Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;Khanlar Hajiyev;Sverre Erik Jebens

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in ORG , a town in LOC .

On an unspecified date the economic crimes bureau of ORG ( PERSON по борьбе с экономическими преступлениями ORG по Новосибирской области DATE “ the economic crimes bureau ” ) obtained information concerning the circulation of counterfeit money in town . Based on the above information and pursuant to LAW the economic crimes bureau instituted operational proceedings ( дело оперативного учета ) .

In the course of the operational proceedings at issue the economic crimes bureau discovered incidents of forgery of official documents .

Following the approval of the report on the operational - search activities conducted within the framework of the operational proceedings at issue , on DATE in accordance with LAW the Deputy Head of ORG decided to carry out a test purchase in the applicant ’s flat . The reason for that decision had been the information that the applicant was involved in unlawful activity consisting in forgery of banknotes and official documents entitling its holders to certain benefits or exonerating them of duties and obligations . On DATE criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of counterfeiting .

On DATE CARDINAL plain - clothes police officers , PERSON and PERSON , came to the applicant ’s flat to carry out the test purchase . The officers said that they were a husband and wife wishing to obtain a copy of a high - school graduation certificate . The applicant invited the visitors to come in , scanned the documents handed over by the “ husband ” , then , at the “ clients’ ” request , changed the name of the holder and certain grades . Then he made colour printouts and asked for MONEY by way of payment .

According to the applicant , when the “ clients ” were on their way out , a police squad and an investigator who had been waiting outside in the meantime burst into the applicant ’s flat .

According to the Government , after the test purchase had been completed the applicant saw the “ clients ” to the door , opened it , and the police officers who had been waiting outside in the meantime entered the flat . They showed their identification documents and informed the applicant of the purpose of their visit . After that the forgery of a document was reported to an investigator of the investigative department of ORG . When the investigator arrived to the applicant ’s flat , the applicant ’s wife opened the door . Upon her permission the investigator entered the flat . The applicant did not object to the investigator ’s presence . After the attesting witnesses had been invited the investigator explained to the applicant and those present that there were reasons to believe that the applicant had committed forgery of an official document and expressed his will to conduct an investigative action – inspection of the crime scene . The applicant and his wife gave their consent .

NORP The investigator inspected the applicant ’s flat as a crime scene and seized material evidence . In accordance with LAW he drew up a record of the inspection . The record attests to the fact that on DATE from TIME in accordance with ORG CARDINAL - CARDINAL of the Code and in the presence of CARDINAL attesting witnesses , the applicant and his wife , the investigator carried out the inspection of the applicant ’s flat . The record set out in detail the descriptions of the flat and the seized evidence ( computer gear ) .

Thereafter the applicant was taken to the police station where he was detained until TIME on DATE .

On DATE the investigator opened another criminal case against the applicant and charged him with forgery of official documents .

The applicant brought a complaint against the police squad and the investigator , alleging that they had conducted an unlawful search of his LOC , thus violating his right to respect for his home , and that they had frisked him and seized his belongings . In particular , the applicant complained that when police officers PERSON and PERSON were on their way out an armed squad burst into his flat , shouting and threatening . He was thrown to the floor his hands tightly tied behind his back and dealt several blows to his side and the lower part of his back . The squad frisked him and handcuffed him . Afterwards the applicant was informed that the armed persons were police . The attesting witnesses were called , and what the applicant believed to have been a search began , without any prior approval by the prosecutor . The “ search ” lasted TIME . From the conversation of the police officers the applicant understood that they were searching for drugs and arms . After the “ search ” was over some of the applicant ’s belongings were put in boxes and seized . Later the applicant was informed with the record of the investigative action in question , from which he learned that it had been an inspection of the crime scene .

On DATE ORG of GPE rejected the applicant ’s complaint as unsubstantiated . The court found as follows :

“ ... On DATE the investigator [ name ] arrived at [ the applicant ’s address ] in connection with information about the crime , where he conducted , with attesting witnesses , the inspection of the scene of the crime . The investigative action in question was registered in the record of inspection of the crime scene ... The above circumstance is confirmed by the record dated DATE ; a statement by [ the head of the police squad ] in which he confirmed that ... following a signal from [ police officer PERSON ] the police squad arrested [ the applicant ] . [ The investigator ] arrived TIME later and inspected the scene of the crime . [ The above circumstance is further confirmed ] by : statement of [ police officer PERSON ] in which he confirmed that after the test purchase was completed he informed the police squad accordingly through a radio transmitter , following which he came to the door , opened it , the police squad entered the flat and arrested [ the applicant ] ; then [ the investigator ] was called and conducted the inspection of the scene of the crime ; a statement by [ a member of the police squad ] who confirmed that on DATE a test purchase was carried out ; he and [ CARDINAL other members of the squad ] were waiting for a signal from [ police officer PERSON ] to arrest [ the applicant ] . After the signal was received they entered the flat , then called the investigator , who entered the flat and conducted the inspection of the scene of the crime TIME ; statements of [ CARDINAL attesting witness ] who assisted at the inspection of [ the applicant ’s ] flat .

On the basis of the above , taking into account that [ the investigator ] arrived at [ the applicant ’s address ] at the scene of the crime , the actions of [ the investigator ] do not indicate that there was an unlawful entry to a dwelling .

The RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure did not oblige the investigator to hand over the record of the inspection to [ the applicant ] .

In accordance with Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure during the inspection [ the investigator ] had the right to seize the uncovered traces of crime and other physical evidence . At that [ the applicant ’s ] participation was not obligatory .

It has not been established that [ the investigator ] body - searched [ the applicant ] .

As regards the applicant ’s allegations in so far as they concerned the actions of the police squad , the court indicated that the applicant had failed to follow the procedure established by law for challenging police actions ( namely , LAW and the PERSON on complaints about actions and decisions impinging upon the rights and freedoms of citizens ) and refused to examine the relevant part of the complaint on the merits .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of DATE on appeal .

On DATE ORG of the Novosibirsk Region convicted the applicant . It is unclear whether the applicant appealed against the judgment .

The LAW of the Russian Federation establishes that the home is inviolable . No one shall enter a dwelling against the will of those living there , unless otherwise established by a federal law or in accordance with a court order ( LAW ) .

The LAW further provides that everyone shall be guaranteed judicial protection of his rights and freedoms . Decisions and actions ( or inaction ) of bodies of state authority and local self - government , public associations and officials may be appealed against in court ( LAW ) .

The RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure ( Law of DATE , in force until DATE ) replicated the constitutional principle that no one should penetrate into a home against the will of those living there without legal grounds . Search , seizure and inspection of residential LOC could be carried out only on the grounds , and in accordance with the procedure , provided by LAW .

The Code provided specifically that an investigator could carry out an inspection of a crime scene , location , LOC , physical objects or documents in order to detect traces of a crime or other physical evidence , to clarify the scene of the crime and other relevant circumstances . In urgent cases the inspection could be carried out before opening a criminal case . In such cases , the case was to be opened immediately after the inspection of the crime scene ( LAW ) .

The inspection of the crime scene had to be carried out in the presence of attesting witnesses . The investigator could also solicit the participation of an accused , a suspect , a victim , a witness and an expert . When carrying out the inspection the investigator could take measurements , photos , use video recording , draw plans and schemes , and make moulds and take impressions of footprints . If necessary , the investigator could seize the evidence discovered ( LAW ) .

A record of the inspection had to be drawn up by the investigator and signed by all persons who took part in the investigative measure ( Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Code ) .

The Code of Criminal Procedure of GPE ( Law no . CARDINAL of DATE , in force as from DATE ) provides for judicial review of decisions of investigators that might infringe the constitutional rights of participants in the proceedings or prevent a person ’s access to court ( Article CARDINAL ) .

The Operational - Search Activities Act ( Law no . CARDINAL-FZ of CARDINAL DATE ) lists a number of techniques that may be used by law - enforcement or security authorities for the purposes of , inter alia , investigating and preventing offences ( section CARDINAL ) . In particular , the police may carry out a “ test purchase ” ( проверочная закупка ) where , inter alia , a criminal case has been opened or information concerning the preparation or commission of an offence has become known to the police and the available data are insufficient to bring criminal proceedings ( section CARDINAL ) . The taking of operational - search measures which interfere with ORG constitutional rights to respect for their correspondence , telephone communications and home is allowed if authorised , as a general rule , by a court ( section CARDINAL) . The “ test purchase ” of goods , the free sale of which is prohibited , and certain undercover operations by agents or persons assisting them , are carried out on the basis of a decision sanctioned by the head of an agency engaged in operational - search activities ( section CARDINAL) . The agencies charged with operational - search activities may create and use information systems and institute operational proceedings . The operational proceedings are instituted on the grounds listed in section CARDINAL of the Act for the purposes of collection and systematisation of information , verification and evaluation of the results of the operational - search activities , and taking the relevant decisions by the agencies charged with operational - search activities . The institution of operational proceedings may not serve as a ground for restriction of constitutional rights and freedoms and lawful interests of an individual and a citizen ( section CARDINAL ) . Results of operational - search activities can serve as a basis for bringing criminal proceedings and can be used as evidence in accordance with the legislation on criminal procedure ( section CARDINAL ) .

LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL-I of DATE ) provides that the police may enter the dwelling against the will of those living there if there is a reason to believe that a crime has been committed there ( section CARDINAL ) . Actions or inaction on the part of a police officer can be appealed against to a higher police official , a prosecutor or a court ( section CARDINAL ) .

The PERSON on complaints about actions and decisions impinging upon the rights and freedoms of citizens ( PERSON no . ORG of DATE ) provides that a court of general jurisdiction may hear complaints about actions or decisions of ORG and public officials which infringe ORG rights or freedoms or prevent citizens from exercising their rights and freedoms . It is incumbent on the officials concerned to demonstrate the lawfulness of their actions or decisions ( section CARDINAL ) .


THE CONDE NAST PUBLICATIONS LTD v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Giovanni Bonello;Ján Šikuta;Josep Casadevall;Kristaq Traja;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä;Stanislav Pavlovschi

The first applicant , ORG , is a company incorporated in GPE and GPE which is the publisher of ORG , a magazine published DATE in GPE and GPE . The second applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who is the editor - in - chief of ORG and lives in GPE . They were represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

PERSON ( “ RP ” ) , a well - known film director who held dual NORP and NORP nationality , had pleaded guilty in DATE in GPE ( “ GPE ” ) to unlawful sexual intercourse with a CARDINAL-year - old girl . He fled from the GPE before sentencing . Thereafter he lived in GPE from where , being a NORP citizen , he could not be extradited to the GPE .

In DATE the applicants published in the DATE issue of ORG an article concerning ORG which described how he had allegedly tried to seduce a NORP model at a fashionable GPE nightspot shortly after his pregnant wife ’s murder in DATE . He brought an action in GPE for libel against ORG and , fearing possible arrest and extradition to the GPE , applied to give his evidence by video conference link ( “ VCF ” ) .

On DATE ORG ordered that RP be permitted to give his evidence in the libel trial by ORG from a GPE hotel . It was noted that the technology to be used would be of a high standard and that in ORG evidence there was generally very little delay , very little room for confusion and cross - examination could take place at the same pace as if a witness were present at court . On DATE ORG allowed the appeal of the applicants . It was considered that it was “ clearly an indulgence ” to permit RP to give his evidence by ORG and the real question was whether , as a matter of policy in the particular circumstances of this case , that indulgence should be granted . It was considered that the court ’s general policy should be to discourage litigants from escaping the normal processes of the law , rather than to facilitate it , so that , accordingly , the judge had erred in making the ORG order which should be set aside .

On DATE ORG allowed an appeal by ORG by a majority of CARDINAL - CARDINAL .

Lord PERSON of GPE , delivering the leading majority speech , with whom Lord Hope of PERSON and ORG of GPE agreed , found that there was no doubt that , as between ORG and ORG , the judge ’s order was rightly made . The test of the relevant Practice Direction for the use of ORG , namely that it could be allowed to save costs and where it would be beneficial to the efficient , fair and economic disposal of the litigation , was satisfied in the circumstances .

RP was entitled to bring his action in GPE where the offending article had been published . His flight from the GPE in DATE and the steps he had taken ever since to remain beyond the reach of the GPE court , did not preclude him from bringing proceedings in GPE in respect of damage to his reputation flowing from publication of defamatory material in GPE . Hence , the libel proceedings did not constitute an abuse of the process of the court . A direction that ORG ’s evidence might be given by means of ORG , an entirely satisfactory means of giving evidence , would not prejudice ORG to any significant extent ; indeed , any prejudice would more likely be suffered by ORG by reason of the lessened impact of his evidence and celebrity status on the jury . Improvements in technology enabled ORG ’s evidence to be tested as adequately if given by ORG as it would be if given in court . If a ORG order were refused , RP would be gravely handicapped in the conduct of the proceedings . In practice he would either abandon his action or , possibly , continue but under the serious disadvantage that his oral evidence on the crucial dispute of fact , concerning what took place at the restaurant , would not be placed before the jury . Either way , in its conduct of the litigation ORG would receive an unjustified windfall at the expense of ORG . ORG would find itself in the fortunate position of not being called to account for having published what might be a serious libel .

Whether the use of the court ’s procedures in a particular way would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or would be an affront to the public conscience , called for an overall balanced view . A fugitive from justice was not as such precluded from enforcing his rights through the courts of GPE . RP ’s status as a fugitive offender did not deprive him of any rights he would otherwise possess in respect of the subject matter of his action . The contrary approach , adopted in the name of the public interest , would lead to wholly unacceptable results in practice . It would mean that for so long as a fugitive remained on the run from the criminal law , his property and other rights could be breached with impunity . That could not be right . Such harshness had no place in the law that knew no principle of fugitive disentitlement .

Although a direction that a fugitive such as ORG may give his evidence by use of ORG was a departure from the normal way a claimant gives evidence in libel proceedings , the extent of this departure should not be exaggerated ; it was expressly sanctioned by ORG and was not an indulgence . Despite his status , a fugitive from justice was entitled to invoke the assistance of the court and its procedures in protection of his civil rights . He could bring or defend proceedings even though he was , and remained , a fugitive . If he was entitled to lodge such proceedings there could be little rhyme or reason in withholding from him a procedural facility flowing from a modern technological development which was now readily available to all litigants . To withhold that facility would be to penalise him because of his status . The appeal was to be allowed and the judge ’s order restored .

Lord PERSON of GPE dissented . He noted that there were CARDINAL policy considerations arising in the present case which were in conflict . The first was that the court should not frustrate the claimant ’s accepted right to sue in the civil courts by refusing a procedural step provided for by the Rules when there was no valid reason to do so . The second was that the civil courts should not take steps the effect of which was to frustrate or impede the due execution of the criminal procedure of another ORG with which GPE had an extradition treaty and under which , if the appellant were in GPE , GPE would be required to respond to a request for his extradition so that he could be sentenced and obliged to comply with any sentence imposed .

Although it was recognised that the fact that ORG was a fugitive offender did not bar him from starting proceedings , there was only CARDINAL reason for the request of the order which was to avoid the risk or likelihood of arrest and extradition and to escape sentence and punishment in the GPE for an admitted offence . To accede to his request in the absence of other overriding considerations compelling the grant of the application , would be contrary to public or judicial policy .

Where a person convicted on his own admission fled the jurisdiction , in the absence of special factors compelling a different result , a ORG order may and should be refused where the sole reason for asking for it was that he wished to escape conviction or sentence in the country where he had commenced proceedings or to avoid extradition to another country for the same reason .

Lord PERSON also dissented , finding that although it was not necessary to import into the GPE legal system the full rigour of the fugitive offender doctrine as it applied in the GPE , permitting a fugitive to give his evidence by ORG so that he could stay out of the jurisdiction and avoid arrest affronted the public conscience and brought the administration of justice into disrepute . Moreover , it was noted that excluding the claimant from presenting his case in court by ORG would not constitute a breach of LAW as the right of access to court is not absolute .

The trial took place in DATE . RP gave evidence by ORG from a GPE hotel suite and the editor and eyewitnesses came to the GPE and gave evidence in person . The applicants claim that ORG ’s cross - examination by ORG was made difficult for defence counsel given delays and inaudibility . On DATE the jury found for ORG and awarded him MONEY ( GBP ) in damages . The applicants did not lodge an appeal .

LAW DATE provides , in so far as relevant , that :

“ CARDINAL.—(CARDINAL ) In civil proceedings evidence shall not be excluded on the ground that it is hearsay .

Rules of court may provide that where a party to civil proceedings adduces hearsay evidence of a statement made by a person and does not call that person as a witness , any other party to the proceedings may , with the leave of the court , call that person as a witness and cross - examine him on the statement as if he had been called by the first - mentioned party and as if the hearsay statement were his evidence in chief . ”

PERSON of ORG ( “ LAW ” ) provides :

“ ( I ) The ORG may control the evidence by giving directions as to ...

( c ) the way in which the evidence is to be placed before the court . ”

Annex CARDINAL to the Practice Direction to the ORG , Pt CARDINAL sets out video conferencing guidance . Paragraph CARDINAL of that guidance states :

“ ORG may be a convenient way of dealing with any part of proceedings : it can involve considerable savings in time and cost . Its use for the taking of evidence from overseas witnesses will , in particular , be likely to achieve material saving of costs , and such savings may also be achieved by its use for taking domestic evidence . It is , however , inevitably not as ideal as having the witness physically present in court . Its convenience should not therefore be allowed to dictate its use . A judgment must be made in every case in which the use of ORG is being considered not only as to whether it will achieve an overall cost saving but as to whether its use will be likely to be beneficial to the efficient , fair and economic disposal of the litigation . In particular , it needs to be recognised that the degree of control a court can exercise over a witness at the remote site is or may be more limited than it can exercise over a witness physically before it . ”


CASE OF HARTMAN v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC [Extracts]

Preliminary objection rejected (estoppel);Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award

On DATE the applicants left the former GPE clandestinely . Since DATE the first applicant has been a permanent resident of GPE , where he was naturalised in DATE , while keeping NORP nationality . The second applicant settled in GPE in DATE . On DATE he obtained NORP nationality , automatically losing NORP nationality in accordance with the bilateral treaty of DATE on naturalisation . On DATE he acquired NORP nationality .

After the applicants had emigrated all their immovable property , namely QUANTITY houses in GPE , a detached house and adjoining land in Želízy , together with movable property in the shape of CARDINAL books from the library of the famous singer PERSON ( PERSON ) , were seized and administered by the local communist authorities . On DATE ORG ( lidový soud ) ordered the confiscation of this property .

