The applicant is a NORP citizen , born in DATE and living in GPE , GPE . He is represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE ( GPE ) . The respondent Government are represented by their Agent , PERSON .

A.

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant served in ORG and in DATE retired from service . His military pension was assessed to PERCENT of his average wage , according to his rank and DATE of service and was paid from ORG . The payments terminated in DATE , following the dissolution of GPE .

However , on DATE , ORG , ORG , assessed the applicant ’s pension , as from DATE , to PERCENT of the amount he had received until DATE . The applicant appealed against that decision and after his appeal was dismissed , instituted administrative proceedings with ORG , which dismissed the applicant ’s claim on CARDINAL DATE .

According to the Government , in DATE the pensions of the former ORG officers have been increased by PERCENT , and ever since the real amount of those pensions has been PERCENT of what they amounted to in DATE . Furthermore , the Government claim that as from DATE the pensions in question had been adjusted in the same way as those of all other categories of pensioners , i.e. , to take into account an increase of salaries in GPE and as from DATE to take into account an increase in living expenses .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint claiming that the decisions of the administrative bodies and ORG violated his constitutional rights . On DATE the Constitutional Court informed the applicant that his constitutional complaint had been registered . On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the applicant requested that ORG proceed with his case . He received no reply .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s complaint .

B. Relevant domestic law

DATE LAW on ORG ( Ustavni zakon o PERSON ) provides as follows

< Original >

“ Odlukom kojom se usvaja tužba ukida se osporeni akt kojim je povrijeđeno ustavno pravo i vraća nadležnom organu na ponovni postupak . ”

< Translation >

“ By the decision granting a claim , the impugned decision that violated a constitutional right is quashed and the case is remitted to the competent body for retrial . ”


The applicant is a NORP citizen born in DATE . He resides in GPE nad ORG .

A.

On DATE the ORG Jablonce nad ORG ( městské zastupitelstvo ) ( ORG ) accepted the mayor ’s proposal to appoint the applicant as the Secretary of the PERSON u Jablonce nad ORG ( městský úřad ) ( " the Town Office " ) .

On DATE the applicant and ORG , represented by the mayor , signed a contract of employment . The applicant began to work on DATE .

On DATE ORG decided to remove the applicant from his position . By letter of DATE the mayor informed the applicant that ORG could not offer him an alternative employment and that he would be dismissed as of DATE .

On DATE and DATE the applicant brought an action against ORG before the GPE nad ORG ( okresní soud ) ( “ the FAC ” ) claiming unfair dismissal . He challenged the validity of the dismissal as having been made by LAW Rychnov u Jablonce nad Nisou ( město ) ( " the Town " ) and not by ORG which signed his contract of employment , and having been pronounced without the previous consent of a trade union authority . The applicant also claimed that the dismissal could not be made in pursuance of Sections CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(c ) and CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ( zákoník práce ) as these provisions applied only to a termination of an employment relationship based on appointment [ i.e. without a contract as such ] , which was not his case because his employment relationship was created by the contract signed on DATE without any previous or subsequent appointment . The fact that on CARDINAL DATE ORG approved the mayor ’s proposal could not be considered as the applicant ’s appointment because at that time he had not yet been working for the defendant .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s action . The court stated inter alia that the applicant ’s employment relationship had been based on appointment and created on DATE , the date on which the applicant would start exercising his duties as agreed by the parties . It further considered that , bearing in mind that ORG and Town were identical legal persons , it could not be said that the applicant had not been employed by LAW . The court also examined the decision of ORG concerning the applicant ’s dismissal and found it valid . It finally stated that the dismissal notice contained a clause which read that the applicant ’s dismissal had been a matter of consultation with the trade union authority on DATE , and that the original of the notice had been signed by the applicant .

On DATE the applicant appealed against this judgment . He claimed inter alia that ORG had not established the facts correctly and had not assessed evidence in accordance with the domestic law . He further objected to the legal assessment of the case by this court .

By ruling of CARDINAL DATE LOC ( “ ORG ” ) , after a public hearing held on DATE in which the applicant had participated , quashed the judgment of ORG and stayed the proceedings . It found that , in accordance with Section PERSON ) of LAW No . CARDINAL/CARDINAL as amended ( zákon o obcích ) , a municipality ( obec ) had a legal personality . However , according to LAW ) and ( CARDINAL)(a ) of this LAW , a municipality office was an organ of the municipality without legal personality . Accordingly , ORG could not be a party to the proceedings . The ruling was not given in public .

