Background Global Train and Equip  Authority to Build Foreign  Partner Capacity DOD has used the Global Train and Equip program to provide training,  equipment, and small-scale military construction activities intended to  build the capacity of partner nations’ military forces to conduct  counterterrorism operations. The program was originally authorized under  Section 1206 of the 2006 NDAA and has been amended several times.  The 2015 NDAA permanently authorized the Secretary of Defense, with  concurrence of the Secretary of State, to conduct programs to (1) build  the capacity of a foreign country’s national military forces to conduct  counterterrorism operations or participate in, or support, ongoing allied or  coalition military or stability operations that benefit the national security  interests of the United States; (2) build the capacity of a foreign country’s  national maritime or border security forces to conduct counterterrorism  operations; and (3) build the capacity of a foreign country’s national-level  security forces that have among their functional responsibilities a  counterterrorism mission in order for such forces to conduct  counterterrorism operations. The fiscal year 2017 NDAA repealed Section  2282 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code and created Section 333 of the same  title (Section 333). Section 333 authorized DOD to continue providing  training and equipment to the national security forces of foreign countries  for the purpose of building the capacity of such forces to conduct  counterterrorism operations, among other things. The fiscal year 2017  NDAA also contained several administrative and organizational  instructions for the management and oversight of DOD security  cooperation policy. According to DOD, counterterrorism and stability operations assistance  generally consist of security capability projects that fortify a partner  nation’s land, sea, or air capability. Projects often provide equipment or  training intended to build partner communications, intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Figure 1 shows an  example of a UH-60 helicopter—a type of equipment that has been  provided through Global Train and Equip projects. U.S. Security Assistance  Policy Presidential Policy Directive 23, published in April 2013, was aimed at  strengthening the ability of the United States to help allied and partner  nations build their own security capacity. The directive states that U.S.  agencies should target security sector assistance where it can be  effective. The directive identifies principal goals of, and guidelines for,  security sector assistance that highlight the importance of including the  following four planning elements in project design and execution:  identifying objectives that address partner nation needs;  considering partner nations’ capacity to absorb U.S. assistance;  integrating assessment, monitoring, and evaluation to provide  policymakers, program managers, and implementers with information  and evidence necessary to make effective decisions and maximize  program outcomes; and anticipating sustainment needs. Global Train and Equip  Program Management and  Project Planning During the reporting period covered by this review, DOD’s Office of the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity  Conflict was responsible for providing policy guidance and oversight of  the Global Train and Equip program. The office coordinated with State’s  Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and other stakeholders in an  interagency process to solicit project proposals annually, in accordance  with guidance that DOD revises each year to reflect lessons learned,  congressional concerns, and other considerations. DOD 2016 and 2017  guidance implements Presidential Policy Directive 23, requiring that  project proposals for the Global Train and Equip program address the  four planning elements highlighted in the directive. Figure 2 illustrates the conceptual framework of the project proposal,  approval, and implementation processes in 2016 and 2017. According to  DOD officials, various elements of the proposal development, review,  selection, and notification process occurred simultaneously, as proposal  submission and review occurred on a rolling basis and agency-approved  projects were notified to Congress in multiple groups throughout each  fiscal year. As figure 2 shows, DOD instituted some changes to the proposal  development and approval process for projects notified to Congress in  2017. According to DOD officials, for 2017, geographic combatant  commands and embassy staff first submitted high-level concepts for  review rather than fully drafted project proposals. These concepts were  intended to provide information on project objectives for an interagency  working group’s review and approval before further resources were  committed to developing full proposals. DOD officials told us that the  2017 process remains in place for 2018 and 2019 projects. DOD officials  said that in prior years, including 2016, geographic combatant commands  and embassy staff were required to draft full proposals without  confirmation that DOD and State would approve the proposals for  notification to Congress. In 2016 and 2017, DOD and State officials reviewed proposals— approved by the geographic combatant command and ambassador or  chief of mission—and selected projects to recommend to the Secretaries  of Defense and State. Following approval by the Secretary of Defense,  with concurrence from the Secretary of State, DOD prepared and  submitted congressional notifications for each project it intended to fund  through the program. These notifications summarized project information  such as the project’s objectives, the partner nation’s absorptive capacity,  the baseline assessment of the recipient unit’s capabilities, and  arrangements for the project’s sustainment. Congressional notifications  were submitted for each project to the appropriate committees at least 15  days before activities were initiated. According to DOD, project  implementation did not begin immediately after the 15-day notification  period if congressional staff requested additional time for briefings and for  DOD to ensure that the congressional committees agreed with the  proposed activities. After congressional notification, DOD’s Defense  Security Cooperation Agency assumed responsibility for overseeing the  obligation of funds for training and equipment procurement before