Background The cost of the census has been escalating over the last several  decennials. The 2010 decennial was the costliest U.S. Census in history  at about $12.3 billion, and was about 31 percent more costly than the  $9.4 billion 2000 Census (in 2020 dollars). The average cost for counting  a housing unit increased from about $16 in 1970 to around $92 in 2010  (in 2020 dollars). According to the Bureau, the total cost of the 2020  Census is estimated to be approximately $12.5 billion dollars (in 2020  dollars). As discussed later in this statement, however, the cost of the  2020 Census will likely be higher than this current estimate. Meanwhile, the return of census questionnaires by mail (the primary  mode of data collection) declined over this period from 78 percent in 1970  to 63 percent in 2010 (see figure 1). Declining mail response rates—a key  indicator in determining the cost-effectiveness of the census—are  significant and lead to higher costs. This is because the Bureau sends  temporary workers to each non-responding household to obtain census  data. As a result, non-response follow-up is the Bureau’s largest and  most costly field operation. In many ways, the Bureau has had to invest  substantially more resources each decade to match the results of prior  enumerations. Further, achieving a complete and accurate census is becoming an  increasingly daunting task, in part, because the nation’s population is  growing larger, more diverse, and more reluctant to participate. When the  census misses a person who should have been included, it results in an  undercount; conversely, an overcount occurs when an individual is  counted more than once. Such errors are particularly problematic  because of their impact on various subgroups. Minorities, renters, and  children, for example, are more likely to be undercounted by the census. The Bureau faces an additional challenge of locating unconventional and  hidden housing units, such as converted basements and attics. For  example, as shown in figure 2, what appears to be a small, single-family  house could contain an apartment, as suggested by its two doorbells. If  an address is not in the Bureau’s address file, its residents are less likely  to be included in the census. The Bureau Has  Redesigned the 2020  Census to Help Control  Costs The basic design of the enumeration—mail out and mail back of the  census questionnaire with in-person follow-up for non-respondents—has  been in use since 1970. However, a key lesson learned from the 2010  Census and earlier enumerations, is that this “traditional” design is no  longer capable of cost-effectively counting the population. In response to its own assessments, our recommendations, and studies  by other organizations, the Bureau has fundamentally re-examined its  approach for conducting the 2020 Census. Specifically, its plan for 2020  includes four broad innovation areas (re-engineering field operations,  using administrative records, verifying addresses in-office, and  developing an Internet self-response option). The Bureau has estimated that these innovations could result in savings  of over $5 billion (in 2020 dollars) when compared to its estimates of the  cost for conducting the census with traditional methods. However, in June  2016, we reported that the Bureau’s life-cycle cost estimate of $12.5  billion, developed in October 2015, was not reliable and did not  adequately account for risk, as discussed later in this statement. Bureau Plans to Use IT to Drive Innovation  To help drive these innovations, the Bureau plans to rely on both new and  legacy IT systems and infrastructure. For example, the Bureau is  developing or modifying 11 IT systems as part of an enterprise-wide  initiative called Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing  (CEDCaP), which is managed within the Bureau’s IT Directorate. This  initiative is a large and complex modernization program intended to  deliver a system-of-systems to support all of the Bureau’s survey data  collection and processing functions, rather than continuing to rely on  unique, survey-specific systems with redundant capabilities. In addition,  according to Bureau officials, the 2020 Census Directorate or other  Bureau divisions are developing or modifying 32 other IT systems. To help inform, validate, and refine the operational design of the 2020  Census, and to test several of the IT systems, the Bureau has held a  series of operational tests since 2012. Among these, in March 2017, the  Bureau conducted a nationwide test (referred to as the 2017 Census  Test) of households responding to census questions using paper, the  Internet, or the phone. This test evaluated key new IT components, such  as the Internet self-response system and the use of a cloud-based  infrastructure. The Bureau is currently conducting the 2018 End-to-End Test, which  began in August 2017 and runs through April 2019. It is the Bureau’s final  opportunity to test all key systems and operations to ensure readiness for  the 2020 Census. The Bureau’s plans for this test include, among other  things, address canvassing, self-response (via paper, Internet, and  phone), and nonresponse follow-up. To support its 2018 End-to-End Test, the Bureau plans to deploy and use  43 systems incrementally to support nine operations from December  2016 through the end of the test in April 2019. These nine operations are:  (1) in-office address canvassing, (2) recruiting staff for address  canvassing, (3) training for address canvassing, (4) in-field address  canvassing, (5) recruiting staff for field enumeration, (6) training for field  enumeration, (7) self-response (i.e., Internet, phone, or paper), (8) field  enumeration, and (9) tabulation and dissemination. Appendix I includes  additional details about the 43 systems, the operation or operations they  support, and key deployment dates. The Bureau Needs to  Manage Risks of  Implementing  Innovations The Bureau Plans Four  Innovation Areas for 2020,  but Has Scaled Back Key  Census Tests The four innovation areas the Bureau plans for 2020 show promise for a  more cost-effective head count (see table 1). However, the innovations  also introduce new risks, in part, because they include new procedures  and technology that have not been used extensively