Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - claim dismissed

In DATE the applicant , an NORP , appeared together with PERSON and PERSON before ORG , composed of a judge and a jury , to be tried for conspiracy to defraud .

After the defence had stated its case , the judge started his summingup , which he had almost completed by DATE TIME when he adjourned .

On DATE TIME a juror arrived at the court and handed an envelope to the court usher containing the following complaint :

“ I have decided I can not remain silent any longer . For some time during the trial I have been concerned that fellow jurors are not taking their duties seriously . CARDINAL have been making openly racist remarks and jokes and I fear are going to convict the defendants not on the evidence but because they are NORP . My concern is the defendants will not therefore receive a fair verdict . Please could you advise me what I can do in this situation . ”

The juror who had written the complaint was asked not to join the other jurors . The judge discussed the complaint with counsel in chambers and then adjourned and listened to submissions in open court . The defence asked the judge to dismiss the jury on the ground that there was a real danger of bias . The judge , however , decided to call the jury back into court , at which stage the juror who had written the complaint joined the others . The judge read out the complaint to them and told them the following :

“ Members of the jury , TIME I received a note from CARDINAL of your number expressing extreme concern that some of your number are not taking your duties seriously , are making openly racist remarks and jokes about NORP and may not reach your verdicts upon the evidence but because of some racial prejudice .

I am not able to conduct an inquiry into the validity of those contentions and I do not propose to do so . This case has cost an enormous amount of money and I am not anxious to halt it at the moment , but I shall have no compunction in doing so if the situation demands .

When you took the oath or affirmed as jurors it was , you will remember , to bring in true verdicts according to the evidence . That is solemn and binding and means what it says .

I am going to adjourn now and I am going to ask you all to search your conscience TIME and if you feel that you are not able to try this case solely on the evidence and find that you can not put aside any prejudices you may have will you please indicate that fact by writing a personal note to that effect and giving it to the jury bailiff on your arrival at court TIME . I will then review the position . Thank you very much . ”

The next morning the judge received CARDINAL letters from the jury . The first letter , which was signed by all the jurors including the juror who had sent the complaint , stated the following :

“ We , the undersigned members of the jury , wish to put on record to the ORG our response to DATE 's note from a juror implying possible racial bias .

We utterly refute the allegation .

We are deeply offended by the allegation .

We assure the ORG that we intend to reach a verdict solely according to the evidence and without racial bias . ”

The second letter , which the judge commended , was written by a juror who appeared to have thought himself to have been the one who had been making the jokes . The juror in question explained at length that he might have done so , that he was sorry if he had given any offence , that he was somebody who had many connections with people from ethnic minorities and that he was in no way racially biased .

The judge decided that he would not discharge the jury and told them the following :

“ Ladies and gentlemen , the events of DATE TIME were clearly distressing for you , but I am sure you will see and realise that when a judge receives a note from CARDINAL of your number raising those sort of issues it is the judge 's duty to bring it to the attention of the whole jury .

Whether the suggestions were well or ill - founded is not something I or any judge can decide , nor is it something that can be investigated by the judge . It would be an improper activity . I took the course I did in the exercise of my discretion and I am sorry you were offended and upset .

However , CARDINAL of you have TIME utterly refuted the allegation , expressed your deep offence at it and assured the ORG that you intend to reach a verdict or verdicts solely according to the evidence and without racial bias . CARDINAL of your number has also written at length a most cogent and balanced letter , and it is quite clear to me that each and every one of you are conscious of the oath or affirmation that you have taken and are dutifully prepared to abide by . ”

On DATE the jury found the applicant guilty , but acquitted PERSON , who was also NORP . On DATE the judge imposed on the applicant a sentence of DATE imprisonment .

The applicant was given leave to appeal against conviction . In his appeal he raised , inter alia , the following ground : The judge should have reacted to the juror 's complaint by dismissing the jury ; in any event , the juror who had written the complaint should not have been segregated from the other members of the jury in the early stages and the judge should not have disclosed to the jurors the contents of the complaint .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's appeal . As regards the above - mentioned ground it considered the following : The court had regard to the letter signed by all the members of the jury , and the letter of the juror who was probably responsible for the remarks that had given offence , and found that the trial judge did not err in reaching the conclusion that there was no real risk of bias . Moreover , the judge was right to confront the jury with the problem and ask them to consider it . It was perhaps unfortunate that the juror who had written the complaint was for a time segregated from the other members of the jury , as this led to his identification . However , it would be unrealistic to suppose that the jury would not have wanted to know who the author of the complaint was and the judge dealt with the possibility of tensions among the jurors perfectly sensibly in the direction he gave to them .


The applicant is a NORP citizen born in DATE , residing in ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the applicant , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE in the morning the applicant ’s husband lost consciousness . The applicant ’s neighbour called an ambulance from the local emergency station . As it was not equipped with necessary resuscitation appliances , a second one was called . Despite resuscitation measures taken by the doctor , the applicant ’s husband died at TIME

On DATE the applicant requested that criminal proceedings be instituted against the medical personnel involved in the incident , alleging that they had been negligent in dealing with her husband .

On DATE the ORG discontinued the investigation finding that no criminal offence had been committed . It had been established that the ambulance had been called by the applicant ’s neighbour who had failed to inform the dispatchers at the local emergency station that the applicant ’s husband had an infarctus in DATE and that he had been unconscious . Immediately after the ambulance arrived at TIME , the physician had ordered at TIME that a resuscitation ambulance be called . This ambulance arrived at TIME and resuscitation measures had been taken , to no avail .

The applicant filed an appeal with ORG against this decision .

On DATE the ORG quashed the decision under appeal , considering that the evidence gathered in the case had to be completed . In particular , copies of the dispatching documents of the emergency station on which the lower prosecutor had relied , were unreadable and nothing could reasonably have been established on this basis in respect of the exact time when the ambulance had been called and when the applicant had urged the station to speed up their action . There were also certain discrepancies between these documents , which had not been explained . Moreover , the neighbour who had first called the ambulance should have been questioned . The prosecutor emphasised that the dispatching document had shown that the first call referred to the applicant ’s husband as “ dying ” . Thus , it was necessary to establish why an ordinary ambulance had been sent to a person qualified as dying . It was further necessary to find exact times when the applicant and her neighbours had called the emergency station . Moreover , it was necessary to explain whether it was indeed the case that under existing regulations only a physician was entitled to call a resuscitation ambulance .

On DATE ORG again discontinued the investigations . It was established that on DATE the applicant ’s neighbour called the ambulance . As the applicant was in a state of shock , she did not give precise information concerning her husband ’s state . The neighbour was consequently unable to provide details as to his medical past . PERSON , dispatcher at the emergency station , noted information she obtained stating that the applicant ’s husband was “ dying and conscious ” . A decision was taken by CARDINAL dispatchers PERSON and ORG to send an ordinary ambulance . It was noted that a regulation was in force at that time which allowed for dispatching a resuscitation ambulance only on the order of a physician . Exceptions from this rule were allowed only if the calling person provided medical details allowing for such a decision . The ambulance left the station at TIME and arrived at the applicant ’s address at TIME In the meantime , at CARDINAL approximately , the applicant ’s neighbour had urged the emergency services to send the ambulance . After the ambulance arrived , physician PERSON ordered the driver at CARDINAL to call a resuscitation ambulance and proceeded to the resuscitation with the equipment available at the ordinary ambulance . The resuscitation ambulance arrived at CARDINAL . Subsequently , further resuscitation efforts had been made with the use of a special cardiological equipment , but to no avail . At TIME the applicant ’s husband died . The prosecutor concluded that in the light of the evidence there were no grounds on which to find that the medical staff was negligent or too slow in their actions in such a manner as could contribute to the applicant ’s husband ’s death .

The applicant appealed again , complaining that the evidence taken during the investigations was insufficient for the proceedings to be discontinued .

On DATE the Łódź Regional Prosecutor upheld the decision of DATE , considering that in the light of the evidence there were no grounds on which to accept that the staff of the emergency station had acted in breach of any regulations in force at the material time . It was true that certain doubts could be expressed as regards the fact that no resuscitation ambulance had been sent after the second phone call by which the applicant ’s neighbour provided more detailed information about the state of the applicant ’s husband . However , on the whole , the manner in which the staff had acted confirmed the conclusion of the lower prosecutor that they had no case to answer .

The applicant subsequently requested ORG to reopen the proceedings , to no avail . The prosecutor , in its letter of DATE stated that the case - file had been re - examined . It was further emphasised that the first ambulance was called at TIME approximately , it left the station at CARDINAL a.m. and arrived at the applicant ’s address at TIME . The second ambulance , carrying resuscitation equipment , was called at CARDINAL a.m. and arrived at CARDINAL . There were numerous documents concerning the calling , dispatching and arrival of the ambulances and a number of persons were involved in making these documents . They were acting independently in this respect . This in itself cast doubt on the applicant ’s arguments that the relevant documents had been forged so that the staff could evade criminal responsibility . The evidence given by the applicant ’s neighbours corresponded with the conclusions which had been drawn from the testimony of other witnesses . The evidence was also concordant in that the applicant ’s neighbour , in the first phone call for the ambulance to be sent did not give details concerning the state of the applicant ’s husband at that time , which in turn entailed a decision to send the ordinary ambulance .