After the change of regime in DATE the applicants began to take steps to recover their former possessions .

On DATE ( DATE according to the Government ) the first applicant brought proceedings in ORG ( of over ) for recovery of the land in Želízy , under LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL .

On DATE ... the ORG gave judgment , dismissing the action brought by the first applicant to prove that he was the owner of the land in Želízy .

On DATE the applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG ( krajský soud ) set aside the first - instance judgment and remitted the case to ORG .

On DATE ORG again dismissed the applicant 's action , noting that he had not corrected its procedural defects in the time allowed .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's appeal of DATE ; the ORG asserted that the case was finally concluded on DATE .

On DATE ( DATE according to ORG ) the second applicant brought an action for recovery in ORG against the current owners of the detached house and land in Želízy .

On DATE the ORG gave judgment on the merits , dismissing the second applicant 's action . The judgment became final on DATE .

On DATE ( DATE according to ORG ) the second applicant brought an action against ORG for recovery of the houses under LAW . CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL .

At the end of the hearing on CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's action on the ground with that he was not a NORP national and was therefore not entitled to obtain recovery of the houses he claimed .

On DATE the applicant appealed to ORG ( městský soud ) , arguing that the condition of NORP nationality was of negligible importance , since he had been a NORP citizen at the time when his property was confiscated .

On DATE , in accordance with Law no . CARDINAL , he obtained a certificate of NORP nationality , issued by ORG , and became on that date a citizen of GPE .

On DATE the applicant brought a new action against the district of GPE CARDINAL seeking recovery of CARDINAL of the houses concerned . A hearing was set down for DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the second applicant 's appeal of DATE against the judgment of ORG . The decision concerned was thus upheld and became final on DATE .

Under LAW , everyone is entitled , inter alia , to a hearing within a reasonable time .

Section CARDINAL ) provides that judges are required to rule impartially and fairly and without delay .

By virtue of section DATE ) it is possible to lodge complaints with the organs of the judicial system ( such as presidents of courts , or ORG ) concerning the way courts have conducted judicial proceedings , whether these concern delays , inappropriate behaviour on the part of persons invested with judicial functions or interference with the proper conduct of court proceedings . An appellant is entitled to obtain information on the measures the supervisory authority has taken in response to his appeal , but the latter does not give him a personal right to require the ORG to exercise its supervisory powers .

Section CARDINAL ) provided that the ORG was liable for damage caused by an irregularity committed in the exercise of their official duties by persons vested with public authority .

The ORG incurred strict liability when the following CARDINAL conditions were satisfied : quantifiable pecuniary damage ; an irregularity in the official proceedings of a ORG authority ; and a causal connection between the CARDINAL .

The Government cited in their observations CARDINAL cases ( nos . CARDINAL C CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL C CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) in which claimants had been awarded compensation under PERSON no . TIME for pecuniary damage caused by over - lengthy proceedings .

Section CARDINAL provides that the ORG is liable for damage caused by an irregularity in the conduct of proceedings , including non - compliance with the obligation to perform an act or give a decision within the statutory time - limit . A person who has suffered loss on account of such an irregularity is entitled to damages which section GPE ) requires to include reimbursement of the costs incurred by the claimant in respect of the proceedings in which the irregularity occurred , in so far as those costs are linked to the irregularity .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) provides that when ORG upholds a constitutional appeal it must either set aside the impugned decision by a public authority or , where the infringement of a right guaranteed by LAW is the result of an interference other than a decision , forbid the authority concerned to continue to infringe the right and order it to re - establish the status quo if that is possible .

ORG case - law shows that , in order to be able to declare admissible a constitutional appeal concerning the length of proceedings , it requires the appellant to have appealed to the organs of the judicial system . Where it finds an infringement of the right guaranteed by LAW it may order the court to put an end to the delay and expedite the proceedings ( as it did in cases nos . I ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL and I ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL , cited by the Government in their observations ) , but is not empowered to award compensation to the appellant .

In their additional observations of CARDINAL DATE the ORG gave a fuller account of ORG case - law on the question . In addition to the CARDINAL judgments mentioned in the final decision on admissibility in the case of ORG v. GPE ( application no . CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE , unreported ) they referred to the following judgments :

– no . III . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL : on DATE ORG dismissed the appeal on delays in guardianship proceedings on the ground that the appellant had contributed by his conduct to the prolongation of the proceedings .

– no . III . ÚS CARDINAL : on DATE ORG found that ORG ( vrchní soud ) had infringed with the appellant 's right to have his case heard without unjustified delays . It held that such an infringement would not justify setting aside a decision which had become final unless the delays had led to the infringement of other LAW rights . Procedural delays alone , therefore , did not constitute grounds for setting the decision aside .

– no . III . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL : in this judgement of DATE ORG tried to establish a distinction between the judicial and administrative elements of judicial power by imputing the delays caused by the courts ' excessive workload to the administrative element alone .

– no . Pl . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL : on CARDINAL DATE the full court of ORG decided that the right to a hearing without unjustified delays corresponded to the courts ' obligation to comply with the principle of fair trial , without it being possible to draw a distinction between the various elements of judicial power .

– no . II . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL : on DATE ORG held that delays in proceedings concerning the award of damages could infringe the constitutional right to judicial protection . It therefore ordered the court concerned to expedite the proceedings .

– no . IV . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL : in its judgment of DATE ORG ordered the court concerned to expedite the proceedings and implement the execution it had ordered . ORG

– no . IV . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL : in this judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG held that delays in proceedings already concluded by a decision which had become final did not in themselves amount to a breach of LAW . Setting aside the impugned decision , in a situation where ORG did not have any other means of protecting LAW rights , would be justified only if procedural delays had entailed an infringement of the principle of fair trial or other substantive rights guaranteed by LAW . The appellants had alleged nothing of the sort , nor had they appealed to the president of the court under the PERSON on courts and judges .

– no . I. ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL : on DATE ORG ordered the lower court to cease to infringe an appellant 's right under LAW and to hear his claim without delay . It reiterated that procedural delays were not justified by the courts ' excessive workload and that in such situations it was essential , before lodging a constitutional appeal , to apply to the president of the court in question by lodging an appeal under the LAW on courts and judges . There were however exceptions to that rule since the remedy concerned could not be insisted upon where it proved to be manifestly ineffective .


KOCESKI v. "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA"

Erik Møse;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

The applicants , PERSON ( “ the first applicant ” ) , Mr PERSON ( “ the second applicant ” ) and Mr PERSON ( “ the third applicant ” ) , are NORP nationals , who were born in DATE , DATE respectively and live in NORP . The first and second applicants are the parents of the third applicant .

CARDINAL , may be summarised as follows .

As established in the course of the proceedings described below , companies PERSON and PERSON ( “ the companies ” ) started to construct a local telephone network . Heavy concrete pillars were unloaded on a children ’s playground , which was near the construction site . At TIME on DATE GPE , the DATE daughter of the first and second applicants , slipped and fell to the ground while climbing on the pillars . CARDINAL pillar became dislodged and fell on top of her . As a result , she suffered serious head injuries and died on the spot . The third applicant , who was then DATE , was present at the time and witnessed the accident .

On DATE ORG office lodged an indictment of its own motion against Mr PERSON and Mr GPE , employees in the companies responsible for the construction , accusing them of criminal offences directed against public safety . The first and second applicants took part in the proceedings as victims ( оштетени ) .

On DATE ORG Instance found the accused guilty and sentenced them each to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment . The court held that , contrary to the applicable rules , they had failed to secure the construction site and the concrete pillars in order to avoid any risk of fatal consequences . It further advised the applicants that they could claim compensation by means of a separate civil action before the civil courts .

On DATE ORG accepted appeals by the accused and remitted the case to the trial court for a fresh examination . It ordered the trial court to reconsider the available evidence in order to establish whether the accused had been responsible for placing and securing the concrete pillars . It further rejected as inadmissible an appeal by the first and second applicants in which they complained about the penalty imposed .

On DATE the trial court acquitted PERSON , finding that he had not been responsible for the storage and unloading of the pillars . On the other hand , it convicted PERSON and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment since he had authorised for the pillars to be unloaded and left unsecured in the vicinity of the children ’s playground , despite the fact that he ought to have known that they were dangerous objects . The first and second applicants were again instructed that they could seek compensation before the civil courts . On DATE the trial court rejected an appeal by the first and second applicants , finding that they had participated in the proceedings as victims and that they had been entitled , under the law , to challenge the judgment only in respect of the trial costs . Their appeal , by which they had challenged the merits of the judgment , had accordingly been inadmissible .

On DATE ORG dismissed appeals by the public prosecutor and the first and second applicants ( against the trial court ’s decision of CARDINAL DATE ) and allowed an appeal by PERSON As to the latter , the court dropped the charges on the ground that the prosecution of the offence had become timebarred .

NORP In DATE ORG informed the first and second applicants that on DATE ORG ( PERSON на ORG ) had dismissed the trial judge from office .

In DATE the applicants lodged civil action for damages with ORG claiming compensation from the CARDINAL companies concerned ; company B. that was also involved in the construction ; the municipality of NORP and the ORG ( on behalf of ORG office and the first - instance court ) for the pecuniary and non - pecuniary loss sustained as a result of the death of GPE According to the applicants , no action had been taken in respect of their claim until DATE , when their case was transferred to ORG for consideration .

