David Thór Björgvinsson;Ján Šikuta;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicants are CARDINAL NORP nationals . The first applicant , Mr PERSON , was born in DATE . He is serving a term of imprisonment in the PERSON prison . The second applicant , Mr PERSON , was born in DATE and is serving a sentence of imprisonment in the PERSON prison . They were represented before the ORG by Mr J. Smetana , a lawyer practising in PERSON . The Government of GPE ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE a police investigator accused the applicants , together with CARDINAL other people , of founding and supporting an organised criminal group and of fraud . The accused were suspected of having organised a large - scale financial transaction scheme which resulted in a value - added tax fraud of MONEY . CARDINAL other people were accused of fraud in the same context .

The applicants were arrested on DATE . On DATE a judge of ORG remanded them in custody with effect from DATE . The judge considered that there was a risk of the applicants ' absconding , hampering the investigation into the case and committing further offences within the meaning of LAW § CARDINAL ( a ) , ( b ) and ( c ) of LAW of DATE ( “ the DATE Code ” ) .

The applicants were subsequently accused of murder and several other offences .

On DATE a public prosecutor indicted the applicants , together with CARDINAL other people , for a number of criminal offences before ORG . The offences alleged included fraud , membership of an organised criminal group , murder and robbery .

On DATE the case was transmitted to ORG in Pezinok . That court severed several charges against the applicants in order to conduct separate proceedings . The remaining part of the case was returned to the public prosecutor .

CARDINAL to DATE ORG held the main hearing in the case . It decided to sever several more charges against the applicants and their co - accused into separate proceedings . The remaining part of the case was adjourned with a view to taking further evidence .

On DATE ORG extended the applicants ' detention until DATE . It accepted ORG view that the case was complex and that it was necessary to obtain further evidence . The evidence available justified the suspicion that the applicants were involved in the killing of several people whose bodies had been subsequently dissolved in sulphuric acid . The risk of the applicants ' absconding , influencing witnesses and committing further offences persisted . It could be seen that the case was complex as the file comprised CARDINAL folders at that time , and the first - instance court had displayed due diligence when dealing with the case .

Hearings before ORG were held on DATE , DATE and DATE . The accused and a number of witnesses and experts were heard and documentary evidence was taken .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicants '' detention still existed within the meaning of LAW ( a ) , ( b ) and ( c ) of LAW . In particular , the accused had been away from their place of residence prior to their arrest , several witnesses had made statements against them and , in view of the actions imputed to them , there was a real risk that they would commit offences in the event of their release .

The decision stated that DATE Code continued to apply to the applicants ' case and , accordingly , the maximum permissible duration of their detention was DATE . Following the entry into force of the Code of Criminal Procedure of DATE ( “ the DATE Code ” ) on DATE , their detention during trial could not exceed DATE from DATE , as in the case of people detained under the provisions of the DATE Code .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicants ' complaint against the above - mentioned decision , as it concurred with ORG reasoning .

ORG held that people in the position of the applicants , who had been indicted prior to the entry into force of DATE , were not entitled to have the duration of their detention as a whole or the duration of their detention during trial governed by LAW . LAW clearly indicated that that had not been the intention of the legislature . The situation did not amount to unequal treatment , as the applicants had been remanded in custody under a different legal regime , namely that governed by LAW . However , both categories of detained persons DATE those whose detention was governed by LAW and those detained under LAW – should receive equal treatment as regards the duration of their detention during trial after the entry into force of the DATE Code . In that respect , the applicants were treated equally to the other category of detainees . Thus the detention during trial of accused persons who had been remanded and indicted prior to DATE for offences which LAW of DATE qualified as extremely serious crimes was permissible for a maximum duration of DATE as from DATE .

As to the applicants ' reliance on LAW , ORG held that the legislator was free to choose whether the periods of maximum detention under DATE Code would apply to proceedings which had arisen under the law previously in force . The only situations where the legislator had allowed detained persons to benefit from the newly introduced shorter maximum periods of detention were the cases mentioned in LAW , where criminal proceedings were at the pre - trial stage .

ORG concluded that the applicants , who had been indicted prior to DATE , could in principle be detained until DATE when the maximum permissible detention period of DATE would expire .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the applicants complained separately to ORG that their detention had exceeded the maximum permissible period of DATE . They relied on Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL in conjunction with Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the DATE Code and on LAW § § CARDINAL ( c ) and CARDINAL of the Convention .

On DATE the Special Court convicted the applicants of murder . It sentenced the second applicant to DATE and the first applicant to DATE imprisonment . The applicants appealed .

On DATE ORG rejected the first applicant 's complaint as being manifestly ill - founded . In particular , it held that ORG interpretation and application , in its above decision of CARDINAL DATE , of the relevant provisions of the CARDINAL ORG were in conformity with the LAW and the LAW .

On DATE ORG dismissed the second applicant 's complaint for similar reasons . It held , with reference to LAW , DATE and CARDINAL of the DATE Code , that the date of filing of the indictment was decisive in the determination of whether LAW or DATE Code would govern a criminal case including periods of detention . It therefore considered erroneous the interpretation which ORG had given to the relevant provisions in its decisions CARDINAL Ntv CARDINAL/CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL Ntv CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE and on which the second applicant had relied . The fact that in the second applicant 's case ORG had decided differently from those CARDINAL decisions did not run contrary to the principle of legal certainty . In particular , those CARDINAL decisions had been given in DATE , immediately after the entry into force of the DATE Code . A difference in the interpretation of newly adopted legislation could not be avoided during a period preceding the elaboration of established practice on the issue .

On DATE ORG extended the applicants ' detention until DATE . As to the lawfulness of their detention , reference was made to the above ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE on the complaint of the first applicant .

Under LAW , detention during criminal proceedings was governed by the provisions of Articles CARDINAL et seq . A person charged with a criminal offence could be detained , inter alia , where there were reasonable grounds for believing that he or she would abscond ( Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( a ) ) , influence the witnesses or the co - accused or otherwise hamper the investigation ( LAW ( b ) ) , or continue criminal activities , complete an attempted offence or commit an offence which he or she had been prepared or had threatened to commit ( LAW ( c ) ) .

The duration of detention was regulated by the provisions of Articles CARDINAL et seq . Detention in the pretrial phase of the proceedings and during the trial , taken together , could not exceed DATE . An extension could be authorised by ORG if it had been impossible to complete the proceedings earlier because of the complexity of the matter or for other important reasons and the release of the detainee would jeopardise the purpose of the proceedings . The total duration of the detention could not , however , exceed DATE or , in the case of offences qualified as extremely dangerous , DATE ( Article MONEY § CARDINAL ) .

The new Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted on DATE and its text was published in LAW . It entered into force on DATE . The duration of detention is regulated by ORG CARDINAL et seq .

The total duration of detention in the pre - trial phase of the proceedings and during the trial , taken together , can not exceed DATE where the case concerns a lesser crime ( prečin ) , DATE in the case of a crime ( zločin ) , and DATE in the case of an extremely serious crime ( obzvlášť závažný zločin ) ( LAW ) . Detention in the pretrial phase of the proceedings and during the trial , taken separately , can last up to CARDINAL of the above periods ( LAW ) . As regards detention during trial , the period is to be counted from the moment when the indictment is filed ( LAW § CARDINAL ) . If the detainee faces multiple charges , the offence carrying the most severe potential penalty should be used as the basis for determining the maximum permissible duration of the detention ( LAW § CARDINAL) .

The temporal application of DATE Code is governed by the provisions of Articles CARDINAL et seq . As a general rule , proceedings where the indictment was filed prior to the entry into force of the DATE Code should continue under LAW ( LAW ) . This extends to proceedings in which the duration of and grounds for detention are examined including proceedings on a proposal for one 's detention to be extended by ORG ( Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) .

Paragraph CARDINAL of Article CARDINAL provides that , in cases where a person 's pre - trial detention started prior to the entry into force of the DATE Code , the time - limits within which a decision is required on the extension of such detention at the pre - trial stage of the criminal proceedings start running at the date of entry into force of DATE . Paragraph CARDINAL does not affect the provisions governing the permissible duration of detention , with the exception of cases , where , prior to the entry into force of LAW , a final decision had been given to extend a person 's detention for a period exceeding the periods mentioned in LAW . In such cases , a person 's detention is to end DATE after the entry into force of the DATE Code at the latest .

