Background NASA’s mission is to drive advances in science, technology, aeronautics,  and space exploration, and contribute to education, innovation, our  country’s economic vitality, and the stewardship of the Earth. To  accomplish this mission, NASA establishes programs and projects that  rely on complex instruments and spacecraft. NASA’s portfolio of major  projects ranges from space satellites equipped with advanced sensors to  study the Earth to a telescope intended to explore the universe to  spacecraft to transport humans and cargo to and beyond low-Earth orbit.  Some of NASA’s projects are expected to incorporate new and  sophisticated technologies that must operate in harsh, distant  environments. The life cycle for NASA space flight projects consists of two phases— formulation, which takes a project from concept to preliminary design, and  implementation, which includes building, launching, and operating the  system, among other activities. NASA further divides formulation and  implementation into phase A through phase F. Major projects must get  approval from senior NASA officials at key decision points before they  can enter each new phase. Figure 1 depicts NASA’s life cycle for space  flight projects. Formulation culminates in a review at key decision point C, known as  project confirmation, where cost and schedule baselines are established  and documented in a decision memorandum. To inform those baselines,  each project with a life-cycle cost estimated to be greater than $250  million must also develop a joint cost and schedule confidence level  (JCL). The JCL initiative, adopted in January 2009, is a point-in-time  estimate that, among other things, includes all cost and schedule  elements, incorporates and quantifies known risks, assesses the impacts  of cost and schedule to date, and addresses available annual resources.  NASA policy requires that projects be baselined and budgeted at the 70  percent confidence level. The agency baseline commitment established at key decision point C  includes cost and schedule reserves held at the project—those within the  project manager’s control—and NASA headquarters level. Cost reserves are for costs that are expected to be incurred—for instance, to address  project risks—but are not yet allocated to a specific part of the project.  Schedule reserves are extra time in project schedules that can be  allocated to specific activities, elements, and major subsystems to  mitigate delays or address unforeseen risks. Status of NASA’s  Major Telescope  Projects NASA’s current portfolio of major space telescopes includes three  projects—WFIRST, TESS, and JWST—that vary in cost, complexity, and  phase of the acquisition life cycle. WFIRST, a project that entered the  concept and technology development phase and established preliminary  cost and schedule estimates in February 2016, is in the earliest stages of  the acquisition life cycle. With preliminary cost estimates ranging from  $3.2 billion to $3.8 billion, this project is an observatory designed to  perform wide-field imaging and survey of the sky at near-infrared  wavelengths to answer questions about the structure and evolution of the  universe and to expand our knowledge of planets beyond our solar  system. The current design includes a 2.4 meter telescope that was built  and qualified for another federal agency over 10 years ago; the project is  evaluating which components to reuse and which to modify, refurbish, or  build new. TESS—a smaller project whose latest cost estimate is  approximately $337 million—is targeted to launch in March 2018 and will  be used to conduct the first extensive survey of the sky from space for  transiting exoplanets. And finally, JWST, with a life-cycle cost estimate of $8.835 billion, is one  of NASA’s most complex projects and top priorities. The telescope is  designed to help understand the origin and destiny of the universe, the  creation and evolution of the first stars and galaxies, and the formation of  stars and planetary systems. With a 6.5-meter primary mirror, JWST is  expected to operate at about 100 times the sensitivity of the Hubble  Space Telescope. JWST’s science instruments are to detect very faint  infrared sources and, as such, are required to operate at extremely cold  temperatures. To help keep these instruments cold, a multi-layered  tennis-court-sized sunshield is being developed to protect the mirrors and  instruments from the sun’s heat. We have reported for several years on the JWST project, which has  experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays. Prior to  being approved for development, cost estimates for JWST ranged from  $1 billion to $3.5 billion, with expected launch dates ranging from 2007 to  2011. Before 2011, early technical and management challenges,  contractor performance issues, low levels of cost reserves, and poorly  phased funding levels caused JWST to delay work after confirmation,  which contributed to significant cost and schedule overruns, including  launch delays. The Chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Commerce,  Justice, Science, and Related Agencies requested from NASA an  independent review of JWST in June 2010. In response, NASA  commissioned the Independent Comprehensive Review Panel, which  issued its report in October 2010. The panel concluded that JWST was  executing well from a technical standpoint, but that the baseline cost  estimate did not reflect the most probable cost with adequate reserves in  each year of project execution, resulting in an unexecutable project. Following this review, Congress in November 2011 placed an $8 billion  cap on the formulation and development costs for the project and NASA  rebaselined JWST with a life-cycle cost estimate of $8.835 billion that  included additional money for operations and a planned launch in October  2018. The new baseline represented a 78 percent increase to the  project’s