the end  of the relevant fiscal year, while officials from the security cooperation  office at U.S. embassies were responsible for coordinating in-country  project implementation. DOD planned to conduct assessments of  selected projects 12 to 18 months after delivering major project  components, to evaluate the extent to which U.S. assistance has  contributed to building recipient unit capabilities and the extent to which  the partner nation applied its capabilities consistent with the project’s  intent. DOD Has Obligated  the Majority of Over  $4 Billion Allocated  for Global Train and  Equip Projects since  2009 and Disbursed  About Two-Thirds of  Obligated Funds Of the $4.1 billion allocated for Global Train and Equip projects in 2009  through 2017, DOD has obligated approximately $3.7 billion and  disbursed $2.5 billion. Table 1 details Global Train and Equip program  funding, by fiscal year of appropriation, in 2009 through 2017. As table 1  shows, DOD reported no unobligated balances as of December 2017. Figure 3 details Global Train and Equip allocations in 2009 through 2017,  according to the fiscal year in which DOD allocated the funds. As figure  3 shows, allocations averaged about $276 million in 2009 through 2014  and about $827 million in 2015 through 2017. DOD’s allocations for  Global Train and Equip activities increased from $675 million in 2015 to  about $1.2 billion in 2016 because of an influx of funding from the  Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, which was created in 2015 and  authorized to fund Global Train and Equip projects. In addition, in 2015,  DOD allocated funds from the European Reassurance Initiative, which  also was created that year and authorized to fund Global Train and Equip  projects. DOD’s allocations for Global Train and Equip activities for 2017  totaled $635 million. DOD concentrated allocations of Global and Train Equip funding in 2016  and 2017 on projects for Jordan and Lebanon, which received a  combined total of $856 million, or 47 percent of total allocations during  that period (see fig. 4). In 2016, allocations for projects in Jordan and  Lebanon amounted to about $579 million—nearly 50 percent of  approximately $1.2 billion in total allocations that year. In 2017,  allocations for projects in those countries amounted to about $279  million—44 percent of $635 million in total allocations. For more  information about allocations for specific Global Train and Equip projects  in 2016 and 2017, see appendix II. DOD Consistently  Addressed Only One  of Four Planning  Elements in 2016 and  2017 Proposals but  Reported Efforts to  Ensure Inclusion of  All Elements in 2018 DOD’s 2016 and 2017 proposals for Global Train and Equip projects  consistently addressed only one of the four security assistance planning  elements called for by DOD guidance, but agency officials reported  implementing an informal process to improve coverage of these planning  elements in 2018 proposals. DOD’s 2016 and 2017 guidance for Global  Train and Equip project proposals called for proposal packages to  address (1) project objectives, (2) partner nation absorptive capacity, (3)  baseline assessments of partner nation capabilities, and (4) project  sustainment needs. All 72 proposal packages we reviewed for 2016 and  2017 included project objectives. Slightly more than 30 percent of  proposal packages in 2016 and over 80 percent in 2017 included  information about partner nations’ absorptive capacity, compared with 19  percent in 2015 (see fig. 5). More than 90 percent of 2016 and 2017  proposal packages included baseline assessments, in contrast to 63  percent in 2015. However, less than three-quarters of proposal packages  in 2016 and 2017 included complete sustainment plans, with the  percentage that did so declining from 73 percent in 2016 to 68 percent in  2017. Although DOD’s 2016 and 2017 guidance called for proposals to  address sustainment planning, it did not provide instructions for doing so  when sustainment was not anticipated. According to DOD officials, the  department has hired additional staff and developed an informal quality  review process to better ensure that proposal packages include all key  elements but, as of February 2018, had not documented this process as  written policy. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government  calls for documenting internal control activities aimed at ensuring effective  use of resources and documenting in policies an organization’s internal  control responsibilities. More complete information about each of the  four planning elements—including sustainment costs, even when  negligible—would improve DOD’s ability to plan and allocate funding for  the program, while formalizing the quality review process would also  enable DOD to provide greater consistency in its oversight of project  development. Project Proposals in 2016  and 2017 Consistently  Addressed Only Project  Objectives but Improved  Coverage of Absorptive  Capacity and Baseline  Assessments All 2016 and 2017 Project  Proposals Included Information  about Project Objectives We found that DOD included information that addressed project  objectives in all 72 proposals for Global Train and Equip projects in 2016  and 2017. We previously reported that all 2015 proposals for the program  addressed project objectives. DOD’s guidance notes that it is important  for geographic combatant commands and chiefs of mission to produce  proposals that include a clear narrative about how the proposed  capability-building effort will fit into the theater campaign plans and  integrated country strategies and advance U.S. interests. DOD officials  from one geographic combatant command noted that 2017 Global Train  and Equip project objectives were initially developed at the country level  by the Security Cooperation Office and other embassy personnel and  were based on theater campaign plans. Each proposal we reviewed from  2016 and 2017 outlined the objectives for the project. For example, one  proposal stated that the training and equipment outlined in the proposal  would enhance the partner nation’s armed forces’ ability to effectively  conduct border security, counterincursion, and other night operations. Less Than Half of 2016 Project  Proposals Included Information  about Absorptive Capacity, but  Most 2017 Proposals  Addressed This Element DOD improved its efforts to include information about partner nations’  absorptive capacity in Global Train and Equip project