CASE OF GILLAN AND QUINTON v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Violation of Art. 8;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient

Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE .

DATE there was a ORG and Equipment International Exhibition ( “ the arms fair ” ) at FAC in GPE , GPE , which was the subject of protests and demonstrations .

At TIME on DATE the first applicant was riding a bicycle and carrying a rucksack near the arms fair , on his way to join the demonstration . He was stopped and searched by QUANTITY police officers who told him he was being searched under section CARDINAL of LAW ( “ the GPE ” : see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) for articles which could be used in connection with terrorism . He was handed a notice to that effect . The first applicant claimed he was told in response to his question as to why he was being stopped that it was because a lot of protesters were about and the police were concerned that they would cause trouble . Nothing incriminating was found ( although computer printouts giving information about the demonstration were seized by the officers ) and the first applicant was allowed to go on his way . He was detained for TIME .

At TIME on DATE , the second applicant , wearing a photographer 's jacket , carrying a small bag and holding a camera in her hand , was stopped close to the arms fair . She had apparently emerged from some bushes . The second applicant , a journalist , was in the area to film the protests . She was searched by a police officer from ORG notwithstanding that she showed her press cards to show who she was . She was told to stop filming . The police officer told her that she was using her powers under sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act . Nothing incriminating was found and the second applicant was allowed to go on her way . The record of her search showed she was stopped for TIME but she thought it was more like TIME . She claimed to have felt so intimidated and distressed that she did not feel able to return to the demonstration although it had been her intention to make a documentary or sell footage of it .

The applicants sought to challenge the legality of the stop and search powers used against them by way of judicial review . Prior to ORG hearing , the Secretary of ORG offered the applicants a procedure which would have enabled ORG to review in closed session , with the benefit of submissions from a special advocate , the underlying intelligence material which had been the basis for the Secretary of ORG 's decision to confirm the authorisation ( section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act : see paragraphs DATE below ) . The applicants , however , indicated that they did not consider it necessary or appropriate to proceed in this way , since they did not intend to challenge the assessment that there was a general threat of terrorism against GPE . Instead , they contended , first , that the authorisation and confirmation in question , since they formed part of a rolling programme of authorisations covering the entire GPE area , were ultra vires and unlawful , since there were a number of clear indications that ORG had intended an authorisation under LAW ( “ a section CARDINAL authorisation ” ) to be given and confirmed only in response to an imminent terrorist threat to a specific location in respect of which normal police powers of stop and search were inadequate . Secondly , the applicants claimed that the use of the section CARDINAL authorisation by police officers to stop and search them at the arms fair was contrary to the legislative purpose and unlawful and that the guidance given to police officers was either non - existent or calculated to cause officers to misuse the powers . Thirdly , the applicants claimed that the section CARDINAL authorisations and the exercise of powers under them constituted a disproportionate interference with their rights under Articles CARDINAL , CARDINAL , DATE , DATE and CARDINAL of the Convention .

On DATE , ORG dismissed the application ( [ DATE ] EWHC CARDINAL ) . Lord Justice PERSON , giving the judgment of the court , held that ORG had envisaged that a section CARDINAL authorisation might cover the whole of a police area as a response to a general threat of terrorist activity on a substantial scale and that the authorisation and the subsequent confirmation by the Secretary of ORG were not ultra vires .

PERSON held as follows , in connection with the applicants ' second ground of challenge :

“ The powers conferred on the police under section DATE are powers which most NORP people would have hoped were completely unnecessary in this country , particularly in time of peace . People have always been free to come and go in this country as they wish unless the police have reasonable cause to stop them . ORG has , however , judged that the contemporary threats posed by international terrorism and dissident NORP terrorism are such that as a people we should be content that the police should be able to stop and search us at will for articles that might be connected with terrorism .

It is elementary that if the police abuse these powers and target them disproportionately against those whom they perceive to be no particular friends of theirs the terrorists will have to that extent won . The right to demonstrate peacefully against an arms fair is just as important as the right to walk or cycle about the streets of GPE without being stopped by the police unless they have reasonable cause . If the police wish to use this extraordinary power to stop and search without cause they must exercise it in a way that does not give rise to legitimate complaints of arbitrary abuse of power .

We are not , however , satisfied that the police 's conduct on DATE entitles either Mr PERSON or PERSON to a public law remedy . There is just enough evidence available to persuade us that , in the absence of any evidence that these powers were being habitually used on occasions which might represent symbolic targets , the arms fair was an occasion which concerned the police sufficiently to persuade them that the use of section CARDINAL powers was needed ... . But it was a fairly close call , and ORG would do well to review their training and briefing and the language of the standard forms they use for section CARDINAL stop / searches if they wish to avoid a similar challenge in future . ... ”

Finally , the court found that the powers were provided for by law and not disproportionate , given the risk of terrorist attack in GPE .

The Court of Appeal gave judgment on DATE ( [ DATE ] EWCA Civ CARDINAL ) . As to the proper interpretation of the legislation , it held that :

“ It is clear that ORG , unusually , has permitted random stopping and searching , but , as we have already indicated when examining the language of the relevant sections , made the use of that power subject to safeguards . The power is only to be used for a single specified purpose for a period of an authorisation granted by a senior officer and confirmed by the Secretary of ORG . Furthermore , the authorisation only has a limited life unless renewed .

We do not find it surprising that the word ' expedient ' should appear in section NORP ) in conjunction with the power to authorise . The statutory scheme is to leave how the power is to be used to the discretion of the senior officer . In agreement with ORG , we would give the word its ordinary meaning of advantageous . It is entirely consistent with the framework of the legislation that a power of this sort should be exercised when a senior police officer considers it is advantageous to exercise the power for the prevention of acts of terrorism .

Interpreted in this way , sections DATE and DATE could not conflict with the provisions of the Articles of the ORG . If those ORG were to be infringed it would be because of the manner of the exercise of the power , not its existence . Any possible infringement of the ORG would depend on the circumstances in which the power that the sections give is exercised . ”

ORG did not consider it necessary to determine whether LAW applied , since it held that any deprivation of liberty was justifiable under LAW ) . However it held that , if the point had to be decided , the better view was that there was no deprivation of liberty , taking into account the likely limited nature of any infringement in a normal stop and search and the fact that the main aim would not be to deprive an individual of his liberty but rather to effect a verification of one form or another . Nor did it consider that LAW and CARDINAL applied . Although the applicants ' evidence gave some cause for concern that the power had been used against them to control or deter their attendance at the demonstration , those issues had not been tested because the thrust of their argument was directed at the conformity of the legislation with the LAW and , properly used as a measure of limited duration to search for articles connected with terrorism , the stop and search power would not impinge on the rights to freedom of expression or assembly .

The respondent Commissioner of ORG had conceded that the stop and search measures amounted to interferences with the applicants ' LAW , and ORG accepted that this was the correct approach , describing section CARDINAL as “ an extremely wide power to intrude on the privacy of the members of the public ” . It considered that the interference was , however , in accordance with the law , for the following reasons :

“ ' The law ' that is under criticism here is the statute , not the authorisation . That law is just as much a public record as is any other statute . And the provisions are not arbitrary in any relevant sense . Although the police officer does not have to have grounds for suspecting the presence of suspicious articles before stopping a citizen in any particular case ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(b ) ) , he can only be authorised to use those powers for limited purposes , and where a decision has been made that the exercise of the powers is expedient for the serious purpose of the prevention of acts of terrorism ( section LANGUAGE ) . The system , so controlled , can not be said to be arbitrary in any sense that deprives it of the status of ' law ' in the autonomous meaning of that term as understood in LAW . In addition , while the authorisations and their confirmation are not published because not unreasonably it is considered publication could damage the effectiveness of the stop and search powers and as the individual who is stopped has the right to a written statement under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) , in this context the lack of publication does not mean that what occurred was not a procedure prescribed by law . ”

Furthermore , given the nature of the terrorist threat against GPE , the authorisation and confirmation of the power could not , as a matter of general principle , be said to be disproportionate : the disadvantage of the intrusion and restraint imposed on even a large number of individuals by being stopped and searched could not possibly match the advantage that accrued from the possibility of a terrorist attack being thereby foiled or deterred . Having regard to the nature of the arms fair , its location near an airport and a previous site of a terrorist incident ( connected with the GPE problems ) and the fact that a protest was taking place , the police were entitled to decide that section CARDINAL powers should be exercised in connection with it . However , the inadequacy of the evidence provided by the police concerning the use of the section CARDINAL power in the vicinity of the arms fair made it impossible to come to any conclusion as regards the lawfulness and proportionality of the use of the power against the applicants .

