Violation of Art. 5-3;Non-pecuniary damage -  financial award

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE . The application was lodged on his behalf by his mother , PERSON , who submitted a duly signed written authorisation from the applicant .

On DATE the ORG ( Sąd Rejonowy ) ordered that the applicant be detained on remand in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed several counts of armed robbery . It considered that there was a risk that the applicant would attempt to induce witnesses to give false testimony or to obstruct the proceedings by other unlawful means . It also relied on the severity of the anticipated penalty .

In the course of the investigation , the applicant 's detention was prolonged on the following dates : CARDINAL DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE , DATE and DATE .

NORP In its decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( Sąd Apelacyjny ) considered that the strong suspicion against him of having committed the serious offences with which he had been charged , the severity of the anticipated sentence and the risk of his tampering with evidence justified holding him in custody .

On DATE the ORG terminated the investigation . On DATE the applicant was indicted on CARDINAL charges , including , inter alia , several counts of armed robbery before ORG ( PERSON ) . The bill of indictment listed CARDINAL charges brought against CARDINAL accused , who were all detained on remand . The case - file comprised CARDINAL volumes . The prosecution asked the court to hear evidence from CARDINAL witnesses . The principal witness was a certain LOC , who was indicted together with all the defendants but gave evidence against them .

The trial began on DATE . However , as of DATE the reading out of the bill of indictment by the prosecution was still continuing .

During the trial , the applicant 's detention was prolonged several times by ORG . The relevant decisions were given on DATE ( extending the applicant 's detention until DATE ) , on DATE ( ordering his continued detention until DATE ) , on DATE ( prolonging his detention until DATE ) , on DATE ( extending that period until DATE ) , on DATE ( ordering his continued detention until DATE ) , on DATE ( prolonging that period until DATE ) , on DATE ( extending his detention until DATE ) , on DATE ( ordering his continued detention until DATE ) , on DATE ( prolonging his detention until DATE ) and on DATE ( extending that period until DATE ) . As at the latter date , CARDINAL of the CARDINAL accused were still detained on remand and the trial court had heard most of the prosecution witnesses .

In its decision of DATE , ORG considered that the applicant 's detention was justified under LAW since that provision established a presumption to the effect that the likelihood of a severe penalty being imposed on the applicant might induce him to obstruct the proceedings .

NORP In its decision of DATE , ORG added that the case was “ particularly complex ” within the meaning of LAW CARDINAL of the Code of Criminal Procedure .

In its decision of DATE , ORG observed that up to DATE the main reason for the delays during the trial was the obstructiveness of the defendants and the abuse of the rights of the defence .

On DATE the trial court made a severance order with a view to expediting the proceedings , and thereafter CARDINAL defendants ( ORG , GPE , GPE and GPE ) , who in the meantime had been released from detention , were to be tried separately from other defendants .

During the trial the applicant filed numerous but unsuccessful applications for release on health grounds and appealed , likewise unsuccessfully , against the decisions prolonging his detention . He maintained that the length of his detention was excessive and unreasonable and that the charges against him lacked a sufficiently strong basis . He also relied on his family 's situation .

It appears that the applicant is still in detention pending trial .

The Code of Criminal Procedure of DATE , which entered into force on DATE , defines detention on remand as CARDINAL of the so - called “ preventive measures ” ( środki zapobiegawcze ) . The other measures are bail ( poręczenie majątkowe ) , police supervision ( dozór policji ) , guarantee by a responsible person ( poręczenie osoby godnej zaufania ) , guarantee by a social entity ( poręczenie społeczne ) , temporary ban on engaging in a given activity ( zawieszenie oskarżonego w określonej działalności ) and prohibition to leave the country ( zakaz opuszczania kraju ) .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL sets out the general grounds for imposition of the preventive measures . That provision reads :

“ CARDINAL . Preventive measures may be imposed in order to ensure the proper conduct of proceedings and , exceptionally , also in order to prevent an accused 's committing another , serious offence ; they may be imposed only if the evidence gathered shows a significant probability that an accused has committed an offence . ”

Article CARDINAL lists grounds for detention on remand . It provides , in so far as relevant :

“ CARDINAL . Detention on remand may be imposed if :

( CARDINAL ) there is a reasonable risk that an accused will abscond or go into hiding , in particular when his identity can not be established or when he has no permanent abode [ in GPE ] ;

( CARDINAL ) there is a reasonable risk that an accused will attempt to induce [ witnesses or co - defendants ] to give false testimony or to obstruct the proper course of proceedings by any other unlawful means ;

NORP If an accused has been charged with a serious offence or an offence for the commission of which he may be liable to a statutory maximum sentence of DATE imprisonment , or if a court of first instance has sentenced him to DATE imprisonment , the need to continue detention to ensure the proper conduct of proceedings may be based on the likelihood that a severe penalty will be imposed . ”

The Code sets out the margin of discretion as to the continuation of a specific preventive measure . Article CARDINAL reads , in so far as relevant :

“ CARDINAL . Detention on remand shall not be imposed if another preventive measure is sufficient . ”

Article CARDINAL , in its relevant part , reads :

“ CARDINAL . If there are no special reasons to the contrary , detention on remand shall be lifted , in particular if depriving an accused of his liberty would :

( CARDINAL ) seriously jeopardise his life or health ; or

( CARDINAL ) entail excessively harsh consequences for the accused or his family . ”

The DATE Code not only sets out maximum statutory time - limits for detention on remand but also , in LAW , lays down that the relevant court – within those time - limits – must in each detention decision determine the exact time for which detention shall continue .

Article CARDINAL sets out time - limits for detention . In the version applicable up to DATE it provided :

“ CARDINAL . Imposing detention in the course of an investigation , the court shall determine its term for a period not exceeding DATE .

The whole period of detention on remand until the date on which the first conviction at first instance is imposed may not exceed DATE .

Only ORG may , on application made by the court before which the case is pending or , at the investigation stage , on application made by ORG , prolong detention on remand for a further fixed period exceeding the periods referred to in DATE , when it is necessary in connection with a stay of the proceedings , for the purpose of a prolonged psychiatric observation of the accused or a prolonged preparation of an expert report , when evidence needs to be obtained in a particularly complex case or from abroad or when the accused has deliberately prolonged the proceedings , as well as on account of other significant obstacles that could not be overcome . ”

On DATE paragraph CARDINAL was amended and since then the competence to prolong detention beyond the time - limits set out in paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL has been vested with the court of appeal within whose jurisdiction the offence in question has been committed .


Preliminary objection dismissed (non-exhaustion);Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial claim;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant had a car accident . CARDINAL vehicles were involved in the incident . PERSON , the driver of the car that ran into the applicant 's car , had taken out insurance with the insurance company ORG .

On DATE the applicant instituted civil proceedings against ORG in ORG , ORG ( PERSON sodišče v GPE , PERSON v GPE ) seeking payment of ORG ( MONEY ) for the material damage sustained .

On DATE the court held a hearing and decided to request ORG ( ORG in GPE ) , GPE , to hear the applicant who lived in GPE at the time .

On DATE the Convention took effect with respect to GPE .

On DATE the applicant urged the court to issue the request to ORG . She also requested the court to process her case more diligently .

On DATE ORG ( ORG sodišče v GPE ) gained jurisdiction in the present case due to the reform of the NORP judicial system .

On DATE and DATE , and CARDINAL DATE , DATE and DATE and CARDINAL DATE the applicant repeated her request of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the court informed the applicant that it would only request the court in GPE to take her testimony , if she produced substantiated reasons why she could not appear before the court in GPE .

On DATE the applicant informed the court that the reason why she should be heard in GPE was that she did not have sufficient knowledge of LANGUAGE language to appear before the NORP court and that retaining an interpreter would be to costly and time consuming . Since the court found those reasons insufficient , it decided not to request a court in GPE to hear the applicant .