The Chambers of Physicians’ Act of CARDINAL DATE established ORG as a professional organisation of physicians . Membership of the ORG is mandatory . Disciplinary responsibility of physicians for professional misconduct may be determined in proceedings before the organs of the ORG , i.e. agents for disciplinary matters and disciplinary courts . Agents and members of the courts for each region are elected by members of a local chamber . The Chief Agent for ORG and ORG are elected by ORG , composed of delegates of local chambers .

Pursuant to LAW , the following penalties may be imposed in disciplinary proceedings : a warning , a reprimand , suspension of the right to practise medicine for a period from DATE and striking out of the register of physicians .

The procedure to be followed in disciplinary proceedings is governed by the Order on Procedure in Disciplinary Proceedings issued by the Minister of Health on DATE .

Under this Order , the agent for disciplinary matters must investigate the matter if he obtains credible information that the rules of professional conduct have been infringed . While investigating such a complaint , the agent may question physicians charged with professional misconduct , may appoint experts and question witnesses , and take such other evidence as he or she sees fit . A physician charged with professional misconduct is entitled to make any submissions which he or she deems relevant .

If information existing at the time the investigations are instituted , or gathered in the course thereof , is sufficient to charge a physician with professional misconduct , the agent shall draw up a motion to the court for a disciplinary penalty to be imposed , containing a detailed description of the alleged offence and written grounds .

Pursuant to LAW , the agent shall discontinue proceedings if he concludes that the material gathered does not suffice for drawing up a motion for a penalty to be imposed .

A complainant may lodge an appeal against that decision with the Chief Agent for Disciplinary Matters . A further refusal of the Chief Agent may be appealed against to ORG .

Under LAW , if the court , having received a motion for a penalty to be imposed , decides that the case is ready for examination at a hearing , it orders that a hearing be held . A physician is summoned to a hearing , whereas his defence counsel and the agent are informed of its date .

Under LAW , in disciplinary proceedings the complainant is entitled to : submit a request for evidence to be taken , lodge with the disciplinary court an appeal against the agent ’s decision to discontinue the proceedings , and lodge an appeal against a decision of a first - instance court on the merits , but only on the question of responsibility . The complainant is entitled to have access to the case - file but the agent can limit this access to documents that are not covered by medical confidentiality .

Pursuant to LAW , the proceedings before the court are public for members of ORG .

Under LAW of LAW Civil Code , the ORG and local municipalities are liable for damage caused by its agents in the exercise of their functions . There is established case - law of NORP courts to the effect that this liability of the ORG includes also liability for damages caused by medical treatment in a public system of medical care , run either by the ORG or by the municipalities .


Preliminary objections joined to merits and dismissed (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies;victim);Violation of Art. 3 (susbtantive aspect);Violation of Art. 8;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä;Sverre Erik Jebens;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE .

Early in DATE the applicant visited PERSON in a hospital in GPE , in the region covered by the then ORG ( replaced later by the countrywide ORG ) . Having performed an ultrasound scan , PERSON estimated that the applicant was in DATE of pregnancy .

On DATE , in DATE of her pregnancy , the applicant – who was at that time DATE , was married and had CARDINAL children DATE was registered as a pregnant patient in her local clinic .

On DATE and DATE ultrasound scans were performed , in DATE of the applicant ’s pregnancy . On DATE PERSON estimated that it could not be ruled out that the foetus was affected with some malformation and informed the applicant thereof . The applicant told him that she wished to have an abortion if the suspicion proved true .

The Government submitted that in DATE and DATE the applicant had visited PERSON at a private clinic . They argued that such an institution had no right to issue a referral to any public health institution .

The applicant disagreed . She first submitted that at the material time Dr PERSON worked both at a public hospital in DATE where she had visited him in DATE and in DATE , after the second scan DATE and at a non - public clinic . She further submitted that the NORP health care system was composed of so - called public health units and non - public health units . The latter , most often being first contact and basic care institutions , had financing contracts with the public ORG ( and had had such contracts with its predecessors , ORG Funds , at the material time ) . Medical services available in non - public clinics were partly financed by public funds , constituted by premiums paid by all persons covered by the universal system of health insurance . Doctors working for non - public units had the same rights and duties to provide health care to patients as doctors employed by public units , including a right to refer a patient to a public unit .

Subsequently , the applicant went to a hospital in GPE results of a third ultrasound scan performed in that hospital confirmed the likelihood that the foetus was suffering from some malformation . A genetic examination by way of amniocentesis was recommended by PERSON , in order to confirm or dispel this suspicion .

On DATE the applicant had another ultrasound scan in a private clinic in FAC . She had no referral from PERSON and had therefore to pay for the service herself . Under the applicable laws , her expenditure could not be reimbursed . The results of that scan confirmed the likelihood that the foetus was affected with an unidentified malformation . Genetic tests were recommended again .

She was subsequently received by Professor PERSON . in ORG , a specialist in clinical genetics . A genetic test was again recommended . Professor PERSON . recommended that the applicant should obtain a formal referral from her family doctor , PERSON , to have the test carried out in a public hospital in FAC , which was outside her region covered by the then ORG .

Subsequently , PERSON refused to issue a referral , because in his view the NORP condition did not qualify the applicant for an abortion under the provisions of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

The Government submitted that no reference to the possibility of the foetus being affected with PERSON syndrome had ever been made .

The applicant disagreed . She submitted that during that visit she was told that the scan gave rise to a suspicion of either PERSON or ORG syndrome .

In DATE the applicant and her husband visited PERSON during his night duty at the hospital in T. They demanded termination of the pregnancy . He refused and indicated that the results of the ultrasound scan could not be treated as a sole ground for diagnosis that the foetus was affected with severe malformation . He proposed having a panel of doctors from the same hospital review his decision . The applicant refused .

On DATE the applicant was admitted to a public hospital in GPE , within her region covered by ORG , and requested advice . She was told that a decision on termination could not be taken at that hospital and was referred to a university hospital in GPE , to a pathological pregnancies ward , in another region of the Fund , for further diagnosis ( “ w celu dalszej diagnostyki ” ) .

During the applicant ’s stay in the hospital in T. a hospital lawyer was asked to give an opinion with a view to ensuring that the laws on the availability of legal abortion were respected . The applicant was also told that termination of pregnancy would entail a serious risk to her life and that the CARDINAL caesarean births which she had previously had constituted the most important risk factor in deciding whether she should have a genetic test at all .

On DATE , immediately after being discharged from the T. hospital , the applicant travelled QUANTITY to GPE . She went to see PERSON at ORG . He criticised her for contemplating a termination . She was also informed that the hospital categorically refused to carry out abortions and that no abortions had ever been performed there for DATE . She was also refused a genetic examination , Dr GPE being in the opinion that it was not necessary in her case . She stayed in the hospital for DATE and had another ultrasound scan performed , the results of which were inconclusive . Urine and blood tests were also performed . She was discharged on DATE . The applicant ’s discharge record stated that the foetus was affected with developmental abnormalities ( “ wady rozwojowe płodu ” ) . The same was stated in a medical certificate signed by PERSON He recommended genetic testing in order to establish the character of the ailment .

On DATE the applicant again contacted Professor PERSON . , who had examined her in DATE . Another ultrasound scan performed in a private clinic where Professor PERSON . received patients confirmed the suspicion of malformation . The applicant obtained a referral from the professor to ORG in FAC , but he informed her that he was in fact not competent to issue it . The professor told her that in order to have a genetic test carried out in ORG , which was outside her region , she needed a referral issued by a doctor practising in her region and , in addition , an approval by a regional insurance fund , together with an undertaking that it would reimburse the costs of the test to the regional fund where the test was to be performed . The professor advised her to report to the FAC hospital as an emergency patient , claiming that she was about to miscarry , as it was likely that she would then be admitted to that hospital .

Subsequently , on DATE , the applicant asked PERSON for a referral .

The Government submitted that PERSON could not have referred the applicant for a genetic test in GPE because neither ORG nor any other hospital in PERSON carried out such tests as a routine procedure . The applicant disagreed . She submitted that PERSON had told her that she would not obtain the referral for testing because if the results were positive she would want to have an abortion .

Afterwards , on DATE , she again unsuccessfully asked PERSON for a referral to the FAC hospital .

The Government submitted that the applicant had obtained from him a referral to the same ORG where she had already been hospitalised CARDINAL and DATE . The applicant disagreed and submitted that no referral had been issued to her .

The ORG notes this discrepancy in the parties’ submissions and notes that no copy of that referral has been submitted to it .

On DATE the applicant went to the ORG and ORG .

The Government submitted that she had gone to the hospital with a referral issued by Professor PERSON .

The applicant disagrees . She submits that she had gone to that hospital without a referral , as advised , and had been admitted as an emergency patient .

A genetic test ( amniocentesis ) was performed there on DATE , in DATE of pregnancy , and the applicant was told that she had to wait DATE for the results .

The Government submitted that the tests were carried out despite the fact that the applicant had not sought from the GPE section of the medical insurance fund any approval for financing them .

The applicant was discharged from the FAC hospital on DATE . Before the results were available , on DATE the applicant , increasingly desperate as by then she was very afraid that the foetus was suffering from severe genetic abnormalities , reported to the T. hospital , where she submitted a written request for an abortion . Dr PERSON told her that he could not take such a decision himself . He had to speak with the consultant .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE the applicant requested the hospital in T. to terminate the pregnancy , referring to the provisions of LAW . She requested that in case of a negative reply it should be made in writing “ as soon as possible ” .