ORG , on DATE , unanimously dismissed the applicants ' appeals ( [ DATE ] UKHL CARDINAL ) . Lord PERSON , with whom the other ORG agreed , began by observing :

“ CARDINAL . It is an old and cherished tradition of our country that everyone should be free to go about their business in the streets of the land , confident that they will not be stopped and searched by the police unless reasonably suspected of having committed a criminal offence . So jealously has this tradition been guarded that it has almost become a constitutional principle . But it is not an absolute rule . There are , and have for DATE been , statutory exceptions to it . These appeals concern an exception now found in sections CARDINAL - CARDINAL of LAW ( ' LAW ) . The appellants challenge the use made of these sections and , in the last resort , the sections themselves . Since any departure from the ordinary rule calls for careful scrutiny , their challenge raises issues of general importance . ”

The first issue before ORG was as to the proper construction of the statute . The applicants had argued that section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) should be interpreted as permitting an authorisation to be made only if the decision - maker had reasonable grounds for considering that the powers were necessary and suitable , in all the circumstances , for the prevention of terrorism . Lord PERSON rejected this interpretation , since the word “ expedient ” in the section had a meaning quite distinct from “ necessary ” . He continued :

“ CARDINAL . ... But there are other reasons also for rejecting the argument . It is true , as already recognised , that section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(b ) , in dispensing with the condition of reasonable suspicion , departs from the normal rule applicable where a constable exercises a power to stop and search . CARDINAL would therefore incline , within the permissible limits of interpretation , to give ' expedient ' a meaning no wider than the context requires . But examination of the statutory context shows that the authorisation and exercise of the power are very closely regulated , leaving no room for the inference that ORG did not mean what it said . There is indeed every indication that ORG appreciated the significance of the power it was conferring but thought it an appropriate measure to protect the public against the grave risks posed by terrorism , provided the power was subject to effective constraints . The legislation embodies a series of such constraints . First , an authorisation under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) or ( CARDINAL ) may be given only if the person giving it considers ( and , it goes without saying , reasonably considers ) it expedient ' for the prevention of acts of terrorism ' . The authorisation must be directed to that overriding objective . Secondly , the authorisation may be given only by a very senior police officer . Thirdly , the authorisation can not extend beyond the boundary of a police force area , and need not extend so far . Fourthly , the authorisation is limited to a period of DATE , and need not be for so long . Fifthly , the authorisation must be reported to the Secretary of ORG forthwith . Sixthly , the authorisation lapses after TIME if not confirmed by the Secretary of ORG . Seventhly , the Secretary of ORG may abbreviate the term of an authorisation , or cancel it with effect from a specified time . ORG , a renewed authorisation is subject to the same confirmation procedure . Ninthly , the powers conferred on a constable by an authorisation under sections CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) or ( CARDINAL ) may only be exercised to search for articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism . Tenthly , ORG made provision in section CARDINAL for reports on the working of the LAW to be made to it at least once a year , which have in the event been made with commendable thoroughness , fairness and expertise by Lord PERSON of Berriew QC . Lastly , it is clear that any misuse of the power to authorise or confirm or search will expose the authorising officer , the Secretary of ORG or the constable , as the case may be , to corrective legal action .

The principle of legality has no application in this context , since even if these sections are accepted as infringing a fundamental human right , itself a debatable proposition , they do not do so by general words but by provisions of a detailed , specific and unambiguous character . Nor are the appellants assisted by ORG circular . This may well represent a cautious official response to the appellants ' challenge , and to the urging of PERSON that these powers be sparingly used . But it can not , even arguably , affect the construction of section GPE ) . The effect of that sub - section is that an authorisation may be given if , and only if , the person giving it considers it likely that these stop and search powers will be of significant practical value and utility in seeking to achieve the public end to which these sections are directed , the prevention of acts of terrorism . ”

Lord PERSON rejected the applicants ' contention that the “ rolling programme ” of authorisations had been ultra vires , as follows :

“ CARDINAL . The appellants ' second , and main , ground of attack was directed to the succession of authorisations which had had effect throughout the Metropolitan Police District since DATE , continuing until DATE . It was , they suggested , CARDINAL thing to authorise the exercise of an exceptional power to counter a particular and specific threat , but quite another to authorise what was , in effect , a continuous ban throughout the GPE area . Again this is not an unattractive submission . One can imagine that an authorisation renewed DATE after DATE might become the product of a routine bureaucratic exercise and not of the informed consideration which sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL clearly require . But all the authorisations and confirmations relevant to these appeals conformed with the statutory limits on duration and area . Renewal was expressly authorised by section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) . The authorisations and confirmations complied with the letter of the statute . The evidence of the Assistant Commissioner and PERSON does not support , and indeed contradicts , the inference of a routine bureaucratic exercise . It may well be that ORG , legislating before the events of DATE , did not envisage a continuous succession of authorisations . But it clearly intended that the section CARDINAL powers should be available to be exercised when a terrorist threat was apprehended which such exercise would help to address , and the pattern of renewals which developed up to DATE ( it is understood the pattern has since changed ) was itself a product of ORG 's principled refusal to confer these exceptional stop and search powers on a continuing , countrywide basis . Reporting on the operation of the CARDINAL Act during DATE and DATE , PERSON ... found that sections DATE and CARDINAL remained necessary and proportional to the continuing and serious risk of terrorism , and regarded GPE as ' a special case , having vulnerable assets and relevant residential pockets in almost every borough ' . ”

On the question whether either applicant had been deprived of liberty as a result of the stop and search procedure , Lord PERSON commented on the absence of any decision of ORG on closely analogous facts and accepted that there were some features indicative of a deprivation of liberty , such as the coercive nature of the measure . However , since the procedure would ordinarily be relatively brief and since the person stopped would not be arrested , handcuffed , confined or removed to any different place , such a person should not be regarded “ as being detained in the sense of confined or kept in custody , but more properly of being detained in the sense of kept from proceeding or kept waiting ” . Article CARDINAL did not , therefore , apply .

As to the question whether LAW was applicable , Lord PERSON was :

“ CARDINAL . ... doubtful whether an ordinary superficial search of the person can be said to show a lack of respect for private life . It is true that ' private life ' has been generously construed to embrace wide rights to personal autonomy . But it is clear Convention jurisprudence that intrusions must reach a certain level of seriousness to engage the operation of the Convention , which is , after all , concerned with human rights and fundamental freedoms , and I incline to the view that an ordinary superficial search of the person and an opening of bags , of the kind to which passengers uncomplainingly submit at airports , for example , can scarcely be said to reach that level . ”

Lord PERSON did not consider that the power to stop and search under sections DATE , properly used in accordance with the statute and Code A , could be used to infringe a person 's rights under Articles CARDINAL or CARDINAL of the Convention .

NORP Despite his doubts as to the applicability of LAW , DATE , DATE or DATE , Lord PERSON went on to consider whether the stop and search powers complied with the requirement of “ lawfulness ” under the Convention , as follows :

“ DATE . The lawfulness requirement in the Convention addresses supremely important features of the rule of law . The exercise of power by public officials , as it affects members of the public , must be governed by clear and publicly - accessible rules of law . The public must not be vulnerable to interference by public officials acting on any personal whim , caprice , malice , predilection or purpose other than that for which the power was conferred . This is what , in this context , is meant by arbitrariness , which is the antithesis of legality . This is the test which any interference with or derogation from a LAW right must meet if a violation is to be avoided .

The stop and search regime under review does in my opinion meet that test . LAW informs the public that these powers are , if duly authorised and confirmed , available . It defines and limits the powers with considerable precision . Code A , a public document , describes the procedure in detail . The LAW and the LAW do not require the fact or the details of any authorisation to be publicised in any way , even retrospectively , but I doubt if they are to be regarded as ' law ' rather than as a procedure for bringing the law into potential effect . In any event , it would stultify a potentially valuable source of public protection to require notice of an authorisation or confirmation to be publicised prospectively . The efficacy of a measure such as this will be gravely weakened if potential offenders are alerted in advance . Anyone stopped and searched must be told , by the constable , all he needs to know . In exercising the power the constable is not free to act arbitrarily , and will be open to civil suit if he does . It is true that he need have no suspicion before stopping and searching a member of the public . This can not , realistically , be interpreted as a warrant to stop and search people who are obviously not terrorist suspects , which would be futile and time - wasting . It is to ensure that a constable is not deterred from stopping and searching a person whom he does suspect as a potential terrorist by the fear that he could not show reasonable grounds for his suspicion . It is not suggested that the constables in these cases exercised their powers in a discriminatory manner ( an impossible contention on the facts ) , and I prefer to say nothing on the subject of discrimination . ”

Lord Hope of PERSON agreed with Lord PERSON . In particular , he considered that the stop and search power complied with the principle of legality for the following reasons :

“ DATE . The sight of police officers equipped with bundles of the stop / search form CARDINAL which is used to record the fact that a person or vehicle was stopped by virtue of sections CARDINAL ) or CARDINAL ) has become familiar in LOC since the suicide bombings that were perpetrated on DATE and the attempts to repeat the attacks DATE . They can be seen inside the barriers at stations on LOC , watching people as they come through the barriers and occasionally stopping someone who attracts their attention and searching them . Most people who become aware of the police presence are there because they want to use the transport system . The travelling public are reassured by what they see the police doing at the barriers . They are in the front line of those who would be at risk if there were to be another terrorist outrage . But those who are singled out , stopped and searched in this way may well see things differently . They may find the process inconvenient , intrusive and irritating . As it takes place in public , they may well also find it embarrassing . This is likely to be the case if they believe , contrary to the facts , that they are being discriminated against on grounds of race . These features of the process give rise to this question . Are the limits on the use of the power sufficient to answer a challenge that the Convention rights of the person who is searched are being violated because its use is unforeseeable and arbitrary ?

