Background Overview of Peacekeeping  Operations In accordance with the UN Charter, peacekeeping operations aim to  maintain international peace and security, among other things. The UN  has deployed 71 peacekeeping operations since 1948. As of December  2018, the UN had 14 active peacekeeping operations worldwide (see fig.  1). We have previously reported that UN peacekeeping operations have  become more complex since 1998. Traditional UN peacekeeping  operations were primarily military in nature and limited to monitoring  cease-fire agreements and stabilizing situations on the ground while  political efforts were made to resolve conflicts. More recently, in response  to increasingly complex situations in which conflicts may be internal,  involve many parties, and include civilians as deliberate targets, several  UN peacekeeping operations deploy civilian and police personnel, in  addition to those from the military, and focus on peacebuilding activities. Key UN Components in  Establishing UN  Peacekeeping Operations There are three principal UN bodies active in peacekeeping: The General Assembly, which consists of 193 member states that  work through membership in one of six main committees and various  subsidiary components tasked with specific issue areas. The Security Council, which has 15 members, including 5 permanent  members with veto power: the United States, the United Kingdom,  France, Russia, and China. The remaining 10 members of the  Security Council are elected for 2-year terms to ensure geographical  representation. The Secretariat, which comprises the administrative component of the  UN and is led by the Secretary-General, who has responsibility for  managing multiple UN departments, offices, and activities. The United States holds positions in two of these three components—the  General Assembly and the Security Council. See table 1 for more  information. The United States’ Role in  UN Peacekeeping State’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs (State/IO) and the  USUN serve primary roles with regard to the UN. State/IO is the U.S.  government’s primary interlocutor with the UN and other international  organizations, and is charged with advancing U.S. national interests  through multilateral engagement on a range of global issues, including  peace and security, nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, economic  development, climate change, and global health. The USUN serves as  the United States’ delegation to the UN and is responsible for carrying out  U.S. participation in the organization. The USUN represents the United  States’ political, legal, military, and public diplomacy interests at the UN. As part of its oversight of UN peacekeeping operations, State/IO conducts  annual monitoring trips to most UN peacekeeping operations and  documents the findings of these trips in Mission Monitoring and  Evaluation reports. These reports summarize State/IO’s evaluation of  each peacekeeping operation’s progress toward meeting its mandate and  identify challenges the operation faces in doing so. State/IO summarizes  the findings of these reports for the National Security Council in a U.S.  strategy and priorities memorandum that includes recommendations for  U.S. action, including how the United States should conduct negotiations  and vote on upcoming renewals of the mandates that authorize  peacekeeping operations. According to State, the National Security  Council conducts an interagency policy formulation process based on this  input. Other U.S. government entities also support UN peacekeeping  operations. For instance, State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and  Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs provide  capacity-building support for troops and police from troop- and police- contributing countries, respectively, serving in UN peacekeeping  operations. Additionally, the Department of Defense participates in UN  peacekeeping operations by providing UN forces with equipment,  personnel, and other support services. The United States’  Principles of Effective  Peacekeeping In April 2017, during a Security Council meeting on peacekeeping, the  U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN outlined five principles that the  United States believes are critical for effective peacekeeping. She  remarked that, while peacekeeping is the UN’s most powerful tool to  promote international peace and security, there is room for improvement,  citing examples of operations that no longer need to exist or have limited  host country consent. To make peacekeeping operations more effective,  she emphasized that the UN should identify operations that lack the  underlying political conditions for a resolution to the conflict, noting that  numerous studies have concluded that such conditions are central to an  operation’s success. To guide this process, she announced a set of five  principles to which peacekeeping operations should be held:  1.  Peacekeeping operations must support political solutions to conflict.  2.  Operations must have host country consent.  3.  Mandates must be realistic and achievable.  4.  There should be an exit strategy, which would articulate the Security  Council’s agreement on what success looks like and how to achieve  it.  5.  The Security Council should be willing to adjust peacekeeping  mandates when situations improve or fail to improve. Since the Permanent Representative’s announcement of these principles,  State/IO has included an assessment of each peacekeeping operation  against these principles in the U.S. strategy and priorities memoranda  that it prepares for the National Security Council. With regard to the fifth  principle, in these memoranda, State/IO assesses whether and how a  mandate itself should be changed, rather than assessing the Security  Council’s willingness to change the mandate. Officials indicated that they  conduct their assessment in this manner in order to inform and establish  the U.S. negotiating position. The UN Security  Council Establishes  and Renews  Peacekeeping  Operations, Which  Conduct a Range of  Tasks  Working with UN Member  States, the UN Security  Council Establishes and  Renews Peacekeeping  Operations UN Peacekeeping  Operations Are Mandated  to Perform Tasks Such As  Maintaining Ceasefires,  Protecting Civilians, and  Providing Electoral  Assistance Security Council resolutions establishing UN peacekeeping operations  define mandates, or tasks, for each operation, and the peacekeeping  operations perform a variety of activities to fulfill these tasks. In some  cases, these activities are specifically mandated by a Security Council  resolution; in others, the peacekeeping operation engages in an activity  pursuant to a broad grant of authority to achieve a task. Each UN  peacekeeping operation performs a unique set of tasks. The mandates of  peacekeeping operations established prior to 1998 tend to include the  monitoring of cease-fire as a mandated task, while those established after  1998 also include tasks such as the protection of civilians, facilitation of  humanitarian assistance, and enforcement of economic sanctions or an  arms embargo. Comparatively, operations in the African region have  mandates that include the highest number of tasks. See appendix II for a  list of the mandated tasks of all 14 peacekeeping operations. The UN has defined 16 categories into which these activities can be  classified, including supervision or monitoring of ceasefire agreements,  the protection and promotion of human rights, and protecting civilians.  See table 3 for a list and description of these categories. State’s Assessments  Show that UN  Peacekeeping  Operations Generally  Do Not Fully Meet  U.S. Principles of  Effective  Peacekeeping and  Face Challenges to  Achieving Their  Mandates Based on our review of State’s most recent assessments and discussions  with State officials, we found that despite some military and political  successes of individual peacekeeping operations, UN peacekeeping  operations generally do not fully meet the U.S.-stated principles of  effective peacekeeping and face challenges to achieving their mandates.  