Violation of Art. 5-3;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE . At present , he is detained at FAC .

On DATE the applicant was arrested and interrogated on a charge of murder . He was charged with having murdered a man in DATE . The man 's corpse had been found in the garden of a co - accused . The victim 's identity was not yet known . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's complaint in respect of his arrest . In the ensuing proceedings he was assisted by a defence counsel of his choice .

On DATE , DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE the applicant was interrogated , but he refused to answers the questions put to him . His co - accused was interrogated on CARDINAL and DATE , DATE and DATE . Witnesses were heard on DATE , CARDINAL and DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE , DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE , DATE and CARDINAL March CARDINAL and DATE .

Meanwhile , on DATE ORG , as confirmed by ORG on DATE , ordered the applicant 's detention on remand until DATE . ORG considered that – given the seriousness of the charges against him – there was a risk of the applicant 's collusion and absconding .

On DATE a forensic pathologist was appointed . He submitted his final opinion on DATE .

On DATE ORG , as confirmed by ORG on DATE , prolonged the applicant 's detention until DATE for the same reasons given by ORG .

On DATE and DATE ORG , as confirmed by an appeal panel of the same court on DATE and DATE , prolonged , for the same reasons , the applicant 's detention until DATE and DATE , respectively .

On DATE , DATE and DATE ORG prolonged the applicant 's detention until DATE , DATE and DATE , respectively . It referred to the danger of the applicant 's absconding , noting that a DNA - analysis was being carried out with a view to confirming the victim 's identity . An expert in haemogenetics , who had been appointed to this end on DATE , submitted his final opinion on DATE .

On DATE ORG , as confirmed by an appeal panel of the same court on DATE , dismissed the applicant 's request for release .

On DATE ORG prolonged the applicant 's detention until DATE and dismissed his request for release . It invoked the danger that the applicant would abscond if released .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's request for release .

On DATE ORG prolonged the applicant 's detention until DATE on the ground that he might abscond .

On CARDINAL DATE the investigation was closed and the case - file was made available to the defendants . On DATE ORG reopened the investigation with a view to completion of the case against the defendants . These proceedings ended on DATE .

Meanwhile , on DATE ORG , as confirmed by an appeal panel of the same court on DATE , dismissed the applicant 's request for release .

On DATE ORG preferred a bill of indictment , accusing the applicant and CARDINAL others of murder . The indictment listed several witnesses and CARDINAL forensic medical experts .

On DATE and DATE ORG , as confirmed by ORG on DATE and DATE respectively , upheld the applicant 's detention on remand until the delivery of the first - instance judgment . The courts invoked the danger of the applicant 's absconding .

On DATE the applicant filed a request for release in which he referred to domestic jurisprudence and the ORG 's case - law concerning pre - trial detention . He argued , inter alia , that his absconding was unlikely in view of his close ties with his sick mother and paralysed father , his siblings and his CARDINAL-year old son , and of the fact that he had been living with his common - law wife for DATE and that they had carried out a major renovation of their flat .

On DATE the presiding judge refused , under section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW , to take a formal decision on the applicant 's renewed request for release on the ground that it referred to no new circumstances . On DATE ORG held hearings . On DATE a forensic psychiatrist was appointed to examine the defendants . He submitted his opinion on DATE .

On DATE ORG held a hearing and refused to release the applicant . On DATE ORG dismissed his appeal , relying on the danger of absconding .

On DATE ORG held hearings and refused to release the applicant .

Further hearings took place on DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL and DATE . On the latter date ORG delivered a judgment . In its CARDINALpage judgment ORG convicted the applicant of murder and imposed a life sentence .

On DATE the applicant appealed . On DATE he completed his appeal .

On DATE ORG held a hearing .

The court quashed the first - instance judgment , remitted the case to ORG and prolonged the applicant 's pre - trial detention . The applicant has been detained ever since .

Section CARDINAL of the Code of Criminal Procedure , as in force in the relevant period , reads as follows :

( CARDINAL ) Detention on remand , when ordered prior to the indictment , may last until the decision of the court in the preliminary proceedings before trial , up to a maximum of DATE . Detention on remand can be prolonged by ORG on CARDINAL occasion , for DATE at the most . After DATE , detention on remand can be prolonged by a single judge of ORG , on CARDINAL occasions , but may not continue beyond DATE after the remand order . Thereafter , the duration of detention on remand can only be extended by ORG .

( CARDINAL ) Detention on remand , when ordered or upheld by the first - instance court after the indictment , may last until the first - instance judgment is pronounced ...

( CARDINAL ) When the length of the detention on remand ordered or upheld after the indictment

a ) exceeds DATE and the first - instance court has not delivered a judgment , the first - instance court ,

b ) exceeds DATE , ORG

shall review the reasonableness of the detention on remand .

( CARDINAL ) The court ... may dispense with delivering a [ formal ] decision if ... a repeated request for release from pre - trial detention refers to no new circumstances .


Preliminary objections dismissed;No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-2 - Charged with a criminal offence);No violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Guido Raimondi;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE GPE , the applicant ’s husband , a high ranking tax police officer , was arrested on suspicion of having committed various offences of fraud . He was remanded in custody .

DATE he was charged with forgery , fraud and inappropriate commercial activities .

In DATE PERSON was charged with more serious offences , including that of smuggling large quantities of alcohol .

In DATE PERSON was accused of further serious crimes , including forming and leading a criminal association in order to smuggle alcohol and cigarettes in large quantities .

In DATE a criminal investigator froze certain property belonging to GPE , his mother and the applicant . The mother appealed against that decision , pursuant to LAW and practice part below ) . As a result , on ORG of GPE released some of her assets – an apartment , a garage and a plot of land DATE the seizure of which was deemed to have been unreasonable . The court noted , however , that the café and shares in a telecommunications company which had been in the possession of the mother of PERSON was property acquired as a result of his criminal activities . The seizure of those items was upheld .

The applicant did not appeal against the seizure of her property .

NORP In DATE a prosecutor approved a bill of indictment against GPE and CARDINAL of his accomplices , PERSON , GPE and GPE The case was transmitted to ORG .

On DATE PERSON committed suicide in FAC .

On DATE and DATE the applicant and the mother of PERSON requested the court to continue the case to enable his rehabilitation . DATE ORG decided to continue the proceedings in so far as they concerned the activities of the criminal association organised by the applicant ’s late husband . The court appointed a lawyer to defend the interests of the deceased .

On DATE the ORG received a request from the applicant and PERSON ’s mother to discontinue the criminal proceedings . By a ruling of DATE the court dismissed that request , noting that it had already started examining the evidence in the case . It observed that , without having examined the evidence , the court could not establish whether grounds existed to rehabilitate GPE

On DATE ORG adopted its judgment . It noted that there were no grounds on which PERSON could be exculpated . On the contrary , the court found sufficient evidence to prove that the applicant ’s husband , being a ORG official , had indeed organised and led a criminal association for smuggling purposes DATE . The offenders had succeeded in passing contraband on CARDINAL occasions . However , in view of GPE ’s death , the court decided to discontinue the proceedings against him . CARDINAL of his co - accused , PERSON , GPE and GPE , were convicted and sentenced to prison sentences ranging from DATE . CARDINAL other co - accused were released from criminal liability because they had cooperated with the authorities and contributed to discovering the crimes .

ORG ordered the confiscation of certain items of property on the ground that they had been acquired as a result of GPE ’s criminal activities ( LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ) . In particular , the court ordered confiscation of the applicant ’s apartment in GPE . The court established that the applicant had bought the apartment in DATE , having obtained a sham loan of CARDINAL NORP litai ( ORG , MONEY ( ORG ) ) from the mother of GPE The applicant ’s shares in a telecommunications company , to the value of LTL CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) , were also to be confiscated on the ground that they had been obtained through an off - shore company which the criminal organisation used to hide the proceeds of its crimes . The trial court also ordered confiscation of a café belonging to ORG mother as well as certain other items . Nonetheless , it lifted the seizure of a plot of land , a garden house , and some money and furniture that belonged to the applicant , given that there was no evidence of the illicit origin of that property . For the same reason , the seizure of flats and plots of land belonging to ORG parents was also lifted . Lastly , the trial court ordered confiscation of ORG car on the ground that it had been used as a means to smuggle goods ( LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ) .

The reasons why each item of seized property should or should not be confiscated were set out in CARDINAL pages of the judgment .

Considering that the trial court ’s judgment was erroneous , PERSON ’s family hired another lawyer , PERSON , to prepare an appeal . As the applicant wrote in her application to the ORG , from that moment the lawyer PERSON “ de facto represented all persons [ who were affected by the confiscation measure ] ” . Appeals were also lodged by the prosecutor and CARDINAL convicted persons .

In the appeal the lawyer PERSON contended that the criminal proceedings should have been discontinued after PERSON ’s death . He also argued , mentioning each item of confiscated property , that those assets had been obtained from legitimate sources and thus the confiscation was unlawful . As concerns the applicant , PERSON averred that there was no proof to find that the apartment and shares in the telecommunications company , both registered in her name , had been obtained from the proceeds of the crimes . For the lawyer , the trial court ’s conclusions about the circumstances in which the applicant had acquired the apartment and the shares were factually and legally erroneous .