proposals in 2016  and 2017. Thirty-two percent (13 of 41) of 2016 proposals and 84 percent  (26 of 31) of 2017 proposals addressed this planning element. We  previously reported that less than 20 percent (10 of 54) of 2015 proposals  addressed absorptive capacity. Before 2017, DOD guidance called for  project proposals to address absorptive capacity, but the project proposal  template did not include a required field for it. However, DOD updated its  proposal template in 2017 to include a required field for analyzing and assessing the partner nation’s security forces’ current capability and  current performance level in employing the proposed counterterrorism  capabilities while serving in the desired counterterrorism role. According  to DOD officials, they updated the proposal template to better identify  problems with absorptive capacity because of its importance and because  it is an area of high congressional interest. DOD assessments of partner nations’ absorptive capacity noted a range  of abilities to absorb assistance. For example, DOD assessed one  country as having the capacity to immediately employ new equipment  once training was completed and assessed another country’s ability to  absorb training and equipment as average, noting that previous training  had resulted in continuous improvements. DOD officials acknowledged  that assessing absorptive capacity has been a consistent challenge. One  senior official also noted that pressing national security goals, such as  quickly developing the capabilities of strategic partners for ongoing  operations, required the U.S. government to assume some risk by  supporting a project without fully assessing or documenting a partner  nation’s absorptive capacity. Most Project Proposals  Included Baseline  Assessments in 2016 and  2017 We found that 92 percent (66 of 72) of 2016 and 2017 Global Train and  Equip proposal packages included baseline assessments, compared with  63 percent (34 of 54) of 2015 proposal packages. DOD’s assessment  framework is based on a dual-purpose document that includes portions  for assessing the recipient unit’s capabilities at baseline—that is, before a  project begins—and after project delivery and implementation. DOD’s  2016 and 2017 program guidance states that a baseline assessment of  recipient unit capabilities should be completed prior to submission of each  proposal. According to DOD officials, baseline assessments are the  primary mechanisms to identify and document the recipient unit’s  capabilities at the time the project is proposed and its needs to improve  its capabilities to meet its mission. The baseline assessments are  intended to be submitted with project proposals and later used for project  outcome assessments by assessment teams, policy officials, embassy  staff, and other stakeholders. Less Than Three-Quarters of  Proposals Included Complete  Sustainment Plans in 2016 and  2017 Less than three-quarters of Global Train and Equip proposals included  complete sustainment plans in 2016 and 2017, and the percentage of  proposals with complete plans declined from 2016 to 2017. While 73  percent (30 of 41) fully addressed this planning element in 2016, 68  percent (21 of 31) fully addressed it in 2017. We previously reported that  76 percent of 2015 proposals included complete sustainment plans.  According to DOD’s Global Train and Equip guidance for 2016 and 2017,  complete sustainment plans include three elements: (1) an identification  of funding sources for project sustainment, (2) an estimate of the annual  sustainment costs, and (3) an assessment of the sustainment capability  of the partner nation. Most 2016 and 2017 proposals included information  about sustainment funding sources and the partner nation’s sustainment  capability. However, the percentage of proposals that estimated annual  sustainment costs varied: 85 percent of proposals estimated sustainment  costs in 2016 and 71 percent of proposals estimated such costs in 2017. DOD officials told us that sustainment costs may not have been  documented in some cases if sustainment was not expected to be a  significant factor in the proposed project. For example, officials explained  that some projects provided assistance, such as ammunition and training,  that is expendable and does not require sustainment. Officials also noted  that other projects provided assistance that may not have been intended  to be sustained. For instance, long-term sustainment would be  unnecessary for a project with a discrete objective, such as providing  equipment to allow for closer coordination with U.S. and North Atlantic  Treaty Organization forces in support of the International Security  Assistance Force–Afghanistan. Nevertheless, DOD officials said that  when project sustainment is not anticipated, proposals for the projects  should explain why sustainment costs are not included. DOD’s 2015 guidance for Global Train and Equip proposals included  instructions for addressing sustainment planning when sustainment is not  anticipated; however, the guidance for 2016 and 2017 did not include  these instructions. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government states that internal control activities aimed at ensuring  effective use of resources should be clearly documented and that  documentation should be readily available for examination. Updating the  guidance for Global Train and Equip proposals to include instructions  addressing sustainment planning when sustainment is not anticipated  would help ensure decision makers’ access to complete information on  annual sustainment costs, including costs expected to be negligible. DOD Recently  Implemented an Informal  Process to Ensure  Proposals Address All  Four Planning Elements  but Has Not Formalized  the Process as Policy To improve management of the Global Train and Equip program, DOD  officials told us that they developed an informal quality review process  designed to ensure that proposals in 2018 and subsequent years address  required elements. According to DOD officials, this informal process  includes the following steps:  Interagency “red teams” evaluate each proposal line by line to verify  that the proposal is complete. Proposals with missing elements are returned to the drafters for  revision and reevaluation. After proposals clear interagency review, senior DOD officials also  review the proposals for completeness before approving them. According to DOD officials, the department is developing this process as  part of its review and approval of proposals under the new Section 333  authority to build partner capacity and is in the process of hiring staff to  support this effort. For example, in February 2018, DOD officials said they  had created a position for a full-time contractor who will be based at  headquarters and charged with verifying that proposal packages include  all required security assistance planning elements. DOD officials told us  in February 2018 that they were also soliciting feedback on the process  from relevant stakeholders. However, according to the officials, DOD had  not yet determined whether to formalize the proposal review process as  written policy. