent  assessments of lenders’ information security controls, it does not have a  process for identifying weaknesses in the FFEL lenders’ security and  privacy controls and monitoring corrective actions. Lenders do not notify  FSA of security or privacy weaknesses that may be identified in their  systems, nor do they report on corrective actions taken to remedy such  weaknesses. In the absence of such reporting, FSA cannot ensure that  weaknesses in the security and privacy controls of the lenders’ systems  are being addressed. FSA did not establish procedures for monitoring FFEL lenders’  implementation of controls on an ongoing basis: FSA does not have  a process for ongoing monitoring of lenders’ implementation of security or  privacy safeguards. FSA does not require lenders to provide periodic  reports to FSA on their security and privacy posture or to conduct any  reviews of their implementation of security and privacy controls. Without  requiring evidence that lenders are effectively implementing security and  privacy protections, FSA cannot ensure that the data accessed by lenders  are being safeguarded commensurate with risk. Regarding the lack of FFEL lender oversight, FSA officials noted that  lenders, as financial institutions, are subject to a number of other legal  and regulatory requirements that were not defined by FSA as part of the  FFEL program. For example, lenders are subject to requirements for  protecting customer information imposed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act  and FTC’s Safeguards Rule, which calls for financial institutions to  document an information security program that includes specific  elements. However, FSA does not have a process for ensuring that lenders are  complying with these, or other, requirements related to the protection of  student aid data. Consequently, FSA lacks assurance that risk-based  safeguards commensurate with the sensitivity of these data are being  effectively implemented, tested, and monitored. In our previous work, we  similarly found that FSA did not have assurance that schools, which are  also required to comply with the FTC Safeguards Rule, were  implementing these requirements. OMB noted that agencies are ultimately responsible for ensuring that their  information is adequately protected, and NIST stated that this  responsibility does not change when information is shared with non- federal partners. Accordingly, agencies should have assurance that  information they share with non-federal entities is being protected at an  appropriate level. In the case of FSA, this could include leveraging  processes already in place, such as the FTC Safeguards Rule, to gain  assurance that appropriate security and privacy controls are in place and  are being regularly monitored and tested. Without establishing a process  for gaining such assurance, FSA is not meeting its responsibility to  ensure that borrowers’ data are being adequately protected. Conclusions FSA shares PII on millions of people with non-school partners (i.e., loan  servicers, private collection agencies, guaranty agencies, and FFEL  lenders) so that they can carry out key aspects of the federal student aid  program. FSA is responsible for ensuring that its non-school partners  protect this information by implementing adequate information security  and privacy safeguards. While FSA has taken steps to oversee the security and privacy  protections of some of its non-school partners, its policies and procedures  did not always include all key oversight practices. In particular, while FSA  established requirements for loan servicers and private collection  agencies, along with processes for ensuring their implementation that  generally adhered to the key practices, the agency had not ensured that  controls are tested and results are reported on an ongoing basis. FSA,  therefore, may lack visibility into the effectiveness of the protections  applied to student aid data. With respect to guaranty agencies, FSA established security and privacy  requirements and has taken steps to enhance security assessments.  Nevertheless, without ensuring that controls are monitored on an ongoing  basis, it lacks adequate assurance that security controls required by FSA  are in place and effective. Further, because it exercised minimal oversight over FFEL lenders, FSA  has limited assurance that they are protecting student aid data consistent  with the agency’s requirements. FSA’s limited oversight could result in  inconsistent or ineffective implementation of security controls, which in  turn could have serious consequences for the privacy of millions of  borrowers whose information is shared with non-school partners. Recommendations for  Executive Action We are making the following six recommendations to the Department of  Education: The Secretary of Education should enroll loan servicers in FSA’s  continuous monitoring program and, in the interim, require these  entities to report the results of security controls testing at an FSA- defined frequency.  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Education should enroll private collection agencies  in FSA’s continuous monitoring program, and, in the interim, require  these entities to test all controls at an FSA-defined frequency and  regularly report the results.  (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Education should modify FSA’s agreements with  guaranty agencies to specify a required baseline of security controls  based on the impact level of the information shared with these  agencies, as determined by FSA.  (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Education should establish a process for continuous  monitoring of guaranty agencies’ implementation of security and  privacy requirements between on-site assessments, to include testing  all controls at an FSA-defined frequency and regularly reporting  results.  (Recommendation 4) The Secretary of Education should include specific security and  privacy requirements in agreements with FFEL lenders based on  FSA’s categorization of the information shared with the lenders.  (Recommendation 5) The Secretary of Education should develop policies and procedures to  gain assurance that FFEL lenders have appropriate security and  privacy controls in place and that these controls are being regularly  tested and monitored.  (Recommendation 6) Agency Comments  and Our Evaluation We received written comments on a draft of this report from FSA. In its  comments (reprinted in appendix II), FSA concurred with three of our  recommendations, partially concurred with two recommendations, and did  not concur with one. In addition, FSA provided technical comments, which  we have incorporated as appropriate. FSA generally concurred with our first three recommendations and  described various actions it planned or had under way to implement them.  