Analysis of the response of a liquid-full Moss Sphere LNG tank insulated with polystyrene foam to an engulfing LNG fire indicates that current regulatory requirements for pressure relief capacity sufficient to prevent tank rupture are inadequate. The inadequacy of the current requirements stems primarily from two factors. Firstly, the area of the Moss Sphere protruding above what would be the nominal deck on a conventional carrier, which is protected only by a steel weather cover from exposure to heat from a tank-engulfing fire, is being underestimated. Secondly, aluminum foil-covered polystyrene foam insulation applied to the exterior of the LNG tank is protected above the deck only by the steel weather cover under which the insulation could begin to melt in as little as 1-3 min, and could completely liquefy in as few as 10 min. U.S. and International Regulations require that the insulations on the above-deck portion of tanks have approved fire proofing and stability under fire exposure. Polystyrene foam, as currently installed on LNG carriers, does not appear to meet these criteria. As a result of these findings, but giving no consideration to the significant potential for further damage if the polystyrene should burn, the boil-off rate is predicted to be an order-of-magnitude higher than provided for by current PRV sizing requirements.
Fossil Fuels Polystyrenes