On DATE the applicant requested that a date be set for a hearing .

On DATE the court held a hearing and heard the applicant without an interpreter . The court found that the applicant was able to understand the questions in LANGUAGE and was also able to respond in the same language to the questions asked . The court decided to adjourn the hearing till DATE .

On DATE the applicant requested the court to postpone the hearing scheduled for DATE in order to allow her time to summon GPE , one of the witnesses . Her request was granted .

The postponed hearing was held on DATE , but GPE did not attend .

On DATE the applicant informed the court that GPE had died and requested the court to appoint a road traffic expert .

On DATE the court held a hearing and decided to appoint a road traffic expert .

On DATE the court appointed a road traffic expert and awarded him a delay of DATE to produce an expert opinion .

On DATE the expert delivered the opinion holding that Mr F.J. was only party liable for the damage made on the applicant 's car . Another person involved in the accident was partly responsible for the remaining damage , but this person was not a party to the proceedings .

On DATE the applicant submitted her comments on the expert opinion .

On DATE the applicant requested the court to seek an additional opinion from the appointed expert .

On DATE the court ordered the expert to produce an additional opinion , which he did on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged written submissions .

On DATE the court held a hearing , heard the appointed expert and decided to deliver a written judgment .

The judgment , upholding the applicant 's claim in part , was served on the applicant on DATE . The judgment became final on DATE .

“ Everyone shall have the right to compensation for damage caused by the unlawful acts of a person or body when performing a function or engaged in an activity on behalf of a state or local authority or as a holder of public office . ... ”

If a court is responsible for undue delay in the proceedings and an individual has sustained pecuniary damage as a result , he or she may claim compensation from the ORG under LAW CARDINAL ( PERSON zakonik ) . The person seeking compensation will thus have to prove , firstly , that there has been a delay in the proceedings ; secondly , that damage has occurred and , thirdly , that there is a causal link between the conduct of the court and the damage sustained .


Violation of Art. 8;Not necessary to examine Art. 6;Not necessary to examine Art. 13;Not necessary to examine P7-5;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - domestic proceedings;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings

The applicant , born in DATE , lived at the time of the events with her family in Absdorf .

Following difficulties in the relationship with her husband , the applicant left the common household in DATE . On DATE the applicant 's husband instituted divorce proceedings with the ORG ( LOC ) . The court subsequently , on CARDINAL DATE , suspended the divorce proceedings as the applicant had meanwhile returned to the common household and had reconciled herself with her husband .

On DATE the applicant , following a violent assault by her husband and his family , left the common household again .

On DATE she filed an action with the Kirchberg / Wagram District Court ( Bezirksgericht ) for sole custody of the CARDINAL children from the marriage , PERSON , born in DATE , and the PERSON , born in DATE , who stayed at their father 's . On DATE ORG granted her provisional custody of the M. , at that time a nursling . Subsequently , on DATE , the PERSON was taken away from the applicant 's husband by compulsory means . On CARDINAL DATE the applicant requested the provisional custody of F. and further that ORG withdraw , as an interim measure , PERSON 's name from her husband 's passport . She submitted that she feared that her husband would bring PERSON to GPE .

On DATE the applicant 's husband requested that the divorce proceedings be resumed . However , in a further hearing before ORG on DATE , the parties agreed to suspend the divorce proceedings until the outcome of criminal proceedings instituted against the applicant 's husband concerning his violent assaults against her .

In DATE ORG informed the applicant and her husband that at the moment it would not take any further official measures concerning the custody of their children . It referred in this regard to a report by ORG Bezirkshauptmannschaft ) stating that despite the efforts of its social workers and the parties ' repeated questioning by ORG no solution could be reached . Both parents claimed custody , objected to visit arrangements in neutral surroundings and were uncertain whether they wished divorce or not . ORG in particular referred to ORG statement that there were no reasons to change the present situation of separation of the CARDINAL children .

On DATE the applicant reiterated , in the context of submissions made in another matter with the court , her request of DATE for sole custody of F.

NORP In DATE , after the criminal proceedings against him had been terminated , the applicant 's husband requested that divorce proceedings be resumed . On DATE ORG pronounced the divorce . With final decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( Oberster Gerichtshof ) confirmed ORG findings . No decision was taken on the custody of the children .

On DATE the applicant again requested that sole custody of F. be granted to her and that the court issue an injunction prohibiting the father from bringing F. to GPE . She submitted that her former husband did not sufficiently care for PERSON and planned to place F. with his relatives in GPE at the end of DATE . This would adversely affect the child 's well - being .

On DATE ORG , without holding a formal hearing , dismissed the latter request . It noted that a possible transfer would not adversely affect the well - being of F. , who and whose family , including the applicant , were still more closely related to GPE than to GPE .

The applicant appealed and complained inter alia that ORG had not taken sufficient evidence and had not taken account of the fact that PERSON 's transfer to GPE would in perpetuity frustrate her right to visit which would adversely affect PERSON 's well - being .

In his submissions of DATE the applicant 's former husband contested to have any intention to bring PERSON to GPE and requested that custody of F. be granted to him .

On DATE , ORG ( PERSON ) quashed ORG decision and remitted the case back to ORG to take further evidence as to the concrete danger of PERSON 's transfer to GPE and , eventually , his well - being there .

ORG subsequently , on DATE , requested ORG for further investigations . On DATE ORG submitted its report in which it expressed itself in favour of ORG 's stay at his father 's . ORG , on DATE , requested ORG ( ORG für ORG und Familie ) for further information .

In DATE the applicant informed ORG that F. had moved to GPE and that she had now no contact with the child .

On DATE ORG rejected all pending requests and declared the custody proceedings null and void . It noted that LAW concerning the powers of authorities and the law applicable in respect of the protection of infants of DATE was applicable to the proceedings at issue . LAW provides that the judicial or administrative authorities of ORG the habitual residence of an " infant " have power to take measures directed to the protection of his or her person or property . In so doing they apply their own law . ORG found that , having regard to the fact that PERSON was staying since DATE , namely DATE , with his grandparents in GPE , had signed off residence and school in GPE and was attending school in GPE , this country had to be regarded as his habitual residence . Therefore , the case had ceased to be within the scope of NORP jurisdiction .

NORP The applicant appealed and , at the same time , lodged a motion of bias against the competent judge PERSON at ORG . In the latter regard she submitted inter alia that ORG 's inactivity had brought about the facts on the ground of which the NORP jurisdiction had ceased .

On DATE ORG rejected the motion of bias . On DATE it dismissed the applicant 's appeal without holding a hearing . It noted that neither ORG of decisions concerning the custody of children and on restoration of custody of children , nor LAW were applicable to the present case as until now no decision on the custody of F. had been taken and the applicant 's former husband had exercised factual custody over F. since DATE . The applicant had not actually exercised her custody right at the time of PERSON 's removal from GPE to GPE , which , therefore had not been “ wrongful ” within the meaning of the latter convention .

On DATE the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal on points of law ( außerordentlicher Revisionsrekurs ) with ORG . She submitted inter alia that she had not voluntarily renounced to the exercise of PERSON 's custody . Her former husband and his family had hindered her access to F. so that she had only been able to see him in secret when he was attending school . ORG 's transfer to GPE entirely cut off her contact to him . She invoked Articles CARDINAL , CARDINAL , DATE of Protocol no . CARDINAL of the Convention . She further complained that throughout the proceedings no public hearing had been held and that the decisions had not been pronounced publicly .