For the 11 peacekeeping operations with mandates that renew on a  regular basis, State prepares strategy and priority memoranda for  appropriate committees of the National Security Council to inform the  mandate renewal process. We reviewed these memoranda and spoke  with State officials about their assessments of these operations against  four of the U.S. principles. Table 4 presents GAO’s categorization of the  results of State’s assessments. Supporting political solutions to conflict. Based on State’s  assessment, we categorized 10 of the 11 peacekeeping operations as  having met (five) or partially met (five) the principle of supporting  political solutions to the conflict. For example, in Cyprus, State  assessed that the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus  (UNFICYP) met this principle because its activities generally support a  political solution, despite the country’s slow progress toward  negotiating a final settlement of conflict between the Greek Cypriot  and Turkish Cypriot communities. We categorized one peacekeeping  operation, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western  Sahara, as not meeting this principle. Host country consent. Based on State’s assessment, we  categorized all 11 peacekeeping operations as having met (four) or  partially met (seven) the principle of host country consent. For  example, State officials assessed that the government of the Central  African Republic cooperates fully with the UN Multidimensional  Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic  (MINUSCA). With respect to other peacekeeping operations, officials  noted that a country’s consent to host an operation differs from  cooperation with all aspects of a peacekeeping operation. For  example, State reported that while the government of the Democratic  Republic of the Congo has consented to the UN Organization  Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s  (MONUSCO) presence in the country, the government has, at times,  been hostile toward and actively taken steps to undermine the  mission. Realistic and achievable mandates. Based on State’s assessment,  we categorized seven of the 11 peacekeeping operations as having  met (two) or partially met (five) the principle of having realistic and  achievable mandates. For example, we categorized the African  Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) as having  partially met this principle because State reports that it has been able  to carry out many of its mandated tasks; however, according to  State’s assessments, government obstructions, a slow peace  process, and mission management inefficiencies prevent the full  implementation of UNAMID’s mandate. We categorized the remaining  four peacekeeping operations as not meeting this principle. Exit strategies. Based on State’s assessment, we categorized five of  the 11 peacekeeping operations as having met (two) or partially met  (three) the principle of having an exit strategy in their mandates. For  example, we categorized MINUSCA as having partially met the  principle because, according to State’s assessment, the operation’s  mandate has an exit strategy that will take several years to achieve  given the lack of host government capacity. We categorized the  remaining six peacekeeping operations as not meeting this principle.  For example, based on State’s assessment, we categorized the UN  Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) as not meeting this  principle because the operation had not considered a near-term exit  strategy because of ongoing conflict and the political stalemate in  South Sudan. In addition to the four principles in the table, the fifth principle for effective  peacekeeping reads as the Security Council’s willingness to change the  mandate. In its memoranda, State assessed the fifth principle by  examining whether the mandate was achieving its objective and, if not,  should be adjusted. Using this method, State assessments show that the  Security Council should adjust the mandates of nine of the 11  peacekeeping operations. For example, State assessed that the  UNFICYP (Cyprus) mandate should be adapted to address the stalled  political process. Although we found that State’s assessments show most peacekeeping  operations are not fully meeting the U.S.-stated principles for effective  peacekeeping, State officials we interviewed noted the important role UN  peacekeeping operations play in maintaining stability in volatile conflicts  around the world. These officials noted the dangerous and hostile  environments in which peacekeeping operations are located, and, in  some cases, human atrocities these operations help prevent. Further,  U.S. and UN officials cited UN peacekeeping operations’ strengths,  including international and local acceptance, access to global expertise,  and the ability to leverage assistance from multilateral donors and  development banks. Officials also cited strengths of individual operations,  such as the protection of civilians against atrocities in South Sudan, the  Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic,  assistance toward the peaceful conduct of elections in numerous  countries, police capacity building in Haiti, and support to peace  processes and agreements in numerous countries. According to State/IO and USUN officials, continual evaluation and  adjustment of the mandates of UN peacekeeping missions to better align  with the U.S. principles remains a key tenet of the Administration’s UN  peacekeeping policy, but the U.S. government faces two key challenges  in this regard. First, some aspects of two of the five principles—host  country consent and support for a political process—may be outside of  the control of any international organization or bilateral partner. For  example, MONUSCO’s (Democratic Republic of the Congo) mandate  includes the provision of elections assistance in support of the nation’s  political process, but, according to State officials, the lack of host  government cooperation has relegated MONUSCO’s efforts in this area to  technical assistance. Second, these officials explained that the Security  Council does not always adopt U.S. proposals to change mandates to  align with these principles, such as including an exit strategy. Changing  peacekeeping mandates requires nine affirmative votes and no vetoes  from permanent Council members, which, according to State and USUN  officials, can be difficult. For example, USUN officials stated that the UN  Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) had fulfilled its  mandate, but Russia and China were not supporting a vote to close the  operation. Moreover, State officials noted that the assessment process using the  principles began in 2017 and the United States has had a limited number  of opportunities to negotiate changes to peacekeeping mandates  because renewals generally occur annually. State officials cited several  examples of notable progress, however, in improving the efficiency and  focus of UN peacekeeping operations. According to State officials,  through U.S. leadership, the Security Council reconfigured the operation  in Haiti to focus on police and the rule of law. Additionally, the Security  Council changed and downsized the operation in Darfur to reflect current  political and security realities. State officials also said that the UN Security  Council supported responsible drawdowns of peacekeeping operations,  most recently in Cote d’Ivoire, while pushing peacekeepers in Lebanon to  use all of their mandated authorities to be more effective in carrying out  their tasks. According to State officials, adherence to these principles is not sufficient  to guarantee success. An operation could fully meet all the principles, but  still face challenges carrying out its mandate because of formidable  circumstances, such as insecure security environments or limited  government cooperation. However, State officials also noted that these  principles describe critical conditions for effective peacekeeping in that an  operation that does not meet these principles is unlikely to be able to fully  carry out its mandate. Moreover, given the importance of establishing the  necessary conditions for peacekeeping success, State/IO and USUN  officials acknowledged that State must continue to work with the Security  Council to ensure that peacekeeping operations meet the principles of  effectiveness, such as modifying mandates to include exit strategies. In  doing so, the UN and its member states could have greater assurance  that they have set up peacekeeping