The provisions on the temporal application of the newly introduced DATE Code initially gave rise to differing interpretations by the benches of ORG . Thus , contrary to the above - mentioned decision on the applicants ' case of DATE , ORG also found that the maximum duration of detention of a person who had been indicted prior to DATE should be governed by the newly enacted DATE Code . ORG stated that any other interpretation of the relevant provisions would run contrary to the constitutional principle of equality of persons before the law ( ORG decision CARDINAL Ntv CARDINAL/CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ) . A similar view was expressed in ORG decision CARDINAL Ntv CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE .

The criminal law section ( kolégium ) of ORG therefore adopted a practice direction indicating how LAW CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the DATE Code should be interpreted ( no . GPE CARDINAL/CARDINAL , practice direction adopted on DATE and subsequently published in the Collection of practice directions of ORG and decisions of courts , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

With reference to relevant provisions of the LAW , the criminal law section of ORG held that detained persons who had been indicted prior to the entry into force of the DATE Code were not entitled to have the duration of their detention as a whole or the duration of their detention during trial governed by LAW and CARDINAL of the DATE Code . LAW clearly indicated that that had not been the intention of the legislature . The situation did not amount to unequal treatment as the individuals concerned had been remanded in detention under a different legal regime , namely that governed by LAW .

However , ORG also held that both categories of detained persons DATE those whose detention was governed by LAW and those detained under LAW – should receive equal treatment as regards the duration of their detention during trial after the entry into force of the DATE Code . In practical terms , the detention during trial of individuals falling within the former category in the period after DATE should not last longer than CARDINAL , CARDINAL or DATE , depending on the nature of the offence in issue , as specified in LAW . In that respect , those individuals were treated equally to the other category of detainees . For example , the detention during trial of accused persons who had been remanded and indicted , prior to DATE , for offences which the DATE LAW qualified as extremely serious crimes , could not exceed DATE from DATE . Detention of such persons after DATE was therefore not permissible .


The applicants were born in DATE , DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE respectively , CARDINAL plots of land were sold to the LOC by ORG , the late wife of the first applicant GPE and the mother of the second and third applicants , PERSON . and ORG

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE , respectively , CARDINAL plots of land were sold to GPE by the second applicant ( PERSON . ) and his brother ( ORG ) , the third applicant .

On DATE and DATE CARDINAL plots of land were sold to GPE

On CARDINAL DATE the applicants lodged a request for the return of CARDINAL plots of land with ORG on the basis of the DATE LAW , claiming that they had signed the contracts of sale under duress which was tantamount to expropriation .

On DATE ORG transferred their request to ORG ( ORG sodišče v PERSON ) as the competent authority .

On DATE a hearing was held . The court requested the applicants to complete their request and submit further documents .

On DATE and DATE , DATE , DATE , CARDINAL May and CARDINAL DATE the court sent a letter to the applicants ' lawyer , reiterating its request . The court also informed the new lawyer representing the applicants that it had received no reply .

On DATE the court summoned the applicants to complete their request within DATE , or else it would reject it or consider it withdrawn .

On DATE the applicants filed the requested document through their representative and enlarged their claim , directing it also against ORG ( the “ SCC ” ) . On DATE the latter replied to the applicants .

Further to their reply , on DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE the court requested the lawyer to submit further documents .

On DATE the applicants through their representative filed the requested documents which were forwarded to the SCC . The latter replied on DATE .

On DATE the applicants specified the amount of compensation claimed .

On DATE a hearing was held . Since some of the requested documents were still missing , the applicants ' representative obliged himself to reply to the ORG 's statements .

On DATE GPE filed a reply .

On DATE , further to the court 's additional request , the applicants ' representative filed submissions .

On DATE , after a hearing , ORG rejected the claim .

On DATE the applicants lodged an appeal with ORG ( PERSON sodišče ) .

On DATE ORG rejected their appeal . On DATE the decision was served on the applicants . That decision became final .


The applicant is a NORP national , born in DATE and living in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant is a member of ORG and practises as a lawyer in GPE .

On DATE the applicant was arrested and taken to ORG for interrogation . He was detained for DATE before appearing before ORG .

On DATE the prosecutor charged the applicant with being a member of an armed gang , the ORG ( LAW ) , and applied for him to be detained on remand . The applicant was also accused of participating in the activities of the ORG , forming committees on its behalf , trying to recruit new militants for their mountain guerrilla teams and possessing illegal documents and CARDINAL guns .

On DATE the applicant was detained on remand .

At a hearing on DATE before ORG , the applicant denied all the charges and claimed that he was forced to sign a confession statement prepared by the police while being blindfolded . He maintained that he was not a member of ORG . He stated that one of the guns in question belonged to his father who held a licence for it and that the other was unlicensed and belonged to him . He also submitted that it was not he but his brother who tried to recruit new militants for the ORG ’s mountain guerrilla teams and possessed the illegal documents on behalf of the armed gang at their house . He stated that after his brother ’s death , he still kept these illegal documents on account of his fear of the gang and his brother ’s warnings that these documents should be delivered to the gang in the future .

On DATE ORG released the applicant on bail .

In a judgment dated DATE , the court found the applicant guilty of an offence under LAW . It sentenced the applicant to DATE and DATE imprisonment . It also decided to prohibit him from entering the public service for DATE . The court held that although the applicant had denied all the accusations , he had confirmed before the court that he was in possession of documents in order to deliver them to the gang sometime in the future . The court considered this acknowledgement as evidence of the applicant ’s aim of becoming a member of the armed gang .

The applicant appealed against this judgment . He reiterated the defence which he had made before ORG . On DATE ORG upheld the decision of the lower court .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property

David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Ján Šikuta;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an application with ORG ( PERSON i GPE dhe PERSON Pronave – “ the Commission ” ) , seeking to have the property of her deceased relative , confiscated in DATE , returned to her .

On DATE the Commission upheld the application and recognised the applicant ’s property rights over CARDINAL villas and a three - storey building measuring QUANTITY m and a plot of land measuring QUANTITY m.

As regards the QUANTITY building and CARDINAL of the villas , the Commission decided to return the property to the applicant . As regards the other villa , the Commission recognised the applicant ’s co - ownership with its existing occupier . However , as it was impossible to allocate the original plot of land measuring QUANTITY . m to the applicant , the Commission ordered the payment of compensation in ORG bonds equivalent to the value of the plot . Lastly , the ORG ordered the authorities to enforce the decision .

On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a civil action with the ORG challenging the part of the ORG ’s decision that recognised one of the villas as being jointly owned and claiming full ownership thereof . Notice of the proceedings was given to the existing occupier and the ORG .

On DATE the court upheld the applicant ’s civil claim and granted her full ownership of the villa . The court did not rule on the part of the ORG ’s decision relating to the compensation issue .

On DATE , following an appeal by the defendant party , ORG upheld ORG decision . As no appeal was lodged with ORG , that decision became final and binding .

On an unspecified date , following the enforcement of the court ’s decision , the applicant took possession of the properties allocated to her , that is to say , the CARDINAL villas and the QUANTITY building .

In DATE , as no ORG bonds had been issued , the applicant wrote a letter to the ORG seeking a solution to the compensation issue in respect of his plot of land measuring QUANTITY m. She did not receive a reply to her letter .

To date , the authorities have not provided compensation in respect of the plot of land measuring QUANTITY . m , in spite of the ORG ’s decision .

The relevant domestic law has been described in detail in NORP v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , ORG DATE ... ( extracts ) ) and PERSON and Others v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , CARDINAL DATE ) .


Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Mihai Poalelungi;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr J. PERSON of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE at TIME the applicant was arrested by the police in his hometown , PERSON . He was taken to GPE and from there , upon the order of a prosecutor , to a jail ( izba zatrzymań ) in GPE .

On DATE at TIME the prosecutor lodged with the court his application to remand the applicant in custody for DATE . The applicant was placed under the authority of a court ( przekazany do dyspozycji sądu ) .

On DATE at TIME the applicant was brought before a judge of ORG ( Sąd Rejonowy ) who decided to remand him in custody .

Subsequently , the applicant ’s pre - trial detention was extended by numerous court decisions .

