Cable de la embajada norteamericana en San Salvador: Sobre Mungia Payez, Sanchez Cerén, FMLN
VZCZCXYZ0003OO RUEHWEBDE RUEHSN #0928/01 2732102ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY ADBBC5AB MSI4648-695)O 302102Z SEP 09FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADORTO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1683 S E C R E T SAN SALVADOR 000928NOFORNSIPDISC O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTIONE.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2034TAGS: PINR PGOV ESSUBJECT: (S/NF) FUNES'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FMLN(C-AL9-01786)REF: A. STATE 93069¶B. SAN SALVADOR 789Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, for reasons 1.4 (b), (c), and (d).¶1. (SBU) Embassy San Salvador provides the followingresponses to Reftel queries.¶2. (S/NF) DOES MINISTER OF DEFENSE PAYES HAVE CLOSE RELATIONSWITH FMLN HARDLINERS? IF SO, WITH WHOM? No. Munguia Payes,both during the campaign and since becoming Minister ofDefense, has been quick to point out to Embassy interlocutorsthat he fought against the guerrilla forces that later formedthe FMLN during his time in the Salvadoran Armed Forces.Indeed, Munguia Payes seems to see himself as the solecabinet-level official in a security position without dividedloyalties between Funes and the FMLN. However, he has acordial/correct relationship with the FMLN hardliners in theGOES.¶3. (S/NF) WHAT IS VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR SANCHEZ CEREN'SCURRENT RELATIONSHIP WITH FMLN HARDLINERS? We have noevidence to suggest that longstanding ties between SanchezCeren and FMLN Coordinator General (and head of legislativebloc) Medardo Gonzalez, Jose Luis Merino, Sigfrido Reyes, andother hard-line elements of the FMLN have changed. However,the heavy schedule Sanchez Ceren keeps as Minister ofEducation and Vice President, along with persistent rumors ofhealth problems, suggest he has less time to devote to partybusiness than when he was head of the FMLN's bloc in theLegislative Assembly. It is very troubling that on September26 Sanchez Ceren made anti-American statements at an FMLNrally in support of Manuel Zelaya. The GOES is wrestlingwith Sanchez Ceren's inconsistency when wearing his VP hat asopposed to his FMLN hat. HOW DOES HE GET ALONG WITH FUNES?Sanchez Ceren's relationship with Funes grew from nearlynon-existent to a working relationship during the campaign.XXXXXXXXXXXX recently told PolCouns that Funes and SanchezCeren did not talk "as much as I would like" but  that when theydid talk, it was productive and that the two  seemed to get alongwell together. The two almost never  appear together in public.Also, in early September, Funes  countermanded a decision bySanchez Ceren regarding  agriculture subsidies.¶4. (S/NF) IS FUNES CONSIDERING CONFRONTING FMLN HARDLINERSWHOM HE BELIEVES ARE UNDERMINING HIM? HOW IS FUNES COPINGUNDER STRESS? XXXXXXXXXXXX  told PolCounsSeptember 22 that the divorce between Funes and the FMLN wafinal,  pointing to the lack of public conflict as convincingevidence: the two sides are no longer even trying to worktogether. XXXXXXXXXXXX  is convinced FMLN hard-linerssmuggled  Honduran President Zelaya into TegucigalpaSeptember 21  without the knowledge of Funes and in directdefiance of his  efforts to keep the Honduras conflict from playingout on  Salvadoran soil. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes the relationshipis beyond  repair. We believe that Funes distrusts the orthodoxFMLN,  but is not able to break with the party at this time. He hassome valuable FMLN "lite" members of his cabinet, and wouldrisk more active subversion and street protests if he brokewith the party.¶5. (S/NF) WHO ARE CURRENTLY THE MOST INFLUENTIAL FMLNLEADERS? HOW DO THEY VIEW FUNES? HOW DOES FUNES VIEW THEM?WHAT PLANS DO THEY HAVE, IF ANY, TO STRENGTHEN THE FMLN'SINFLUENCE? FMLN General Coordinator Medardo Gonzalez,PARLACEN Deputies Jose Luis Merino and Nidia Diaz, andSalvadoran Assembly Deputy Sigfrido Reyes continue to holdsignificant power within the FMLN. Hato Hasbun, nowSecretary for Strategic Affairs in the presidential staff,straddles both worlds as an FMLN insider and Funesconfidante. Within the hard-line faction of the FMLN, itappears the influence of the BRV and Hugo Chavez is on therise, with some in the FMLN capitalizing on the crisis