On DATE the applicant filed an appeal on points of law ( dovolání ) challenging the legal opinion of ORG . He further maintained that his appeal had been dealt with by judges who should have been excluded for bias because of their knowledge of another action brought by the applicant against some judges of ORG . On CARDINAL DATE a lawyer appointed by the applicant informed ORG ( Vrchní soud ) that he agreed with the content of the applicant ’s appeal .

On DATE ORG , without a public hearing , rejected the applicant ’s appeal . ORG confirmed the finding of ORG that the applicant ’s action had been brought against ORG which did not have legal personality and which , therefore , could not be a party to the proceedings . It found unsubstantiated the applicant ’s objection concerning the exclusion of the judges stating that by a decision of DATE , referred to by the applicant , ORG had excluded all judges of ORG because of their relation to CARDINAL defendants in other proceedings brought by the applicant , who did not participate in the present proceedings .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal alleging a violation of his right to judicial protection under ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the LAW and Articles CARDINAL , DATE and CARDINAL of LAW ( Charter ) . He claimed in particular that the courts had not complied with their duty under LAW to advise the applicant to change the defendant . He referred in this regard to the judgment of ORG No . II ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL concerning a similar problem . He also submitted that he was in a difficult financial situation , that ORG had refused to appoint for him a lawyer for the purposes of the constitutional appeal and that he did not have access to the court - file of ORG because it had been sent to ORG . On DATE , the applicant ’s constitutional appeal was submitted by a lawyer .

On DATE ORG declared the applicant ’s appeal manifestly ill - founded . ORG held that the applicant was wrong in his opinion that the ordinary courts are generally and in any case obliged to advise a claimant on the legal capacity to be a party to the proceedings , and on who could or could not be the defendant in a particular case . The claimant is free to specify the defendant but must be sure that the defendant can be a party to the proceedings . The ORG stated that the question who was authorised to dismiss the applicant and who , therefore , could be a party to the proceedings , was the subject - matter of those proceedings and that this question had been duly clarified in the course of the proceedings . Therefore , it was not explicitly included , as one of the court ’s obligations , to advise the applicant in this regard . In particular , ORG had concluded that there was no reason to declare the dismissal void on the ground that the Town had no authority to do it . Accordingly , the applicant could have concluded that it was necessary to change the defendant in his appeal . The fact that he did not do so could not be considered as a violation of his right to judicial protection as provided for in LAW and in LAW . ORG finally stated that its judgment , referred to by the applicant , concerned matters of extra - judicial rehabilitation which were different from his case .

B. Relevant domestic law

LAW . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( in force until DATE )

According to LAW , a municipality , acting in the sphere of assigned competence , executed matters of state administration in accordance with special provisions .

Municipal councils

According to Section CARDINAL , a municipal council was the executive body of a municipality as regards the sphere of independent and assigned competence . When exercising independent competence the municipal council reported to the municipal board of representatives . When exercising assigned competence it was subordinate to a district office .

Municipal offices

According to LAW , a municipal office was constituted by a chairman , CARDINAL or more deputy chairmen and other officials . The head of the municipal office was the mayor . The municipal office acted in the sphere of both independent and assigned competence . In the sphere of assigned competence , it executed matters of state administration , with the exception of matters which were within the competence of the municipal council , a commission or a special body . It was subordinate to a district office .

Secretary of the municipal office

According to Sections NORP and DATE , if the municipal office had more officials , the municipal board of representatives could create the function of Secretary of the municipal office and decide on his appointment after having consulted the district office . The Secretary was a staff - member of the municipal office and reported to the municipal council . He was the superior of all other staff - members of the municipal office . He acted as the head of the organisation in accordance with special provisions unless the municipal council decided otherwise . He ensured , through the staff - members of the municipal office , that decisions taken by the municipal board of representatives and municipal council were executed . He co - ordinated and controlled the activities of the municipal office staff - members . Finally , he participated in meetings of the municipal board of representatives and municipal council in an advisory capacity .

LAW . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( in force from DATE )

According to LAW , a municipality , acting in the sphere of assigned competence , executes matters of state administration in accordance with special provisions .

Municipal councils

According to Section CARDINAL , a municipal council is the executive body of a municipality as regards the sphere of independent competence . When exercising such independent competence the municipal council reports to the municipal board of representatives . The municipal council does not act in the sphere of assigned competence , except to issue generallybinding decrees .

According to Section CARDINAL , the municipal council , with the consent of the chairman of the district office , appoints and removes from office the Secretary of the municipal office and defines his remuneration in accordance with special provisions .