DATE . From that person 's perspective the situation is one where all the cards are in the hands of the police . It is they , and not the general public , who know that an authorisation is in force and the area that it relates to . It is they who decide when and where within that area they should exercise the power that has been given to them . It is they who decide which persons or which vehicles should be stopped and searched . Sections CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) make it clear that the power may be exercised only by a constable in uniform . Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) provides that the power may be exercised only for the purpose of searching for articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism . But no criterion is laid down in the statute or in any published document as to the precise state of mind that the constable must be in before the power can be exercised .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(b ) provides that the power may be exercised whether or not the constable has grounds for suspecting the presence of articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism . The definition of the word ' terrorism ' for the purposes of the LAW is a wide one , and the matter is left to the judgment of each individual police officer . The first indication that members of the public are likely to get that they are liable to be stopped and searched is when the order to stop is given . Those who are well informed may get some indication as to what is afoot when they see the police with bundles of forms in their hands looking in their direction . But for most people the order to stop will come as a surprise . Unless they are in possession of articles of the kind that the constable is entitled to search for , they may well wonder why they have been singled out for the treatment that they are being subjected to .

There is , of course , a strong argument the other way . If the stop and search procedure is to be effective in detecting and preventing those who are planning to perpetrate acts of terrorism it has to be like this . Advertising the time when and the places where this is to be done helps the terrorist . It impedes the work of the security services . Sophisticated methods of disguise and concealment may be used where warnings are given . Those involved in terrorism can be expected to take full advantage of any published information as to when and where the power is likely to be exercised . So the police need to be free to decide when and where the use of the procedure is to be authorised and whom they should stop on the spur of the moment if their actions are to be a step ahead of the terrorist . Must this system be held to be unlawful under LAW on the ground that it is arbitrary ?

... The use of the section CARDINAL power has to be seen in the context of the legislation that provides for it . The need for its use at any given time and in any given place to be authorised , and for the authorisation to be confirmed within TIME , provides a background of law that is readily accessible to the citizen . It provides a system of regulatory control over the exercise of the power which enables the person who is stopped and searched , if he wishes , to test its legality in the courts . In that event the authorisation and the confirmation of it will of necessity , to enable the law to be tested properly , become relevant evidence . The guidance in DATE of Code A warns the constable that the power is to be used only for reasons connected with terrorism , and that particular care must be taken not to discriminate against members of minority ethnic groups when it is being exercised . It is no more precise than that . But it serves as a reminder that there is a structure of law within which the power must be exercised . A constable who acts within these limits is not exercising the section CARDINAL power arbitrarily .

As the concluding words of para CARDINAL of the decision in GPE v GPE ( DATE ) CARDINAL EHRR CARDINAL indicate , the sufficiency of these measures must be balanced against the nature and degree of the interference with the citizen 's Convention rights which is likely to result from the exercise of the power that has been given to the public authority . The things that a constable can do when exercising the section CARDINAL power are limited by the provisions of section CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ) . He may not require the person to remove any clothing in public except that which is specified , and the person may be detained only for such time as is reasonably required to permit the search to be carried out at or near the place where the person or vehicle has been stopped . The extent of the intrusion is not very great given the obvious importance of the purpose for which it is being resorted to . In my opinion the structure of law within which it is to be exercised is sufficient in all the circumstances to meet the requirement of legality .

It should be noted , of course , that the best safeguard against the abuse of the power in practice is likely to be found in the training , supervision and discipline of the constables who are to be entrusted with its exercise . Public confidence in the police and good relations with those who belong to the ethnic minorities are of the highest importance when extraordinary powers of the kind that are under scrutiny in this case are being exercised . The law will provide remedies if the power to stop and search is improperly exercised . But these are remedies of last resort . Prevention of any abuse of the power in the first place , and a tighter control over its use from the top , must be the first priority . ”

Lord PERSON of PERSON - under - PERSON observed , inter alia :

“ CARDINAL . Given the exceptional ( although , as Lord PERSON has explained , neither unique nor particularly novel ) nature of [ the section DATE ] power ( often described as the power of random search , requiring for its exercise no reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing ) , it is unsurprisingly hedged about with a wide variety of restrictions and safeguards . Those most directly relevant to the way in which the power impacts upon the public on the ground are perhaps these . It can be used only by a constable in uniform ( section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) ) . It can be used only to search for terrorist - connected articles ( section GPE ) ( a ) ) . The person searched must not be required to remove any clothing in public except for headgear , footwear , an outer coat , a jacket or gloves ( section CARDINAL ) ) . The search must be carried out at or near the place where the person or vehicle is stopped ( section CARDINAL ) ) . And the person or vehicle stopped can be detained only for such time as is reasonably required to permit such a search ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ) . Unwelcome and inconvenient though most people may be expected to regard such a stop and search procedure , and radically though it departs from our traditional understanding of the limits of police power , it can scarcely be said to constitute any very substantial invasion of our fundamental civil liberties . Nevertheless , given , as the respondents rightly concede , that in certain cases at least such a procedure will be sufficiently intrusive to engage a person 's article CARDINAL right to respect for his private life , and given too that this power is clearly open to abuse — the inevitable consequence of its exercise requiring no grounds of suspicion on the police officer 's part — the way is clearly open to an argument that the scheme is not properly compliant with the Convention requirement that it be ' in accordance with the law . '

For this requirement to be satisfied ... not only must the interference with the Convention right to privacy have some basis in domestic law ( as here clearly it does in LAW ) ; not only must that law be adequately accessible to the public ( as here clearly it is — unlike , for example , the position in GPE v GPE ( DATE ) CARDINAL EHRR CARDINAL ) ; not only must the law be reasonably foreseeable , to enable those affected to regulate their conduct accordingly ( a requirement surely here satisfied by the public 's recognition , from the very terms of the legislation , that drivers and pedestrians are liable to be subjected to this form of random search and of the need to submit to it ) ; but there must also be sufficient safeguards to avoid the risk of the power being abused or exercised arbitrarily .

DATE . As I understand the appellants ' argument , it is upon this final requirement that it principally focuses : this power , submits PERSON , is all too easily capable of being used in an arbitrary fashion and all too difficult to safeguard against such abuse . True , he acknowledges , if the power is in fact abused in any particular case the police officer concerned will be liable to a civil claim for damages ( and , no doubt , to police disciplinary action ) . But , he submits , it will usually be impossible to establish a misuse of the power given that no particular grounds are required for its apparently lawful exercise . Assume , for example , that a police officer in fact exercises this power for racially discriminatory reasons of his own , how could that be established ? There are simply no effective safeguards against such abuse , no adequate criteria against which to judge the propriety of its use . Certainly it is provided by paragraph CARDINAL of Code A ( a published code issued CARDINAL of ORG ) that : ' Officers must take particular care not to discriminate against members of minority ethnic groups in the exercise of these powers ' . But , say the appellants , there is simply no way of policing that instruction with regard to the exercise of so wide a random power . No way , that is , submits [ counsel for the applicants ] , unless it is by stopping and searching literally everyone ( as , of course , occurs at airports and on entry to certain other specific buildings ) or by stopping and searching on a strictly numerical basis , say every tenth person . Only in one or other of these ways , the appellants ' argument forces them to contend , could such a power as this be exercisable consistently with the principle of legal certainty : there can not otherwise be the necessary safeguards in place to satisfy the Convention requirement as to ' the quality of the law ' ...

I would reject this argument . In the first place it would seem to me impossible to exercise the section CARDINAL power effectively in either of the ways suggested . Imagine that following the GPE bombings DATE the police had attempted to stop and search everyone entering an underground station or indeed CARDINAL ( or CARDINAL ) such person . Not only would such a task have been well nigh impossible but it would to my mind thwart the real purpose and value of this power . That , as Lord PERSON puts it in paragraph CARDINAL of his opinion , is not ' to stop and search people who are obviously not terrorist suspects , which would be futile and time - wasting [ but rather ] to ensure that a constable is not deterred from stopping and searching a person whom he does suspect as a potential terrorist by the fear that he could not show reasonable grounds for his suspicion . ' It is to be hoped , first , that potential terrorists will be deterred ( certainly from carrying the tools of their trade ) by knowing of the risk they run of being randomly searched , and , secondly , that by the exercise of this power police officers may on occasion ( if only very rarely ) find such materials and thereby disrupt or avert a proposed terrorist attack . Neither of these aims will be served by police officers searching those who seem to them least likely to present a risk instead of those they have a hunch may be intent on terrorist action .

DATE . In his DATE review of the operation of the Prevention of Terrorism ( Temporary Provisions ) Act DATE ( amended as explained by Lord PERSON in paragraph CARDINAL of his opinion ) and GPE ( Emergency LAW Act DATE , Mr PERSON said this of the power to stop and search those entering or leaving GPE with a view to finding out whether they were involved in terrorism :

' The “ intuitive ” stop

It is impossible to overstate the value of these stops ...

I should explain what I mean by an “ intuitive stop ” . It is a stop which is made “ cold ” or “ at random”—but I prefer the words “ on intuition”—without advance knowledge about the person or vehicle being stopped .

