Aloha Airlines Flight 243
{'<entity_0>': 'Hilo International Airport', '<entity_1>': 'Aloha Airlines Flight 243', '<entity_2>': 'Aloha Airlines', '<entity_3>': '28 April 1988', '<entity_4>': 'fatigue', '<entity_5>': 'Daniel K. Inouye International Airport', '<entity_6>': 'Kahului', '<entity_7>': 'Hawaii', '<entity_8>': 'Maui'}
[['Aloha Airlines Flight 243', 'operator', 'Aloha Airlines'], ['Aloha Airlines Flight 243', 'destination point', 'Daniel K. Inouye International Airport'], ['Aloha Airlines Flight 243', 'start point', 'Hilo International Airport'], ['Aloha Airlines Flight 243', 'has cause', 'fatigue'], ['Aloha Airlines Flight 243', 'point in time', '28 April 1988'], ['Aloha Airlines Flight 243', 'start time', '28 April 1988'], ['Aloha Airlines Flight 243', 'end time', '28 April 1988'], ['Aloha Airlines Flight 243', 'location', 'Hilo International Airport'], ['Aloha Airlines Flight 243', 'location', 'Hawaii'], ['Aloha Airlines Flight 243', 'location', 'Maui'], ['Aloha Airlines Flight 243', 'location', 'Kahului']]
<entity_1> (IATA: AQ243, ICAO: AAH243) was a scheduled <entity_2> flight between <entity_0> and <entity_5> in <entity_7>. On <entity_3>, a Boeing 737-297 serving the flight suffered extensive damage after an explosive decompression in flight, but was able to land safely at <entity_6> Airport on <entity_8>. Flight 243 departed from <entity_0> at 13:25 HST on <entity_3>, with six crew members and 89 passengers on board, bound for <entity_5> Nothing unusual was noted during the pre-departure inspection of the aircraft, which had already completed three round-trip flights from <entity_5> to <entity_0>, <entity_8>, and Kauai earlier that day, all uneventful. After a routine takeoff and ascent, the aircraft had reached its normal flight altitude of 24,000 feet (7,300 m), when at around 13:48, about 23 nautical miles (43 km; 26 mi) south-southeast of <entity_6> on the island of <entity_8>, a small section on the left side of the roof ruptured with a "whooshing" sound The captain felt the aircraft roll to the left and right, and the controls went loose; the first officer noticed pieces of grey insulation floating above the cabin. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the <entity_2> maintenance program to detect the presence of significant disbonding and <entity_4> damage which ultimately led to failure of the lap joint at S-10L and the separation of the fuselage upper lobe. Contributing to the accident were the failure of <entity_2> management to supervise properly its maintenance force; the failure of the FAA to require Airworthiness Directive 87-21-08 inspection of all the lap joints proposed by Boeing Alert Service Bulletin SB 737-53A1039; and the lack of a complete terminating action (neither generated by Boeing nor required by the FAA) after the discovery of early production difficulties in the B-737 cold bond lap joint which resulted in low bond durability, corrosion, and premature <entity_4> cracking. One board member dissented, arguing that the <entity_4> cracking was clearly the probable cause, but that <entity_2> maintenance should not be singled out because failures by the FAA, Boeing, and <entity_2> Maintenance each were contributing factors to the disaster.
['aviation accident']