in earlier decennials,  if at all. Our prior work has shown the importance of the Bureau  conducting a robust testing program, including the 2018 End-to-End  Test. However, because of funding uncertainty the Bureau canceled the  field components of the 2017 Census Test including non-response follow- up, a key census operation. In November 2016, we reported that the cancelation of the 2017 field  tests was a lost opportunity to test, refine, and integrate operations and  systems, and that it put more pressure on the 2018 End-to-End Test to  demonstrate that enumeration activities will function under census-like  conditions as needed for 2020. In May 2017, the Bureau scaled back  the operational scope of the 2018 End-to-End and, of the three planned  test sites, only the Rhode Island site would fully implement the 2018 End- to-End Test. The Washington and West Virginia state test sites would test  address canvassing. In addition, due to budgetary concerns, the Bureau  decided to remove three coverage measurement operations (and the  technology that supports them) from the scope of the test. Without  sufficient testing, operational problems can go undiscovered and the  opportunity to improve operations will be lost, in part because the 2018  End-to-End Test is the last opportunity to demonstrate census technology  and procedures across a range of geographic locations, housing types,  and demographic groups. New Uses of  Administrative Records  Are Promising, but  Introduce Challenges Administrative records—information already provided to the government  as it administers other programs, such as mail collection by the U.S.  Postal Service—have been discussed and used for the decennial census  since the 1970s, and for 2020 the Bureau plans a more significant role for  them. In July 2017, we reported that the Bureau had taken steps to  ensure that its use of administrative records would lower the cost and  improve the accuracy of the 2020 Census. For example, the Bureau set a rule that it would only use administrative  records to count a household when a minimum amount of information  was present within data sources. According to the Bureau, this would help  ensure that administrative records are used only in circumstances where  research has shown them to be most accurate. Additionally, before using  any administrative records to support census operations, the Bureau  determined it will subject each source to a quality assurance process that  includes, among other things, basic checks for data integrity as well as  assessments by subject matter experts of the information’s fitness for  various uses by the Bureau. (See figure 3.) According to the Bureau, it links administrative records data sources to  complement each other, improving their reliability and completeness. The  Bureau also creates an anonymous personal identifier for each individual  in the data to reduce the risk of disclosure once the data are linked across  sources. In July 2017, we reported that the Bureau had already tested the uses of  administrative records that hold the most potential for reducing census  costs, such as counting people who did not respond to census mailings.  The Bureau planned to test additional applications of administrative  records for the first time during the 2018 End-to-End Test. For example,  the Bureau planned to use administrative records to support quality  control during its non-response field enumeration. The Bureau planned to  compare response data collected by enumerators to administrative  records and flag significant differences based on predefined rules. The  differences might be in the total count of persons in a household or in  specific combinations of personal characteristics, such as age or race.  According to the Bureau, flagging such differences could be used to help  identify which enumeration cases to reinterview as part of the quality  control operation. However, we reported in October 2015 that the Bureau faced other  challenges with using administrative records for the 2020 Census. For  example, although the Bureau has no control over the accuracy of data  provided to it by other agencies, it is responsible for ensuring that data it  uses for the 2020 Census are of sufficient quality for their planned uses.  Another challenge we identified in 2015 is the extent to which the public  will accept government agencies sharing personal data for the purposes  of the census. The Bureau has recognized these challenges within its risk  registers. The Bureau Has  Fundamentally Re- Engineered Address  Canvassing for 2020 In-Office Address Canvassing. The Bureau has re-engineered its  approach to building its master address list for 2020. Specifically, by  relying on multiple sources of imagery and administrative data, the  Bureau anticipates constructing its address list with far less door-to-door  field canvassing compared to previous censuses. One major change the Bureau has made consists of using in-office  address canvassing—a two-phase process that was to systematically  review small geographic areas nationwide, known as census blocks, to  identify those that will not need to be canvassed in the field, as shown in  figure 4. The Bureau estimated that the two phases of in-office canvassing would  have resulted in roughly 25 percent of housing units requiring in-field  canvassing, instead of canvassing nearly all housing units in the field as  done in prior decennials. With in-office address canvassing census  workers compare current aerial imagery for a given block with imagery for  that block dating to the time of the last decennial census in 2010. During  this first phase, called Interactive Review, specially trained census  workers identify whether a block appears to have experienced change in  the number of housing units, flagging each block either as stable—free of  population growth, decline, or uncertainty in what is happening in the  imagery over time—or “active,” in which case it moves to the next phase.  