On DATE ORG rejected the extraordinary appeal on points of law . It noted with reference to GPE 's reservation to LAW that custody proceedings would not necessarily require a public hearing , and that the parties ' right to present their case was duly complied with by submitting written statements , which the applicant had been able to do . The decision of ORG to annul the proceedings , resulting in a shift of jurisdiction from GPE to GPE , was lawful . LAW expressly referred to the actual exercise of custody as a condition for its application . The applicant 's submissions that she had been hindered in the actual exercise of her custody were not relevant as the DATE Hague Convention served the child 's and not the parents ' interest and the same applied as regards the DATE LAW . Under this aspect , an interference with the applicant 's rights under LAW was justified . The decision was served on DATE .


The first applicant , Mr PERSON , is an NORP national born in DATE . The second applicant , PERSON GPE , is an NORP national born in DATE . The third applicant , PERSON , their daughter , was born in DATE . They were represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr PERSON , ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The second applicant arrived in GPE and applied for asylum on DATE . The first applicant arrived in GPE and applied for asylum on DATE . The couple met there and moved in with each other on DATE . On DATE their daughter was born .

On DATE ORG ( Migrationsverket ) rejected their applications and ordered that they be deported to their respective native countries . ORG noted that the first applicant had not submitted any proof of identity . With respect to the first and second applicants’ reasons for seeking asylum , the ORG found that , under the provisions of LAW ( Utlänningslagen , CARDINAL ) , they were neither to be regarded as refugees or otherwise in need of protection nor entitled to residence permits on humanitarian grounds . As regards the second applicant , who had claimed to risk persecution not only in her native country but also in GPE , ORG considered that her submissions with regard to the latter country were unfounded . In this connection , it noted that her mother is of NORP origin .

The ORG further held that , as the first and second applicants were not married , their daughter should be considered as having the same nationality as her mother and follow her to GPE . In view of the daughter ’s young age and the limited time she had spent in GPE , the move to GPE could not be against her best interests . Moreover , the deportation would not be contrary to the principle of family unity under LAW on the Rights of the LAW , as the first and second applicants could reunite in the country of their choice after deportation .

By a decision of DATE , ORG ( Utlänningsnämnden ) rejected the ORG appeal , agreeing with the reasoning given by ORG . It added that the applicants’ deportation would not violate their right to respect for their family life under LAW , as they would be able to unite in either of their native countries . Issues of a formal or practical nature that might arise were to be handled by the responsible authority , in the first place ORG . ORG concluded that the second and third applicants could be deported to both GPE and GPE .

On DATE ORG reviewed the applicants’ situation under chapter CARDINAL , section CARDINAL b of LAW , a new temporary provision aimed at extending the right to residence permits for certain groups , including families with children , who had , inter alia , resided in GPE for long periods of time . The applicants submitted that the second applicant was pregnant with a second child and was expected to give birth in DATE . ORG found , however , that they were not entitled to residence permits under the temporary legislation .

According to the applicants , they were later informed that ORG planned to enforce the deportation orders by sending them to different countries , the first applicant to GPE and the second and third applicants to GPE .

On DATE , following the ORG ’s indication under LAW , ORG decided to stay the enforcement of the applicants’ deportation until further notice .

On DATE the applicants lodged a new application with ORG , claiming that there were permanent impediments to their deportation and that they should be given residence permits . In substance , they argued that their deportation to different countries involved a violation of LAW Subsequently , the applicants submitted a medical opinion on the daughter ’s mental health , given by a certified psychologist and a child psychiatrist on DATE . They noted that the second applicant suffered from depressions and that the overall situation was dominated by stress caused by the family ’s insecure future . The daughter showed a serious resignation syndrome , which required qualified , immediate and long - term treatment .

On DATE the second applicant gave birth to a second daughter . An application for a residence permit for her was submitted to ORG .

On DATE ORG rejected the ORG new application , stating that the possible deportation to different countries was not a new circumstance and could not therefore be considered . In regard to the mental health of the third applicant , the eldest daughter , as well as the second applicant ’s depression , ORG concluded that they did not constitute medical impediments to the deportation . No appeal lay against this decision .

The application concerning the youngest daughter has not yet been determined .


Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 34 - Victim);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court;Reasonable time);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

The applicant was born in DATE and lived in GPE ( PERSON ) .

On DATE the applicant brought proceedings in the Benevento Magistrate ’s Court , sitting as an employment tribunal , seeking acknowledgment of her right to an invalidity pension ( pensione di inabilità ) and an attendance allowance ( indennità di accompagnamento ) .

On DATE the ORG set the case down for the first hearing on DATE . On DATE the court appointed an expert and adjourned the proceedings to a hearing on DATE . The hearing was adjourned by the court of its own motion to CARDINAL DATE . On DATE the court set the case down for hearing of oral submissions on DATE . In the meantime , following his mother ’s death , PERSON declared his intention to continue the proceedings .

The following hearing was adjourned by the court of its own motion to DATE . However , it was not held on that date because of a ORG strike . The QUANTITY hearings held DATE and DATE were devoted to new expert evidence .

In a decision of DATE , the text of which was deposited with the registry on DATE , the ORG , sitting as an employment tribunal , dismissed the applicant ’s claim .

On DATE Mr Casciano appealed to ORG . On DATE the president appointed a reporting judge . The first hearing was held on DATE . CARDINAL hearings later , on DATE , judgment was reserved . In a judgment of the same date , the text of which was deposited with the registry on DATE , ORG dismissed the appeal .

On an unspecified date , after DATE , the applicant ’s son lodged an application with ORG under PERSON no . CARDINAL of DATE , known as the “ Pinto Act ” , complaining of the excessive length of the above - described proceedings . The applicant ’s son requested the court to rule that there had been a breach of LAW and to order ORG to pay compensation for the non - pecuniary damage sustained and pay the legal costs including those incurred before the ORG . PERSON claimed , inter alia , MONEY ( DATE ( ORG ) ) in non - pecuniary damages . He sought the reimbursement of his legal costs , including those incurred before the ORG , but did not quantify or give particulars of them .

In a decision of DATE , the text of which was deposited with the registry on DATE , ORG found that the proceedings had been excessively long . It held as follows :

“ ... As is clear from the circumstances described by the applicant , and confirmed by the documentation produced , the length of these proceedings ( DATE ) was justified only in part by the procedural requirements whereas certain adjournments were attributable to the inefficiency of the authorities themselves or their officers .

Delays occurred that were not justified by specific reasons related to the special nature of the case , are not attributable to the conduct of the applicant and give rise , irrespective of the finding of particular omissions or negligence of the persons involved , to responsibility on the part of the ORG for a breach of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time .

The case concerns social - security proceedings . Bearing in mind the complexity of the proceedings and the necessary expert reports , the proceedings should have been disposed of within DATE from the originating application for both levels of jurisdiction . Accordingly , the applicant ’s claim for compensation for the non - pecuniary damage recognisable in the inconvenience and distress probably suffered as a result of the long and unjustified wait for delivery of judgment is founded in respect of the excessive length .

After using the assessment criteria under LAW , reiterated in LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL [ Pinto Act ] ; and having regard to , among other things , the period beyond the reasonable time , as determined above , and the modest economic interests at stake , the court finds it equitable to award a total sum of MONEY plus statutory interest accruing from DATE of the application . ”

ORG awarded PERSON CARDINAL in compensation for non - pecuniary damage , ORG CARDINAL for costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before ORG and EUR DATE of which ORG CARDINAL were under the head of fees – for the Pinto proceedings . The decision was served on the authorities on CARDINAL DATE and became final on DATE . The authorities were given notice to comply on DATE and in DATE PERSON lodged an application for a garnishee order with the GPE judge responsible for enforcement proceedings . Payment was made on CARDINAL DATE .

NORP In a letter of CARDINAL DATE PERSON informed the Court of the outcome of the domestic proceedings and asked it to resume its examination of his application .

In the same letter the applicant ’s son also informed the ORG that he did not intend to appeal to ORG because an appeal to that court could only be on points of law .