DATE . I do not think such a stop by a trained Special Branch officer is “ cold ” or “ random ” . The officer has experience and training in the features and circumstances of terrorism and terrorist groups , and he or she may therefore notice things which the layman would not , or he or she may simply have a police officer 's intuition . Often the reason for such a stop can not be explained to the layman . '

Later in his review Mr PERSON noted of the more general stop and search powers originally contained in sections CARDINALA and CARDINAL of the DATE Act that ' these powers were used sparingly , and for good reason ' . I respectfully agree that the section CARDINAL power ( as it is now ) should be exercised sparingly , a recommendation echoed throughout a series of annual reports on QUANTITY by PERSON of ORG , the independent reviewer of the terrorist legislation appointed in succession to Mr Rowe — see most recently paragraph CARDINAL of his DATE report , suggesting that the use of the power ' could be cut by CARDINAL per cent without significant risk to the public or detriment to policing . ' To my mind , however , that makes it all the more important that it is targeted as the police officer 's intuition dictates rather than used in the true sense randomly for all the world as if there were some particular merit in stopping and searching people whom the officers regard as constituting no threat whatever . In short , the value of this legislation , just like that allowing people to be stopped and searched at ports , is that it enables police officers to make what Mr PERSON characterised as an intuitive stop .

Of course , as ORG chaired by Lord PERSON of GPE noted in its DATE report on ORG DATE :

' Sophisticated terrorists change their profile and methods to avoid presenting a static target . For example , ORG is reported to place particular value on recruiting NORP converts because they judge them to be less likely to be scrutinised by the authorities . '

It seems to me inevitable , however , that so long as the principal terrorist risk against which use of the section CARDINAL power has been authorised is that from ORG , a disproportionate number of those stopped and searched will be of NORP appearance ( particularly if they happen to be carrying rucksacks or wearing apparently bulky clothing capable of containing terrorist - related items ) .

Is such a conclusion inimical to Convention jurisprudence or , indeed , inconsistent with domestic discrimination law ? In my judgment it is not , provided only that police officers exercising this power on the ground pay proper heed to paragraph CARDINAL of Code A :

' The selection of persons stopped under LAW should reflect an objective assessment of the threat posed by the various terrorist groups active in GPE . The powers must not be used to stop and search for reasons unconnected with terrorism . Officers must take particular care not to discriminate against members of minority ethnic groups in the exercise of these powers . There may be circumstances , however , where it is appropriate for officers to take account of a person 's ethnic origin in selecting persons to be stopped in response to a specific terrorist threat ( for example , some international terrorist groups are associated with particular ethnic identities ) . '

Ethnic origin accordingly can and properly should be taken into account in deciding whether and whom to stop and search provided always that the power is used sensitively and the selection is made for reasons connected with the perceived terrorist threat and not on grounds of racial discrimination . ”

The applicants also commenced a claim in ORG on DATE for , inter alia , damages under LAW DATE on the basis that the police had used the stop and search powers unlawfully against each applicant and in breach of LAW , CARDINAL of the Convention , to control or deter their attendance at the demonstration rather than to search for articles linked to terrorism . The claims were stayed pending the outcome of their appeal to ORG and were finally heard in DATE . ORG rejected the applicants ' claims and determined that the power had , in respect to each of them , been properly and lawfully exercised . The applicants did not seek to appeal against this judgment .

Police officers have the power to stop and search individuals under a range of legislation . For example , section CARDINAL of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act DATE allows an officer who has reasonable grounds for suspicion to stop and search a person or vehicle to look for stolen or prohibited items . Section CARDINAL of ORG and LAW DATE allows a senior officer to authorise the stop and search of persons and vehicles where there is good reason to believe that to do so would help to prevent incidents involving serious violence or that persons are carrying dangerous instruments or offensive weapons .

The police power to stop and search at random where expedient to prevent acts of terrorism was first introduced as a response to the bombing campaign DATE in and around GPE . LAW of ORG DATE inserted a new section CARDINALA into the Prevention of Terrorism ( Temporary LAW DATE ( “ the DATE LAW ) in similar terms to LAW CARDINAL of QUANTITY ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , but without any requirement that the Secretary of ORG confirm the authorisation . ORG DATE created an additional , separate power to stop and search pedestrians , under section CARDINALB of the CARDINAL LAW . LAW also established for the first time the confirmation procedure involving the Secretary of ORG .

NORP In DATE the ORG asked Lord PERSON , a ORG judge , to undertake an Inquiry into the need for specific counter - terrorism legislation in GPE following the decrease in terrorism connected to GPE . The Inquiry included consideration of whether there remained a continuing need for a power equivalent to that in sections CARDINALA and CARDINAL of the DATE Act . In his ORG , § DATE ) , PERSON noted that DATE the police in GPE had carried out searches of CARDINAL drivers and passengers and CARDINAL pedestrians under sections CARDINALA and CARDINAL of the DATE Act . When considering whether similar powers should be retained in any permanent counter - terrorism legislation that might be enacted , he observed that a decision to give the police a power to stop and search at random was not to be taken lightly . On the other hand there was evidence that a number of terrorists had been intercepted by alert officers on patrol , and in CARDINAL case a potential catastrophe had been averted . He said that there was also reason to believe that terrorists were deterred to some extent by the prospect of police road checks and the consequent risk that they would be intercepted . He commented :

“ As to usage , the figures show that the power has been used with great discretion . The requirement for authorisation by a very senior police officer is an important control mechanism . A number of requests have been turned down . That is reassuring . The police are very sensitive to the damage which would be done if there were ever any grounds for suspecting that the power was being used as anything other than a counter - terrorism measure . ”

In the end Lord PERSON recommended that powers on the lines of the existing sections CARDINALA and DATE should be retained in permanent legislation . He also recommended that the Secretary of ORG 's confirmation should be required in relation to each provision . Since ORG applied the same standards to the terrorism provisions as to other statutory powers to stop and search , he saw no need for additional safeguards .

The CARDINAL Act was intended to overhaul , modernise and strengthen the law relating to terrorism in the light , inter alia , of Lord ORG .

“ Terrorism ” is defined , in LAW , as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) In this LAW ' terrorism ' means the use or threat of action where -

( a ) the action falls within subsection ( CARDINAL ) ,

( b ) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public , and

( c ) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political , religious or ideological cause .

( CARDINAL ) Action falls within this subsection if it -

( a ) involves serious violence against a person ,

( b ) involves serious damage to property ,

( c ) endangers a person 's life , other than that of the person committing the action ,

( d ) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public , or

( e ) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system .

( CARDINAL ) The use or threat of action falling within subsection ( CARDINAL ) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection ( CARDINAL ) is satisfied .

( CARDINAL ) In this section -

( a ) ' action ' includes action outside GPE ,

( b ) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person , or to property , wherever situated ,

( c ) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than GPE , and

( d ) ' the government ' means the government of GPE , of a Part of GPE or of a country other than GPE .

( CARDINAL ) In this LAW a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation . ”

Sections CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act , under the sub - heading “ Suspected terrorists ” , provide for arrest without warrant , the search of premises and the search of persons by a police officer . In each case there must be reasonable suspicion that the person subject to the arrest or search is a terrorist .

Sections CARDINAL - CARDINAL , under the sub - heading “ Power to stop and search ” , are not subject to the requirement of reasonable suspicion . These sections provide for a CARDINAL stage procedure .

The first stage , under section CARDINAL , is authorisation :

“ CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) An authorisation under this subsection authorises any constable in uniform to stop a vehicle in an area or at a place specified in the authorisation and to search -

( a ) the vehicle ;

( b ) the driver of the vehicle ;

( c ) a passenger in the vehicle ;

( d ) anything in or on the vehicle or carried by the driver or a passenger .

( CARDINAL ) An authorisation under this subsection authorises any constable in uniform to stop a pedestrian in an area or at a place specified in the authorisation and to search -

( a ) the pedestrian ;

( b ) anything carried by him .

( CARDINAL ) An authorisation under subsection ( CARDINAL ) or ( CARDINAL ) may be given only if the person giving it considers it expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism .

( CARDINAL ) An authorisation may be given -

( a ) where the specified area or place is the whole or part of a police area outside GPE other than one mentioned in paragraph ( b ) or ( c ) , by a police officer for the area who is of at least the rank of assistant chief constable ;

( b ) where the specified area or place is the whole or part of the metropolitan police district , by a police officer for the district who is of at least the rank of commander of the metropolitan police ;

( c ) where the specified area or place is the whole or part of GPE , by a police officer for GPE who is of at least the rank of commander in GPE police force ;

( d ) where the specified area or place is the whole or part of GPE , by a [ member of ORG ] who is of at least the rank of assistant chief constable .

( CARDINAL ) If an authorisation is given orally , the person giving it shall confirm it in writing as soon as is reasonably practicable . ”

By section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)-(CARDINAL ) , an authorisation takes effect when given and expires when it is expressed to expire , but may not be for longer than DATE . The existence and contents of section CARDINAL authorisations are not within the public domain .

