The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE in GPE .

In DATE the applicant sued ORG for provision of housing . He had by this time for DATE suffered from a grave form of infectious tuberculosis and was entitled to housing according to the relevant provisions of the domestic law .

On DATE ORG allowed the applicant 's claim and ordered the town administration :

“ ... to grant Mr. PERSON , whose family comprises CARDINAL members , well - equipped housing according to the sanitary - technical requirements , with a living surface of QUANTITY and a total surface of QUANTITY ” .

On DATE the judgment was upheld on appeal by ORG , and entered into force . The decision was to be implemented by way of providing the applicant with an occupancy voucher ( ордер на жилое помещение ) from the local municipal authority . The voucher served as the legal basis for taking possession of the flat designated therein and for the signing of a tenancy agreement between the landlord , the tenant and the housing maintenance authority .

On DATE the enforcement proceedings were opened . However , the judgment could not be enforced because the town administration allegedly possessed no available housing of the indicated size or financial resources to purchase it .

Following ORG request to review the case by way of supervisory review due to the impossibility to enforce it , on DATE the Rostov ORG decided to obtain the case - file from ORG and to stay the enforcement proceedings until its examination by way of supervisory review .

On DATE the Rostov ORG granted the request for supervisory review lodged by the Mayor of ORG and remitted the matter for examination on the merits to the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court .

On DATE the ORG of ORG amended the judgment of DATE as upheld on DATE . It found that the previous instances had misapplied certain provisions relating to the rules for calculating the living surface and thus awarded the applicant the maximum possible surface per person ( CARDINAL m² per person ) instead of applying the minimum standard ( CARDINAL m² per person ) without giving any reasons . The ORG of ORG ordered ORG :

“ ... to grant [ the applicant ] ... housing ... with the living space of QUANTITY ” .

On DATE the Mayor of ORG issued an order which granted the applicant a social tenancy voucher for a CARDINAL room flat with a living surface of QUANTITY . The applicant contested the order in court , expressing general discontent with the flat . On DATE the Rostov ORG in final instance dismissed the applicant 's complaint .

On DATE ORG obliged the applicant to sign the social tenancy agreement for the awarded flat . The applicant , however , refused to sign the agreement .

The RSFSR Housing Code ( Law of DATE , effective until DATE ) provided that NORP citizens were entitled to possess flats owned by the ORG or municipal authorities or other public bodies , under the terms of a tenancy agreement ( section CARDINAL ) . Certain “ protected ” categories of individuals ( disabled persons , war veterans , GPE victims , police officers , judges , etc . ) had a right to priority treatment in the allocation of flats .

Flats were granted for permanent use ( section CARDINAL ) .

ORG . Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Law on the Prevention of Spread of Tuberculosis in GPE ( MONEY of DATE ) provides that those suffering from infectious tuberculosis who do not have a separate living space but share it with other tenants ( family members ) , shall be provided with such by a local authority within DATE from the date of lodging their application .

A judicial decision becomes legally binding after the appeal court has examined the matter ( LAW ) . A judicial decision must be enforced once it became legally binding , unless the law provides for its immediate enforcement ( LAW ) .

The relevant provisions governing the supervisory - review proceedings read as follows :

“ CARDINAL . Courts may issue judicial decisions in the form of judicial orders , judgments and interim decisions ... ”

“ CARDINAL . Judicial decisions that have become legally binding , with the exception for judicial decisions by the ORG of ORG of GPE , may be appealed against ... to a court exercising supervisory review , by parties to the case and by other persons whose rights or legal interests have been adversely affected by these judicial decisions .

Judicial decisions may be appealed against to a court exercising supervisory review within DATE after they became legally binding ... ”

“ An application for supervisory review must contain :

( CARDINAL ) the name of the court to which it is addressed ;

( CARDINAL ) a reference to the first - instance , appeal or cassation courts that examined the case and a summary of their decisions ;

( CARDINAL ) a reference to the judgment or decision which is being appealed against ... ”

“ CARDINAL . Having examined an application for supervisory review , the judge issues an interim decision on –

( CARDINAL ) obtaining the case file if there exist doubts as to the lawfulness of the judicial decision ;

( CARDINAL ) refusing to obtain the case file if the arguments in the application for supervisory review may not , in accordance with the federal law , result in quashing of the judicial decision .

NORP The President of the regional ORG ... may disagree with the judge 's decision refusing to obtain the case file . In such case the President issues his own decision on obtaining the case file . ”

“ CARDINAL . Having examined the case file obtained by the supervisory - review court , the judge issues an interim decision on –

– refusing to remit the case for examination on the merits by the supervisory - review court ;

– remitting the case for examination of the application for supervisory review on the merits by the supervisory - review court . ”

“ CARDINAL . NORP The President of the regional ORG ... may disagree with the judge 's decision refusing to remit the case for examination on the merits by the supervisory - review court . In such case the President issues his own decision on remitting the case for examination on the merits by the supervisory - review court . ”

“ CARDINAL . A judicial decision on remitting the case for examination on the merits by a supervisory - review court must contain :

( CARDINAL ) a reasoned description of the grounds for remitting the case for examination on the merits ... ”

“ Judicial decisions of lower courts may be quashed or altered by way of supervisory review on the grounds of substantial violations of substantive or procedural legal provisions . ”

“ CARDINAL . Having examined the case by way of supervisory review , the court may

( CARDINAL ) quash or alter the judicial decision issued by a court of first , second or supervisory - review instance and issue a new judicial decision , without remitting the matter for a fresh examination , if substantive legal provisions have been erroneously applied or interpreted . ”

Once instituted , enforcement proceedings must be completed within DATE upon receipt of the writ of execution by the bailiff ( Section CARDINAL ) .


Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 37-1 - Striking out applications);Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court;Fair hearing);No violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions);Non-pecuniary damage - award

David Thór Björgvinsson;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

In a letter of DATE to ORG ( Zaklad Ubezpieczeń Spolecznych ) in GPE , the applicant 's husband submitted that in his view the applicant , who had been receiving a disability pension since DATE , was in fact healthy and should no longer be receiving a pension . He suggested that she be re - examined by competent doctors . Apparently divorce proceedings involving the parties were pending at that time .

On DATE ORG , referring to the applicant 's medical records , instituted proceedings in order to reassess the applicant 's condition with a view to establishing whether she complied with the conditions governing entitlement to a disability pension .