On DATE the applicant filed with ORG a claim for compensation for unlawful detention CARDINAL June DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s claim .

The applicant did not appeal against that judgment .

On DATE the applicant was charged with the rape of a certain ORG , a minor daughter of his partner .

On DATE he was , in addition , charged with sexual abuse of ORG and her minor sister PERSON and with psychological abuse of both PERSON and ORG

On DATE ORG assigned a lawyer under the legal - aid scheme to represent the applicant in the criminal proceedings . On DATE the applicant was indicted on charges of sexual abuse and rape of GPE , sexual abuse of PERSON and psychological abuse of both PERSON and ORG

On DATE ORG convicted him as charged and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment .

The applicant ’s lawyer appealed , arguing that the court had erred in its assessment of the facts .

On DATE ORG upheld the first - instance judgment in the relevant part .

The applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal . However , he asked ORG ) to do so on his behalf .

By a letter of DATE the Prosecutor General informed the applicant that he had not found any grounds to lodge a cassation appeal in the applicant ’s case .

From DATE until DATE the applicant was in continuous detention . On DATE he was released .

From DATE until DATE the applicant was detained in FAC .

The applicant submitted that he had been held in dark and overcrowded cells without any access to hot water . On CARDINAL occasion he shared a QUANTITY cell with CARDINAL other detainees .

The Government did not provide details as to the size and occupancy rate in the applicant ’s cells during his initial detention . They submitted , however , that from DATE until DATE the applicant had been placed in cells in which the space per prisoner ranged from CARDINAL to CARDINAL m² . It was also noted that the sanitary conditions in the applicant ’s cells had occasionally been below the standard required by the sanitary inspectorate . Lastly , the Government submitted that the applicant had been afforded adequate medical care in FAC .

He submitted that he had been held in an overcrowded cell without any access to hot water . He shared a CARDINAL m² cell with CARDINAL inmates . The medical care provided to prisoners was inadequate . In this connection the applicant submitted that he suffered from ulcers and that his eye sight had deteriorated in prison because of the overall poor conditions and inadequate medical care and the fact that he was not taking the medicine which he had been prescribed when he was at liberty .

The applicant also submitted that the prison management had confiscated his tape player for no reason . As a result he could not continue his audio LANGUAGE lessons .

The Government submitted that in FAC the applicant had been placed in cells in which the space per prisoner for the most part ranged from DATE to CARDINAL.CARDINAL m² . For a total of DATE the statutory minimum standard of CARDINAL m² had been respected in the applicant ’s cells . Moreover , the Government submitted that during his stay in ORG the applicant had been examined by doctors on over thirty occasions , which proved that the medical care provided in prison had been sufficient .

On DATE the applicant was committed to ORG .

In the applicant ’s submission , the living and sanitary conditions in the prison were inadequate . The cells were overcrowded and dirty .

From DATE until DATE the applicant was detained in cell no . CARDINAL in wing I. The cell in question was designed for CARDINAL prisoners but instead was shared by CARDINAL prisoners . There was not enough room at the table and many inmates had their meals standing up or sitting on a stool . In the applicant ’s wing there were no toilets inside the cells . Instead , there were CARDINAL toilet cubicles and CARDINAL urinals accessible from the corridor . They were shared by CARDINAL prisoners .

The applicant also submitted that the medical care in FAC was insufficient . There was a practice of mixing healthy and ill prisoners and medical treatment offered in the event of sickness was inadequate . Many prisoners suffered from sepsis . The applicant submitted that his CARDINAL-year old cellmate had died on DATE of that disease and that afterwards , the applicant and his fellow inmates had been administered preventive drugs .

After numerous complaints to the prison management , in DATE the applicant was transferred to wing PERSON .

The applicant submitted that his cell in ORG had been occupied by CARDINAL prisoners , including the applicant , even though its designated maximum capacity was for QUANTITY persons .

The applicant submitted that he had initially been committed to cell no . CARDINAL , which was a single cell . He shared it with another inmate . On DATE he was placed in cell no . CARDINAL which was designed for CARDINAL people . The applicant shared it with CARDINAL other prisoners .

From DATE until DATE the applicant was detained in the therapeutic wing of ORG .

The applicant submitted that in LOC he had been assigned to cell no . CARDINAL , which he shared with CARDINAL other prisoners .

The applicant lodged numerous complaints with ORG authorities about various aspects of his detention . They were to no avail .

By a letter of DATE the Director of ORG of ORG ( ORG PERSON ) informed the applicant that his allegations that the staff of ORG had monitored the contents of the letters by his family , the ORG and ORG authorities , had been found to be without merit . It was noted that the letters in question had admittedly been opened and monitored , but only by the authorities responsible for overseeing the applicant ’s pre - trial detention . It was emphasised that such a procedure was in compliance with the domestic law and was necessary to ensure the proper conduct of the criminal proceedings pending against the applicant .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE the Director of ORG of ORG informed the applicant that his complaint about the allegedly inadequate medical care in FAC had been considered ill - founded .

The applicant also complained to the management of ORG . He also wrote to ORG to complain of the overall poor sanitary conditions in prison . It appears that on an unspecified date a Sanitary Inspector fined ORG and ordered the renovation of the toilets .

The applicant did not bring a civil action in tort to seek compensation for the alleged infringement of his personal rights .


Violation of Art. 5-3;Remainder inadmissible;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses (domestic proceedings) - claim dismissed;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed several car thefts .

On DATE ORG ( Sąd Rejonowy ) remanded the applicant in custody until DATE . The court considered that his detention was justified by the existence of substantial evidence against him and the gravity of the charges . It also noted that the applicant had attempted to induce CARDINAL of the witnesses to change her testimony .

On DATE the court prolonged the applicant ’s detention until DATE . It repeated the reasons previously given and added that the need to obtain additional evidence justified keeping the applicant in custody .

The applicant ’s detention was subsequently prolonged several times by ORG and ORG ( Sąd Apelacyjny ) until DATE .

His appeal against the prolongation of his detention was dismissed by ORG on DATE .

On DATE the applicant and CARDINAL other persons were indicted on charges of being members of an organised criminal group and having committed numerous car thefts .

Subsequently , the applicant ’s detention was extended several times by ORG and ORG , for the same reasons as before .

On DATE ORG refused the applicant ’s application for release .

On DATE ORG granted ORG request to prolong the applicant ’s detention until DATE . The court considered that the case was very complex and that it was necessary to examine voluminous evidence . It also found that the detention was justified by the existence of strong evidence against the applicant and the gravity of the charges . There was also the possibility that the applicant would attempt to tamper with evidence . His appeal against that decision was dismissed on DATE .

On DATE and DATE ORG again granted ORG requests and ordered that the applicant be detained until DATE . It dismissed the applicant ’s appeals against those decisions .

On DATE the ORG released the applicant under police supervision ; it also prohibited him from leaving the country . The court considered that the applicant suffered from a personality disorder and depression and that his isolation from the outside world constituted a danger to his life and health . The court based its view on a report by CARDINAL expert psychiatrists .

The proceedings are still pending .

