The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a national of the Former GPE ( “ the FYR of NORP ” ) , who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON . He is represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . The respondent Government are represented by their Agent PERSON , of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant came to the GPE on DATE and applied for asylum . This request was rejected on DATE . The applicant ’s subsequent request for revision ( herziening ) was dismissed on CARDINAL DATE . The final decision on the asylum application was taken by ORG ( arrondissementsrechtbank ) , which rejected the applicant ’s appeal on DATE . However , the applicant did not leave the country and neither was he forcibly expelled .

In DATE , while the proceedings on his request for asylum were still pending , the applicant formed a relationship with PERSON , a GPE national . PERSON was living next door to the applicant with her parents , but she spent so much time with the applicant that they were de facto living together . On DATE a daughter , PERSON , was born to the applicant and PERSON The applicant did not at that time recognise his daughter given that PERSON father was vehemently opposed to this . Being an asylum seeker , the applicant was not allowed to work in the GPE and he was thus unable to contribute financially to his daughter ’s upbringing . However , he did spend CARDINAL or CARDINAL afternoons per week with her .

On DATE the applicant applied for a residence permit for compelling reasons of a humanitarian nature related to his having a GPE partner and daughter . On DATE Ms van B. informed the immigration authorities that her relationship with the applicant had ended .

The applicant ’s request for a residence permit was rejected by the Deputy Secretary of ORG ( ORG ) on DATE . It was held that , even assuming that it could be established DATE that the applicant was the father of PERSON , it had in no way been shown that he had enjoyed family life with her . Neither had it appeared that there had existed a lasting and exclusive relationship between the applicant and PERSON

The applicant lodged an objection ( bezwaar ) against this decision , arguing that he saw his daughter on a regular basis – at least once and sometimes twice DATE and that , as his relationship with PERSON had ended , it could not be expected of the latter to move to the FYR of GPE in order to enable him to enjoy family life with his daughter . He further submitted a letter written by PERSON to his lawyer , in which she confirmed that the applicant was the biological father of her daughter PERSON ; that the applicant had insufficient means to contribute financially to M. ’s upbringing but that he did sometimes buy presents for her ; that , although their relationship had ended , they were still friends ; and that the CARDINAL of them undertook activities together at least once DATE .

By a decision of DATE , the Deputy Minister rejected the objection , considering that the refusal to grant the applicant a residence permit did not constitute an interference with the applicant ’s family life since that refusal was not aimed at taking from the applicant a residence permit which enabled him to enjoy family life in the GPE . Neither did there exist any special facts or circumstances which placed the ORG under a positive obligation to grant the applicant a residence permit . In this context the Deputy Minister noted that the applicant had never officially lived together with PERSON and that his claim that he saw his daughter once or twice a week had remained unsubstantiated . It had further not been shown that he had custody of PERSON or that he contributed financially to her upbringing . In addition , in view of the geographical distance between the GPE and the FYR of GPE and the cost of regular trips between those CARDINAL countries , it was held that the contact which the applicant had with his daughter would not need to undergo a substantial change as a result of the refusal of a residence permit .

The applicant appealed this decision to ORG , submitting that his return to the FYR of GPE would render regular contact with his daughter impossible . As the FYR of GPE was the poorest country in LOC , it was unlikely that he would be able to afford regular trips to the GPE . If he had a job in the FYR of GPE , he would not have enough holidays to make regular longer trips to the GPE . In addition , there was no guarantee whatsoever that the applicant would be granted a visa . It was further not to be expected that Ms van B. would travel to the FYR of GPE to enable the applicant to see his daughter in view of the difficulties between the applicant and PERSON father and the latter ’s influence over his daughter . The applicant also argued that not all relevant circumstances had been taken into account by the Deputy Minister when the interests of the community as a whole were balanced against those of the applicant ’s . The circumstances which , in his view , merited to be taken into account were the fact that he had been living in the GPE since DATE , that his daughter was DATE , that he had regular contact with her , that due to an insufficiency of means it was impossible for him to contribute financially to his daughter ’s upbringing , and that he did not dare take legal proceedings in order to recognise his daughter out of fear that PERSON father would stop him from seeing his daughter . In the proceedings before ORG the applicant submitted a letter from the owner of a company saying he should like to employ the applicant and requesting that the applicant be granted a residence permit .

On DATE ORG rejected the appeal . It found that the Deputy Minister had been justified in attaching greater weight to the economic well - being of the country than to the applicant ’s interest in exercising family life with his daughter in the GPE . In this context ORG had regard to the fact that the applicant and his daughter had never lived together as a family unit ( gezin ) , that there was no arrangement concerning access and that the applicant did not contribute financially to his daughter ’s upbringing . Finally , ORG considered that the applicant should be deemed capable of maintaining some kind of contact with his daughter from the FYR of GPE . No further appeal lay against this decision , which was notified to the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the applicant requested the juvenile court judge of ORG to establish an access arrangement between him and his daughter . In her decision of DATE , the juvenile court judge noted that PERSON was born out of the relationship between the applicant and PERSON , and that the parents had themselves agreed on an access arrangement which had latterly , however , not been working out . Given that , pending the proceedings , it had appeared that the parents had reached agreement , the juvenile court judge established the access arrangement as agreed by the parents , to the effect that the applicant would see PERSON every DATE from TIME to TIME and that further contacts would take place by mutual agreement .

On DATE the applicant recognised his daughter with the permission of PERSON , as a result of which legally recognised family ties ( familierechtelijke betrekkingen ) were created between them . Moreover , on DATE a son , J. , was born to the applicant and PERSON , who was recognised by the applicant on DATE . In a letter to ORG DATE the applicant described his family situation as “ living apart together ” . PERSON worked DATE , during which the applicant , who lived QUANTITY away , looked after the children . The family spent DATE mainly together .

As of CARDINAL DATE the local authorities of the town where the applicant was residing stopped providing him with ORG - sponsored accommodation , social benefits and health insurance . Legal proceedings instituted by the applicant against this decision were to no avail .

On DATE Ms van B. lost her job . As a result , the applicant is prevented from applying for a residence permit for the purpose of residing with his partner and children since one of the requirements for such a permit is that the partner who is already residing in the GPE is in employment and in receipt of a salary of QUANTITY per month .

At the time relevant to the present application , the admission , residence and expulsion of aliens were regulated by LAW DATE ( Vreemdelingenwet DATE ) . On DATE a new Aliens Act entered into force but this has no bearing on the present case .

Under LAW paragraph CARDINAL of LAW DATE a residence permit could be refused on public interest grounds . The Government pursued DATE and still pursue – a restrictive immigration policy due to the population and employment situation in the GPE . Aliens are eligible for admission only on the basis of obligations arising from international agreements , or if their presence serves an essential national interest , or on compelling humanitarian grounds . Respect for family life is CARDINAL of those obligations arising from international agreements . To implement this restrictive policy , further conditions have been drawn up relating to each of the various grounds for the admission of aliens wishing to stay in the GPE .

The admission policy for the purposes of forming a family was laid down in LAW DATE ( Vreemdelingencirculaire DATE ) . Section BCARDINAL/CARDINAL of these Guidelines addressed the requirements of LAW initial admission and continued residence . It had to be determined whether family life existed within the meaning of LAW , whether refusal to grant admission to the alien would constitute an interference with his or her right to respect for family life and whether the interference would be justified LAW CARDINAL § CARDINAL .


David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by Mr H Tepe , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Ms J PERSON of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant came to GPE in DATE . He was granted leave to enter and remain , which permitted him to work in GPE . On DATE he was granted Indefinite Leave to Remain .

In DATE the applicant married a NORP citizen . His wife was born in GPE in DATE but she came to GPE when she was DATE , while GPE was still under NORP control . She speaks LANGUAGE .

The applicant and his wife have a daughter , who was born in GPE on DATE . She is a NORP citizen . She married in DATE and has CARDINAL children , born on DATE and CARDINAL DATE , who are also NORP citizens . Her husband 's family are NORP and she travels to GPE approximately once a year to visit them .

On DATE the applicant was convicted of the importation of controlled drugs . Together with CARDINAL accomplices , he had imported QUANTITY of pure heroin , worth GBP CARDINAL . Although it was the applicant 's first offence , the sentencing judge noted that he had organised the importation and although he had pleaded guilty , he had only done so at a late stage . He was sentenced to DATE imprisonment but was not recommended for deportation . He did not appeal against sentence or conviction .

On DATE the Secretary of ORG for ORG wrote to the applicant , asking him to submit reasons why he should not be deported . The applicant 's representations were considered but on DATE the Secretary of ORG advised the applicant that he intended to deport him on the ground that his deportation would be conducive to the public good . On DATE the applicant was issued with a Decision to Make a Deportation Order . The applicant appealed to ORG ( “ ORG ” ) . In a decision dated DATE , the ORG dismissed the appeal , holding , inter alia , that the applicant 's crime was too serious for his deportation to be found to be disproportionate , notwithstanding the interference with his private and family life in GPE . On DATE the ORG decided not to make an order for reconsideration . The applicant considered renewing his application to ORG , but counsel advised him that it would be virtually impossible to challenge the ORG 's decision .