operations for success. The United States  Has Worked with the  UN to Adjust  Peacekeeping  Mandates, but Does  Not Have Sufficient  Information to  Determine if UN  Resource Decisions  Accurately Reflect  These Adjustments  The United States Has  Worked with Security  Council Members to Adjust  Peacekeeping Mandates When the U.S. agencies involved in peacekeeping agree that the UN  should change a peacekeeping operation’s mandate, USUN officials told  us that the USUN works with other Security Council members to make  adjustments, such as adding or removing tasks from an operation’s  mandate. While not all proposals are adopted by the Security Council,  State officials highlighted several types of mandate adjustments the  United States has pursued, including: Removal of tasks. State and USUN officials told us they strive to  remove tasks from peacekeeping mandates when those tasks have  been achieved or are no longer relevant or achievable. For example,  officials noted that the USUN successfully advocated that election  monitoring be removed from the list of mandated tasks for MINUSCA  because the elections had taken place in the previous year and,  therefore, the task was no longer relevant. Addition of language to prioritize tasks. State and USUN officials  told us that another strategy is to add language to a mandate to  designate priority tasks. Officials stated that, as a result of such  language in mandates for MINUSCA, MONUSCO, and MINUSMA,  management at these peacekeeping operations had shifted mission  resources to focus on priority tasks. For example, officials cited  MINUSCA’s proposed budget, which increased resources for  protection of civilians—a task designated as a priority by the Security  Council—and reduced resources for Security Sector Reform, an area  of less relevance to the mission given the current situation in the  Central African Republic. Addition of language to clarify exit strategies. State and USUN  officials noted that adding language to clarify exit strategies aids an  operation’s success. For example, for the MINUJUSTH (Haiti) 2017  mandate, USUN officials noted that the United States had advocated  successfully for the Security Council to include language calling for an  exit strategy with benchmarks to assist the UN in monitoring the  progress of the operation’s transition to a non-peacekeeping mission  beginning in October 2019. USUN Does Not Have  Sufficient Information from  the UN on the Cost of  Peacekeeping Operations  to Determine Accurate  Resource Allocation When  Adjusting Mandates USUN officials told us that they do not have sufficient information to allow  them to determine accurate resource allocation to peacekeeping  operations when the Security Council makes a change to the mandate.  For example, USUN officials told us that as a result of the Security  Council’s decision to reduce resources for specific tasks in MONUSCO’s  2017 mandate—such as Security Sector Reform and Disarmament,  Demobilization, and Reintegration activities, where little progress had  been achieved—the United States had sought to reduce the MONUSCO  budget to reflect this change. However, the USUN did not have complete  information from the UN on all of the costs associated with this change,  including support costs, such as flight hours and fuel for transport  vehicles. In the absence of such information from the UN, USUN officials  estimated these costs and advocated for a reduction in MONUSCO’s  budget based on their own estimates. USUN officials noted that without  input from the UN, they did not have sufficient information to determine  the accuracy of their estimates. USUN officials told us that these information gaps exist because UN  peacekeeping budgets do not include estimated costs by task. Rather,  UN peacekeeping budgets provide information on the operation’s use of  financial resources for personnel and operational costs. Thus, according  to USUN officials, when the Security Council changes a peacekeeping  operation’s mandate—such as by adding or removing a task—it is not  clear how to adjust the budget for that operation to accurately reflect the  change. UN headquarters officials told us that the UN does not prepare  peacekeeping budgets with estimated costs by task because it is  challenging to do so. However, senior officials with whom we spoke at  two peacekeeping operations said that, despite challenges, it is possible  to estimate costs by mandated task, which would provide additional  budget transparency for the UN. Further, USUN officials stated that  having UN estimates readily available to all member states would not only  improve the accuracy of decisions related to resource allocation, but also  improve the transparency of the budget negotiation process. UN guidance on peacekeeping states that when the UN changes an  existing peacekeeping mandate it should make commensurate changes  in the resources available to the operation. Further, internationally- accepted and federal standards for internal control note that organizations  should use quality information to make informed decisions to achieve  their objectives. Without information on estimated costs by task, USUN  and other UN member states have difficulty determining that resources  for UN peacekeeping operations accurately reflect changes to the  mandates of peacekeeping operations. With this information, the United  States and the international community can better ensure that resources  provided to peacekeeping operations support the tasks agreed upon by  UN member states. Member States Have  Expressed Concerns  Regarding the Quality  of Peacekeeping  Performance  Information, Despite  UN Reform Efforts in  This Area Member States Have  Expressed Concerns  about the Completeness  and Timeliness of UN  Peacekeeping  Performance Data UN member states, including the United States, have expressed  concerns regarding the quality of information regarding UN peacekeeping  operations. Specifically, according to member states, information on  peacekeeping performance can be incomplete and is not always provided  on a timely basis, despite ongoing UN efforts to improve performance  information. UN Security Council resolutions and peacekeeping guidance  documents have stated the importance of having access to quality  performance information to make management decisions. For example,  UN Security Council resolutions note that data—based on clear and well- defined benchmarks—should be used to improve the performance of  peacekeeping operations. The UN’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping  Operations has also called for a timely flow of information regarding how  well peacekeeping operations perform their mandated activities.  Additionally, internationally-accepted and federal standards for internal  control also highlight the importance of quality information in enhancing  the ability of organizations to achieve their performance goals. Quality  information includes information that is complete and provided on a timely  basis, among other attributes. Completeness UN member states have expressed concerns regarding the completeness  of peacekeeping performance information. For example, USUN officials  have noted concerns related to the completeness of performance  information about peacekeeping troops. USUN officials noted that while  the UN maintains some performance information on peacekeeping  operations, such as a database with information on troop capabilities and  readiness to deploy, it does not provide a complete picture of  peacekeeping performance. Specifically, USUN officials noted that they  would like better performance information about when peacekeeping units  are engaging well, failing to engage, or lack the training to perform the  tasks they have been asked to carry out. Also, the Security Council noted  concern in a September 2018 resolution sponsored by the United States  about the underperformance of some peacekeepers, such as inaction in  the face of imminent threats of physical violence against civilians and  conduct issues. Another concern relates to the completeness of performance information  about civilian peacekeeping staff. According to the UN, civilian  peacekeeping staff, who comprise about 14 percent of all peacekeeping  personnel, perform many of the mandated activities of peacekeeping  operations, including promoting and protecting human rights, helping  strengthen the rule of law, and fostering the political process. However,  according to USUN officials, the UN needs more complete information on  the performance of these staff. For example, as noted above, UN officials  told us that the UN had developed a database to collect performance  information on military personnel staffed to UN peacekeeping operations,  but did not have a similar way to track information on civilian personnel.  