The Code of Criminal Procedure of DATE , which entered into force on DATE , defines detention on remand as CARDINAL of the so - called “ preventive measures ” ( środki zapobiegawcze ) . The other measures are bail ( poręczenie majątkowe ) , police supervision ( dozór policji ) , guarantee by a responsible person ( poręczenie osoby godnej zaufania ) , guarantee by a social entity ( poręczenie społeczne ) , temporary ban on engaging in a given activity ( zawieszenie oskarżonego w określonej działalności ) and prohibition on leaving the country ( zakaz opuszczania kraju ) .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL sets out the general grounds for imposition of the preventive measures . That provision reads :

“ Preventive measures may be imposed in order to ensure the proper conduct of proceedings and , exceptionally , also in order to prevent an accused ’s committing another , serious offence ; they may be imposed only if evidence gathered shows a significant probability that an accused has committed an offence . ”

Article CARDINAL lists grounds for detention on remand . It provides , in so far as relevant :

“ CARDINAL . Detention on remand may be imposed if :

( CARDINAL ) there is a reasonable risk that an accused will abscond or go into hiding , in particular when his identity can not be established or when he has no permanent abode [ in GPE ] ;

( CARDINAL ) there is a justified fear that an accused will attempt to induce [ witnesses or co - defendants ] to give false testimony or to obstruct the proper course of proceedings by any other unlawful means ;

NORP If an accused has been charged with a serious offence or an offence for the commission of which he may be liable to a statutory maximum sentence of CARDINAL CARDINAL years’ imprisonment , or if a court of first instance has sentenced him to CARDINAL CARDINAL years’ imprisonment , the need to continue detention to ensure the proper conduct of proceedings may be based on the likelihood that a severe penalty will be imposed . ”

The Code sets out the margin of discretion as to the continuation of a specific preventive measure . Article CARDINAL reads , in so far as relevant :

“ CARDINAL . Detention on remand shall not be imposed if another preventive measure is sufficient . ”

Article CARDINAL , in its relevant part , reads :

“ CARDINAL . If there are no special reasons to the contrary , detention on remand shall be lifted , in particular if depriving an accused of his liberty would :

( CARDINAL ) seriously jeopardise his life or health ; or

( CARDINAL ) entail excessively harsh consequences for the accused or his family . ”

The DATE Code not only sets out maximum statutory time - limits for detention on remand but also , in LAW , lays down that the relevant court – within those time - limits – must in each detention decision determine the exact time for which detention shall continue .

Article CARDINAL sets out time - limits for detention . In the version applicable up to DATE it provided :

“ CARDINAL . Imposing detention in the course of an investigation , the court shall determine its term for a period not exceeding DATE .

The whole period of detention on remand until the date on which the first conviction at first instance is imposed may not exceed DATE .

The court of appeal within whose jurisdiction the offence in question has been committed may , on application made by the court before which the case is pending or , at the investigation stage , on application made by ORG , prolong detention on remand for a further fixed period exceeding the periods referred to in DATE , when it is necessary in connection with a stay of the proceedings , a prolonged psychiatric observation of the accused , a prolonged preparation of an expert report , when evidence needs to be obtained in a particularly complex case or from abroad , when the accused has deliberately prolonged the proceedings , as well as on account of other significant obstacles that could not be overcome . ”


The applicant is an NORP citizen , born in DATE and living in GPE . He is represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

A.

In DATE the applicant went to ORG ( GPE ) in order to file an application for restitution of property which had previously belonged to his father . The property - a plot of land together with an industrial building - was nationalised in DATE . He alleges that his application was not accepted on the ground that he had not submitted a proof of ownership .

On DATE the deadline stipulated in section CARDINAL of LAW for filing applications for restitution of property expired .

The applicant thereafter repeatedly requested ORG to accept his application nevertheless and reinstate the deadline . In its letters of DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE ORG stated that he had not submitted an application by the set deadline and had therefore lost his right to claim the restitution of property .

In DATE the applicant obtained , after several requests , a certificate from an archive proving that the nationalised property had belonged to his father . It appears that in the preceding period the archive was unable to locate the necessary document .

On DATE the applicant asked ORG to accept his application .

On DATE ORG stated that it lacked competence to reinstate the deadline of DATE . Pursuant to the “ PERSON concerning the procedure for reinstatement of time - limits for submission of applications for return or compensation of unlawfully expropriated property ” the body competent to reinstate the deadline in respect of applications submitted until DATE was ORG on the Return and Compensation of Unlawfully Expropriated Property .

The applicant filed a complaint with ORG ( Tartu Halduskohus ) concerning the refusal of ORG to accept his application in DATE arguing that its officials had failed to provide him with adequate information and assistance .

By judgment of DATE ORG declared the actions of ORG officials unlawful and suggested that the competent body accept the applicant ’s restitution application . It found that ORG officials had failed to comply with the requirements of sections CARDINAL of the “ Procedure for filing and examination of applications concerning unlawfully expropriated property and for submission and evaluation of evidence . ”

In its appeal against the judgment ORG argued that the applicant had , in fact , not lodged an application for restitution of property at the relevant time and that , in visiting the City Government buildings in DATE , he had addressed himself to a department which had no competence to decide on the matter . It also contended that , under the procedure in force , proof of ownership was not required for the initial submission of restitution applications . Such proof could be furnished later .

On DATE ORG ( GPE ) revoked the judgment of the first instance court on the ground that the rejection of the applicant ’s complaint by ORG officials had not been established .

On DATE ORG ( NORP ) refused to grant the applicant leave to appeal .

B. Relevant domestic law

LAW ( Omandireformi aluste seadus ) was adopted on DATE and entered into force on DATE .

Pursuant to its LAW applications for restitution of unlawfully expropriated property can be filed until DATE . Such applications are to be accompanied by documents that the applicants have concerning the ownership , form and value of property .

The applications are reviewed by city or county commissions established by county governors or city governments . The decisions of the local commissions can be appealed to ORG on the Return and Compensation for ORG .

It further provides that the Government of GPE is to fix the procedure for filing and review of applications as well as for filing and assessment of evidence .

The Procedure for Filing and Examination of Applications Concerning Unlawfully Expropriated Property and for Submission and Evaluation of Evidence ( NORP võõrandatud vara tagastamise ja kompenseerimise avalduste esitamise ja läbivaatamise ning tõendite esitamise ja hindamise kord ) , was approved by the decree of the Government of GPE of CARDINAL DATE .

According to its provisions , the authorities handling restitution applications are to inform the applicants of the procedure for restitution of property and establish possibilities for collecting further evidence . They are to provide the applicants with legal and other assistance necessary for the exercise of their rights ( sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) .

The Law Concerning the Procedure for Reinstatement of Time - limits for Submission of Applications for Return or Compensation of Unlawfully Expropriated Property ( Seadus avalduste esitamise tähtaegade ennistamise korrast õigusvastaselt võõrandatud vara tagastamisel ja kompenseerimisel ) was adopted on DATE and amended on DATE .

It provides that time - limits for submission of applications for restitution of property can be reinstated by ORG on the Return and Compensation of ORG which would accept such applications until DATE . Its decision refusing an application can be appealed against to a court ( sections CARDINAL ) , CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ) .


Giovanni Bonello;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Mihai Poalelungi;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in FAC .

On DATE the applicant instituted civil proceedings for payment against the GPE .

On DATE ORG ( Sąd Wojewódzki ) gave judgment . The court partly allowed the applicant ’s claim . The defendant appealed .

On DATE ORG ( Sąd Apelacyjny ) quashed the impugned judgment and remitted the case .

On DATE the ORG ( PERSON ) dismissed the applicant ’s claim against GPE . The applicant appealed .

On DATE the ORG dismissed her appeal . The applicant lodged a cassation appeal against the appellate court ’s judgment .

On DATE ORG ( ORG ) refused to entertain her cassation appeal .

On an unspecified date the applicant lodged with ORG of Appeal a complaint under LAW on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time ( LOC o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki ) ( “ the CARDINAL Act ” ) .

On DATE ORG acknowledged the excessive length of the proceedings before FAC finding that there had been several periods of unjustified inactivity for which ORG had been responsible . It referred to the periods DATE and DATE , DATE and DATE , CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE and qualified them as unjustified delays . The court did not examine , however , the period prior to the entry into force of LAW .

The court awarded the applicant MONEY ( PLN ) ( approx . CARDINAL euros ( ORG ) ) in just satisfaction .

The relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the excessive length of judicial proceedings , in particular the applicable provisions of LAW , are stated in the ORG ’s decisions in the cases of ORG v. GPE no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( dec . ) , § § DATE , ECHR CARDINAL-V and NORP v. GPE no . CARDINAL ( dec . ) , ORG CARDINAL-VIII and the judgment in the case of GPE v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , ORG CARDINAL


Ganna Yudkivska;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicant was born in DATE and is currently serving a sentence in ORG no . CARDINAL ( ORG колонія № CARDINAL ) in GPE , GPE . He is disabled ( his feet were partly amputated in DATE ) and walks with a stick .

Late in TIME DATE P. , the applicant 's neighbour , was severely beaten in her house and received several knife wounds , concussion and broken bones . She died in hospital DATE .

On DATE criminal proceedings for grievous bodily harm causing death were instituted by the police . On DATE the applicant was questioned . He submitted that he knew P. as she was his neighbour . She had lived alone and communicated with nobody . He further submitted that in DATE QUANTITY persons , PERSON , had built an extension to P. 's house and on DATE there had been a party in the neighbourhood .