On DATE the applicant went to that hospital again and was told that the consultant could not see her because he was ill . The visit was rescheduled for DATE . On DATE she wrote a letter of complaint to the director of the T. hospital , submitting that she had not received adequate treatment and that she felt that the doctors were intentionally postponing all decisions in her case so that she would be unable to obtain an abortion within the time - limit provided for by law .

On DATE she again requested doctors at the T. hospital to carry out an abortion . She referred to the results of the genetic tests which she had received on that date . The certificate , established by Professor K.Sz . , confirmed that the karyotype indicated the presence of ORG syndrome . The certificate further read :

“ A chromosomal aberration and an ultrasound image were established , indicating the presence of congenital defects which can have a serious impact on the child ’s normal development . Further handling of the case under the provisions of the DATE law on termination of pregnancy can be envisaged . A relevant decision should be taken with due regard to the GPE opinion ” .

The doctors in the T. hospital refused to carry out an abortion , Dr PERSON telling her that it was too late by then as the foetus was able at that stage to survive outside the mother ’s body .

On DATE the applicant again complained in writing to the Director of the T. hospital about the manner in which her case had been handled and about the procrastination on the part of Dr PERSON

NORP In DATE the applicant and her husband submitted a number of complaints to various health care system institutions . In a reply from ORG , dated DATE , it was stated that “ it was impossible to establish on the basis of the available documents why the genetic tests were postponed until DATE when the foetus had already become capable of surviving outside the mother ’s body . ”

On DATE she received a reply from the T. hospital to her complaints of CARDINAL DATE and DATE . The letter contained an account of the facts of the case and quoted provisions of the DATE Act . No assessment of the lawfulness of the conduct of the medical staff involved was made .

On DATE the applicant gave birth to a baby girl affected with PERSON syndrome .

On DATE the applicant requested the prosecuting authorities to institute criminal proceedings against the persons involved in handling her case . She alleged serious failure on the part of the doctors , acting as public agents , to safeguard her interests protected by law , on account of their failure to perform timely prenatal examinations . As a result , the applicant had been denied information on the NORP condition and , consequently , divested of the possibility to decide for herself whether or not she wished to terminate her pregnancy in the conditions provided for by law , and she had been forced to continue it .

On DATE ORG discontinued the investigations , finding that no criminal offence had been committed . The prosecutor relied on an expert opinion prepared by ORG , according to which under LAW legal abortion was possible only when foetal malformation was severe . It was not possible to assess whether malformations of a foetus were severe enough to justify an abortion until the foetus was able to live on its own outside the mother ’s body . It concluded that in the applicant ’s case an abortion would have been possible until DATE of pregnancy . The applicant appealed .

NORP On DATE ORG allowed her appeal and ordered that the investigation be re - opened . Additional medical evidence was taken during the investigation . On DATE the prosecutor again discontinued the investigation , finding that no criminal offence had been committed .

The applicant appealed , complaining , inter alia , that the prosecuting authorities had failed to address the critical issue of whether , , genetic tests should have been carried out in order to obtain a diagnosis of the foetus’ condition . Instead the investigation had focused on whether or not the applicant had a right to an abortion under the applicable law .

Ultimately , on DATE , the competent court upheld the decision of the prosecuting authorities . The court held that doctors employed in public hospitals did not have the quality of “ public servantsthe criminal offence of breach of duty by a public servant .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant filed a civil lawsuit with ORG against doctors PERSON , GPE and GPE and against the GPE and GPE hospitals . She argued that the doctors dealing with her case had unreasonably procrastinated in their decision on her access to genetic tests and had thereby failed to provide her with reliable and timely information about the NORP condition . They had also failed to establish the NORP condition in time for her to make an informed decision as to whether or not to terminate the pregnancy . As a result of an unjustified delay in obtaining relevant information she had been divested of the possibility of exercising an autonomous choice as to her parenthood .

The applicant further argued that the laws in force authorised abortion in specific situations . However , that right had been denied her as a result of difficulties in obtaining timely access to genetic tests and the lengthy delay before she had ultimately obtained such access .

The applicant referred to section CARDINAL ( a ) CARDINAL of the DATE Family Planning ( Protection of the Human Foetus and Conditions Permitting Pregnancy Termination ) Act and to Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW guaranteeing socalled personal rights .

The applicant argued that the circumstances in which the determination of her access to genetic testing had been decided had breached her personal rights and dignity and had deeply humiliated her . No regard had been had to her views and feelings .

She also claimed compensation from PERSON for hostile and disparaging statements about her character and conduct which he had made in a press interview about her case . He had disclosed to the public details about her and the NORP health covered by medical secret and told the journalist that the applicant and her husband were bad and irresponsible parents .

She claimed just satisfaction in a total amount of ORG CARDINAL for breach of her rights as a patient and her personal rights . She also sought a declaration that the CARDINAL medical establishments were responsible in respect of future costs to be borne by the applicant in connection with her daughter ’s treatment .

On DATE the ORG found PERSON guilty of having disclosed to the public , in an interview he had given to the press , information covered by medical secrecy , including the fact that she had envisaged the termination of the pregnancy . It conditionally discontinued the proceedings against him and fixed a period of probation .

On DATE ORG awarded the applicant LAW , finding that in a press interview published in DATE he had disclosed information relating to the applicant ’s health and private life in connection with her pregnancy . He had also made disrespectful and hurtful comments about the applicant ’s conduct and personality .

The court dismissed the remaining claims which she had lodged against doctors PERSON and GPE and against the hospitals . The courts found that the applicant ’s personal and patient ’s rights had not been breached by either of these doctors or the hospitals . There had been no procrastination on the LOC part in the applicant ’s case . Under ORG standards termination was permissible only until DATE of pregnancy , whereas the applicant had reported to the hospitals concerned when she was already in DATE of pregnancy , and on DATE she had been in DATE . Hence , neither her right to decide about her parenthood nor her rights as a patient had been breached in such a way as to place the defendants at fault .

On DATE the applicant appealed . She submitted that the right to health - related information was protected both by LAW , providing for legal protection of personal rights , and by section CARDINAL of LAW of DATE . In her case doctors GPE , GPE and PERSON had been of the view that genetic tests were relevant to establishing the NORP condition , but had not given her the necessary referral . GPE had not been able to cite any legal basis for his refusal . PERSON had stated before the court that he had not issued a referral because the applicant had not asked for one . However , it was for a doctor with the required professional knowledge to decide what tests were called for in a given medical situation . The testimony given by the defendants had clearly shown that their conduct in the case had failed to comply with the applicable legal provisions . The doctors had tried to shift the responsibility for the way in which her case had been handled to the applicant , despite the obvious fact that the fundamental responsibility for the proper handling of a medical case lay with them as health professionals . The doctors had also been well aware , as shown by the evidence which they had given , that the applicant had been desperate , in reaction to information that the foetus might be affected with a genetic disorder .

The applicant submitted that the ORG conduct had breached the law , in particular section CARDINAL ( a ) of LAW in so far as it imposed on the authorities an obligation to ensure unimpeded access to prenatal information and testing , in particular in cases of increased risk or suspicion of a genetic disorder or development problem , or of an incurable lifethreatening ailment . The applicant had therefore had such a right , clearly provided for by the applicable law , but the defendants had made it impossible for her to enjoy that right .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal and upheld the first - instance judgment , endorsing the conclusions of the lower court .

On DATE ORG allowed her cassation appeal , quashed the judgment of the appellate court in its entirety on grounds of substance and ordered that the case be re - examined .

ORG observed that the applicant ’s claim was CARDINAL - pronged : it was based firstly on the failure to refer her for genetic testing and , secondly , on the breach of her right to take an informed decision which resulted from this failure .

As to the first part of her claim , ORG observed that it was not open to doubt ( and had been confirmed by an expert opinion prepared for the purposes of the criminal investigation ) that only genetic testing could confirm or dispel suspicions that the foetus was affected with PERSON syndrome . The doctors concerned had known of the procedure . They were obliged , under LAW DATE ( ustawa o zakładach opieki zdrowotnej ) , insofar as it guaranteed patients’ rights , to refer the applicant for genetic testing of their own motion , without her asking for it . Under the same LAW , the applicant had a legally protected right to obtain adequate information about the NORP health . Had the doctors had conscientious objections to issuing a referral , they should have informed the applicant thereof and referred her to another practitioner who would have referred her for the testing , in accordance with the applicable laws on the medical profession governing the relevant procedure , but they had failed to do so .

The procedures governing the carrying out of genetic tests and their financing by various parts of the then ORG , applicable at the material time , could not be validly relied on as exempting doctors from issuing a referral , in particular as those procedures were not of a statutory character and could not be plausibly relied on to justify restricting the applicant ’s rights as a patient . The obligation to refer the applicant had not , contrary to the ORG position , ended on the date when legal abortion of a foetus affected with suspected malformation was no longer possible ( that is , after DATE ) , since there were no legal – or medical – grounds on which to automatically link genetic testing with access to legal abortion . Furthermore , at the material time there had been no temporal limitation in law on the carrying out of these tests during pregnancy . It was only in DATE that an ordinance had been enacted under which genetic testing became available only until DATE of pregnancy .

ORG considered that there were therefore good reasons to accept that the doctors dealing with the applicant ’s case had breached her personal rights within the meaning of Article CARDINAL of LAW and her patient ’s rights guaranteed by LAW . They had been aware that only genetic testing was capable of determining the NORP genetic situation , but had still refused a referral ; instead they had sent her for various tests carried out in a hospital setting which were not relevant to such a diagnosis .