The second stage is confirmation , governed by section CARDINAL ) . The giver of an authorisation must inform the Secretary of ORG as soon as is reasonably practicable . If the Secretary of ORG does not confirm the authorisation within TIME of the time when it was given , it then ceases to have effect ( without invalidating anything done during the CARDINAL-hour period ) . When confirming an authorisation the Secretary of ORG may substitute an earlier , but not a later , time of expiry . He may cancel an authorisation with effect from a specified time . Where an authorisation is duly renewed , the same confirmation procedure applies . The Secretary of ORG may not alter the geographical coverage of an authorisation but may withhold his confirmation if he considers the area covered to be too wide .

The third stage , under section DATE , involves the exercise of the stop and search power by a police constable :

“ ( CARDINAL ) The power conferred by an authorisation under section CARDINAL ) or ( CARDINAL ) -

( a ) may be exercised only for the purpose of searching for articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism , and

( b ) may be exercised whether or not the constable has grounds for suspecting the presence of articles of that kind .

( CARDINAL ) A constable may seize and retain an article which he discovers in the course of a search by virtue of section CARDINAL ) or ( CARDINAL ) and which he reasonably suspects is intended to be used in connection with terrorism .

( CARDINAL ) A constable exercising the power conferred by an authorisation may not require a person to remove any clothing in public except for headgear , footwear , an outer coat , a jacket or gloves .

( CARDINAL ) Where a constable proposes to search a person or vehicle by virtue of section CARDINAL ) or ( CARDINAL ) he may detain the person or vehicle for such time as is reasonably required to permit the search to be carried out at or near the place where the person or vehicle is stopped .

( CARDINAL ) Where -

( a ) a vehicle or pedestrian is stopped by virtue of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) or ( CARDINAL ) , and

( b ) the driver of the vehicle or the pedestrian applies for a written statement that the vehicle was stopped , or that he was stopped , by virtue of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) or ( CARDINAL ) ,

the written statement shall be provided .

( CARDINAL ) An application under subsection ( CARDINAL ) must be made within DATE beginning with the date on which the vehicle or pedestrian was stopped . ”

These powers are additional to the other powers conferred on a constable by law ( CARDINAL Act , section CARDINAL ) . Section CARDINAL makes it an offence punishable by imprisonment or fine or both to fail to stop when required to do so by a constable , or wilfully to obstruct a constable in the exercise of the power conferred by an authorisation under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) or ( CARDINAL ) .

Sections CARDINAL - CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act came into force on DATE . It was disclosed during the domestic proceedings in the present case that successive section CARDINAL authorisations , each covering the whole of FAC district and each for the maximum permissible period ( DATE ) , have been made and confirmed ever since that time .

A Code of Practice was issued by the Secretary of ORG on DATE to guide police officers in the exercise of all statutory powers of stop and search . It was required to be readily available at all police stations for consultation by police officers and was a public document .

The Code required , inter alia , that such powers be “ used fairly , responsibly , with respect to people being searched ” . It required that the power under LAW “ must not be used to stop and search for reasons unconnected with terrorism ” and that the power should be used “ to search only for articles which could be used for terrorist purposes ” . In paragraphs PERSON and CARDINAL , the Code provided :

“ CARDINAL.CARDINAL The intrusion on the liberty of the person stopped or searched must be brief and detention for the purposes of a search must take place at or near the location of the stop .

CARDINAL these fundamental principles are not observed the use of powers to stop and search may be drawn into question . Failure to use the powers in the proper manner reduces their effectiveness . Stop and search can play an important role in the detection and prevention of crime , and using the powers fairly makes them more effective . ”

Paragraph CARDINAL.CARDINAL of the Code provided :

“ There is no power to require a person to remove any clothing in public other than an outer coat , jacket or gloves except under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ( which empowers a constable conducting a search under section CARDINAL ) or CARDINAL ) of that LAW to require a person to remove headgear and footwear in public ) ... A search in public of a person 's clothing which has not been removed must be restricted to superficial examination of outer garments . This does not , however , prevent an officer from placing his or her hand inside the pockets of the outer clothing , or feeling round the inside of collars , socks and shoes if this is reasonably necessary in the circumstances to look for the object of the search or to remove and examine any item reasonably suspected to be the object of the search . For the same reasons , subject to the restrictions on the removal of headgear , a person 's hair may also be searched in public ... ”

Certain steps were required by paragraph CARDINAL to be taken before the search :

“ CARDINAL Before any search of a detained person or attended vehicle takes place the officer must take reasonable steps to give the person to be searched or in charge of the vehicle the following information :

( a ) that they are being detained for the purposes of a search ;

( b ) the officer 's name ( except in the case of enquiries linked to the investigation of terrorism , or otherwise where the officer reasonably believes that giving his or her name might put him or her in danger , in which case a warrant or other identification number shall be given ) and the name of the police station to which the officer is attached ;

( c ) the legal search power which is being exercised ; and

( d ) a clear explanation of ;

( i ) the purpose of the search in terms of the article or articles for which there is a power to search ; ...

( iii ) in the case of powers which do not require reasonable suspicion ... , the nature of the power and of any necessary authorisation and the fact that it has been given . ”

Officers conducting a search were required by paragraph CARDINAL to be in uniform . The PERSON continued , in paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL.CARDINAL :

“ CARDINAL Before the search takes place the officer must inform the person ( or the owner or person in charge of the vehicle that is to be searched ) of his or her entitlement to a copy of the record of the search , including his entitlement to a record of the search if an application is made within DATE , if it is wholly impracticable to make a record at the time . If a record is not made at the time the person should also be told how a copy can be obtained .... The person should also be given information about police powers to stop and search and the individual 's rights in these circumstances .

CARDINAL If the person to be searched , or in charge of a vehicle to be searched , does not appear to understand what is being said , or there is any doubt about the person 's ability to understand LANGUAGE , the officer must take reasonable steps to bring information regarding the person 's rights and any relevant provisions of this Code to his or her attention . If the person is deaf or can not understand LANGUAGE and is accompanied by someone , then the officer must try to establish whether that person can interpret or otherwise help the officer to give the required information . ”

A record was required to be made at the time or as soon as practicable ( paragraph CARDINAL ) :

“ CARDINAL.CARDINAL An officer who has carried out a search in the exercise of any power to which this Code applies , must make a record of it at the time , unless there are exceptional circumstances which would make this wholly impracticable ( e.g. in situations involving public disorder or when the officer 's presence is urgently required elsewhere ) . If a record is not made at the time , the officer must do so as soon as practicable afterwards . There may be situations in which it is not practicable to obtain the information necessary to complete a record , but the officer should make every reasonable effort to do so . ”

Section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act requires the Secretary of ORG to lay a report on the working of the LAW before ORG at least once DATE and PERSON of Berriew ORG has been appointed as ORG to prepare the DATE report , inter alia .

In paragraph CARDINAL of his report on the operation of the Act in DATE PERSON briefly summarised the effect of section CARDINAL - CARDINAL and then said :

“ No difficulties have been drawn to my attention in relation to the exercise of these powers . They were used extensively in DATE . I have examined the full list of such authorisations , which have been deployed in almost every police authority area in GPE . It would not be in the public interest to provide details of the reasons and events . I am satisfied that their use works well and is used to protect the public interest , institutions , and in the cause of public safety and the security of the state . I have been able to scrutinise the documentation used for LAW authorisations . It is designed to limit inconvenience to the general public , and to ensure that no authorisation is given without detailed and documented reasons . ”

In Lord PERSON 's “ Report on the Operation in DATE and DATE of LAW CARDINAL ” , he commented on the section CARDINAL power as follows :

“ CARDINAL . Part CARDINAL of the Act contains counter - terrorism powers available to the police to deal with operational situations . During DATE these powers have become more controversial , particularly because of increased levels of protest arising from the war against GPE . In particular , section CARDINAL has been the cause of considerable anxiety and debate .

DATE I asserted that no particular problems had been drawn to my attention from the operation of these provisions during DATE . The opposite has been the case in relation to DATE . I have received many complaints , some from organisations and others from individuals . I can not comment here on individual cases ...

In GPE there have been rolling DATE authorisations for the whole of the area policed by the GPE police and GPE . I have seen detailed figures for the use of the powers in every part of that area . In some parts of GPE the section CARDINAL/CARDINAL powers have been used very little . In others , with obvious targets such as an airport or ORG , there has been more extensive use , as one would expect . There is no part of GPE where the powers have not been used at all between DATE and DATE , the period for which I have statistics . There are huge differences between the boroughs in this context : I take this to be evidence of specific operational decisions by the police . The nature of GPE means that a terrorist may well live in CARDINAL borough , have associates in others , and have targets in yet others . Having said that , at present there is no other city with continuous section CARDINAL authorisations .

Lord Justice PERSON 's judgment [ in the present case : see paragraph CARDINAL above ] exactly reflects my own concerns on this front . Whilst the section CARDINAL authorisations for the Metropolitan Police area , and for parts of GPE and neighbouring areas , at the material times were justifiable and proof from judicial review , their use gave some rise for anxiety . That anxiety arises from the contents of DATE , and the difficulty faced in real - time situations by constables confronted by complex legislative decisions .