On DATE the applicant was arrested . In the report drawn upon his arrest it was indicated , without any further details , that the applicant had been arrested on suspicion of causing grievous bodily harm to P. The applicant was further questioned as a suspect . He submitted that in the evening of DATE he had wanted to buy some home - made alcohol or to borrow some money from P. As the latter had refused , he had hit her with his wooden walking stick . P. told him that she would inform the police . The applicant decided that if she did that he would get a criminal record , he had taken a knife and struck P. several times “ in order to intimidate her and take revenge ” . In his written statements he also wrote that he “ refused to be represented by a lawyer and this was not related to his financial state ” .

On DATE the police held an on - site reconstruction of events with the participation of the applicant and witnesses PERSON . and PERSON

On DATE the applicant was charged with inflicting grievous bodily harm causing PERSON 's death ; he pleaded guilty . The maximum possible punishment for this crime was DATE imprisonment . The applicant again confirmed that he did not need a lawyer .

On DATE ORG remanded the applicant in pre - trial custody .

On DATE , during a forensic psychiatric examination , the applicant stated that he had not committed the crime and had been subjected to physical and psychological pressure from the police . The experts stated that the applicant was lying and insincere . They also indicated that although the applicant was “ socially dysfunctional ” and suffered from chronic alcoholism , he was able to control his actions .

On DATE and DATE the applicant submitted that he did not want to be legally represented and “ would defend his rights himself ” . On DATE he also pleaded guilty and indicated that he had not wanted to kill P.

On DATE the GPE town prosecutor decided not to qualify the applicant 's actions as murder .

On an unknown date the case was transferred to the court .

On DATE during the preliminary examination of the case by the court the applicant lodged a request for a lawyer .

On DATE the applicant 's representative , PERSON , joined the proceedings as his lawyer .

On DATE the court returned the case for further investigation . In the court hearing the prosecutor indicated that more witnesses should be questioned , the construction workers who built an extension to P. 's house in DATE should be found , and there should be a further forensic examination of samples of P. 's skin , hair and nails and the applicant 's stick . The applicant submitted that he had not committed the crime in question . He had confessed to it only because , being disabled , he was afraid that the police officers would ill - treat him . The ambulance doctor , PERSON , testified that PERSON had said that she had been beaten by “ men ” without giving any names . PERSON insisted that the word was used in the plural . P. 's neighbours testified that P. lived alone and would never let strangers , including the applicant , who had lived on their street for a month , into her house .

On DATE the applicant 's actions were reclassified as murder committed for financial gain , since the nature of the victim 's injuries confirmed the attacker 's intention to kill her . The possible penalties for this crime included a life sentence .

On DATE the applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer and denied guilt .

On DATE ORG found the applicant guilty of murder and robbery . In particular , it found that the applicant had hit PERSON with his walking stick and with a knife , and had stolen QUANTITY of home - made alcohol , an apple and a glass . In a court hearing the applicant contested the charges and submitted that he had pleaded guilty because the police officer PERSON . had beaten him and the investigation officer PERSON . had promised him the minimum punishment if he pleaded guilty . In the applicant 's opinion , PERSON had been murdered by the people who had built the house extension , because she had not paid them .

The court rejected the applicant 's submissions and referred to the applicant 's testimony given during the pre - trial investigation . It also based its decision on the following evidence .

G. , the ambulance doctor , testified that PERSON had told her that she had been attacked by a man , without giving a name . PERSON . and PERSON testified that they had been present at the on - site reconstruction of events during which the applicant had explained how had he committed the crime . He was not subjected to any pressure . The police officer , PERSON . , explained that he had never met the applicant . The investigation officer , PERSON . , testified that the applicant had not been subjected to any pressure . PERSON and PERSON submitted that PERSON had paid them for their work . When they played football with the applicant he told them that they had not been paid enough . The forensic medical examination confirmed that some of P. 's injuries could have been inflicted in the circumstances described by the applicant earlier . According to the DNA examination the blood from the blood spots on the applicant 's trousers could have been P. 's , with a degree of probability of CARDINAL .

NORP The court finally sentenced the applicant to DATE imprisonment , with obligatory treatment for alcoholism .

The applicant appealed against this decision . He complained , inter alia , that his actions had been wrongly classified at the pre - trial stage of the proceedings , which had breached his right to defence . The applicant indicated that P. knew him but while still alive she had never identified him as her attacker . Also , P. 's neighbours , including PERSON . and PERSON . , who were drinking in the house next to the victim 's , were not questioned at all , or only perfunctorily .

On DATE ORG of GPE , in the presence of a prosecutor , upheld the applicant 's sentence . Neither the applicant nor his lawyer were present at the hearing . The applicant was apprised of this decision on DATE .

The relevant extracts from LAW ORG as worded at the material time read as follows :

“ Participation of a defence lawyer in the inquiry , pre - trial investigations and trial by the first - instance court is compulsory :

( CARDINAL ) from the moment of the person 's arrest or when he or she is [ officially ] charged with a criminal offence carrying a penalty of life imprisonment ... ”

Article CARDINAL of the ORG as worded at the material time provided that a suspect , accused or defendant was entitled to waive his or her right to defence counsel . Such a waiver was permissible only on the initiative of the suspect , accused or defendant , himself or herself .

A waiver was not permitted if the participation of a defence lawyer was compulsory .


Violation of Art. 5-3;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant was born in DATE . She is detained in FAC .

On DATE the applicant was arrested by police officers from the anti - terrorism branch of ORG on suspicion of being a member of PERSON ( Revolutionary Left ) , and was taken into custody . During the operation , the police officers gathered guns and illegal documents from the flat where they had captured the applicant . The applicant had also CARDINAL forged identity cards in her possession .

On DATE she was brought before the investigating judge at ORG . Subsequently , the investigating judge ordered the applicant ’s detention on remand .

On DATE the public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with ORG against CARDINAL persons , including the applicant , and requested that the applicant be punished pursuant to LAW with the death penalty .

NORP Throughout the criminal proceedings , either on its own motion or at the applicant ’s request , ORG examined and ordered the applicant ’s continued detention . The court relied on “ the serious nature of the offences with which the applicant had been charged , the state of evidence , the content of the case file , and the duration of the detention ” when further detaining the applicant . On CARDINAL occasions on DATE and CARDINAL DATE , the court also noted that the case was due to be decided soon .

On DATE the applicant was convicted of the offence as charged and sentenced to life imprisonment .

On DATE ORG quashed the applicant ’s conviction , and remitted the case back to ORG .

The case is still pending before ORG .


The first applicant , PERSON , born in DATE , is the mother of the second to seventh applicants , PERSON , born in DATE , PERSON , born in DATE , ORG , born in DATE , ORG , born in DATE , ORG , born in DATE , and ORG , born in DATE . They are NORP nationals of NORP origin and live currently in GPE ( GPE ) . In the proceedings before the ORG they are represented by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE am GPE .

In DATE the applicants entered GPE together with the first applicant ’s husband , respectively the other applicants’ father . On DATE they applied for asylum . On DATE when heard before ORG ( ORG für die ORG ) they declared that there were GPE . The first applicant stated that she had been kidnapped in DATE by NORP , but that after DATE she escaped . According to ORG customs a kidnapped girl could not return to her family . She therefore went to Batman where she met her future husband who , although being officially a NORP , belonged to the PERSON community . In DATE her husband ’s brother , the head of the village of ORG , was murdered . Thereafter they were harassed by members of the ORG security service and their NORP neighbours . In DATE the first applicant ’s husband was arrested for DATE by members of the security forces and asked him for the reasons of his conversion to the LOC religion . A further stay in GPE had been impossible for them .

On DATE ORG dismissed the ORG request as being manifestly ill - founded and invited them to leave the NORP territory within DATE . ORG did not consider that the evidence they adduced in support of fear of persecution to be reliable and doubted the credibility of their asylum claim . According to ORG , the first applicant had ceased being a LOC at the moment of her marriage with a NORP . She was not recognised as a LOC neither by the members of her family nor by the people surrounding her . The applicants could therefore not be considered as NORP . Finally the applicants had not alleged to be victims of political persecution as NORP .