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government, management should document in policies the internal  control responsibilities of an organization. Formalizing as written policy  its informal process to ensure that proposals address all four required  planning elements would enable DOD to provide consistent oversight of  Global Train and Equip project development and ensure decision makers  have access to complete information about each element. Such  information would, in turn, help DOD and State decision makers to ensure  the efficient use of funding under the new Section 333 authority. DOD Reported  Progress in Achieving  Project Objectives,  Factors Limiting  Progress, and Efforts  to Improve  Assessments DOD reporting on the achievement of Global Train and Equip project  objectives in 2016 and 2017 indicated progress in building partner  capacity to combat terrorism and conduct stability operations as well as  factors that affected the progress achieved. According to DOD  assessment reports and supporting documents, partner nation recipient  units’ overall capabilities were greater after implementation of 8 of 21  Global Train and Equip projects, and some of the remaining 13 projects  produced some positive results. (See app. III for the number of  assessment reports conducted between 2006 and 2015 out of the total  number of projects implemented in those years.) DOD documents and  officials also identified several factors—including proposal design  weaknesses, equipment suitability and procurement issues, partner  nation shortfalls, and workforce management challenges—that may have  affected the extent to which DOD was able to achieve project objectives.  DOD officials described several changes they are making to improve  assessments of Global Train and Equip projects. Reports on Projects  Assessed in 2016 and  2017 Indicate Some  Progress in Building  Partner Capacity DOD assessment reports for 2016 and 2017, which included baseline and  post-implementation assessments of recipient units’ capabilities for 21  Global Train and Equip projects, indicated some progress in building  partner capacity. For 8 of the 21 projects, the recipient units’ capability  levels were assessed as having increased by at least one rating level  after the project’s implementation (see fig. 6). Although the recipient units for the remaining 13 projects were assessed  as showing no change in capability levels, the assessment reports for  some of these projects described some positive project outcomes. For  example, one 2017 assessment report of a project initiated in 2015 found  that, while the recipient unit had not yet been integrated into the special  operations force (a stated goal of the project), the project had resulted in  some increased capacity for the recipient unit. Specifically, the  assessment found that the project increased the recipient unit’s capability  to support counterterrorism operations while also enhancing command  and control capabilities and interoperability. Further, the 2016  assessment report for several related projects in one country found that,  although the recipient unit had not increased its overall capability level,  the equipment provided by the Global Train and Equip projects had  assisted the recipient unit in executing its border security mission.  Additionally, the 2016 assessment report for a 2010 project found that,  whereas the recipient unit’s overall capability level had not changed, the  unit’s abilities to conduct internal defense operations throughout the  country had increased as a result of Global Train and Equip assistance. To conduct the assessments, DOD uses a standard framework for  evaluating the capabilities and performance of each recipient unit before  and after a project has been implemented. For the baseline assessments,  DOD rates the recipient unit’s level of capability and performance on a 5- point scale; 1 is defined as the ability to perform some basic tasks to at  least a low standard of performance and 5 is defined as the ability to  perform most of the advanced tasks for the unit’s missions and to operate  almost continuously throughout its assigned area of operations. After  project implementation, DOD uses the same 5-point scale to identify any  changes in the recipient unit’s level of capability and performance since  receiving the assistance. As we have previously reported, these ratings  do not represent only the effect of the provision of training and equipment  on the recipient unit’s capability and performance, as other factors may  contribute to changes in performance level. DOD Reports and Officials  Described Several Factors  That Can Limit  Achievement of Global  Train and Equip  Objectives DOD’s assessment reports and supporting documents, as well as agency  officials we interviewed, described several factors that can affect the  extent to which DOD is able to achieve Global Train and Equip project  objectives. These factors—project design weaknesses, equipment  suitability and procurement issues, partner nation shortfalls, and  workforce management challenges—are consistent with the challenges  noted in our April 2016 report. Project design weaknesses. According to DOD assessment reports,  project designs that did not adequately reflect a partner nation’s ability  to contribute resources to a project or sufficiently address recipient  unit needs and capabilities challenged the achievement of project  objectives. For example, DOD’s 2016 assessment of several projects  in one partner nation indicated that small-scale construction projects  often present problems in achieving objectives. According to the  assessment, these problems are largely due to the limited number  and capability of construction firms willing to bid on work in remote  locations and a dollar ceiling