Municipal offices

According to LAW , a municipal office is constituted by a chairman , CARDINAL or more deputy chairmen , a Secretary ( if such a position has been created ) and other officials . The head of the municipal office is the mayor . The municipal office , in the sphere of independent competence , performs tasks assigned to it by the municipal council or municipal board of representatives , provides expert guidance to organisations and institutions funded by the municipality and nonprofitmaking bodies created by it , unless otherwise provided by special legislation , and provides assistance to commissions in their activities . In the sphere of assigned competence , the municipal office executes matters of state administration , with the exception of matters which are within the competence of a commission or a special body . As regards matters of assigned competence , the municipal office is subordinate to a regional office , unless otherwise provided by special legislation .

Secretary of the municipal office

According to LAW , a Secretary is appointed in municipalities where CARDINAL divisions have been created by the municipal council , and in municipalities with accredited municipal offices . The Secretary is a staffmember of a municipal office . When acting within the sphere of independent competence he reports to the municipal council and mayor . When acting within the sphere of assigned competence he reports to the mayor . The Secretary of a municipal office is the superior of all other staffmembers of the municipal office . He acts as a statutory body in accordance with special provisions , ensures that decisions taken by the municipal board of representatives and municipal council are executed , directs and controls the activities of the municipal office staffmembers , and sets the remuneration of the municipal office staffmembers in accordance with special provisions . He participates in meetings of the municipal board of representatives and municipal council in an advisory capacity .


Violation of Art. 6-1;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant was arrested in flagrante delicto for entering without prior authorisation to the operation block of the hospital where he was working . He was placed in detention for DATE .

On DATE ORG found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment . The same day the applicant appealed against this decision . His appeal has suspensive effect . The hearing was scheduled for DATE .


The applicant is a NORP national , born in DATE , and resides in GPE . He is represented by PERSON , Solicitors , from GPE .

In DATE , the applicant witnessed the tragic death by drowning of his CARDINAL young children when the car they were in , being driven by their nanny , went into a river . The applicant had previously experienced some psychological instability in his life , but , following the accident , he began to manifest symptoms of ORG . From being a successful businessman , he became unemployable , and the relationship with his wife broke down . In DATE , they were divorced .

In DATE , a writ was issued in an action for damages for personal injury against the driver of the vehicle . The action was set down for trial on the application of the Defence in DATE . The initial estimate for the length of the trial was DATE . The trial began on DATE . After DATE , the applicant as plaintiff was still giving evidence . He was in the witness box for DATE overall . Due to his mental condition , the process of questions and answers was very lengthy , and the estimate for the trial length was revised . There were additionally conflicts with the judge 's timetable which required lengthy breaks in the trial , and a move in the venue from GPE to GPE .

An application was made by the applicant 's representatives in DATE to impose time - limits in respect of cross - examination of the applicant . This was refused on the basis that the defence must have every opportunity to present their case , subject to the normal controls . In DATE , the applicant ’s expert witnesses , PERSON and Mr M , gave evidence , essentially stating that the prognosis was not very good , and that the applicant was unlikely ever to be able to work again . On DATE , Mr Justice PERSON imposed time - limits for the hearing of the remaining witnesses and to ensure the trial finished in time . The evidence in the trial , which lasted DATE , concluded on DATE . Counsel made their final submissions on DATE and DATE . The judge , Mr Justice PERSON , did not give his judgment until DATE , which judgment ran to CARDINAL pages , giving judgment for the applicant in the sum of over ORG . Following further submissions of the parties on aspects of social security benefits , interest , costs , stay of execution , time for appeal and the form of order , Mr Justice PERSON gave a further judgment on DATE .

In DATE , the applicant had applied for a residence order under LAW DATE in respect of his remaining children . The expert doctors who had given evidence in the personal injury trial were instructed by the applicant to give their views of the state of the applicant 's mental health for the purpose of these proceedings . They produced draft reports which gave a more positive prognosis . Mr M ’s report went so far as to suggest that the applicant was no longer suffering mental health problems . It was sent to the solicitors of the applicant ’s wife by mistake . The applicant ’s counsel , on his instructions , applied to the judge in the family matter for the report to be returned on the basis that it had been disclosed without the applicant ’s authority and that the applicant did not wish to rely on it . The judge ruled that the report was to be admitted in evidence . The applicant states that as a result he was obliged to call Mr M as a witness . Mr M produced a revised version of his draft report . PERSON in his oral evidence stated that he would have to alter the prognosis given previously as the applicant had remained free of depression and his medication had been reduced , such that it was now appropriate to see if it could be further reduced or even stopped . He stated that he had not foreseen this improvement earlier though it was premature to be optimistic . In the applicant ’s evidence in the family proceedings , he said in a statement of CARDINAL DATE that his psychiatric situation had improved dramatically and , in his oral evidence , he did not resile from his descriptions of his improved mental health . On DATE , the Judge in the family matter , Judge PERSON , rejected the applicant ’s claim for a residence order , though subsequently , the applicant ’s ex - wife agreed that he should have custody of the youngest child .