On DATE the applicants filed an action against the refusal of asylum and their envisaged expulsion and applied for an interim injunction ( einstweilige Anordnung ) requesting to stay their expulsion pending the administrative court proceedings . They repeated their previous submissions and referred to pending asylum proceedings of close members of their family some of which had been successful . They further stressed that on several occasions they had been interrogated and threatened by the NORP police . Also their neighbours had treated them as GPE and the children had been insulted in school . Since NORP fundamentalists had a strong influence in Batman , their situation there became unbearable .

On DATE ORG ( Verwaltungsgericht ) dismissed their request for an interim injunction . Confirming the findings of ORG , ORG added that being a ORG was a matter of birth , not of faith . A marriage with a person belonging to a different religion was considered as a sin and sanctioned by the exclusion from the PERSON community . The applicants were not NORP . There was no indication that their life was determined by this religion that their neighbours considered them as LOC . Unlike LOC practising their religion , the applicants were not subjected to persecution in GPE .

On DATE the applicants renewed their request to be granted political asylum ( PERSON ) . They alleged that their submissions in the previous asylum proceedings had not been correctly understood due to linguistic problems . The first applicant ’s husband submitted that he too was born by PERSON parents . When he was DATE , his mother had been kidnapped by NORP . He then lived together with his mother and his NORP stepfather . However , he and his mother had always maintained close contacts with the LOC in their surroundings and he had been brought up according to the LOC traditions .

On DATE the parish of the Norden ORG church granted the applicants church asylum . The first applicant ’s husband was expelled to GPE on DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicants’ renewed asylum request . The court observed that the applicants had failed to show that they had been prevented , through no fault of their own , from filing their new submissions in the previous proceedings .

On DATE ORG dismissed the action filed by the applicants on DATE against the refusal of asylum and their envisaged expulsion . The ORG considered the ORG submissions as unsubstantiated and contradictory . The first applicant ’s submission , according to which she had been kidnapped by NORP when she was young , was irrelevant for the purposes of being granted asylum , since this event occurred too long a time ago . Moreover , even if it were true that her uncle had been murdered , there was no evidence that the applicants were persecuted for their religious beliefs . It was true that NORP manifesting their religion were persecuted in GPE . However , if in a case such as the present where the religion had not been practised or where after the marriage with a person belonging to a different religion the membership in the ORG community had come to an end , there was no likelihood of persecution . Accordingly , there was no need to take further evidence in this respect . Furthermore , persons of NORP origin had the possibility to live in the NORP parts of GPE , in particular in larger cities , where they did not risk direct or indirect persecution or an existence under the poverty level .

On DATE ORG GPE ( Niedersächsisches Oberverwaltungsgericht ) refused the applicants’ application for leave to appeal . The court considered that ORG had correctly assessed the evidence and had rejected the ORG requests to take further evidence in a convincing manner . ORG had not arbitrarily concluded that the applicant ’s submissions were unsubstantiated . The ORG furthermore found that the NORP from the NORP regions had generally a possibility to live in the LOC of GPE . As to the question whether NORP who practised their religion in an NORP environment , had to fear persecution by NORP , the ORG pointed out that this question had been answered affirmatively in the past but was irrelevant in the present case because the applicants were not GPE .

On DATE the applicants requested to reopen the asylum proceedings . When interviewed on DATE before ORG , they submitted that the first applicant ’s husband was a LOC . He had been excluded from his family when his mother married a NORP . However , he and the first applicant lived according to the LOC faith . After the murder of the first applicant ’s uncle in DATE their neighbours realised that they were GPE . They were then harassed by the resident population and had to move house CARDINAL times . Following the introduction of compulsory religious instruction in school , it became clear that the children were not NORP and they were insulted and beaten . The applicants maintained that in case of their expulsion to GPE their would face a real risk of being murdered .

On DATE ORG refused to conduct new asylum proceedings . It took the view that the applicants’ submissions did not constitute new facts . Furthermore , ORG did not consider the evidence they adduced in support of their fear of persecution to be reliable and doubted the credibility of their asylum claim .

The applicants filed an action with ORG and applied for an interim injunction ( einstweilige Anordnung ) requesting to stay their expulsion pending the administrative court proceedings .

On DATE ORG dismissed this request on the ground that the applicants submissions were contradictory and not credible . Their claims had to be considered as completely fabricated . There was no evidence showing that they were of PERSON origin and that they were persecuted when they had left their country nor was there a sufficient likelihood that they would be persecuted if they were to return to their country . However , there were no grounds justifying to quash the final judgments given by ORG . According to ORG , the applicants merely alleged an erroneous appreciation of the law and facts by the previous court instances . Their earlier and new submissions concerning their membership in the PERSON community being unsubstantiated , there was no need to take further evidence in this respect .

The applicants filed a constitutional complaint against the refusal of the requested interim injunction .

On DATE a panel of CARDINAL judges of ORG ( Bundesverfassungsgericht ) declined to accept the ORG constitutional complaint for adjudication .


Violation of Art. 6-1;Not necessary to examine Art. 13+6 and 14+6;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses award - domestic proceedings;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings

Mr PERSON is a NORP national . Since DATE he has been a consultant engineer .

Following a disagreement as to the amount of fees owed to him for a number of projects which he had designed , CARDINAL disputes arose between him and those who had commissioned the work , CARDINAL public corporations and a private individual .

DATE , and then from DATE , the GPE , a body under the authority of ORG , concluded with the applicant a series of contracts for the design of electro - mechanical installations and the supervision of the relevant work . In DATE it repudiated these contracts and refused to pay him the agreed remuneration .

DATE and DATE , the applicant brought , in the GPE first - instance court ( PERSON ) , i.e. composed of a single judge , CARDINAL actions to recover the fees payable for the supervision of the work in question . In addition , he asked ORG ( PERSON " ) to bring proceedings on his behalf concerning the fees which he claimed in respect of the design of the projects , because , according to the terms of ORG no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , it alone had the capacity to institute proceedings for the recovery of fees payable to engineers , being subrogated to their rights for this purpose . The T.E.E. brought CARDINAL actions , on DATE , DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE Mr PERSON asked the T.E.E. to bring CARDINAL more actions . He repeated his request on DATE and DATE . By a letter of CARDINAL DATE , the T.E.E. warned him of the poor prospects of success of the additional actions envisaged ; consequently , it demanded the pre - payment of the legal fees and the lodging of a bank guarantee intended to cover the costs of the opposing party . The applicant regarded these conditions as unlawful and called upon the T.E.E. not to delay any further , because of the danger that his rights would become time - barred . On DATE he repeated his protest but agreed to provide the guarantee requested .

On DATE the T.E.E. informed him that on DATE it had complied with his request of DATE . It stated however that it would seek purely declaratory judgments ( anagnoristikes agoges ) if it did not receive payment of the legal costs before the first hearing .

In the meantime the first - instance court had allowed CARDINAL of the actions brought by the T.E.E. ; ORG ( Efeteio ) had , however , dismissed them , whereupon the T.E.E. had appealed to ORG ( Areios Pagos ) . In the course of the proceedings , the GPE requested a stay , with a view to securing an out of court settlement with the applicant .

At this point , ORG adopted , on DATE , on the basis of a bill prepared by ORG , Act no . DATE which amended and supplemented various provisions of the employment legislation . LAW thereof reads as follows :

" Transitional provisions

Works contracts or contracts for the provision of independent services of specified or indefinite duration , concluded prior to DATE of the publication of the present LAW between the ORG and private engineers ... or engineers employed in the public sector or by public corporations ... shall be valid notwithstanding any other statutory provisions .

The ... above - mentioned engineers shall be entitled to the remuneration agreed upon ; the provisions ... of Act no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ‘ on the registers of researchers and the award and design of projects’ shall not apply .

The provisions of this paragraph shall also apply to cases currently pending before the courts at any level of jurisdiction in so far as no final ruling has been made . "

After the entry into force of LAW , the GPE refused any further negotiation .

Before ORG , Mr PERSON complained of the " interference of the executive , through the legislature " in his cases pending before the courts .