Addresses in stable blocks are not marked for in-field canvassing. For blocks where change is detected or suspected, the Bureau was to  use a second phase of in-office canvassing, known as Active Block  Resolution, to attempt to resolve the status of each address and housing  unit in question within that block. During this phase, census workers use  aerial imagery, street imagery, and data from the U.S. Postal Service, as  well as from state, local, and tribal partners when reviewing blocks. If a  block can be fully resolved during this phase of in-office canvassing, the  changes are recorded in the Bureau’s master address file. If a block  cannot be fully resolved during the second phase of in-office canvassing,  then the entire block, or some portion of the block, is flagged for inclusion  in the in-field canvassing operation. A first pass of the entire country for  in-office address canvassing began in September 2015 and was  completed in June 2017. In-field canvassing for the 2020 Census is  scheduled to begin in August 2019. However, in July 2017 we reported that the Bureau altered its design for  re-engineered address canvassing because of budget uncertainty by  suspending the second phase of in-office address canvassing. Without  the second phase of in-office address canvassing, blocks that are not  resolved by phase one will have a greater chance of requiring in-field  canvassing. Bureau officials told us at that time that they anticipated  that canceling the second phase of in-office address canvassing  altogether would increase their estimated in-field canvassing workload by  5 percentage points, from 25 percent to 30 percent of housing units— increasing costs. The Bureau did not develop cost and quality information on address  canvassing projects, and detailed information on cost tradeoffs was not  available when we requested it. The information the Bureau had did not  break out the estimated cost of the different phases of in-office address  canvassing through 2020. However, the total estimated cost for both  phases one and two was approximately $22 million. Thus, this  suspension might save a portion of the $22 million, but it will potentially increase the cost of the address canvassing operation downstream. Our  July 2017 report recommended, and the Bureau agreed, that the Bureau  should use its evaluations before 2020 to determine the implications of in- office address canvassing on the cost and quality of address canvassing,  and use this information to justify decisions related to its re-engineered  address canvassing approach. In-Field Address Canvassing for the 2018 End-to-End Test. On  August 28, 2017, temporary census employees known as address listers  began implementing the in-field component of address canvassing for the  2018 End-to-End Test. Listers walked the streets of designated census  blocks at all three test sites to verify addresses and geographic locations.  The operation ended on September 27, 2017. As part of our ongoing  work, we visited all three test sites and observed 18 listers conduct  address canvassing. Generally, we found that listers were able to conduct  address canvassing as planned. However, we also noted several  challenges. We shared the following preliminary observations from our  site visits with the Bureau:  Internet connectivity was problematic at the West Virginia test site.  We spoke to four census field supervisors that described certain  areas as dead spots where Internet and cell phone service were not  available. We also were told by those same supervisors that only  certain cell service providers worked in certain areas. In order to  access the Internet or cell service in those areas, census workers  sometimes needed to drive several miles. The allocation of lister assignments was not always optimal. Listers  were supposed to be provided assignments close to where they live in  order to optimize their local knowledge and to limit the numbers of  miles being driven by listers to and from their assignment area.  Bureau officials told us this was a challenge at all three test sites.  Moreover, at one site the area census manager told us that some  listers were being assigned work in another county even though  blocks were still unassigned closer to where they resided. Relying on  local knowledge and limiting the number of miles can increase both  the efficiency and effectiveness of address canvassing. The assignment of some of the large blocks early in the operations  was not occurring as planned. At all three 2018 End-to-End Test sites  Bureau managers had to manually assign some large blocks (some  blocks had hundreds of housing units). It is important to assign large  blocks early on because leaving the large blocks to be canvassed  until the end of the operation could jeopardize the timely completion of  address canvassing. The global positioning system-derived location for the lister was not  always corresponding to the location on the map. A Bureau official  confirmed that at all three test sites, the location icon jumped around  or was on the wrong street. According to a Bureau official, listers were  told to override the global positioning system-derived location when  confirming the geographic location of the residence. We have discussed these challenges with Bureau officials who stated that  overall they are satisfied with the implementation of address canvassing  but also agreed that resolving challenges discovered during address  canvassing, some of which can affect the operation’s efficiency and  effectiveness, will be important before the 2020 Census. We will continue  to monitor address canvassing operation and plan to issue a report in the  winter of 2018. The Bureau  Continues to Face  Challenges in  Implementing and  Securing Key IT  Systems The Bureau Continues to  Face Challenges  Implementing and  Managing IT Systems We have previously reported that the Bureau faced challenges in  managing and overseeing IT programs, systems, and contractors  supporting the 2020 Census. Specifically, it has been challenged in  managing schedules, costs, contracts, and governance and internal  coordination for its IT systems. As a result of these challenges, the  Bureau is at risk of being unable to fully implement key IT systems  necessary to support the 2020 Census. We have previously  recommended that the Bureau take action to improve its implementation  and management of IT in areas such as governance and internal  coordination. We also have ongoing work reviewing each of these  areas. Our ongoing work has indicated that the Bureau faces significant  