On DATE ORG upheld the trial court ’s judgment . The appellate court emphasised that the persons convicted had acted as an organised group ( nusikalstamas susivienijimas ) which was the most dangerous form of conspiracy ( bendrininkavimas ) . The group ’s criminal activity had lasted DATE , was conducted systematically and did great harm to the ORG . The value of smuggled goods was CARDINAL of NORP litai . Taking into account the scale , its systematic nature and the organisational level of the criminal activity , the case could be viewed as exceptional .

On the issue of confiscated property ORG noted that of all persons whose property had been confiscated , only PERSON ’s parents - in - law had testified before the trial court . Even so , they could not explain how they had obtained that property . Furthermore , ORG conspirator PERSON had confirmed that his GPE financial situation was not good and he could not explain financial transactions by his mother .

As regards the applicant , ORG also noted that she was well aware of the criminal activities of her husband ’s criminal association :

“ Even though ORG wife ORG herself has not been charged [ in this case ] , the examined evidence leaves no doubt that she was well aware of her spouse ’s and the other co - accuseds’ criminal activities . ... ORG was informed each time smuggled goods were loaded or unloaded as well as about the sale of those goods . ... There is evidence that PERSON herself received money which had been paid for smuggled goods . ... Consequently , PERSON without any doubt knew that property which the [ trial ] court confiscated and which had been registered in her name previously had been obtained as a result of criminal activities . ”

The appellate court also dismissed the argument by the lawyer PERSON that confiscation was not possible because criminal proceedings against PERSON had been discontinued . LAW obliged the court to confiscate property which was the proceeds of crime , if third persons to whom the property had been transferred knew about the unlawful origin of that property . Confiscation was in no way linked to whether those third persons had been charged with a crime or convicted . On the contrary , pursuant to the aforementioned provision , confiscation of the proceeds of the crime had to be ordered both when imposing a punishment and when a person has been released from criminal liability and even in the event that he or she had not even been charged with a crime .

ORG also held :

“ ... PERSON ’s lawyer has unreasonably linked the confiscation of all the property listed in the judgment with the fact that the proceedings had been discontinued against PERSON However , it has been forgotten that not only GPE but also other persons had been charged in the criminal proceedings in question . Those other persons had smuggled goods together with PERSON , and the illicit gains had been obtained together . Some of those co - accused had been released from criminal liability , but CARDINAL of the co - accused , PERSON , GPE and GPE , were convicted . For LAW of LAW to be applied , it was not important that the third persons to whom the property had been transferred should be family members or relatives of the person who committed the crime . Moreover , even presuming that it was PERSON who had transferred the property to his wife , his parents and his parents - in - law , it did not mean that that property had been obtained from the criminal activity of him alone . In the present case that property had been obtained as a result of the criminal activities of all co - accused , including those who had been convicted . Furthermore , GPE , who was PERSON ’s cousin , had played a very important role in the activities of the criminal organisation . Accordingly , the persons to whom the confiscated property had been transferred were connected by family links not only to PERSON , who died , but also to GPE , who was convicted . These circumstances totally rebut the appellant ’s contention that the property had been confiscated after the proceedings had been discontinued , because in reality confiscation had been ordered after [ the trial court ] adopted an accusatory judgment ” .

Lastly , the appellate court pointed out that the trial court had exceptionally thoroughly set out the reasons why particular items had to be confiscated . In setting out its conclusions the trial court had relied on extensive analysis of the evidence examined in court , devoting a whole chapter of the judgment , CARDINAL pages in length , to that . In the appellate court ’s view , the trial court ’s findings had been reasonable . Even so , the appellate court again went through the evidence and upheld the trial court ’s findings , dismissing PERSON ’s arguments to the effect that the CARDINAL confiscated items in the applicant ’s ownership had a lawful provenance ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

The lawyer PERSON submitted an appeal on points of law . He contended , first , that the criminal proceedings against PERSON should have been discontinued after his death and that confiscation of property was possible only if an accusatory judgment had been adopted . Secondly , he alleged that the property , the confiscation of which had been ordered by the trial court , including that of the applicant , did not meet the requirements of LAW CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW . In his submission , no fault of third person whose property was confiscated had been established .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal on points of law . As regards the confiscation of property , ORG ruled that confiscation as a penal measure ( baudžiamojo poveikio priemonė ) could be applied independently of whether the procedure had been concluded by acquittal or conviction , and even in cases where a person had not been charged with a crime ( kai asmuo netraukiamas baudžiamojon atsakomybėn ) . ORG emphasised that it was a court ’s duty to confiscate property which fell under LAW and CARDINAL of LAW . It was noted that , in its judgment , the trial court had thoroughly reasoned its choice as to which items of property should be confiscated as being the proceeds of illegal activities . ORG acknowledged that most of that property had been found in the possession of third persons . However , given the trial court ’s conclusion that those persons knew or should have known about the illicit funding of the items concerned , it was lawful to confiscate them even though those persons had not been charged in the criminal proceedings against GPE and the criminal organisation .

By a judgment of DATE of ORG the applicant was convicted of misappropriating property and falsifying documents . The court established that she was actively involved in organising unlawful money transfers to off - shore companies used by the criminal organisation led by her late husband , so that the money was hidden . She fully confessed that she had committed the crimes with the aim of helping her husband avoid criminal liability while he was in detention . The applicant was sentenced to DATE imprisonment .

The mother of the applicant ’s late husband was convicted of falsifying documents and sentenced to DATE imprisonment . The court noted that she was merely executing the orders of the applicant , but that they had the common goal of helping GPE

Both the applicant and her late husband ’s mother were pardoned under LAW .

The Code of Criminal Procedure at the relevant time provided that a pre - trial investigator could freeze the assets of an accused , or assets which were acquired in a criminal manner but later were in a third party ’s possession , so as to protect a potential civil claim or confiscation order ( LAW ) . Appeals lay against such orders of investigators to CARDINAL court instances ( Article CARDINAL ) .

As concerns confiscation of property , at the material time the Criminal Code provided :

Confiscation of property shall be the compulsory uncompensated taking into the ownership of a ORG of any form of property subject to confiscation and held by the offender , his accomplice or other persons .

Confiscation of property shall be applicable only in respect of the property used as an instrument or a means to commit a crime or as the result of a criminal act . A court must confiscate :

CARDINAL ) NORP the money or other items of material value delivered to the offender or his accomplice for the purpose of commission of the criminal act ;

CARDINAL ) NORP the money and other items of material value used in the commission of the criminal act ;

CARDINAL ) NORP the money and other items of material value obtained as a result of the commission of the criminal act .

NORP The property transferred to other natural or legal persons shall be confiscated regardless of whether or not those persons are subject to criminal liability , where :

CARDINAL ) NORP the property has been transferred to them for the purpose of commission of a criminal act ;

CARDINAL ) NORP when acquiring the property , they were aware , or ought to have been aware and could have been aware that this property , money or the valuables newly acquired by means thereof have been gained from of a criminal act .

NORP The property transferred to other natural or legal persons may be confiscated regardless of whether or not a person who has transferred the property is subject to criminal liability , where this person ought to and could have been aware that that property may be used for the commission of a serious or grave crime .

When ordering confiscation of property , a court must specify the items subject to confiscation or the monetary value of the property subject to confiscation . ”

In the legal systems of ORG the concept of “ confiscation ” generally refers to a measure the effect of which is permanent deprivation of property by way of transfer of that property to the ORG . CARDINAL countries ( GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE and GPE ) provide for confiscation orders regardless of conviction . This type of confiscation order generally covers property that has been acquired though unlawful activities . As long as the origin can not be justified , confiscation of such property may be imposed . Criminal liability of the offender is not relevant for the purposes of the confiscation order . For example , in GPE a court may order the confiscation of the proceeds of the crime despite the fact that the proceedings have been discontinued , as long as it can be established that a wrongful act has indeed been committed .

Five States ( GPE , GPE , GPE , the GPE and GPE ) in principle require conviction as a prerequisite for confiscation whilst allowing for some exceptions to the general rule . In GPE , if it is established or there are reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect committed the offence , confiscation of property acquired through that offence is permitted , even if the suspect is not ultimately convicted because of his or her death . GPE and GPE allow confiscation of property which constitutes material evidence in limited circumstances . In the GPE , as a rule , a confiscation order will not be available upon the death of the accused . However , confiscation of the property that has already been seized can be imposed if it is plausible that the deceased had indeed committed an economic crime .

CARDINAL States ( GPE , GPE and GPE ) strictly rule out the possibility of confiscation without conviction .

Confiscation of property which is the proceeds of a crime may be imposed without conviction in certain circumstances either against third parties in general , or against family members in particular ( GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , the GPE , GPE , GPE and GPE ) . Knowledge of the illicit origin of the property , failure to justify its origin , the type of crime at issue and whether or not the third party is a fictitious owner are CARDINAL most common circumstances in which a confiscation order may be made against property belonging to family members of an accused regardless of their conviction .