By CARDINAL judgments of CARDINAL May and DATE ( nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , ORG ruled that LAW covered all engineers and did not therefore infringe the principle of equal treatment . It added that nothing prevented the legislature from adopting measures affecting civil rights provided that that principle was observed . Finally , it considered that the appeals were unfounded because they were based on provisions which had been repealed .

These judgments are not at issue in the present case .

On DATE the T.E.E. brought an action before the GPE first - instance court for the payment of the applicant ’s fees relating to the projects designed in DATE and DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the GPE was ordered to pay the sum of MONEY . It appealed from this judgment on DATE . The applicant intervened in the proceedings on CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE Mr PERSON requested the T.E.E. to bring additional actions to obtain the compound interest ( LAW ) which had accrued since DATE and for the adjustment of his claim in accordance with the rate of inflation ( Article CARDINAL para . CARDINAL of LAW of DATE ) . In addition , he complained that the action brought by DATE had sought merely a declaratory judgment and that it had failed to contest a large number of objections raised by the opposing party .

ORG dismissed the GPE ’s appeal on CARDINAL DATE ( judgment no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . It considered that since DATE no employment or works contract existed between the applicant and the Organisation . On the contrary , it noted that Mr PERSON had designed the disputed projects as an independent engineer within the meaning of Act no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) and that the LAW of DATE was therefore not material to the case . The PERSON appealed to ORG on DATE .

DATE previously , the applicant had again requested the T.E.E. to file the additional claims ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . On DATE he complained that it had not yet collected the sum awarded on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) ; in his view , the GPE ’s appeal did not preclude the execution of the appeal judgment upholding the first - instance decision . He also protested that there had been no replies to his previous representations .

By a fourth letter of CARDINAL DATE Mr PERSON accused the T.E.E. of being responsible for the slowness of the proceedings in ORG and demanded explanations from it as to the manner in which it was carrying out its duties .

In a memorandum of CARDINAL DATE to the T.E.E. ’s legal advisor , which was communicated to the applicant , the lawyer assigned to the case stated as follows :

a ) The T.E.E. has never lodged a claim for compound interest against the ORG or a public corporation .

b ) Decree no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL does not provide for the adjustment of fees . Admittedly , the above - mentioned judgment of ORG ( the only one in our favour ) recognises that the design projects fell within the scope of Act no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL which provides for such a possibility , but in our view this judgment is inconsistent with section CARDINAL para . CARDINAL of Act no . DATE ... .

The terms of this provision suggest that the judgment will be quashed on appeal .

c ) CARDINAL actions brought by ourselves and Mr PERSON have already been dismissed with final effect .

d ) The T.E.E. has already paid out considerable amounts for these cases and has had costs awarded against it on several occasions .

e ) The outcome of the case pending in ORG is uncertain . We shall probably lose it .

For the above reasons we consider it unwise for the T.E.E. to incur criticism and run financial risks by bringing an action for compound interest and the adjustment of the claim under LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL before ORG has given judgment . "

The applicant again contacted the T.E.E. on DATE and DATE .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( PERCENT CARDINAL ) , ORG ruled that Act no . DATE was not applicable and dismissed the GPE ’s appeal .

On DATE Mr PERSON called upon the T.E.E. to pay him the sum awarded on DATE plus interest and various others sums , amounting to MONEY , which it had not included in the claims filed at the beginning of the proceedings .

On DATE the T.E.E. informed him in writing that the legislation in force did not allow it to institute enforcement proceedings against the GPE , that a request for the re - adjustment of the claim would be unlawful and that an action for interest " would clearly be devoid of any moral basis " . It added that until the delivery of judgment no . DATE , serious doubts had subsisted as to the outcome of the main proceedings , which had prevented it from filing such claims , but the applicant could lodge them himself by means of a subrogation action ( LAW , see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE , the T.E.E. re - introduced , in the light of the new legislation , CARDINAL of the actions which it had brought on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) in the GPE first - instance court . Mr PERSON intervened in the proceedings .

At the hearing on DATE the T.E.E. converted these actions into actions for declaratory judgments .

The court found for the applicant , by CARDINAL judgments of CARDINAL DATE ( ORG . ORG and CARDINAL ) , but on CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE ORG allowed the GPE ’s appeal ( judgments ORG . CARDINAL and DATE ) . It ruled that the applicant ’s rights were time - barred on the ground that DATE had elapsed DATE in the course of which they had come into existence and the date on which the actions had been re - introduced before the court . In reply to the opposing view of the T.E.E. , it considered that the initial claims had been made on a different legal basis and had therefore not been capable of interrupting the running of time .

On DATE Mr PERSON complained to the T.E.E. that it had failed to put his case properly . As it refused to lodge an appeal on points of law , he did so himself on DATE . In his memorial , he stated that the appeal was directed against the T.E.E. as well as against the GPE

By CARDINAL judgments of DATE ( no . CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL DATE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , ORG declared inadmissible the submissions concerning the T.E.E. and dismissed the remainder of the appeal as ill - founded .

On DATE the T.E.E. re - introduced CARDINAL of its actions of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) before the GPE first - instance court , which simply declared the action in question time - barred ( judgment no . DATE of CARDINAL DATE ) .

On DATE ( judgment no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) ORG dismissed the T.E.E. ’s appeal .

The applicant himself filed an appeal on points of law . His memorial , drawn up by a lawyer of his choice , contained a number of complaints regarding the manner in which the T.E.E. had carried out its duties as a body subrogated to his rights .

By a judgment of DATE ( no . CARDINAL ) , ORG declared the appeal inadmissible in so far as it related to the T.E.E. and ill - founded for the rest .

In DATE the applicant requested the T.E.E. to re - introduce certain of the actions which it had instituted from DATE to DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

In a report of CARDINAL DATE to the head of the T.E.E. ’s legal department , the lawyer assigned to the case expressed the view that there were sufficient prospects of success and stressed that no problem of res judicata arose from judgments nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) of ORG .

On DATE Mr PERSON repeated his request and warned the T.E.E. of the risk that the disputed rights would become time - barred . It brought the actions in the court on DATE , but only in the form of actions for a declaratory judgment . The applicant intervened in the proceedings .

On DATE May the court dismissed the actions on the same grounds as in the judgments on appeal of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

The applicant ’s appeal filed on DATE is still pending .

On DATE the ( PERSON ) - Patriotic Foundation for ORG and Assistance - P.I.K.P.A. , a public body under the authority of ORG commissioned Mr PERSON to design a project for the extension of the heating system of one of its hospitals , the PERSON children ’s hospital . On DATE this hospital , which in the meantime had become a public - law body , asked the applicant to alter his plans . The project , which was submitted within the time - limits laid down , was approved on DATE .

The applicant considered that a reduction of his fees effected by the ORG was arbitrary and he accordingly asked it to re - examine its method of calculation , but to no avail . On DATE he applied to the relevant department of ORG .

As he did not obtain satisfaction , the applicant instituted proceedings against the P.I.K.P.A. and the LOC in ORG on DATE pursuant to LAW of LAW ( ORG ) to LAW . On DATE he was asked by the court to provide evidence that he was enrolled on the register of Public expenditure , a condition which allowed an engineer to carry out public works ; he did so on DATE .

On DATE the court dismissed his action against the P.I.K.P.A. on the ground that all the latter ’s rights and obligations had been transferred to the P.N.P. It also ordered the parties to produce expert opinions concerning the work carried out by Mr PERSON .

At Mr PERSON ’s request , ORG held a second hearing on DATE . It dismissed the action by a judgment , which became final on DATE . It ruled that , by virtue of LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , only the T.E.E. had the capacity to bring proceedings to recover payment of fees in that it was subrogated to the rights of the engineer ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) ; it acknowledged nevertheless that the applicant could reasonably have believed that he was entitled to bring proceedings himself and ordered both parties to pay costs .

In DATE a public works contractor , GPE , commissioned the applicant to draw up plans for the installation of a drains system in the town of PERSON .

By a letter of DATE Mr PERSON asked for the assistance of the T.E.E. because GPE had rejected the plans and had not paid the agreed remuneration .

In DATE the T.E.E. replied to him that it wished to settle the dispute out of court .

As the negotiations were unsuccessful , the applicant on DATE urged it to bring legal proceedings .

On DATE he repeated his request and asked the T.E.E. to reassess the sums claimed .