NORP In reply to a query from the applicant about the legal basis on which these proceedings were instituted , on DATE ORG informed her that the proceedings had been instituted under the provisions governing the internal supervision of physicians working for the ORG .

Eventually , on DATE ORG gave a decision by which the applicant 's right to receive a disability pension was extinguished as she was no longer unfit to work .

On DATE the applicant appealed , submitting that ORG had failed to assess properly the medical evidence concerning her condition . She also submitted that her condition had been reassessed in DATE . On each of these occasions decisions had been given confirming that she was permanently unfit to work .

In her pleadings submitted on DATE and DATE the applicant submitted that there was no legal basis for conducting medical examinations in order to reassess her condition . She referred to the DATE Ordinance , which prohibited reassessment of the medical condition of persons who had been receiving a disability pension for longer than DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The GPE provided that no medical examination could be conducted in respect of such persons with a view to a reassessment of their condition . She further invoked the case - law of ORG which , in the applicant 's submission , supported the conclusion that no medical reassessment of a condition which had served as the basis for granting a disability pension could be ordered once DATE had elapsed from the date on which the decision awarding the entitlement to a pension became final ( II URN DATE , see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

ORG , by a judgment of DATE , partly amended the decision of ORG by granting the applicant the disability pension for a fixed period , namely from DATE until DATE .

The applicant appealed , claiming that in view of her condition she was entitled to a permanent disability pension . She complained about the assessment of the medical evidence by the first - instance court . In her additional pleadings submitted to ORG on DATE , she reiterated her arguments about the lack of legal basis for the reassessment of her condition and concluded that the first - instance judgment was therefore in breach of substantive law .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal . The court examined the complaint concerning the allegedly incorrect assessment of the evidence and concluded that the first - instance court had been thorough in the assessment it had carried out . It also noted that during the appellate proceedings and in view of doubts the appellate court had harboured as to the applicant 's condition , it had ordered that , in addition to the evidence available in the applicant 's medical records , a medical opinion should be obtained from the local centre for occupational medicine and further examinations should be carried out by specialists in cardiology , nephrology , endocrinology and gynaecology . The applicant had refused to undergo these examinations .

The court further observed that the first - instance judgment had maintained the applicant 's pension for the period from DATE until DATE . When that period expired , the applicant had failed to submit to ORG a request to have her entitlement to the pension prolonged .

NORP In response to the applicant 's argument based on the DATE Ordinance and the prohibition it imposed on the medical re - examination of persons in receipt of a disability pension for DATE , the court observed :

“ It should be borne in mind that the proceedings concerning the applicant 's case had been instituted [ by ORG ] under the legal provisions governing the internal supervision by the principal physician of doctors working for that ORG and assessing the medical condition of persons seeking a disability pension ( see LAW of the Minister of ORG ) . Accordingly , it was of no legal relevance to the applicant 's case that she had been declared permanently unfit to work in DATE . Neither was the length of time for which she had been receiving her pension of any significance for the present case . ”

On DATE ORG refused to grant the applicant legal aid to lodge a cassation appeal . The written grounds for the refusal read as follows :

“ Under LAW of the Code of Civil Procedure a party to proceedings who has been exempted , fully or in part , from the obligation to pay court fees can request that a legal - aid lawyer be assigned to represent him or her in the case . The court shall allow such a request if it decides that the participation of a lawyer in the case is necessary . A legal - aid lawyer shall be so assigned where the party is unable to argue the case competently or the case is complex as to the facts or law .

The crucial issue in the present case was the assessment of the [ applicant 's ] condition and , consequently , it can not be regarded as so complex as to warrant legal assistance . The court therefore considers that legal assistance would be unnecessary and , accordingly , dismisses the applicant 's request .

The mere fact that a party can not afford to pay legal fees does not justify the granting of legal assistance ; this also applies to cases where legal representation is mandatory for the preparation of the cassation appeal . ”

At the material time LAW provided that parties to proceedings could ask the court competent to deal with the case to grant them an exemption from court fees provided that they submitted a declaration to the effect that the fees required would entail a substantial reduction in their standard of living and that of their family .

NORP Parties to proceedings concerning social insurance allowances and pensions were exempted , under LAW , from the obligation to pay court fees .

Under LAW , persons exempted from court fees could request that legal aid be granted to them . This provision , in so far as relevant , provided :

“ CARDINAL . A party [ to the proceedings ] exempted partly or entirely from court fees may request that an advocate or a legal adviser be appointed for him or her . ... The court shall grant that request if it considers that the participation of an advocate or a legal adviser in the case is necessary . ...

The provisions of the preceding paragraph are also applicable to parties who benefit from a statutory exemption from court fees , provided that they demonstrate , by way of the declaration referred to in LAW , that the fees of the advocate or legal adviser would entail a reduction in their standard of living and that of their family . The court shall refuse to assign a lawyer to the case if it considers that the party 's action or appeal is manifestly ill - founded . ”

At the material time a party to civil proceedings could lodge a cassation appeal with ORG against a final judicial decision of a secondinstance court terminating the proceedings . Under Article MONEY of the Code of Civil Procedure a cassation appeal had to be lodged with the court that had given the relevant decision within DATE from the date on which the decision with its written grounds was served on the party concerned . Cassation appeals which were not lodged by an advocate or a legal adviser were to be dismissed .

Article CARDINAL of the Code listed the grounds on which a cassation appeal could be lodged . It read as follows :

“ The cassation appeal may be based on the following grounds :

( CARDINAL ) a breach of substantive law on account of its erroneous interpretation or wrongful application ;

( CARDINAL ) a breach of procedural provisions if the defect in question could significantly affect the outcome of the case . ”

Article CARDINAL of the Code of Civil Procedure guarantees the parties to proceedings the right to appeal against a decision of the first - instance court terminating the proceedings . An interlocutory appeal ( zażalenie ) of this kind is also available against certain interlocutory decisions specified in this provision . An appeal lies against a refusal of exemption from court fees and likewise against a refusal of legal aid , where such decisions have been given by a first - instance court .

No appeal lies where such decisions are given by an appellate court .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) of the DATE Ordinance of the Minister of ORG of CARDINAL DATE ( ORG . CARDINAL , item CARDINAL ) , as amended in DATE , provided that no medical examination could be organised with a view to reassessing the medical condition of persons who had been declared unfit to work and who had been in receipt of a disability pension for DATE .

This Ordinance was repealed with effect from DATE .