challenges in managing the schedule for developing and testing systems  for the 2018 End-to-End Test that began in August 2017. In this regard,  the Bureau still has significant development and testing work that remains  to be completed. As of August 2017, of the 43 systems in the test, the  Bureau reported that 4 systems had completed development and  integration testing, while the remaining 39 systems had not completed  these activities. Of these 39 systems, the Bureau reported that it had deployed a portion  of the functionality for 21 systems to support address canvassing for the  2018 End-to-End Test; however, it had not yet deployed any functionality  for the remaining 18 systems for the test. Figure 5 summarizes the  development and testing status for the 43 systems planned for the 2018  End-to-End Test, and appendix I includes additional information on the  status of development and testing for these systems. Moreover, due to challenges experienced during systems development,  the Bureau has delayed key IT milestone dates (e.g., dates to begin  integration testing) by several months for the systems supporting six of  the nine operations in the 2018 End-to-End Test. Figure 6 depicts the  delays to the deployment dates for the operations in the 2018 End-to-End  Test, as of August 2017. However, our ongoing work also indicates that the Bureau is at risk of not  meeting the updated milestone dates. For example, in June 2017 the  Bureau reported that at least two of the systems expected to be used in  the self-response operation (the Internet self-response system and the  call center system) are at risk of not meeting the delayed milestone dates.  In addition, in September 2017 the Bureau reported that at least two of  the systems expected to be used in the field enumeration operation (the  enumeration system and the operational control system) are at risk of not  meeting their delayed dates. Combined, these delays reduce the time available to conduct the security  reviews and approvals for the systems being used in the 2018 End-to- End Test. We previously testified in May 2017 that the Bureau faced  similar challenges leading up to the 2017 Census Test, including  experiencing delays in system development that led to compressed time  frames for security reviews and approvals.  Specifically, we noted that  the Bureau did not have time to thoroughly assess the low-impact  components of one system and complete penetration testing for another  system prior to the test, but accepted the security risks and uncertainty  due to compressed time frames. We concluded that, for the 2018 End-to- End Test, it will be important that these security assessments are  completed in a timely manner and that risks are at an acceptable level  before the systems are deployed. The Bureau noted that, if it continues to be behind schedule, field  operations for the 2018 End-to-End Test will not be performed as  planned. Bureau officials are evaluating options to decrease the impact of  these delays on integration testing and security review activities by, for  example, utilizing additional staff. We have ongoing work reviewing the  Bureau’s development and testing delays and the impacts of these delays  on systems readiness for the 2018 End-to-End Test. The Bureau faces challenges in reporting and controlling IT cost growth.  In April 2017, the Bureau briefed us on its efforts to estimate the costs for  the 2020 Census, during which it presented IT costs of about $2.4 billion  from fiscal years 2018 through 2021. Based on this information and other  corroborating IT contract information provided by the Bureau, we testified  in May 2017 that the Bureau had identified at least $2 billion in IT costs. However, in June 2017, Bureau officials in the 2020 Census Directorate  told us that the data they provided in April 2017 did not reflect all IT costs  for the 2020 program. The officials provided us with an analysis of the  Bureau’s October 2015 cost estimate that identified $3.4 billion in total IT  costs from fiscal years 2012 through 2023. These costs included, among  other things, those associated with system engineering, test and  evaluation, and infrastructure, as well as a portion of the costs for the  CEDCaP program. Yet, our ongoing work determined that the Bureau’s $3.4 billion cost  estimate does not reflect its current plans for acquiring IT to be used  during the 2020 Census and that the related costs are likely to increase:  In August 2016, the Bureau awarded a technical integration contract  for about $886 million, a cost that was not reflected in the $3.4 billion  expected IT costs. More recently, in May 2017, we testified that the  scope of work for this contract had increased since the contract was  awarded; thus, the corresponding contract costs were likely to rise  above $886 million, as well. In March 2017, the Bureau reported that the contract associated with  the call center and IT system to support the collection of census data  over the phone was projected to overrun its initial estimated cost by at  least $40 million. In May 2017, the Bureau reported that the CEDCaP program’s cost  estimate was increasing by about $400 million—from its original  estimate of $548 million in 2013 to a revised estimate of $965 million  in May 2017. In June 2017, the Bureau awarded a contract for mobile devices and  associated services for about $283 million, an amount that is about  $137 million higher than the cost for these devices and services  identified in its October 2015 estimate. As a result of these factors, the Bureau’s $3.4 billion estimate of IT costs  is likely to be at least $1.4 billion higher, thus increasing the total costs to  at least $4.8 billion. Figure 7 identifies the Bureau estimate of total IT  costs associated with the 2020 program as of October 2015, as well as  anticipated cost increases as of August 2017. IT cost information that is accurately reported and clearly communicated  is necessary so that Congress and the public have confidence that  taxpayer funds are being spent in an appropriate manner. However,  changes in the Bureau’s reporting of these total costs, combined with cost  growth since the October 2015 estimate, raise questions as to whether  the Bureau has a complete understanding of the IT