On DATE he complained to it for not already having brought the action and for having miscalculated the fees .

The T.E.E. brought an action in the GPE first - instance court on DATE . On DATE the action was allowed in part ; the applicant did not intervene in these proceedings .

The T.E.E. and GPE challenged the judgment in ORG . On DATE that court ordered GPE to pay the T.E.E. CARDINAL,CARDINAL drachmas plus interest ; however , it rejected the submission concerning the reassessment of the claim because the T.E.E. had not specified the amount claimed ( judgment no . DATE ) .

On DATE Mr PERSON complained to the T.E.E. for having failed to include in its memorial the information on the basis of which the coefficient for the above - mentioned reassessment could be calculated ; he also requested it to institute enforcement proceedings in relation to the judgment of CARDINAL DATE .

On CARDINAL DATE he again contacted the T.E.E. He accused it of having waited for DATE before bringing the proceedings , of having miscalculated his fees and of having failed to bring the enforcement proceedings to a conclusion with the result that he had received nothing .

On DATE the T.E.E. replied to him that it could not be accused of negligence and that he had not shown that he had suffered damage . It noted that ORG had already paid the interest and the legal costs and had sought authorisation to pay the remaining sum in CARDINAL DATE instalments . Finally it added that it was for Mr PERSON himself to specify such property of GPE as might be liable to attachment .

According to LAW para . CARDINAL of the LAW , " every person shall be entitled to receive legal protection by the courts and may plead before them his views concerning his rights or interests , as specified by law . "

The following provisions of the above - mentioned LAW of DATE , as they were applicable at the material time , are relevant :

" CARDINAL . Engineers holding diplomas from ORG ... , members of ORG ( T.E.E. ) , and persons who pursue , on a full - time or part - time basis , ... in accordance with Act no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , the profession of engineer and naval architect , shall , when commissioned to design a project , communicate to the T.E.E. ( ... ) a declaration attesting to their appointment by the commissioning party and a separate declaration to the effect that they have accepted the assignment ; where the project is commissioned by the ORG or a public corporation , the copy of the document authorising the assignment of the project [ shall be communicated to the T.E.E. ] ...

" CARDINAL . Any party who commissions the design of plans from the persons referred to in DATE ... shall deposit with the T.E.E. or the latter ’s authorised representative ... , the full amount of the project fee , such fee being determined by the competent ministry or by the T.E.E. in the manner described below . He may not pay it directly to the person commissioned to carry out the work .

Where the commissioning party refuses , hinders or delays payment of the deposit or of the fee owed , the T.E.E. shall have the capacity to bring legal proceedings for the recovery of the amount due ... by being subrogated ex officio to the rights of the payee .

In such cases , the T.E.E. shall inform the payee that it has introduced proceedings , after which it is freed from any liability in his regard , in particular from any obligation to pay him compensation . The payee or the T.E.E. are entitled at any moment to intervene in the proceedings . "

" CARDINAL . The fees paid shall be deposited by the T.E.E. in a special bank account and a sum equivalent to PERCENT of the total fee shall be credited to the T.E.E. ’s account with ORG . ...

The remainder of the fee , after deduction of the percentages witheld and the charge payable for the professional licence , shall be paid to the payee by the T.E.E. or its authorised representative , free of interest .

The ORG shall pay directly to the payees the fees which it owes to them after having deducted PERCENT of such amounts , which is paid to the T.E.E. "

The subrogation system set up by LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL was initially intended to protect engineers from pressure being brought to bear on them to reduce excessively their fees , but also - and this remains the case - to secure the payment of a compulsory contribution of PERCENT ( since reduced to PERCENT ) to their insurance fund ( LAW . It is applicable only in respect of the recovery of fees payable for the design of projects and not for the supervision of work ( LAW .

The T.E.E. has the responsibility of instituting proceedings on the basis of the information provided by the engineer . Once the action has been brought , the latter may intervene ( LAW and , by filing memorials or even by attending the hearing , support the arguments of the T.E.E. , which remains the main party in the proceedings . By so intervening the engineer acquires the right to lodge appeals himself .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( no . DATE ) ORG ruled as follows :

" ... it follows that under the above - mentioned provisions [ LAW paras . CARDINAL and CARDINAL of Royal Decree no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ] the T.E.E. has not only a right ( discretionary power ) , but also an obligation , to take legal proceedings on behalf of the engineer to recover fees . This interpretation ... is consistent with the prevailing case - law according to which the payee has no right whatsoever to bring proceedings for the recovery of his remuneration . ... Consequently , in carrying out this obligation , the T.E.E. acts not as the engineer ’s representative but as an authority exercising an unfettered and exclusive right conferred on it by law ... . "

In a judgment ( no . CARDINAL ) ORG held as follows :

" ... it is clear from ... Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of Royal Decree no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ... that ORG , which alone is entitled to collect the disputed renumeration , is subrogated to the rights of engineers , regardless of whether they are members . If it were otherwise the aim of the above - mentioned provisions would be frustrated , that aim being to safeguard the interests of the profession and to deter any competition as regards ORG fees , liable to affect adversely the quality of the projects which they design " .

DATE . On the other hand , in a judgment no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL the ORG observed :

" Royal Decree no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ... provides in DATE and CARDINAL of Article CARDINAL thereof : ‘ ... CARDINAL . In such cases , the T.E.E. shall inform the payee that it has introduced proceedings ... . The payee or the T.E.E. are entitled at any moment to intervene in the proceedings’ . It follows from these provisions that the T.E.E. has the right to take legal proceedings to secure the payment of remuneration owed to CARDINAL of its members in respect of the design of a project only where the member in question has not done so himself . If the payee takes proceedings himself to recover the fees , the T.E.E. is entitled only to intervene in the proceedings " .

ORG had occasion to rule on a claim for compensation from an engineer who complained that the T.E.E. had not brought proceedings to recover his fees in sufficient time to avoid the action in question being time - barred . It considered that such negligence gave rise to a right to compensation , but only as from the moment at which the action became time - barred and at which the T.E.E. could therefore no longer bring it ( judgment no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

LAW provides as follows :

" Capacity to bring proceedings of parties

Any person who can establish a direct legitimate interest may seek judicial protection . "

" Subrogation action ( plagiastiki agogi )

Creditors may apply for judicial protection , exercising the rights of their debtors in the event of the latter ’s failure to exercise them , except rights of a close personal nature . "

" Intervention in support of CARDINAL of the parties ( apli prostheti paremvasi )

If , in proceedings pending before a court , a third party has an interest in the success of CARDINAL of the parties , he may intervene in support of the claims of that party until final judgment has been given . "

" Procedural position of the intervener

The intervener may take all the steps in the proceedings in the interests of the party which he supports and is bound to accept any steps which have already been completed before his intervention . The steps which he takes shall be valid in so far as they are compatible with those of the main party in the proceedings ... "

" ‘ Autonomous’ intervention ( aftotelis prostheti paremvasi )

If the decision in the main proceedings affects the relationship between the intervener and the opposing party , the provisions of Articles DATE to CARDINAL shall apply . " ( ORG " concerning common interest between the parties " - " omodikia " )

The subrogation action was introduced into NORP law in DATE in LAW and was considered to be an action for provisional measures and interlocutory relief . It is now governed by the general provisions of the first LAW . It is generally agreed that this action is a sui generis action which aims at safeguarding the property of the debtor in the interests of the creditor . A person who brings the action must prove that he is the creditor of a debtor who has neglected to exercise his rights . The latter ’s insolvency is not a necessary condition for bringing the action .

In a judgment of DATE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) concerning enforcement proceedings against a debtor , a private individual , who had just lost his action against the T.E.E. , ORG stated as follows :

" ... between the T.E.E. and the engineer there is a ‘ quasi’ debtor ( the T.E.E. ) - creditor ( the engineer ) relationship , which lasts for as long as the T.E.E. is under a statutory duty to secure the recovery of the fee and to pay it thereafter to the person to whom it is strictly due , the engineer ... It follows from the above - mentioned provisions ( LAW ) that if the T.E.E. fails to institute proceedings for the recovery of fees or to bring an enforcement action for their payment , ... the engineer , as the payee , has a legitimate interest in doing so provided that he stipulates in his application that the amount in question is to be paid to the T.E.E. ... "