On DATE the applicant was served with a deportation order . He was deported to GPE on DATE .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) of LAW DATE ( as amended by ORG ) provides that a person who is not a NORP citizen shall be liable to deportation from GPE if the Secretary of ORG deems his deportation to be conducive to the public good . Sections CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL of the Nationality , Immigration and Asylum Act DATE provide for a right of appeal against this decision on the grounds , inter alia , that the decision is incompatible with the Convention .

Section CARDINAL of LAW DATE provides that , in determining any question that arises in connection with a Convention right , courts and tribunals must take into account any case - law from this ORG so far as , in the opinion of the court or tribunal , it is relevant to the proceedings in which that question has arisen .

A person who has been deported may apply to have the deportation order revoked . LAW of ORG CARDINAL ( as amended ) provide that :

“ CARDINAL . An application for revocation of a deportation order will be considered in the light of all the circumstances including the following :

( i ) the grounds on which the order was made ;

( ii ) any representations made in support of revocation ;

( iii ) the interests of the community , including the maintenance of an effective immigration control ;

( iv ) the interests of the applicant , including any compassionate circumstances .

In the case of an applicant who has been deported following conviction for a criminal offence continued exclusion

( i ) in the case of a conviction which is capable of being spent under LAW , unless the conviction is spent within the meaning of that LAW or , if the conviction is spent in DATE , DATE have elapsed since the making of the deportation order ; or

( ii ) in the case of a conviction not capable of being spent under that LAW , at any time , unless refusal to revoke the deportation order would be contrary to LAW or LAW .

will normally be the proper course . In other cases revocation of the order will not normally be authorised unless the situation has been materially altered , either by a change of circumstances since the order was made , or by fresh information coming to light which was not before , or the appellate authorities or the Secretary of ORG . The passage of time since the person was deported may also in itself amount to such a change of circumstances as to warrant revocation of the order .

Revocation of a deportation order does not entitle the person concerned to re - enter GPE ; it renders him eligible to apply for admission under LAW . Application for revocation of the order may be made to ORG or direct to ORG . ”


Violation of Art. 3 (substantive aspect);Violation of Art. 3 (procedural aspect);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - award

András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Nona Tsotsoria;Vladimiro Zagrebelsky

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE at TIME the applicant , a journalist working for a DATE newspaper , was taken into custody by police officers from ORG of ORG along with CARDINAL other persons . At the time of the arrest , the applicant and the other arrestees were in the ORG branch of ORG ( HADEP ) , where demonstrations and hunger strikes were allegedly being organised , in order to protest about the arrest of PERSON , the leader of the ORG ( ORG , an illegal organisation .

At TIME on DATE the applicant was taken to ORG . The doctor who examined him noted that there was no sign of recent physical violence on the applicant ’s person .

On DATE the applicant made statements to the police . According to the report signed by CARDINAL police officers and the applicant , the applicant stated that he had been in the ORG branch of ORG in order to participate in the demonstration .

The applicant alleges that he was subjected to various forms of illtreatment while in police custody . In particular , he was kept in a dark cell with insufficient ventilation , deprived of food and water and was prevented from going to the toilet . He was forced to stand , handcuffed , in the same position for TIME . During the questioning , he was stripped naked , insulted and threatened with death and rape . The applicant was beaten on various parts of his body . In particular , he received repeated blows to his abdomen . His testicles were squeezed and he was subjected to sexual abuse . Finally , he was forced to watch a female detainee being sexually abused .

On DATE the applicant , along with CARDINAL other persons , was taken to a clinic in GPE and examined there by a medical expert , who drafted CARDINAL document in respect of all CARDINAL people , and noted that none of them had sustained any injuries .

On DATE the applicant , along with CARDINAL other persons , was taken to the same clinic and examined there by another doctor , PERSON On a document of the police headquarters in which the names of all CARDINAL persons were put , PERSON noted the same sentence below every name :

“ No sign of physical violence has been observed ” .

The applicant claimed that there had been police officers present in the examination room and that although he had described the type of ill - treatment to which he had been subjected in police custody , the doctor did not note any of his complaints .

On DATE the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor at ORG . He maintained that he had been in the HADEP building as a journalist and that he had not participated in the demonstration or the hunger strike . He stated that he had been made to sign his police statements without reading them .

At TIME on DATE , the applicant was released upon the decision of the public prosecutor .

On DATE the applicant was examined by a doctor from the ORG branch of ORG of GPE , PERSON , who recorded the following :

“ There is a bruise measuring QUANTITY on the right side of the hypogastrium . He has sensitivity and pain upon palpation behind his knees , pain in the ankles , sensitivity and pain in the toe muscles in both feet . He also has sensitivity in his testicles and epididymis , swelling in the groin ( may be the beginning of a hernia ) , sensitivity and pain in the epigastrium . An eruption on the occipital region has been observed . ”

On an unspecified date the ORG branch of ORG of GPE referred the applicant to the GPE branch of ORG . CARDINAL DATE the applicant underwent various medical examinations , the results of which were noted in a medical report of CARDINAL DATE . According to this report , the applicant was suffering from a hernia in the groin , pain in various parts of his body and from major depression and an acute stress disorder , CARDINAL psychiatric conditions that normally are caused by traumatic experiences such as rape and torture . The doctors concluded that the applicant ’s complaints were consistent with his allegations of ill - treatment . While reaching this conclusion , the doctors from the GPE branch of ORG also noted the findings of the report of CARDINAL DATE drawn up by PERSON

On DATE the applicant underwent surgery for the hernia in his groin , which had allegedly occurred as a result of the ill - treatment he had suffered in police custody .

On DATE the applicant drafted a document for his lawyers in which he described in detail the alleged ill - treatment that he had suffered during his police custody DATE . At the end of the document , he noted that the applicant ’s representative before the ORG and another advocate would bring proceedings on his behalf as his legal representatives .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant ’s lawyer lodged a complaint with the ORG public prosecutor ’s office that the applicant had been subjected to ill - treatment during his police custody . He submitted a copy of the medical report of CARDINAL DATE along with his petition .

On DATE the ORG public prosecutor invited the applicant ’s representative to his office in order to make statements .

On DATE the applicant ’s representative made statements to the public prosecutor . He contended that the applicant had requested him to initiate proceedings on his behalf DATE before DATE , the date on which he had lodged a complaint on behalf of the applicant . The representative further noted that the applicant ’s allegations were consistent with the findings of the report of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the ORG public prosecutor invited the applicant to his office in order to make statements .

On DATE the applicant made statements to the public prosecutor . He noted that he had requested his lawyer to lodge a complaint against the persons who had inflicted ill - treatment on him . He contended that his lawyer had told him that he had initiated proceedings . The applicant stated that he had not applied to the public prosecutor ’s office himself . He finally requested that the police officers who had ill - treated him be punished .

On DATE the ORG public prosecutor issued a decision not to prosecute in respect of the applicant ’s allegations of ill - treatment . In his decision , the public prosecutor noted that the applicant had been detained in police custody DATE and that the relevant medical reports did not reveal any sign of violence on the applicant ’s person . The public prosecutor further noted that the applicant had applied to ORG at the end of his custody period and that he should have lodged a complaint with the public prosecutor ’s office instead .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer lodged an objection with ORG against the ORG public prosecutor ’s decision of DATE . He requested that persons who had been in police custody at the same time as the applicant be summoned to make statements . He further requested that the doctors who had drawn up the report of CARDINAL August DATE and PERSON , the doctor who had examined the applicant along with CARDINAL other persons on DATE , be heard . The lawyer also requested that the police officers who had been on duty during the applicant ’s detention in custody be determined and the photos of the applicant taken during his detention be included in the file , if there were any .

On DATE a single judge at ORG dismissed the applicant ’s objection . In his decision , the judge noted that the applicant had been in police custody DATE and that the medical report of DATE , the date on which he was released , did not reveal any sign of violence on the applicant ’s person . He further observed that the applicant had not alleged illtreatment before the public prosecutor at ORG on DATE , immediately after his detention in police custody . The judge finally noted that the applicant had applied to ORG , and had lodged his complaint on DATE . The judge considered that the applicant ’s allegations were dubious , since he had lodged his application a long time after his release from police custody .

A full description of the domestic law and practice at the relevant time may be found in GPE and Others v. GPE ( nos . PERSON and CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL - CARDINAL , ECHR CARDINAL-IV ( extracts ) ) .


No violation of Art. 8;Violation of Art. 10;No violation of Art. 6 or 13;Non-pecuniary damage - financial awards;Costs and expenses awards - Convention proceedings

The applicants are NORP citizens . Their dates of birth and places of residence are set out in the FAC .

On DATE a group of young people organised a sit - in in the premises of a department store in GPE , PERSON ( presently PERSON ; henceforth “ Stockmann ” ) , criticising it for selling fur coats and thereby participating in cruelty to animals . Around the same time various pamphlets and posters had appeared in GPE , criticising the fur trade in general and PERSON in particular . The group had to be forcibly removed from the store .

In DATE PERSON requested a pre - trial investigation into “ the distribution to the public of printed matters purporting to be produced on the company ’s behalf but which had not been commissioned by [ it ] ” . Should the police find that a criminal offence had been committed , PERSON requested that the matter be brought to the attention of the public prosecutor . The request was registered as a matter of suspected public defamation .