On DATE ORG of First Instance partly ruled in the applicants’ favour . Referring to the findings of the criminal courts , the court ruled that the companies were at fault for having stored the concrete pillars unsecured on the children ’s playground . It thus awarded the applicants MONEY ( ORG ) in respect of pecuniary damage for funeral costs and MKD CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL in respect of non - pecuniary damage on account of the mental distress caused . The court fixed the interest at the statutory rate to be calculated from the date of GPE ’s funeral ( in respect of the pecuniary damage ) and from DATE of the judgment ( concerning the non - pecuniary damage ) . It dismissed the ORG claim against the municipality of NORP and the ORG , finding no evidence that any responsibility could be attributed to them for the damage sustained . Lastly , it awarded the applicants ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL for the trial costs incurred in the compensation proceedings . It dismissed their claim for reimbursement of the trial costs incurred in the criminal proceedings against Mr PERSON and Mr GPE , arguing that they could only have been claimed in the course of those proceedings . On appeal by the applicants , in DATE ORG quashed that judgment and ordered a retrial .

On DATE the first - instance court again partly allowed the applicants’ claim and awarded them the same amount in respect of pecuniary damage . It also increased the award in respect of non - pecuniary damage to MKD CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL and it awarded them MKD CARDINAL,CARDINAL for the trial costs incurred in those proceedings . It dismissed the claim against the municipality for lack of evidence and it noted that the applicants had withdrawn the claim against the ORG .

On DATE ORG overturned that judgment and increased the amount of compensation awarded in respect of non - pecuniary damage by an additional MKD CARDINAL,CARDINAL It also amended the decision regarding the calculation of the interest . The rest of the first - instance court ’s judgment remained the same . Consequently , the final award was set at FAC ( approximately EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) in respect of pecuniary damage ; MKD CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) in respect of non - pecuniary damage and MKD CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( approximately ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) in respect of trial costs and expenses .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW provides that civil courts are bound by decisions given by criminal courts finding an accused guilty , in respect of the commission of the offence and the convict ’s criminal responsibility .

Section CARDINAL enumerates grounds under which civil proceedings are suspended ipso jure . Under section CARDINAL ) , the civil court may suspend proceedings if the decision depends on whether a criminal offence prosecutable ab initio was committed , who the perpetrator was and if he or she was guilty .

Pursuant to LAW , prosecution of offences subject to a prison sentence of DATE becomes statute - barred DATE after the offence was committed .

Under LAW of LAW , a prosecution will in any event be barred by prescription after a period equal to double the length of the statutory limitation period for prosecution of the offence has elapsed .


Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies);No violation of Art. 5-3;Violation of Art. 5-1;Violation of Art. 5-4;Violation of Art. 5-5;Remainder inadmissible;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

Prior to the events at issue , in DATE , the applicant was convicted of theft and served a prison term . Several other sets of criminal proceedings were opened against him , some of which were terminated on the basis that the applicant , who suffered from schizophrenia , was found to be of unsound mind and therefore not criminally liable .

After DATE the applicant spent DATE in GPE until his expulsion on an unspecified date .

On DATE CARDINAL persons were robbed and murdered in their home in GPE .

On DATE the applicant was arrested , remanded in custody and charged with CARDINAL counts of murder . The charges were later amended to robbery aggravated by murder .

In the course of the investigation approximately twenty witnesses were examined , some of them repeatedly . The investigator ordered numerous expert reports , including autopsies , analyses of blood stains and tissue , ballistic reports and reports by psychiatrists on the applicant 's mental health . Several witness confrontations and identity parades were organised and other evidence was collected .

For DATE the case was dealt with by prosecution authorities at a number of levels in relation to the applicant 's request for a third psychiatric examination ( see paragraphs DATE below ) and , additionally , on account of divergent views expressed by the investigator and prosecutors as regards the precise legal characterisation of the charges . On DATE ORG submitted to ORG an indictment against the applicant .

The trial started in DATE . During the period when the applicant was deprived of his liberty CARDINAL hearings were held . The hearing held on DATE was adjourned as some of the psychiatric experts who had examined the applicant were absent . The next hearing took place on CARDINAL and DATE , when the court examined CARDINAL witnesses and QUANTITY experts . Another hearing was held on DATE .

NORP In a judgment of DATE ORG acquitted the applicant , holding that the charges against him had not been proven .

This judgment was quashed on DATE by ORG , acting on an appeal by the prosecutor , on the basis that , inter alia , the lower court had failed to examine all relevant facts . The case was remitted to ORG for a fresh examination .

The proceedings were terminated on an unspecified date following the applicant 's death on DATE .

Following the applicant 's arrest on DATE , he was remanded in custody by decision of an investigator and a prosecutor who found on the basis of witness testimony and other evidence that there was a reasonable suspicion as to the applicant 's having been involved in the murders committed on DATE .

The applicant spent an unspecified period in the detention facility of ORG . DATE and DATE he was at ORG of ORG for a psychiatric examination ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) .

On an unspecified date prior to DATE he was transferred to GPE prison .

On an unspecified date in DATE , while detained in GPE prison , the applicant underwent a medical examination which detected the presence of a lump in his salivary gland . On DATE he was transferred to GPE and admitted to the PERSON prison hospital for the purpose of surgically removing the lump and analysing it with a view to establishing whether it was cancerous or benign . The applicant refused to undergo surgery and on DATE was transferred back to GPE prison .

On an unspecified date in DATE the applicant appealed against his detention , arguing that he had been unlawfully detained , that he was ill and needed immediate surgery and that there was no longer any risk of his absconding , re - offending or hindering the investigation .

On DATE ORG examined the applicant and his lawyer in person and dismissed the appeal on the basis that as the applicant had had a previous conviction for a serious wilful offence ( theft ) and had been charged with murder , there was a risk of his absconding or re - offending . As regards the applicant 's health condition , the court noted the medical experts ' opinion that the applicant could undergo surgery and receive adequate treatment in the PERSON prison hospital .

NORP The applicant appealed stating , among other things , that he did not want to undergo surgery in the PERSON prison hospital because it did not offer appropriate conditions .

On DATE ORG decided to release the applicant from custody and place him under house arrest . It held that there was sufficient evidence supporting a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed an offence and considered that , as correctly assessed by ORG , there was a real risk of his absconding or re - offending . However , the court took into account the applicant 's health . It noted the medical experts ' opinion that the applicant might have developed a tumour of the salivary gland and decided that he would have greater freedom to choose the medical treatment he wished to have if placed under house arrest .

Following his release from custody the applicant sought and obtained , on DATE , permission to undergo surgery in a GPE hospital . That was performed on an unspecified date before DATE , when he was discharged from hospital .

NORP In DATE the applicant sought his release from house arrest . That was granted by a decision of DATE of ORG on the basis that the proceedings against him risked exceeding a reasonable time . The applicant was released on bail on an unspecified date .

In the course of the criminal proceedings it was established that the applicant had been suffering from paranoid schizophrenia since DATE and had been treated in psychiatric hospitals in DATE .

The investigator in charge of the case ordered an expert report on the applicant 's mental health . He was examined on DATE . The experts , relying mainly on the history of his illness , concluded that the applicant was of unsound mind .

The investigator ordered a second , more detailed examination by a larger group of experts , and , for that purpose , the applicant 's placement at ORG of ORG .

The applicant stayed at the psychiatric hospital DATE and DATE , when he was remanded in custody . In their ensuing report submitted on DATE the medical experts considered that the applicant suffered from a form of schizophrenia but was not of unsound mind within the meaning of LAW . The report mentioned that the applicant 's stay in hospital had been effected “ under the conditions of pre - trial detention ” .

In DATE , and again at DATE , the applicant and his lawyer insisted on a third detailed psychiatric examination in view of the divergent conclusions of the first CARDINAL examinations . The investigator initially refused and the applicant appealed . By decisions of CARDINAL and DATE of the prosecuting authorities , the applicant 's request was granted .

On DATE the prosecutor in charge of the case wrote to the investigator stating that he did not object to a third examination and that the applicant could be placed in a psychiatric hospital for a period of DATE .

On DATE the investigator in charge of the case ordered a third psychiatric report to be prepared by a commission of CARDINAL experts and , accordingly , the applicant 's placement at ORG of ORG . The investigator considered that the length of the applicant 's stay was to be decided by the experts . The order referred to LAW , which concerned the commissioning of expert reports . No reference was made to LAW ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) .

The applicant , who was under house arrest at that time , spent DATE ( from DATE to CARDINAL DATE ) at ORG of ORG . In their ensuing report , CARDINAL of the experts came to the conclusion that despite his mental illness the applicant had been of sound mind at all relevant times and the remaining CARDINAL experts considered that he was of unsound mind within the meaning of LAW .

The experts also stated that the applicant had been placed at ORG “ under conditions of house arrest ” and had complied “ relatively strictly ” with the ensuing restrictions . They stated that towards the end of his stay in the hospital he had occasionally been tense and had made statements that he had been “ fed up ” and would commit suicide or “ blow up the hospital ” .

The relevant legislation at the time of the events in the present case was LAW ( “ ORG ” ) of DATE ( abrogated with effect from DATE ) .