Moreover , the lower courts had erred in their finding that the applicant had not suffered non - pecuniary damage as a result of the ORG acts . Such damage had been caused by the distress , anxiety and humiliation she had suffered as a result of the manner in which her case had been handled .

As to the second part of the applicant ’s claim , ORG observed that it transpired from the case - law of ORG ( IV CK CARDINAL/CARDINAL , judgment of CARDINAL DATE ; see paragraph DATE below ) that a right to be informed about the foetus’ health and to take informed decisions , in the light of that information , as to whether to continue the pregnancy or not was a personal right within the meaning of LAW . If a child affected with a genetic problem was born as a result of failure to carry out genetic testing , a claim for just satisfaction ( zadośćuczynienie ) arose on the parent ’s part . The lower courts had erred in that they had found that there was no adequate causal link between the LOC conduct in the applicant ’s case and the fact that she had not had access to legal abortion . In this respect the court noted that there had been enough time DATE of the pregnancy , when the suspicions had arisen , and DATE , when the time - limit for legal abortion had expired , to carry out genetic testing . When the tests had finally been carried out , the applicant had received the results DATE . The tests should therefore have been carried out immediately after the suspicions had arisen , but instead , as a result of procrastination on the part of doctors GPE , GPE and GPE , they had ultimately been conducted much later .

NORP The court finally held that the amount of FAC CARDINAL,CARDINAL to be paid by doctor PERSON for denigrating statements he had made in a

Hence , the judgment had to be quashed and the case remitted for reexamination in its entirety .

On DATE ORG gave a judgment . It stated , referring to the findings of ORG , that PERSON had failed to refer the applicant for genetic testing as soon as the suspicions as to the NORP condition had arisen . He had referred her twice to the GPE hospital , despite the fact that she had already been at that hospital and that no genetic tests had been carried out at that time . The court held that the applicant ’s claim of ORG should therefore be allowed .

It further amended the judgment of the first - instance court by increasing to ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL the just satisfaction to be paid to the applicant by S.B. for breach of her personal rights in making denigrating public statements about her in the press .

In so far as the action was directed against the T. hospital , the court held that the applicant had not received a proper diagnosis . PERSON , working at the NORP hospital , had not referred her for genetic testing , but only to FAC , even though he had been aware that genetic testing was not carried out there . When the applicant had eventually received the results of the tests and , relying on them , had asked PERSON on DATE to perform an abortion , a written negative reply had been served on DATE , namely on DATE .

In respect of ORG , the court noted that when the applicant had been admitted there on DATE , she had already had the results of the scan made by Professor PERSON . in ORG , which strongly indicated that the foetus was affected with ORG syndrome . In such circumstances , the hospital was under an obligation to carry out tests in order to either confirm or dispel these suspicions , but had failed to do so . Other tests had been carried out instead , concerning a possible inflammatory condition of the foetus , which were irrelevant for the diagnosis of ORG syndrome . The hospital had exposed the applicant to unnecessary stress , while the correct diagnosis had not been made . The defendants had been aware that time was of the essence in the availability of legal abortion , but had failed to accelerate their decision - taking . The hospitals were liable for the negligent acts of their employees in so far as it was their duty to provide the applicant with full information about any genetic disorder of the foetus and how it might affect its development and to do so in time for her to prepare herself for the prospect of giving birth to a child with a genetic disorder . Moreover , the doctors had failed to make any record of their refusals and the grounds for them , an obligation imposed on them by LAW .

As ORG had a higher referral level , its liability was more serious as a high level of professional skill could have been reasonably expected of it . The applicant had legitimately expected that she would obtain diagnostic and therapeutic treatment of the requisite quality , whereas her case had in fact been handled with unjustifiable delays .

Having regard to the GPE failure to respect the applicant ’s rights , the court awarded the applicant ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL against ORG against ORG , and dismissed the remainder of her appeal .

DATE LAW reads as follows :

“ GPE shall ensure the legal protection of the life of every human being . ”

Article CARDINAL of the LAW reads :

“ Everyone shall have the right to legal protection of his private and family life , of his honour and good reputation and to make decisions about his personal life . ”

The Family Planning ( Protection of the Human Foetus and Conditions Permitting Pregnancy Termination ) Act , which is still in force , was passed by ORG in DATE . LAW provided at that time that “ every human being shall have an inherent right to life from the moment of conception ” .

Section CARDINAL ( a ) of the DATE Act reads :

“ The ORG and local administration shall ensure unimpeded access to prenatal information and testing , in particular in cases of increased risk or suspicion of a genetic disorder or development problem or of an incurable life - threatening ailment . ”

Section CARDINAL(a ) of the DATE LAW , in its relevant part :

“ CARDINAL . An abortion can be carried out only by a physician where

CARDINAL ) NORP pregnancy endangers the mother ’s life or health ;

CARDINAL ) NORP prenatal tests or other medical findings indicate a high risk that the foetus will be severely and irreversibly damaged or suffering from an incurable lifethreatening ailment ;

CARDINAL ) NORP there are strong grounds for believing that the pregnancy is a result of a criminal act .

NORP In the cases listed above under CARDINAL ) , an abortion can be performed until such time as the foetus is capable of surviving outside the mother ’s body ; in cases listed under CARDINAL ) above , until DATE of pregnancy .

In the cases listed under CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ) above the abortion shall be carried out by a physician working in a hospital . ...

Circumstances in which abortion is permitted under paragraph CARDINAL , sub - paragraphs CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ) above shall be certified by a physician other than the one who is to perform the abortion , unless the pregnancy entails a direct threat to the woman ’s life . ”

An ordinance issued by the Minister of Health on DATE , on qualifications of doctors authorised to perform abortions , contains CARDINAL substantive sections . In its section CARDINAL , the requisite qualifications of doctors authorised to perform legal abortions in the conditions specified in the DATE Act are stipulated . Section CARDINAL of the LAW reads :

“ The circumstances indicating that pregnancy constitutes a threat to the woman ’s life or health shall be attested by a consultant specialising in the field of medicine relevant to the woman ’s condition . ”

On DATE the Minister of Health enacted an Ordinance on ORG ( rozporządzenie ORG w sprawie zakresu świadczeń opieki zdrowotnej ) . An Appendix No . CARDINAL to this Ordinance , entitled ORG ( ... ) ( PERSON lekarskich badań prenatalnych ( ... ) ) read , in so far as relevant :

“ CARDINAL . Prenatal tests are to be understood as examinations and diagnostic procedures carried out in respect of pregnant women during DATE of pregnancy where there is an increased risk of genetic ailment or malformation , but not later than in DATE of pregnancy .

Prenatal tests comprise : CARDINAL ) non - invasive examinations [ including ultrasound scans and biochemical tests [ marking of serum levels in a pregnant woman ’s blood ] ; CARDINAL ) invasive tests [ including biopsy of the trophoblast and amniocentesis ] .

Prenatal tests are recommended , in particular , where ... CARDINAL ) results of the ultrasound scan carried out during the pregnancy indicate an increased risk of the foetus being affected with a chromosomal aberration or other malformation . ”

Termination of pregnancy in breach of the conditions specified in the DATE Act is a criminal offence punishable under LAW . Anyone who terminates a pregnancy in violation of the LAW or assists such a termination may be sentenced to up to three years’ imprisonment . The pregnant woman herself does not incur criminal liability for an abortion performed in contravention of LAW .

Under LAW ( a ) CARDINAL , causing physical damage to an unborn child is a criminal offence punishable by a fine , by limitation of liberty , or by imprisonment of DATE .

At the relevant time , patients rights were provided for by ORG ustawa o zakładach opieki zdrowotnej ) . Its section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) provided that a patient had a right to obtain information about his or her condition .

Under section CARDINAL of LAW ( ustawa o zawodzie lekarza ) , a doctor may refuse to carry out a medical service , invoking her or his objections on the ground of conscience . He or she is obliged to inform the patient where the medical service concerned can be obtained and to register the refusal in the patient ’s medical records . Doctors employed in health care institutions are also obliged to inform their supervisors of the refusal in writing .

Section CARDINAL.CARDINAL of LAW DATE provides that physicians are under an obligation to provide to the patient , or his or her representative , comprehensible information about his or her health , diagnosis , proposed and possible diagnostic and therapeutic methods , foreseeable consequences of a decision to have recourse to them or not , and about possible results of therapy and prognosis .

Section CARDINAL of the DATE LAW provides that in the event of any diagnostic or therapeutic doubts , a doctor may , on his or her own initiative or at a patient ’s request and if he or she finds it reasonable in the light of the requirements of medical science , obtain an opinion of a relevant specialist or arrange a consultation with other doctors .

DATE . Articles CARDINAL et seq . of the NORP LAW provide for liability in tort . Under this provision , whoever by his or her fault causes damage to another person , is obliged to redress it .

Pursuant to Article CARDINAL of LAW , in cases of bodily injury or harm to health , a perpetrator shall be liable to cover all pecuniary damage resulting therefrom .

Under LAW of LAW , a person whose personal rights have been infringed may seek compensation . That provision , in its relevant part , reads :

“ The court may grant an adequate sum as pecuniary compensation for nonpecuniary damage ( krzywda ) suffered by anyone whose personal rights have been infringed . Alternatively , the person concerned , without prejudice to the right to seek any other relief that may be necessary to remove the consequences of the infringement sustained , may ask the court to award an adequate sum for the benefit of a specific social interest . ... ”

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( V ORG CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) ORG held that unlawful refusal to terminate a pregnancy where it had been caused by rape , that is to say in circumstances provided for by section CARDINAL ( a ) CARDINAL of the DATE LAW , could give rise to a compensation claim for pecuniary damage sustained as a result of such refusal .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( PERSON CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) ORG expressed the view that a refusal of prenatal tests in circumstances where it could be reasonably surmised that a pregnant woman ran a risk of giving birth to a severely and irreversibly damaged child , that is to say in circumstances set out by section CARDINAL ( a ) CARDINAL of that LAW , gave rise to a compensation claim .