In the ensuing pre - trial investigation CARDINAL persons , including the applicants , were heard as suspects in respect of the offence of public defamation .

On DATE the police conducted a search at the home of PERSON , relying on DATE , section CARDINAL , and chapter CARDINAL , section CARDINAL of LAW ( pakkokeinolaki , tvångsmedelslagen GPE . According to TIME , the search was carried out for the purpose of an investigation into malicious damage ( vahingonteko , skadegörelse ) of which his room mates – PERSON ( not an applicant ) and PERSON – had been suspected . The police seized pamphlets critical of PERSON ’s sale of fur products as well as letters related to Mr PERSON ’s participation in an association of anti - fur activists .

On DATE the police searched the homes of GPE and PERSON . According to the minutes , the searches were carried out “ for other investigation purposes ” . The police seized pamphlets and documents related to PERSON participation in the same association of anti - fur activists . At the home of PERSON the police seized similar pamphlets , diaries from DATE and a telephone note book .

On DATE the police returned to PERSON some of the seized material , retaining CARDINAL pamphlets stating , inter alia : “ PERSON supports trading in carcasses ” ( GPE [ Stockmann ] tukee raatokauppaa ) .

On DATE the police returned CARDINAL of PERSON diaries , keeping CARDINAL one until DATE .

On DATE ORG ( käräjäoikeus , tingsrätten ) of GPE maintained the seizures of GPE and PERSON materials until DATE . The seizures were later extended until DATE .

On DATE the pre - trial investigation ended with a signed report . On DATE applicants PERSON and PERSON , PERSON , GPE , GPE , GPE , PERSON , GPE , GPE , GPE , PERSON , GPE and ORG were charged with a violation of PERSON ’s domiciliary peace ( kotirauhan rikkominen , hemfridsbrott ) and a violation of LAW , both committed on DATE . All except applicants PERSON , GPE , GPE and PERSON had been minors at the time of the offence .

At the same time , applicants PERSON , PERSON and PERSON were charged with having defamed PERSON in public while being minors . PERSON and GPE were charged with the same offence but were no longer minors when committing the offence , namely DATE . In the alternative , all except ORG were charged with common nuisance .

Mr Purmonen was charged with incitement to CARDINAL or the other of those offences .

In addition , applicants PERSON , PERSON , PERSON and PERSON were charged with some further offences .

On DATE PERSON requested that the seizure of her possessions be lifted . ORG having maintained the seizures , she appealed to ORG ( hovioikeus , hovrätten ) of GPE .

On CARDINAL DATE the police lifted the seizure and returned the remaining material to PERSON and PERSON . On DATE ORG found that since the police had already returned the material seized from PERSON it was not necessary to examine her appeal .

Meanwhile , on DATE applicants PERSON , PERSON , GPE , GPE , PERSON , GPE , GPE , GPE , PERSON , GPE and ORG were convicted of violation of PERSON ’s domiciliary peace and sentenced to DATE , CARDINAL sixty days’ conditional imprisonment respectively . Mr PERSON was likewise convicted – except on CARDINAL count not relevant to this case DATE and given a longer conditional prison sentence coupled with a fine .

Applicants Purmonen , DATE and PERSON were acquitted of all charges .

On DATE ORG reversed ORG judgment by acquitting CARDINAL convicted applicants in so far as they had been found guilty of violating domiciliary peace . The court considered that ORG shop LOC , being accessible to the public , could not be considered a domicile for the purposes of the relevant provision of LAW . While upholding these applicants’ convictions of CARDINAL or several other offences the court reduced their sentences to fines .

Article CARDINAL of LAW ( Suomen Hallitusmuoto , ORG ) , as amended by Act no . CARDINAL and in force at the relevant time , provided , in so far as relevant , as follows :

“ Everyone has the freedom of expression . Freedom of expression entails the right to express , disseminate and receive information , opinions and other communications without prior prevention by anyone . More detailed provisions on the exercise of the freedom of expression are laid down by an LAW . ... ”

The same provision appears in DATE ( GPE , section CARDINAL ) .

According to chapter CARDINAL of LAW ( rikoslaki , strafflagen ) , as in force at the relevant time , a person alleging , either contrary to his or her better knowledge or without better knowledge , that someone had committed an offence was to be convicted of defamation , unless he or she could show probable cause in support of the allegation . If the defamation took place in public or , for example , by means of printed matter , the sentence could be increased . The injured party was required to report the offence before the public prosecutor might bring charges ( sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL) .

The current chapter DATE , section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL of LAW , as amended by LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , provides that where criticism is aimed at the conduct of another person in his or her political or business activity , public office or function , scientific , artistic or other comparable public activity , and where this criticism clearly does not exceed the limits of acceptable conduct , it shall not be considered defamation within the meaning of subsection CARDINAL . Whereas only a natural person may be considered a victim of defamation , legal persons may be afforded indirect protection as in some cases defamation directed at a legal person may also be considered to concern individuals employed by that legal person ( see Government Bill no . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) .

LAW ( painovapauslaki , tryckfrihetslagen CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , as in force at the relevant time , confirmed the right to disseminate printed matters without prior censorship ( section CARDINAL ) . “ Printed matter ” meant any writing which had been reproduced with a printing machine or by some other comparable means ( section CARDINAL ) .

The Ministry of Justice was to monitor compliance with the LAW and could order that charges be brought and that specific printed matter be seized ( sections DATE ) . In practice the Ministry was deemed competent to order that charges be brought only if they could be brought by the public prosecutor of his or her own motion , and not when the injured party was required to report the offence for the purpose of having charges brought ( Report of the Committee considering new legislation on the freedom of the media , no . CARDINAL:CARDINAL , p.CARDINAL ) . A public prosecutor or a police commander could , of his or her own motion , order the seizure of printed matter without a prior order by ORG . ORG had to be informed of such seizure within TIME .

NORP If charges could not be brought on the prosecutor ’s own initiative , the seizure could only be ordered on the request of the allegedly injured party . After charges had been brought the court examining the case had exclusive competence in respect of the seizures ( section CARDINAL ) .

ORG was required , within a matter of days , to submit any seizure order for review by a court . The court had to either confirm or revoke the order within DATE . If that time - limit was not respected the seizure expired . If charges were not brought within DATE from the court ’s confirmation of the seizure , the court would pronounce the expiry of the seizure ( sections DATE ) .

The Freedom of the Press Act was repealed as from DATE by the LAW on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in ORG ( laki sananvapauden käyttämisestä joukkoviestimissä , lag om yttrandefrihet i masskommunikation CARDINAL ) . It contains a single section ( section CARDINAL ) on the seizure of publications . The Government Proposal which gave the reasons for the LAW stated , with regard to this section , that the existing provisions of LAW on seizures could be regarded as wholly unnecessary . LAW passed in DATE contained , according to the Proposal , all the necessary provisions concerning the authority to order seizures , the legal conditions , the procedure and the right to appeal for seizures . It was therefore sufficient that LAW contained merely a reference to LAW , in addition to clarifying , with regard to the proportionality rule in that LAW , that the seizure of all publications meant for distribution in any given case could only be ordered if it could be assumed that the court would later order them to be confiscated . LAW therefore served to clarify the relation between legislative provisions on publications and LAW .

Section CARDINAL of ORG ( esitutkintalaki , förundersökningslagen CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) stipulates that in a criminal investigation no one ’s rights shall be infringed any more than necessary for the achievement of its purpose . No one shall be placed under suspicion without due cause and no one shall be subjected to harm or inconvenience unnecessarily .

Chapter CARDINAL , section CARDINAL a , of LAW provides that such measures may only be used where they can be deemed justified in light of the seriousness of the offence under investigation , the importance of the investigation , the degree of interference with the rights of the suspect or other persons subject to the measures as well as in light of any other pertinent circumstances .

By DATE , CARDINAL of LAW , a search of LOC may be carried out if there is reason to suspect that an offence has been committed which carries a maximum punishment of imprisonment DATE .

By LAW , section CARDINAL of LAW , an object may be seized where there are reasons to presume that it may serve as evidence in criminal proceedings , has been removed from someone by means of an offence or is likely to be confiscated by a court order . According to section CARDINAL , a seizure shall be lifted as soon as it is no longer necessary . If charges have not been brought within DATE of the seizure , the court may extend it at the request of a police officer competent to issue arrest warrants .

Section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL of ORG provides that when it has been decided that the case will not be submitted to the prosecutor , that decision shall without delay be notified to the persons who have been questioned as parties , unless this is deemed unnecessary .


CASE OF THE NATIONAL & PROVINCIAL BUILDING SOCIETY, THE LEEDS PERMANENT BUILDING SOCIETY AND THE YORKSHIRE BUILDING SOCIETY v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

No violation of P1-1;No violation of Art. 14+P1-1;No violation of Art. 6-1;No violation of Art. 14+6-1

C. Russo;John Freeland;N. Valticos;R. Pekkanen

The applicants were at all relevant times building societies within the meaning of LAW DATE . Building societies operate under the status of “ mutual societies ” under LANGUAGE law as opposed to the status enjoyed by companies under company law . A building society ’s members are made up of its investors who deposit savings with it and receive a rate of interest or a dividend in return , and its borrowers who are charged interest on their loans . By and large , loans are taken out by borrowers to buy private residential property .