life-cycle cost from the original baseline and a launch date in  October 2018, a delay of 52 months. The revised life-cycle cost estimate  included a total of 13 months of funded schedule reserve. Our ongoing work indicates that these three projects are each making  progress in line with their phase of the acquisition cycle, but also face  challenges in execution. Some of these challenges are unique to the  projects themselves and some are common among the projects in  NASA’s portfolio. For example, when projects enter the integration and  test phase, unforeseen challenges can arise and affect the cost and  schedule for the project. Table 1 provides more details about the current  acquisition phase, cost, and schedule status of NASA’s major space  telescope projects based on our ongoing work. WFIRST. NASA’s preliminary cost and schedule estimates for the  WFIRST project are currently under review as the project responds to  findings in the WFIRST Independent External  Technical/Management/Cost Review. This independent review was  conducted to ensure the mission’s scope and required resources are well  understood and executable. NASA initiated this review in April 2017 to  address the National Academies’ concerns that WFIRST cost growth  could endanger the balance of NASA’s astrophysics program and  negatively affect other scientific priorities. The review found that the  mission scope is understood, but not aligned with the resources provided  and concluded that the mission is not executable without adjustments  and/or additional resources. For example, the study team found that  NASA’s current forecasted funding profile for the WFIRST project would  require the project to slow down activities starting in fiscal year 2020,  which would result in an increase in development cost and schedule.  NASA agreed with the study team’s results and directed the project to  reduce the cost and complexity of the design in order to maintain costs  within the $3.2 billion cost target. The project is currently identifying potential ways to reduce the scope of  planned activities (called “descopes”), assessing the science impact of  those descopes, and then developing recommendations for the  Astrophysics Division leadership. An example of a descope that may be  considered is the requirement for WFIRST to be “star-shade ready,”  which means the design must be compatible with a star-shade device that  is positioned between it and the star being observed to block out starlight  while allowing the light emitted by the planet through. TESS. The TESS project is currently holding cost and schedule reserves  consistent with NASA center requirements, but there are no longer  headquarters-held cost reserves to cover a delay if the project cannot  launch as planned in March 2018. According to a project official, the  project is holding 16 days of schedule reserve to its target March 2018  launch readiness date, which includes 6 days for the completion of  integration and test, and 10 days for launch operations. The project  previously used schedule reserves to accommodate the delayed delivery  of its Ka-band transmitter, which is essential for TESS as it transmits the  mission data back to Earth, due to continued performance and  manufacturing issues. The two main risks to the March 2018 launch date  are if: 1) SpaceX requires additional time past December 2017 for  NASA’s Launch Services Program to certify that TESS can fly on its  upgraded launch vehicle—certification is necessary because it will be the  first time that NASA will use this version of the vehicle—and 2) any issues  are identified during the remainder of environmental testing. The project is also conducting additional testing on its spare camera at  temperatures seen in space to better understand expected camera  performance on orbit. TESS will use four identical, wide field-of-view  cameras to conduct the first extensive survey of the sky from space for  transiting exoplanets. However, during thermal testing, the project found  that the substance attaching the lenses to the camera barrel places  pressure on the lenses and causes the cameras to be slightly out of  focus. In June 2017, NASA directed the project to proceed with  integrating the cameras—as they are expected to meet TESS’s top level  science requirements even with the anomaly. At its most recent key  decision review in August 2017, NASA reallocated $15 million of TESS’s  headquarters-held reserves to the WFIRST project. While this had the  effect of decreasing life cycle costs for TESS, it also increased risk as the  project no longer has any additional headquarters-held cost reserves to  cover a launch delay past March 2018. JWST. The JWST project continues to make progress towards launch,  but the program is encountering technical challenges that require both  time and money to fix and may lead to additional delays, beyond a delay  recently announced. While the project has made much progress on  hardware integration and testing over the past several months, it also  used all of its remaining schedule reserves to address various technical  issues, particularly on the spacecraft element. In September 2017, the  JWST project requested from the European Space Agency—who will  contribute the Ariane V launch vehicle—a launch window from March to  June 2019, or 5 to 8 months later than the planned October 2018 launch  readiness date, established in 2011. The project based this request on  the results of a schedule risk assessment that incorporated inputs from  the contractor on expected durations of ongoing spacecraft element  integration work and other challenges that were expected to increase  schedule. With the later launch window to June 2019, the project expected to have  up to 4 months of new schedule reserves. However, shortly after  requesting the revised launch window, the project learned from its  contractor that up to another 3 months of