for small-scale projects ($750,000) that  often cannot cover all expenses at such sites. The assessment found  that relying on a partner nation to provide the additional funds  frequently results in the construction not being completed. In addition,  DOD’s 2016 assessment report indicated a problem with the  adequacy of an airplane spare-parts package provided in some  Global Train and Equip projects. The assessment found that the  Cessna Caravan spare parts, intended to cover 2 years of  maintenance, proved insufficient for high-speed combat flight  operations. (See fig. 7 for an example of a Cessna Caravan at a  partner nation airbase.) The report also noted that this problem had  been identified in other Global Train and Equip projects that included  spare-parts packages for Cessna Caravans. The report indicated that  the equipment manufacturers determine the package contents without  regard to the unique operational and environmental conditions in the  receiving partner nation. Equipment suitability and procurement issues. A lack of suitability  of equipment provided by Global Train and Equip projects, as well as  problems with procuring the equipment, can make it difficult to  achieve desired capability-building objectives. For example, a 2017  assessment report of a 2015 project found that size distributions for  body armor and helmets were not aligned with the general size  requirements—an issue that had been identified in other countries  receiving Global Train and Equip assistance. Additionally, the  assessment noted that consideration was not given to providing body  armor with built-in buoyancy for personnel operating in a maritime  environment. Further, the assessment noted that bright orange life  jackets were provided as tactical equipment, when a subdued color  would have been more appropriate. Moreover, the 2016 assessment  report found that equipment procurement issues in a 2012 project  caused maintenance problems for the partner country. According to  the report, the U.S. Army did not have an existing contract to obtain  diesel vehicles from the manufacturer specified in the project proposal  and congressional notification and therefore used an existing contract  to obtain vehicles from a different manufacturer. The assessment  observed that, while delivery of available vehicles provides some  value, in this case it created maintenance problems for the partner  nation because there was no dealership in the country to provide  repairs and spare parts for the vehicles. The assessment found that in  such situations it may be best to delay fulfillment until a contract is  available to procure vehicles from the specified manufacturer. Partner nation shortfalls. Shortfalls of partner nations, including not  using assistance for the envisioned purposes, inability to maintain and  sustain equipment, and difficulty in manning and training recipient  units, can negatively affect the achievement of project objectives. For  example, the 2016 assessment report for a 2015 project found that,  although the recipient unit was able to plan and execute more  complex operations to combat regional threats, such as Boko Haram,  in a professional manner, the assessment team received no evidence  that the unit had played more than a minor role in counter–Boko  Haram operations. In a separate review of a partner nation’s Global  Train and Equip projects, the 2016 assessment found that the  recipient unit had difficulties in maintaining weapons in a fully mission- capable status. The assessment found that a number of the unit’s  small arms were old and many had warped barrels, making them  much less accurate. A 2017 assessment of a 2013 project found that  the recipient unit suffered from shortages of junior noncommissioned  officers and officers. The unit was also found to have few soldiers in  specialty jobs who had received school training. The assessment  report acknowledged that certain conditions in the partner nation,  such as low levels of education, presented a multitude of problems in  ensuring the development and maintenance of national security forces  capable of working with, and integrating, a range of modern combat  systems. Workforce management challenges. DOD officials indicated that  workforce challenges, particularly related to turnover and staffing  levels, can inhibit effective project design, program implementation,  and oversight. DOD officials acknowledged that staff turnover, an  issue that we previously identified, remains a challenge. According  to the officials, there is a high degree of institutionalized turnover,  particularly among security cooperation officers, at U.S. embassies  and to some extent within the geographic combatant commands. As  a result, the officials overseeing project implementation may not have  been responsible for project development and are less likely to  understand the capabilities of the intended recipient units or the  capability gaps that could be addressed by equipment and training.  DOD officials also told us that they have been challenged to meet  programmatic demands with current staffing levels, particularly given  the influx of funds appropriated for the Counterterrorism Partnerships  Fund in 2015. DOD officials said that the volume of Global Train and  Equip projects expanded with the large increase in funding in 2015  and 2016, which stressed the foreign military sales system as well as  geographic combatant commands’ ability to plan for, and manage, the  program with existing resources. For example, DOD officials said that  teams of three staff at geographic combatant commands were  managing over three times more funding than in prior years. As a  result, staff were unable to maintain consistent levels of due diligence  on issues such as ensuring that proposal packages addressed  absorptive capacity and sustainment planning. According to DOD  officials, negative effects of this inconsistent due diligence included  the arrival of equipment not suitable for operations and overestimation  of one partner nation’s absorptive capacity, necessitating unplanned  training and resulting in project delays. DOD officials said that they  are now in the process of acquiring additional staffing to address  capacity constraints. DOD Officials Described  Several Ongoing Changes  to Improve Assessments DOD officials told us that they are in the process of evaluating the  effectiveness of the assessment process conducted in 2016 and 2017  and described a variety of changes