Investors with a building society are liable to pay income tax in respect of the interest earned on their deposits . The income tax owed to ORG for the purposes of DATE to CARDINAL DATE of DATE was in practice calculated or measured with reference to a period of equal length preceding DATE . The so - called “ measurement principle ” required that the period measured be always equal in length to the period taxed . The taxpayer was not in fact taxed on the income of DATE but assessed to tax on the income received in DATE , the amount of DATE income being artificially computed by reference to the income of DATE . Accordingly , in normal circumstances , individual investors with building societies would be obliged to declare in their tax returns for DATE in question the amount of interest or dividends earned on their deposits in a preceding reference period of equal length to DATE , and the Inland Revenue would have to make individual assessments to tax on the strength of the information supplied by the investor .

NORP However , in view of the very large number of building society investors , many of whom had only modest savings and were thus only liable to small amounts of income tax , or to no tax at all , it had for many years up to and including DATE CARDINAL/CARDINAL been the practice for ORG to make voluntary arrangements with building societies for the payment by each society of a single annual composite amount . The effect of this payment by a building society was to discharge its investors’ liability to income tax at the basic rate on the interest which they earned . These arrangements , which were for DATE operated on a non - statutory basis , were at the relevant time given statutory recognition under section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of ORG DATE “ the DATE LAW .

The composite - rate payment under the voluntary arrangements was calculated for DATE by reference to the global amount of interest paid by the society to its investors . However , in order to reflect the fact that some of the investors would not have been liable to tax at all given the modest amounts of their savings ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) a reduced rate of tax was applied . For this reason the annual ORG payments made under this scheme were known as “ reduced - rate tax ” or “ composite - rate tax ” , or “ ORG ” .

The amount paid to investors by way of interest on their investments took account of the fact that their liability to income tax was discharged by the building society via the payment of ORG to ORG . Investors thus received their interest net of tax .

In accordance with the “ revenue - neutrality ” principle , set out in section CARDINAL of LAW DATE , the ORG payment reflected only the amount which would have been paid by the investors themselves had they been obliged to declare and pay tax on the interest they earned through their deposits .

To achieve this , the ORG , following negotiations with ORG , set DATE , by statutory instrument , the ORG rate . In doing so , it was required to aim at a result whereby the same amount of tax was collected at source from building societies for DATE in question as would have been collected from the individual depositors had they been taxed directly on the interest they received over a preceding reference period ( see paragraphs CARDINAL above and CARDINAL below ) .

Until CARDINAL , a “ prior - period ” system applied in respect of ORG . The amount of ORG to be paid by each building society for DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) was calculated by reference to the interest which it paid to its investors not during the actual year being taxed , but during the society ’s own CARDINAL months’ accounting period ending within DATE . The tax was in every case paid on or CARDINAL January of the year of assessment . As noted above ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , the legal effect of this payment representing income tax was to discharge investors’ basic - rate liability on the interest earned in DATE being taxed .

There was no legal requirement to have a harmonised accounting period . Different time frames were used by different building societies , but in all cases the time frames represented a period equal in length to DATE , having regard to the requirements of the measurement principle ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The following accounting periods were operated by each of the applicant societies :

Thus , on or DATE , the CARDINAL applicant societies paid to ORG , to discharge their ORG liability to income tax at the basic rate for DATE , sums measured by reference to the interest paid to their investors in their accounting periods ended DATE ( the GPE ) and DATE ( ORG and the GPE ) . Under the effect of the voluntary arrangements ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , these payments completely discharged the income - tax liability of their investors in respect of the interest paid to them by the respective societies for DATE .

On that basis each of the applicant companies paid the following amounts by way of ORG to the Inland Revenue :

With a view to putting the taxation of the interest paid by building societies to investors on a similar footing to the scheme which had been introduced for banks by LAW DATE , the ORG proposed the introduction of a mandatory regime for the collection of tax on ORG interest and the payment of the tax DATE on DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE instead of DATE in DATE . In his budget statement on DATE announcing the introduction of the new scheme , the Chancellor of the ORG declared that it would not produce any additional revenue . The proposal was adopted by ORG in the form of section CARDINAL of LAW DATE .

Section CARDINAL amended section CARDINAL of the DATE LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) by inserting a new sub - section ( CARDINALA ) which had the effect of bringing to an end the long - standing voluntary arrangements as from DATE . It also empowered ORG to make regulations introducing a new system of accounting for DATE and for subsequent years . Under the Income Tax ( Building Society ) Regulations CARDINAL ( “ the DATE Regulations ” ) , which came into force on DATE , tax was to be calculated on a DATE basis on the actual interest paid during DATE of assessment , as opposed to a prior period .

However the ending of the voluntary arrangements exposed a gap ( “ the gap period ” ) between the end of the applicant GPE accounting periods in CARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) and the start of DATE under the new regime . In the case of the GPE the gap period was from CARDINAL DATE to CARDINAL DATE , and in the case of ORG and the GPE it was from DATE to CARDINAL DATE . In order to ensure that each payment of interest formed the basis of an assessment to tax , transitional regulations were introduced which deemed payments falling into the “ gap period ” to have been made in a later accounting period , with the result that they formed the basis for an assessment to tax under the new “ DATE ” arrangements . In the view of the Government the legislative intention was to ensure that the same amount of tax was collected as would have been collected if the previous arrangements had continued and that the building societies did not receive an undeserved windfall in respect of the gap period .

Against this background , LAW ( read in conjunction with LAW ) of the DATE Regulations purported to require building societies to account for tax relating to payments of interest to their investors in their respective gap periods . LAW ( CARDINAL ) provided for tax to be charged on interest paid in the gap period at CARDINAL rates , i.e. PERCENT , the basic rate of income tax being PERCENT for DATE .

Each of the applicant societies took the view that the transitional regulations ran counter to the Government ’s declared intention that the new regime introduced by LAW DATE should not produce any additional revenue ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , which view was reaffirmed during the parliamentary debates on section QUANTITY . They considered that the effect of Regulations CARDINAL and CARDINAL was to impose tax again on interest they had paid in CARDINAL , DATE for which liability on their ORG interest had already been discharged ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . For the applicants this had the result that , for CARDINAL months’ interest paid to its investors in DATE and DATE , a society like the GPE , with DATE , was required to pay tax on CARDINAL months’ interest . For ORG and the GPE , each would have to pay tax on DATE months’ interest for DATE period covered by DATE and DATE . In the view of the applicant societies these consequences ran counter to the measurement principle according to which the measurement period forming the basis of assessment to tax can never exceed the length of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

Each of the CARDINAL applicant societies did in fact pay the tax claimed to be due under the transitional provisions of the ORG as follows :

The Government point out that the payments were made “ without formal protest ” . However , the applicants assert that they made clear from the outset that they disputed the lawfulness of the tax and that they associated themselves with the proceedings initiated by ORG ( “ the PERSON ” ) to challenge the lawfulness of the transitional provisions in Regulation DATE . For its part the GPE issued a press release when the Regulations were still at the draft stage , drawing attention to , inter alia , their complaint that the ORG would have the objectionable effect of subjecting building societies to double taxation . The affidavit sworn by the Executive Vice - Chairman of the PERSON referred to the Leeds’ support for its decision to initiate legal proceedings against the transitional arrangements . Both ORG and the GPE made requests for the repayment of the amounts they had paid to ORG .

On DATE the ORG commenced judicial review proceedings seeking a declaration that LAW was unlawful as being outside the scope of the enabling legislation . It was further alleged that the transitional arrangements transgressed the fundamental principles of constitutional and taxation law and that the machinery adopted by LAW in order to implement the change in the system resulted in a double charge to tax over the gap period .

On DATE the Government introduced in ORG a measure intended to validate retrospectively the impugned ORG and to give effect to what they claimed to be the original intention of ORG when adopting them ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) . The responsible Government minister informed ORG that the ORG did not affect the amount of tax collected , only the timing of payment and reiterated that they would not bring extra tax to ORG . On DATE LAW DATE ( “ the DATE LAW ) received the Royal Assent . Section CARDINAL of the LAW retrospectively amended section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) with the purpose of authorising ORG to make regulations requiring the taxation in DATE and subsequent years of assessments of sums paid to investors in the gap period and not previously brought into account .

On DATE the ORG issued a writ against the Inland Revenue claiming repayment of the sums paid by way of tax under the transitional provisions of the ORG , as well as interest from the date of payment .

On DATE PERSON granted the application in PERSON CARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) and made a declaration that LAW was void in its entirety and that the remaining Regulations were void in so far as they purported to apply to payments made to investors prior to DATE . He held that :

The Inland Revenue appealed against the decision . They conceded that Regulation CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) was invalid but contended that this partial invalidity did not invalidate the rest of the Regulation .

Towards DATE , ORG repaid to the ORG the sum of GBP CARDINAL with interest from CARDINAL DATE ( the date of the order of PERSON ) but refused to pay interest from any earlier date . Thus , the remaining issue in the PERSON CARDINAL proceedings ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) came to be whether or not PERSON had grounds for claiming interest on the payments made by them up to CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE PERSON dismissed the PERSON CARDINAL action , holding that the PERSON was not entitled to recover the sums in issue under any general principle of restitution or as having been paid under duress . He took the view that the sums had been paid under an implied agreement that they would be repaid if and when the dispute about the validity of LAW was resolved in favour of the PERSON . Thus , the PERSON had no cause of action to recover the money until the date of his order of CARDINAL DATE . The PERSON appealed against the decision and order .