Pursuant to section DATE , a section CARDINAL/CARDINAL search can be carried out by a constable in an authorised area whether or not he has grounds for suspicion , but may only be ' for articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism ' . This calls at least theoretically for officers to pause for thought between ( a ) stop , ( b ) commencement of search , and ( c ) during search . If the search commences as defined in section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) , but the officer realises at any given moment that in reality he is searching for non - terrorism articles , he should change gear into a non-[Terrorism Act CARDINAL ] search procedure . This is asking a lot of an officer who may have been briefed in short form at a testing scene .

In my view section DATE and section CARDINAL remain necessary and proportional to the continuing and serious risk of terrorism . GPE is a special case , having vulnerable assets and relevant residential pockets in almost every borough . The use of LAW authorisations elsewhere in the country has been relatively sparing . However , I would urge ORG and [ the ORG ] ... to produce new , short , clear and preferably nationally accepted guidelines for issue to all officers in DATE authorised areas . All briefings should remind officers that , even where there is a section CARDINAL authorisation , other stop and search powers may be judged more appropriate with some individuals stopped . Whilst agreeing with the Chief Constable of GPE that the powers are drawn widely , and with ORG that they have great potential utility to protect the public , in using the powers appropriate attention should be given to the important right to protest within the law . ”

NORP In his report on the operation of QUANTITY in DATE ( DATE ) , PERSON commented :

“ CARDINAL . In DATE and DATE I received many complaints , some from organisations and others from individuals , about the operation of sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL . These and some litigation have been taken seriously by the police . As a result , I have been consulted upon and have been able to contribute to work towards providing a clearer understanding throughout police forces of the utility and limitations of sections DATE .

The crucial thing is that police officers on the ground , exercising relatively unfamiliar powers sometimes in circumstances of some stress , should have a greater degree of knowledge of the scope and limitations of those powers . Terrorism related powers should be used for terrorism related purposes ; otherwise their credibility is severely damaged . An incident on DATE at a hospital in GPE yet again highlighted this . In a diverse community the erroneous use of powers against people who are not terrorists is bound to damage community relations .

... [ LAW ] authorisations have been used extensively in DATE , unsurprisingly in the immediate aftermath of the events of the CARDINALth and DATE .

Although available in GPE , to date section CARDINAL powers have never been authorised by a NORP police force . I had anticipated that they might have been deployed for the DATE meeting of the GCARDINAL Summit in GPE . They were not . GPE apart , I doubt that there is evidence that GPE is less at risk from terrorism than other parts of the country . This perpetuates the question of why section CARDINAL is needed in GPE and GPE if it is not required in GPE . There is no other provision specific to PERSON to explain the difference of approach . At the very least this demonstrates that other powers are on the whole perfectly adequate for most purposes .

My view continues as expressed DATE - that I find it hard to understand why section CARDINAL authorisations are perceived to be needed in some force areas but not others with strikingly similar risk profiles . This view has not been affected by the events of DATE .

I remain sure that section CARDINAL could be used less and expect it to be used less . There is little or no evidence that the use of section CARDINAL has the potential to prevent an act of terrorism as compared with other statutory powers of stop and search .

ORG scrutinises applications critically . It is a sound approach for them to refuse unless the circumstances are absolutely clear .

In my view section DATE and section CARDINAL remain necessary and proportional to the continuing and serious risk of terrorism . GPE is a special case , having vulnerable assets and relevant residential pockets in almost every borough , and fairly extensive use is understandable . However , I emphasise that they should be used sparingly . Evidence of misuse , especially in an arbitrary way , will not find favour with the courts and could fuel demands for repeal . It involves a substantial encroachment into the reasonable expectation of the public at large that they will only face police intervention in their lives ( even when protesters ) if there is reasonable suspicion that they will commit a crime . ”

In his report on the operation of LAW in DATE ( DATE ) , Lord PERSON observed :

“ CARDINAL . My view continues as expressed in DATE that I find it hard to understand why section CARDINAL authorisations are perceived to be needed in some force areas but not others with strikingly similar risk profiles .

I remain sure that section DATE could be used less and expect it to be used less . There is little or no evidence that the use of section CARDINAL has the potential to prevent an act of terrorism as compared with other statutory powers of stop and search . Its utility has been questioned publicly by senior ORG staff with wide experience of terrorism policing .

ORG continues to scrutinise applications critically . I think that they could and should refuse more often . There are instances in which public order stop and search powers are as effective DATE and they are always more palatable to those stopped and searched .

In my view section DATE and section CARDINAL remain necessary and proportional to the continuing and serious risk of terrorism . However , I emphasise again that they should be used sparingly . They encroach into the reasonable expectation of the public at large that they will only face police intervention in their lives ( even when protesters ) if there is reasonable suspicion that they will commit a crime . ”

In his report into the operation of LAW in DATE ( DATE ) , Lord PERSON noted that the criticism of the section CARDINAL power had increased further during DATE and continued :

“ CARDINAL . I am sure beyond any doubt that section CARDINAL could be used less and expect it to be used less . There is little or no evidence that the use of section CARDINAL has the potential to prevent an act of terrorism as compared with other statutory powers of stop and search . Whilst arrests for other crime have followed searches under the section , none of CARDINAL of searches has ever related to a terrorism offence . ... ”

Nonetheless , he concluded that the powers remained necessary and proportionate to the continuing terrorist threat .

Finally , in his report on the operation of LAW in DATE ( DATE ) , Lord PERSON commented :

“ CARDINAL . Examples of poor or unnecessary use of section CARDINAL abound . I have evidence of cases where the person stopped is so obviously far from any known terrorism profile that , realistically , there is not the slightest possibility of him / her being a terrorist , and no other feature to justify the stop . In CARDINAL situation the basis of the stops being carried out was numerical only , which is almost certainly unlawful and in no way an intelligent use of the procedure . Chief officers must bear in mind that a section CARDINAL stop , without suspicion , is an invasion of the stopped person 's freedom of movement . I believe that it is totally wrong for any person to be stopped in order to produce a racial balance in the section CARDINAL statistics . There is ample anecdotal evidence that this is happening . I can well understand the concerns of the police that they should be free from allegations of prejudice ; but it is not a good use of precious resources if they waste them on self - evidently unmerited searches . It is also an invasion of the civil liberties of the person who has been stopped , simply to ' balance ' the statistics . The criteria for section CARDINAL stops should be objectively based , irrespective of racial considerations : if an objective basis happens to produce an ethnic imbalance , that may have to be regarded as a proportional consequence of operational policing .

Useful practice guidance on stop and search in relation to terrorism was produced during DATE by ORG on behalf of ORG [ ORG ] . This guidance emphasises crucial requirement , which include DATE

● These powers are exceptional

● The geographical extent of LAW authorisations must be clearly defined

● The legal test is expediency for the purposes of preventing acts of terrorism

● Community impact assessments are a vital part of the authorisation process

● The Home Secretary should be provided with a detailed justification for a section CARDINAL authorisation

● Chief officers must expect ORG to apply detailed and rigorous scrutiny in considering whether to confirm authorisations

● Leaflets should be made available to the public in an area where the power is being deployed

● Officers must keep careful records

My view remains as expressed in DATE , but reinforced : that I find it hard to understand why section CARDINAL authorisations are perceived to be needed in some force areas , and in relation to some sites , but not others with strikingly similar risk profiles . Where other stop and search powers are adequate to meet need , there is no need to apply for or to approve the use of the section . Its primary purpose is to deal with operationally difficult places at times of stress , when there is a heightened likelihood of terrorists gaining access to a significant location . For example , I have no criticism of its careful use at the time of a major demonstration at FAC : terrorists might well use the opportunity of participation in such a demonstration to enter , photograph or otherwise reconnoitre , and otherwise add to their knowledge of a potential target such as FAC . Nor do I criticise its use at or near critical infrastructure or places of especial national significance .

I now feel a sense of frustration that ORG still does not limit their LAW authorisations to some boroughs only , or parts of boroughs , rather than to the entire force area . I can not see a justification for the whole of the LOC area being covered permanently , and the intention of the section was not to place GPE under permanent special search powers . However , a pilot project is about to start in which the section is deployed in a different way . I shall examine that project closely . The alarming numbers of usages of the power ( CARDINAL stops per month as we entered DATE ) represent bad news , and I hope for better in a DATE 's time . The figures , and a little analysis of them , show that section DATE is being used as an instrument to aid non - terrorism policing on some occasions , and this is unacceptable .

I am sure that safely it could be used far less . There is little or no evidence that the use of section CARDINAL has the potential to prevent an act of terrorism as compared with other statutory powers of stop and search . Whilst arrests for other crime have followed searches under the section , none of CARDINAL of searches has ever resulted in conviction of a terrorism offence . Its utility has been questioned publicly and privately by senior ORG staff with wide experience of terrorism policing .

It should not be taken that the lesser usage of section CARDINAL in places other than GPE means that such places are less safe , or more prone to terrorism . There are different ways of achieving the same end . The effect on community relations of the extensive use of the section is undoubtedly negative . Search on reasonable and stated suspicion , though not in itself a high test , is more understandable and reassuring to the public .