On DATE GPE ORG , Search , LAW ( DATE ) . The ORG aimed to facilitate international co - operation and mutual assistance in investigating crime and tracking down , seizing and confiscating the proceeds thereof . Parties undertake in particular to criminalise the laundering of the proceeds of crime and to confiscate instrumentalities and proceeds ( or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds ) .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Art. 6-2;Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 8;Violation of P1-1;Just satisfaction dismissed

Anatoly Kovler;Dean Spielmann;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Khanlar Hajiyev;Sverre Erik Jebens

The applicants are brothers . PERSON and PERSON were twins born in DATE and Mr NORP was born in DATE . They all live in the town of GPE in GPE of GPE . On DATE Mr PERSON died in an accident .

On DATE the first and second applicants were arrested on suspicion of kidnapping committed in concert . The case was assigned to Mr PERSON , a senior investigator in the prosecutor ’s office of GPE .

On DATE the investigator Mr PERSON questioned the third applicant as a witness . On DATE he was placed in custody . On DATE the investigator issued a formal decision to arrest the third applicant on suspicion on aiding and abetting kidnapping .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the first applicant was allowed to see his fiancée , PERSON . It would appear that on the latter date they contracted a marriage because from DATE she began visiting him as his wife and changed her name to PERSON . In the subsequent period she visited the first applicant on a regular basis once or DATE .

On DATE the CARDINAL applicants were charged with kidnapping and torture , offences under ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW . They were accused of having abducted a certain PERSON , a homeless tramp , and forced him to perform physical labour in a fruit warehouse owned by them in exchange for extremely low pay . On several occasions PERSON had run away but the brothers had caught him , beaten him and tortured him by applying electric wires to various parts of his body .

On DATE the first applicant and his counsel requested the investigator to arrange for a confrontation with ORG and a certain witness U. On DATE the investigator refused their request , noting that the confrontation was “ undesirable as both ORG had previously been financially dependent on the NORP brothers and during a confrontation PERSON could exert a negative influence on them ” .

The third applicant and his counsel requested the investigator to interview witnesses PERSON , PERSON , and PERSON , who could allegedly testify that ORG had been able to move around freely and that the NORP brothers had treated him well . On DATE the investigator dismissed the request as unsubstantiated . He noted that ORG ’s liberty of movement had indeed been unrestricted in the beginning and the NORP brothers had restrained him “ only at a later stage ” and that there were “ a sufficient number of depositions by witnesses and the victim to the effect that the NORP brothers had treated PERSON very badly and humiliated him ” .

It appears that on an unspecified date the police entered and inspected a warehouse belonging to the applicants .

On DATE the ORG television channel GPE broadcast ORG ( “ Version ” ) programme . The second part of the programme concerned the applicants’ case . The participants included the presenter PERSON Temeyeva , the GPE town prosecutor PERSON , the investigator Mr PERSON , and PERSON , who was head of the division for particularly important cases in the office of the prosecutor of GPE , as well as the victim PERSON , whose face was not shown .

Mr PERSON opened the programme with the following statement :

“ The NORP brothers are , by their nature , cruel , insolent and greedy ; they wished to get cheap or , more precisely , free labour . On the other hand , the victim ORG , a person with no fixed abode , mild and gentle ... ”

The presenter started telling the story of ORG ’s enslavement . As she was speaking , black - and - white passport - size photos of the applicants were shown full screen .

The presenter ’s story alternated with that of the victim PERSON , who related how he had been ill - treated by the PERSON and had unsuccessfully attempted to escape . The presenter asked the participants whether the NORP brothers could be described as sadistic .

Mr PERSON replied as follows :

“ We , that is , prosecutors and the police , have known these brothers from the time when they were still minors ... We investigated the acts committed by the brothers but they could not be held criminally liable by virtue of their young age . After they reached the age [ of majority ] , they found themselves in the dock . All CARDINAL brothers were convicted of disorderly acts . In my opinion , that offence is very much characteristic of all the NORP brothers in its cruelty and meaningless brutality . I think that the personal qualities of the NORP brothers and [ their ] desire to have free labour have led to this crime . ”

The participants subsequently discussed why the victim had not come to the police immediately after the beatings had begun , and commented on legal aspects of the pending proceedings :

“ [ Mr PERSON : ] You know when [ V. ] came to the law - enforcement authorities in DATE , our investigative group in the GPE town prosecutor ’s office was shocked at the cruelty of this crime . When a person comes for protection to the law - enforcement authorities , you should examine him closely , listen carefully to his story . [ ORG ] had CARDINAL injuries on him . The Convention [ for the Prevention ] of Torture naturally comes to mind .

[ Presenter : ] The NORP brothers are now charged under CARDINAL provisions of LAW : Article CARDINAL – kidnapping committed for lucrative motives , and Article CARDINAL – torture . ”

As she was speaking , the first page of the criminal case file was shown on screen .

The other participants offered the following comments :

[ Mr PERSON : ] The prosecutor ’s office will insist on imprisonment as a measure of punishment in respect of all CARDINAL brothers ... For instance , LAW provides for DATE imprisonment , Article CARDINAL provides for DATE imprisonment . The court will have to choose ...

[ Mr Nikitin : ] A brazen crime . If anyone knows about similar facts , report them to the police and the criminals will be punished ...

[ Presenter : ] ... In DATE the ORG begins its examination of the criminal case . CARDINAL businessman brothers who got a false idea of being slave - owners will get a well - deserved punishment . ”

NORP The programme was broadcast again in DATE and on DATE and DATE .

On DATE the journalist PERSON published an article under the headline “ The Land of Slaves ” ( « PERSON рабов GPE ) in the local newspaper ORG . It began as follows :

“ I am firmly convinced that the following story is just one fact that emerged from the dim waters of market relations . And ethnic relations as well . Though I wish I were impartial as regards these ethnic relations – each people has its enlightened scholars and cruel murderers . ”

NORP The journalist related the story of PERSON , who had been exploited and beaten by the NORP brothers . The article mentioned that the elder brother ’s first name was PERSON , that the CARDINAL other brothers were twins aged DATE and that they traded in fruit at a local market . The applicants’ last names were not listed . A former classmate of PERSON who had given him refuge was quoted as citing a statement by PERSON himself , to the effect that “ these NORP have everything fixed up ” . The final paragraph read as follows :

“ Many , many questions crossed my mind as I was reading the criminal case file . Why is the life of a dirty piglet more valuable than a human life ? Why are masses of NORP , GPE and others among the unemployed , while ‘ they’ not only find work for themselves but also use hired labour ! And why does everyone in the town know about the doings of that best friend of all tramps and put up with it ? ... ”

The applicants lodged several complaints about the press coverage of proceedings against them .

In a letter of DATE Mr Nikitin replied that the programme had been produced on the basis of information supplied by the division for particularly important cases in the office of the prosecutor of GPE . Pursuant to LAW , the prosecutor ’s office had had the right to disclose materials in the case file and make them available to the journalist .

NORP In a letter of CARDINAL DATE a deputy prosecutor of GPE replied that there were no grounds to hold officials of the PERSON prosecutor ’s office criminally liable for disclosure of materials from the investigation .

On DATE Mr PERSON wrote that there were no grounds for liability to be incurred either by officials of the prosecutor ’s office or by journalists who had provided coverage of the proceedings .

On DATE a deputy prosecutor of GPE replied to the third applicant that Mr PERSON could not be held criminally liable for his statements .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE a deputy prosecutor of GPE confirmed that the disclosure of the case file to the mass media had been in compliance with LAW . He further noted that the GPE town prosecutor ( Mr PERSON ) had been told to use “ a more balanced approach in determining the scope of information that could be made public in criminal cases before the conviction has become final ” .

In similarly worded letters of DATE and DATE , deputy prosecutors of GPE informed the first and third applicants that there were no grounds to initiate a criminal case against the maker of the television programme and that no further replies concerning that matter would be given . The GPE town prosecutor was , however , instructed to check whether a criminal investigation should be opened in connection with the article in the ORG newspaper .

On DATE an investigator from the ORG prosecutor ’s office issued a formal decision not to initiate a criminal case for libel against the journalist PERSON , who had authored the article “ The Land of Slaves ” . It appears from the decision that , in PERSON ’s own words , she had received formal permission from the investigator PERSON to consult the case file and that PERSON had approved a draft of the article . PERSON , however , denied any memory of granting access to the file to PERSON and claimed he had never read the article in question . He did not deny , though , that he had briefed the presenter of the television programme on details of the criminal case . Referring to the applicants’ conviction by the judgment of DATE ( see below ) , the investigator found that the contents of the article had been essentially true and that PERSON had not disseminated any false information damaging the third applicant ’s dignity or honour .

On DATE ORG held a directions hearing and scheduled the opening of the trial for DATE .

The trial continued in DATE and DATE . Witnesses for the prosecution and defence , as well as the victim PERSON , testified in court .

On DATE the ORG found the applicants guilty of kidnapping and torture under LAW and LAW . The third applicant was sentenced to DATE and DATE imprisonment , whilst the first and second applicants were to serve DATE in a high - security colony .

The applicants appealed against the conviction . Their points of appeal concerned , in particular , the alleged prejudice to their presumption of innocence which had resulted from the newspaper publication and television programme described above . The prosecution also lodged an appeal . The case file was sent to ORG for consideration on appeal .

On DATE the acting president of ORG of GPE returned the case file to ORG because the trial judge had failed to consider the applicants’ comments on the trial record , to locate the allegedly missing documents and to provide the applicants with a copy of the prosecution ’s points of appeal .