Since DATE the system of social insurance has been regulated by ORG of DATE ( Ustawa o systemie ubezpieczeń społecznych ) and a number of other acts applying to specific occupational groups or types of benefits . Social insurance benefits are essentially paid from a single fund financed by various compulsory contributions from employees and employers and managed by ORG . Entitlement to a disability pension is based on the claimant 's inability to continue paid employment on grounds of illhealth , confirmed by a medical certificate by doctors working for the ORG .

In a number of judgments ORG and ORG examined whether entitlement to a disability pension which had been paid to the insured person for DATE could be redetermined following a fresh medical examination and reassessment of the person 's condition .

In its judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( II URN CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) quashed a judgment of ORG in which the latter had accepted that a fresh medical examination could be ordered in respect of the appellant , who had been in receipt of a disability pension for DATE . ORG found that , despite the fact that it was contained in the Ordinance , the prohibition should be regarded as being of a statutory nature . In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( II URN CARDINAL ) ORG reached the same conclusion and quashed a judgment of the appellate court . It observed that the decision that the appellant should undergo a medical examination to reassess his condition lacked any legal basis and that , accordingly , the result was of no legal relevance to the appellant 's entitlement to a disability pension . In both judgments ORG referred to its judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( II URN CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( II URN CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) ORG allowed an extraordinary appeal brought by the ORG in the case of an appellant who had been in receipt of a disability pension for DATE . It reiterated the conclusions previously reached by ORG and held that the medical reassessment of a person 's condition after that time had no legal basis as it was contrary to section CARDINAL of the Ordinance DATE . It would have been possible only if , prior to issuing such an order , ORG had obtained evidence showing that the person 's condition no longer made him or her unfit to work . In the absence of such evidence , medical reassessment breached the principle of vested rights . On DATE ( II URN CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) ORG reiterated its previous conclusions as to the prohibition of medical reassessment after longer than DATE . In its judgment of DATE the ORG shared the view of ORG and held that in such cases the disability should be presumed to be permanent .

In its judgment of DATE ( II UKN CARDINAL ) ORG held :

“ ORG can not challenge the assessment that a person entitled to a disability pension is unfit to work if that person has been recognised as disabled for a period of over DATE . The change of legal situation in DATE [ when the DATE Ordinance was repealed ] is irrelevant in this respect . ”

In a judgment of DATE ( II UKN CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) ORG held that the legal changes made to the social insurance system in DATE did not affect existing disability entitlements in so far as the applicable provisions guaranteed the permanence of entitlements which had been paid for a period exceeding DATE .

In its judgments of CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE ( III GPE CARDINAL and II GPE CARDINAL respectively ) ORG noted that the Ordinance had been repealed with effect from DATE . It further referred to the views expressed by ORG in the judgments referred to above and disagreed with them . It was of the opinion that section CARDINAL of the DATE Ordinance did not create a presumption of permanent entitlement to a disability pension which had been paid for DATE . It observed that the temporal scope of the application of that GPE and the principle stated in LAW thereof were unclear ; in particular , it was not clear whether after the entry into force of LAW the prohibition on medical re - assessment remained valid . The court took the view that this was not the case and that the right to social insurance entitlements , including disability pensions , could not be seen as being irrevocable under all circumstances .

On DATE ( III UZP CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) ORG examined a request brought by the ORG for a resolution by CARDINAL judges as to whether ORG could challenge the entitlement to a disability pension of persons who prior to DATE , the date on which the DATE Ordinance was repealed , had been receiving the pension for longer than DATE . The ORG pointed to discrepancies in the case - law of the various appellate courts and in ORG case - law . In its resolution the ORG retraced the history of the relevant case - law and acknowledged that diverging views had been expressed by different benches of that court . It ultimately expressed the view that the prohibition on medical reassessment contained in the DATE Ordinance was merely of a procedural nature and as such could not be applied after the ORG had been repealed . In consequence , nothing prevented ORG from ordering a fresh medical examination with a view to reassessing whether the person concerned continued to be unfit for work .


The applicant , Mr PERSON , is an NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He is a practising lawyer by profession and presents his own case before the ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the car , of which the applicant is the registered owner , was parked illegally in a street in the nineteenth district of GPE . CARDINAL sets of proceedings ensued .

On DATE ORG ( NORP der PERSON ) ordered the applicant pursuant to section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW ( GPE ) to disclose the full name and address of the person who had driven the car on DATE .

The applicant replied that he had not left the car to anybody on that date .

On DATE ORG issued a penal order ( PERSON ) in which it sentenced the applicant under sections CARDINAL § CARDINAL and CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW to pay a fine of CARDINAL NORP schillings ( ORG ) with TIME imprisonment in default . It found that he had failed to give the requested information .

The applicant appealed on DATE , submitting in particular that any obligation to give more detailed information than he had given would be incompatible with his right not to incriminate himself as well as with the presumption of innocence as guaranteed by LAW . In submissions of CARDINAL DATE the applicant added that meanwhile on DATE ORG had issued a penal order for illegal parking against him ( see below ) . He argued that the information he had actually given had , thus , had the effect of incriminating him .

On DATE ORG ( Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat ) dismissed the applicant 's appeal . Referring to the wording of section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW , it found that the applicant , by stating that he had not left the car to anyone at the material time , had failed to give the information requested . As to the applicant 's argument that the obligation to disclose who had been driving his car at a certain time violated his right not to incriminate himself , the Panel observed that the relevant sentence in section CARDINAL § CARDINAL had constitutional rank . In this connection it also referred to ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( see below – relevant domestic law and practice ) .

Subsequently , the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG ) . He argued that if ORG view was correct he would be obliged to incriminate himself by stating that he had driven the car .

On DATE ORG refused to deal with the applicant 's complaint . Having regard to its judgment of CARDINAL DATE , it considered that the applicant 's complaint did not offer sufficient prospects of success . This decision was served on the applicant on DATE .

The applicant did not lodge a complaint with ORG .

On DATE ORG issued a provisional penal order against the applicant , finding that he had parked his car contrary to section CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( a ) and CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( a ) of FAC ( Strassenverkehrsordnung ) on DATE and imposed a fine of ORG CARDINAL with TIME imprisonment on him .

The applicant filed an objection . Subsequently , on DATE ORG ordered him pursuant to section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW to disclose the full name and address of the person who had driven the car on DATE ( see above ) .