Award of just satisfaction in the event of a breach of the requirement to dispose of proceedings within a reasonable time and amendment to LAW

CHAPTER II

Just satisfaction Section CARDINAL Entitlement to just satisfaction

“ CARDINAL . Anyone sustaining pecuniary or non - pecuniary damage as a result of a violation of ORG , ratified by PERSON no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE , on account of a failure to comply with the ‘ reasonable - time’ requirement in LAW , shall be entitled to just satisfaction .

NORP In determining whether there has been a violation , the court shall have regard to the complexity of the case and , in the light thereof , the conduct of the parties and of the judge deciding procedural issues , and also the conduct of any authority required to participate in or contribute to the resolution of the case .

NORP The court shall assess the quantum of damage in accordance with LAW and shall apply the following rules :

( a ) NORP only damage attributable to the period beyond the reasonable time referred to in subsection CARDINAL may be taken into account ;

( b ) in addition to the payment of a sum of money , reparation for non - pecuniary damage shall be made by giving suitable publicity to the finding of a violation . ”

Section CARDINAL Procedure

“ CARDINAL . Claims for just satisfaction shall be lodged with the court of appeal in which the judge sits who has jurisdiction under LAW to try cases concerning members of the judiciary in the district where the case in which the violation is alleged to have occurred was decided or discontinued at the merits stage or is still pending .

NORP The claim shall be made on an application lodged with the registry of the court of appeal by a lawyer holding a special authority containing all the information prescribed by LAW .

The application shall be made against the Minister of ORG where the alleged violation has taken place in proceedings in the ordinary courts , the Minister of Defence where it has taken place in proceedings before the military courts and the Finance Minister where it has taken place in proceedings before the tax commissioners . In all other cases , the application shall be made against the Prime Minister .

NORP The court of appeal shall hear the application in accordance with Articles CARDINAL et seq . of ORG . The application and the order setting the case down for hearing shall be served by the applicant on the defendant authority at its elected domicile at the offices of ORG ( Avvocatura dello Stato ) DATE prior to the date of the hearing before the ORG .

The parties may apply to the court for an order for production of all or part of the procedural and other documents from the proceedings in which the violation referred to in LAW is alleged to have occurred and they and their lawyers shall be entitled to be heard by the court in private if they attend the hearing . The parties may lodge memorials and documents up till DATE before the date set for the hearing or until expiry of the time allowed by the court of appeal for that purpose on an application by the parties .

The court shall deliver a decision within DATE after the application is lodged . An appeal shall lie to ORG . The decision shall be enforceable immediately .

To the extent that resources permit , payment of compensation to those entitled shall commence on DATE . ”

Section CARDINAL Time - limits and procedures for lodging applications

“ A claim for just satisfaction may be lodged while the proceedings in which the violation is alleged to have occurred are pending or within DATE from the date when the decision ending the proceedings becomes final . Claims lodged after that date shall be time - barred . ”

Section CARDINAL Communications

“ If the court decides to allow an application , its decision shall be communicated by the registry to the parties , to ORG at ORG to enable him to start an investigation into liability , and to the authorities responsible for deciding whether to institute disciplinary proceedings against the civil servants involved in the proceedings in any capacity . ”

Section CARDINAL Transitional provisions

“ CARDINAL . Within DATE after the entry into force of this LAW , anyone who has lodged an application with ORG in due time complaining of a violation of the ‘ reasonable - time’ requirement contained in LAW , ratified by LAW . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE , shall be entitled to lodge a claim under LAW hereof provided that the application has not by then been declared admissible by ORG . In such cases , the application to the court of appeal must state when the application to the said ORG was made .

NORP The registry of the relevant court shall inform the Minister for ORG without delay of any claim lodged in accordance with section QUANTITY and within the period laid down in subsection CARDINAL of this section . ”

Section CARDINAL Financial provisions

“ CARDINAL . NORP The financial cost of implementing this LAW , which is put at MONEY from DATE , shall be met by releasing funds entered in the DATE budget DATE in the chapter concerning the basic current - liability estimates from the ‘ special fund’ in DATE forecast of ORG . ORG deposits shall be set aside for that purpose .

The Ministry of the ORG , ORG is authorised to make the appropriate budgetary adjustments by decree . ”

NORP On appeal from decisions delivered by the courts of appeal in “ Pinto ” proceedings , ORG , sitting as a full court ( ORG ) , gave CARDINAL judgments ( nos . CARDINAL , DATE , DATE and DATE ) on DATE , the texts of which were deposited with the registry on CARDINAL DATE , quashing the appeal court ’s decision and remitting the case for a rehearing . It held that “ the case - law of ORG is binding on the NORP courts regarding the application of PERSON no . CARDINAL ” .

In its judgment no . CARDINAL it affirmed , inter alia , the principle that

“ the court of appeal ’s determination of non - pecuniary damage in accordance with LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , although inherently based on equitable principles , must be done in a legally defined framework since reference has to be made to the amounts awarded , in similar cases , by ORG . Some divergence is permissible , within reason . ”

Extracts from the plenary ORG judgment no . CARDINAL deposited with the registry on DATE

“ ... CARDINAL.- The present application poses the fundamental question of what legal effect must be given – in implementing the Law of DATE no . CARDINAL , and in particular in determining the non - pecuniary damage arising out of the breach of the reasonable length of proceedings requirement – to the judgments of ORG , whether considered generally as interpretative guidelines which the said ORG has laid down with regard to the consequences of the said violation , or with reference to a specific case in which ORG has already had occasion to give a judgment on the delay in reaching a decision . ...

As stipulated in LAW , the legal fact which gives rise to the right to the just satisfaction that it provides for is constituted by the “ violation of ORG , ratified in accordance with LAW DATE no . CARDINAL , for failure to comply with the reasonable time referred to in DATE , paragraph CARDINAL of the LAW . ” In other words , PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL identifies the fact constituting the right to compensation by reference to a specific provision of ORG . This Convention instituted a ORG ( ORG , with its seat in GPE ) to ensure compliance with the provisions contained therein ( Article CARDINAL ) . Accordingly , the competence of the said court to determine , and therefore to interpret , the significance of the said provisions must be recognised .

As the fact constituting the right conferred by PERSON no . ORG consists of a violation of LAW , it is for ORG to determine all the elements of such a legal fact , which thus ends by being “ brought into conformity ” by ORG , whose case - law is binding on the NORP courts in so far as the application of PERSON no . PERSON is concerned .

It is not necessary therefore to pose the general problem of the relationships between LAW and the internal judicial system , which ORG ( Procuratore Generale ) has amply discussed in court . Whatever opinion one may have about that controversial issue and therefore about the place of LAW in the context of the sources of domestic law , it is certain that the direct implementation in the NORP judicial system of a provision of LAW , established by PERSON no . PERSON ( that is , by LAW in the part relating to “ reasonable time ” ) , can not diverge from the interpretation which ORG gives of the same provision .

The opposite argument , which would permit a substantial divergence between the application accorded to PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL in the national system and the interpretation given by ORG to the right to reasonable length of proceedings , would deprive the said PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL of any justification and cause the NORP ORG to violate LAW , according to which ‘ The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in LAW ( including the said LAW , which provides for the right to have a case decided within a reasonable length of time ) .

The reason behind the enactment of PERSON no . PERSON was the need to provide a domestic judicial remedy against violations in respect of the duration of proceedings , so as to give effect to the subsidiary character of intervention on the part of ORG , expressly provided for by LAW CARDINAL : “ the ORG may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted ” ) . The NORP system for the protection of human rights is founded on the said principle of subsidiarity . From it derives the duty of the GPE which have ratified LAW to guarantee to individuals the protection of the rights recognised by LAW , above all in their own internal order and vis - à - vis the organs of the national judicial system . And this protection must be “ effective ” ( LAW ) , that is , of a kind to remedy the claim without the need for recourse to ORG .