On DATE ORG Recommendation No . R ( CARDINAL ) CARDINAL on prenatal genetic screening , prenatal genetic diagnosis and associated genetic counselling . The recommendation contains , inter alia , the following principles :

“ ORG [ ... ] noting that in DATE considerable progress has been achieved in detecting genetic abnormalities in the child to be born , through genetic screening and through prenatal diagnosis of pregnant women , but also noting the fears that these procedures arouse ;

Considering that women of childbearing age and couples should be fully informed and educated about the availability of , the reasons for and risks of such procedures ;

Convinced that the genetic diagnosis and screening must always be accompanied by appropriate genetic counselling but that such counselling should in no cases be of a directive nature and must always leave the woman of childbearing age fully informed to take a free decision ; ...

Recommends that the governments of the member GPE adopt legislation in conformity with the Principles contained in this LAW or take any other measures to ensure their implementation .

" Prenatal diagnosis " is the term used to describe tests used to confirm or exclude whether an individual embryo or foetus is affected by a specific disorder .

Principle CARDINAL : No prenatal genetic screening and/or prenatal genetic diagnosis tests should be carried out if counselling prior to and after the tests is not available .

Principle CARDINAL : Prenatal genetic screening and/or prenatal genetic diagnosis tests undertaken for the purpose of identifying a risk to the health of an unborn child should be aimed only at detecting a serious risk to the health of the child . ...

Principle CARDINAL : The counselling must be non - directive ; the counsellor should under no condition try to impose his or her convictions on the persons being counselled but inform and advise them on pertinent facts and choices . ...

Principle CARDINAL : In order to protect the woman ’s freedom of choice , she should not be compelled by the requirements of national law or administrative practice to accept or refuse screening or diagnosis . In particular , any entitlement to medical insurance or social allowance should not be dependent on the undergoing of these tests .

Principle CARDINAL : No discriminatory conditions should be applied to women who seek prenatal screening or diagnostic testing or to those who do not seek such tests , where these are appropriate . ”

In DATE ORG of ORG adopted LAW ( DATE ) “ Access to safe and legal abortion in LOC ” . This resolution , in so far as relevant , reads :

“ CARDINAL . ORG reaffirms that abortion can in no circumstances be regarded as a family planning method . Abortion must , as far as possible , be avoided . All possible means compatible with women ’s rights must be used to reduce the number of both unwanted pregnancies and abortions .

In most of ORG member states the law permits abortion in order to save the expectant mother ’s life . Abortion is permitted in the majority of NORP countries for a number of reasons , mainly to preserve the mother ’s physical and mental health , but also in cases of rape or incest , of foetal impairment or for economic and social reasons and , in some countries , on request . The ORG is nonetheless concerned that , in many of these states , numerous conditions are imposed and restrict the effective access to safe , affordable , acceptable and appropriate abortion services . These restrictions have discriminatory effects , since women who are well informed and possess adequate financial means can often obtain legal and safe abortions more easily .

The ORG also notes that , in member states where abortion is permitted for a number of reasons , conditions are not always such as to guarantee women effective access to this right : the lack of local health care facilities , the lack of doctors willing to carry out abortions , the repeated medical consultations required , the time allowed for changing one ’s mind and the waiting time for the abortion all have the potential to make access to safe , affordable , acceptable and appropriate abortion services more difficult , or even impossible in practice .

The ORG takes the view that abortion should not be banned within reasonable gestational limits . A ban on abortions does not result in fewer abortions but mainly leads to clandestine abortions , which are more traumatic and increase maternal mortality and/or lead to abortion “ tourism ” which is costly , and delays the timing of an abortion and results in social inequities . The lawfulness of abortion does not have an effect on a woman ’s need for an abortion , but only on her access to a safe abortion .

The ORG affirms the right of all human beings , in particular women , to respect for their physical integrity and to freedom to control their own bodies . In this context , the ultimate decision on whether or not to have an abortion should be a matter for the woman concerned , who should have the means of exercising this right in an effective way .

The ORG invites the member states of ORG to :

decriminalise abortion within reasonable gestational limits , if they have not already done so ;

guarantee women ’s effective exercise of their right of access to a safe and legal abortion ;

CARDINAL.CARDINAL . allow women freedom of choice and offer the conditions for a free and enlightened choice without specifically promoting abortion ;

lift restrictions which hinder , de jure or de facto , access to safe abortion , and , in particular , take the necessary steps to create the appropriate conditions for health , medical and psychological care and offer suitable financial cover ... ”

The provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to ORG ) , adopted in GPE , GPE , on DATE , in so far as relevant , read :

“ DATE General rule

An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to it . This person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks . ...

Article DATE Private life and right to information

Everyone has the right to respect for private life in relation to information about his or her health .

Everyone is entitled to know any information collected about his or her health . However , the wishes of individuals not to be so informed shall be observed . ”

ORG , in their fifth periodic report submitted to ORG CCPR / C / POL/CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , stated :

“ CARDINAL . In GPE data about abortions relate solely to abortions conducted in hospitals , i.e. those legally admissible under a law . The number of abortions contained in the present official statistics is low in comparison with DATE . Nongovernmental organisations on the basis of their own research estimate that the number of abortions conducted illegally in GPE amounts to CARDINAL DATE .

It follows from the ORG ’s DATE Reports of the execution of the [ DATE ] PERSON [ which the ORG is obliged to submit to the ORG ] and from reports of non - governmental organisations , that the PERSON ’s provisions are not fully implemented and that some women , in spite of meeting the criteria for an abortion , are not subject to it . There are refusals to conduct an abortion by physicians employed in public health care system units who invoke the so - called conscience clause , while at the same time women who are eligible for a legal abortion are not informed about where they should go . It happens that women are required to provide additional certificates , which lengthens the procedure until the time when an abortion becomes hazardous for the health and life of the woman . There [ are ] no official statistical data concerning complaints related to physicians’ refusals to perform an abortion . ... In the opinion of the Government , there is a need to [ implement ] already existing regulations with respect to the ... performance of abortions . ”

The United Nations Human Rights Committee considered the fifth periodic report of GPE ( ORG ) at its GPE and CARDINAL meetings ( ORG and CARDINAL ) , held on DATE and DATE and adopted the concluding observations which , in so far as relevant , read :

“ CARDINAL . ORG reiterates its deep concern about restrictive abortion laws in GPE , which may incite women to seek unsafe , illegal abortions , with attendant risks to their life and health . It is also concerned at the unavailability of abortion in practice even when the law permits it , for example in cases of pregnancy resulting from rape , and by the lack of information on the use of the conscientious objection clause by medical practitioners who refuse to carry out legal abortions . The ORG further regrets the lack of information on the extent of illegal abortions and their consequences for the women concerned ( article CARDINAL ) .

ORG should liberalize its legislation and practice on abortion . It should provide further information on the use of the conscientious objection clause by doctors , and , so far as possible , on the number of illegal abortions that take place in GPE . These recommendations should be taken into account when the draft LAW is discussed in ORG . ”

ORG on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ( CEDAW ) , at its CARDINALth session , held from DATE to CARDINAL DATE , considered the combined fourth and fifth periodic report ( CEDAW / C / POL/CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) and the sixth periodic report of GPE ( CEDAW / C / POL/CARDINAL ) . It formulated the following concluding comments :

“ CARDINAL . ... ORG is concerned about the lack of official data and research on the prevalence of illegal abortion in GPE and its impact on women ’s health and life .

... CARDINAL . The ORG urges the State party to take concrete measures to enhance women ’s access to health care , in particular to sexual and reproductive health services , in accordance with article CARDINAL of the Convention and the ORG ’s general recommendation CARDINAL on women and health . It calls on ORG to conduct research on the scope , causes and consequences of illegal abortion and its impact on women ’s health and life . It also urges ORG to ensure that women seeking legal abortion have access to it , and that their access is not limited by the use of the conscientious objection clause . ”

The objective of ORG and Obstetrics ( FIGO ) is to promote sexual and reproductive health and rights through educational research and advocacy activities . In DATE its ORG issued a statement on Ethical Issues Concerning Prenatal Diagnosis of Disease in the ORG . It states that :

“ Prenatal diagnosis has become an established service in the care of pregnant women . Further advances , especially at the molecular level , will expand the accuracy and diagnostic scope of manifest disease in later life . Such information may lead to termination of pregnancy , genetic engineering or to adjustments in future lifestyle . There is also the potential danger of stigmatization or discrimination against the parent or the child identified as affected by some disorder or potential disorder . ...

A potential benefit of prenatal diagnosis is the rejection of the diseased conceptus when requested by the woman and permitted by the law . The legal position and the likely attitude of the woman to termination of pregnancy should be ascertained in advance .

Prior to undertaking diagnostic procedures , women should be counseled about the risks and benefits of the technique to be used . Such counseling should be factual , respectful of the woman ’s view , and non - coercive . Consent should be obtained for the use of the procedure .