On DATE ORG issued a penal order against the applicant , finding that he had illegally parked his car on DATE . He had thereby violated sections CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( a ) and QUANTITY ( a ) of FAC and was liable to pay a fine of ORG CARDINAL with TIME imprisonment in default .

The applicant appealed on DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's appeal . It noted , inter alia , that the applicant had not contested that he had parked the car . It found that the imposition of a fine for failure to disclose the driver of the car did not in all circumstances prevent the authority from imposing a fine for the traffic offence in respect of which the request to disclose the driver had been made .

On DATE ORG refused to deal with the applicant 's complaint for lack of sufficient prospects of success . This decision was served on the applicant on DATE .

Again , the applicant did not lodge a complaint with ORG .

By virtue of LAW ( Bundesverfassungsgesetz ) , ORG has jurisdiction to hear , inter alia , applications alleging that an administrative decision is unlawful . Pursuant to LAW the application may be brought by any person claiming a violation of his or her rights by the administrative decision , provided that all other remedies have been exhausted .

Pursuant to section DATE of LAW ( Verwaltungsgerichtshofsgesetz ) , in the version in force at the material time , ORG could decline to deal with an application against a decision of ORG , if the fine imposed did not exceed ATS CARDINAL and if no important legal problem was at stake . An important legal problem arises in particular , if ORG deviated from ORG case - law , if case - law on the issue does not exist , or if ORG case - law on the issue is not uniform .

Section CARDINAL of the same LAW provides that , save as otherwise provided , ORG must either dismiss an application as ill - founded or quash the impugned decision if it is unlawful , by reason of its contents , because of a lack of jurisdiction by the authority which gave it , or on account of a breach of procedural rules .

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of the same LAW provides that , if ORG quashed the impugned decision the administrative authorities are bound by its legal view .

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW as amended in DATE ( ORG ) provides as follows :

The ultimate sentence of this provision was enacted as a provision of constitutional rank after ORG had , in its judgments of DATE and CARDINAL DATE quashed previous similar provisions on the ground that they were contrary to LAW which prohibits inter alia that a suspect be obliged on pain of a fine to incriminate himself .

In its judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( GPE . CARDINAL ) ORG found that the first to third sentences of section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW as amended in DATE were , like the previous provisions , contrary to the right not to incriminate oneself which flowed from LAW and from LAW but were saved by the ultimate sentence of that provision which had constitutional rank . In reaching that conclusion ORG had examined whether the ultimate sentence of section CARDINAL § CARDINAL was contrary to the guiding principles of the constitution , but had found that this was not the case .

Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW , in the version in force at the material time , provided that a fine of up to ORG CARDINAL with DATE imprisonment in default could be imposed on a person who violates the regulations of this Act .

Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( a ) of FAC ( Strassenverkehrsordnung ) provides that it is prohibited to stop or park a vehicle within any area delimited by the traffic sign “ stopping and parking prohibited ” .

Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( a ) of LAW in the version in force at the material time , provided that anyone who , as driver of a vehicle , violated the regulations of this LAW committed an administrative offence and was liable to a fine of up to ATS CARDINAL,CARDINAL with DATE imprisonment in default .


Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses - domestic proceedings - claim dismissed;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant is a NORP national , born in DATE and living in GPE ( GPE ) .

The applicant is a physiotherapist who completed his professional training in GPE and received his diploma in DATE . DATE he worked as a physiotherapist in GPE during which time he was employed by an association working in that field .

On DATE the PERSON Governor ( PERSON ) recognised his diploma with suspensive effect until he accomplished CARDINAL additional exams . On DATE the Regional Governor completed the decree of recognition upon the applicant ’s submission of the required certificates .

On DATE the applicant filed a request with the ORG Governor for the authorisation to work as a self - employed physiotherapist . He further submitted an employment certificate dated DATE , which had been issued by the association he had worked for .

On DATE the Regional Governor refused to grant the applicant ’s request . It found that the applicant did not comply with the requirements set out in section QUANTITY of the Act on ORG ( Bundesgesetz über die GPE medizinisch - technischen CARDINAL , ORG ) . According to this provision the right to work as a self - employed physiotherapist may only be granted after DATE of authorised professional practice within DATE .

On DATE ORG ( Ministerium für Gesundheit und Konsumentenschutz ) partly granted the applicant ’s appeal . It found that the Regional Governor should have based its decision on section QUANTITY of LAW ( Krankenpflegegesetz ) according to which the right to work as a self - employed physiotherapist may already be granted after DATE of authorised professional practice within DATE . It held that , as regards the content , ORG had decided correctly , however , it had based its decision on the wrong legal provision .

On DATE the applicant filed a complaint with ORG . He requested an oral hearing and asked the court to seek a preliminary ruling from ORG under Article CARDINAL of LAW .

On DATE the applicant filed another request with the Regional Governor in order to be granted the right to work as a self - employed physiotherapist .

On DATE the Regional Governor also rejected this request . He held that the applicant was authorised to work as physiotherapist in GPE since DATE following recognition of his foreign diploma . His employment at the association had been before that time and could not be considered as “ authorised ” professional practice within the meaning of section QUANTITY of LAW .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal on formal grounds , applying the principle of res iudicata .

On DATE the applicant filed a complaint with ORG , requested an oral hearing and asked the court to seek a preliminary ruling from ORG under LAW .

On DATE ORG refused to deal with the applicant ’s complaint for lack of prospects of success . It found that his case did not raise serious questions of constitutional law or of the application of Community law and that the matter was not excluded from the competence of ORG .

On DATE the applicant filed a complaint with ORG against the ORG ’s decision of CARDINAL DATE , requesting , inter alia , an oral hearing . He further asked the court to seek a preliminary ruling from ORG under LAW on the question whether the refusal to exercise his profession as a self - employed physiotherapist in GPE was in accordance with Community law .

On DATE ORG , in the course of official liability proceedings instituted by the applicant , also requested ORG to decide upon the lawfulness of the decision by ORG of DATE .

On DATE ORG , in a joint decision , dismissed the applicant ’s complaints of DATE and DATE and the request by ORG without holding an oral hearing , relying on section CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW . It confirmed the decisions by ORG as being lawful . It further held that there was no issue that would require a preliminary ruling by ORG , since the applicant ’s requests did not concern the interpretation of a specific provision of Community law but rather challenged the implementation of national law exercised by NORP authorities . The decision was served on the applicant ’s counsel on DATE .