In an interim decision of DATE the ORG partly accepted and partly rejected the applicants’ corrections of the trial record .

On DATE ORG of the GPE heard the case on appeal and upheld the judgment of DATE . The court did not address the ORG arguments concerning an alleged impairment of their presumption of innocence .

Following their conviction , the applicants remained in detention facility no . IZ-CARDINAL/CARDINAL for unspecified reasons .

On DATE the facility administration distributed DATE clothing to the prisoners . The applicants refused to take it . On DATE the third applicant accepted a padded jacket and the second applicant DATE shoes .

On DATE the applicants were listed for transport from detention facility no . IZ-CARDINAL/CARDINAL to correctional colonies . According to them , the outside temperature on DATE was -CARDINALo C ; the Government submitted a certificate from the meteorological service showing that the temperature fell to -CARDINAL.CARDINAL o C in the night .

At TIME , when the applicants were taken to the assembly cell of the detention facility together with CARDINAL other detainees , they were wearing T - shirts and tracksuit bottoms . The wardens offered them DATE jackets and hats which , according to the ORG , hailed from the humanitarian - aid supplies but had been washed and were neat . The applicants claimed that the items were “ torn and old ” and refused to take them .

At TIME the applicants , together with other prisoners , were put into a prison van and taken to GPE railway station to board the FAC train that arrived at TIME The distance between the facility and the station was QUANTITY and the journey time was TIME . At TIME the van arrived at the station and the applicants emerged from it without DATE clothing . A prison inspector dashed into the van , collected the DATE clothing which the applicants had left behind , and gave it to the escorting officer . The officer again offered the clothing to the applicants to put on but they refused to do so , claiming that it was unfit to wear . According to the statements by the inspector and the officer , the clothing was in an “ appropriate condition ” .

It appears that the argument went on for TIME . The head of the train escort refused to take the applicants in without appropriate clothing and the facility personnel decided to take them back into the cells .

In support of their claim that the clothing had been “ inappropriate ” , the applicants produced to the ORG a written statement signed by CARDINAL other detainees who had been held in facility no . IZ-CARDINAL/CARDINAL at that time .

On DATE and DATE , DATE and DATE and other dates the applicants complained that they had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment on DATE .

On DATE Mr PERSON responded to them in the following terms :

“ It has been established that DATE clothing was given to you and that you remained outside in clothing inappropriate for DATE only because you refused to put it on . Your arguments that the clothing offered did not meet sanitary and hygiene standards could not have been objectively confirmed ; there are no grounds for disciplining any officials . ”

On DATE the third applicant arrived in his van at the FAC police station for questioning . On DATE he was taken into custody ( see above ) .

On CARDINAL DATE the investigator PERSON impounded the van and ordered that it should be kept in the car park of a private company . The charging order itself did not indicate the grounds on which it had been issued , but referred back to the investigator ’s decision of DATE , a copy of which was not made available to ORG .

The third applicant repeatedly complained to various authorities that his van had been unlawfully seized . He alleged that the investigator was using it for his private errands .

In a letter of DATE the acting PERSON prosecutor reported to the third applicant the findings of an internal inquiry into his complaints . He found as follows :

“ On CARDINAL DATE PERSON arrested you ... However , the PERSON car , in which you had arrived , remained in the street outside the LOC of the GPE police station , and measures for its safe keeping were not taken . The car remained there until DATE , when PERSON impounded it ... However , he did not examine the state of the car , nor did he show it to you or any attesting witnesses ...

The impounded car was taken by a road police employee from GPE police station , acting on PERSON orders , into the premises of the [ private company ] . The car was not properly sealed ...

It must be noted at the same time that there existed no legal grounds for impounding the vehicle , as required by LAW . According to that provision , a charging order could be issued with a view to securing a civil claim or a possible confiscation order . However , in this case no civil claim was brought throughout the proceedings and the criminal - law provisions under which [ the third applicant ] was charged do not provide for confiscation measures as a penal sanction .

Thus , PERSON breached ORG CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW which set out the requirements for the record of impounding and the procedure for issuing charging orders – and also the Instruction on the procedure for seizing , accounting , storing and transferring physical evidence in criminal cases , values and other assets by law - enforcement authorities and courts .

Further to the internal inquiry , the prosecutor of GPE was advised to determine whether PERSON should be disciplined . ”

On DATE the investigator PERSON handed the keys and registration documents of the van to the ORG .

In letters of DATE and DATE the GPE prosecutor ’s office informed the third applicant that Mr PERSON had been disciplined for breaches of the Instruction on the procedure for storing physical evidence and fined in the amount of his bonus salary for DATE .

It appears that on DATE the ORG lifted the charging order and the third applicant ’s van was returned to PERSON ( his brother ’s wife ) .

On an unspecified date the third applicant sued the investigator Mr PERSON for damages on account of his failure to ensure the safe keeping of his van ; all CARDINAL applicants also brought a defamation action against the journalist PERSON , seeking compensation in respect of non - pecuniary damage . FAC ordered the joinder of both actions and listed a hearing for DATE .

In DATE the applicants asked the court for leave to appear . PERSON , as a representative of the first applicant , asked the court to ensure the attendance of the applicants at the hearing .

On DATE ORG issued several procedural decisions . In the first decision , it rejected PERSON request for the applicants’ attendance , holding that LAW did not provide for the possibility of bringing convicted persons from a correctional colony to the local investigative unit for the purpose of taking part in a hearing in a civil case . The second decision took stock of the absence of both parties – the journalist PERSON and a representative of the newspaper had not shown up despite having been notified of the hearing DATE and indicated that the case would be heard in their absence . It appears that PERSON then walked out of the courtroom in protest against the court ’s decision to hear the case in the absence of the first applicant . In a third decision , the court decided to proceed with the case in her absence . It additionally rejected the ORG request for leave to appear on the same grounds as above , adding :

“ ... parties to the case do not just have rights but also have duties , such as [ a duty ] to make written submissions and substantiate their claims . Taking into account the fact that the rights of Mr A. Khuzhin , Mr NORP and Mr NORP are not restricted and can be exercised by them in full measure , there are no legal grounds to ensure the attendance of individuals who have committed particularly serious , insolent [ дерзкие ] crimes . ”

Lastly , ORG rejected the ORG requests to summon witnesses and study the hearing records , reasoning as follows :

“ The substantiation of the PERSON claim seeks to obtain a new assessment of the circumstances and findings set out in the criminal judgment of DATE . The statements by the NORP brothers are not reasoned or argued ; they are not procedural requests as such [ sic ] ; they have repeatedly studied the materials in the case file and can study them again by receiving copies of them ; since they are serving a sentence imposed by a court judgment in a penitentiary institution , the case must be examined in their absence . ”

On DATE ORG refused for the same reasons the third applicant ’s request to obtain attendance of witnesses and an expert . It also decided to proceed with the hearing in the absence of both GPE representatives .

On DATE ORG dismissed all of the applicants’ claims . On the defamation issue it found that the article “ The Land of Slaves ” had been based on the true facts which had subsequently been established in the criminal judgment of DATE . As regards the claim relating to the damage caused to the third applicant ’s van , it established that the vehicle had been returned to him after he had paid compensation to the victim for non - pecuniary damage and that the investigator had acted within his powers and had not caused any damage through his actions .

The applicants and PERSON appealed . They complained , in particular , of a breach of the principle of equality of arms . PERSON additionally pointed out that she had not been the representative of either PERSON or NORP .

On DATE ORG of ORG of GPE held an appeal hearing . It appears that neither the applicants nor PERSON were in attendance . The court held that there had been no breach of equality of arms because the applicants had been duly notified of the hearing and informed of their right to appoint representatives . The second and third applicants had not made use of that right , whereas the first applicant ’s representative , PERSON , had declined to take part in the hearing . In the court ’s view , the joinder of the cases was also lawful and justified because the second applicant had been a party to both claims .

According to a letter of DATE from the prosecutor of GPE to the second applicant , it was incumbent on the court hearing a civil claim to decide whether the detainee ’s presence was necessary . The second applicant could have been escorted to the hearing if there had been a decision of ORG to that effect .

On an unspecified date the third applicant brought a defamation action against the prosecutor Mr PERSON . He challenged as defamatory the statements made by PERSON in the ORG television programme about the applicants’ adolescent delinquency , insolence and greediness .

On DATE the ORG delivered its judgment . Mr PERSON made oral submissions to the court ; the third applicant was neither present nor represented . In dismissing the defamation action , the court noted as relevant the materials relating to the criminal case against the applicants and , more specifically , a reference letter for the second applicant from his secondary school that concerned his unauthorised absences from classes and disorderly behaviour . The court held that the facts as established in the judgment of DATE had justified Mr PERSON ’s reference to the applicants as insolent and greedy .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the third applicant lodged his points of appeal , alleging , in particular , a violation of the principle of equality of arms .

The ORG has not been provided with any information about the appeal proceedings .

The Criminal Code provides that torture is punishable with up to DATE imprisonment ( LAW ) and kidnapping with up to DATE imprisonment ( LAW ) .

The RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure ( in force at the material time ) provided as follows :

“ If the investigator observes , on the basis of the case file , that the crime committed caused pecuniary damage to an individual or organisation , he must explain to them or to their representatives that they have a right to lodge a civil claim ...