Additionally, the Security Council noted in a September 2018 resolution  that the UN must improve evaluation of all UN personnel supporting  peacekeeping operations, including civilians. Individual member states  have concurred, with some stating that better performance information is  needed in all sectors of UN peacekeeping and others noting the need for  comprehensive information on all peacekeeping personnel, including  civilian personnel. The Security Council has also noted concerns about underreporting of  information, which can affect data completeness. For example, in a  September 2018 resolution, the Security Council expressed concern  regarding the underreporting of sexual exploitation and abuse by some  UN peacekeepers and non-UN forces authorized under a Security  Council mandate, including military, civilian, and police personnel. The  UN has reported that instances of sexual exploitation and abuse by  peacekeepers undermine the credibility of peacekeeping operations by  breaking down the trust between an operation and the communities it  serves. Timeliness UN member states have also expressed concerns regarding the  timeliness of UN performance information on peacekeeping. For example,  USUN officials cited instances of conduct violations by UN troops in the  Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo about  which the Security Council had not been informed for several months.  Ultimately, the Security Council learned of these incidents from media  reporting and had to seek additional information from the UN Secretariat. Additionally, the Security Council has expressed concern regarding the  timely reporting of performance information on police personnel assisting  peacekeeping operations. For instance, in Resolution 2382 adopted in  November 2017, the Security Council emphasized the need to improve  accountability and effectiveness in the performance of peacekeeping  operations, requesting that the UN Secretariat provide member states  timely and complete information regarding the training needs of police  personnel. Further, the UN’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has  also called for a timely flow of information on a range of peacekeeping  performance issues, such as reports and evaluations of peacekeeping  operations, incidents involving the safety and security of peacekeepers,  and troop misconduct, such as sexual exploitation and abuse. For  example, in its March 2018 report, the committee stressed the need for timely information sharing about serious incidents involving the safety and  security of peacekeepers, noting that prompt reporting of such incidents  contributes to their prevention and positive resolution. UN Is in Early Stages of  Reform Efforts to Improve  Performance Information  and the Extent to Which  the Efforts Will Address  Member States’ Concerns  Is Unclear USUN officials told us that they have concerns about the quality of  peacekeeping performance data because the UN does not have  comprehensive performance information about its peacekeeping  operations and officials are unsure whether new UN reforms in this area  will address their concerns. USUN officials described various UN sources  of performance information on peacekeeping operations, such as  strategic reviews conducted by the Secretary-General on the  performance of peacekeeping operations and a UN database containing  information on peacekeeping troops’ readiness to deploy. However,  officials noted that this information is insufficient to help them assess the  overall performance of UN peacekeeping operations. For instance, USUN  officials noted that the information collected is not standardized across  UN peacekeeping operations or for all peacekeeping personnel. Without  better information, USUN officials said that they had challenges obtaining  a clear picture of the performance of UN peacekeeping operations.  According to USUN officials, a culture of performance in peacekeeping is  important to better deliver on peacekeeping mandates and improve the  safety and security of peacekeepers in the field. Acknowledging challenges related to peacekeeping, the UN Secretary- General announced a peacekeeping reform initiative known as Action for  Peacekeeping in March 2018. As part of this effort, the Secretary-General  invited member states to help develop a set of mutually agreed principles  and commitments to improve peacekeeping operations. The Secretary- General announced these shared commitments in August 2018 and, as of  September 2018, 151 member states and several regional organizations  had made political commitments to implement them. The declaration of  shared commitments includes a commitment to ensure the highest level  of peacekeeping performance and to hold all peacekeeping personnel  accountable for effective performance by, among other things, ensuring  that performance data are used to inform planning, evaluation,  deployment decisions and reporting. However, USUN officials told us in October 2018 that their concerns  about the quality of UN peacekeeping performance data still remained  because the UN is in the early stages of adopting these reforms. Further,  USUN officials stated that they have yet to see concrete plans of action  and as such, it is not clear to them that the reforms will address their  concerns to ensure that the UN provides complete and timely  peacekeeping performance information to its member states. For  instance, officials stated that in September 2018—6 months after the  Action for Peacekeeping agreements to improve the use of performance  data to manage peacekeeping operations—the Security Council adopted  Resolution 2436, which noted continued concerns related to  completeness and timeliness of peacekeeping performance information  provided to the Council. Without fully addressing member states’  concerns about the quality of information on the performance of  peacekeeping operations, the Security Council is limited in its ability to  identify problems and take corrective action to improve the performance  of peacekeeping operations. More complete and timely performance  information could enhance the Security Council’s ability to effectively  manage peacekeeping operations. Conclusions Peacekeeping operations are a key instrument for implementing the UN’s  central mission of maintaining international peace and security. As a  member state of the UN, a permanent member of the Security Council,  and the largest financial contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget, the  United States plays a significant role in both the management of  peacekeeping operations and encouraging reforms to improve  peacekeeping activities. According to State, the U.S.-stated principles for  effective peacekeeping are critical conditions for peacekeeping  operations to carry out their mandates. Given the importance of  establishing the necessary conditions for peacekeeping success, State/IO  and USUN officials acknowledged the imperative of continuing to work  with the Security Council to ensure that peacekeeping operations meet  U.S.-stated principles of effectiveness. In doing so, the UN and its  member states could have greater assurance that they have set up  peacekeeping operations for success. Without information on estimated  costs by task, USUN and other UN member states have difficulty  determining that resources for UN peacekeeping operations accurately  reflect changes to the mandates of peacekeeping operations. With this  information, the United States and the international community can better  ensure that resources provided to peacekeeping operations support the  tasks agreed upon by UN member states. Additionally, while the UN has  initiated reform efforts to strengthen peacekeeping, including better use of  performance information, UN member states have continued to express  concerns about the quality of this information and note that it is too soon  to tell whether reforms will address their concerns. Without fully  addressing member states’ concerns about the quality of information on  the performance of peacekeeping operations, the Security Council is  limited in its ability to identify problems and take corrective action to  improve the performance of peacekeeping operations. Recommendations for  Executive Action We are making the following three recommendations to State:  The Secretary of State should continue to work with the Permanent  Representative to the United Nations to ensure that UN peacekeeping  operations fully meet principles of effective peacekeeping.  (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of State should work with the Permanent Representative to  the United Nations to ensure that the United Nations provides information  to member states on the estimated costs of mandated peacekeeping  tasks to provide better cost information when the Security Council adjusts  peacekeeping mandates. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of State should continue to work with the Permanent  Representative to the United Nations to ensure that the United Nations  takes additional steps to address member states’ concerns about  complete and timely information on the performance of United Nations  peacekeeping operations. (Recommendation 3) Agency Comments  and Our Evaluation We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense and  State for review and comment. The Department of Defense told us that  they had no comments on the draft report. In its comments, reproduced in  appendix V, State concurred with our recommendations. State also  provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate  throughout the report. We are sending copies of this report to congressional committees; the  Acting Secretary of the Department of Defense; and the Secretary of the  Department of State. In addition, the report is available at no charge on  the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-7141 or groverj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices  of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last  page of this report. GAO staff who made significant contributions to this  report are listed in appendix VI. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and  Methodology In this report, we examine (1) the United Nations’ (UN) process to  establish and renew peacekeeping operations, including the tasks these  operations perform; (2) the Department of State’s (State) assessment of  the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations; (3) how the United  States works within the UN to adjust peacekeeping mandates and  associated resources; and (4) UN member states’ concerns regarding the  UN’s performance information. To examine the UN’s process to establish and renew peacekeeping  operations and the tasks these operations perform, we reviewed UN  policy and guidance, as well as various UN websites accessed as of  November 2018, and interviewed State and UN officials to discuss UN  processes. To determine the tasks these operations perform, we  analyzed the most recent UN resolution authorizing the peacekeeping  operation passed by the Security Council as of December 31, 2018— generally referred to as a mandate—for each of UN’s 14 peacekeeping  operations, and categorized the tasks of each operation. We describe UN  categories of activities to achieve mandated tasks as listed in the  Department of Peacekeeping Operations-Department of Field Support’s  Core Pre-deployment Training Materials for United Nations Peacekeeping  Operations, which lists and defines 16 categories. We also analyzed the  most recent mandate as of December 31, 2018 for the 14 UN  peacekeeping operations to identify the date on which the authority for  each operation expires and the period of time reported until the next  renewal decision. To examine State’s assessment of the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping  operations, we analyzed State’s Bureau of International Organization  Affairs’ (State/IO) most recent Mission Monitoring and Evaluation reports  as of December 2018 and the accompanying U.S. strategy and priorities  memoranda outlining U.S. priorities for the operations’ mandate renewal.  State bases its Mission Monitoring and Evaluation reports on annual field  visits to peacekeeping operations during which assessors interview U.S.  and UN officials to evaluate the operation’s progress toward meeting its  mandate and identify factors that affect the operation’s ability to do so.  Based on these reports, State’s strategy and priorities memoranda  summarize U.S. observations on the peacekeeping operation and, among  other things, propose options for U.S. action within the Security Council.  Each of the 11 memoranda we reviewed also includes State’s  assessment of the peacekeeping operation against the U.S.  government’s stated principles of effective peacekeeping, which State  considers to be critical conditions for an operation to successfully  implement its mandate. These principles are whether a peacekeeping  operation (1) supports a political solution to conflict, (2) has host country  consent, (3) has a realistic and achievable mandate, and (4) has an exit  strategy; and (5) whether the Security Council is willing to adjust the  mandate if the situation in the country improves or fails to improve. We reviewed State’s memoranda on the operations and considered the  following types of factors when determining whether to categorize State’s  assessments as met, partially met, or not met:  Supporting political solutions: Mediation processes, peace  agreements, and support for democratic elections. Host country consent: Consent to the operation, and the  necessary freedom of action, both political and physical to carry  out its mandated tasks. Realistic and achievable mandates: Extent to which operation  tasks appeared feasible in light of current conditions and available  resources. Exit strategies: Strategic goals and targets, strategic planning,  and timetables for withdrawal. We categorized a principle as “met” if State indicated that the operation  was generally succeeding in an area. We categorized a principle as “not  met” if State indicated that the operation was generally not succeeding in  an area. We categorized a principle as “partially met” if State indicated  that the operation had some areas of success, but was generally not  succeeding or restricted from success in some way. The fifth principle for  effective peacekeeping reads as the Security Council’s willingness to  change the mandate. However, in its memoranda, State/IO assesses  whether and how a mandate should be changed, rather than assessing  the Security Council’s willingness to change the mandate. For this  principle, we categorized State’s results as either “yes” or “no.” We coded  the results as “yes” if State assessed that the Security Council should  adjust the mandate. We categorized the results as “no” if State assessed  that the Security Council did not need to adjust the mandate. The coding  was conducted by one GAO analyst and separately verified by two other  GAO analysts. In December 2018, we met with State/IO and USUN  officials to discuss their current assessment of each peacekeeping  operation. We updated our categorization of State’s written assessments  to reflect the agency’s most current assessment as appropriate. We discussed our methodology and results with officials from the U.S.  