Women should not be denied the availability of prenatal diagnosis because they will not agree in advance to pregnancy termination as an option . Nor should the techniques be withheld on social or financial grounds .

Knowledge of prenatally diagnosed disease should not be used as justification for withholding normal medical support or services during pregnancy , at birth , or thereafter , which are desired by the parents .

Equity requires that these important diagnostic services are made as widely available as possible . ... ”

ORG DATE statement on Ethical Aspects of Termination of Pregnancy Following Prenatal diagnosis states , inter alia , that :

“ CARDINAL . ORG acquired by prenatal diagnosis allows for the possibility of termination of pregnancy in those countries where this is legal . This raises serious ethical questions with regard to the degree of abnormality and the reduction in quality of life which may justify this course of action . The attitude of the parents , particularly the woman , after counseling , is of major importance in reaching a decision . It is unethical for anyone to bring pressure to bear on the couple with a view to their accepting a particular option .

Doctors should be aware of the desire of parents for a “ perfect baby ” . However , this wish is unrealistic and parents should be counselled accordingly .

Termination should be discouraged when the disorder is treatable and will not necessarily affect the future quality of life .

In enabling parents to reach an appropriate decision the primary concern should be the quality of life and the longevity of the individual . A second consideration must be the effect that the birth and life of such a child might have on the woman herself and on her family . In this regard consideration must also be given to the effect of the termination of the pregnancy on the physical and/or psychological health of the woman and her family . A third concern is the availability of resources and support for long - term care . ”

The ORG ’s DATE statement on ORG requires that :

“ CARDINAL . when decisions regarding medical care are required , women be provided with full information on available medical alternatives including risks and benefits . Informing women and obtaining their input and consent , or dissent , should be a continuing process .

If a physician is either unable or unwilling to provide a desired medical service for non - medical reasons , he or she should make every effort to achieve appropriate referral . ”


Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger

The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in GPE in DATE and now lives in GPE . ORG , GPE . She was represented by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr PERSON , of ORG and their Co - Agent , PERSON , of ORG .

In DATE in GPE , PERSON , a NORP national born in DATE , as single adopter , via a NORP adoption centre , adopted the applicant whose biological father had died and whose biological mother the NORP authorities were unable to find . It appears that both biological parents had previously been deprived of custody .

Before the adoption , PERSON had contacted the municipality for guidance on the benefits for which she would be eligible after the adoption , including whether she should try to obtain a copy of the death certificate of the applicant ’s biological father during her stay in GPE in order to fulfil formal criteria . By letter of CARDINAL DATE the municipality informed her that she would be entitled to child subsidy and extra child subsidy , but not to a so - called special child subsidy .

Also before the adoption , PERSON had to substantiate that she was able to satisfy the financial conditions for adopting as a single adopter and she declared that she undertook full responsibility to provide for the applicant .

In GPE , by virtue of sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ( Børnetilskudsloven ) the applicant , via her adoptive mother , was granted socalled child subsidy and extra child subsidy , together amounting to MONEY ( ORG ) per month .

PERSON request of DATE for the so - called special child subsidy , also amounting to approximately ORG DATE , was refused on DATE by the municipality because she failed to fulfil section CARDINAL , subsection MONEY ) DATE ( iii ) , of the LAW which required ( i ) that paternity of the child had not been established ; ( ii ) that the child only had CARDINAL surviving parent who provided for the child ; or ( iii ) that the child , after the death of the guardian , had been adopted by the latter ’s spouse or by a single person . It stated that single adopters who adopt a foreign child via CARDINAL of the organisations approved by ORG were not entitled to the special child subsidy under section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL(iii ) , of LAW , since the single adopter , when adopting , undertook full responsibility to provide for the child .

On appeal , the decision was upheld on DATE by ORG ( Det Sociale Nævn i Statsamtet Vestsjælland ) .

The applicant ’s appeal to ORG ( PERSON ) was dismissed on DATE on the ground that it was not a matter of principle or of general importance as the state of law was sufficiently clear . In that connection it referred to the fact that it had previously determined CARDINAL cases concerning applications for special child subsidy in respect of children adopted by single adopters .

The applicant brought ORG decision of DATE before ORG of Eastern Denmark ( PERSON ) , ( “ the High Court ” ) , claiming that she was entitled to the special child subsidy by virtue of section CARDINAL , subsection PERSON ) , ( ii ) or ( iii ) . She also invoked LAW since in her view she was discriminated against , notably as compared to children of single women who refused to disclose the paternity of their children , or of single women having been artificially inseminated , who were entitled to the special child subsidy under no . ( i ) .

Statistics were submitted showing , inter alia , that in DATE , CARDINAL single adopters were approved in GPE , and that in CARDINAL cases paternity had not been established . Moreover , for DATE no NORP children had been adopted by single adopters without there having been a family relationship or other connection between the adopted child and the adopter .

By judgment of DATE the ORG found against the applicant . It noted that only section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL ) , of LAW concerned adoption . Moreover , it noted that before DATE , subsection CARDINAL(iii ) , read as follows “ when the child , after the death of the guardian , is adopted by the latter ’s spouse or by a single person within the child ’s family ” and considered that the amendment had been made primarily to ensure that partners , as opposed to spouses , were also encouraged to adopt a child after the guardian had died . More specifically it stated :

“ .... although the wording of LAW , subsection CARDINAL ) , of the Act on Child Subsidy may leave some doubt about the correct interpretation , the High Court finds no basis for assuming from the wording of the provision , in which the word ‘ ORG has been maintained , and on the basis of the comments to the changed wording in DATE that it was intended that the provision was to include single adopters who , as in this case , have adopted a child without a certain kind of connection existing between the child and the adopter while the parental responsibility holder was alive . Hence , the amendment must be assumed mainly to reflect an updating of the current rules for the purpose of ensuring increased child subsidy also in the situations in which the adopter was not married to the parental responsibility holder , but cohabited with him or her outside marriage . This outcome is supported by the fact that it was presupposed in connection with the bills of DATE and DATE concerning a change in the legal position that , as a rule , children adopted by single adopters are not entitled to special child benefits . Accordingly , the provision of paragraph ( iii ) is deemed not to be applicable . ”

The applicant appealed against the judgment to ORG which , by a judgment of DATE and by a majority of CARDINAL out of CARDINAL judges , found against the applicant .

The majority stated as follows :

“ Having regard to the background and wording of and the reciprocal connection between section CARDINAL , subsection PERSON ) , ( ii ) and ( iii ) , of LAW , [ those provisions ] must be understood in such a way that entitlement to the special child subsidy for a child adopted by a single adopter is regulated solely by no . ( iii ) . The provisions on sole providers under nos . ( i ) and ( ii ) do not affect single adopters .

Until DATE a child adopted by a single adopter had no right to the special child subsidy just because the single adopter was sole provider . When section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL(iii ) , was inserted in DATE the right to the special child subsidy for children of sole providers was expanded to include certain single adopters . It was a condition that the child , after the death of the guardian , had been adopted by the latter ’s spouse or by a single person within the child ’s family . The preparatory notes ( GPE DATE , ORG A , sp . DATE ) stated that the purpose was to give the stepfather or stepmother an incitement to adopt the child instead of placing him or her in foster care . The provision also included other orphans , provided they were adopted by a single family member , for example one of the parent ’s siblings or CARDINAL of the grandparents . At the same time it was emphasised that the new no . ( iii ) did not include unrelated single adopters .

In DATE the wording “ within the child ’s family ” was omitted . Thus , in accordance within the wording , the special child subsidy is granted when the child , after the death of the guardian , is adopted by the latter ’s spouse or by a single person . It is left unmentioned in the preparatory notes – ( GPE DATE , ORG A , sp . DATE ) – whether no ( iii ) hereafter includes all cases in which an orphan is adopted by an unrelated single person , or whether the incitement to single adoption entailed in the provision , continues to be aimed only at single persons with whom the child has a certain connection – a connection which is not necessary family related .

In line with ORG , we find no reason to assume that the amendment in DATE intended to include single adopters , who are guardian to an orphan , without there having been some connection between the adopter and the child before the guardian ’s death .

It is undisputed that [ the applicant ’s ] biological mother was alive at the time of adoption and that [ prior to that time ] there had been no connection between [ the applicant ] and her adoptive mother .

In these circumstances we agree that [ the applicant ] does not fulfil the requirements set out in DATE , subsection CARDINAL ) , to be granted the special child subsidy .

The question of the connection that the child and the parents must have to GPE in order to be entitled to child subsidy [ in general ] is regulated in section CARDINAL of LAW . The requirements set out in DATE , subsection CARDINAL(i ) - ( iii ) , do not distinguish between NORP and foreign children . Accordingly , foreign children who are adopted in [ GPE ] are entitled to the special child subsidy under the same conditions as NORP children who are adopted by a single person . The fact that , outside family relations and so on , on the whole , by and large , only foreign children are adopted by single persons in [ GPE ] can not in our view lead to the conclusion that ORG refusal to grant [ the applicant ] the special child subsidy is discriminatory in breach of LAW in conjunction with LAW , or of the other invoked conventional provisions . ”

The minority stated as follows :

“ Section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL(iii ) , of LAW was inserted in the legislation by Act no . CARDINAL of DATE and Act no . CARDINAL of DATE gave it its current wording . In the original provision [ it was a condition for obtaining the subsidy ] that the child , after the death of the guardian , was adopted by the latter ’s spouse or by a single person within the child ’s family . The wording “ within the child ’s family ” was omitted at the amendment in DATE . According to the wording , hereafter the criterion is fulfilled , despite the single adopter having had no previous connection with the child , and the preparatory notes give no reason to assume otherwise . In these circumstances , we consider that subsequent to the legal amendment in DATE , it is no longer justified to require a previous connection between the single adopter and the child in order to grant subsidy under no . ( iii ) . The course of events related to the discussion in ORG as to the proposal of CARDINAL DATE to amend LAW , and the proposal of DATE can not lead to another result .