costs associated with  the 2020 program. In this regard, we have previously reported on issues  with the Bureau’s cost estimating practices (which are discussed in more  detail later in this statement). To address these issues, in October 2017,  officials stated that the Bureau is developing a new cost estimate for the  entire 2020 Census program, which they expect to release by the end of  this fall. Our ongoing work also determined that the Bureau faces challenges in  managing its significant contractor support. The Bureau is relying on  contractor support in many key areas of the 2020 Census. For example, it  is relying on contractors to develop a number of key systems and  components of the IT infrastructure. These activities include (1)  developing the IT platform that is to be used to collect data from a  majority of respondents—those using the Internet, telephone, and non- response follow-up activities; (2) procuring the mobile devices and cellular  service to be used for non-response follow-up; and (3) developing the  infrastructure in the field offices. According to Bureau officials, contractors  are also providing support in areas such as fraud detection, cloud  computing services, and disaster recovery. In addition to the development of key technology, the Bureau is relying on  contractor support for integrating all of the key systems and infrastructure.  The Bureau awarded a contract to integrate the 2020 Census systems  and infrastructure in August 2016. The contractor’s work was to include  evaluating the systems and infrastructure and acquiring the infrastructure  (e.g., cloud or data center) to meet the Bureau’s scalability and  performance needs. It was also to include integrating all of the systems,  supporting technical testing activities, and developing plans for ensuring  the continuity of operations. Since the contract was awarded, the Bureau  has modified the scope to also include assisting with operational testing  activities, conducting performance testing for two Internet self-response  systems, and technical support for the implementation of the paper data  capture system. However, our ongoing work has indicated that the Bureau is facing  staffing challenges that could impact its ability to manage and oversee the  technical integration contractor. Specifically, the Bureau is managing the  integration contractor through a government program management office,  but this office is still filling vacancies. As of October 2017, the Bureau  reported that 35 of the office’s 58 federal employee positions were  vacant. As a result, this program management office may not be able to  provide adequate oversight of contractor cost, schedule, and  performance. The delays during the 2017 Test and preparations for the 2018 End-to- End Test raises concerns regarding the Bureau’s ability to effectively  perform contractor management. As we reported in November 2016, a  greater reliance on contractors for these key components of the 2020  Census requires the Bureau to focus on sound management and  oversight of the key contracts, projects, and systems. As part of our  ongoing work, we plan to monitor the Bureau’s progress in managing its  contractor support. Effective IT governance can drive change, provide oversight, and ensure  accountability for results. Further, effective IT governance was envisioned  in the provisions referred to as the Federal Information Technology  Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA), which strengthened and reinforced  the role of the departmental CIO. To ensure executive-level oversight of the key systems and technology,  the Bureau’s CIO (or a representative) is a member of the governance  boards that oversee all of the operations and technology for the 2020  Census. However, in August 2016 we reported on challenges the Bureau  has had with IT governance and internal coordination, including  weaknesses in its ability to monitor and control IT project costs,  schedules, and performance. We made eight recommendations to the  Department of Commerce to direct the Bureau to, among other things,  better ensure that risks are adequately identified and schedules are  aligned. The department agreed with our recommendations. However, as  of October 2017, the Bureau had only fully implemented one  recommendation and had taken initial steps toward implementing others. Further, given the schedule delays and cost increases previously  mentioned, and the vast amount of development, testing, and security  assessments left to be completed, we remain concerned about executive- level oversight of systems and security. Moving forward, it will be  important that the CIO and other agency executives continue to use a  collaborative governance approach to effectively manage risks and  ensure that the IT solutions meet the needs of the agency within cost and  schedule. As part of our ongoing work, we plan to monitor the steps the  Bureau is taking to effectively oversee and manage the development and  acquisition of its IT systems. The Bureau Has  Significant Information  Security Steps to  Complete for the 2018  End-to-End Test In November 2016, we described the significant challenges that the  Bureau faced in securing systems and data for the 2020 Census, and we  noted that tight time frames could exacerbate these challenges. Two  such challenges were (1) ensuring that individuals gain only limited and  appropriate access to the 2020 Census data, including personally  identifiable information (PII) (e.g., name, address, and date of birth), and  (2) making certain that security assessments were completed in a timely  manner and that risks were at an acceptable level. Protecting PII, for  example, is especially important because a majority of the 43 systems to  be used in the 2018 End-to-End Test contain PII, as reflected in figure 8. To address these and other challenges, federal law and guidance specify  requirements for protecting federal information and information systems,  such as those to be used in the 2020 Census. Specifically, the Federal  Information Security Management Act of 2002 and the Federal  Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) require executive  branch agencies to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide  program to provide security for the