The domestic remedy introduced by Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL did not previously exist in the NORP system , with the consequence that appeals against GPE in respect of a violation of LAW had “ clogged ” ( the term used by rapporteur PERSON in the sitting of the ORG of DATE ) ORG . ORG observed , prior to LAW no . PERSON , that the said failures to comply on the part of GPE “ reflect a continuing situation that has not yet been remedied and in respect of which litigants have no domestic remedy . This accumulation of breaches accordingly constitutes a practice that is incompatible with the Convention ” ( see the CARDINAL judgments of the ORG delivered on DATE in the cases of PERSON , PERSON , ORG and PERSON ) .

Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL constitutes the domestic remedy to which a “ victim of a violation ” ( as defined by LAW CARDINAL ( failure to comply with the reasonable - time requirement ) must have recourse before applying to ORG to claim the “ just satisfaction ” provided for in LAW , which , when the violation exists , is only awarded by the ORG “ if the internal law of ORG concerned allows only partial reparation to be made ” . Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL has therefore allowed ORG to declare inadmissible applications lodged with it ( including before the LAW was passed ) and aimed at obtaining just satisfaction provided for in LAW for the excessive length of proceedings ( ORG v. GPE , decision of DATE ) .

This mechanism for implementation of LAW and observance of the principle of subsidiarity in respect of interventions of ORG of GPE does not operate , however , in cases in which the ORG holds that the consequences of the established violation of LAW have not been redressed by domestic law or that this has been done only “ partially ” , because in such an event the said LAW provides for the intervention of ORG to protect the “ victim of the violation ” . In such cases an individual application to ORG on the basis of LAW is admissible ( Scordino and Others v. GPE , decision of DATE ) and the ORG acts directly to protect the rights of the victim whom it considers not to have been adequately protected by domestic law .

The judge of the adequacy or inadequacy of the protection that the victim has had from domestic law is , obviously , ORG , whose duty it is to apply LAW of LAW to ascertain whether , in the presence of a violation of a provision of LAW , the internal law has been able to fully redress the consequences of this violation .

The argument whereby , in applying PERSON no . PERSON , the NORP court may follow a different interpretation from that which ORG has given to the provisions of LAW ( violation of which is the fact giving entitlement to the right to compensation attributed by the said national law ) implies that the victim of the violation , if he or she receives reparation at national level considered inadequate by ORG , must obtain the just satisfaction provided for in LAW from the latter Court . This would defeat the purpose of the remedy provided for in NORP law by PERSON no . PERSON and entail a violation of the principle of the subsidiarity of the intervention of ORG .

It is therefore necessary to concur with ORG , which , in the above - mentioned decision on the PERSON application ( concerning the inadequacy of the protection afforded by the NORP courts in implementing LAW no . PERSON ) , affirmed that “ it follows from the principle of subsidiarity ... that the national courts must , where possible , interpret and apply domestic law in accordance with the Convention ” .

... The preparatory documents of PERSON no . PERSON are even more explicit . In the report concerning the bill of Senator PERSON ( proceedings of the ORG no . CARDINAL of DATE ) it is affirmed that the compensatory mechanism proposed in the legislative initiative ( and then adopted by the LAW ) secures for the applicant “ a protection analogous to that which he or she would receive in the international court ” , as the direct reference to LAW makes it possible to transfer to domestic level “ the limits of applicability of the same provision existing at international level , limits which depend essentially on the ORG and on the development of the case - law of the GPE authorities , especially that of ORG , whose decisions must therefore guide ... the domestic court in the definition of these limits ” .

... CARDINAL . – The considerations expounded in sections CARDINAL of the document refer in general to the importance of the interpretative guidance of ORG on the implementation of PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL with regard to reparation for non - pecuniary damage .

In this particular instance , however , any possibility for the national court to exclude non - pecuniary damage ( despite having found a violation of LAW of ORG ) must be considered as non - existent because such is precluded by the previous decision of ORG which , with reference to the same proceedings , had already ascertained that the unjustified delay in reaching a decision had had consequences involving non - pecuniary damage for the applicant , which the ORG itself redressed for a limited period . From such a decision of ORG it follows that , once the national court has ascertained that the violation has continued in the period following that considered in the said decision , the applicant has continued to suffer non - pecuniary damage , which must be compensated for in application of PERSON no . PERSON .

It can not therefore be maintained DATE as ORG has done DATE that compensation is not due because of the small amounts at stake in the proceedings in question . Such a reason , apart from being rendered immaterial by the fact that ORG has already ruled that non - pecuniary damage had been sustained because of delay in the same action , is in any case incorrect , because the amount of what is at stake in an action in which non - compliance with reasonable time - limits has been ascertained can never have the effect of excluding non - pecuniary damage , given that the anxiety and distress resulting from the length of the proceedings normally also occur in cases in which the amounts at stake are small ; hence this aspect may have the effect of reducing the amount of compensation but not of totally excluding it .

CARDINAL – In conclusion the decision appealed against must be quashed and the case remitted to ORG , which , in a different composition , will order payment to the applicant of the non - pecuniary damages payable as a result of the violation of the reasonable - time requirement for the period following DATE alone , taking as a reference point payments of the same kind of damages by ORG , from which it may diverge , but only to a reasonable extent ( ORG , DATE , PERSON GPE ) ” .

ORG held as follows :

“ ... Where the victim of unreasonably lengthy proceedings dies prior to the entry into force of Law no . CARDINAL of DATE [ known as the “ Pinto Act ” ] this shall preclude a right [ to just satisfaction ] from arising and passing to the heirs , in accordance with the general rule that a person who has died can not become entitled to a right conferred by an Act that is passed after their death ... ”

ORG judges noted that the right to compensation for a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time derived from LAW . The mechanism set in place by the NORP standard did not give applicants a cause of action before the domestic courts . Accordingly , the right to “ just satisfaction ” could neither be acquired nor transferred by a person who had already died by the time the Pinto Act came into force . The fact that the deceased had , while alive , lodged an application with ORG was not decisive . LAW did not constitute , as the applicants had maintained , a procedural standard bringing about a transfer of powers from ORG to the domestic courts .

In this case , which concerned the possibility or otherwise of transferring to heirs the right to compensation deriving from a breach of LAW on account of the length of the proceedings , ORG referred the case to the full court indicating that there was a conflict between the case - law authorities , that is , between the restrictive approach taken by ORG in the earlier judgments regarding heirs and LAW and the CARDINAL judgments delivered by ORG , sitting as a full court , on DATE to the extent that a less strict interpretation would lead to the conclusion that this right to compensation has existed since GPE ratified LAW on DATE .

In the case giving rise to the order mentioned above referring the case to the full court ( see preceding paragraph ) , ORG , sitting as a full court , established the following principles , thus preventing any further conflicting decisions being given by the courts :

( i ) Law no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE , which ratified the LAW and made it enforceable , introduced into domestic legal order the fundamental rights , belonging to the category of rights conferred on the individual by public law , provided for in the first section of the Convention and which correspond to a large extent with those set forth in LAW . In that respect the LAW provisions are confirmatory and illustrative . ...

( ii ) It is necessary to reiterate the principle that the act giving rise to the right to reparation conferred by domestic law corresponds to a breach of the provision in LAW , which is immediately applicable in domestic law .

The distinction between the right to a hearing within a reasonable time , introduced by LAW ( or even pre - existing as a constitutionally protected value ) , and the right to equitable reparation , which was allegedly introduced only by LAW , can not be allowed in so far as the protection provided by the domestic courts does not depart from that previously offered by ORG , the domestic courts being bound to comply with the case - law of ORG . ...

( iii ) Accordingly , the right to equitable reparation for loss sustained as a result of the unreasonable length of proceedings prior to the entry into force of Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL must be acknowledged by the domestic courts even in favour of the heirs of a party who introduced the proceedings before that date , subject only to the condition that the claim has not already been lodged with ORG and the ORG has not ruled on admissibility . ...