On DATE ORG allowed the appeal of ORG in the PERSON CARDINAL proceedings ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The court held that :

On DATE ORG allowed the appeal of the PERSON in the PERSON CARDINAL proceedings . ORG , Lord PERSON dissenting , declared the transitional provisions in LAW to be ultra vires on the grounds that Regulation CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) , as the Inland Revenue had previously conceded , and Regulation CARDINAL , so far as it related to the period after DATE and before DATE , were ultra vires the empowering statute . ORG considered that Regulation DATE ) could not be severed from the rest of Regulation CARDINAL and that the transitional provisions in LAW were therefore void in their entirety .

Lord PERSON , delivering the judgment of the majority , concluded :

“ ... I confess that I find the conclusion irresistible that ORG intended by these words [ section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act ] to enable the Revenue to take account of and to charge to tax sums which , rightly or wrongly , it regarded as otherwise representing windfalls in the hands of building societies . CARDINAL has only to look at the circumstances . LAW had been made and had been objected to . They were made the subject of a direct challenge in legal proceedings , the evidence in support of which clearly adumbrated the arguments advanced before the judge and ORG . The notion that ORG should go to the trouble of enacting an expressly retrospective amendment in order to provide , unnecessarily , for the use of these sums as a measurement of tax liability – a matter never remotely in issue – is simply fanciful ...

... I am bound to say that I think it unfortunate that the Revenue , through ORG , should have chosen by secondary rather than primary legislation to take what was , on ordinary principles , the very unusual course of seeking to tax more than DATE income in DATE of assessment , but section CARDINAL of LAW DATE is , on any analysis , a very unusual provision and I have , in the end , found myself irresistibly driven to the conclusion that this was what ORG intended should occur . It may be – I do not know – that the legislature did not appreciate fully that the effect of the arrangements made in DATE was to discharge all liability for tax on interest paid in DATE of assessment CARDINAL , including tax on interest paid after the end of a society ’s accounting year , and that , accordingly , to tax those sums again in DATE was , in a sense , to tax them twice . But even making that assumption it amounts to no more than saying that the legislature should not have intended to do that which it plainly set out to do . I would , for my part , therefore , reject the ORG ’s principal argument . ”

This ruling declaring LAW ( CARDINAL ) void on technical grounds meant that no mechanism existed to achieve what the ORG claimed to be ORG ’s initial intention that interest payments made during the gap period should be assessed for tax . This led the ORG to introduce new legislative provisions . A draft press release was circulated DATE for the approval of the Chancellor of the Exchequer . The draft indicated that the Chancellor in his budget - day speech on DATE would introduce legislation to validate retrospectively the ORG which had been struck down in the PERSON CARDINAL case ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

Following the ORG of Lords’ decision in the ORG CARDINAL proceedings , and after having made several requests for repayment , the GPE commenced proceedings on DATE against ORG for the restitution of the sum of GBP CARDINAL paid pursuant to LAW which had been declared void in the PERSON CARDINAL proceedings .

On DATE the ORG , which had also sought but was refused repayment , commenced proceedings against ORG for the restitution of the sum of GBP CARDINAL paid pursuant to the void Regulations .

On DATE , in his budget statement , the Chancellor of the ORG announced the introduction of legislation to remedy “ the technical defects in the Regulations ” . This legislation became section CARDINAL of the Finance Act DATE ( “ the DATE LAW ) , which entered into force on DATE . Section CARDINAL provided , inter alia :

“ Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of the [ CARDINAL Act ] ... shall be deemed to have conferred powers to make all the provisions in fact contained in [ LAW ] . ”

The provision had retrospective effect , save that by subsection ( CARDINAL ) it had no effect “ in relation to a building society which commenced proceedings to challenge the validity of the ORG before DATE ” . The PERSON was the only building society which satisfied this condition .

In a letter dated DATE the Director - General of ORG informed the Financial Secretary to the ORG that the decision of the Government “ [ did ] not come as any great surprise , although it will still be very disappointing to the societies concerned ” . In fact , the concrete effect of the measure was to stifle the GPE CARDINAL and ORG CARDINAL proceedings ( see paragraphs CARDINAL above ) . Although they had shown support for the PERSON ’s judicial proceedings ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) neither had formally commenced legal proceedings before DATE . At the costs hearing the Government conceded that they had no defence to the action brought by the GPE and ORG had it not been for section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act . Costs were awarded against the Government .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG , by a majority , allowed the appeal by the PERSON in ORG and awarded the interest claimed .

The majority of ORG accepted the PERSON ’s primary submission that , where money was paid under an illegal demand for taxation by a government body , the payer had an immediate prima facie right to recover the payment .

On DATE the GPE applied for leave to commence judicial review proceedings for a declaration that the ORG Orders establishing the composite - rate tax for DATE and for DATE were unlawful ( “ GPE CARDINAL ” ) . The GPE claimed that :

On DATE the ORG was granted leave to commence judicial review proceedings similar to those in GPE CARDINAL for a declaration that the ORG Orders establishing the composite - rate tax for DATE and subsequent DATE were unlawful because of the retrospective validation of the Regulations ( “ ORG CARDINAL ” ) . The application was joined with the GPE CARDINAL proceedings and with a similar application made by the GPE and ORG .

On DATE the GPE applied for leave to commence similar judicial review proceedings for a declaration that the ORG Orders establishing the composite - rate tax for DATE and subsequent DATE were unlawful ( “ FAC ) .

Further proceedings were commenced by the GPE on DATE ( “ GPE CARDINAL ” ) , by the GPE on DATE ( “ GPE CARDINAL ” ) and by ORG on DATE ( “ ORG CARDINAL ” ) . In those proceedings the applicant societies claimed restitution of the money due to them if the judicial review proceedings ( GPE CARDINAL and ORG CARDINAL , and GPE CARDINAL ) were successful ( see paragraphs CARDINAL–CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE section CARDINAL of the Finance ( No . CARDINAL ) Act DATE ( “ the DATE LAW ) entered into force . This legislation had been anticipated as from DATE when the ORG Secretary in a reply to a parliamentary question noted that his Government intended to introduce legislation to validate retrospectively the impugned ORG Orders . Section CARDINAL provided , with retrospective effect , that the ORG Orders “ shall be taken to be and always to have been effective ” . The Government acknowledged during the parliamentary debates on section CARDINAL that the measure was intended to pre - empt the legal proceedings launched by the applicants to challenge the validity of the Treasury Orders and that it would result in the PERSON being treated more favourably . However , they pointed out that the challenge to the composite rate for ORG in DATE into doubt the lawfulness of the collection of all sums from building societies , banks and other deposit institutions in the periods in question . While there was no doubt as to the lawfulness of the collection in respect of the vast majority of those sums , the effect of impugning the rates set would have been to render the collection of all sums unlawful . The amount at stake was in the region of GBP MONEY .

The effect of section CARDINAL was to extinguish the remaining proceedings lodged by the applicants for judicial review of the validity of the ORG Orders and for restitution ( see paragraphs CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE ORG , by a majority , dismissed ORG appeal in the PERSON CARDINAL proceedings .

ORG did not accept that , on the facts of the PERSON case , there was any implied agreement for the repayment of the money paid under LAW if and when the dispute was resolved in the taxpayer ’s favour . Nevertheless , by a majority , ORG held :

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( introduced by section CARDINAL of the Finance Act DATE , and as amended by section CARDINAL of LAW DATE ) provides as follows :

“ ORG may by regulations made by statutory instrument make provision with respect to DATE and any subsequent year of assessment requiring building societies , on such sums as may be determined in accordance with the regulations ( including sums paid or credited before DATE but not previously brought into account under subsection ( CARDINAL ) above or this subsection ) , to account for and pay an amount representing income tax ... and any such regulations may contain such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to ORG to be appropriate , including provisions requiring the making of returns . ” [ The words in bold print were added by LAW . ]

Section CARDINAL of the Finance Act DATE provides , so far as relevant , as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of ORG DATE ... shall be deemed to have conferred power to make all the provisions in fact contained in LAW ...

( CARDINAL ) In relation to a building society which commenced proceedings to challenge the validity of the ORG before DATE , this section shall not have effect to the extent that the ORG apply ( or purport to apply ) to payments or credits made before DATE . ”

Section CARDINAL of the Finance ( No . CARDINAL ) Act DATE provides as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) For the purposes of this section each of the following is a relevant order –

( a ) the Income Tax ( Reduced and Composite Rate ) Order DATE ...

( b ) the Income Tax ( Reduced and Composite Rate ) Order DATE ...

( c ) the Income Tax ( Reduced and Composite Rate ) Order DATE ...

( d ) the Income Tax ( Reduced and Composite Rate ) Order DATE ...

( CARDINAL ) If apart from this section a relevant order would not be so taken , it shall be taken to be and always to have been effective to determine the rate set out in the order as the reduced rate and the composite rate for DATE of assessment for which the order was made . ”


The applicant , PERSON , is an NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON . He is represented before the ORG by Mr A. Amenduni , a lawyer practising in PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the applicant , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant is the manager of the NORP DATE newspaper ORG .