that they are making to improve  assessments of Global Train and Equip projects. DOD officials  acknowledged that baseline and post-implementation assessments, as  well as monitoring activities, had been conducted inconsistently in prior  years, including for the projects developed and implemented in 2016 and  2017. DOD officials said that staffing constraints were a contributing  factor. In March 2017, we also identified some weaknesses in the design  of evaluations for Global Train and Equip projects and recommended that  DOD develop a plan for improving the quality of these evaluations. While prior laws required DOD to conduct assessments and evaluate the  program’s effectiveness, the fiscal year 2017 NDAA requires that DOD  maintain a program of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation in support  of the agency’s security cooperation programs and activities. Given the  requirements for an assessment, monitoring, and evaluation program,  and recognizing the importance of improving the assessment processes,  DOD officials said they are developing an enhanced assessment process  that includes increased staffing dedicated to monitoring and evaluation.  For example, DOD officials said that they had hired several full-time contractors to perform key tasks related to monitoring and evaluation.  According to the officials, several full-time contractor positions will be  located in the various geographic combatant command locations, with  responsibilities to develop baseline assessments in coordination with the geographic  combatant commands and oversee the quality and completeness of  those assessments; write performance indicators and performance plans into every Global  Train and Equip project proposal;  conduct monitoring and provide reports to the geographic combatant  command and to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency on the  status of project objectives and performance indicators; and  conduct annual, independent evaluations to assess a few Global Train  and Equip projects in detail. In addition, DOD officials stated that they had hired a full-time contractor  who will be based at headquarters and provide further support for each  geographic combatant command and who will be charged with  documenting that baseline assessments were completed and conducting  quality reviews of assessment-related documents. Conclusions The Global Train and Equip program is a critical tool for building partner  capacity to counter terrorism worldwide, and allocations for the program  totaled more than $4.1 billion in 2009 through 2017. DOD has established  an interagency process to develop and select Global Train and Equip  projects that takes into account four required security assistance planning  elements. However, although DOD consistently addressed project  objectives in its 2016 and 2017 project proposals, DOD did not  consistently address the other three planning elements. In addition, DOD  guidance no longer includes instructions for addressing one of these  elements, sustainment planning, in proposals for projects for which DOD  does not intend or anticipate sustainment. Updating its guidance to  include such instructions would help ensure decision makers’ access to  complete information on annual sustainment costs, even costs anticipated  to be negligible. Moreover, although officials reported having recently  developed an informal quality review process designed to ensure that  proposal packages address all required planning elements, DOD has not  formalized this process as written policy. Formalizing the process would  enhance DOD’s ability to provide consistent oversight of project  development and to ensure that decision makers have access to  complete information about each planning element for proposed projects.  This information would, in turn, help DOD and State decision makers  ensure the efficient use of funding under the new Section 333 authority to  build partner capacity. Recommendations for  Executive Action We are making the following two recommendations to DOD:  The Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency should update  guidance for project proposal packages to require an explanation when  sustainment plans are not documented for projects for which sustainment  is not intended or anticipated. (Recommendation 1) The Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency should  formalize as written policy its informal process for ensuring that project  proposal packages fully address and document all four required security  assistance planning elements. (Recommendation 2) Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to DOD and State for comment. In its  comments, DOD concurred with our recommendations and noted that the  Defense Security Cooperation Agency will seek to update guidance for  project proposal packages. DOD’s comments are reproduced in appendix  IV. State did not provide comments. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Director of the  Defense Security Cooperation Agency. In addition, the report is available  at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact  me at (202) 512-5130 or mazanecb@gao.gov. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and  Methodology The Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense  Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015 contains a provision for  GAO to conduct biennial audits of such program or programs conducted  or supported pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2282 during the preceding 2 fiscal  years. This report examines (1) the status of funding that the Department  of Defense (DOD) allocated for Global Train and Equip projects in 2009  through 2017; (2) the extent to which DOD addressed security assistance  planning elements in project proposals in 2016 and 2017; and, (3) DOD’s  reporting on the achievement of Global Train and Equip project objectives  and any factors affecting its ability to achieve those objectives. To address these objectives, we analyzed funding data, program  guidelines, project proposal documents, and congressional notifications.  We discussed the funding data, project proposal process and key  elements of project planning, documentation, and assessment with  officials from DOD and the Department of State (State); geographic  combatant commands in whose areas of responsibility partner nations  received 2016 or 2017 assistance—the U.S. Africa Command, the U.S.  