On DATE ORG , dismissed the applicant ’s claim relating to official liability proceedings . It found that there was no legal basis in national or Community law , which could support the applicant ’s claim .

Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW ( Verwaltungsgerichtshof - gesetz ) provides that ORG is to hold a hearing after its preliminary investigation of the case where a complainant has requested a hearing within the time - limit . Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) provides however :

" Notwithstanding a party ’s application , ORG may decide not to hold a hearing when ( ... )

It is apparent to the ORG from the written pleadings of the parties to the proceedings before ORG and from the files relating to the prior proceedings that an oral hearing is not likely to contribute to clarifying the case , and if this is not against LAW . "

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW reads as follows :

" ORG may ... decline to accept a case for adjudication if it does not have sufficient prospects of success or if it can not be expected that the judgment will clarify an issue of constitutional law . The ORG may not decline to accept for adjudication a case excluded from the jurisdiction of ORG by Article CARDINAL . "


András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Nona Tsotsoria;Vladimiro Zagrebelsky

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

Following a report to the police by CARDINAL witnesses , GPE and ORG , on DATE a pre - trial investigation was started regarding several crimes . The investigation of other crimes was joined to the case on various dates . Ultimately CARDINAL different crimes were investigated . On DATE the applicant 's place of residence was searched . On DATE the seizure of the applicant 's assets was ordered . However , according to the Government , no assets were discovered . On CARDINAL DATE the applicant was questioned as a suspect . On DATE the applicant was officially informed of the accusations , questioned as an accused and ordered not to leave his place of residence . On DATE the public prosecutor again informed the applicant of the accusations against him and questioned him . On DATE the investigation was officially concluded and , as of that date until DATE , the applicant and his co - accused had the possibility to acquaint themselves with the case file . On DATE the public prosecutor concluded the pre - trial investigation in the case by issuing the final bill of indictment and transferred the case to the courts .

The Government specified that the case file consisted of CARDINAL volumes and concerned CARDINAL victims and CARDINAL defendants facing CARDINAL charges . The ORG also submitted that , in the course of the pre - trial investigation , GPE and ORG had disappeared in DATE . They were found abroad and returned to GPE in DATE , but absconded again after DATE . The authorities later received information that GPE had been killed in DATE . ORG was never found again .

On DATE ORG set the dates for trial . The court held CARDINAL hearings , CARDINAL of which were adjourned because CARDINAL of the parties , other than the applicant , failed to be present . Several hearings were postponed because CARDINAL of the co - accused went missing . On DATE the court separated the part of the case which concerned the missing co - accused , and continued the examination of remainder of the case . The hearing of DATE was delayed until DATE as the applicant 's lawyer had died and a replacement had to be organised . On DATE the applicant failed to appear at the hearing and it was postponed until DATE , when it was decided to continue the examination of the case in his absence . The court took into account the fact that the applicant had already submitted his final statement at the hearing of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE ORG sentenced the applicant to DATE imprisonment for an organised burglary with CARDINAL other co - accused . He was acquitted of several charges : CARDINAL due to a lack of evidence and another for being time - barred . The court examined the testimonies of CARDINAL witnesses and QUANTITY victims , as well as the submissions of the police and other evidence . It found that the applicant had not provided any credible evidence to negate the testimonies of the various witnesses . PERSON and ORG 's testimonies given during the pre - trial investigation were read out at the hearings . CARDINAL of the co - accused , FAC , also gave a deposition incriminating the applicant . PERSON was sentenced by the same judgment but he was dispensed from carrying out the sentence on mitigating grounds .

On DATE , after CARDINAL hearings , ORG upheld the conviction of the applicant . The court noted that the applicant 's request to question PERSON and ORG had been dismissed because the former had died and the latter was missing . Their testimonies during the pre - trial investigation were read out during the court hearings in accordance with procedural law and were evaluated in the context of all other evidence and the testimonies of other witnesses . No substantial discrepancies in their submissions existed . The court was able to take into consideration the submissions of these CARDINAL witnesses , as not only testimony given during hearings , but also that given during pre - trial investigations may be legitimate and relevant for the case under examination . These testimonies were not treated as superior to the other evidence in the case . As regards the submissions of the co - accused PERSON , the court also noted that his submissions had been assessed in the context of all other evidence and the relevant procedural rules had been observed . Moreover , there was nothing to put in doubt his mental state and his ability to recollect the facts . ORG concluded that the court of first instance had properly assessed all the evidence in the case and clarified the discrepancies . Therefore the case had been thoroughly examined . No bias or unfairness was disclosed in the latter 's decision .

On DATE ORG , in oral proceedings , dismissed the cassation appeal lodged by the applicant . The court observed that the reading of the testimonies of the CARDINAL missing witnesses had been justified ihad been in accordance with the domestic law . The court .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Civil Code allows a civil claim to be made for pecuniary and non - pecuniary damage arising from the unlawful actions of investigating authorities or courts in the context of a criminal case . The provision envisages compensation for an unlawful conviction , an unlawful arrest or detention , the application of unlawful procedural measures of enforcement , or an unlawful administrative penalty . According to recent domestic case - law , this provision may also allow claims for damages arising from the excessive length of criminal proceedings . In particular , by a judgment of DATE , ORG awarded an individual damages under this provision on account of the excessive length of criminal proceedings which had been instituted in DATE and discontinued in DATE ( see FAC , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE and DATE , DATE ) . Other relevant domestic law concerning domestic remedies for the excessive length of civil proceedings is reproduced in the judgment of ORG and Others v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § DATE , DATE ) .


Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in Velenje .

On DATE the applicant was injured in an accident at work . The applicant ’s employer had taken out insurance with the insurance company ZT .

On DATE the applicant instituted civil proceedings against ZT in ORG ( Okrožno sodišče v PERSON ) seeking damages in the amount of CARDINAL NORP tolars ( MONEY ) for the injuries sustained .

DATE and DATE the applicant lodged CARDINAL preliminary written submissions .

On DATE she made a request that a date be set for a hearing .

Of the CARDINAL hearings held DATE and DATE , none was adjourned at the request of the applicant .

During the proceedings , the court appointed CARDINAL different medical experts . The court also sought additional opinions of the appointed experts .

At the last hearing , the court decided to deliver a written judgment . The judgment , upholding the applicant ’s claim in part , was served on the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the applicant appealed to ORG ( PERSON v PERSON ) .