I emphasise that I am not in favour of repealing section CARDINAL . Subject to the views expressed above , in my judgment section CARDINAL and section CARDINAL remain necessary and proportional to the continuing and serious risk of terrorism . ”

Under section CARDINAL of LAW DATE , the Secretary of ORG is under an obligation to publish information relating to the criminal justice system with reference to avoiding discrimination on the ground of race . In a report published pursuant to this obligation in DATE , “ Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System – CARDINAL ” , ORG recorded that :

“ A total of CARDINAL searches were made under section CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ) of LAW in DATE compared with CARDINAL in DATE , an overall increase of PERCENT ( Table CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) . Searches of NORP people increased from CARDINAL to CARDINAL ( up PERCENT ) , searches of NORP people increased from CARDINAL to CARDINAL ( up PERCENT ) . Searches of people in the Other ethnic group also increased , from CARDINAL in DATE to CARDINAL in DATE ( up PERCENT ) , as did searches of White people , increasing from CARDINAL in DATE to CARDINAL in DATE ( up PERCENT ) . CARDINAL of searches took place in the ORG area and PERCENT in GPE , compared to PERCENT and PERCENT respectively in DATE . The large increases in comparison to the CARDINAL/CARDINAL figures may be explained , in part , by the GPE bombings of DATE . As with stop and searches under s.CARDINAL PACE , resultant increased street activities of the police led to an increase in the use of stop and search powers under LAW .

In DATE , CARDINAL searches of vehicle occupants were made under section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ( Table CARDINAL ) . MONEY of those searched in DATE were White , PERCENT NORP and PERCENT Black . There was a slight increase in the proportion of White people searched and a slight fall in the proportion of NORP people searched under this provision compared to DATE . CARDINAL arrests of vehicle occupants in connection with terrorism resulted from section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) searches , compared to CARDINAL in DATE . Arrests under non - terrorism legislation following the use of this provision remained constant DATE at CARDINAL . Most arrests following a section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) search were in GPE . This most likely reflects the increased use of the powers in GPE .

The number of stop and searches of pedestrians under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) nearly doubled DATE with CARDINAL stop and searches recorded in DATE . This increase was accounted for by the increase in use of the power in GPE . Use of the power in areas outside of GPE decreased by PERCENT DATE . In DATE , PERCENT of people stopped under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) were White compared to PERCENT in DATE and PERCENT in DATE . The proportions for NORP and NORP people fell to PERCENT and PERCENT respectively in DATE . In DATE , CARDINAL arrests in connection with terrorism resulted from section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) searches compared to CARDINAL in DATE and CARDINAL in DATE . Arrests under non - terrorist legislation rose from CARDINAL in DATE to CARDINAL in DATE . ”

In the report published DATE , in DATE , “ Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System – CARDINAL/CARDINAL ” , ORG recorded that :

“ A total of CARDINAL searches were made under section CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ) of LAW in DATE compared with CARDINAL in DATE and represents a decrease of PERCENT ( Table CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) . Over a third of police force areas did not record any use of this power in DATE . Searches decreased for all ethnic groups but the biggest fall was for NORP people ( PERCENT ) , followed by those in the White group ( PERCENT ) , those in the Other category ( PERCENT ) , and lastly NORP people ( PERCENT ) . CARDINAL areas did increase the number searched under LAW and this included the [ ORG ] who registered an PERCENT rise . This contrasts with GPE where there was a PERCENT fall . The proportion of NORP people searched under LAW in the GPE police area ( PERCENT ) exceeded the proportion of NORP persons ( PERCENT ) .

In DATE searches of vehicle occupants were made under LAW ) ( Table CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) . CARDINAL per cent of those searched during this period were White , a fall of CARDINAL percentage points on DATE , PERCENT Black ( up CARDINAL percentage points ) , and PERCENT NORP ( up CARDINAL percentage points ) . CARDINAL arrests of vehicle occupants in connection with terrorism resulted from LAW ( CARDINAL ) searches , compared to CARDINAL DATE . CARDINAL of these involved NORP persons and CARDINAL NORP . NORP under non - terrorism legislation following the use of this provision have remained constant DATE at CARDINAL .

The number of stop and searches of pedestrians under LAW ) has reduced by PERCENT DATE from CARDINAL . A large part of DATE can be accounted for by the decrease in GPE from CARDINAL to CARDINAL over DATE . The proportion of White pedestrians searched under LAW ) has increased since DATE from PERCENT of the total to PERCENT . NORP people remain the highest ORG group both searched ( PERCENT ) and subsequently arrested in connection with terrorism ( PERCENT ) . ”

The most recent report , “ Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System DATE ” , published in DATE , recorded a significant increase in the use of the section CARDINAL powers :

“ A total of CARDINAL searches of people were made under section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW in DATE compared with CARDINAL in DATE and represents an increase of PERCENT ( Table CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) . Just under a fifth ( PERCENT ) of police force areas did not record any use of this power in DATE . Searches increased for all ethnic groups but the biggest rise was for Black people ( PERCENT ) , followed by those in the NORP group ( PERCENT ) , those in the Other category ( PERCENT ) , and lastly White people ( PERCENT ) .

The large rise in the number of stop and searches made under LAW largely reflects increases in the use of this power by the GPE police . In DATE the GPE police were responsible for PERCENT of searches made under LAW ( CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW , compared to PERCENT of those made in DATE . The Metropolitan police used this power on CARDINAL more occasions than in DATE , which represents an increase of PERCENT . This rise is directly attributable to the robust response by the GPE police to the threat of terror related networks in GPE since the Haymarket bomb in DATE .

Tables CARDINAL and CARDINAL show selected police force areas , where the total number stopped and searched under s. CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) & ( CARDINAL ) of LAW CARDINAL exceeded CARDINAL people in DATE .

In DATE , CARDINAL searches of vehicle occupants were made under LAW ( CARDINAL ) ( Table CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) . CARDINAL per cent of those searched during this period were White , a fall of CARDINAL percentage points on DATE , PERCENT were Black ( up CARDINAL percentage points ) , and PERCENT were NORP ( up CARDINAL percentage points ) . CARDINAL arrests of vehicle occupants in connection with terrorism resulted from LAW ( CARDINAL ) searches , compared to CARDINAL DATE . CARDINAL of these involved NORP persons and CARDINAL NORP . NORP under non - terrorism legislation following the use of stop and search under LAW ( CARDINAL ) increased to CARDINAL from CARDINAL in DATE .

The number of stop and searches of pedestrians under LAW ( CARDINAL ) has increased by PERCENT DATE from CARDINAL ( Table CARDINAL ) . As previously mentioned , this large increase can be attributable to the LOC police 's robust response to the LOC bombs . The proportion of White pedestrians searched under LAW ( CARDINAL ) has decreased since DATE from PERCENT of the total to PERCENT . NORP people remain the highest ORG group both searched ( PERCENT ) and subsequently arrested in connection with terrorism ( PERCENT ) . ”

In its ORG , “ Demonstrating respect for rights ? A human rights approach to policing protest ” , published in DATE , ORG on Human Rights recommended , in connection with CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act :

“ Counter - terrorism powers

A significant number of witnesses expressed serious concerns at the use of counter - terrorism powers on protestors , particularly the power under LAW to stop and search without suspicion . Witnesses suggested that the use of the powers contravened the ORG which note :

Domestic legislation designed to counter terrorism or ' extremism ' should narrowly define these terms so as not to include forms of civil disobedience and protest ; the pursuit of certain political , religious , or ideological ends ; or attempts to exert influence on other sections of society , the government , or international opinion .

ORG complained that the police had relied on LAW to prevent journalists from leaving demonstrations . Some witnesses noted that restrictions on peaceful protests were increasingly justified by reference to the security threat . The following comment by PERSON reflects the views of a number of witnesses :

... there can be no justification to call upon anti - terrorism legislation to police protests / protestors and such use debases the very real threat terrorists are capable of posing to us all .

High profile examples of the inappropriate use of counter - terrorism powers include : preventing PERSON from re - entering the ORG conference in GPE in DATE , following his physical ejection for heckling the then ORG Secretary PERSON MP ; and stopping and searching a protestor and a journalist at an arms fair at FAC in GPE , GPE in DATE . Less well - known examples include the use of stop and search on demonstrators at military bases or people wearing slogans on t - shirts .

ORG and the author and commentator PERSON both distinguished protestors ( including animal rights extremists ) from terrorists . Mr PERSON said ' terrorism is a word we ought to reserve for some kind of insurgency , or guerrilla of asymmetrical warfare ' . In contrast , ORG argued in relation to protest against its activities by animal rights activists , however , that ' insufficient consideration was given to counter - terrorism powers in what was widely considered in practice ( but not in name ) to be domestic terrorism ' .

When we asked police representatives whether it was appropriate to use counter - terrorism powers against protestors , PERSON replied that ' there are occasions when we do need to use our counter - terrorism powers : I would say that that is why we have them ' .

Addressing the same question , the Minister was clear that counter - terrorism powers should only be used in relation to terrorism . He noted that the Prime Minister had ordered a review into the use of stop and search powers and as a result new guidance had been published . He pointed out , however , that :

If you have a big protest near a big power station or airport , [ ... ] it is very difficult to say that under no circumstances should the police in those situations ever consider using a counterterrorism power when we all know it is perfectly possible for the legitimate protestors to be infiltrated by CARDINAL or CARDINAL who may have other desires ...