information and information systems  that support operations and assets of the agency. Accordingly, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)  developed risk management framework guidance for agencies to follow in  developing information security programs. Additionally, the Office of  Management and Budget’s (OMB) revised Circular A-130 on managing  federal information resources required agencies to implement the NIST  risk management framework to integrate information security and risk  management activities into the system development life cycle. In accordance with FISMA, NIST guidance, and OMB guidance, the  Office of the CIO established a risk management framework. This  framework requires that system developers ensure that each of the  systems undergoes a full security assessment, and that system  developers remediate critical deficiencies. In addition, according to the  Bureau’s framework, system developers must ensure that each  component of a system has its own system security plan, which  documents how the Bureau plans to implement security controls. As a  result, system developers for a single system might develop multiple  system security plans (in some cases as many as 34 plans), which all  have to be approved as part of the system’s complete security  documentation. We have ongoing work that is reviewing the extent to  which the Bureau’s framework meets the specific requirements of the  NIST guidance. According to the Bureau’s framework, each of the 43 systems in the 2018  End-to-End Test will need to have complete security documentation (such  as system security plans) and an approved authorization to operate  prior to their use in the 2018 End-to-End Test. However, our ongoing  work indicates that, while the Bureau is completing these steps for the 43  systems to be used in the 2018 End-to-End Test, significant work  remains. Specifically: None of the 43 systems are fully authorized to operate through the  completion of the 2018 End-to-End Test. Bureau officials from the  CIO’s Office of Information Security stated that these systems will  need to be reauthorized because, among other things, they have  additional development work planned that may require the systems to  be reauthorized; are being moved to a different infrastructure  environment (e.g., from a data center to a cloud-based environment);  or have a current authorization that expires before the completion of  the 2018 End-to-End Test. The amount of work remaining is  concerning because the test has already begun and the delays  experienced in system development and testing mentioned earlier  reduce the time available for performing the security assessments  needed to fully authorize these systems before the completion of the  2018 End-to-End test. Thirty-seven systems have a current authorization to operate, but the  Bureau will need to reauthorize these systems before the completion  of the 2018 End-to-End Test. This is due to the reasons mentioned  previously, such as additional development work planned and  changes to the infrastructure environments. Two systems have not yet obtained an authorization to operate. For the remaining four systems, the Bureau has not yet provided us  with documentation about the current authorization status. Figure 9 depicts the authorization to operate status for the systems being  used in the 2018 End-to-End Test, as reported by the Bureau. Because many of the systems that will be a part of the 2018 End-to-End  Test are not yet fully developed, the Bureau has not finalized all of the  security controls to be implemented; assessed those controls; developed  plans to remediate control weaknesses; and determined whether there is  time to fully remediate any deficiencies before the systems are needed for  the test. In addition, as discussed earlier, the Bureau is facing system  development challenges that are delaying the completion of milestones  and compressing the time available for security testing activities. As we previously reported, while the large-scale technological changes  (such as Internet self-response) increase the likelihood of efficiency and  effectiveness gains, they also introduce many information security  challenges. The 2018 End-to-End Test also involves collecting PII on  hundreds of thousands of households across the country, which further  increases the need to properly secure these systems. Thus, it will be  important that the Bureau provides adequate time to perform these  security assessments, completes them in a timely manner, and ensures  that risks are at an acceptable level before the systems are deployed. We  plan to continue monitoring the Bureau’s progress in securing its IT  systems and data as part of our ongoing work. The Bureau Needs to  Improve the  Reliability of Its 2020  Cost Estimate 2020 Census Cost  Estimate Does Not Reflect  Best Practices In June 2016, we reported that the Bureau’s October 2015 update of its  life-cycle cost estimate for the 2020 Census did not conform to the four  characteristics that constitute best practices, and, as a result, the  estimate was unreliable. Cost estimates that appropriately account for  risks facing an agency can help an agency manage large, complex  activities like the 2020 Census, as well as help Congress make funding  decisions and provide oversight. Cost estimates are also necessary to  inform decisions to fund one program over another, to develop annual  budget requests, to determine what resources are needed, and to  develop baselines for measuring performance. In June 2016, we reported that, although the Bureau had taken steps to  improve its capacity to carry out an effective cost estimate, such as  establishing an independent cost estimation office, its October 2015  version of the estimate for the 2020 Census only partially met the  characteristics of two best practices (comprehensive and accurate) and  minimally met the other two (well-documented and credible). All four  characteristics need to be substantially met in order for an estimate to be  deemed high-quality: Comprehensive. To be comprehensive an estimate should have  enough detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor  double-counted, and all cost-influencing assumptions are detailed in  the estimate’s documentation, among other