inHonduras to widen the breach between Funes and partyhard-liners. Samayoa was recently introduced (by phone) toHavana's new Charge d'Affaires and believes the Cubans areplanning to raise their profile in El Salvador. FMLNhard-liners engineered Funes' selection as a pragmatic stepto gain power, expecting they would eventually govern throughFunes as their puppet. Funes made a pragmatic decision torun for President on the FMLN ticket, expecting to governdespite the opposition he expected would emerge from radicalelements of the party. San Salvador's political punditscontinue to speculate that the Friends of Mauricio (now beingrebranded the Citizen Movement for Change) will soon mergewith the FMLN's smaller ally CD (Democratic Change) givingthem a base to win seats in 2012 legislative elections and apower base from which to negotiate. El Salvador'sconservative business class continues to assess that workingwith Funes is the best avenue for protecting Salvadorandemocracy and their own business interests in the long run.A senior executive XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolCouns September22 he thought Funes  would wind up governing with the support ofARENA and other  conservative parties before his term was up.¶6. (S/NF) HAVE KEY SECURITY ORGANIZATION BUDGETSCHANGED? IF  SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? Funes' Private Secretartold us (Ref  (B)) the President was disappointed in Eduardo Linares,new  Director of the Salvadoran State Intelligence Organization(OIE). In fact, Funes has privately commented on hiscomplete lack of faith with Linares and the OIE, whom Funesbelieves to be beholden to the hard-line factions of theFMLN. Given Funes' disappointment in and distrust ofLinares, Funes has decided to shift a significant part ofOIE's intelligence collection duties to the El Salvador ArmedForces (ESAF). Even so, the CY2010 budget for the ESAF wasreduced USD 6 million from its CY2009 level of USD 132million, a significant decrease considering over 90 percentof the budget is directed to salaries. Accordingly, Funesplans to also gradually reduce OIE's budget to furthermarginalize the Agency's ability to operate effectively.Hato Hasbun has told us he envisages OIE evolving into a moreanalytical than operational organization. Other sensitivereporting suggests a pending realignment of the GOESintelligence apparatus.¶7. (S/NF) HOW DO AVERAGE SALVADORANS SEE FUNES'S ACTIONS TOREDUCE CRIME, SPECIFICALLY THE MURDER RATE, IN THE COUNTRY?DO FMLN HARDLINERS IN GOVERNMENT VIEW THE ISSUE AS A KEYPRIORITY? WHAT IS THE MOST RECENT OFFICIAL HOMICIDE RATE?Salvadoran press reported September 29 that as of September28, the number of murders in 2009 (3,182) had alreadyexceeded the 2008 total (3,179). This represents anannualized total of 4,286 killings if the current rate holds,or almost 12 per day in 2009 compared to a rate of nearly 9per day in 2008. This uptick in the homicide rate seems tohave shocked even those Salvadorans who had grown numb to thepersistently high levels of violence in their country.September polling numbers from the University of CentralAmerica's IUDOP polling institute suggest a majority ofSalvadorans are concerned about public security but remainwilling to give the Funes Administration time to address theproblem. 58.6 percent of respondents believe crime isgrowing worse since Funes took office, while 26.5 percentbelieve it is about the same and only 14.9 percent believe itis improving. Respondents were almost evenly split as towhether Funes' public security policies represent more of thesame (48.9 percent) or a change (49.9 percent) from policiesof the Saca administration. 67.8 percent of respondentsbelieve Funes' security policies will have some or asignificant effect on crime, while 32.3 percent believe theywill have little or no effect. However, 51.9 percent ofrespondents thought Funes' public security policies werehaving little to no effect while 48.0 percent believed theywere, in fact, showing results already. FMLN hardliners areconcerned more with obtaining operational control over thePNC than they are with reducing the crime rate. Thebiographies of some of these hardliners include involvementin murder (Melgar, Sanchez Ceren, Nidia Diaz), kidnapping(Sanchez Ceren), and arms trafficking (Merino), so theircommitment to law and order cannot be easily assumed.BLAU