schedule reserve use is likely,  due to lessons learned from conducting deployment exercises of the  sunshield, such as reach and access limitations on the flight hardware. As  a result, and pending further examination of the schedule, the project now  has approximately one month of schedule reserve to complete  environmental testing of the spacecraft element and the final integration  phase. The final integration phase is where the instruments and telescope  will be integrated with the spacecraft and sunshield to form the completed  observatory. As I previously noted, our work has shown the integration  and test is the riskiest phase of development, where problems are most  likely to be found and schedules slip. Given the risks associated with the  integration and test work ahead, coupled with a level of schedule  reserves that is currently well below the level stated in the procedural  requirements issued by the NASA center responsible for managing  JWST, additional delays to the project’s revised launch readiness date of  June 2019 are likely. As a result, the funding available under the  Congressional cost cap of $8 billion may be inadequate as the contractor  will need to continue to retain higher workforce levels for longer than  expected to prepare the mission for a delayed launch. Lessons Learned  from NASA  Acquisitions As Congress, NASA, and the science community consider future  telescope efforts, it will be exceedingly important to shape and manage  new programs in a manner that minimizes cost overruns and schedule  delays. This is particularly important for the largest programs as even  small cost increases can have reverberating effects. NASA’s telescope  and other science projects will always have inherent technical, design,  and integration risks because they are complex, specialized, and often  push the state of the art in space technology. But too often, our reports  find that management and oversight problems—which can include poor  planning, optimistic cost estimating, funding gaps, lax oversight, and poor  contractor performance, among other issues—are the real drivers behind  cost and schedule growth. To its credit, NASA has taken significant steps, partly in response to our  past recommendations, to reduce acquisition risk from both a technical  and management standpoint, including actions to enhance cost and  schedule estimating, provide adequate levels of reserves to projects,  establish better processes and metrics to monitor projects, and expand  the use of earned value management to better monitor contractor  performance. For example, in November 2012, we found that NASA  employee skill sets available to analyze and implement earned value  management vary widely from center to center, and we recommended  that NASA conduct an earned value management skills gap analysis to  identify areas requiring augmented capability across the agency, and,  based on the results of the assessment, develop a workforce training plan  to address any deficiencies. NASA concurred with this recommendation  and developed an earned value management training plan in 2014 based  on the results of an earned value management skills gap analysis that  was conducted in 2013. Moreover, in recent years, we have found that  many of the projects within the agency’s major project portfolio have  improved their cost and schedule performance. Nevertheless, the extent  to which NASA has adopted some of the following lessons learned within  its portfolio of major projects is mixed, and NASA has an opportunity to  strengthen its program management of major acquisitions, including its  space telescopes, by doing so. Manage Cost and Schedule Performance for Large Projects to Limit  Implications for Entire Portfolio. In 2013, following JWST’s cost  increases and schedule growth, we found that though cost and schedule  growth can occur on any project, increases associated with NASA’s most  costly and complex missions can have cascading effects on the rest of  the portfolio. For example, we found that the JWST cost growth would  have reverberating effects on the portfolio for years to come and required  the agency to identify $1.4 billion in additional resources over fiscal years  2012 through 2017, according to Science Mission Directorate officials.  NASA identified approximately half of this required funding from the four  science divisions within the Science Mission Directorate account. The  majority of the cuts were related to future high priority missions, missions  in the operations and sustainment phase, and research and analysis. In essence, NASA had to mortgage future high priority missions and  research to address JWST’s additional resource needs. Similarly, the  National Academy of Sciences has concluded in the past that it is  important for NASA to have a clearly articulated and consistently applied  method for prioritizing why and how its scarce fiscal resources are  apportioned with respect to the science program in general and on a  more granular level among component scientific disciplines. The  academy noted that failure to do so could result in a loss of capacity,  capability, and human resources in a number of scientific disciplines and  technological areas that may take a generation or more to reconstitute  once eliminated. NASA’s establishment of the WFIRST Independent  External Technical/Management/Cost Review that I previously discussed  is a step in the right direction to help ensure the Astrophysics Division  incorporates this lesson learned. Establish Adequate Cost and Schedule Reserves to Address Risks.  