This judgment of ORG concerned an appeal by ORG challenging ORG award of non - pecuniary damages to a juristic person . ORG referred to the decision reached in the case of Comingersoll v. GPE [ ORG ] , no . CARDINAL , ORG CARDINALIV and , after referring to the CARDINAL judgments of the full court delivered on DATE , found that its own case - law was not in line with ORG . It held that there was no legal barrier to awarding just satisfaction to “ juristic ” persons according to the criteria of ORG . Accordingly , since ORG had correctly decided the case the appeal was dismissed .

ORG made the following observations :

“ ... [ Whereas ] non - pecuniary damage is the normal , albeit not automatic , consequence of a breach of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time , it will be deemed to exist , without it being necessary to specifically prove it ( directly or by presumption ) , on the basis of the objective fact of the breach , on condition that there are no special circumstances indicating the absence of any such damage in the actual case concerned ( PERSON . ORG CARDINAL DATE nos . CARDINAL and DATE ) .

- the assessment on an equitable basis of compensation for non - pecuniary damage is subject DATE on account of the specific reference in section CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL of DATE to LAW ( ratified by PERSON no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ) DATE to compliance with the Convention , in accordance with the judicial interpretation given by ORG ( non - compliance with which results in a violation of the law ) , and must therefore , as far as possible , be commensurate , in substantive and not merely formal terms , with the amounts paid in similar cases by ORG , it being possible to adduce exceptional circumstances that suggest themselves in the particular case , on condition that they are reasoned , not excessive and not unreasonable ( PERSON . ORG DATE no . CARDINAL ) . ...

- a discrepancy in the method of calculation [ between the ORG ’s case - law and LAW ] shall not affect the general vocation of PERSON no . CARDINAL of DATE to meet the objective of awarding proper compensation for a breach of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time ( vocation acknowledged by ORG in , inter alia , a decision of DATE in GPE ( application no . MONEY ) ) , and accordingly shall not allow any doubt as to the compatibility of that domestic standard with the international commitments entered into by GPE when ratifying LAW and the formal recognition , also at constitutional level , of the principle stated in LAW ... ”

In the report ORG , revised on DATE , the ORG deputies made the following indications regarding an assessment of the Pinto remedy :

“ ... CARDINAL . As regards the domestic remedy introduced in DATE by the “ Pinto Act ” , a number of shortcomings remain , particularly in connection with the effectiveness of the remedy and its application in conformity with the Convention : in particular , the law does not provide yet for the acceleration of pending proceedings . ...

In the framework of its examination of the CARDINALst DATE report , ORG expressed concern at the fact that this legislation did not foresee the speeding up of the proceedings and that its application posed a risk of aggravating the backlog of the appeal courts . ...

It should be pointed out that in the framework of its examination of DATE report , ORG had noted with concern that the Convention had no direct effect and had consequently invited the NORP authorities to intensify their efforts at national level as well as their contacts with the different bodies of ORG competent in this field . ... ”

In this interim resolution the ORG deputies indicated as follows :

“ ORG

Noting ...

“ ... the setting - up of a domestic remedy providing compensation in cases of excessive length of proceedings , adopted in DATE ( the " Pinto ” law ) , as well as the recent development of the case - law of ORG , increasing the direct effect of the case - law of ORG in the NORP legal system , while noting that this remedy still does not enable for acceleration of proceedings so as to grant effective redress to all victims ;

Stressing that the setting - up of domestic remedies does not dispense states from their general obligation to solve the structural problems underlying violations ;

Finding that despite the efforts undertaken , numerous elements still indicate that the solution to the problem will not be found in the near future ( as evidenced in particular by the statistical data , the new cases before both domestic courts and ORG , the information contained in the annual reports submitted by the government to ORG and in the reports of ORG at the Court of cassation ) ; ...

Stressing the importance the LAW attaches to the right to fair administration of justice in a NORP society and recalling that the problem of the excessive length of judicial proceedings , by reason of its persistence and extent , constitutes a real danger for the respect of the rule of law in GPE ; ...

URGES the NORP authorities to enhance their political commitment and make it their effective priority to meet GPE ’s obligation under the ORG and the ORG ’s judgments , to secure the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time to all persons under GPE ’s jurisdiction . ... ”

ORG for the efficiency of justice was set up at ORG by Resolution Res(CARDINAL)CARDINAL with the aim of ( a ) improving the efficiency and the functioning of the justice of member GPE with a view to ensuring that everyone within their jurisdiction can enforce their legal rights effectively , thereby generating increased confidence of the citizens in the justice system and ( b ) enabling a better implementation of the international legal instruments of ORG concerning efficiency and fairness of justice .

In its framework programme ( CEPEJ ( DATE ) CARDINAL Rev CARDINAL § ( CARDINAL ) the ORG noted that “ the mechanisms which are limited to compensation are too weak and do not adequately incite the GPE to modify their operational process , and provide compensation only a posteriori in the event of a proven violation instead of trying to find a solution for the problem of delays . ”


The following , who are NORP citizens , are named as applicants :

PERSON born in DATE and resident in GPE ,

PERSON O’Toole born in DATE and resident in GPE

PERSON born in DATE and resident in LOC ;

PERSON born in DATE and resident in GPE .

The application is presented by ORG , a solicitor practising in GPE .

In DATE , the CARDINAL applicants were serving sentences of imprisonment in FAC .

On DATE , an incident occurred in the prison involving CARDINAL members of staff and a number of prisoners . The first applicant claimed that a prison officer had hit him on the head with a radio causing him to fall to the ground with a bleeding head . An altercation had ensued in which CARDINAL prison officers received injuries . CARDINAL prisoners , including the applicants , were escorted to the segregation unit .

At TIME on DATE , officers entered the first applicant ’s cell in full riot gear . They punched him , kicked him and swore at him , calling him a “ scumbag ” and a “ black bastard ” . He was pinned to the ground and handcuffed . A female officer cut off his clothes with scissors . Once he was naked a pair of boxer shorts was pulled on him and he was removed to the prison yard . The officers continued kicking and beating him and threw him face down on the ground in a puddle . He was placed kneeling in a prison van and taken to FAC nearby where the beating continued . He was placed in segregation and the officers threw food and water at him . He was forced to eat off the floor .

The other applicants were assaulted in a similar manner . The second applicant , O’Toole , was made to stand facing the wall . When he tried to look round , his head was smashed against the wall . The officers grabbed his hair and genitals .

Following allegations by the prison officers concerning the applicants’ conduct , the applicants stood trial , inter alia , for causing grievous bodily harm , violent disorder and affray .

In DATE , the jury acquitted all CARDINAL applicants .

The applicants lodged civil claims , inter alia , for assault and malicious prosecution .

Following a hearing before judge and jury in ORG in DATE , the first applicant succeeded in his claims of assault and malicious prosecution , and the other applicants succeeded in claims of misfeasance based on incidents of assault . The jury found , inter alia , that the prison officers had wrongly alleged that the first applicant was involved in the assault on the prison officers on DATE , doing so deliberately without any honest belief in what they alleged and that the prison officers had punched and kicked him on DATE during his transfer to another prison . The jury awarded GBP CARDINAL to the first applicant , and GBP CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL respectively to the other CARDINAL applicants . The jury also made an award of GBP CARDINAL in exemplary damages to be shared by the applicants .

After the conclusion of the civil proceedings , the applicants’ solicitor wrote to ORG requesting a formal investigation into the allegations of abuse by prison officers . On DATE , ORG indicated that it had commissioned an investigation by a prison governor from outside the area , Governor PERSON of FAC . Though the applicants’ solicitor contested his independence , the internal investigation proceeded . On DATE , ORG replied that Governor PERSON did not work in the area and was not subject to any line management from that area in respect of his functions as governor or investigator . It was satisfied that the investigation would be carried out fairly and impartially and would be independent without supervision of control from anyone else . It would be decided later how widely the findings of the investigation would be disclosed .