Mission to the UN (USUN), who confirmed that our methodology and  results were valid. We also discussed with these officials additional steps  the United States could take to ensure that peacekeeping operations fully  meet the principles for effective peacekeeping. We did not independently  verify State’s assessment, but we reviewed State’s methodology and  discussed it with officials and found the information in State’s reporting to  be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To examine how the United States works within the UN to adjust  peacekeeping mandates and associated resources, we interviewed  USUN officials to understand the different approaches the Security  Council takes to revise mandates and to understand the types of  information available to UN member states to determine appropriate  resource adjustments when mandates change. We also interviewed a  senior official from the UN Department of Field Support’s Field Budget  and Finance Division and reviewed UN budget and performance reports  to identify how the UN reports on peacekeeping budget information to  member states. In addition, we interviewed officials at two of the four  peacekeeping operations we selected for in-depth case studies, as  discussed below, to determine whether they were able to report on the  operation’s budget by mandated task. To determine the extent to which  State has sufficient information to advocate for resources adjustments  when mandates change, we compared information currently provided by  the UN to internationally-accepted and federal standards for internal  control, which state that organizations should have quality information to  help them make decisions. To examine UN member states’ concerns regarding the UN’s  performance information, we interviewed officials from the USUN to  understand their concerns regarding performance information available to  them from the UN. Based on these interviews, we identified two main  issues of completeness and timeliness. To understand the extent to which  UN member states share these concerns, we analyzed the UN Special  Committee on Peacekeeping’s 2016, 2017, and 2018 annual reports and  Security Council resolutions to confirm member states’ concerns related  to completeness and timeliness of performance information. We did not  independently verify the veracity of these concerns, because we did not  have access to the UN’s internal performance information. We also  reviewed UN documents on the Secretary-General’s new reform efforts,  transcripts of meetings the Security Council held on peacekeeping in  2018, and Security Council resolutions to identify steps the UN is taking  to address these concerns. Further, we analyzed the extent to which the  UN could better address member state concerns regarding performance  information by comparing the Secretary-General’s plans for implementing  the UN’s new reform efforts with internationally-accepted and federal  standards for internal controls, which identify necessary elements of  performance information. To inform our analyses of all four objectives, we also selected UN  peacekeeping operations in four countries—the Democratic Republic of  the Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, and Lebanon—for in-depth case studies. We  selected these peacekeeping operations because they are the largest of  the three types the UN employs, and are located in the four geographic  regions in which UN peacekeeping operations are currently deployed— Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere. While the  findings from these peacekeeping operations cannot be generalized, they  provide an illustrative mix of the UN’s peacekeeping activities. To inform  our audit, we conducted a literature review using ProQuest language  searches, focusing on literature published between 2015 and 2018. In  total, we identified and reviewed 12 relevant publications that helped  inform our study of the four operations. We conducted fieldwork at  peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Kosovo, and Lebanon, and interviewed  U.S., UN, and host government officials, as well as representatives of  other donor countries and civil society. In lieu of fieldwork, we conducted  videoconferences with senior officials at the peacekeeping operation in  the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We conducted this performance audit from October 2017 to March 2019  in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix II: Mandated Tasks of United  Nations Peacekeeping Operations We analyzed United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions  authorizing the 14 UN peacekeeping operations, in effect as of December  31, 2018, and identified the mandated tasks of these operations. See  table 5 below for a complete list. Appendix III: Department of State’s  Assessment of Challenges United Nations  Peacekeeping Operations Face To inform its oversight of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations,  the Department of State’s Bureau of International Organizations Affairs  (State/IO) conducts annual monitoring trips to most UN peacekeeping  operations. State/IO evaluates peacekeeping operations’ progress toward  meeting their mandates and identifies any challenges to their progress.  State/IO documents its findings in Mission Monitoring and Evaluation  reports and disseminates these reports for comment to various State  bureaus involved in international peacekeeping efforts and to relevant  offices in the Department of Defense. The findings of these assessments  are intended to inform the National Security Council and the U.S. Mission  to the United Nations in their decision-making. We analyzed the most recent Mission Monitoring and Evaluation reports  that State had conducted through June 30, 2018. In our analysis of  State’s assessments, we found that the challenges State most frequently  identified for each UN peacekeeping operation were those associated  with host government cooperation, resources, and the security situation. Host Government  Cooperation According to the UN, the UN does not deploy a peacekeeping operation  unless the organization has the consent of the involved parties, which  often include the governments of the countries in which conflicts occur.  While host governments generally have consented to the presence of UN  peacekeeping operations, State found instances in which the host  government did not cooperate fully or did not have a positive relationship  with the peacekeeping operation working in-country. For example, in  Darfur, State found that while the Sudanese government had  demonstrated some progress, it continued to restrict the African Union- United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur’s (UNAMID) access and  movement in certain regions. Additionally, according to government  officials in Kosovo, the government of Kosovo does not engage with the  UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) because it  considered the operation to have completed its mandate as a transitional  authority once Kosovo declared its independence and established a  functioning government. As a result, UNMIK works on community trust- building activities with local communities according to the vision and  strategic direction of the head of the peacekeeping operation. Resources State found that several operations faced financial, human, and material  resource constraints. For example, State assessed that the peacekeeping  operations in Mali; the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the Golan  Heights, Syria; and Haiti did not have enough funds to meet their needs.  State also found that troops in the peacekeeping operations in the Central  African Republic; the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and the Golan  Heights, Syria did not have enough troops with sufficient skillsets.  Further, State found that the operations in the Democratic Republic of the  Congo; Haiti; Mali; and Abyei, Sudan lacked adequate equipment.  