If a civil claim has been lodged , the investigator must issue a reasoned decision recognising [ the interested party ] as a civil claimant or refusing such status ... ”

“ Materials from the preliminary investigation may only be made public with the consent of an investigator or a prosecutor and to the extent they consider it possible ... ”

“ With a view to securing a civil claim or a possible confiscation order , the investigator must charge the property of the suspect , defendant ... or of the other persons who keep criminally acquired property ... If necessary , the charged property may be impounded ... ”

The Code of Civil Procedure of GPE provides that individuals may appear before the court in person or act through a representative ( LAW ) . A court may appoint an advocate to represent a defendant whose place of residence is not known ( LAW . LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL-FZ of DATE ) provides that free legal assistance may be provided to indigent plaintiffs in civil disputes concerning alimony or pension payments or claims for health damage ( section CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) .

DATE . The Penitentiary Code provides that convicted persons may be transferred from a correctional colony to an investigative unit if their participation is required as witnesses , victims or suspects in connection with certain investigative measures ( Article CARDINAL ) . The Code does not mention the possibility for a convicted person to take part in civil proceedings , whether as a plaintiff or defendant .

On several occasions ORG has examined complaints by convicted persons whose requests for leave to appear in civil proceedings had been refused by courts . It has consistently declared the complaints inadmissible , finding that the contested provisions of LAW and LAW did not , as such , restrict the convicted person ’s access to court . It has emphasised , nonetheless , that the convicted person should be able to make submissions to the civil court , either through a representative or in any other way provided by law . If necessary , the hearing may be held at the location where the convicted person is serving the sentence or the court hearing the case may instruct the court having territorial jurisdiction over the correctional colony to obtain the applicant ’s submissions or carry out any other procedural steps ( decisions no . CARDINAL-O of DATE , no . CARDINAL of DATE , and no . CARDINAL of DATE ) .


The applicant is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

Before his discharge from the army the applicant was the president of ORG at ORG .

On DATE ORG ( ORG ) decided to discharge the applicant from the army on grounds of acts of “ insubordination and immoral conduct ” pursuant to LAW .

The Government submit the following in the light of the intelligence reports concerning the applicant :

The applicant was a member of ORG ( PERSON ) movement . He established contacts with CARDINAL other officers who were discharged from the army on account of their involvement in extreme religious movements . The applicant was involved in disseminating the ideology of ORG . He had an antisocial character and his wife carried an NORP scarf . He refused to participate in a saving fund on the ground that his religious belief was against the notion of interest which such a fund involved .

A committee of CARDINAL members of the armed forces concluded , in the light of the findings of the above intelligence reports , that the applicant had breached military discipline and that he should be discharged from the army . Subsequently , ORG based its decision on that opinion .

The relevant provisions of the LAW are as follows :

“ None of the rights and freedoms set forth in the LAW may be exercised with the aim of undermining the territorial integrity of the ORG or the indivisible unity of its people , imperilling the existence of ORG and the Republic , abolishing fundamental rights and freedoms , handing over control of the ORG to a single individual or group or bringing about the dominance of CARDINAL social class over the others , establishing discrimination on the grounds of language , race , religion or adherence to a religious sect or setting up by any other means a ORG order based on such beliefs and opinions . ”

“ Everyone shall have the right to freedom of conscience , faith and religious belief . Prayers , worship and religious services shall be conducted freely , provided that they do not violate the provisions of LAW . No one shall be compelled to participate in prayers , worship or religious services or to reveal his religious beliefs and convictions ; nor shall he be censured or prosecuted because of his religious beliefs or convictions .

No one may exploit or abuse religion , religious feelings or things held sacred by religion in any manner whatsoever with a view to causing the social , economic , political or legal order of the ORG to be based on religious precepts , even if only in part , or for the purpose of securing political or personal influence thereby . ”

“ All acts or decisions of the administration are subject to judicial review ...

Decisions of the President of the Republic concerning matters within his sole jurisdiction and decisions of ORG shall not be subject to judicial review .

Article CARDINAL § § CARDINAL , CARDINAL and DATE of the LAW provides that a disciplinary action can not be imposed to the civil servants provided that that the right to defence is respected . Moreover , it lays out that the disciplinary actions , other that the warnings and the reprimands are subject to legal control . The provisions concerning the soldiers are reserved . LAW on ORG stipulates that the disciplinary actions imposed to the soldiers are not subject to legal control .

Section CARDINAL ( c ) of ORG provides :

“ Irrespective of length of service , servicemen whose continued presence in the armed forces is adjudged to be inappropriate on account of breaches of discipline or immoral behaviour on CARDINAL of the grounds set out below , as established in CARDINAL or more documents drawn up during their service in the last military rank they held , shall be subject to the provisions of LAW .

Where their conduct and attitude reveal that they have adopted unlawful opinions . ”

Section CARDINAL ( c ) of LAW provides :

“ Irrespective of length of service , servicemen whose continued presence in the armed forces is adjudged inappropriate on account of breaches of discipline and immoral behaviour shall be subject to the provisions of LAW . LAW shall lay down which authorities have jurisdiction to commence proceedings , to examine , monitor and draw conclusions from personnel assessment files and to carry out any other act or formality in such proceedings . A decision of ORG is required to discharge an officer whose case has been submitted by ORG to ORG . ”

Section CARDINAL ( b ) of LAW provides :

“ ( b ) Discharge from the army for the acts of insubordination and immoral conduct :

Notwithstanding the seniority in the service , the non - commissioned officers whose maintenance is considered to be inappropriate for the acts of insubordination and immoral conduct are subject to PERSON on ORG . The investigation , examination and follow - up of the notation reports and the formalities and the competent authorities fulfilling these duties are subject to the provisions of The Regulations on assessment of officers and non - commissioned officers . The General Staff determines which non - commissioned ORG cases concerning their discharge from the army should be examined by ORG . ”

LAW on assessment of officers and non - commissioned officers provides :

“ Irrespective of length of service , the compulsory retirement procedure shall be applied to all servicemen whose continued presence in the armed forces is adjudged to be inappropriate on account of breaches of discipline or immoral behaviour on CARDINAL of the grounds set out below , as established in CARDINAL or more documents drawn up during their service in the last military rank they held :

( e ) where by his conduct and attitude the serviceman concerned has provided evidence that he holds unlawful , subversive , separatist , fundamentalist and ideological political opinions or takes an active part in the propagation of such opinions . ”


Violations of Art. 5-4;Violation of Art. 5-5;Violation of Art. 13+8;Remainder inadmissible;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Mihai Poalelungi;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the ORG commenced a criminal investigation into a suspicious money transfer CARDINAL bank accounts .

On DATE the Prosecutor General ruled that the investigation should be supervised by ORG . It was observed that the suspected offence had been committed in the region of LOC and that the Prešov Regional Prosecutor would normally have had jurisdiction to deal with it . It was , however , presumed that the offence had been part of a larger criminal transaction involving several individuals in various places and requiring extensive investigation . In order to ensure the effectiveness and expeditious determination of the proceedings , it was necessary to transfer jurisdiction to ORG .

On DATE the Prosecutor General took a similar measure in respect of an investigation into irregularities in insolvency proceedings concerning bank A.

On DATE the applicant and CARDINAL other individuals were charged with conspiracy and embezzlement on suspicion of having fraudulently and in an organised fashion drained money from the insolvency estate of A.

The applicant for his part was suspected of having organised a bank transfer of the money in question . The decision was based on “ previously obtained testimonies and documentary evidence ” .

On DATE the applicant was placed in detention pending trial . He remained detained until his release on DATE . The circumstances and decisions relating to his detention are described in paragraphs CARDINAL below .

On DATE the investigation in question was joined to inquiries in CARDINAL other cases concerning murders which had connections with the insolvency proceedings in respect of bank A.

After the investigation had been completed , the applicant was invited to inspect the investigation file . He did so on DATE and DATE . He discovered , inter alia , that the file contained information which had been obtained by monitoring his telephone calls . This information comprised the transcript of a specific phone call from the applicant ’s mobile telephone and a list of outgoing and incoming calls in a specific period .

The applicant unsuccessfully complained to the prosecution service and ORG that the monitoring of his telephone communications had been unlawful and unjustified . The details concerning his constitutional complaint are set out in DATE and DATE below .

On DATE the Trenčín Regional Prosecutor indicted the applicant and committed him to stand trial before the Prešov Regional Court ( Krajský súd ) on charges of conspiracy and embezzlement . The indictment was also directed against CARDINAL other individuals , including CARDINAL lawyers , and included charges of money laundering , murder and illegal possession of firearms .

On DATE the ORG ruled that the case fell within the jurisdiction of ORG ) , which had been established a short time before in order to try cases involving corruption , organised crime and other serious offences . Both the applicant and the prosecution service challenged this ruling .

On DATE ORG ( Najvyšší súd ) upheld the jurisdiction of ORG . The applicant then unsuccessfully challenged this decision before ORG , which rejected his constitutional complaint on DATE , and before ORG .

On DATE the case was transferred to ORG , which decided , on DATE , to hive off the applicant ’s trial to a separate set of proceedings .