On DATE ORG informed the applicants’ solicitor that the investigation was completed . It stated that the report would not be disclosed . Following a threat of legal proceedings , the report was provided to the applicants’ solicitor on DATE .

According to the report , prison officers emphatically denied the allegations and new evidence had become available , namely statements by other prison staff and by CARDINAL prisoners who supported the accounts of staff . It noted that there had been extremely damaging inconsistencies in the account at trial of CARDINAL officer but that there had also been inconsistencies in the accounts of the complainants which did not appear to have been challenged in the civil trial . It considered that there was little , and thereby insufficient evidence , apart from the minor injuries to the complainants , to substantiate their allegations of assault and fabrication of dishonest allegations . As regarded the first applicant , it concluded that it was unlikely and not independently substantiated that he had been assaulted in an unprovoked attack by a prison officer on DATE or that he had been assaulted on DATE when being transferred in full view of the Governor , ORG and other senior managers .

On DATE , the applicant ’s solicitor wrote to ORG making a formal request for a properly independent investigation into the applicant ’s allegations . On DATE ORG refused that request .

In line with ORG , no criminal or disciplinary sanctions have been commenced against any officer .


CASE OF MIKHALKOVA AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE

Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Art. 2 (substantive aspect);Violation of Art. 2 (procedural aspect);Violation of Art. 3 (substantive aspect);Violation of Art. 3 (procedural aspect);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Ganna Yudkivska;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Renate Jaeger;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicants were born in DATE , DATE and DATE respectively and live in PERSON .

On DATE the first applicant requested FAC to take PERSON , born in DATE , her son and the brother of the second and third applicants , to a sobering - up facility because of his severe alcohol intoxication . CARDINAL police officers , PERSON arrived in response to her call . According to the first applicant , they mocked and kicked PERSON , notwithstanding the first applicant 's protests , dragged him into their police car and took him to the police station .

On DATE the first applicant went to the police station and discovered that PERSON was dead .

Following an autopsy , on DATE it was established that PERSON had died on DATE of an acute internal haemorrhage and the laceration of the small intestine resulting from abdominal trauma sustained on DATE .

In the meantime , on DATE ORG refused to institute criminal proceedings into the incident . On DATE this decision was quashed and the case remitted for further inquiry .

On DATE a post - mortem forensic assessment of PERSON body confirmed the earlier conclusion concerning the cause of his death . It was also established that the abdominal injury could have resulted from DATE on to a blunt object , such as a kerb or a concrete pole . Other injuries found on his arms , legs and buttocks could have resulted from his body being dragged .

Following this assessment , on DATE ORG took a fresh decision not to initiate criminal proceedings .

On DATE the Kompaniyivsky ORG annulled this decision and initiated criminal proceedings into the circumstances of ORG death . This investigation is currently under way .

The applicants have provided no documents concerning the course of the investigation , maintaining that they had been denied access to the case file and any meaningful opportunity to participate in the proceedings , regardless of their repeated complaints to various authorities , including ORG . By way of response , ORG kept forwarding their complaints to ORG , which assured the applicants , without providing any details , that the criminal proceedings were well under way . On several occasions the first applicant requested a meeting with the employees of ORG to discuss the progress of the case ; however , her requests were not accommodated .

On DATE the first applicant lodged a complaint with ORG of GPE , seeking to oblige ORG to ensure meaningful monitoring of the proceedings and to address omissions by the local authorities . She claimed , in particular , that there was sufficient evidence to charge CARDINAL named police officers with abuse of position and a violent assault on her son .

On DATE the court dismissed this claim . It found , in particular , that the investigation was pending , the necessary investigative measures were under way , the persons responsible for inflicting injuries on her son had not yet been identified , ORG was monitoring the proceedings and ORG had referred the applicants ' complaints to the local prosecutorial authorities for reacting . On DATE and DATE ORG and ORG respectively dismissed the first applicant 's appeals .

The Government likewise provided no documents concerning the investigation of ORG death , referring to the confidentiality of documents concerning a pending investigation . They noted , however , that in the course of the investigation CARDINAL witnesses had been questioned , CARDINAL reconstructions of the crime scene were conducted and CARDINAL expert assessments were carried out . They further provided summaries of the findings of the expert assessments .

According to the ORG 's submissions , the expert assessment of DATE established that PERSON death had been directly caused by the internal abdominal injury and acute haemorrhage . These injuries could have resulted from DATE .

On DATE a further expert assessment confirmed the results of the previous assessments .

On DATE a further expert assessment established that the injury had been inflicted by the impact , of considerable force , of a blunt object with limited contact surface , possibly a booted foot , hitting the applicant 's abdomen at an acute angle . This injury could not have resulted from a simple fall on to a flat or convex surface .

On DATE a further expert assessment concluded that the injury could have been inflicted in the circumstances described by the first applicant .

On DATE a further expert assessment suggested that the injury could have resulted from the cumulative impact of various kicks , possibly under the circumstances described by the first applicant .

On DATE a further expert assessment was ordered to examine in detail how the injuries on PERSON legs and arms were incurred . This expert assessment was followed by an order of a further expert assessment on DATE , which is currently underway .

The relevant provisions of the LAW and LAW can be found in the judgment in the case of PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security

Giovanni Bonello;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of homicide .

On DATE the applicant was brought before ORG ( Sąd Rejonowy ) . The court remanded him in custody on charges of assault occasioning death . The court held that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged . In addition , the detention was necessary to ensure the proper course of the proceedings . The court also referred to the likelihood that a severe sentence could be imposed on the applicant .

During the investigation the applicant ’s detention was extended twice . The last of the relevant decisions was given on DATE by ORG ( Sąd Apelacyjny ) and extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE . The courts considered that the grounds originally given for his detention were still valid .

DATE the applicant made several applications for release . In particular , he asked to be released on bail . All those applications were dismissed , both at first instance and on appeal . The applicant stressed that in view of the witness testimonies his detention lacked any reasonable basis . In addition , his son had just started school and it was necessary for him to have regular contact with his father .

Neither the applicant nor his lawyer participated in any of the sessions in connection with his applications for release .

On DATE ORG lodged a bill of indictment with ORG ( PERSON ) . The applicant was indicted on charges of participation in a fight resulting in homicide and using false documents . The bill of indictment included CARDINAL other persons . The prosecutor stated that evidence from CARDINAL witnesses needed to be obtained .

At a session held on DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE . The court relied on the gravity of the charges against the applicant . It further stressed that the charges concerned CARDINAL persons . In addition , extradition proceedings were pending against CARDINAL of the accused . The court still needed to obtain evidence from CARDINAL witnesses including CARDINAL anonymous witnesses . Neither the applicant nor his lawyer was present at this session . An appeal by the applicant against this decision was dismissed on DATE by ORG . The court referred to the gravity of the charges against the applicant and the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings . In addition , the applicant ’s arguments that he needed to take care of his family had been groundless since before his arrest he had not lived with them .

The trial began on DATE . DATE and DATE ORG held CARDINAL hearings .

At hearings held on DATE and DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE and CARDINAL DATE respectively .

On DATE ORG gave judgment and sentenced the applicant to seven years’ imprisonment . It also extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE . It pointed out that in view of the behaviour of the applicant and the other co - accused it had been necessary to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings .

On DATE the applicant appealed against this judgment .

On DATE ORG gave a decision and extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE .

On DATE ORG quashed the firstinstance judgment and remitted the case .

On DATE ORG again extended the applicant ’s detention , this time until DATE . On DATE ORG extended the detention of the applicant and CARDINAL other co - defendants until DATE . The court held that given the evidence collected so far by the courts there was a high degree of likelihood that the applicant had committed the offence with which he had been charged . In addition , there was a high risk of his absconding or going into hiding .