Thus , we find it unjustified that ORG in its decision of DATE refused the special child subsidy by referring to the fact that before the guardian ’s death there had [ been no connection ] between [ the applicant ] and her adoptive mother .

Under LAW , subsection CARDINAL ) , of LAW it is furthermore a condition that the guardian has died before the adoption . In that way , the provision attaches weight to the guardian ’s death as opposed to no . ( ii ) , which [ refers ] to the GPE death . It must be considered a fact that [ the applicant ’s ] biological parents were deprived of custody before the adoption , that her father was dead and that her mother ’s whereabouts were unknown . In these circumstances , [ the applicant ’s ] situation before the adoption must be comparable with a situation where the guardian has died .

In conclusion , therefore in our view [ the applicant ] is entitled to the special child subsidy by virtue of LAW , subsection CARDINAL(iii ) . ”

NORP social law is based on a principle of self - support , which implies that everybody has a duty to support themselves , while any person unable to provide for him or herself is entitled to public assistance .

Under LAW ( LAW No . CARDINAL of DATE with amendments ) all sole providers are granted ordinary child subsidy for children under DATE . For DATE , such child subsidy amounted to DKK MONEY ( equal to CARDINAL , ORG ) a DATE per child .

Additionally , extra child subsidies are granted to sole providers , for DATE amounting to DKK CARDINAL . Extra child subsidies are granted for CARDINAL child only , regardless of the number of children .

Pursuant to LAW ( lov om børnefamilieydelse ) , families with children , including sole providers , are granted benefits for families with children DATE . For DATE , those benefits amount to DKK CARDINAL per child DATE , DKK CARDINAL per child between DATE , and DKK QUANTITY per child DATE .

These benefits are paid to all sole providers regardless of whether they became sole provider following divorce or termination of cohabitation , or the sole provider adopted a child . The benefits are not dependent on income .

In addition , parents who adopt a foreign child through CARDINAL of the organisations approved by ORG are entitled to an adoption subsidy under section CARDINALb of the Act on Child Subsidy to cover expenses in connection with the adoption . For DATE , the subsidy amounts to DKK CARDINAL , equal to QUANTITY . Also single persons who adopt a foreign child are eligible for this subsidy . This subsidy is not income dependent either .

Moreover , all sole providers can apply for a rent subsidy , which is a financial subsidy contributing to the rent for rented accommodation , and which depends on the household income , the amount of the rent and the size of the dwelling . A sibling subsidy is also granted to parents with CARDINAL child attending day - care institutions . Finally , like other sole providers , single adopters will be eligible for the special provider rates that apply to single parents under the rules on cash assistance and ORG education grants , if the provider needs assistance for his or her own support .

The Act on Child Subsidy ( Børnetilskudsloven , at the relevant time lovbekendtgørelse no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE with amendments , now lovbekendtgørelse no . CARDINAL of DATE ) read in so far as relevant :

In addition a special child subsidy may be granted by virtue of subsections CARDINAL and CARDINAL .

The special child subsidy amounts to CARDINAL PERSON ( ORG ) DATE ,

( i ) when paternity of the child is not established ;

( ii ) when the child only has CARDINAL surviving parent [ who provides for the child ] ;

( iii ) when the child , after the death of the guardian , is adopted by the latter ’s spouse or by a single person .

( iv ) DATE ( vi ) ...

Until DATE , children adopted by single persons were not entitled to special child subsidy . When section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL ) , was inserted into LAW in DATE , the entitlement to special child subsidy for children of sole providers was extended to include children of certain single adopters . Accordingly , special child subsidy could then be granted ‘ where , after the death of the parental responsibility holder , the child is adopted by the spouse of the deceased or by a person within the child ’s family’ . In the explanatory notes to the PERSON to amend LAW and other ORG , which was adopted on DATE , the following was stated :

“ Under the current rules , a spouse who adopts the child of the other spouse upon the latter ’s death will thereby cut off the child from receiving special child subsidy as , under the rules of LAW ( adoptionsloven ) , the adopter assumes full responsibility for supporting the child . This means that the stepfather or stepmother who wants to give the child special support through an adoption relationship is placed in a more difficult financial position than the person who merely takes the child into foster care .

It appears reasonable to ensure that the financial position is not impaired , and it is therefore proposed to provide authority for the child to become entitled to special child subsidy as a child of a widow or widower , regardless of the fact that the legal relationship between the child and its original family is severed by the adoption . According to the proposal , the rule will also include other children adopted by a single relative , for example one of the GPE siblings or CARDINAL of the grandparents , but will not include unrelated single adopters . ”

On DATE , a Act on Child Subsidies and ORG ( the ‘ LAW Act’ ) entered into force , and the words ‘ within the child ’s family’ were deleted from DATE , subsection CARDINAL ) .

The reason therefor was not explained in the preparatory notes .

In guidelines of DATE on child benefits and advance payment of child support issued by ORG ( GPE ) it was stated in clause CARDINAL that the rules on child subsidies , including special child subsidy , substantially corresponded to the rules of the former LAW and Other Family Allowances . Clause CARDINAL mentioned that it was no longer required , as under the former Act , that the adopter be related to the child . Accordingly , there was no change in the situation entitling a person to special child subsidies , but the amendment meant that it became possible to grant special child benefits also in situations in which the adopter had not been married to the parental responsibility holder , but had cohabited with the latter outside marriage . Subsequent to the amendment it was still a condition that a connection had existed between the child and the adopter .

In clause CARDINAL of the guidelines on child subsidies and advance payment of child support from DATE , issued by ORG , which applied when PERSON adopted the applicant , and in clause CARDINAL of the subsequent guidelines No . CARDINAL of DATE issued by ORG the following was set out :

“ It is not a requirement that the adopter is related to the child . The provision is aimed at adoptions where , prior to the parental responsibility holder ’s death , there was some form of connection between the child and the adopter . ”

“ Single adopters who adopt a foreign child through CARDINAL of the organisations approved by ORG under LAW do not fall within section GPE ) , as there has not been any connection between the child and the adopter prior to such adoptions . ”

This interpretation was confirmed by the legislature in DATE , when a large parliamentary majority rejected an amending bill aiming to insert a new provision into section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL ) of LAW so that special child subsidy would also be granted where the child was adopted under the rules of single - parent adoption without any previous connection existing between the adopter and the child ( see ORG of Parliamentary Proceedings DATE , supplement B , column CARDINAL , and ORG of Parliamentary Proceedings DATE , Proceedings , column DATE ) .

The legislature ’s unwillingness to insert such a provision into LAW was demonstrated again in connection with the reading of PERSON . B CARDINAL of DATE on special child subsidy for children adopted by a sole provider . In connection with the first reading of the PERSON , the Minister for ORG stated that such provision would depart from the principle that special child subsidy for sole providers was only paid to sole providers who had been exposed to a social event over which the sole provider had no influence ( see Official Report of Parliamentary Proceedings DATE , Proceedings , column CARDINAL ) . The PERSON never passed through the readings and lapsed .

Subsequently , in DATE a parliamentary majority again rejected a bill concerning equality between single adopters and sole providers regarding entitlement to special child subsidy ( see PERSON . DATE , ORG on Parliamentary Proceedings CARDINAL - CARDINAL , supplement A , column CARDINAL ) and a corresponding bill lapsed in DATE ( see PERSON . DATE , ORG on Parliamentary Proceedings supplement A , column CARDINAL ) . On the contrary , in connection with an amendment in DATE , the legislature clarified the existing state of law by inserting the following provision into section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL , of LAW :

“ A child of a single adopter is not entitled to special child benefits unless the single adopter dies , see subsection CARDINAL , CARDINAL or more of the conditions of subsection CARDINAL ) to ( v ) are satisfied , or the child has been adopted as a stepchild and CARDINAL or more of the conditions of subsection CARDINAL ) to ( vi ) are satisfied . ”

In DATE an act ( no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ) amended LAW ( now PERSON , no . CARDINAL of DATE ) and granted the Minister of ORG authority to lay down rules inter alia on the approval of adopters and the processing of adoption cases . The intention of the legislature was to relax a number of the requirements then applicable concerning the age of the candidate adopters , the length of the cohabitation , and so on . As concerns single adopters , the following was stated ( see ORG on Parliamentary Proceedings DATE , supplement A , column CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) :

“ Under current practice , it has only been possible for single persons to be approved as adopters in a very few exceptional cases . From DATE , a wish has been put forward for extended access for single persons to become adopters . In view of the fact that there are no doubt single persons who will be just as suited to bring up a child as a married couple , it would be wrong to exclude such single persons from adopting . However , according to the information available , it is doubtful whether it will be possible to allocate foreign children for adoption by unmarried applicants , and hence it may prove meaningless to examine single candidates for the purpose of approval for adoption . It may also be difficult to establish clear criteria for the cases in which single persons should have access to pre - examination . It is the intention to take up these questions for further consideration for the purpose of examining the prospects of improving the access of single persons to become adopters . During those proceedings , particular attempts will be made to seek clarity concerning the attitude of foreign countries to allocating children for adoption by single adopters . ”

Single - parent adoption was formally allowed in GPE on DATE by Executive Order no . CARDINAL of DATE amending ORG ) . The said Order inserted a provision into the ORG according to which a single candidate could be approved as an adopter if , upon an overall assessment , the candidate was found suited to bringing up a child on his or her own .