On DATE the court allowed the applicant ’s appeal in part and increased the damages awarded .

The judgment was served on the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with ORG sodišče ) .

On DATE the court dismissed the applicant ’s appeal .

The decision was served on the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal .

The proceedings are still pending .


Violation of Art. 5-1-f;Violation of Art. 5-4;Violation of Art. 3;Remainder inadmissible;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Khanlar Hajiyev

The applicant was born in DATE . She lived in GPE , GPE .

On DATE the applicant was arrested upon arrival at GPE airport in GPE . She was told that on DATE the GPE authorities had placed her name on the list of fugitives from justice , suspecting her of involvement in human trafficking .

The applicant was taken to the GPE transport police department . No arrest record was compiled .

On DATE counsel for the applicant complained to the transport prosecutor 's office about the absence of an arrest record and failure to provide the applicant with food , drink and access to a toilet . It is unclear whether any response was received .

On DATE the first deputy head of the central police station of GPE faxed a letter to the head of the LOC transport police department , asking him to keep the applicant in custody . He enclosed a warrant for the applicant 's arrest sanctioned by the GPE town prosecutor on DATE .

On DATE the acting ORG sent the following letter to the head of the LOC transport police department :

“ Owing to the fact that ORG has no temporary detention ward , I request you to hold [ the applicant ] in the GPE transport police department until such time as a judicial decision on application of a custodial measure has been issued . ”

Also on DATE , counsel for the applicant complained to a court that the applicant had already spent DATE in detention without a judicial order and asked for her release .

On DATE the ORG of the Moscow Region refused to deal with the complaint on the ground that no criminal proceedings against the applicant were pending in GPE . On DATE ORG upheld that decision on appeal .

On DATE the ORG of GPE dismissed the same complaint . It found that the letter from the GPE police officer constituted a lawful basis for the applicant 's detention within the meaning of LAW until such time as the formal extradition request had been received by ORG . ORG further determined that it was not competent to examine the application for release because it lacked territorial jurisdiction . On DATE ORG upheld that judgment on appeal .

On DATE ORG received a request for the applicant 's extradition from the GPE authorities .

Counsel for the applicant complained to a court about unlawful actions of the GPE transport prosecutor , who had permitted the applicant 's detention in excess of TIME without a judicial decision , on the basis of a non - procedural communication from the GPE authorities of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the ORG of GPE dismissed the complaint against the transport prosecutor . It found that the GPE authorities ' letter of DATE constituted a request for the applicant 's arrest pending an official request for extradition within the meaning of LAW . The decision on the applicant 's extradition and the application of a custodial measure was to be taken by ORG rather than by the GPE transport prosecutor . In these circumstances , the transport prosecutor had acted lawfully and within his competence . On DATE ORG upheld that judgment on appeal .

On DATE ORG forwarded a copy of the extradition request to the GPE prosecutor responsible for supervising compliance with laws in air and water transport . The prosecutor applied to a court for an arrest warrant in respect of the applicant .

On DATE the ORG granted the prosecutor 's application and remanded the applicant in custody . ORG founded its decision on the facts that the applicant was charged with a criminal offence carrying a prison term of DATE and that the extradition request was pending . Noting the applicant 's “ character ” and state of health , ORG held that no grounds for applying a more lenient preventive measure had been shown to exist .

The applicant and her counsel lodged appeals . They pointed out that the applicant had a permanent place of residence and employment in GPE and that her health had deteriorated as a consequence of being detained in the police cell .

On DATE ORG upheld the detention order on appeal . It rejected the applicant 's arguments about her residence in GPE on the basis of a certificate from ORG which showed that her residence in LOC had not been formally registered .

Replying to a complaint by the applicant 's lawyer , on DATE the senior assistant to the GPE transport prosecutor admitted that no arrest record had been compiled in respect of the applicant at the GPE transport police department because it had not been required by law in cases of extradition .

On DATE the Constitutional Court confirmed to the applicant that it had been its constant case - law to require a judicial decision for any deprivation of liberty in excess of TIME and also to require effective judicial supervision of detention matters . These requirements were likewise applicable to foreign nationals whose extradition was sought .

On DATE the NORP Ombudsman replied to the applicant that her complaint about unlawful detention had been forwarded for examination to ORG . On CARDINAL DATE ORG wrote to the applicant 's lawyer that her detention had been lawful and justified .

On DATE the ORG of GPE disallowed the applicant 's complaint about ORG failure to put an end to her unlawful detention . ORG held that the applicant was not a party to any criminal proceedings in GPE and that she could not therefore lodge a complaint under LAW .

On DATE a deputy Prosecutor General of GPE granted the request for the applicant 's extradition to GPE .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld the extradition decision on appeal and maintained the custodial measure in respect of the applicant . On DATE ORG of GPE dismissed the applicant 's appeal against that decision .

Upon her arrest on DATE the applicant was placed in the cell for detention of administrative offenders ( “ ORG ” , комната для административно-задержанных ) on the premises of the duty station of the LOC transport police department ( дежурная часть ЛУВД аэропорта « PERSON ) .

On DATE the applicant complained to ORG , the Ombudsman , ORG and the President about unlawful detention in the GPE transport police station in appalling conditions . She complained that she did not receive food or hygiene articles on a regular basis , that medical assistance was inadequate , and that she had had no access to fresh air for DATE . It is unclear whether she received any replies .

On DATE , following ORG decision on the application of a custodial measure , the applicant was transferred to remand centre no . IZ-CARDINAL/CARDINAL in GPE .

The parties ' description of the physical conditions of the applicant 's detention at GPE airport differ in certain aspects . Their submissions are summarised below .

The Government submitted multiple written depositions by police officers from the GPE transport police department . According to them , the applicant received food from the canteen and from her relatives . At TIME - time she was given a mattress , blanket and bedding from the airport hotel . She could take walks under the escort of a police officer and occasionally have a shower . A nurse came to visit her and take her blood pressure .

The Government also submitted a certificate from the medical unit of the airport . It indicated that the applicant had been examined on CARDINAL occasions in connection with complaints about headaches , weakness or indisposition .

The Government produced a layout plan of the LOC transport police department , showing that the applicant 's cell measured QUANTITY . It had no windows . A bunk bed , QUANTITY long and QUANTITY wide , occupied the space along one wall .

The Government submitted a report on a conversation with the head cook of the airport canteen . The cook had stated orally DATE but refused to confirm the same in DATE that from DATE to CARDINAL DATE CARDINAL meals a day had been sent to the applicant .