On DATE ORG gave a decision and remitted the case to the prosecution authorities in order to complete the investigation . The prosecutor appealed . On DATE ORG quashed the first - instance decision and ordered ORG to proceed with the case .

Meanwhile , on DATE ORG again extended the detention of the applicant and the other co - defendants , this time until DATE . The court referred to the reasons given previously and held that they were still valid . In particular , there were good grounds for believing that if released the defendants might commit another serious crime . The applicant appealed , submitting that as the case had been transferred to the prosecution authorities , it would indicate that there was no “ high probability that he had committed the crime with which he had been charged ” since the prosecution needed to collect more evidence . On DATE ORG upheld the first - instance decision .

On DATE ORG gave a decision and extended the detention of the applicant and CARDINAL other co - defendants until DATE . The court held that the grounds for keeping them in detention were still valid . In particular , there was a need to hear evidence from additional witnesses . At a hearing held on DATE the court extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE . The court repeated the reasons given previously . On DATE ORG again extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE . On CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against this decision . The court stressed that there was a likelihood that the charges against the applicant and his co - defendants would be proved and that the interests of the proper administration of justice justified the continuation of the detention . The applicant ’s lawyer was present at this session .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG gave judgment and sentenced the applicant to five years’ imprisonment . It also extended the applicant ’s detention . On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision to extend his detention . On DATE ORG dismissed his appeal . The applicant ’s lawyer was present at the session .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s interlocutory appeal and upheld the decision to extend his detention . The applicant ’s lawyer was present at both court sessions . At a session held on DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention and dismissed his application for release . The applicant ’s lawyer was present at this session . At yet another session , held on DATE , ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request for release . The applicant ’s lawyer was present at that session .

On DATE ORG gave judgment and acquitted the applicant . The court also ordered that the applicant be released from detention .

On DATE the prosecutor lodged a cassation appeal against this judgment .

On DATE ORG quashed the first– and secondinstance judgments and remitted the case to ORG .

On DATE the ORG gave judgment and sentenced the applicant to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment .

On DATE the applicant asked to be served with a copy of the judgment together with the reasoning . It was served on him on DATE . ORG informed the applicant that the delay in serving the judgment was caused by the complexity of the case and the number of defendants involved .

The applicant appealed against the judgment of DATE .

At a hearing held on DATE ORG gave judgment . It quashed ORG judgment and remitted the case .

It would appear that the proceedings are pending before ORG .

The applicant claimed in his initial submissions that during the whole period of his detention on remand he had been held in solitary confinement .

According to the information provided by the ORG , the applicant was placed in CARDINAL different detention centres throughout the period of his detention : FAC , FAC and FAC .

On DATE the applicant , who had been classified as a difficult detainee , was placed separately in a cell for CARDINAL prisoners until DATE .

On DATE the FAC penitentiary commission decided to include the applicant in the category of “ dangerous ” detainees , the so called “ Ds ” . The commission considered that the applicant had been aspiring to a role of an informal leader of prison subculture thus posing a potential risk of a riot in prison . The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against this decision . On DATE ORG upheld this decision .

On DATE the applicant was transferred to ORG , where he was placed alone in a cell with an area of QUANTITY , designated for dangerous inmates . The applicant had the right to an TIME ’s exercise every day . He was able to have visits from his family and his lawyer .

The applicant was subsequently transferred to FAC on DATE . He was placed in a separate cell with an area of QUANTITY . He could not participate in collective sport or cultural activities . However , he could have exercise under the supervision of CARDINAL guards . Books were provided in his cell , where he could also listen to the prison radio . He received visits from his common law wife , his son , his sister and other members of the family .

On DATE ORG again upheld the decision of the penitentiary commission . The applicant ’s lawyer lodged an interlocutory appeal . On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal .

On DATE and DATE the penitentiary commission gave decisions confirming the applicant ’s status as a dangerous detainee . He did not appeal against these decisions .

On DATE the penitentiary commission decided not to extend the applicant ’s classification as a dangerous detainee . It is not clear whether the conditions of the applicant ’s detention changed following this decision .

On DATE the applicant was transferred to ORG , where he was placed in a cell for CARDINAL prisoners and was not subjected to pre - trial detention in conditions of solitary confinement .

The relevant domestic law and practice concerning the imposition of detention on remand ( aresztowanie tymczasowe ) , the grounds for its extension , release from detention and rules governing other “ preventive measures ” ( środki zapobiegawcze ) are stated in the ORG ’s judgments in the cases of GPE v. GPE [ ORG ] , no . GPE , § § DATE , ECHR CARDINAL-XI ; PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ; and PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , CARDINAL DATE .


Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Elisabet Fura;Josep Casadevall;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

On DATE the applicant was injured in an accident at work . The applicant 's employer had taken out insurance with the insurance company GPE .

On DATE the applicant instituted civil proceedings against GPE in ORG ( Okrožno sodišče v PERSON ) seeking damages for the injuries sustained . He also sought an exemption from paying court fees .

DATE and DATE the applicant lodged preliminary written submissions and adduced evidence CARDINAL times .

The first hearing was held on DATE .

On DATE the court appointed a medical expert . On DATE the appointed expert submitted his report .

On DATE the court held another hearing and decided to deliver a written judgment . The judgment , upholding the applicant 's claim in part , was served on the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the applicant appealed to ORG ( PERSON v PERSON ) . He also requested the first - instance court to rectify its judgment .

On DATE the first - instance court rectified the judgment of DATE .

On DATE ORG upheld the applicant 's appeal in part and modified the first - instance court 's judgment accordingly . That decision was served on the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with ORG sodišče ) , which was rejected on DATE as the value of the claim fell below the statutory threshold . That decision was served on the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the respondent Government were given notice of the application . The Government was asked to provide information as to whether LAW applied in respect of the present case , which would enable the applicant to avail himself of domestic settlement proceedings before ORG ( see Relevant domestic law below ) .

Subsequently , on CARDINAL DATE , the ORG submitted that LAW was not applicable in the present case since the applicant 's right to a trial within a reasonable time had not been infringed in the impugned domestic proceedings . Therefore , the Government refused to offer the applicant a settlement proposal under LAW .

The applicant did not comment on this issue .

The Act on the Protection of the Right to a Trial without Undue Delay ( Zakon o varstvu pravice do sojenja brez nepotrebnega odlašanja , ORG , No . DATE CARDINAL Act ” ) became operational on DATE .

Section CARDINAL lays down the following transitional rules in relation to applications already pending before the Court :

“ ( CARDINAL ) In cases where a violation of the right to a trial without undue delay has already ceased and the party had filed a claim for just satisfaction with the international court before the date of implementation of this LAW , the ORG Attorney 's ORG shall offer the party a settlement on the amount of just satisfaction within DATE of the date of receipt of the case referred by the international court for the settlement procedure . The party shall submit a settlement proposal to the ORG Attorney 's ORG within DATE of receipt of the proposal of the ORG Attorney 's ORG . The State Attorney 's Office shall decide on the proposal as soon as possible and within DATE at the latest ...

( CARDINAL ) If the proposal for settlement referred to in paragraph CARDINAL of this section is not acceded to or ORG and the party fail to negotiate an agreement within DATE of the date on which the party filed its proposal , the party may bring an action before the court with jurisdiction under this LAW . The party may bring an action within DATE of receipt of the ORG Attorney 's ORG reply that the party 's proposal referred to in the previous paragraph was not acceded to , or after the expiry of the period fixed in the previous paragraph for the ORG Attorney 's ORG to decide to proceed with settlement . Irrespective of the type or amount of the claim , the provisions of LAW concerning small claims shall apply in proceedings before a court . ”