Specifically, regarding our recommendation to enroll loan servicers in  FSA’s continuous monitoring program (recommendation 1), the agency  stated that loan servicers are scheduled to be enrolled in its ongoing  security authorization program beginning in fiscal year 2019. Regarding our recommendation to enroll private collection agencies in  FSA’s continuous monitoring program and, in the interim, require these  entities to test all controls at an FSA-defined frequency and regularly  report the results (recommendation 2), FSA stated that it concurred,  although the actions it said it planned to take would not fully address the  recommendation. Specifically, the agency stated that it intends to work  with private collection agencies to identify specific relevant criteria to  strengthen continuous monitoring testing schedules and include these  criteria in private collection agencies’ quarterly reports to FSA. This  measure, if implemented effectively, would address the interim measure  called for in our recommendation. However, FSA did not describe actions to address the first part of our  recommendation. Specifically, it did not state whether it intended to enroll  private collection agencies in its ongoing security authorization program,  as called for by its contracts with these agencies. Doing so would provide  enhanced oversight of their implementation of security and privacy  controls. The agency concurred with our recommendation to modify FSA’s  agreements with guaranty agencies to specify a required baseline of  security controls (recommendation 3). In this regard, FSA stated that the  agreements it has established with guaranty agencies require them to  comply with standards in NIST Special Publication 800-53, revision 4, and  that assessments of the guaranty agencies require compliance with the  moderate-impact level control baseline under the applicable NIST  standards. Even though FSA did not describe plans to modify its  agreements with guaranty agencies to explicitly require a specific  baseline of controls, the procedures that it noted should help FSA ensure  that guaranty agencies are protecting student aid data based on the  office’s determination of risk. We intend to follow up with FSA to obtain  and assess the evidence supporting its implementation of these  recommendations. FSA stated that it partially concurred with two other recommendations.  With respect to establishing a process for continuous monitoring of  guaranty agencies’ implementation of security and privacy requirements  between on-site assessments, to include testing all controls at an FSA- defined frequency and regularly reporting results (recommendation 4),  FSA cited its process for on-site assessments or self-assessments as the  means by which it monitors guaranty agencies. Specifically, it stated that  it requires guaranty agencies to annually either complete a self- assessment or participate in an on-site assessment. However, FSA did not describe any additional steps it intends to take to  monitor guaranty agencies’ implementation of security and privacy  controls between assessments. As noted in the report, the self- assessment process that FSA established for guaranty agencies does not  include such elements as collecting or reviewing documentation to verify  that controls have been appropriately implemented. Further, FSA does  not monitor all security controls between on-site assessments by  requiring guaranty agencies to report regularly on the status of security  controls. Regular reporting on the status of security controls, such as test  results, would provide FSA with additional assurance that guaranty  agencies have implemented adequate protections. Thus, we believe our  recommendation remains appropriate. FSA also stated that it partially concurred with our recommendation to  include specific security and privacy requirements in agreements with  FFEL lenders based on FSA’s categorization of the information shared  with the lenders (recommendation 5). Specifically, FSA stated that it has  revised its 2019-2020 Lender Organization Participation Agreement with  FFEL lenders to include specific security and privacy responsibilities and  requirements, which is to be effective at the beginning of fiscal year 2019.  The planned actions that the agency described in its response should  fully address our recommendation, if effectively implemented. We intend  to follow up with FSA to obtain and assess the evidence supporting its  implementation of this recommendation. FSA did not concur with our recommendation to develop policies and  procedures to ensure that FFEL lenders have appropriate security and  privacy controls in place and that these controls are being regularly tested  and monitored (recommendation 6). According to the agency, it lacks  statutory authority under the Higher Education Act to monitor FFEL  lenders in this area. FSA noted that the lenders are already subject to  security and privacy controls that are monitored and enforced through  other legal authorities that are not administered by the Department of  Education or FSA. However, we continue to believe that our recommendation should be  implemented. We recognize that FSA may not have the authority to  impose additional requirements related to monitoring the adequacy of  security and privacy controls implemented by FFEL lenders. Furthermore,  the recommendation does not require FSA or the Department of  Education to exercise additional regulatory authority over FFEL lenders or  to conduct testing or other assessments of the lenders’ security and  privacy programs. Rather, it seeks for FSA to review the results of other  compliance audits or program assessments, including, as appropriate,  those conducted by other federal entities, to acquire visibility into the  lenders’ implementation of information security and privacy safeguards.  Leveraging such a process should help provide FSA with assurance that  the student aid data it shares with them are being adequately protected.  Accordingly, we have clarified our recommendation to better reflect its  intent. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretary of Education, and other interested parties. In  addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at  http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-9342 or marinosn@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix III. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and  Methodology The objectives of our review were to (1) describe the roles of the Office of  Federal Student Aid’s (FSA) non-school partners in the federal student  financial aid program, including the types of personally identifiable  information (PII) shared with them; and (2) assess the extent to which  FSA’s policies and procedures for overseeing non-school partners’  protection of federal student aid data align with federal requirements,  federal guidance, and best practices. To address the first objective, we obtained and reviewed various  documentation that described the federal student aid process and the  types of information collected, used, and shared in the process. To  determine the roles played by non-school partners in the federal student  aid process, we reviewed reports from the Department of Education and  FSA, including FSA’s annual reports for fiscal years 2016 and 2017, and  reports from the department’s Office of Inspector General; reports from  the Congressional Research Service on federal student aid programs;  and prior GAO reports on aspects of federal student aid programs. These  non-school partners included entities that FSA directly engages with to  carry out key aspects of the student aid process. These partners were non-federal lenders participating in the Federal Family Education Title IV loan servicers, guaranty agencies, and private collection agencies. Specifically, we identified key functions carried out by these partners, the  types of agreements they had with FSA, and the numbers of each type of  partner that FSA engages with. To determine the types of PII shared with non-school partners, we  reviewed FSA documentation on key systems used to collect, store, and  process information as part of the student aid process. This included  high-level documentation and descriptions of FSA’s systems architecture,  privacy impact assessments for FSA and non-school partner systems,  and information on the process by which FSA enrolls non-school partners  to share student aid data with the agency. We also reviewed previous  GAO reports on FSA’s management of student aid data, including PII  collected during the aid process. In addition, we interviewed FSA officials,  including officials from the agency’s technology and business operations  offices. To address the second objective, we reviewed and analyzed the policies,  procedures, and processes FSA has in place for overseeing non-school  partners’ protection of student aid data and compared them to federal  requirements and guidance for ensuring the protection of PII. We  identified key activities for overseeing the protection of PII by reviewing  laws, including the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of  2014; Office of Management and Budget requirements and guidance on  managing federal information; and National Institute of Standards and  Technology information security standards and guidance. Based on our  review of these requirements and guidance, we identified four key  practices for establishing security and privacy requirements for non- federal entities and overseeing the implementation of these requirements.  These practices are  require the implementation of risk-based security and privacy controls,  independently assess the implementation of security controls, develop and implement corrective actions, and monitor the implementation of controls on an ongoing basis. We collected and reviewed evidence provided by FSA (policy and  process documents, artifacts, written responses to questions, and verbal  responses to questions) to understand its processes for overseeing the  non-school partners’ protection of student aid data. We then compared  the processes to the four key practices we identified. We determined  whether the process met, partially met, or did not meet the key practices: Met – the agency provided evidence of processes and procedures  that address all aspects of the key practice. Partially met – the agency provided evidence of processes and  procedures that address some, but not all aspects of the key practice. Not met – the agency did not provide evidence of processes and  procedures that addressed the key practice. We supplemented our review with interviews of FSA Business Operations  and Information Technology officials with knowledge of and responsibility  for the oversight of non-school partners. We also reviewed relevant  Department of Education inspector general reports. We conducted this performance audit from June 2017 to September 2018  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix II: Comments from the Office of  Federal Student Aid Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff  Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff  Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, John De Ferrari (assistant  director), Chris Businsky, Marisol Cruz, Rebecca Eyler, Lee McCracken,  David Plocher, and Bruce Rackliff made key contributions to this report.
FSA administers billions of dollars in student financial aid, including loans and grants, to eligible college students. The processing of student aid is complex, and FSA relies on non-school partners to carry out various activities supporting the student aid process, such as loan repayment and collection. GAO was asked to review how FSA ensures the protection of PII by its non-school partners. The objectives of this review were to (1) describe the roles of non-school partners and the types of PII shared with them and (2) assess the extent to which FSA policies and procedures for overseeing the non-school partners' protection of student aid data adhere to federal requirements, guidance, and best practices. To address these objectives, GAO collected and reviewed FSA documentation, reports, policies, and procedures and compared FSA policies and procedures to four key practices included in federal guidance for overseeing the protection of PII by non-federal entities. GAO also interviewed FSA officials with responsibility for the oversight of non-school partners. The Department of Education's Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA) partners with various entities (“non-school partners”) that are involved primarily in supporting the repayment and collection of student loans. Federal loan servicers are responsible for collecting payments on loans and providing customer service to borrowers on behalf of the Department of Education through its Direct Loan program. Private collection agencies collect on loans that are in default and work with borrowers to help them get out of default. Guaranty agencies insure lenders against loss due to borrower default and carry out a variety of loan administration activities. Federal Family Education Loan lenders are non-federal lenders, such as banks, credit unions, or other lending institutions, that made loans to students in the past and continue to service these loans. FSA shares a variety of personally identifiable information (PII) on borrowers with its non-school partners. This includes names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, Social Security numbers, and financial information. Key practices for overseeing the protection of PII shared with non-federal entities include requiring (1) risk-based security and privacy controls, (2) independent assessments to ensure controls are effectively implemented, (3) corrective actions to address identified weaknesses in controls, and (4) ongoing monitoring of control status. FSA established oversight policies and procedures for loan servicers and private collection agencies that generally address these key practices. However, FSA exercises minimal oversight of lenders' protection of student data (see table). FSA officials maintain that the lenders are subject to other legal and regulatory requirements for protecting customer data. However, FSA does not have a process for ensuring lenders are complying with these requirements, and thus lacks assurance that appropriate risk-based safeguards are being effectively implemented, tested, and monitored.