Officials from the peacekeeping operation at the UN Interim Force in  Lebanon (UNIFIL) also told us they anticipated a budget shortfall of over  $2 million for the 2018-2019 peacekeeping fiscal year as a result of a  reduced budget and an increase in UN troop salaries. However, officials at the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) told us about ways in  which they were maximizing and readjusting existing resources in spite of  these challenges. They stated that MONUSCO’s March 2018 mandate  renewal was intended to streamline the operation and was informed by  the UN’s most recent strategic review of the operation. Senior  MONUSCO officials also told us that, as a result of the review, the  Security Council had reduced its work in the justice reform sector by 50  percent because it believed the operation would be able to engage more  meaningfully in this arena after the presidential election. Security Situation State identified several peacekeeping operations that worked in  environments in which there were ongoing ceasefire violations or  unstable security situations. State found that peacekeeping operations in  the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the Golan Heights, Syria; Western  Sahara; Cyprus; and Lebanon faced ongoing ceasefire violations. State  also found that the peacekeeping operations in Mali and the Central  African Republic worked in dangerous conditions and the operations in  Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo faced persistent attacks  on civilians. During our field work in Lebanon, UNIFIL officials  emphasized the importance and successes of the UNIFIL-facilitated  tripartite mechanism, which provides regular opportunities for soldiers  from the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israeli Defense Force to help  prevent any event from escalating into a major event. According to U.S.  embassy officials, because of the prevalence of armed groups in eastern  Congo, the government’s and international community’s response to the  Ebola outbreak that started there in August 2018 was significantly more  complex and challenging than their response to the May 2018–July 2018  outbreak in northwestern Congo, an area that does not have a significant  presence of armed groups. Appendix IV: Synopsis of Four United  Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Key  Challenges They Face We selected United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in four  countries—the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, and  Lebanon—for case studies. Below is a synopsis of each of these  peacekeeping operations and key challenges they face, according to U.S.  and UN officials. Key Facts About DRC  Population: Approximately 83.3  million people live in DRC. About  60 percent of the population is  under the age of 25, and about 40  percent is under the age of 15.  There are over 200 ethnic groups;  the majority is Bantu. Map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Government: DRC is a semi- presidential republic. The last  presidential election was held on  December 30, 2018. Economy: DRC’s estimated gross  domestic product for 2017 was  $40.4 billion. Conflict and  corruption have contributed to the  poor economic performance of  DRC, despite its vast natural  resource wealth. Timeline of Key Events  1960: The Republic of the Congo is  granted independence from  Belgium.  1960-1964: The UN deploys the  United Nations Operation in the  Congo (ONUC) to ensure the  withdrawal of Belgian forces from  the Republic of the Congo, among  other things.  1998: “Africa’s World War” begins,  with seven countries fighting in  DRC. Current Status and Challenges  According to U.S. and United Nations (UN) officials, MONUSCO’s most  important mandated tasks are the protection of civilians and support to  the government of DRC’s elections. According to the Secretary-General,  the impact of intercommunal violence and attacks by armed groups  continue to persist in eastern and southern DRC and have led to the  displacement of thousands of people. Held after several delays, the  results of the December 30, 2018 national and provincial elections are  expected to result in the first democratic transition of power in the nation’s  history. Despite varied disputes over preliminary results and reports of  sporadic violence, the UN reports that the elections were relatively  peaceful. However, according to the UN, pending the announcement of  the final results by the DRC Constitutional Court, the coming days will be  critical. 1999: The Lusaka Ceasefire is  signed, ending the war. The UN  establishes a peacekeeping  operation in DRC—United Nations  Organization Mission in the  Democratic Republic of the Congo  (MONUC). July 2010: The UN renames  MONUC MONUSCO and updates  the peacekeeping operation’s  mandate. According to U.S. and UN officials, the biggest challenges MONUSCO  faces in carrying out its mandated tasks are the vast size of DRC and the  fact that the government of DRC will accept limited help from MONUSCO  in carrying out its elections. According to UN officials, MONUSCO is  having some success in addressing instability in eastern DRC. For  example, MONUSCO said it receives 300 to 400 calls per month alerting  it to attacks and that either MONUSCO or DRC forces respond to 90  percent of these calls. In addition, UN officials told us that the Security  Council provided MONUSCO with a budget to use for logistical support  for  elections assistance, so MONUSCO can readily help the DRC  government if and when it asks for assistance. Key Facts about Haiti  Population: Approximately 10.6  million people live in Haiti. More  than 50 percent of the population is  under the age of 24. Government: Haiti is a semi- presidential republic. Economy: Haiti’s estimated gross  domestic product for 2017 was  $8.36 billion.  Haiti continues to rely  on international economic  assistance for fiscal sustainability,  with over 20 percent of its budget  coming from foreign aid. In 2010,  Haiti’s unemployment rate was  estimated to be 40.6 percent, and  in 2012, 58.5 percent of its  population was estimated to be  living below the poverty line. Timeline of Key Events  1993: Following a military coup, the  UN establishes the first of a series  of three peacekeeping operations.  The last of these operations leaves  in 2000.  2004: The UN establishes the  United Nations Stabilization  Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to  help restore and maintain order  after the collapse of the  government.  2017: The UN establishes  MINUJUSTH as a successor to  MINUSTAH, composed of police  and civilian personnel and focused  on institutional strengthening and  development. Current Status and Challenges  The United Nations (UN) established MINUJUSTH in 2017 to assist the  government of Haiti in strengthening rule-of-law institutions, further  support and develop the Haitian National Police, and engage in human  rights monitoring, reporting, and analysis. In the resolution establishing  MINUJUSTH, the Security Council called on the Secretary-General to  develop a 2-year exit strategy with clear benchmarks. The Secretary- General regularly reports on MINUJUSTH’s progress toward reaching its  benchmarks. The Security Council resolution extending the MINUJUSTH  mandate to April 2019 calls on the Secretary-General to conduct a  strategic assessment of the operation by early 2019 and present  recommendations on the UN’s future role in Haiti. To facilitate the  transition, the UN has created a joint UN Development Program and  MINUJUSTH rule-of-law program to continue its work in this area after  the peacekeeping operation ends. According to U.S. and UN officials, Haiti continues to struggle with weak  institutions and high levels of government corruption. Moreover,  according to MINUJUSTH officials, the process of transitioning from the  previous peacekeeping operation in Haiti to MINUJUSTH was challenging  because of the level of effort involved in liquidating assets, among other  things. These officials told us that similar issues will make the  MINUJUSTH transition to a non-peacekeeping UN presence equally  challenging. Key Facts about Kosovo  Population: Approximately 1.9  million people live in Kosovo. About  42 percent of the population is  under the age of 25. The primary  ethnic group is the Albanian  Kosovars, making up  approximately 93 percent of the  population. Other ethnic minorities  include Serbs and Bosnians. Government: Kosovo is a  parliamentary republic. Economy: Kosovo’s estimated  gross domestic product in 2017  was an estimated $19.6 billion.  Kosovo's economy has achieved  some stability, but it is still highly  dependent on the international  community for financial and  technical assistance. Kosovo’s  unemployment rate is 33 percent,  with a youth (under 26)  unemployment rate near 60  percent. Timeline of Key Events  1991: Kosovo's Albanians declare  independence from Serbia.  1998: Multi-year conflict results in  large numbers of casualties,  refugees, and displaced persons. Current Status and Challenges  The Security Council established UNMIK to provide an interim  administration for Kosovo, under which UNMIK had authority over the  territory and people of Kosovo, including all legislative and executive  powers and administration of the judiciary. Following the declaration of  independence by the Kosovo Assembly in June 2008, the tasks of the  operation have changed to focus primarily on the promotion of security,  stability, and respect for human rights in Kosovo, as well as reducing  tensions between Serbia and Kosovo. 