things, according to best  practices. In June 2016, we reported that, while Bureau officials were  able to provide us with several documents that included projections  and assumptions that were used in the cost estimate, we found the  estimate to be partially comprehensive because it was unclear if all  life-cycle costs were included in the estimate or if the cost estimate  completely defined the program. Accurate. Accurate estimates are unbiased and contain few  mathematical mistakes. We reported in June 2016 that the estimate  partially met best practices for this characteristic, in part because we  could not independently verify the calculations the Bureau used within  its cost model, which the Bureau did not have documented or  explained outside its cost model. Well-documented. Cost estimates are considered valid if they are  well-documented to the point they can be easily repeated or updated  and can be traced to original sources through auditing, according to  best practices. In June 2016, we reported that, while the Bureau  provided some documentation of supporting data, it did not describe  how the source data were incorporated. Credible. Credible cost estimates must clearly identify limitations due  to uncertainty or bias surrounding the data or assumptions, according  to best practices. In June 2016, we reported that the estimate  minimally met best practices for this characteristic in part because the  Bureau carried out its risk and uncertainty analysis only for about $4.6  billion (37 percent) of the $12.5 billion total estimated life-cycle cost,  excluding, for example, consideration of uncertainty over what the  decennial census’s estimated part will be of the total cost of CEDCaP. In June 2016, we recommended that the Bureau take action to ensure its  2020 Census cost estimate meets all four characteristic of a reliable cost  estimate. The Bureau agreed with our recommendation. We also reported  in June 2016 that risks were not properly accounted for in the cost  estimate and recommended that the Bureau properly account for risk to  ensure there are appropriate levels for budgeted contingencies, and  those recommendations have not yet been implemented. In October 2017, Bureau officials told us they were making progress  towards implementing our recommendations and would provide us with  that documentation when the cost estimate and supporting  documentation are finalized. Moreover, Bureau officials also told us that  an updated cost estimate would be available by the end of this fall.  However, until the Bureau updates its estimate and we have the  opportunity to review its reliability, questions will surround the quality of  the 2020 Census cost estimate and the basis for any 2020 Census  annual budgetary figures. The Cost of the 2020  Census Will Likely Be  Higher Than Originally  Planned While the Bureau has not updated its October 2015 cost estimate, several  events since then indicate that the cost of the current design will be  higher. For example: As previously mentioned, in August 2016 an $886 million IT  integration contract was awarded. According to Bureau officials, there  was no reference to this contract in the documentation for the planned  contract costs supporting the October 2015 life-cycle cost estimate. In March 2017, the Bureau suspended part of how it is verifying  address in-office procedures using on-screen imagery—one of its four  key design innovations intended to control the cost of the 2020  Census. According to Bureau officials, the suspension of the one part  of in-office canvassing will increase the workload of the more  expensive in-field (door-to-door address identification) by at least five  percentage points, from 25 percent to 30 percent of housing units— increasing the cost over what had been assumed as part of the earlier  cost estimate. Based on cost assumptions underlying its October  2015 life-cycle cost estimate, we found, as part of our prior work, that  the potential addition of five percentage points to the field workload  alone could reduce the Bureau’s cost savings by $26.6 million. As earlier discussed, in May 2017, Bureau officials reported that the  cost of the CEDCaP program has now increased by over $400 million,  from about $548 million to $965 million. 2020 Census Cost  Estimate May Not Fully  Inform Annual Budget  Requests Cost estimates are also used by the Bureau as a tool to inform the annual  budget process. However, since the Bureau did not fully follow best  practices for developing and maintaining the life-cycle cost estimate, as  previously described, annual budget requests based on that cost estimate  may not be fully informed. A high-quality cost estimate is the foundation of a good budget. A major  purpose of a cost estimate is to support the budget process by providing  an estimate of the funding required to efficiently execute a program.  Because most programs do not remain static but evolve over time,  developing a cost estimate should not be a onetime event but rather a  recurrent process. Effective program and cost control requires ongoing  revisions to the cost estimate and budget. Using a reliable life-cycle cost estimate to formulate the budget could help  the Bureau ensure that all costs are fully accounted for so that resources  are adequate to support the program. Credible cost estimates could also  help the Bureau effectively defend budgets to the Department of  Commerce, OMB, and Congress. Concerns about the soundness of the  life cycle cost estimate and the quality of annual budgets related to the  2020 Census are particularly important because the bulk of funds will be  obligated in fiscal years 2019 through 2020. In our June 2016 report on  the Bureau’s life-cycle cost estimate we made several recommendations  with which the Bureau agreed. We will continue to monitor the Bureau’s  efforts to address these recommendations. In conclusion, the Bureau has made progress in revamping its approach  to the census and testing the new design. However, it faces considerable  challenges and uncertainties in (1) implementing the cost-saving  innovations; (2) managing the development and security of key IT  systems; and (3) developing a quality cost estimate for the 2020 Census.  