CARDINAL of the fundamental requirements for approval as a single adopter is that the candidate can prove having sufficient financial means at his or her disposal to support the child on his or her own . Thus , section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL , of Executive Order no . CARDINAL of DATE on Approval as an Adopter ( the ‘ Approval Order’ ) - a provision which also applied when the applicant was approved in DATE – set out that to be approved as a single adopter , a candidate must satisfy the requirements of sections CARDINAL to CARDINAL of ORG and must generally be considered suited to bringing up a child on his or her own . Pursuant to section CARDINAL , subsection l ( iii ) , of ORG , one of the conditions for approval as a single adopter is that the candidate disposes of ‘ adequate financial means’ . According to Guidelines No . DATE of DATE issued by ORG ( Familiestyrelsen ) , the requirement of ‘ adequate financial ORG is to be understood to mean that the applicant ’s personal finances are sufficient to support a family , also following the introduction of an adopted child .

When assessing whether a single candidate satisfies the financial conditions , the authorities will request the candidate to submit information from the tax authorities on income figures and assets for DATE and information on any arrears due to the tax or local authorities . Additionally , the candidate will have to provide information on DATE income and expenses and his or her current assets .

If the adoption authorities find that the candidate does not satisfy the financial requirements because his or her personal finances are not sufficient to support the adopted child , the candidate will not be approved .

LAW sets out the legal effect of adoption as follows :

CARDINAL ) The effects of adoption are to create between the adopter and the adopted child the same legal relationship as that between parents and their child , and the adopted child and its issue shall succeed to the property of the adopter and his or her family , and vice versa , as if the adopted child were the adopter ’s own child . At the same time , the legal relationship between the adopted child and its original family will be extinguished .

( CARDINAL ) In the case of stepchild adoption under section CARDINAL(a ) of this LAW , the legal relationship between the adopted child and the spouses or former spouses shall be the same as if the child had been born to the couple or former couple .

CARDINAL ) In respect of the name of the adopted child , the provisions contained in the [ NORP ] legislation on personal names shall apply .

Adoption does not confer upon the adopted child a right of succession to entailed estates of any nature whatsoever , except where this is specifically provided by legislation .

D. Paternity not established

Under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ( Børneloven ) , the mother has an absolute duty to disclose who is or may be the father of the child . Married women and women cohabiting with a man who submits a ‘ declaration of care and responsibility’ may be exempted from this duty . If the woman does not disclose who is or may be the father of the child , she must be guided on the consequences that this may have for her and the child ( see section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ) . If a woman refuses to disclose who the father may be in cases in which she is obliged to do so , the regional state administration must summon the woman for a meeting at which she must be guided on the consequences that this may have for her and will have , especially later , for the child . The meeting may be attended by various professionals depending on the nature of the case . If the mother continues to refuse to disclose the father ’s identity , the regional state administration may bring the case before the courts . The mother has a duty to appear in court and to give evidence subject to liability as a witness and under the rules of ORG ( Retsplejeloven ) on the compelling of witnesses to attend . The woman may be sentenced to default fines if she does not want to assist in establishing the facts of the case . If the regional state administration or the court finds that the mother does not know who is or may be the father of the child , the case is dismissed , or it is decided by judgment that paternity can not be established .

With effect from DATE , it became possible for single women to receive artificial insemination treatment at public hospitals following an amendment of LAW ( NORP om kunstig befrugtning ) .

Artificial insemination of single women was also lawful before DATE at private clinics outside the public health system and without the assistance of doctors . Artificial insemination of single women carried out by midwives and others occurred , although to a limited extent .

CARDINAL of the consequences of the amendment of DATE was that the single women who were artificially inseminated at public hospitals in the subsequent period were also able to obtain special child subsidy under LAW . In DATE , however , LAW was amended so that children conceived by artificial insemination of single women carried out on DATE or later were no longer entitled to special child benefits despite the fact that paternity could not be established . In that connection , the legislature emphasised that single women who were artificially inseminated have themselves chosen to support a child on their own and must have considered , before making such choice , whether they possessed the human and financial resources required to support a child on their own . The outcome of the DATE amendment was that the legal position of children of single adopters and children conceived by artificial insemination of single women was the same in respect of entitlement to special child subsidy .


Violation of Art. 3;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant is born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant with CARDINAL other people was taken into police custody by the Anti - Terror branch of ORG on suspicion of being a member of the ORG .

The applicant alleges that he was ill - treated and tortured in the police car on the way to ORG and during his detention there . He claims that during his interrogation , he was blindfolded and stripped naked . He was strung up by his arms in the form of torture known as “ NORP hanging ” . His head was hit against the wall and he was held parallel to the ground on his hands and feet . He was also electrocuted , threatened and insulted .

NORP The applicant further claims that he was coerced into signing a statement in which it was stated that he had worked for and had been involved in the terrorist activities of the ORG . After having signed the statement prepared by the police , he was allegedly kept in custody for DATE so that the signs of the ill - treatment to which he had been subjected would disappear . During DATE , he claims that a police officer came to his cell at regular intervals and applied a medicine on his wounds in order to cover up the signs of ill - treatment . He claims that due to this medicine his scars healed very quickly .

The Government submit that the applicant was questioned by the police on DATE . They have produced a copy of a statement signed by the applicant on this occasion .

On DATE the applicant together with CARDINAL other detainees was examined by PERSON at ORG . According to the medical report prepared by PERSON , the applicant showed no signs of ill - treatment .

On DATE the applicant was brought before ORG at ORG . According to the records of this hearing , the applicant admitted that he had been involved with ORG related activities in the past and had been convicted on that account by ORG in DATE . He denied having any current relation with the ORG . He stated that the police invented the statement taken in custody .

The applicant alleges that he was brought to ORG at ORG together with the other detainees on DATE but that ORG did not take his statement because he had complained to the prosecutor that he had been tortured in police custody . He further stated that because he told to the prosecutor that he was subjected to torture , he was once again tortured by the police . The Government contested this argument and stated that the applicant was brought for the first time before ORG on DATE .

The applicant alleges that he told the prosecutor on DATE of his subjection to torture but that his statement was not taken into consideration by ORG and was not written down on the hearing records .

The applicant further stated that he was not seen by a doctor before being questioned by the Prosecutor on DATE and consequently he does not have any medical evidence concerning the torture he was subjected to on DATE .

On DATE the applicant was also brought before the Judge at ORG . He denied the allegations against him and stated that he was not a member of the ORG . He further declared that the statement he gave to ORG was true . The Judge ordered his detention on remand .

The applicant claims that he told ORG Judge that he had been tortured in police custody and that he had explained this to ORG at ORG . However the case files show that the applicant did not claim to have being subjected to ill - treatment neither before ORG nor ORG .

While the applicant was held in detention in prison , he requested to see a doctor . The prison doctor prepared a provisional report for the applicant and he was sent to ORG for a medical examination .

On DATE the medical report prepared by the institution and signed by the medical expert stated that the applicant complained of widespread pain on his back , right arm and on both of his legs but that he could not find any signs of traumatic lesions . The medical report further stated that the complaints were not life threatening but accorded him DATE sick leave .

On DATE ORG of GPE ( GPE Tabib Odası ) , in the context of disciplinary proceedings following complaints , found that PERSON had concealed signs of torture in the medical examinations conducted on several persons DATE and DATE and he was , therefore , prohibited from practising as a doctor for DATE .

On DATE ORG at ORG filed an indictment with the court , requesting that the court to apply Articles CARDINAL § § CARDINAL and CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW and LAW .

On DATE the applicant filed a complaint with ORG . He alleged that he had been ill - treated while in police custody and requested that proceedings be instituted against the police officers . He submitted the medical report of CARDINAL DATE as proof of his ill - treatment .

On DATE ORG , referring to the medical report of ORG , gave a decision of non - prosecution on account of lack of evidence .

On DATE the applicant filed an objection with ORG against ORG decision .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's objections .

The ORG refers to the overview of the domestic law derived from previous submissions in other cases , in particular ORG v. GPE , no . MONEY , DATE , ORG v. GPE ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE , and GPE v. GPE , judgment of DATE , Reports of Judgments and Decisions CARDINALVI ) .


The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant and another plaintiff brought an action before ORG , seeking the invalidation of a contract .

On DATE the court held a hearing and , on DATE , appointed an expert who filed an opinion on DATE .

On DATE , DATE , DATE , CARDINAL May and DATE hearings were held . Subsequently the proceedings were interrupted on account of the death of the applicant 's co - plaintiff . On DATE a successor joined the proceedings .

On DATE the case was suspended pending the termination of criminal proceedings against the respondents which the court considered a preliminary question . This prosecution , conducted on charges of financial fraud , originated in DATE . On CARDINAL DATE the plaintiffs informed the court of the termination of the criminal case by the appellate criminal court and requested the continuation of the civil proceedings .

On DATE , CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE the court held hearings . On DATE it gave judgment , finding for the plaintiffs . On CARDINAL DATE the respondents appealed .

On DATE ORG held a hearing and , by judgment of DATE , upheld the first - instance decision .

On DATE the respondents filed a petition for review . By its review judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld the final judgment .