Central Command, and the European Central Command; and the U.S.  embassies in Jordan, Niger, and Uganda. We selected these countries on  the basis of their having received a higher proportion of DOD’s allocations  for the Global Train and Equip program in fiscal years 2016 and 2017; we  also considered factors such as the number of project assessments  conducted in each country, the maturity of projects, embassy officials’  project assessment experience, and the countries’ geographic  distribution. To identify the status of funding that DOD allocated for Global Train and  Equip projects in fiscal years 2009 through 2017, we assessed funding  data for 2009 through 2017. DOD provided data on allocations, amounts  reallocated, unobligated balances, unliquidated obligations, and  disbursements of funds for program activities according to the fiscal year  when the funds were appropriated. We analyzed these data to determine  the extent to which funds had been allocated, obligated, and disbursed.  DOD also provided data on project funding by year of allocation. We used  these data to report allocations for Global Train and Equip projects by  fiscal year and recipient country. We assessed the reliability of these data  by interviewing cognizant agency officials and comparing the data with  previously published data. We determined that the data were sufficiently  reliable for our purposes. To assess the extent to which DOD addressed key elements of security  sector assistance for projects it planned to implement in 2016 and 2017,  we analyzed agency documents and interviewed agency officials. We  reviewed Presidential Policy Directive 23 on Security Sector Assistance,  which identified four key elements to be considered for security sector  assistance programs: (1) project objectives that address partner needs,  (2) the absorptive capacity of the recipient unit, (3) the baseline  capabilities of the recipient unit, and (4) the arrangements for the  sustainment of the project. We also reviewed DOD guidance, which  requires these elements to be considered in project proposal  development. To determine the extent to which DOD addressed these  elements in project proposals, we analyzed the content of agency- approved project proposals in 2016 and 2017. Two reviewers  independently analyzed 41 proposal packages for 2016 and 31 proposal  packages for 2017. The reviewers resolved any disagreements through  discussion of the information used to make their independent  determinations. We also interviewed State and DOD officials who develop  and review proposals, discussing (1) how they use information in the  project proposal packages to consider planning elements and (2) other  factors they may consider in developing and reviewing proposals. Further, we reviewed congressional notifications DOD developed  subsequent to agency approval of Global Train and Equip project to  determine the extent to which those documents included information  about the four planning elements. With respect to our reporting on  support for information about baseline assessments, congressional  notifications lay out a standardized assessment framework to be used to  assess the effects of projects. This framework includes a baseline  assessment that DOD requires to be completed for inclusion in project  proposal packages. DOD provided baseline assessments for 38 of 41  project proposals notified to Congress in 2016 and 30 of 31 project  proposals notified to Congress in 2017. To evaluate the completeness of  the required baseline assessment sections, we compared these 38  baseline assessment documents included in 2016 project proposal  packages and 30 baseline assessment documents in 2017 project  proposal packages with DOD internal guidance. To assess the  completeness of sustainment plans, we used DOD’s Global Train and  Equip guidance for 2016 and 2017, which defined complete sustainment  plans to include three elements: (1) an identification of funding sources  for project sustainment, (2) an estimate of the annual sustainment costs,  and (3) an assessment of the sustainment capability of the partner nation. To examine DOD reporting on the achievement of project objectives in  2016 and 2017, we reviewed agency documents and interviewed agency  officials. In particular, we analyzed DOD’s annual project assessment  reports and supporting documents for 2016 and 2017 as well as the  assessment framework handbook. DOD submitted an annual assessment  report to Congress in 2016 but was not required to submit an annual  assessment report in 2017. As a result, DOD prepared country-level  assessments in 2017 but did not compile them and submit them to  Congress as it did in 2016. To examine the extent to which DOD’s  assessments and supporting documents indicated progress in building  partner capacity, we compared baseline assessments of recipient unit  capability and performance levels, conducted when projects were  proposed, with post-implementation assessments of recipient unit  capability levels, conducted after the delivery of program assistance.  DOD uses a standard framework for evaluating the capabilities and  performance of each recipient unit. Baseline assessments rate the  recipient unit’s level of capability and performance before project  implementation on a 5-point scale, with 1 defined as the ability to perform  some basic tasks to at least a low standard of performance and 5 defined  as the ability to perform most of the advanced tasks for the unit’s  missions and to operate almost continuously throughout its assigned area  of operations. After project implementation, project assessments and  supporting documents use the same 5-point scale to rate any changes  (positive or negative) in the recipient unit’s level of capability and  performance. DOD’s 2016 assessment report and 2017 country-level  assessment reports included information on 84 Global Train and Equip  projects; of these, 21 projects included both a baseline and a post- implementation assessment of the recipient unit. We relied on DOD’s  assessment reports and did not systematically validate the assessment  results because it was beyond the scope of this engagement to assess  the reliability of the assessments. However, for the purposes of this  analysis, we met with DOD and contracted officials responsible for  conducting and reviewing project assessments to gather information  about their processes for assessing recipient unit capabilities. In addition,  we reviewed DOD’s project assessment guidance and their template for  conducting