For these reasons, the 2020 Census is a GAO high risk area. Continued management attention is vital for ensuring risks are managed,  the Bureau’s preparations stay on-track, and the Bureau is held  accountable for implementing the enumeration as planned. We will  continue to assess the Bureau’s efforts to conduct a cost-effective  enumeration and look forward to keeping Congress informed of the  Bureau’s progress. Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings, and Members of the  Committee, this completes our prepared statement. We would be pleased  to respond to any questions that you may have. GAO Contacts and  Staff  Acknowledgments If you have any questions about this statement, please contact David A.  Powner at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov or Robert  Goldenkoff at (202) 512-2757 or by e-mail at goldenkoffr@gao.gov.  Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public  Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Other key  contributors to this testimony include Lisa Pearson (Assistant Director);  Jon Ticehurst (Assistant Director); Kate Sharkey (Analyst in Charge);  Mark Abraham, Dewi Djunaidy; Hoyt Lacy; Andrea Starosciak; Umesh  Thakkar; Timothy Wexler; and Katherine Wulff. Staff who made key  contributions to the reports cited in this statement are identified in the  source products. Appendix I: Status as of August 2017 of  Development and Integration Testing for  Systems in the 2018 End-to-End Test As part of its 2018 End-to-End Test, the Census Bureau (Bureau) plans to  deploy 43 systems incrementally to support nine operations from  December 2016 through the end of the test in April 2019. The nine  operations are: (1) in-office address canvassing, (2) recruiting for address  canvassing, (3) training for address canvassing, (4) in-field address  canvassing operation, (5) recruiting for field enumeration, (6) training for  field enumeration, (7) self-response (i.e., Internet, phone, or paper)  operation, (8) field enumeration operation, and (9) tabulation and  dissemination. According to the Bureau, a single system may be  deployed multiple times throughout the test (with additional or new  functionality) if that system is needed for more than one of these  operations. Table 1 describes the status as of August 2017 of development and  integration testing for each system in the 2018 End-to-End Test.  Specifically, as of August 2017, the Bureau had completed both  development work and integration testing for 4 systems, and was in the  process of completing development and testing for 39 systems.
One of the Bureau's most important functions is to conduct a complete and accurate decennial census of the U.S. population, which is mandated by the Constitution and provides vital data for the nation. A complete count of the nation's population is an enormous undertaking as the Bureau seeks to control the cost of the census, implement operational innovations, and use new and modified IT systems. In recent years, GAO has identified challenges that raise serious concerns about the Bureau's ability to conduct a cost-effective count. For these reasons, GAO added the 2020 Census to its high-risk list in February 2017. In light of these challenges, GAO was asked to testify about the Bureau's progress in preparing for the 2020 Census. To do so, GAO summarized its prior work regarding the Bureau's planning efforts for the 2020 Census. GAO also included observations from its ongoing work on the 2018 End-to-End Test. This information is related to, among other things, recent decisions on preparations for the 2020 Census; progress on key systems to be used for the 2018 End-to-End Test, including the status of IT security assessments; execution of the test at three test sites; and efforts to update the life-cycle cost estimate. The Census Bureau (Bureau) is planning several innovations for the 2020 Decennial Census, including re-engineering field operations, using administrative records to supplement census data, verifying addresses in-office using on-screen imagery, and allowing the public to respond using the Internet. These innovations show promise for controlling costs, but they also introduce new risks, in part because they include new procedures and technologies that have not been used extensively in earlier decennial censuses, if at all. GAO's prior work has emphasized the importance of the Bureau conducting a robust testing program to demonstrate that the systems and operations perform as intended under census-like conditions prior to the 2020 Census. However, because of budget uncertainties the Bureau canceled its 2017 field test and then scaled back its 2018 End-to End Test, placing these innovation areas more at risk. The Bureau continues to face challenges in managing and overseeing the information technology (IT) programs, systems, and contracts supporting the 2020 Census. For example, GAO's ongoing work indicates that the system development schedule leading up to the 2018 End-to-End test has experienced several delays. Further, the Bureau has not yet addressed several security risks and challenges to secure its systems and data, including making certain that security assessments are completed in a timely manner and that risks are at an acceptable level. Given that certain operations for the 2018 End-to-End Test began in August 2017, it is important that the Bureau quickly address these challenges. GAO plans to monitor the Bureau's progress as part of its ongoing work. In addition, the Bureau's cost estimate is not reliable and is out-of-date. Specifically, in June 2016, GAO reported that the cost estimate for the 2020 Census did not fully reflect characteristics of a high-quality estimate and could not be considered reliable. Moreover, since the Bureau did not follow cost estimation best practices, its annual budget requests based on the cost estimate may not be fully informed. Additionally, the Bureau has not yet updated its October 2015 cost estimate, but GAO expects that the cost of the current census design (around $12.5 billion in 2020 constant dollars) will increase due to, for example, expected increases in 2020 program IT costs (see figure). GAO made several recommendations to address these concerns, and the Bureau plans to address these recommendations in an updated cost estimate to be released later this fall.