Until DATE , LAW ORG provided that confinement in a psychiatric institution for the purpose of effecting a psychiatric examination of a person charged in criminal proceedings could be ordered by a prosecutor or a court . In practice , such measures were ordered by prosecutors where the case was pending at the investigation stage and by judges where the case was pending before a court .

This provision was amended with effect from DATE . The amended text required a judicial decision in all cases and also introduced a DATE maximum period of confinement ( subject to not CARDINAL extension ) and other procedural guarantees .

Article CARDINAL was in a chapter of the ORG entitled “ Measures of procedural compulsion ” . This chapter contained separate provisions for various such measures – pre - trial detention , house arrest , bail , undertaking not to leave the place of residence , suspension from office , confinement to a psychiatric hospital and several others . The provisions concerning each measure were phrased and structured as separate rules governing separate measures . The same structure was reproduced in the new ORG in force since DATE .

At all relevant times , paragraph CARDINAL of LAW provided that the period spent in psychiatric hospital for examination should count as a period of pre - trial detention . The effect of this provision was that persons sentenced to imprisonment could deduct from their prison term the time spent in a psychiatric hospital .

ORG has issued an instruction for the guidance of health care personnel dealing with persons confined to psychiatric institutions ( Инструкция No . CARDINAL за дейността на здравните органи при настаняване на лица в психиатрични стационари по принудителен ред , ДВ бр.бр. CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL и CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . It clarifies , in its sections CARDINAL and DATE , that persons in pre - trial detention or serving a prison term are to be placed in facilities for detained persons and held under conditions of detention . The instruction does not mention persons under house arrest .

Under LAW ORG of DATE , decisions of an investigator could be appealed against to a prosecutor and prosecutors ' decisions to a higher prosecutor .

Under section CARDINAL ) of the LAW , the ORG is liable for damage caused by forced medical treatment ordered by a court if its decision has been set aside for lack of lawful grounds . Under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the LAW compensation is available for pre - trial detention set aside for lack of lawful grounds ( construed in judicial practice as compensation in cases of acquittal or discontinuation of criminal proceedings ) . Persons seeking redress for damage occasioned by decisions of the investigating and prosecuting authorities or the courts in circumstances falling within the scope of the ORG have no claim under general tort law as the LAW is a lex specialis and excludes the application of the general regime ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the LAW ; реш. № DATE г. от CARDINAL декември DATE г. , по PERSON № DATE г. на ВС GPE ) .


The applicants , PERSON and PERSON are NORP nationals who were born in DATE , respectively , and live in GPE . The respondent Government are represented by Mr PERSON , Deputy ORG - Secretary , ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicants allegedly broke into the house of the first applicant 's husband and , using violence , forced him to sign documents agreeing to the dissolution of their marriage .

On CARDINAL , DATE and DATE the applicants were interrogated .

In DATE ORG preferred a bill of indictment against the applicants charging them with ' aggravated extortion ' , punishable by DATE imprisonment under LAW § CARDINAL of LAW .

ORG held hearings on DATE , DATE and DATE , DATE , CARDINAL May and DATE . On DATE , ORG convicted the applicants of extortion and sentenced them to DATE imprisonment . The execution of the sentence was suspended for DATE .

On appeal , on DATE the FAC ORG quashed the first instance decision and remitted the case to ORG , essentially on the ground of procedural irregularities .

In the resumed proceedings before ORG , on DATE the applicants requested the court to postpone the hearing , which had originally been scheduled for TIME on DATE , to TIME on DATE . They claimed that , as they lived in GPE , they could not arrive in LOC in time by public transport . The hearing was eventually re - scheduled for DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicants ' motion for bias .

The hearings of DATE and DATE were adjourned since the applicants did not appear . Meanwhile , on CARDINAL DATE the police unsuccessfully attempted to escort the second applicant to the courtroom .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicants ' motion that another court be appointed to hear the case .

On DATE ORG held a hearing . Subsequently it appointed ORG to give an opinion on the first applicant 's health .

On DATE the court ordered a telephone company to submit some information as evidence .

A further hearing took place on DATE .

A hearing scheduled for DATE had to be postponed , apparently because of the first applicant 's illness .

In reaction to the applicants ' renewed motion for bias , on DATE ORG appointed ORG to hear the case .

A hearing scheduled by ORG for DATE had to be adjourned as the applicants did not appear .

On DATE ORG appointed a medical expert to confirm whether the first applicant 's illness was such as to prevent her from appearing at the court hearings . On DATE the expert presented his opinion in which he replied in the negative .

A hearing scheduled for CARDINAL DATE had to be adjourned as the applicants did not appear .

On DATE the second applicant was escorted by the police to the courtroom . Subsequently the court held a hearing and heard that applicant , witnesses and an expert .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the court held further hearings and heard the applicants , witnesses and an expert .

On the latter date the court convicted the applicants of ' infringement of personal liberty ' and sentenced them to DATE imprisonment . The execution of the sentence was suspended for DATE .

On DATE both the applicants and the prosecutor appealed . The proceedings are still pending at second instance .

The applicants allege that , during the proceedings , they have not been allowed to leave the country .

On DATE an article was published in a DATE newspaper on the events of DATE . The article was based on the results of the investigation and interviews with the applicants and the first applicant 's husband .

On DATE the applicants filed an action for damages against the newspaper with ORG .

On DATE ORG requested the applicants to complete their action , which they did on DATE . A further order to complete of CARDINAL DATE was complied with on DATE .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the court held hearings . On DATE it ordered the first applicant to complete the pleadings .

On DATE and DATE the court held hearings . On the latter date it dismissed the action .

On DATE the applicants appealed .

On DATE and DATE ORG held hearings . On DATE , it dismissed the appeal .

On DATE the applicants filed a petition for review .

On DATE ORG appointed a legal - aid lawyer for the applicants . The lawyer , being indisposed , refused the appointment on DATE . Another lawyer was appointed on DATE . This lawyer completed the petition on DATE . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicants ' petition for review .

Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL a ) of Act no . CARDINAL of DATE on Travelling Abroad and on Passports ( “ the DATE LAW , as in force until DATE ) prohibited from travelling abroad anyone against whom criminal proceedings for a deliberate offence punishable by a sentence exceeding DATE imprisonment were being pursued , and for as long as those proceedings were pending .

As of DATE , this legislation was replaced by section CARDINAL § CARDINAL a ) of Act no . CARDINAL of DATE on Travelling Abroad ( “ the DATE LAW ) . This provision , as in force until DATE , prohibited from travelling abroad anyone against whom criminal proceedings for an offence punishable by a sentence of or exceeding DATE imprisonment were being pursued , and until a final decision was taken in those proceedings .

Under section CARDINAL § CARDINAL a ) of the same LAW , the passport authority shall refuse to issue a travel document to , or withdraw it from , a person , on whom a travel ban under LAW § CARDINAL has been imposed .

Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL provides that the passport authority may – at the request of a citizen , on whom a travel ban under section CARDINAL § CARDINAL has been imposed DATE grant leave , on a ground worthy of special appreciation , to travel abroad for a definite period of time . Such leave is subject to approval by the public prosecutor or the trial judge .

From DATE , the travel ban prescribed by LAW no . CARDINAL of DATE was annulled .


BACEV v. "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA"

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE , the former GPE .

In DATE , after CARDINAL unsuccessful requests for rectification of the defects in his apartment and compensation for deficiency in its size ( DATE and CARDINAL DATE ) , the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the construction company ( “ the company ” ) to restore or to pay for the damage caused . On DATE the court rejected his claim , finding that it had been withdrawn due to his failure to attend CARDINAL hearings . On DATE this decision became final .

On DATE the applicant instituted civil proceedings for damages against the company claiming that his apartment was of inadequate quality and smaller than was specified in the contract .

On DATE ORG GPE ( GPE суд ) dismissed the applicant ’s claim . It found that on DATE the applicant had entered into agreement with the company for construction of the apartment . On DATE the company had transferred the apartment into the applicant ’s possession . Minutes had been drawn up in which the defects had been noted and accepted by the applicant and the company .

The court referred to the PERSON on obligations ( Зaкон за облигациони односи ) according to which in case of defects , the buyer / acquirer ’s rights expired DATE after notifying the vendor i.e. the CARDINAL responsible for the construction . It held that the applicant ’s claim for damages was time barred as it was lodged before the court DATE after he had first notified the company about the defects ( DATE ) . The court dismissed the applicant ’s argument that the absolute time bar of DATE for damage claims had not expired . It found it irrelevant that the claim was submitted within the absolute time bar as he failed to comply with the relative time bar of DATE which ran from the moment when he became aware of the damage and that the company was responsible . The court also dismissed the applicant ’s claim that the civil proceedings instituted in DATE suspended the time bar as his claim had been rejected as being withdrawn .