The new guidance on stop and search noted that the powers to stop and search under sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW CARDINAL only allow an officer to ' search for articles of evidence that relate to terrorism ' and that ' [ the section CARDINAL ] power should be used sparingly ' . In the light of the decision of ORG in PERSON , which concerned the use of the stop and search power on protestors and journalists outside an arms fair in the FAC in GPE , the guidance states that stop and search should never be used to conduct arbitrary searches but should be based on objective criteria . The guidance refers to protests , noting that section CARDINAL may be appropriate for large public events that may be at risk from terrorism , but states ' officers should also be reminded at briefings that stop and search powers under LAW CARDINAL must never be used as a public order tactic . ' The only reference to human rights is contained in the section of the guidance on the contents of the community impact assessment : it suggests that ' the requirements of LAW DATE ' should be included in the community impact assessment . Although not specifically referring to journalists , the guidance states that LAW , even where a section CARDINAL designation is in place , does not prevent people from taking photographs . In addition , although film and memory cards may be seized as part of a search , officers do not have a legal power to delete images or destroy film .

Whilst we accept that there may be circumstances where the police reasonably believe , on the basis of intelligence , that a demonstration could be used to mask a terrorist attack or be a target of terrorism , we have heard of no examples of this issue arising in practice . We are concerned by the reports we have received of police using counter - terrorism powers on peaceful protestors . It is not clear to us whether this stems from a deliberate decision by the police to use a legal tool which they now have or if individual officers are exercising their discretion inappropriately . Whatever the reason , this is a matter of concern . We welcome the Minister 's comments that counter - terrorism legislation should not be used to deal with public order of protests . We also welcome the recommendation in the new guidance to human rights being included in community impact assessments . We recommend that the new guidance on the use of the section CARDINAL stop and search power be amended to make clear that counter - terrorism powers should not be used against peaceful protestors . In addition , the guidance should make specific reference to the duty of police to act compatibly with human rights , including , for example , by specifying the human rights engaged by protest . ”

In DATE ORG published a report summarising the conclusions of their review into the use of the power under LAW . The report stated that the “ emerging findings ” from the review supported a CARDINAL - layered approach to the use of the power , namely that the power should continue to be available in the vicinity of sites across GPE of key symbolic or strategic importance , but that elsewhere , except where authorised by a specific directive , officers should only stop and search individuals using the power under LAW of LAW , where they had grounds to suspect that the person might be engaged in a terrorism - related offence .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression);Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage - award

David Thór Björgvinsson;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicant , Mr PERSON , was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

After the dissolution of GPE , the land and property of the former collective farms ( kolkhozes ) were divided among the villagers who had been members of the collective farms . In some localities new collective farms were formed , to which the villagers contributed their land and other goods inherited from the former collective farms . The collective farms were headed by leaders . In some cases the villagers worked in the collective farms , whereas in other cases they merely received a part of the revenue of the farm at DATE . At the time of the events in question , the applicant was a member of such a collective farm and had a tense relationship with its leader , GPE , whom he suspected of abusing his position . It does not appear that the applicant and PERSON had an employer - employee relationship .

In DATE during a local election campaign , the applicant , who was a member of the electoral staff of CARDINAL of the candidates , wrote a letter to the President of GPE , the Speaker of ORG and the local ORG which was critical of ORG , who was also a candidate for the position of mayor of their village . In the letter , the applicant accused ORG of numerous abuses . The applicant requested that the ORG authorities intervene in order to solve the problems of : ( i ) access to a lake and pasture on the part of local villagers ; and ( ii ) PERSON 's abusive behaviour .

NORP In DATE TIME initiated civil defamation proceedings against the applicant and claimed compensation of CARDINAL lei ( ORG ) . He argued , in particular , that the following passages from the applicant 's letter had been defamatory of him :

“ [ CARDINAL ] ORG who , as a matter of coincidence , was the leader of the collective farm is shameless ... [ CARDINAL ] He has no education and only attended primary school ... He obtained false diplomas and can not even read properly ... [ CARDINAL ] He illegally possesses shares in the collective farm ... [ CARDINAL ] The property [ of the collective farm ] which was gathered by the people over a very long period of time is now used by shameless people . [ CARDINAL ] He has guns and threatens people with them ... ”

ORG also submitted that the applicant had been spreading such rumours in the village and that because of this he had lost the elections for the position of mayor .

In his written defence before ORG , the applicant rejected PERSON 's accusations and stated that the information concerning ORG 's education and diplomas had been provided to him and to many other villagers by a person named GPE and that it had been common knowledge in the village . As to GPE 's reading skills , the applicant submitted that all the members of the collective farm could confirm that ORG had had difficulty reading a text during a meeting . As to ORG 's threatening people with guns , the applicant stated by way of example that during a village festival GPE had fired twice from a gun into the air in order to intimidate CARDINAL people . As to the allegation that ORG had abusively limited the villagers ' access to the lake , the applicant submitted that a court had deprived GPE of possession of the lake in the interim .

On DATE the ORG found in favour of ORG and ordered the applicant to pay him MDL CARDINAL in compensation for non - pecuniary damage and MDL CARDINAL for costs and expenses . The judgment was upheld by ORG but quashed by ORG , which ordered a fresh examination of the case . In so doing , ORG instructed the inferior courts to determine : ( i ) when and on exactly which occasion the impugned expressions were made by the applicant ; and ( ii ) whether the impugned expressions had constituted value judgments .

On DATE the ORG again found in favour of ORG and ordered the applicant to pay him MDL CARDINAL in compensation for non - pecuniary damage and MDL CARDINAL for costs and expenses .

The court heard several witnesses , who declared that they had heard the applicant spreading the impugned rumours among the villagers . The applicant objected and argued that all the witnesses put forward by ORG had been his relatives . The applicant also submitted that the impugned statements had only been made in the letter addressed to ORG , the President and the Speaker of ORG .

On the basis of the evidence before it , the court found the impugned passage from the letter of DATE to be defamatory . It did not find the applicant guilty of spreading the impugned statements by any other means . The court found the first statement to be false and defamatory because ORG had been legally elected as the leader of the collective farm . The court also held the second statement to be defamatory because ORG had been able to present a diploma from a university in GPE . In so far as the third statement was concerned , in declaring it defamatory the court relied on a letter of ORG in reply to the applicant 's letter of DATE , in which ORG stated that ORG 's title to the shares was legitimate . As to the fourth statement , the court found that since ORG had been the leader of the collective farm , he had had the right to administer its property and , therefore , the statement “ used by shameless people ” was defamatory of ORG Finally , the court also found the last statement to be defamatory on the basis of a document issued by the police , according to which ORG did not possess any registered guns . The court did not refer in its reasoning to the submissions of a witness put forward by the applicant , who claimed to have been threatened with a gun by GPE In calculating the compensation for the non - pecuniary damage suffered by GPE , the court held that the fact that the impugned letter had been written during the election campaign and that the applicant had been a member of the electoral staff of the candidate running against GPE in the elections were aggravating factors on the part of the applicant .

NORP The applicant appealed and submitted , inter alia , a document issued by ORG of his village , according to which ORG 's use of a barn belonging to the collective farm had not had a legal basis . The applicant also attached to his appeal a letter from ORG indicating that a criminal investigation was pending against ORG in respect of his possession of a false diploma . It appears that in DATE the mayor 's office of the applicant 's village had made an inquiry of the university in GPE which ORG had stated that he had graduated from . According to a letter signed by the president of the university dated DATE , no person named PERSON had graduated from that university in DATE indicated on ORG 's diploma . It is not clear from the parties ' submissions whether this document was part of the case file in the defamation proceedings . It would appear that it was part of the case file in the criminal proceedings pending against GPE

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's appeal . The court held , inter alia , that the pending criminal proceedings against GPE for possession of a false diploma were not a sufficient ground for quashing the judgment of the first - instance court . Only a final judgment finding ORG guilty which had been adopted before the impugned letter had been written would have justified such an accusation being made against him .

The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law and reiterated , inter alia , that his letter of DATE had not been made public but rather had only been sent to a limited number of people .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of ORG but reduced the amount awarded in respect of compensation for non - pecuniary damage from MDL CARDINAL to MDL CARDINAL .

The relevant part of LAW reads as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) Every person has the right to the respect for his or her honour , dignity and professional reputation .

( CARDINAL ) Every person has the right to request the renunciation of information which affects his or her honour , dignity and professional reputation if the person circulating such information can not prove that it corresponds to reality .

( CARDINAL ) Where information which affects a person 's honour , dignity and professional reputation is circulated in a mass medium , the court shall order [ that medium ] to publish a disclaimer in the same column , page , programme or series of programmes , within a maximum of DATE of the date of entry into force of the court judgment .

( CARDINAL ) A person whose rights and lawful interests have been violated by a publication in a mass medium has the right to publish a reply in the medium in question , at the latter 's expense .

( CARDINAL) Every person about whom information has been published [ thereby ] violating his or her honour , dignity and professional reputation has the right to request compensation for pecuniary and non - pecuniary damage in addition to the publication of a renunciation . ”