Cable de la embajada norteamericana en San Salvador: Lo bueno, lo malo y lo feo
VZCZCXYZ0007PP RUEHWEBDE RUEHSN #0708/01 2092039ZNY SSSSS ZZHP 282039Z JUL 09FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADORTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1438INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITYRUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY S E C R E T SAN SALVADOR 000708NOFORNSIPDISE.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2019TAGS: PGOV PREL ESSUBJECT: EARLY IMPRESSIONS OF FUNES GOVERNMENTREF: SAN SALVADOR 653Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)¶1. (C) Summary: Some eight weeks into the FunesAdministration, we are beginning to see more clearly thetrends and factions inside the GOES. President MauricioFunes' non-FMLN campaign support group, the Friends ofMauricio, is largely in control of the economic apparatus ofEl Salvador. Similarly, Defense is in the hands of aformerly-retired, recently-promoted military officer andFriend of Mauricio, Brigadier General David Munguia Payes.FMLN hard-liners are at the helm of the security andintelligence apparatus. Foreign policy is in the hands of aloyal FMLN member, but has thus far been characterized bypragmatism and outreach to the U.S. Assistance programsbroadly mirror the rest of the relationship, with mostprograms moving forward successfully but some police andsecurity programs under review. The Funes GOES has madepoverty eradication its highest priority. End Summary.--------The Good--------¶2. (C) The Funes Administration inherited two seriouseconomic problems. First, the Salvadoran economy likelyentered recession in late 2008, driven by falling remittancesand declining exports because of the U.S. recession. Second,the government was effectively broke ) and in many casesbehind on its bills ) because of declining tax revenues andthe Saca Administration’s lavish, election-year subsidies.So far, the government has chosen to seek new funding fromthe World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, andInternational Monetary Fund, rather than from sources likeVenezuela. The government's "Anti-Crisis Plan" likewiseappears to consist primarily of increased funding forexisting social programs. These programs, however, willlikely do little to boost the economy, where recoveryultimately depends on the recovery in the U.S.¶3. (C) Since June 1, Salvadoran foreign policy has also beencharacterized by pragmatism. Foreign Minister Hugo Martinezstepped into the chair at the OAS General Assembly in SanPedro Sula just hours after assuming his new role; heimpressed both the U.S. delegation and Salvadoran observerswith his performance. Since then, the main foreign policyissue faced by the GOES has been Honduras. In the hoursafter President Zelaya's expulsion to Costa Rica, bothMartinez and Funes reached out to the Embassy and toWashington to coordinate what has been a reasonable,responsible approach to the crisis on their northern border.On Funes' first day in office he recognized Cuba, butbalanced this by meeting Secretary Clinton and the USDEL tohis inauguration. FMLN hardliners, particularly VicePresident Sanchez Ceren, would prefer an ALBA-esque foreignpolicy and carry out a parallel FMLN agenda, but they are notpermitted to wreck relations with traditional partners.Ambassadorial appointments are being made in a deliberate,unhurried fashion, and have not raised concerns; indeed,keeping former FM Francisco Lainez in place at the OAS sentan early signal of continuity.¶4. (C) On foreign assistance, USAID reports good cooperationacross the board, save for some difficulties in publicsecurity. (More on that below.) The GOES has voiced strongsupport for continuing USAID programs and has indicated it isin agreement with USAID's strategic goals for El Salvador.The Funes Administration has elevated to Vice Minister theMFA position responsible for coordinating foreign assistanceprograms and has called for the formulation of a globalcooperation strategy. The GOES is actively leveraginginternational donors to address its near-term anti-crisisplan. In charge of both economic policy and donorcoordination is Alex Segovia, the President's Chief ofCabinet. Segovia, a kind of super-minister, is the mostpragmatic and least ideological figure in the GOES.¶5. (C) The GOES just reaffirmed its continued interest inUSAID's programs for improved tax collection, health sectorreform and a diagnostic of the education system. MCC's rateof implementation continues to gain speed, in large degreebecause of the efforts of local partner FOMILENIO's Director,Jose Angel Quiroz. We successfully pushed back against amove by Funes to replace Quiroz in the early days of hisgovernment, arguing that another disruption in FOMILENIOmanagement would set back MCC's program by months, if notmore. It was Segovia, in his role as FOMILENIO BoardChairman, who convinced Funes to leave Quiros in place. Thenew GOES has shown great interest in the MCC indicators;Segovia just wrote a warm letter to MCC CEO Rodney Bentrecommitting the GOES to the indicators and all other MCCcriteria.