The decision was served on the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the applicant appealed this decision indicating the reasons in general terms . He stated :

“ Being dissatisfied with the ORG decision ... I lodge this appeal in time on account of : substantive infringement of the civil procedure ; erroneous and incomplete establishment of the facts and wrong application of the substantive law . I will submit the explanation of the grounds with a subsequent submission . ”

In a submission lodged on DATE , the applicant inter alia contested the court ’s findings that the agreement concluded with the company was of a commercial nature ( contract for construction ) and that consequently , the court had wrongly applied the national law concerning the time bar . He also referred to the minutes drawn on DATE in which the company acknowledged the defects and committed itself to remedying them by DATE , as allegedly newly discovered evidence that could influence the time bar . He argued that the lower court had wrongly interpreted the law in respect of the relevance to the time bar of the civil proceedings terminated in DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . It inter alia found that :

“ the plaintiff [ the applicant ] filed his appeal in time , but he submitted the reasons and the rationale of his appeal after expiration of the time limit of DATE ... as the appeal does not provide any reasoning , the court considered the judgment on the basis contained in the appeal and within its ex officio capacity to determine substantial infringements of the procedure and the correct application of the law ... ”

It went further on to conclude that

“ ... the first instance court had properly established that the claim was time barred as the term of DATE had expired ... ”

It also held that the trial court had correctly applied the substantive law as the facts had been properly and fully established . It also , inter alia , repeated the parts of the lower court ’s decision concerning the agreement between the applicant and the company ; the time when the apartment was transferred into the applicant ’s possession and the dates when the applicant had notified the company about the shortcomings and asked for rectification or compensation .

On DATE ORG informed the applicant that there were no statutory grounds for submitting a request for the protection of legality ( барање за заштита на законитоста ) before ORG .

According to section CARDINAL of ORG ( ORG за парничната постапка ) , if a party concerned fails to attend a hearing or to take another action in the proceedings and consequently loses the right to do so , the court shall uphold that party ’s request to perform that action subsequently ( restoration to previous state of affairs ) if it finds a reasonable explanation for the failure .

When the restoration in the previous state of affairs is granted , the proceedings are restored to the state before the failure had occurred and all other decisions in that respect are considered void .

Section CARDINAL provides that , inter alia , parties can appeal the first instance decision within DATE from the date of service of the trial court decision , if not otherwise regulated by law .

According to section CARDINAL , the trial court shall by decision summon the appellant to correct or supplement the appeal if on the basis of the information provided , it can not be determined which judgment is complained of or if the appeal was not signed . It the appellant does not comply with the court ’s instruction within the time - limit given , the latter shall reject the appeal as incomplete . In case of other deficiencies , the trial court shall transmit the appeal to ORG without summoning the appellant to correct or to complete it .

Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL prescribes inter alia , the following substantial infringements of procedure : if the court was improperly composed or the judgment was adopted by a judge or a lay - judge who had not participated at the trial hearing ; if the judgment was adopted by a judge or a lay - judge who had to be removed by virtue of law , i.e. who was removed by a court decision ; if the court decided a case which fell outside its competence ratione materiae ; if the court wrongly ruled as to its competence ratione loci ; if contrary to the law , the court decided in absentia , on the basis of a confession or a denial ; if the party concerned was deprived of the opportunity to participate in the proceedings by unlawful conduct , in particular due to a lack of service ; if contrary to the law , the court rejected the party ’s request for an interpreter ; if the court decided without a public hearing which was compulsory ; if a person , lacking capacity to stand as a litigant , participated in the proceedings , or the legal entity acting as litigant was not represented by an authorised person , or if a legally incapable person was not represented by the statutory representative , or if the legal or statutory representative did not have the adequate authorisation ; if the court decided on a case in which another proceedings were pending , or if it was res judicata , or if a court settlement had been concluded ; if the public was excluded contrary to the law ; if the impugned decision contained deficiencies which made its review impossible , in particular if it was illegible , contradictory , lacked reasoning or did not provide reasons for the relevant findings of fact or if they were unclear or contradictory .

Section CARDINAL prescribes that the substantive law is wrongly applied if the court did not apply the relevant statutory provision or if it failed to apply it properly .

Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL provides that ORG assesses the trial court decision on the basis of the grounds set out in the appeal and having regard to its ex officio capacity to consider any substantial infringement of the civil procedure and the correct application of the law .


David Thór Björgvinsson;Ineta Ziemele;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Päivi Hirvelä;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicants , born in DATE , are NORP citizens resident in GPE or GPE . They are represented by ORG in GPE .

The applicants , a mother , and CARDINAL adult siblings , NORP citizens , living in GPE , claimed to be the owners of CARDINAL separate plots of land , CARDINAL of which contained the family ’s second home , all of which were in the occupied area of the “ TRNC ” ( “ GPE ” ) .

On DATE the applicants filed claims with ORG ( “ ORG ” ) claiming restitution of this property and damages for loss of use and non - pecuniary damage . On DATE , there was a directions hearing before the ORG , which required the production of further documents . A preliminary hearing took place on DATE at which the “ NORP ” representative made an offer of settlement . The ORG adjourned the case pending the applicants’ response to the offer of settlement . A number of preliminary hearings were listed and adjourned during DATE , during which the applicants claimed further attempts were made to obtain their agreement to a settlement . The applicants lodged a written request on CARDINAL August CARDINAL for a hearing of their claims .

The ORG held hearings on the claims on DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE . On DATE , the ORG issued its decisions . Of the CARDINAL properties in issue , it found that the applicants were not the registered owners of CARDINAL properties , which were held by a registered company of which the applicants were shareholders still in existence . Of the other properties , restitution was ordered in respect of part of CARDINAL plot ( CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) ; as no particulars had been given of loss of use , no award was made for pecuniary loss and as the land had been uninhabited no award for non - pecuniary loss was made . Restitution was refused in respect of the other plots as the property was either occupied by a refugee family or by the military . The claims for non - pecuniary compensation and loss of use were rejected as these could not be made under the law where restitution was refused and where no claim had been lodged for exchange of land or for pecuniary compensation for the land .

The applicants lodged appeals to ORG on DATE and DATE . The appeals were listed for hearing on DATE . By CARDINAL decisions dated DATE , the court upheld the decisions of the ORG , noting that the applicants had been represented by a lawyer at the hearing and that there had been interpretation into LANGUAGE at the hearing . It found that the ORG had not erred in its application of the law , citing the provisions concerned .

The relevant law and practice are set out in GPE and Others v. GPE ( dec . ) [ ORG ] , ORG . CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL , ORG , DATE , CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL , ECHR DATE .


Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in Velenje .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the applicant was injured while working for the NORP employer GVV in GPE . He consequently instituted CARDINAL sets of civil proceedings in ORG ( Okrožno sodišče v PERSON ) seeking damages for the injuries sustained . In both proceedings an insurance company ORG was acting as an intervening party .

On DATE the applicant instituted civil proceedings against GVV seeking damages in the amount of CARDINAL tolars ( MONEY ) for the injuries sustained on DATE .

DATE and DATE the applicant lodged CARDINAL written submissions and/or adduced evidence .

DATE and DATE he made CARDINAL requests that a date be set for a hearing .

Of the CARDINAL hearings held DATE and DATE , CARDINAL was adjourned due to the absence of both parties and CARDINAL was adjourned due to the absence of the applicant

At the last hearing the court decided to deliver a written judgment . The judgment , upholding the applicant ’s claim in part , was served on the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the applicant appealed to ORG ( PERSON v PERSON ) . GVV cross - appealed .

On DATE the court dismissed both appeals .

The judgment was served on the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with ORG sodišče ) .

On DATE the court dismissed the applicant ’s appeal .

On DATE the applicant instituted civil proceedings against ORG seeking damages in the amount of CARDINAL tolars ( MONEY ) for the injuries sustained on DATE .

DATE and DATE the applicant lodged CARDINAL preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence .

DATE and CARDINAL DATE he made CARDINAL requests that a date be set for a hearing .

Of the CARDINAL hearings held DATE and DATE none was adjourned at the request of the applicant .

During the proceedings the court appointed a medical expert . The court also sought an additional opinion from the appointed expert

On DATE the applicant appealed to ORG .

On DATE the court allowed the applicant ’s appeal in part and increased the damages awarded .


The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant brought civil proceedings claiming damages from the regional police department .

The hearings scheduled at ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) for DATE and DATE did not take place as the judge was involved in different proceedings . The applicant also chose to amend his claims which required their communication to the respondent .

The hearing of DATE was adjourned at the respondent ’s request to collect certain evidence .

By judgment of DATE , ORG awarded the applicant MONEY ( RUR ) against the police department . The respondent appealed .

On DATE ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) decided to postpone examination of the appeal pending the outcome of an inquiry initiated by ORG with ORG concerning compliance of certain legal provisions with LAW .

Following the adoption of a judgment by ORG on DATE , on CARDINAL DATE ORG resumed the appeal proceedings .

The appeal hearing of DATE did not take place due to the illness of the respondent ’s representative .

On DATE ORG examined the appeal , set the judgment aside and ordered re - examination of the case .

At the hearings of DATE and DATE the applicant amended his claims . Both hearings were adjourned to enable the respondent to study the amendments .

The hearings of CARDINAL DATE and DATE did not take place due to the respondent ’s representative ’s involvement in different proceedings and the judge ’s illness , respectively .

By judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG awarded the applicant RUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL in respect of unpaid disability allowance for the period from DATE . The police department was also ordered to pay ORG starting from DATE and to adjust that sum on a DATE basis in accordance with the statutory level of minimum wages and the cost of living in LOC .

Neither of the parties challenged the judgment , which became final on DATE . The enforcement proceedings were opened .

On DATE the police department asked ORG to fix a new time - limit for lodging an appeal against the judgment of DATE .

On DATE ORG rejected their request . The police department appealed , and the applicant requested that the appeal hearing be postponed due to his illness . DATE ORG quashed the impugned decision and remitted the matter to the first instance .