Following a judgment of ORG DATE finding that the legislation establishing ORG was contrary to LAW and the subsequent replacement of that court by a newly established ORG ( Špecializovaný trestný súd ) ( for details see PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , the applicant ’s trial was transferred to the latter court and it is still pending there .

On DATE , at TIME , the applicant was arrested on charges which had been brought on DATE .

On DATE , at TIME , the regional prosecutor lodged a request with ORG súd ) that the applicant and the other suspects be placed in detention pending trial .

On TIME DATE the applicant ’s brother appointed a lawyer to represent the applicant . At TIME FAC , in whose custody the applicant was at that time , refused the lawyer access to the applicant .

On TIME DATE the lawyer and the applicant met for TIME .

On DATE , at TIME , ORG opened a hearing on the prosecutor ’s request . CARDINAL by one , the suspects were questioned . The applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer . Neither of them had access to the case file . At TIME FAC ordered the detention of the applicant and the other suspects pending trial .

ORG found that there was a well - founded suspicion against the accused . The investigation was in its initial stages and there was still much evidence to be gathered . This , together with the “ character and circumstances of the offence ” , gave rise to fears that the suspects would collude within the meaning of LAW ( b ) of LAW ( “ the ORG ” ) . Furthermore , the information available indicated that other criminal offences had been committed in connection with the insolvency of bank PERSON accused were suspected of having been involved in those offences . This prompted fears that the accused would continue criminal activities within the meaning of LAW ( c ) of the ORG .

On DATE the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal ( sťažnosť ) against his detention and on DATE he adduced further grounds of appeal .

He argued first of all that ORG had no territorial jurisdiction to decide on his detention . The court competent to do so had been the court in the judicial district where the offence had purportedly been committed .

The applicant further argued that he had not had adequate time and facilities to confer with his lawyer and to prepare his defence . Both the prosecutor ’s proposal and the decision on detention had been so vague that it had been impossible to mount any meaningful defence .

The applicant went on to argue that the suspicion against him had been ill - founded and that there had been no admissible evidence in support of it . There had been no reasons for detaining him and the decision had lacked adequate reasoning .

On DATE ORG , sitting in private ( neverejné zasadnutie ) , dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . In summary reasoning , it simply referred to and fully concurred with ORG reasons for detention . The decision was served on the applicant on DATE .

In the meantime , the applicant ’s lawyer had unsuccessfully requested access to the case file on several occasions .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint under LAW with ORG ( Ústavný súd ) .

He challenged the above - mentioned decisions concerning his detention and claimed a violation of a number of his procedural rights . The applicant complained that : ( i ) the court which had issued the detention order had had no territorial jurisdiction in the matter ; ( ii ) he had not had adequate time and facilities to confer with his lawyer and prepare his defence ; ( iii ) he and his lawyers had been refused access to the case file ; ( iv ) there had been no reasonable suspicion against him and no reason for detaining him ; ( v ) the decisions had lacked adequate reasoning ; and ( vi ) the proceedings had been too lengthy .

The applicant sought a ruling setting aside the impugned decisions , releasing him and awarding him damages .

On DATE ORG declared admissible the complaint concerning the refusal of access to the case file , and the remaining complaints inadmissible .

As to the inadmissible complaints , ORG observed that the territorial jurisdiction of ORG had been based on LAW ORG , pursuant to which territorial jurisdiction in matters concerning the preparatory stage of proceedings was vested in the court in the judicial district in which the prosecutor acted . The offences of which the applicant was suspected and the reasons for his detention had been stated and had been adequately explained .

The applicant had known as far back as DATE how much time he had had to consult his lawyer . His constitutional complaint alleging that the time had been insufficient had been made in DATE that is to say , outside the statutory DATE time - limit .

The length of the proceedings in respect of the applicant ’s detention had been acceptable , given that the applicant had not fully specified his appeal until DATE .

On DATE the ORG delivered a judgment ( nález ) on the merits of the admissible complaint . It held that the absolute refusal of access to the case file had been incompatible with LAW . However , this had had no material impact on the lawfulness and constitutionality of the detention as such . That finding was therefore sufficient compensation for any non - pecuniary damage the applicant might have sustained .

On DATE the applicant applied for release or , alternatively , for his detention to be replaced by a pledge LAW ORG that he would live in accordance with the law .

By law the requests fell to be determined first by the regional prosecutor , who dismissed them , and , on DATE , forwarded them ex officio to ORG for judicial determination .

On DATE ORG , sitting in a private session , rejected the request for release . “ Having examined the applicant ’s request and the case file ” , ORG “ established that the reasons for the applicant ’s detention persisted ” . The offences under investigation were very serious . The investigation had been carried out on a large scale and with due diligence , and given that it was in its early stages there was a well - founded fear that the applicant would collude with the other suspects and continue criminal activities .

ORG made no formal ruling in respect of the alternative proposal to replace the applicant ’s detention with a pledge of lawful conduct . It merely observed in its reasoning that such a move was not possible if a person stood accused of such offences as the applicant did . The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal .

On DATE ORG , sitting in private , dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . In summary reasoning it simply referred to and fully concurred with the reasons given by ORG .

On DATE the applicant challenged the decisions of CARDINAL May and DATE and the proceedings leading to them by means of a constitutional complaint . He alleged a violation of several of his procedural rights .

As in his previous complaint , the applicant objected that : ( i ) the court deciding on his detention had had no territorial jurisdiction in the matter ; ( ii ) there had been an irregularity in the assignment of his appeal for determination by a specific chamber at ORG ; ( iii ) the decision - making process had been conducted in private and the applicant had had no opportunity to state his case orally ; ( iv ) neither he nor his lawyer had been granted access to the case file ; ( v ) the decisions had been arbitrary , ( vi ) had lacked proper reasoning and ( vii ) had been the outcome of proceedings that had not been speedy ; ( viii ) finally , the total duration of the applicant ’s detention had been excessive and ( ix ) the courts had failed to take a formal decision in respect of his petition for his detention to be replaced by a pledge of lawful conduct .

The applicant sought a ruling that the challenged decisions be set aside and claimed CARDINAL NORP korunas ( SKK ) in damages .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant supplemented his constitutional complaint by arguing that his detention was unlawful on the ground that , when it had begun , he had not been brought before a judge within DATE TIME required by LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL Coll . ) ( PERSON základných práv a slobôd – “ the LAW ” ) .

It was true that the time - limit for bringing an arrested person before a judge under LAW of LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL Coll . ) , as amended with effect from DATE ( Constitutional Law no . PERSON . ) , was TIME . However , neither the LAW nor any other legislation had repealed the LAW expressly and implicit repeal was not permissible . The LAW guaranteed him a broader extent of legal protection and had to be applied in his case .

On DATE ORG declared admissible the complaints listed under ( ii ) , ( iv ) and ( vi ) - ( ix ) above . The remaining complaints were declared inadmissible for the following reasons .

NORP The issue of the territorial jurisdiction of ORG had already been examined and determined in ORG decision of DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) .

The applicant had had ample opportunity to present his case in writing and with the assistance of a lawyer , and had in fact done so at length . The lack of an oral hearing therefore raised no issue under LAW .

The applicant ’s continued detention was , as such , justified and lawful . As to the discrepancy between the time - limits for bringing an arrested person before a judge under LAW ( TIME ) and LAW ( TIME ) , ORG held that , pursuant to LAW , the constitutional provision prevailed .

On DATE the ORG delivered a judgment on the merits of the admissible complaints .

ORG found that there had been a violation of the applicant ’s right under LAW to a trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial , in that the courts had failed to take a formal decision on his request for his detention to be replaced by a pledge of lawful conduct .

ORG also found that there had been a violation of the applicant ’s rights under LAW , in that : the applicant ’s appeal had been determined by the wrong chamber of ORG ; the applicant had been refused access to the case file ; and the proceedings had not been speedy .

The applicant was awarded SKK CARDINAL by way of compensation for non - pecuniary damage , and had his legal costs reimbursed .

The complaint that the impugned decisions lacked proper reasoning was dismissed as unfounded .

On DATE the regional prosecutor requested that ORG authorise an extension of the detention of the applicant and all his co - defendants until DATE . Neither the applicant nor his lawyer was informed of the request .

On DATE , in a private session , ORG acceded to the prosecutor ’s request . Neither the applicant nor his lawyer was informed of the session .

“ Having examined the prosecutor ’s request and the case file ” , the ORG “ established that the request was well founded ” . Although the investigation had been carried out with due diligence , it had not been possible to complete it within DATE which had elapsed from the start of the applicant ’s detention . The reasons for keeping the defendants in detention , as established at the time of the detention order , still persisted . Their release might render the investigation and the whole proceedings difficult or even impossible . No appeal lay against the decision .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer phoned ORG and was informed that , on CARDINAL DATE , the regional prosecutor had requested an extension of the applicant ’s detention . On DATE the lawyer requested in writing that ORG provide him with a copy of the request .

Copies of the decision of DATE and of the prosecutor ’s request were served on the applicant ’s lawyer on DATE .

On DATE the applicant challenged the decision of DATE by means of a constitutional complaint .

He argued in the main ( i ) that the court deciding on the extension of his detention had had no territorial jurisdiction in the matter ; ( ii ) that the prosecutor ’s request had not been made available to him in good time ; ( iii ) that he had consequently had no opportunity to comment on it and to state his case orally ( the decision had been made in private ) ; and ( iv ) that the decision had been arbitrary and unjustified .