project assessments, which was consistently used in the  assessments we reviewed. Finally, to examine DOD reporting on factors affecting the achievement of  project objectives, we reviewed the assessment reports and interviewed  DOD officials responsible for implementing the program, including officials  from DOD’s policy guidance and oversight office and its geographic  combatant commands; officials at embassies in the three selected  countries; and officials at State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. We  also considered the factors that we identified as affecting the  achievement of project objectives for our 2016 report that considered  2015 project proposals. On the basis of our review of DOD’s  assessments and supporting documents and our interviews with agency  officials, we grouped the key factors they identified into four categories:  (1) proposal design weaknesses, (2) equipment suitability and  procurement issues, (3) partner nation shortfalls, and (4) workforce  management challenges. We conducted this performance audit from July 2017 to May 2018 in  accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain  sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our  findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that  the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and  conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix II: Allocations for Global Train and  Equip Projects in Fiscal Years 2016 and  2017 Table 2 shows the total amount of funding DOD allocated for Global Train  and Equip projects in 2016 and 2017 combined. Appendix III: Global Train and Equip Projects  and Allocations Included in DOD’s 2012- 2017 Assessment Reports As figure 8 shows, in 2012 through 2017, the Department of Defense  (DOD) prepared assessment reports for 31 percent of the projects (82 of  262 projects) it had implemented in 2006 through 2015. These 82  projects account for 28 percent of the nearly $3 billion DOD allocated for  the program in those fiscal years. The Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck”  McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 required  DOD to assess the results of the Global Train and Equip program;  however, DOD was not required to assess a specific number or  percentage of projects in each fiscal year. Appendix IV: Comments from the  Department of Defense Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff  Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff  Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Drew Lindsey (Assistant  Director), Jon Fremont (Analyst-In-Charge), Emily Desai, Reid Lowe,  Martin de Alteriis, and Ashley Alley made key contributions to this report.  In addition, Chris Keblitis provided technical assistance.
The United States has undertaken several efforts, including DOD's Global Train and Equip program, to help foreign partners strengthen their security capacity. Presidential Policy Directive 23 states that agencies should target security assistance where it can be effective and highlights the importance of addressing several planning elements in project proposals. DOD develops proposals, using guidance implementing the directive, and selects projects with the Department of State. The fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision for GAO to review the Global Train and Equip program. In this report, GAO examines (1) the status of funding DOD allocated for Global Train and Equip projects in fiscal years 2009 through 2017, (2) the extent to which DOD addressed key security assistance planning elements in project proposals in fiscal years 2016 and 2017, and (3) DOD's reporting on the achievement of Global Train and Equip project objectives and any factors affecting its ability to achieve those objectives. GAO analyzed agency data and program documents and interviewed DOD and State Department officials in Washington, D.C., and at selected combatant commands and embassies. The Department of Defense (DOD) obligated $3.7 billion of $4.1 billion allocated for the Global Train and Equip program in fiscal years 2009 through 2017 to build partner nations' capacity to counter terrorism. DOD increased allocations for the program in 2016, responding to an influx of funding from appropriations to the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund. As of December 2017, DOD had disbursed about $2.5 billion of the obligated funds. Global Train and Equip project proposals for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 consistently addressed only one of four elements of security assistance planning outlined in Presidential Policy Directive 23 . GAO found all 72 proposals in those years included the first element, project objectives. From 2016 to 2017, the percentage of proposals addressing the second element—absorptive capacity—rose from 32 percent to 84 percent. Most 2016 and 2017 proposals included the third element, baseline assessments, but less than three-quarters included complete sustainment plans, the fourth element. DOD guidance for 2016 and 2017 did not include instructions for addressing project sustainment when sustainment was not anticipated, though the 2017 guidance included instructions for addressing the other three planning elements. According to DOD officials, they have developed an informal quality review process to better ensure that 2018 project proposals address all four planning elements. However, DOD has not formalized this informal process as written policy. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for documenting internal control activities and policies. Formalizing the proposal review process would help DOD provide consistent oversight of project development and ensure access to complete information about each planning element, including sustainment needs. Such information is critical in helping decision makers ensure efficient use of funding to build partners' capacity. DOD reporting for 2016 and 2017 indicates progress in building partner capacity to combat terrorism and conduct stability operations as well as factors affecting the progress achieved. According to DOD documents, partner nation recipient units' overall capabilities were greater after implementation of 8 of 21 Global Train and Equip projects, and some of the remaining 13 projects produced some positive results. DOD documents and officials also identified factors—such as equipment suitability and procurement issues—that may have limited the achievement of project objectives.