Twice in the history of the JWST program, independent reviewers found  that the program’s planned cost reserves were inadequate. First, in April  2006, an Independent Review Team confirmed that the project’s technical  content was complete and sound, but expressed concern over the  project’s reserve funding, reporting that it was too low and phased in too  late in the development lifecycle. The review team reported that for a  project as complex as JWST, 25 to 30 percent total reserve funding was  appropriate. The team cautioned that low reserve funding compromised  the project’s ability to resolve issues, address risk areas, and  accommodate unknown problems. As I previously mentioned, following  additional cost increases and schedule threats, NASA commissioned the  Independent Comprehensive Review Panel. In 2010, the panel again  concluded JWST was executing well from a technical standpoint, but that  the baseline cost estimate did not reflect the most probable cost with  adequate reserves in each year of project execution, resulting in an  unexecutable project. NASA heeded these lessons when it established a new baseline for  JWST in 2011. For example, the revised schedule included more  reserves than required by the procedural requirements issued by the  NASA center responsible for managing JWST. We have found, however,  that NASA has not applied this lesson learned to all of its large projects— most notably with its human spaceflight projects, including the Space  Launch System, Orion Crew Capsule, and associated ground systems— and similar outcomes to the JWST project have started to emerge with  these projects. We previously reported that all three of these programs  were operating with limited cost reserves, which limited each program’s  ability to address risks and unforeseen technical challenges. For example, we found in July 2016 that the Orion program planned to  maintain very low levels of annual cost reserves until 2018. The lack of  available cost reserves in the near term led to the program deferring work  to address technical issues to stay within budget, and put the program’s  future cost reserves at risk of being overwhelmed by deferred work. In  April 2017, we also found that all three programs faced development challenges in completing work, and each had little to no schedule reserve  remaining to the launch date—meaning they would have to complete all  remaining work with minimal delay during the most challenging stage of  development. We found that it was unlikely that the programs would  achieve the planned launch readiness date and recommended that NASA  reassess the date. NASA agreed with this recommendation and stated  that it would establish a new launch readiness date. In November 2017,  NASA announced that a review of the possible manufacturing and  production schedule risks indicated a launch date of June 2020—a delay  of 19 months—but the agency will manage to a December 2019 launch  date because, according to NASA, they have put in mitigation strategies  for those risks. We will follow-up on those mitigation strategies as part of  future work on the human space exploration programs. Regularly and Consistently Update Project JCLs to Provide Realistic  Estimates to Decision Makers. In 2009, NASA began requiring that  programs and projects with estimated life-cycle costs greater than $250  million develop a JCL prior to project confirmation. This was a positive  step for NASA to help ensure that cost and schedule estimates are  realistic and projects are thoroughly planning for anticipated risks. This is  because a JCL assigns a confidence level, or likelihood, of a project  meeting its cost and schedule estimates. Our cost estimating best  practices recommend that cost estimates should be updated to reflect  changes to a program or be kept current as a program moves through  milestones. As new risks emerge on a project, an updated cost and  schedule risk analysis can provide realistic estimates to decision-makers,  including the Congress. This is especially true for NASA’s largest projects  as updated estimates may require the Congress to consider a variety of  actions. However, there is no requirement for NASA projects to update their JCLs,  and our prior work has found that projects—including JWST—do not  regularly update cost risk analyses to take into account newly emerged  risks. Our ongoing work indicates that of the 16 major projects currently in NASA’s portfolio that have developed JCL estimates, only 2 have  reported updating their JCLs (other than required due to a rebaseline).  For example, the Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations,  Geodesy, and Heat Transport Project (InSight), a Mars lander, updated  its JCL after the project missed its committed launch date. As a result, the  project was able to provide additional information to decision makers  about the probability that it will meet its revised cost and schedule  estimates. As a project reaches the later stages of development,  especially integration and testing, the types of risks the project will face  may change. An updated project JCL would provide both project and  agency management with data on relevant risks that can guide the project  decisions. For example, in December 2012, we recommended the JWST  project update its JCL. NASA concurred with this recommendation;  however, we recently closed the recommendation because NASA had not  taken steps to implement it and the amount of time remaining before  launch would not have allowed the benefit of implementing the  recommendation to be realized. An updated JCL may have portended the  current schedule delays, which could have been proactively addressed by  the project. Enhance Oversight of Contractors to Improve Project Outcomes. In  December 2012, we found that the JWST project had taken steps to  enhance communications with and oversight of its contractors.  