Proof of the Truthful
{'<entity_0>': 'Demonstration of the Truthful', '<entity_1>': 'Proof of the Veracious', '<entity_2>': 'Proof of the Truthful', '<entity_3>': 'existence of God', '<entity_4>': 'argument', '<entity_5>': 'Avicenna'}
[['Proof of the Truthful', 'creator', 'Avicenna'], ['Proof of the Truthful', 'instance of', 'argument'], ['Proof of the Truthful', 'main subject', 'existence of God'], ['Proof of the Truthful', 'alternative', 'Demonstration of the Truthful'], ['Proof of the Truthful', 'alternative', 'Proof of the Veracious']]
The <entity_2> (Arabic: برهان الصديقين‎, romanized: burhān al-ṣiddīqīn, also translated <entity_0> or <entity_1>, among others) is a <entity_4> for proving the <entity_3> introduced by the Islamic philosopher <entity_5> (also known as Ibn Sina, 980–1037). Historian of philosophy Peter Adamson called the <entity_4> one of the most influential medieval arguments for God's existence, and <entity_5>'s biggest contribution to the history of philosophy. The <entity_4> is outlined in <entity_5>'s various works. However, <entity_5>'s <entity_4> does not preclude the possibility of an infinite regress. <entity_5> anticipates that one could reject the <entity_4> by saying that the collection of contingent things may not be contingent. However, <entity_5> dismisses this counter-<entity_4> as a capitulation, and not an objection at all. The limitation of the <entity_4> so far is that it only shows the existence of a necessary existent, and that is different from showing the <entity_3> as worshipped in Islam. Either way, the opposite proposition resulted in contradiction, which to <entity_5> proves the correctness of the <entity_4>. Present-day historian of philosophy Peter Adamson called this <entity_4> one of the most influential medieval arguments for God's existence, and <entity_5>'s biggest contribution to the history of philosophy. Scholars disagree on whether <entity_5>'s <entity_2> is ontological, that is, derived through sheer conceptual analysis, or cosmological, that is, derived by invoking empirical premises (e.g. Davidson said that <entity_5> did not regard "the analysis of the concept necessary existent by virtue of itself as sufficient to establish the actual existence of anything in the external world" and that he had offered a new form of cosmological <entity_4>. Others, including Parviz Morewedge, Gary Legenhausen, Abdel Rahman Badawi, Miguel Cruz Hernández, and M. M. Sharif, argued that <entity_5>'s <entity_4> was ontological. Morewedge referred to the <entity_4> as "Ibn Sina's ontological <entity_4> for the <entity_3>", and said that it was purely based on his analytic specification of this concept ."
['argument']