¶6. (C) Military-to-military cooperation continues at a temposimilar to that before Funes took office. The USNS Comfortrecently spent 11 days anchored offshore and saw more than19,000 Salvadoran patients. We have three other MedicalReadiness Training Exercises scheduled for 2009 and a fullslate of DOD/SA-funded training for members of the SalvadoranArmed Forces (ESAF). Additionally, the MOD has requested USGsupport to conduct a National Security Strategy (NSS)workshop with the intent to get Cabinet level and Assemblypersonnel involved in the GOES process to develop their ownNSS. Appointment of retired Colonel Munguia Payes asMinister of Defense, as well as mid-ranked active dutycolonels to most key command positions, has createddiscomfort in ESAF ranks. However, the Minister of Defenseis an institutionalist and is focused on maintaining theESAF's apolitical professionalism. The Minister and the ESAFare loyal supporters of the president, and eager to continuelongstanding mil-to-mil relationships with the U.S.-------The Bad-------¶7. (S) Salvadorans across the spectrum link Manuel Melgar,now Minister of Public Security and Justice, to the 1985 ZonaRosa attack which killed four off-duty U.S. Embassy MarineSecurity Guards and other Americans and Salvadorans.Melgar's nomination appears to have been based less on hispublic security credentials than on the hard-line FMLN'sinsistence that they control public security. This was their"pound of flesh" in exchange for "Friends of Mauricio"controlling the economy. Melgar's presence as Minister hasresulted in a distancing from the USG, a far cry from theclose relationship we enjoyed with his predecessor. Lawenforcement cooperation has not been frozen, but fullimplementation of the Merida Initiative is now contingentupon guidance from Washington regarding how best to workaround Melgar. Just as disappointing is the cynical messageit sends to a high-crime society like El Salvador when thePresident names as Minister of Public Security an individualwith blood on his hands.------------And the Ugly------------¶8. (C) Traditional feuds between the Salvadoran right andleft and modern feuds between Funes and the FMLN are playingout in other contexts. Over two weeks after the legaldeadline (June 30) to appoint five new magistrates to theSupreme Court, the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly remaineddeadlocked as the governing FMLN and ARENA-led oppositioncoalition could not reach agreement on a list of names.(Note: Supreme Court appointments require a 2/3supermajority, thus demanding ARENA and the FMLN support anynominee. End note.) Naming a new Attorney General (whichalso requires a 2/3 Assembly vote) became linked to theSupreme Court selections and the entire process ground to ahalt. The Supreme Court was made whole July 16 when a dealwas struck between Funes, the FMLN, and opposition on a slateof nominees. Public and private negotiations continue overthe new Attorney General.¶9. (S/NF) El Salvador's intelligence service (OIE) in thehands of orthodox FMLN member Eduardo Linares could becomeugly, depending upon how much leeway Funes allows him toaccept advice, training, money, and personnel from Cuba orVenezuela. To date Linares has behaved cautiously, firstseeking to get his arms around his own organization, which,to be fair, had previously considered the FMLN as its primarytarget.-------------------------------------Pursuing U.S. Interests Going Forward-------------------------------------¶10. (C) Eight weeks on, we are roughly where we expected tobe. We have enjoyed excellent cooperation in most areas withthe GOES, but lost some ground in other areas, especially lawenforcement. Given the inconsistent performance ofSalvadoran law enforcement in good times, it has been hard todiscern a difference in performance, or crime statistics,since June 1. Our assistance priorities, and continued traderelationship, seems closely aligned with the FunesAdministration's own goals. Foreign policy priorities willsometimes diverge, although our problems are likely to beless with the official GOES policies than with the FMLN's ownparallel policies. The Embassy's approach with the FunesAdministration will continue to be engagement across theboard, even with Public Security, up to and including theDeputy Minister. Our objective is to strengthen theinstitutions of Salvadoran democracy, regardless of who is inpower. Civil society, media, and the business sector take aparallel and complementary approach. ARENA did not disappearJune 1 and its reorganization and regrouping is proceeding.It promises to remain a significant opposition during theentire five years of the Funes Administration.BLA