In DATE an article was published about Mr F.B. , who was the mayor of ORG until DATE . It was entitled “ Mayor [ F.]B. seeks reimbursement on the basis of false invoices ” ( “ Il Sindaco [ PERSON chiede rimborsi con fatture false ” ) . In the article the applicant expressed himself as follows :

“ ORG settled some entertainment expenses incurred on DATE of the same year [ DATE ] by the then mayor , the socialist ORG , on the occasion of the passing through PERSON of the long - distance runner PERSON invoices do not correspond to the day of the celebration . ( ... ) The first invoice is dated DATE . ( ... ) If the celebration was held on DATE only , how is it possible that the ceremony had taken place DATE in advance and on different DATE ? ”

“ ORG liquidava alcune spese di rappresentanza sostenute il CARDINAL Settembre dello stesso anno [ DATE ] dall’allora GPE , il socialista ORG , in GPE da Adelfia del podista L.M. Due fatture non trovano alcun riscontro con il giorno in cui si e’ svolta la manifestazione ( ... ) GPE prima fattura porta la data del DATE ( ... ) Se la manifestazione si e’ svolta nella sola giornata del DATE , com’e’ possibile che i convenevoli sono stati consumati con alcuni mesi di anticipo ed in giorni differenti ? ” .

Copies of the invoices were also published .

In DATE , ORG had been dissolved by a judgment of ORG . On DATE a ORG Commissioner had been appointed and on DATE PERSON , the mayor , had handed over to him .

On DATE , acting on a complaint by PERSON , the judge responsible for preliminary investigations committed the applicant for trial . He was accused of defamation .

On DATE ORG found the accused guilty of defamation within the meaning of LAW , granting mitigating circumstances . It sentenced the applicant to a fine of MONEY ( ITL ) and ordered him to pay costs and damages to be determined in separate proceedings . The court held that the defamatory nature of the article was evidenced principally by the fact that the applicant had associated the mayor ’s name with a request for reimbursement of false invoices without the necessary checks of the truth of the events . In particular , the court noted that the applicant had only verified that PERSON was ORG ’s mayor at the time of the issue of the invoices and that if he had ascertained the truth more fully , the applicant would have noticed the errors in the Government Commissioner ’s deliberation of CARDINAL DATE . In fact , the latter had wrongly linked both the invoices of CARDINAL DATE and DATE to the passing through of the long - distance runner on DATE . In reality that event had taken place on DATE and the invoice of CARDINAL DATE had been issued for a mineral - water supply to ORG . The court held that the defamatory nature of the article was also evidenced by the fact that the article had been published DATE after the event . The court added that the invoices could be not considered false because they had been issued for services which had really been provided . The court concluded that the applicant was not entitled to assert the right to report current events ( diritto di cronaca ) and comment on them ( diritto di critica ) because , in the absence of the truth of the facts and of their objective reference , the article appeared to be the result of a specific intention to muckrake in respect of a particular person with a defamatory aim .

The applicant appealed . Relying on the right to report current events and to comment on them , he submitted that the divulgation of the news was justified by the public interest in knowing how ORG was spending public money . He alleged that the article also contained a putative truth ( putativamente vera ) because he had examined the Government Commissioner ’s deliberation and the enclosed documents . Consequently , he had acted in good faith in relation to the inexactitudes he was accused of .

Evidence was heard from the applicant who declared that before publication he had telephoned the long - distance runner who told him that he had not taken part in any celebration on DATE because he had left ORG DATE before .

In a judgment of DATE ORG acquitted the applicant because the facts did not amount to a crime . The court confirmed that the invoices could not be considered false because they had been issued for services which had genuinely been carried out . Nevertheless , it held that the applicant ’s doubts and considerations about irregularities in the proceedings had been justified by adequate evidential support , namely the Government Commissioner ’s deliberation , that is , a public document . Consequently the court held that the applicant had sufficiently ascertained the facts before publication and concluded that he had been acted in good faith about the inexactitudes he was accused of .

ORG and PERSON lodged an application with ORG .

In a judgment of DATE ORG overturned the judgment of ORG of DATE and remitted the case to another division of the same court to re - examine it . ORG held that the grounds of ORG judgment of DATE were affected by flawed logic , because it had confirmed that the invoices could not be considered false , but held that the applicant had sufficiently ascertained the facts before publication . The court alleged that the applicant , as the manager of the newspaper , could not have been unaware that on DATE , when the long - distance runner was passing through , Mr F.B. was no longer mayor , that the entertainment expenses could not be attributed to him and that the invoice expenses were genuine and not to be linked with the celebrations of CARDINAL DATE .

In a judgment of DATE ORG re - examined the case , upheld ORG judgment of DATE and awarded costs against the applicant . The court held that the absence of good faith was evidenced first by the fact that the title of the article associated the mayor ’s name with a request for reimbursement of false invoices ; second by the fact that the applicant , as the manager of the newspaper , could not have been unaware of the political events in ORG and , in particular , that Mr F.B. was no longer the mayor at the time of the celebrations of DATE ; and finally , by the fact that the applicant had stated that PERSON had asked for reimbursements regardless of the fact that PERSON name was written neither on the invoices nor in the ORG Commissioner ’s deliberation .

The applicant lodged an application with ORG . First , he stressed an error in ORG judgment of DATE in relation to the date on which the long - distance runner had been passing through ( it was on DATE and not on DATE ) . He also stressed an error in ORG judgment of DATE which had stated that on CARDINAL DATE PERSON was no longer the mayor , whereas he had given the court the documentary evidence that PERSON had handed over to the Government Commissioner on CARDINAL DATE . In relation to the accusations of defamation , the applicant alleged that he had noticed the error in the Government Commissioner ’s deliberation about the date of the long - distance runner celebrations and about the ORG session of CARDINAL DATE which the supply of mineral - water was destined to , because on that date no session had taken place . The applicant also alleged that before publication he had telephoned the long - distance runner who told him that he had never taken part in the celebration of DATE because he had left ORG DATE before . Finally , the applicant held that his aim was not to defame anyone , but to inform readers how public money was being spent by public authorities .

In a judgment of DATE , deposited with the registry on CARDINAL DATE , ORG dismissed the application and upheld ORG decision of DATE . The court held that the applicant ’s allegations were irrelevant because he had not , in any case , given evidence that the invoices were false and that they had to be attributed to PERSON Consequently , the court declared the appeal inadmissible and sentenced the applicant to a fine of ITL CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL and awarded costs against him .


The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and is currently detained in a mental hospital in GPE . He is represented before the ORG by Mr H. Davies GPE and Mr A. Jones , barristers practising in GPE . The respondent Government are represented by PERSON , ORG

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE , following an assault upon his girlfriend and a man he believed she was involved with , the applicant was convicted of CARDINAL offences of causing grievous bodily harm with intent , and was sentenced to concurrent terms of CARDINAL years’ imprisonment .

It is likely that by the time the applicant was released , in DATE , he was suffering from schizophrenia . He experienced the delusion that he was a special person who had been born DATE and had been sent to save sinners . He felt that people behaved strangely towards him and were constantly testing him . He was paranoid and began carrying a knife .

On DATE the applicant , who had been using cannabis and Valium , went into a public house in GPE . He attracted attention because of his dishevelled appearance and his attempts to sell a watch to customers . The landlord told him to leave after CARDINAL drink , but meanwhile CARDINAL of the other customers , “ M ” , who was completely unknown to the applicant , noticed the knife in his pocket and attempted to take it from him . The applicant took the knife back and left the pub , followed by PERSON , the applicant struck at M with the knife , cutting M ’s hands . M and his companions retaliated , and the applicant was found by the police lying motionless on the ground . He was arrested and taken to hospital for treatment . When he was finally interviewed he told the police that for some time he had been harassed by gangsters , and that he had bought the knife to protect himself against them . He believed that M was a “ sidekick ” of the gang leader , and that M had tried to rob him and had stolen his girlfriend .

The applicant was charged with an offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm , a “ serious offence ” for purposes of LAW and LAW CARDINAL of ORG ) Act DATE ( see below ) . He was initially remanded in custody in prison , but on DATE he was transferred to a psychiatric hospital for examination , under the care of PERSON . He remained there until DATE .

At the hospital the applicant was diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia . He was prescribed antidepressants and increasing doses of an antipsychotic drug , Quetiapane . However , he proved resistant to this treatment , and to a second antipsychotic drug . In DATE he was prescribed Clozapine , an a - typical antipsychotic licensed especially for use in cases of treatment - resistant schizophrenia . Clozapine may be prescribed only by an approved psychiatrist and must be dispensed by an approved pharmacy . The applicant ’s condition began to improve ; he was complying with the treatment programme and was keen to receive further treatment .

The applicant did not claim to be unfit to plead and did not advance a defence of insanity . Instead , he pleaded guilty in ORG at GPE on DATE . He appeared before ORG for sentencing on DATE . PERSON and another approved consultant psychiatrist gave evidence that the applicant was suffering from schizophrenia and would be a serious danger to the public if released . They recommended that a hospital order be made under LAW of LAW with a restriction on his release , unlimited in time , under section CARDINAL of LAW .