According to project officials, the increased communication allowed them  to better identify and manage project risks by having more visibility into  contractors’ activities. The project reported that a great deal of  communication existed across the project prior to the Independent  Comprehensive Review Panel; however, additional improvements were  made. For example, the project increased its presence at contractor  facilities as necessary to provide assistance; this included assigning two  engineers on a recurring basis at a Lockheed Martin facility to assist in  solving problems with an instrument. The JWST project also assumed full  responsibility for the mission system engineering functions from Northrop  Grumman in March 2011. NASA and Northrop Grumman officials both  said that NASA is better suited to perform these tasks. We continue to see instances in our ongoing work that highlight the  importance of implementing this lesson learned from JWST. For example, we found in 2017 that the Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment  project—a project that plans to develop and deliver a new ground system  for one Space Network site that provides essential communications  tracking services to NASA and non-NASA missions—exceeded its  original cost baseline by at least $401.7 million and been delayed by 27  months. The project has attributed some of the cost overruns and  schedule delays to the contractor’s incomplete understanding of its  requirements, which led to poor contractor plans and late design  changes. The project also took steps to assign a new NASA project  manager, increase physical presence at the contractor facility, and have  more staff focused on validation and verification activities. In summary, NASA continues to make progress developing its space  telescopes to help understand the universe and our place in it. But much  like other major projects that NASA is developing, there continues to be  an opportunity for NASA to learn from JWST and other projects that have  suffered from cost overruns and schedule delays. Key project  management tools and prior GAO recommendations that I have  highlighted here today, could help to better position these large, complex,  and technically challenging efforts for a successful outcome. We look  forward to continuing to work with NASA and this subcommittee in  addressing these issues. Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Bera, and Members of the  Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be  pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. GAO Contact and  Staff  Acknowledgments If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please  contact Cristina T. Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing  Management at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for  our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found  on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions  to this statement include Molly Traci, Assistant Director; Richard  Cederholm, Assistant Director; Carrie Rogers; Lisa Fisher; Laura  Greifner; Erin Kennedy; and Jose Ramos. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety  without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain  copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be  necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Acquisition management has been a long-standing challenge at NASA, although GAO has reported on improvements the agency has made in recent years. Three space telescope projects are the key enablers for NASA to achieve its astrophysics' science goals, which include seeking to understand the universe. In its fiscal year 2018 budget request, NASA asked for about $697 million for these three projects, which represents over 50 percent of NASA's budget for its astrophysics' major projects. In total, these projects represent an expected investment of at least $12.4 billion. This statement reflects preliminary observations on (1) the current status and cost of NASA's major telescope projects and (2) lessons learned that can be applied to NASA's management of its telescope projects. This statement is based on ongoing work on JWST and ongoing work on the status of NASA's major projects. Both reports are planned to be published in Spring 2018. This statement is also based on past GAO reports on JWST and NASA's acquisitions of major projects, and NASA input. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) current portfolio of major space telescopes includes three projects that vary in cost, complexity, and phase of the acquisition life cycle. GAO's ongoing work indicates that these projects are each making progress in line with their phase of the acquisition cycle but also face some challenges. For example, the current launch date for the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project reflects a 57-60-month delay from the project's original schedule. GAO's preliminary observations indicate this project still has significant integration and testing to complete, with very little schedule reserve remaining to account for delays. Therefore, additional delays beyond the delay of up to 8 months recently announced are likely, and funding available under the $8 billion Congressional cost cap for formulation and development may be inadequate. There are a number of lessons learned from its acquisitions that NASA could consider to increase the likelihood of successful outcomes for its telescope projects, as well as for its larger portfolio of projects, such as its human spaceflight projects. For example, twice in the history of the JWST program, independent reviews found that the program was not holding adequate cost and schedule reserves. GAO has found that NASA has not applied this lesson learned to all of its large projects, and similar outcomes to JWST have started to emerge. For example, NASA did not incorporate this lesson with its human spaceflight programs. In July 2016 and April 2017, GAO found that these programs were holding inadequate levels of cost and schedule reserves to cover unexpected cost increases or delays. In April 2017, GAO recommended that NASA reassess the date of the programs' first test flight. NASA concurred and, in November 2017, announced a launch delay of up to 19 months.