1999: A 3-month NATO military  operation against Serbia results in  the Serbs withdrawing their military  and police forces from Kosovo.  1999: UN Security Council  Resolution 1244 (1999) places  Kosovo under a transitional  administration pending a  determination of Kosovo's future  status. According to U.S. and United Nations (UN) officials, the greatest  challenge UNMIK faces in carrying out its mandate is that the Kosovo  government will not engage directly with UNMIK. According to U.S., UN,  and Kosovo government officials, the Kosovar government will not  engage with UNMIK because it views UNMIK’s mandate as obsolete,  given Kosovo’s independence. U.S. officials believe that UNMIK has  achieved its mandate and should be closed. However, these officials also  noted that Russia, as a permanent member of the Security Council with a  veto, prevents the affirmative decision necessary to close UNMIK. 2008: The Kosovo Assembly  declares Kosovo’s independence. U.S. and UN officials told us that UNMIK has found ways to indirectly  assist the Kosovo government, such as by providing funding for  government efforts in Kosovo through other UN agencies with which the  Kosovo government will engage. For instance, one UN official told us that  UNMIK had provided a ground-penetrating radar to the Office of the  United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to assist in efforts  to locate missing persons, which will help clarify the fate and  whereabouts of people unaccounted for after the conflict with Serbia. Key Facts about Lebanon  Population: Approximately 6.2  million people live in Lebanon. The  country is about 27 percent Sunni,  27 percent Shia, and 41 percent  Christian. Officially, there are  almost 1 million Syrian refugees in  Lebanon. Government: Lebanon is a  parliamentary republic, with a  unicameral legislature that elects  the president. Currently, 35 of 128  legislative seats are held by the  Shia Amal-Hezbollah coalition.   Lebanon's borders with Syria and  Israel remain unresolved. Economy: Lebanon’s estimated  gross domestic product for 2017  was $52.7 billion, with a real  growth rate of 1.5 percent. The  growth rate is down from about 7  percent in 2010. Timeline of Key Events  1975-1990: Sectarian violence  leads to the Lebanese civil war.  1978: Israel sends troops into  Lebanon. March 1978: UNIFIL is established  to supervise the withdrawal of  Israeli forces from southern  Lebanon. Israeli forces withdraw in  2000. Current Status and Challenges  UNIFIL was created by the Security Council in March 1978 to supervise  the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and  security, and assist the government of Lebanon in restoring its authority.  In late 2006, following renewed conflict between Israel and Lebanon, the  Security Council enhanced UNIFIL’s forces and added additional tasks to  its mandate to include monitoring the cessation of hostilities and  extending UNIFIL’s assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to  civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced  persons. The United Nations (UN) reported in March 2018 that the  situation in UNIFIL’s area of operations has remained generally calm, but  there has been no progress toward implementing a permanent ceasefire. Early 1980s: Israeli forces in  southern Lebanon start facing  opposition from a militant group  that would become Hezbollah,  backed by Iran. July-August 2006: Hezbollah  captures two Israeli soldiers,  sparking a 34-day war with Israel.  UN Security Council Resolution  1701 calls for a cease-fire between  the two sides and supplements  UNIFIL’s mandate. According to U.S. and UN officials, one challenge UNIFIL faces in  carrying out its mandate is that Israel and Lebanon have not agreed on a  peaceful solution to their conflict. Officials noted that there is no  articulated exit strategy for the operation and that the Lebanese Armed  Forces lack the capacity to secure the southern border with Israel—a  necessary condition for the successful exit of UNIFIL. However, U.S. and  UN officials agreed that UNIFIL plays a vital role by deterring further  hostilities in southern Lebanon and providing a neutral forum for meetings  between Israel and Lebanon. Appendix V: Comments from the Department  of State Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff  Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff  Acknowledgments In addition to the individual named above, Elizabeth Repko (Assistant  Director), Shirley Min (Analyst in Charge), Julia Jebo Grant, Sarah Amer,  Molly Miller, Debbie Chung, Martin de Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Mark  Dowling, Michael Rohrback, and Brandon Hunt made contributions to this  report.
As of December 2018, the UN had 14 ongoing peacekeeping operations with approximately 103,000 personnel. The United States is the single largest financial contributor to these operations, assessed by the UN to contribute an estimated $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2018, according to State. It is also a member of the Security Council, the UN body tasked with maintaining international peace and security. GAO was asked to review UN peacekeeping operations. In this report, GAO examines (1) the UN's process to establish and renew peacekeeping operations, including the tasks these operations perform; (2) State's assessment of the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations; (3) how the United States works within the UN to adjust peacekeeping mandates and associated resources; and (4) member states' concerns regarding the UN's performance information. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed UN and U.S. documents and interviewed UN and U.S. officials. GAO also interviewed officials at peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, and Lebanon. GAO selected these operations because they represent those that perform a variety of tasks and are located in diverse regions. The United Nations (UN) Security Council establishes and renews peacekeeping operations by issuing resolutions, generally referred to as mandates, which can include a range of tasks, such as monitoring ceasefires and protecting civilians. Generally once or twice a year, the Security Council renews an operation's mandate and makes adjustments as needed. GAO's review of the Department of State's (State) assessments as of December 2018 and discussions with State officials found that UN peacekeeping operations generally do not fully meet U.S. principles for effective peacekeeping, which include host country consent and an exit strategy, among others. GAO's review of 11 operations found that all 11 met or partially met the principle of host country consent, while five included or partially included an exit strategy. State officials stated that they must continue to work with the UN to ensure peacekeeping operations meet principles of effectiveness, which they noted are key to success. The United States works with the UN Security Council and member states to adjust peacekeeping mandates, but it lacks sufficient information to determine if associated resources accurately reflect these adjustments. State officials noted that they do not have this information because UN peacekeeping budgets do not estimate costs by mandated task. UN peacekeeping guidance states that when the UN changes a peacekeeping mandate, it should make commensurate changes to that operation's resources. Without information on estimated costs by task, member states have difficulty determining that resources for UN peacekeeping operations accurately reflect mandate changes. The UN has taken steps to improve peacekeeping performance data, but member states have raised concerns about that information's quality, including its completeness and timeliness. Among other concerns, member states note that the UN does not have complete information to assess the performance of civilians, who comprised about 14 percent of peacekeeping personnel, as of December 2018. In March 2018 the UN began peacekeeping reforms, including those to improve performance data. However, according to State officials, these efforts are in the early stages and more work is needed. Without fully addressing member states' concerns about the quality of information, the UN is limited in its ability to improve the performance of peacekeeping operations.