DATE . On DATE the applicant supplemented his complaint by submitting substantially the same arguments as in his submission of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE ORG declared admissible the complaint that the extension of the applicant ’s detention had been arbitrary and unjustified and declared the remaining complaints inadmissible . The decision was served on the applicant on DATE .

As to the inadmissible complaints , ORG observed that the issue of territorial jurisdiction of ORG had already been examined and determined in ORG decision of DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) .

Under applicable law , there had been no legal duty to communicate a copy of the prosecutor ’s request for extension of detention to the person concerned . The applicant ’s lawyer ought to have known that , pursuant to LAW ORG , a request for an extension of a person ’s detention had to be submitted to the competent court DATE before the expiry of their detention . In the present case the deadline had been DATE .

However , the applicant ’s lawyer had not contacted the prosecution service until DATE and his failure to do so at an earlier date could not be imputed to the authorities .

The fact that the decision had been made in a private session was irrelevant because the prosecution service had also not been able to take part in that session . As to the discrepancy between the time - limits for bringing an arrested person before a judge under LAW and the LAW , the court found that it had had no relevance to the decision in question and , moreover , had been raised as an issue outside the statutory DATE timelimit .

On DATE ORG found that there had been a violation of the applicant ’s rights under LAW and CARDINAL of the LAW , in that the decision of DATE had lacked adequate reasoning . The decision in question had contained a detailed description of the charges , the nature of which had themselves constituted a part of the reason for the applicant ’s detention . However , the charges had concerned a group of suspects and it had not been clear from the charges which reasons for detention pertained to which suspects . Although such reasoning had been sufficient to detain the applicant in the initial stage of the proceedings , it had not been sufficiently detailed DATE into the proceedings .

ORG remarked that this conclusion had no impact on whether the applicant ’s detention after DATE had or had not been justified in substance .

It quashed the decision of DATE and awarded the applicant SKK CARDINAL in compensation for non - pecuniary damage . It also reimbursed his legal costs .

As the applicant had been released in the meantime , there was no question of ordering ORG to determine the matter anew .

On DATE the applicant applied for release or , alternatively , for his detention to be replaced by a pledge of lawful conduct . He argued that most of the relevant evidence had already been taken and examined and that it had shown that he was innocent and that there were no reasons for detaining him .

NORP The regional prosecutor dismissed the applicant ’s requests and , on DATE , forwarded them to ORG for judicial determination .

The applicant challenged the handling of the proceedings by the regional prosecutor – in particular , the length of such examination – by means of a constitutional complaint ( for the outcome see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE , in a private session , ORG rejected the application for release . “ Having examined the applicant ’s request and the relevant files ” , ORG “ established that the reasons for the applicant ’s detention persisted ” . It held specifically that there were a number of pieces of evidence which had been secured in the preparatory stage of the proceedings and which still had to be examined by the court . The way in which the suspected offence had supposedly been committed had prompted fears that the applicant would tamper with that evidence .

ORG again made no ruling in respect of the alternative proposal to replace the applicant ’s detention with a pledge of lawful conduct , observing that such a replacement could only be considered in connection with detention to prevent escape ( LAW ) of the ORG ) , which was not applicable to the applicant ’s case . The applicant appealed .

On DATE , in a private session , ORG upheld the above - mentioned decision rejecting the applicant ’s request for release .

At the same time , it ruled that his detention was no longer justified by fears that he would continue criminal activities but merely by the fear that he would collude with other defendants . That concern stemmed from the “ manner in which the offence had been committed and covered up and from the status of the accused ” . The decision was served on the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged another constitutional complaint , directed in the main against the actions and decisions of ORG and ORG .

He again argued that the courts deciding on his detention had had no territorial jurisdiction in the matter .

Furthermore , he complained that the assignment of his request for release to a ORG judge had not followed the procedure prescribed by law . In particular , the request had not been treated as an independent matter , which should have been randomly assigned to a judge through electronic means , but rather had been assigned to a specific judge who had been administratively designated by the President of ORG to deal with all matters concerning the applicant .

Moreover , the courts had not held a hearing and had thus deprived the applicant of the chance to plead his case . The decisions had been arbitrary and had lacked proper reasoning . The length of his detention had been excessive .

On DATE , by way of CARDINAL separate decisions , ORG declared admissible the complaint against ORG and inadmissible the complaint against ORG and ORG . The latter decision was served on the applicant on DATE .

As to the inadmissible complaint , ORG observed that under the applicable procedural rules , the decision of ORG of DATE had become final and binding on DATE . Notwithstanding that the decision had not been served until DATE , the relevant date for commencement of the statutory DATE period for lodging a constitutional complaint had been CARDINAL DATE . The complaint against ORG and ORG had been submitted on DATE , and had therefore been out of time .

On DATE ORG found that ORG had violated the applicant ’s right under LAW to a speedy decision concerning his detention , in that it had taken DATE for the prosecutor to take a decision in relation to the applicant ’s requests of DATE and to forward them to ORG .

ORG took into account the fact that the proceedings concerning those requests had lasted a total of DATE before the final decision was served . It granted the applicant reimbursement of his legal costs but no compensation in respect of non - pecuniary damage . ORG held that it was not appropriate to order the prosecution service to compensate the applicant for any non - pecuniary damage , as the prosecution service ’s share of responsibility for the overall duration of those proceedings was minor compared to that of the ordinary courts .

On DATE the regional prosecutor requested that ORG authorise an extension of the detention of the applicant and all his co - defendants until DATE . No copy of the request was served on the applicant or his lawyer .

The applicant ’s lawyer obtained a copy of the prosecutor ’s request on his own initiative and , on DATE , the applicant filed his observations in reply . On DATE , in a separate submission , the applicant challenged ORG for bias .

The applicant complained , inter alia , that the prosecutor ’s request had not been lawfully and randomly assigned to a judge through electronic means but rather had been assigned administratively by the President of ORG to another judge following the departure of the judge electronically assigned from that court .

On DATE , in a private session , ORG dismissed the challenge of bias and authorised an extension of the detention of all the defendants until DATE . It held that there were still a number of pieces of evidence to be examined by the court and that , if released , the applicant would pose a risk of interfering with such evidence . However , the time frame demanded by the prosecution was excessive and an extension until DATE had to suffice .

The decision of CARDINAL DATE stated that no appeal lay against it . The applicant nevertheless appealed and his appeal was dismissed by ORG on DATE . That decision was served on him on DATE .

ORG acknowledged , inter alia , that assignment of cases to judges at ORG was in principle to be carried out randomly through electronic means . In the applicant ’s case , the judge electronically assigned had been appointed to ORG . It had consequently been the responsibility of the President of ORG to reassign the applicant ’s case to another judge , which she had lawfully done .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint , to which he added further grounds of complaint on DATE and CARDINAL DATE . He argued : ( i ) that the QUANTITY period under the LAW for bringing him before a judge had not been observed ; ( ii ) that the court deciding on the extension of his detention had had no territorial jurisdiction in the matter ; ( iii ) that it had not been impartial ; ( iv ) that the prosecutor ’s request of DATE had not been served on him and that he had been obliged to procure a copy of it himself ; ( v ) that there had been no public hearing of his case and that he had been unable to plead his case ; ( vi ) that the extension of his detention had been arbitrary and ( vii ) had lacked proper reasoning ; ( viii ) that the proceedings in respect of his detention had not been speedy ; and ( ix ) that the total duration of his detention had been excessive .

The applicant claimed SKK CARDINAL in compensation for nonpecuniary damage .

DATE . On DATE ORG declared admissible the complaints listed under ( iv ) , ( v ) , ( vii ) ; ( viii ) and ( ix ) above . The remaining complaints were declared inadmissible .

As to the inadmissible complaints , ORG observed that the applicant had learned in DATE that the extension of his detention would be determined by ORG . He had raised his complaint in that respect before ORG in DATE that is to say , outside the statutory twomonth time - limit .

The complaint concerning delays in dealing with the prosecutor ’s request before ORG had also been submitted out of time .

The proceedings before ORG had ended with its decision of CARDINAL DATE , which the applicant had learned of no later than DATE that is , DATE before he had lodged his complaint .

The scope of ORG review of the factual and legal conclusions of the ordinary courts was limited to constitutionally relevant errors , and the decisions concerning the impartiality of the ORG judges and the extension of the applicant ’s detention fell outside the scope of that review .

On DATE ORG found that the fact that the prosecutor ’s request of DATE had not been served on the applicant had violated his rights under LAW .

ORG allowed a small part of the applicant ’s claim for reimbursement of his legal costs and dismissed his claim for compensation in respect of non - pecuniary damage . ORG considered that such an award was not appropriate because the ordinary courts had conducted the proceedings in accordance with the existing statutory rules .

The remaining admissible complaints were also dismissed . ORG found the reasons which had been given by the courts for extending the detention to be adequate and that the extended detention had been justified . The length of the proceedings concerning the extension of the applicant ’s detention had been acceptable , in particular , in view of the factual and legal complexity of the case .

On DATE the applicant applied for release and , alternatively , for his detention to be replaced by a pledge of lawful conduct .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s requests and forwarded them , with a comment , to ORG for judicial determination .