The applicant acknowledged that the cell measured QUANTITY . However , it was not a normal room but rather a metal cage , its front panel being made of iron rods . The cell had been locked at all times . The only piece of furniture had been a metal bench fixed to the wall . There had been no chair , table , mattress or bedding . During TIME she had not been able to undress because she had been in full view of male police officers . She had covered herself with a jacket .

On occasion the applicant had had to share the cell with other detainees , such as petty offenders or vagrants . Female detainees had been placed together with her . If a male detainee had been brought in , the police had taken her out of the cell – sometimes during her sleep DATE and made her sit on a chair in the nearby office . She had remained seated there for TIME .

The police officers had not brought her any food or drink . All the food had been provided by her boyfriend and sister . The applicant submitted written depositions from them attesting to this fact . She pointed out that no money had been allocated for purchasing food from the canteen .

The applicant had never been taken outside for a walk . The only time she had been outdoors was on DATE when she had been taken to the prosecutor 's office .

The LAW guarantees the right to liberty ( LAW ) :

“ CARDINAL . Everyone has the right to liberty and personal integrity .

Arrest , placement in custody and detention are only permitted on the basis of a judicial decision . Prior to a judicial decision , an individual may not be detained for longer than TIME . ”

ORG ( signed in GPE on DATE and amended on DATE , “ the GPE Convention ” ) , to which both GPE and GPE are parties , provides as follows :

“ CARDINAL . When executing a request for legal assistance , the requested authority applies the laws of its own ORG ... ”

“ CARDINAL . NORP The person whose extradition is sought may also be arrested before receipt of a request for extradition , if there is a related petition ( ходатайство ) . The petition shall contain a reference to a detention order or a final conviction and shall indicate that a request for extradition will follow ... ”

“ CARDINAL . A person arrested pursuant to LAW ... shall be released ... if no request for extradition is received by the requested ORG within DATE of the arrest ... ”

LAW of DATE ( ORG no . CARDINAL ) , to which GPE is a party , provides as follows :

“ CARDINAL . In case of urgency the competent authorities of the requesting ORG may request the provisional arrest of the person sought . The competent authorities of the requested ORG shall decide the matter in accordance with its law .

Provisional arrest may be terminated if , within a period of DATE after arrest , the requested ORG has not received the request for extradition and the documents mentioned in LAW . It shall not , in any event , exceed DATE from the date of such arrest . The possibility of provisional release at any time is not excluded , but the requested ORG shall take any measures which it considers necessary to prevent the escape of the person sought . ”

Article CARDINAL ( “ Personal inviolability ” ) provides that no one may be detained for TIME without a judicial decision .

Chapter CARDINAL ( “ Arrest of a suspect ” ) regulates the procedure for arresting a suspect . Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL provides that an arrest record must be compiled within TIME following arrival at the police station or prosecutor 's office .

LAW ( “ Measures of restraint ” ) governs application of measures of restraint , or preventive measures ( меры пресечения ) , which include , in particular , placement in custody . A custodial measure may only be ordered by judicial decision in respect of a person who is suspected of , or charged with , a criminal offence punishable by DATE imprisonment ( LAW in custody ” ) . The time - limit for detention pending investigation is fixed at DATE ( Article CARDINAL “ ORG - limits for detention ” ) . A judge may extend that period DATE ( LAW ) . Further extensions may only be granted by a judge if the person is charged with serious or particularly serious criminal offences ( LAW ) . No extension beyond DATE is permissible and the detainee must be released immediately ( LAW ) .

Chapter DATE ( “ Extradition of a person for criminal prosecution or execution of sentence ” ) regulates extradition procedures . Article CARDINAL is the only provision in the chapter that governs application of measures of restraint with a view to extradition . Paragraph CARDINAL deals with the situation where a request for extradition is not accompanied by an arrest warrant issued by a foreign court . In that case a prosecutor must decide whether it is necessary to impose a measure of restraint “ in accordance with the procedure provided for in the present Code ” . Paragraph CARDINAL establishes that , if a foreign judicial decision on placement in custody is available , a prosecutor may place the person in detention or under house arrest . In that eventuality no confirmation of the foreign judicial decision by a NORP court is required .

Chapter CARDINAL ( “ Petitions ” ) provides that suspects , defendants , victims , experts , civil claimants , civil defendants , and their representatives may petition officials for taking procedural decisions that would secure rights and protect legitimate interests of the petitioner ( LAW ) . LAW ( “ Complaints about acts and decisions by courts and officials involved in criminal proceedings ” ) provides for judicial review of decisions and acts or failures to act by an investigator or a prosecutor that are capable of damaging the constitutional rights or freedoms of the parties to criminal proceedings ( LAW ) . The competent court is that which has jurisdiction for the place of the preliminary investigation ( ibid . ) .

On DATE ORG examined an application by Mr PERSON , who had submitted that the lack of any limitation in time on the detention of a person pending extradition was incompatible with the constitutional guarantee against arbitrary detention . ORG reiterated its constant case - law that excessive or arbitrary detention , unlimited in time and without appropriate review , was incompatible with LAW in all cases , including extradition proceedings .

In ORG view , the absence of a specific regulation of detention matters in LAW did not create a legal lacuna incompatible with LAW . LAW provided that , in executing a request for legal assistance , the requested party would apply its domestic law , that is , the procedure laid down in LAW . Such procedure comprised , in particular , LAW and the norms in its LAW ( “ Measures of restraint ” ) which , by virtue of their general character and position in Part I of the LAW ( “ General provisions ” ) , applied to all stages and forms of criminal proceedings , including proceedings for examination of extradition requests .

The Constitutional Court emphasised that the guarantees of the right to liberty and personal integrity set out in LAW were fully applicable to detention with a view to extradition . Accordingly , LAW did not allow the authorities to apply a custodial measure without respecting the procedure established in LAW or in excess of time - limits fixed in the Code .

Mr GPE , a GPE citizen , was arrested in GPE on DATE because his extradition was sought by GPE . Upon receipt of the formal extradition request , on DATE a NORP court ordered his detention pending extradition sine die . PERSON complained to ORG that the provisions of LAW which permitted his detention without a judicial decision were incompatible with the LAW .