On DATE ORG granted the request for a new time - limit . The applicant appealed and asked to postpone the appeal hearing due to his counsel ’s unavailability . On DATE ORG upheld the decision .

By an interim decision of CARDINAL DATE , ORG stayed enforcement of the judgment of DATE . After lodging an appeal , the applicant again asked to postpone the appeal hearing due to his counsel ’s unavailability .

On DATE ORG set aside the judgment of CARDINAL DATE and the decision to stay the enforcement proceedings . A new hearing was required .

On DATE the applicant amended his claims .

The hearing of DATE did not take place due to the judge ’s illness .

In the meantime the applicant lodged an application for supervisory review of the appeal decision of DATE . On DATE the supervisory instance called up his case and dismissed his application on DATE .

At the hearings of DATE and CARDINAL DATE the applicant again modified his claims . The respondent requested that the latter hearing be adjourned to verify some evidence . The next hearing of DATE had also to be adjourned due to another amendment of his claims by the applicant .

The respondent ’s representative did not appear at the hearings scheduled for CARDINAL and DATE due to his involvement in different proceedings .

On DATE the applicant again changed his claims , following which the hearing was adjourned to collect certain evidence .

The hearings of DATE and DATE did not take place as the judge was first ill and then involved in different proceedings .

On DATE and DATE the court granted the parties’ motions for obtaining of certain evidence and sent relevant inquiries .

At the next hearing that took place on DATE the applicant again modified his claims .

On DATE ORG awarded the applicant a lump sum of ORG and ordered the police department to pay him ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL per month starting from DATE . The judgment was upheld on appeal by ORG on DATE and enforced on CARDINAL DATE .


David Thór Björgvinsson;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in LOC . He was represented before the ORG by ORG , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG of GPE ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant ’s daughter , PERSON , who was then DATE , died as a result of injuries which she sustained while climbing the PERSON veža peak in the High PERSON . The peak ’s summit is at QUANTITY above sea level .

PERSON and her partner started the climb in excellent weather conditions at TIME on DATE . Both climbers were sufficiently experienced for the climb .

At TIME PERSON fell when a block of rock came loose . She remained hanging on the rope with her head pointing downwards QUANTITY below her co - climber . QUANTITY below her CARDINAL other climbers , Mr. and Mrs. PERSON , were preparing to start the same climb and witnessed the accident .

At TIME and at TIME attempted to contact ORG and ORG using a mobile phone . Both lines were busy . After another attempt she reached ORG at TIME She was told that a helicopter would be sent immediately and that it would arrive at the place of the accident in TIME .

The accident had also been reported to the operations centre of ORG in GPE by a tourist passing near the foot of the mountain . The records indicate that the operations centre received the first emergency call about the accident at TIME

CARDINAL and TIME the co - climber fixed the ropes with a view to preventing PERSON from any further falls and descended by rope to the latter . PERSON was badly injured , but she remained conscious and communicated with her partner until TIME At TIME Mr. and Mrs. PERSON decided to climb up to PERSON and her partner .

At TIME the duty officer of ORG informed Mr J. by phone that the helicopter would arrive in TIME as it was on a different rescue mission in GPE at that time .

At TIME the doctor of ORG called Mr J. to tell him that the rescue team was on its way .

The CARDINAL climbers supported PERSON , hydrated her and communicated with her .

At TIME the rescue service helicopter landed in GPE to fill the fuel tank and to prepare the equipment needed for the rescue of PERSON . At TIME the helicopter took off from GPE . On its flight to the mountain it landed in LOC at TIME , to board CARDINAL member of ORG . It reached the place of the accident at TIME

At TIME the pilot informed the land operator that strong turbulence was preventing PERSON from being rescued directly from the helicopter in flight . A reinforcement of the rescue team and special equipment were required in order to reach the injured person .

The helicopter returned to ORG . CARDINAL a member of ORG with the necessary equipment joined the rescue team and the fuel tank was refilled .

At TIME another CARDINAL members of ORG boarded the helicopter in LOC .

At TIME the rescue team was dropped on the summit of the mountain . The helicopter flew off to attend to another accident . TIME the CARDINAL climbers who had stayed with the injured person spotted the members of the rescue team QUANTITY above them .

The Government submitted that the team reached PERSON at CARDINAL p.m.

According to the climbers involved , the rescue team reached the injured at TIME

By that time PERSON had lost consciousness .

The Government submitted that PERSON had by that time already reached the stage of clinical death .

The members of the rescue team and the climbers fixed PERSON to a transport stretcher . She died at TIME

Her body was lowered to the foot of the mountain by ropes at TIME

A forensic doctor concluded , on DATE , that her death had been caused by the shock resulting from the injuries and by bleeding , and by a third degree embolism . The report indicated that PERSON had dislocated her right thigh bone , that the soft tissues of her right arm and thigh had been massively contused and that she had suffered from an intracranial haemorrhage .

The applicant requested ORG ( Úrad pre dohľad nad zdravotnou starostlivosťou ) to examine whether appropriate medical assistance had been provided to his daughter .

On DATE the ORG branch office of that institution replied to the applicant that no shortcomings had been established in the providing of medical assistance to PERSON .

The letter stated that the helicopter team had been trained and equipped in accordance with the relevant law . The doctor , who had entered the climbing area of the mountain despite the fact that he had not been obliged to do so , found that PERSON had died before she was released from the rope and put on a transport stretcher . Resuscitation had not been possible in the situation . The question as to whether the life of the injured person could have been saved had there been an earlier intervention was purely hypothetical .

The letter further stated that nothing indicated that the actions of ORG and ORG had not been duly coordinated . According to ORG , it had been more efficient to have recourse to ORG in the case of the applicant ’s daughter . In a letter of DATE the Minister of the ORG informed ORG that he had discovered no shortcomings in the action of ORG which fell under the authority of his Ministry .

On DATE the sister of PERSON challenged the conclusions of the LOC branch office .

On DATE , in its protocol , an expert commission under the authority of the President of ORG found an infringement of the relevant health care legislation by ORG .

The commission held that the operator of ORG had proceeded erroneously when sending a helicopter based in GPE to intervene at the very extreme point of its operation area in GPE while a different helicopter based in GPE had been available for the same territory .

The commission qualified the operator ’s misjudgment as a “ human factor ” failure . It had resulted in a delay of TIME during which the helicopter based in GPE had not been available for operations in the High Tatras .

On DATE ORG informed ORG of the commission ’s findings . ORG was requested to bring administrative proceedings against ORG and to impose a fine for the latter ’s failure to comply with its duties .

ORG discontinued the proceedings , on DATE , holding that ORG had not contravened any of the duties imposed by law .

DATE ORG examined the way in which the operators of ORG had organised the rescue of the applicant ’s daughter .

The report indicates that the operators had correctly decided to organise the rescue in co - ordination with ORG . To that effect they had contacted the latter at TIME , immediately after the incident had been reported .

In particular , access to the place of the incident had been difficult . The rescue team would have needed TIME to reach it on foot . In addition , the operators had correctly presumed that the assistance of ORG was required with a view to ensuring the rapid transportation of the injured person to hospital . The members of ORG had been prepared to intervene in co - operation with ORG within TIME after the receipt of the information about the incident .

ORG found no shortcomings in the way in which ORG had acted .

On DATE criminal proceedings were brought within ORG in the context of the accident as a result of which the applicant ’s daughter had died . The investigator questioned CARDINAL witnesses . He considered a forensic report and questioned a forensic expert . Records of communications and reports on the rescue action were submitted by ORG and ORG . The investigator also considered other documentary evidence including reports of ORG and ORG .

On the basis of the evidence obtained the police investigator concluded , on DATE , that the death of the applicant ’s daughter was the result of the injuries which she had suffered during the climb . Criminal liability of a third person in that context was not established . The criminal proceedings were therefore discontinued .

The applicant filed a complaint . He argued , inter alia , that the investigator had disregarded the above protocol of the expert commission of ORG .

On DATE a prosecutor of ORG in GPE , after having obtained additional documentary evidence , dismissed the applicant ’s complaint . The decision stated that the rescue helicopter had been intervening at a different place within its operation area at the time when the emergency call about the incident of the applicant ’s daughter had reached the operations centre . It had started attending to the incident in the High PERSON immediately after it had ended the previous rescue action . The expert commission ’s conclusion that a different helicopter could have been used for the intervention in GPE did not provide a sufficient basis for prosecuting any person for injury to health . The prosecutor found no shortcomings in the way in which the rescue action had been carried out . Reference was made to a report indicating that the doctor had attended to the victim directly in the exposed climbing area despite the fact that he had not been obliged to do so and that the scope of the climber ’s injuries were such that only immediate intervention at a specialised health care centre could have saved her life .

On DATE a prosecutor of ORG in Prešov upheld the above conclusion that no criminal offence had been committed . The letter admitted , however , that the rescue of the applicant ’s daughter had not been organised in an optimal manner . In particular , the decision to send the helicopter based in GPE to a remote place , albeit within its operation area , had not been correct . It was also questionable whether the helicopter should not have deposited the rescue climbers on the summit of the mountain immediately instead of attempting to rescue the injured person directly from the air . With reference to the statement of a forensic expert the prosecutor held that those considerations could not affect the position in the case . In particular , the saving of the life of the injured person would only have been possible in the case of immediate medical intervention which had not been possible for objective reasons .