It was later established that , in his comment , the prosecutor opposed the applicant ’s request “ with reference to [ his ] arguments in the [ second ] request for extension of the applicant ’s detention ” . The comment had not been made available to the applicant .

On DATE the applicant challenged ORG for lack of territorial jurisdiction in the matter and the ORG judges involved in his case for bias .

On DATE and DATE respectively , ORG and , on appeal , ORG , dismissed the request for release . Both decisions were made in private , the latter being served on the applicant on DATE . The courts made no separate ruling concerning the applicant ’s alternative request , merely observing in their reasoning that , in the circumstances , the request was not legally permissible .

The courts concluded that the territorial jurisdiction of ORG to deal with the case had been based on LAW ORG , and observed that the applicant ’s challenge on the ground of bias had already been examined and dismissed in connection with the second extension of his detention ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

The courts held that the available evidence had borne out the suspicion against the applicant . The manner in which the offence had been committed and covered up , combined with the fact that some additional evidence still had to be examined by the trial court , gave rise to a fear that the applicant would collude with other defendants . His continued detention was therefore justified .

DATE . On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint , which he fully specified on CARDINAL DATE . He contended : ( i ) that his detention had been illegal ab initio , in that the time - limit of TIME for bringing him before a judge under the LAW had not been complied with ; ( ii ) that the courts deciding on his detention had had no territorial jurisdiction in the matter and had been biased ; ( iii ) that the observations by the prosecution service in reply to his request for release had not been communicated to him ; ( iv ) that the courts had held no hearing in relation to his application and that he had not been heard in person ; ( v ) that the courts had failed to take a decision in relation to his alternative proposal and that his continued detention was unjustified ; ( vi ) that the courts’ decisions had lacked adequate reasoning ; and ( vii ) that the proceedings had not been speedy .

On DATE ORG declared admissible the complaints under points ( iii ) DATE ( vii ) . The remaining complaints were declared inadmissible .

As to the inadmissible complaints , ORG observed that the applicant had learned in DATE that the extension of his detention would be determined by ORG . He had raised his complaint before ORG in DATE that is , outside the statutory DATE time - limit .

The complaint concerning delays in dealing with the prosecutor ’s request before ORG had also been submitted out of time . The proceedings before ORG had ended with its decision on DATE , which the applicant had learned of no later than DATE that is , DATE before he had lodged the constitutional complaint . In any event , the complaints concerning the territorial jurisdiction and impartiality of the courts had been repetitive of earlier complaints and had warranted no fresh examination .

Lastly , as to the twenty - four - hour time - limit under the LAW , ORG observed that the LAW took precedence over all other legislation and that the time - limit of TIME under the LAW had been observed .

On DATE ORG found that the courts’ failure to take a decision in relation to the applicant ’s alternative proposal to replace his detention by a pledge of lawful conduct had violated his rights under LAW . Furthermore , ORG found that the ORG failure to ensure that a copy of the prosecutor ’s comment in reply to the applicant ’s requests of CARDINAL DATE had been served on the applicant had violated his rights under LAW . The applicant was granted a small part of his claim for reimbursement of his legal costs , but no compensation in respect of nonpecuniary damage . ORG considered that such an award was not appropriate because , inter alia , the ordinary courts had conducted the proceedings in accordance with the applicable statutory rules .

The remaining admissible complaints were dismissed . The applicant had had , and in fact had made full use of , the chance to present his case in writing and with legal assistance . In the light of this fact , the lack of a hearing had entailed no substantial ramifications for his rights . The suspicion against the applicant and the danger of collusion had been established ; the investigation was ongoing and expeditious ; the applicant ’s continued detention had been justified . As to the length of the proceedings concerning the applicant ’s request for release , in line with its decision on the admissibility of the present complaint , ORG reviewed only that part of the proceedings which had taken place before ORG . It found no lack of speed in relation to their determination .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint alleging that the monitoring of his telephone calls had been unlawful , arbitrary and unjustified . He relied , inter alia , on LAW .

On DATE ORG declared the complaint inadmissible for non - exhaustion of ordinary remedies .

It came to the conclusion that the applicant was entitled to raise an objection against the evidence obtained from the monitoring in the course of the ongoing criminal proceedings against him .

If the applicant did so , the courts would have to examine whether that evidence had been obtained lawfully . The ordinary courts’ power of review excluded a review by ORG .

ORG further concluded that the applicant could seek redress under civil law .

On DATE the applicant lodged a request under section CARDINAL of LAW DATE with ORG for payment of SKK CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL by way of compensation in respect of unlawful detention . He relied on ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph DATE above ) .

As ORG had failed to respond , on DATE the applicant lodged the claim with ORG .

In observations of CARDINAL DATE the ORG submitted that , under section CARDINAL ) of the LAW , any compensation for wrongful detention only came into question where the prosecution had been dropped or the person concerned had been acquitted , none of which was the case as regards the applicant . As the charges against the applicant had not been dropped , neither could he be compensated under section PERSON ) of the LAW for wrongful prosecution .

On DATE the action was stayed pending the outcome of the applicant ’s criminal trial .

The relevant provisions and judicial practice are summarised in the ORG ’s judgment in the case of GPE and GPE ( nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL , § § DATE and DATE , DATE ) ; PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) ; PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE to CARDINAL , DATE and DATE , DATE ) .

The relevant provisions are summarised in the ORG ’s judgments in the cases of GPE and PERSON GPE ( cited above , § § DATE ) ; PERSON v. GPE ( cited above , § § CARDINAL to CARDINAL ) ; PERSON v. GPE ( cited above , § § DATE ) .

The relevant provisions are summarised in the ORG ’s judgment in the case of GPE and PERSON GPE ( cited above , § § DATE ) ; PERSON GPE ( cited above , § § CARDINAL to CARDINAL ) ; PERSON v. GPE ( cited above , § § CARDINAL ) .

The applicable rules are summarised in the ORG ’s judgment in the case of GPE and PERSON GPE ( cited above , § § DATE ) ; PERSON v. GPE ( cited above , § § DATE ) ; GPE v. GPE ( cited above , § § CARDINAL to CARDINAL ) .

The relevant provisions and judicial practice are summarised in the ORG ’s judgment in the case of GPE and PERSON GPE ( cited above , § § CARDINAL , DATE and CARDINAL to CARDINAL ) ; PERSON v. GPE ( cited above , § § CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL to CARDINAL ) .

By its judgment of CARDINAL DATE in an appeal on points of law ( no . CARDINAL Cdo CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) concerning an action for damages under LAW DATE , ORG upheld the view that neither that LAW nor an action for protection of personal integrity provided a legal basis for awarding compensation in respect of non - pecuniary damage caused by unlawful detention .

LAW DATE was , however , to be interpreted in line with LAW which presupposed compensation for nonpecuniary damage and which , pursuant to LAW , prevailed over the statutory text .

The relevant statutory provisions and further judicial practice are summarised in PERSON v. GPE ( cited above , § § DATE ) ; GPE v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) ; Pavletić v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) and PERSON v. GPE ( ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE ) .

The relevant statutory provisions and judicial practice are summarised in GPE v. GPE ( DATE . ) , no . DATE , DATE ) , PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE ( extracts ) ) , GPE v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) , PERSON v. GPE ( no . GPE , § § DATE , DATE ) , GPE v. GPE ( ( dec . ) no . GPE , DATE ) , PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § CARDINAL , ORG CARDINALVIII ) , PERSON v. GPE ( cited above ( dec . ) , DATE ) and PERSON v. GPE ( DATE . ) , no . CARDINAL , DATE ) .

ORG has dealt with monitoring of telephone communications in cases nos . IV . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL , I. ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL , PERSON . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL , PERSON . ÚS DATE , II . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL and III . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL .

ORG declared inadmissible cases no . IV . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( on DATE ) , no . IV . ÚS DATE ( on DATE ) , no . II . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( on DATE ) and no . III . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( on CARDINAL DATE ) because the complainants had had , but had not used , the chance to challenge in their criminal trials evidence obtained by monitoring telephone communications and/or because the complaints were manifestly ill - founded .

In none of those cases did the Constitutional Court require the complainants to seek protection of their rights and interests by way of an action for protection of personal integrity for the purposes of exhaustion of ordinary remedies under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW .

In cases nos . I. ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( on DATE ) , PERSON CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( on CARDINAL DATE ) , and III . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( on DATE ) , ORG found a violation of the ORG rights and freedoms under LAW and the Convention on account of monitoring their telephone communications and awarded them compensation in respect of nonpecuniary damage .

In none of those cases is there any indication that the complainants had sought protection of their rights and interests by way of an action for protection of personal integrity , nor that ORG had required them to do so for the purposes of exhaustion of ordinary remedies under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW .

In the judgments mentioned in the preceding paragraph , ORG held that a judicial warrant for monitoring telephone communications was not subject to appeal . It was not reviewable by the ordinary courts , upon which the warrant was binding .

The individuals concerned nevertheless had to have a remedy against the warrant DATE both in relation to the evidence obtained by the monitoring and the fact of the monitoring itself .

However , the individuals concerned could not seek a court order in respect of the fact of the monitoring itself before the ordinary courts , be they criminal or civil , in the context of protection of personal integrity .