The ORG explained that since the applicant had already been convicted , in DATE , of offences classed as “ serious ” under section CARDINAL ) of the Powers of ORG Act DATE ( “ the CARDINAL Act ” : see below ) , he had no choice but to sentence him to a term of life imprisonment . He fixed the minimum term to be served at DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment and remarked :

“ I have to say I regret having to pass this sentence . Had I had power to do so I would have passed a sentence under LAW , making you the subject of a hospital order with a restriction without limitation of time . That , for the reasons I have explained , is impossible . ... ”

The applicant was taken immediately to ORG , where he was admitted at TIME and placed on the hospital wing . According to the prison medical records , he was examined by a doctor who noted that the applicant “ presented as appropriate ” , but was bemused at his sentence as he had been expecting to be sent to mental hospital .

No - one at the prison was authorised to prescribe or dispense Clozapine . The prison authorities contacted ORG , which advised that if the dose was interupted for TIME or longer the patient would have to return to the start of his medication programme . TIME the applicant had difficulty in getting to sleep and was prescribed LOC , after which the prison log recorded that he appeared to sleep well .

The following day , DATE , the prison medical officer attempted to obtain a supply of Clozapine , but this was not possible , so PERSON was prescribed instead . At TIME the applicant complained of feeling unwell . He was given CARDINAL mg of Olanzapine and , according to the prison record , his mood improved . He appeared to sleep well that night . The following day ( DATE ) he was again seen by a doctor who prescribed medication to help him sleep . The doctor described the applicant as appearing relaxed and talking appropriately . No particular problems were recorded in the prison medical log on CARDINAL or DATE .

On DATE PERSON examined the applicant with a view to seeking his transfer to hospital . PERSON report indicated that the applicant was refusing the treatment offered by the prison authorities . An application for his transfer to hospital was made to the Secretary of ORG under section CARDINAL of LAW DATE on DATE .

On DATE the applicant was examined by a second doctor , as required by section CARDINAL of LAW . The second doctor ’s report indicated that the applicant was becoming increasingly depressed and concluded that he should be transferred , because he had responded well to Clozapine in the past and that treatment was available only in a mental hospital .

On DATE the Secretary of ORG , having considered the medical reports , authorised the applicant ’s transfer to hospital .

PERSON noted in his report dated CARDINAL DATE :

“ [ The applicant ] was in FAC for DATE and there was a clear deterioration in his mental state during that time . A number of phone calls were received by [ the hospital ] about his deteriorating mental state by medical staff at the prison . He was becoming more paranoid and more withdrawn and there was concern that he would pose a risk to himself or possibly to others if he started to misinterpret the environment . As a result both myself and one of ORG prepared a medical recommendation which was sent to ORG of ORG for [ the applicant ] to be transferred under LAW DATE , which was achieved ...

[ The applicant ] was returned to Clozapine on his return to [ hospital ] on DATE . The Clozapine was gradually increased . In the early stages of starting his medication he had clear ideas of reference in regard to other patients on the ward and showed increasing preoccupation . ...

Unfortunately when PERSON is stopped there can result in a rebound psychosis whereby the symptoms come back with a vengeance and become more difficult to treat . There is evidence on the medical file that [ the applicant ’s ] mental state was starting to deteriorate once the Clozapine stopped and it certainly took DATE to actually get full control of his symptoms following his return to [ hospital ] . ”

Following his transfer , the applicant has remained in hospital . If and when the hospital authorities decide he no longer requires treatment in hospital , he will be returned to prison . Once the tariff period set by the judge has expired , it will be for ORG to decide whether it is safe to release the applicant back into the community .

The applicant appealed against sentence , arguing that his mental illness had been the primary cause of his committing the offence , and that it was “ inhuman and degrading ” , in breach of ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the LAW , to label him , by sentencing him to life imprisonment , as a deliberate wrongdoer deserving punishment . ORG rejected those submissions ( NORP v. PERSON [ DATE ] CARDINAL ORG R ( S ) CARDINAL ; [ DATE ] Crim LR CARDINAL ) , as follows :

“ In the context of this case we can not say that the sentence of life imprisonment which the ORG was obliged to pass was incompatible with the rights of the [ applicant ] under either LAW . We accept that a sentence of imprisonment does carry a certain stigma . It is ... a public statement that the offender is a deliberate wrongdoer who deserves punishment , but we do not accept that the stigma should not be applied to those convicted of serious crimes but who suffer from mental illness , given that in every case they would only have been convicted at all because they were fit to plead and have been demonstrated at trial to have had at the material time the necessary mens rea . Although ... this ORG has consistently encouraged the use of both hospital and restriction orders , it has always been open to ORG to say , as it did in DATE , that in certain defined cases there is an assumption that the offender presents such a serious and continuing danger to the safety of the public that a hospital order with a restriction order will afford inadequate protection , and there must therefore be a sentence of life imprisonment . Given that a sentence of life imprisonment does afford greater protection to the public , and that the assumption is rebuttable , and that there is no evidence to show that an offender sentenced to life imprisonment will not receive appropriate medical treatment , we find it impossible to see how the introduction of the statutory assumption can be said to have infringed the [ applicant ’s ] Convention rights . ”

The applicant appealed to ORG , arguing that it was wrong in principle to impose a punitive sentence of imprisonment on someone who was mentally ill and not fully criminally culpable , and that the imposition on him of the automatic life sentence was therefore contrary to Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL . Lord PERSON of GPE , giving the judgment of ORG , observed that the applicant ’s mental illness could properly be relied on as mitigating the criminality of his conduct , but not as absolving him of all responsibility for it . There would be strong grounds for challenging the compatibility of the automatic life sentence with LAW if its effect were to deny a mentally disordered defendant the medical treatment which his condition required , but this was not a necessary result , since section QUANTITY of the DATE Act gave the Home Secretary power to transfer a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment to a hospital , and since the ORG Secretary was obliged to act compatibly with the LAW and was subject to judicial review . In the present case , the ORG Secretary acted very promptly . Although the interruption of the applicant ’s medication during DATE following his sentence caused him ill effects , these were not of sufficient severity to engage LAW .

In DATE the ORG issued a White Paper entitled Protecting the Public : The Government ’s Strategy on Crime in England and GPE , ( Cm CARDINAL ) . Chapter CARDINAL was headed “ Automatic Life Sentences for Serious Violent and Sex Offenders ” and explained their reasons for requiring indeterminate sentences for dangerous criminals :

“ CARDINAL . A wide range of serious violent and sex offences carry a maximum sentence of life imprisonment , including manslaughter , rape and the most serious woundings . In these cases the court has the discretion to impose a life sentence either because the offence is so serious that it merits the maximum available penalty , or because the trial judge feels unable to determine when it will be safe to release the offender . In either case , the trial judge will specify the tariff which must be served , and at DATE ORG will determine whether the offender can safely be released .

The great advantage of the life sentence is its flexibility . It recognises that there are CARDINAL separate considerations : the length of time the offender should serve as punishment for the offence he or she has committed ( the tariff ) , and the question whether he or she can safely be released at DATE . However courts make very little use of the discretionary life sentence . In DATE , for example , CARDINAL offenders were convicted of rape or attempted rape , but CARDINAL were sentenced to life imprisonment . In DATE , CARDINAL offenders were convicted of a second serious violent or sexual offence , but CARDINAL received a discretionary life sentence .

This does not necessarily mean that the sentences imposed on violent and sex offenders are too lenient : long sentences are frequently imposed on offenders convicted of violent and sex offences . . . . But if a determinate sentence is imposed the offender must be released once that sentence has been served , even if there is every reason to believe that he or she will commit further serious offences . That has led to a number of tragic cases where offenders convicted of violent or sex offences have been released only to repeat their offences almost immediately .

CARDINAL.CARDINAL . It is essential that the public receives proper protection from serious , dangerous and persistent offenders . Long sentences are not sufficient , of themselves , to provide that protection : before potentially dangerous offenders are released an assessment must be made to see whether they still pose a risk . If an offender can not safely be released he or she must continue to be detained – if necessary indefinitely .

This proposal is not designed to increase the time such offenders spend in prison as punishment for the offences they have committed . That will continue to be the responsibility of the trial judge , who will be expected to set a tariff appropriate to the seriousness of the offence , just as the judge would if he or she were imposing a determinate sentence . This will enable the risk presented by the offender to be assessed towards the end of the tariff , when it will be known in the case of a sex offender , for example , whether that offender had undertaken the sex offender treatment programme , and how he or she had responded to it . The proposal will ensure that when the tariff ordered by the court expires , offenders who represent a real risk to the public are not released unless and until ORG is satisfied that it is safe to do so . Once released , they will remain on licence and subject to recall in the same way as other life sentence prisoners . ”

It was said to be one of the key elements of the Government ’s proposal ( paragraph CARDINAL ) that :

“ the court will also have discretion not to pass the automatic life sentence in genuinely exceptional cases . This is intended to allow for occasional quite unforeseeable circumstances where it would plainly be unjust and unnecessary to impose the life sentence . But it should be emphasised that this provision will be designed to cover only genuinely exceptional cases . The court will be required to explain what were the exceptional circumstances which justified some other sentence in place of a life sentence . . . . ”

The chapter concluded , in paragraph CARDINAL :

“ CARDINAL . Too often in the past , those who have shown a propensity to commit serious violent or sex offences have served their sentences and been released only to offend again . In many such cases , the danger of releasing the offender has been plain for all to see – but nothing could be done , because once the offender has completed the sentence imposed , he or she has to be released . Too often , victims have paid the price when the offender has repeated the same offences . The Government is determined that the public should receive proper protection from persistent violent or sex offenders . That means requiring the courts to impose an automatic indeterminate sentence , and releasing the offender if and only if it is safe to do so . ”

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)-(CARDINAL ) of LAW , which gave effect to the above recommendations , provides as follows :

“ CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) This section applies where―

( a ) a person is convicted of a serious offence committed after DATE ; and

( b ) at the time when that offence was committed , he was DATE or over and had been convicted in any part of GPE of another serious offence .