On DATE ORG , with reference to the above conclusions , dismissed the applicant ’s claim that appropriate medical assistance had not been provided to his daughter in a timely manner . The letter stated that there was no justification for the criminal proceedings to be resumed .

At the request of the sister of PERSON , ORG of ORG carried out an analysis of the accident and of the subsequent events .

The report dated DATE states , inter alia , that the decision of the CARDINAL climbers present not to attempt to lower PERSON to the foot of the mountain by ropes had been correct given that they had been informed that a professional rescue team would arrive shortly . However , that information had turned out to be false . The speediness of the rescue in such cases was of primordial importance . Timely medical intervention could probably have saved the life of the injured climber . There were obvious mistakes as regards the professional rescue system . The most important one seemed to be the late arrival of the helicopter for which no satisfactory explanation existed at the time when the report was drafted .

The report further contains recommendations on action to be taken by mountaineers in cases of similar accidents .

In DATE ORG adopted a Manifesto for Emergency Medicine in LOC . It provides , inter alia , that emergency medical care of a high standard should be available to every person in need in all situations and at all times . This requires a dedicated system which provides appropriate care for all acutely ill or injured persons .

In a speech given at ORG held in GPE in DATE , Professor Dr. PERSON , President of ORG , stated , inter alia , that one of the essential elements of the rescue chain was the statutory definition of delays in first - aid intervention while taking into account the territorial and geographical situation of the country concerned . While it was not realistic to require that an emergency team should reach a person whose life was in danger within TIME in all NORP states , that period should be set as a standard in densely populated and highly developed countries .

The applicant submits that , as from the moment when an accident is reported , a physician attached to an emergency service is required to start life - saving intervention within TIME in various ORG in GPE , within TIME in GPE and within TIME in GPE .

Pursuant to LAW , everyone has the right to life .

Article CARDINAL guarantees to everyone the right to protection of health .

Article CARDINAL enacted with effect from DATE provides :

“ CARDINAL . The Constitutional Court shall decide on complaints lodged by natural or legal persons alleging a violation of their fundamental rights or freedoms or of human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in international treaties ratified by GPE ... unless the protection of such rights and freedoms falls within the jurisdiction of a different court .

When the Constitutional Court finds that a complaint is justified , it shall deliver a decision stating that a person ’s rights or freedoms set out in paragraph CARDINAL were violated as a result of a final decision , by a particular measure or by means of other interference . It shall quash such a decision , measure or other interference . When the violation found is the result of the failure to act , ORG may order that [ the authority ] which violated such rights or freedoms should take the necessary action . At the same time ORG may return the case to the authority concerned for further proceedings , order that such an authority abstain from violating fundamental rights and freedoms ... or , where appropriate , order that those who violated the rights or freedoms set out in paragraph CARDINAL restore the situation existing prior to the violation .

In its decision on a complaint ORG may grant adequate financial satisfaction to the person whose rights under paragraph CARDINAL were violated . ” ...

In accordance with its established practice , the Constitutional Court lacks jurisdiction to examine a complaint lodged by natural or legal persons when the determination of the point in issue involves the preliminary question of conflict of legal rules ( see , for example , I. ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL , decision of CARDINAL DATE ; II . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL , decision of DATE ; NORP . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL , decision of DATE ; or PERSON . ÚS CARDINAL , decision of CARDINAL DATE ) .

Act CARDINAL/CARDINAL governs health care and health services .

Pursuant to section DATE ) , health care is provided correctly where , without delay , medical intervention occurs which is necessary for the correct identification of a disease and for ensuring timely and efficient treatment with a view to healing or improving the state of a person with due regard to the current state of medical science .

Act CARDINAL/CARDINAL Coll . governs , inter alia , persons providing health services .

Under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) , ORG gives permission for the operation of an aerial ambulance as an emergency health service .

ORG ) obliges persons providing health services to give to any person indispensable medical assistance without any unjustified delay .

Act CARDINAL/CARDINAL Coll . governs the emergency health service , that is urgent assistance to persons whose life or health is at immediate threat ( section CARDINAL ) .

The emergency health service comprises operation centres and providers of emergency health services . The latter run emergency ambulances on the basis of an authorisation issued by ORG and form part of the integrated rescue system of GPE ( section CARDINAL ) .

Operation centres are established by ORG , and they direct and co - ordinate the emergency service in a manner which makes it possible to maintain its fluid and permanent character . They are entitled to order the provider of a health service to intervene ( section CARDINAL ) .

Persons providing health services in an emergency are obliged , inter alia , to establish a response centre in the district concerned so that an ambulance can leave within TIME from the receipt of an order by the operations centre or co - ordination centre involved . The time - limit within which an aerial ambulance is to leave for an emergency intervention is to be laid down in a special regulation ( section CARDINAL ) . According to the information available , no regulation governing the aforementioned point has been issued .

A person authorised to provide medical assistance in the case of an emergency can be fined by ORG in the case of failure to meet one of the obligations under LAW ( section CARDINAL ) .

At the relevant time the details concerning the emergency medical service were set out in the Regulation of ORG no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , as amended .

The Regulation specified the requirements as regards the equipment and staffing of operation centres , emergency medical stations and ambulances of the emergency medical service including the aerial ones .

Annex CARDINAL to the Regulation provided that CARDINAL stations of aerial emergency medical service were to be established , namely in GPE , Banská GPE , PERSON , PERSON , GPE and PERSON .

Act CARDINAL/CARDINAL governs ORG . It is established under the authority of ORG from the budget of which it is financed ( section CARDINAL ) .

Pursuant to section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) , ORG organises and carries out the rescue of persons , in particular in co - ordination with ORG . It forms a part of and carries out duties within the integrated rescue system in GPE ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) ) .

Under LAW an ORG is established which , among other things , is charged with the supervision , in the context of public administration , of the provision of health care ( “ ORG ” ) . It carries out its duties impartially and independently of public authorities or other persons ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ) .

Under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(b ) , ORG controls whether health care is provided correctly as required by section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of Act CARDINAL/CARDINAL .

Where the ORG has established shortcomings in the provision of health care , it can initiate the imposition of sanctions on the provider by the respective public authority .

Under LAW , natural persons have the right to protection of their personal rights ( personal integrity ) , in particular their life and health , civil and human dignity , privacy , name and personal characteristics .

Under LAW , natural persons have the right to request that unjustified infringements of their personal rights be ended and that the consequences of such infringements be eliminated . They also have the right to appropriate just satisfaction .

LAW provides that , in cases where the satisfaction obtained under LAW is insufficient , in particular because the injured party ’s dignity or social standing has been significantly diminished , the injured party is also entitled to financial compensation for non - pecuniary damage .

Pursuant to Article CARDINAL , after the death of the injured party the right to the protection of his or her personal integrity passes to his or her spouse and children or , in the case of there being none , to his or her parents .

In an action in ORG ( file no . CARDINALC CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) a mother claimed , among other things , financial compensation for non - pecuniary damage in connection with the death of her daughter . She relied on the previous conviction for manslaughter of a car driver who had run over her daughter .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG accepted that the plaintiff had suffered damage of a non - pecuniary nature and awarded her CARDINAL NORP korunas ( SKK ) by way of compensation .

In an action in the Žiar nad Hronom District Court ( file no . CARDINAL C CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) a mother claimed , among other things , financial compensation for non - pecuniary damage caused to her and her son in connection with the latter ’s violent death . She relied on the defendant ’s previous conviction for the extremely violent and racist murder of her son .

ORG concluded that the plaintiff and her son had suffered non - pecuniary damage and in a judgment of DATE it awarded the plaintiff SKK CARDINAL in respect of the non - pecuniary damage which she had suffered and SKK CARDINAL in respect of the non - pecuniary damage caused to her son . On DATE ORG in Banská GPE upheld the first - instance judgment .

In the ORG proceedings file no . CARDINALC CARDINAL/CARDINAL the plaintiff claimed compensation for non - pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the fact that her mother had died during childbirth due to the incorrect actions of the physician on duty .

On DATE ORG partially granted the claim . It relied on expert opinions concluding that the plaintiff ’s mother had not received appropriate health care as required by the law . It ordered the defendant medical institution to pay SKK CARDINAL,CARDINAL to the plaintiff in compensation for non - pecuniary damage . The judgment became final on DATE .

Act PERSON . governs liability for damage caused in the context of the exercise of public authority .

Section CARDINAL provides that the LAW extends to decision - making and official actions of public authorities related to the rights and interests protected by law and the obligations of natural or legal persons . Public authorities for the purpose of the LAW comprise ORG organs , local self - administration bodies , public - law institutions and also natural or legal persons whom the law has entrusted with the exercise of public authority .

Under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) , ORG liability under LAW comprises , inter alia , incorrect official action .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) qualifies as an incorrect official action , inter alia , a public authority ’s failure to take an action within the time - limit set , inactivity of a public authority or any other unlawful interference with rights and interests of natural or legal persons protected by law .

Pursuant to paragraph CARDINAL of section CARDINAL , any person who has suffered damage as a result of incorrect official action is entitled to compensation .

Section CARDINAL provides for ( i ) compensation for pecuniary damage including loss of profit and , ( ii ) where the finding of a violation of a right does not constitute sufficient satisfaction , also compensation for damage of a nonpecuniary nature .