The Constitutional Court reiterated its constant case - law that the scope of the constitutional right to liberty and personal inviolability was identical for foreign nationals and stateless persons as for NORP nationals . A foreign national or stateless person may not be detained in GPE for more than TIME without a judicial decision . That constitutional requirement served as a guarantee against an excessively long detention beyond TIME , and also against arbitrary detention as such , in that it required a court to examine whether the arrest was lawful and justified .

ORG held that LAW , read in conjunction with LAW , could not be construed as permitting the detention of an individual for DATE on the basis of a request for his or her extradition , without a decision by a NORP court . A custodial measure could be applied only in accordance with the procedure established in LAW and within the time - limits fixed in the Code .

The relevant extract from the CARDINALnd ORG of ORG for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ( ORG ) ( ORG ( CARDINAL ) CARDINAL ) reads as follows :

“ DATE . Custody by the police is in principle of relatively short duration ... However , certain elementary material requirements should be met .

All police cells should be of a reasonable size for the number of persons they are used to accommodate , and have adequate lighting ( i.e. sufficient to read by , sleeping periods excluded ) and ventilation ; preferably , cells should enjoy natural light . Further , cells should be equipped with a means of rest ( e.g. a fixed chair or bench ) , and persons obliged to stay TIME in custody should be provided with a clean mattress and blankets .

Persons in custody should be allowed to comply with the needs of nature when necessary in clean and decent conditions , and be offered adequate washing facilities . They should be given food at appropriate times , including CARDINAL full meal ( i.e. something more substantial than a sandwich ) DATE .

The issue of what is a reasonable size for a police cell ( or any other type of detainee / prisoner accommodation ) is a difficult question . Many factors have to be taken into account when making such an assessment . However , ORG delegations felt the need for a rough guideline in this area . The following criterion ( seen as a desirable level rather than a minimum standard ) is currently being used when assessing police cells intended for single occupancy for stays in excess of TIME : in the order of QUANTITY , QUANTITY or more between walls , QUANTITY between floor and ceiling . ”

The ORG reiterated the above conclusions in DATE ORG ( ORG ( DATE ) CARDINAL , § MONEY ) .

The part of the ORG to ORG on the visit to GPE carried out by the ORG from DATE ( ORG ( DATE ) CARDINAL ) read , in so far as it concerned the conditions of detention in administrative - detention cells located within police stations , as follows :

“ CARDINAL . Similar to the situation observed during previous visits , none of the district commands ( RUVD ) and local divisions of ORG visited were equipped with facilities suitable for TIME stays ; despite that , the delegation found evidence that persons were occasionally held TIME at such establishments ... The cells seen by the delegation were totally unacceptable for extended periods of custody : dark , poorly ventilated , dirty and usually devoid of any equipment except a bench . Persons held TIME were not provided with mattresses or blankets . Further , there was no provision for supplying detainees with food and drinking water , and access to a toilet was problematic .

The ORG reiterates the recommendation made in its report on the DATE visit ( cf . paragraph CARDINAL of document ORG ( DATE ) CARDINAL ) that material conditions in , and the use of , cells for administrative detention at district commands and local divisions of ORG be brought into conformity with ORG CARDINAL/CARDINAL on the general conditions and regulations of detention in administrative detention cells . Cells which do not correspond to the requirements of that Order should be withdrawn from service .

Further , the ORG reiterates the recommendation made in previous visit reports that administrative detention cells not be used for accommodating detainees for TIME . ”


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property

Alvina Gyulumyan;Anatoly Kovler;Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Elisabet Fura;Josep Casadevall

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant was convicted of assault and battery and sentenced to DATE imprisonment .

On DATE ORG quashed the judgment of DATE on supervisory review and discontinued the criminal case against the applicant for the lack of corpus delicti in his actions .

On DATE ORG of GPE awarded the applicant MONEY ( RUB ) against ORG in compensation for the non - pecuniary damage sustained as a result of wrongful conviction and unlawful detention . It also ordered that ORG reimburse the legal fee paid by the applicant in the amount of RUB CARDINAL .

On DATE ORG increased the award to RUB CARDINAL .

On DATE the ORG of ORG , acting on supervisory review , increased the award to RUB CARDINAL . The judgment became enforceable on DATE . On DATE the court issued a writ of execution .

On DATE the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the local office of ORG which forwarded the writ to the central office of ORG . ORG received it on DATE .

On DATE ORG returned the writ to the applicant because he had not indicated his bank details and had not submitted a certified copy of the judgment of DATE .

On DATE the applicant resubmitted the writ to ORG . On DATE the Ministry returned the writ to the applicant for the same reasons as before .

On DATE the applicant submitted the writ to the local bailiffs’ service . On DATE the bailiffs forwarded the writ to the GPE bailiffs’ service . On DATE the GPE bailiffs’ service returned the writ to the applicant and advised him to submit it to ORG .

On DATE the applicant for a third time submitted the writ to ORG .

On DATE the Leningradskiy ORG awarded the applicant RUB CARDINAL against ORG as compensation for the loss of salary during his detention , plus reimbursement of the legal fees . The judgment became enforceable DATE .

On DATE the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the local office of ORG which forwarded it to ORG .

On DATE the ORG issued a duplicate writ and sent it to the local bailiffs’ service . On DATE the bailiffs opened enforcement proceedings .

NORP By letter of CARDINAL DATE , the GPE bailiffs’ service informed the applicant that the writ had been returned to LOC on DATE for corrections in the debtor ’s name and address .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant asked ORG to issue a duplicate writ of execution . The court issued a duplicate writ on DATE .

On DATE the applicant submitted the writ to ORG .

NORP The applicant received the award on DATE .

On DATE ORG of FAC awarded the applicant RUB CARDINAL against ORG in respect of inflation losses sustained as a result of the belated enforcement of the judgment of DATE . The judgment became enforceable DATE .

On DATE the applicant submitted the writ of execution to ORG .

The applicant received the award on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE ORG awarded the applicant RUB CARDINAL against ORG in respect of non - pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the belated enforcement of the judgment of DATE .

The applicant sued ORG for compensation for the loss of profit during his detention . On DATE ORG dismissed his claims as unsubstantiated . On DATE ORG upheld the judgment on appeal .

The applicant sued ORG for the loss of income during his detention . On DATE ORG dismissed his claim as unsubstantiated . On DATE ORG upheld the judgment on appeal .

In DATE the applicant brought CARDINAL court proceedings against the bailiffs’ service . On DATE and DATE ORG dismissed the applicant’ claims in the final instance .