( CARDINAL ) The court shall impose a life sentence , that is to say―

( a ) where the offender is DATE or over when convicted of the offence mentioned in subsection ( CARDINAL)(a ) above , a sentence of imprisonment for life ,

( b ) where he is DATE at that time , a sentence of custody for life under LAW above ,

unless the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances relating to either of the offences or to the offender which justify its not doing so .

( CARDINAL ) Where the court does not impose a life sentence , it shall state in open court that it is of that opinion and what the exceptional circumstances are .

( CARDINAL ) An offence the sentence for which is imposed under subsection ( CARDINAL ) above shall not be regarded as an offence the sentence for which is fixed by law . ”

There follows in subsection ( CARDINAL ) a list of criminal offences all of which are serious offences for purposes of the section if committed in GPE and GPE . The list includes offences related to murder ( although not murder itself , for which a mandatory life sentence is prescribed elsewhere ) , manslaughter , offences under LAW of LAW , rape and attempted rape , unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl aged DATE , certain of the most serious firearms offences and robbery involving the possession of a firearm or imitation firearm . All are offences carrying a maximum penalty of imprisonment for life . In subsections ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) the section contains broadly comparable lists of serious offences committed in GPE and GPE .

Section CARDINAL reproduces ( in its application to GPE and GPE ) section CARDINAL of ORG .

Section CARDINAL of the DATE Act empowers a court to order a person , on being convicted of a criminal offence punishable with imprisonment , to be admitted to and detained in a specified hospital ( “ a hospital order ” ) . The court can make a hospital order only if it is satisfied on the written or oral evidence of CARDINAL registered medical practitioners that the offender is suffering from mental disorder and that :

“ the mental disorder is of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment , and in the case of psychopathic disorder or mental impairment , that such treatment is likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration in his condition ” ( section DATE ( CARDINAL ) ( a ) ( i ) ) ,

“ the court is of the opinion , having regard to all the circumstances including the nature of the offence and the character and antecedents of the offender , and to the other available methods of dealing with him , that the most suitable method of disposing of the case is by means of a [ hospital order ] ” ( section DATE ( CARDINAL ) ( b ) ( ii ) ) .

Section CARDINAL of the DATE Act empowers a court to make a restriction order ( with or without limit of time ) at the same time as it makes a hospital order . The restriction order gives the Secretary of ORG , inter alia , increased powers over the movement of a patient and may be made if it appears to the court having regard to the nature of the offence , the antecedents of the offender and the risk of his committing further offences if still at large , that it is necessary for the protection of the public from serious harm to make the order . A restriction order also confers a power to recall or conditionally discharge a patient at any time and restricts the powers of ORG to order release more narrowly than in the case of an ordinary mental patient .

The Home Secretary may by warrant under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) direct the transfer of a defendant who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment but whose mental condition requires treatment in hospital to a named hospital . Such a transfer direction has the same effect as a hospital order ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ) and may under section DATE be coupled with a restriction order . These are the powers exercised by the Home Secretary in the applicant ’s case .

The situation which arises where neither a sentence of imprisonment nor a hospital order , on its own , appears appropriate in the case of a particular offender was dealt with in the ORG ’s ORG ( “ Protecting the Public ” ) mentioned above ( LAW , “ Sex Offenders and Mentally Disordered Offenders ” ) :

“ CARDINAL . The Government proposes changes in the arrangements for the remand , sentencing and subsequent management of mentally disordered offenders to provide greater protection for the public and to improve access to effective medical treatment for those offenders who need it . The central change , if adopted , would be the provision of a ‘ hybrid ORG for certain mentally disordered offenders for whom the present form of hospital order is unsatisfactory , particularly those who are considered to bear a significant degree of responsibility for their offences . The order would enable the courts , in effect , to pass a prison sentence on an offender and at the same time order his immediate admission to hospital for medical treatment .

The hybrid order , together with other proposals amending the detail of LAW DATE , would substantially increase the flexibility of arrangements for dealing with mentally disordered offenders at all stages from remand through to rehabilitation . In particular , it would enable the courts to deal with some of the most difficult cases in a way which took proper account of the offender ’s need for treatment ; the demands of justice ; and the right of other people to be protected from harm .

Existing sentencing arrangements for offenders who are mentally disordered require the court to decide either to order the offender ’s detention in hospital for treatment , or to sentence him to imprisonment , or to make some other disposal . In some cases , an offender needs treatment in hospital but the circumstances of the offence also require a fixed period to be served in detention . This may be because the offender is found to bear some significant responsibility for the offence notwithstanding his disorder , or because the link between the offending behaviour and the mental disorder is not clear at the time of sentencing . The hybrid disposal would be a way of enabling the requirements of sentencing in such cases to be met . Under the order , an offender would remain in hospital for as long as his mental condition required , but if he recovered or was found to be untreatable during the fixed period set by the court , he would be remitted to prison . The hybrid order was recommended for use in sentencing offenders suffering from psychopathic disorder by ORG on Psychopathic Disorder . The Government is considering whether it might be made available in respect of offenders suffering from all types of mental disorder currently covered by mental health legislation . ”

Legislative effect was given to this proposal by section CARDINALA of LAW , inserted by LAW . So far as relevant the section provides :

“ ( CARDINAL ) This section applies where , in the case of a person convicted before ORG of an offence the sentence for which is not fixed by law –

( a ) the conditions mentioned in subsection ( CARDINAL ) below are fulfilled ; and

( b ) except where the offence is one the sentence for which falls to be imposed under LAW , the court considers making a hospital order in respect of him before deciding to impose a sentence of imprisonment ( ‘ the relevant PERSON ) in respect of the offence .

( CARDINAL ) The conditions referred to in subsection ( CARDINAL ) above are that the court is satisfied , on the written or oral evidence of CARDINAL registered medical practitioners –

( a ) that the offender is suffering from psychopathic disorder ;

( b ) that the mental disorder from which the offender is suffering is of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment ; and

( c ) that such treatment is likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration of his condition .

( CARDINAL ) The court may give both of the following directions , namely –

( a ) a direction that , instead of being removed to and detained in a prison , the offender be removed to and detained in such hospital as may be specified in the direction ( in this LAW referred to as a ‘ hospital direction’ ) ; and

( b ) a direction that the offender be subject to the special restrictions set out in section CARDINAL above ( in this LAW referred to as a ‘ limitation direction’ ) .

( CARDINAL ) A hospital direction and a limitation direction shall not be given in relation to an offender unless CARDINAL of the medical practitioners whose evidence is taken into account by the court under subsection ( CARDINAL ) above has given evidence orally before the court .

( CARDINAL ) A hospital direction and a limitation direction shall not be given in relation to an offender unless the court is satisfied on the written or oral evidence of the registered medical practitioner who would be in charge of his treatment , or of some other person representing the managers of the hospital that arrangements have been made –

( a ) for his admission to that hospital ; and

( b ) for his admission to it within DATE beginning with DATE of the giving of such directions ;

and the court may , pending his admission within that period , give such directions as it thinks fit for his conveyance to and detention in a place of safety .

( CARDINAL) Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) and section CARDINAL above shall have effect as if any reference to the making of a hospital order included a reference to the giving of a hospital direction and a limitation direction .

( CARDINAL ) A hospital direction and a limitation direction given in relation to an offender shall have effect not only as regards the relevant sentence but also ( so far as applicable ) as regards any other sentence of imprisonment imposed on the same or a previous occasion .

( CARDINAL ) The Secretary of ORG may by order provide that this section shall have effect as if the reference in subsection ( CARDINAL ) above to psychopathic disorder included a reference to a mental disorder of such other description as may be specified in the order . ”

This section confers a power exercisable in the case of those upon whom automatic life sentences were required to be imposed under LAW and ( by virtue of paragraph CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of Schedule DATE Act ) section CARDINAL of QUANTITY , but the section applies only to those suffering from psychopathic disorder since the power conferred by subsection ( CARDINAL ) to extend the application of the section to other descriptions of mental disorder has not been exercised in GPE and GPE . In contrast , in GPE section CARDINALA of the Criminal Procedure ( GPE ) Act DATE , inserted by section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of ORG ( GPE ) Act DATE , provides for a disposal by means of a sentence of imprisonment and an allied hospital order in any appropriate case , whatever the nature of the mental disorder .