Concerns had arisen as to the relevance of the medical reports to the imminent decision of Mr Justice PERSON in the personal injury action . The applicant sought the opinion of his Queen 's Counsel as to whether the documents needed to be disclosed . He was advised on DATE that as the reports were subject to professional privilege they need not be .

The defendants in the personal injury action appealed against the decision of Mr Justice PERSON , and the appeal was heard over DATE in DATE and DATE . A draft judgment of ORG was produced on DATE . It reduced the award of damages to £ CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL with interest and costs . Part of the interest awarded by Mr Justice PERSON was deducted ( DATE ) on the basis of the applicant ’s inordinate delay in the case . When the draft judgments were handed down , however , issues were raised by the parties as to the correct calculation of past and future loss of earnings . These matters were adjourned in the hope that the parties could agree , failing agreement the matter was to be re - argued on those points .

On DATE , leading counsel for the defendants received anonymously through the post copies of the reports prepared by the applicant ’s doctors in the Children Act proceedings . On DATE , the defendants applied to ORG for the appeal to be listed for rehearing , for discovery and inspection of the medical reports and evidence given in the family proceedings . After initially resisting the application for disclosure , on DATE , the applicant waived any privilege covering the documents in the light of the decision of ORG of ORG , In re L ( A Minor)(Police investigation : privilege ) judgment of DATE [ DATE ] A.C. CARDINAL , and in the hope of shortening the proceedings . The reports and transcripts of evidence were placed before ORG , which sat on CARDINAL and DATE and CARDINAL to CARDINAL DATE . ORG agreed to the defendant ’s application for further evidence to be heard and for PERSON to be heard as a witness . The applicant called Mr M as a witness .

The applicant also applied to be allowed to give evidence himself as to his current mental condition , and to call another witness as to the same matter . He asked to be able to produce further evidence from an employment expert regarding loss of earnings , based on ORG findings as to his mental state . ORG refused both these applications , giving the following explanation at page CARDINAL of its judgment :

“ So far as the Plaintiff is concerned we know what he was saying about his health in DATE ; we also had PERSON clinical notes recording the < applicant ’s > condition at fairly regular intervals since then . The Judge found the < applicant > to be an unsatisfactory and unreliable witness who was compulsively manipulative . There is also abundant evidence from his pre - accident job applications that he was untruthful when it suited his convenience . If < the applicant > had given further evidence it would only have invited further lengthy cross - examinations to show this ORG what the Judge had already concluded . We did not think further evidence from him would assist the ORG .

As to further evidence from an employment expert , no doubt to be countered by such a person called on behalf of the Defendant and which would in any event have occasioned further delay and expense in this far too protracted litigation , again we did not think this would assist the ORG . Such evidence would be unlikely to be sufficiently precise and would be likely to be discursive and speculative depending on the findings of this ORG . In my judgment the ORG must adopt a broad - brush approach to the question doing the best we can with the material at our disposal . ”

Judgment was given on DATE , and the decision of the ORG , by a majority , was to reduce the award of damages made in favour of the applicant to the sum of just over CARDINAL,CARDINAL . This involved a further reduction in Mr Justice PERSON ’s award of £ MONEY from the sum of future loss of earnings , the sum of general damages was reduced by a further £ MONEY , and sums for future domestic help and future gardener / handyman reduced from £ MONEY and £ MONEY respectively to nothing . This decision was made on the basis of the finding by ORG that the applicant had made a substantial recovery since DATE . While it found that his recovery was not complete and that he would require low level medication and supportive therapy for the foreseeable future , it considered that this did not prevent him functioning normally . As regards the issues arising from the disclosure of materials from the family proceedings , CARDINAL of the appeal court judges observed that “ it is simply unconscionable for a litigant to run contradictory cases in simultaneous proceedings in the hope of gaining advantage in each ” and another appeal judge noted that , if it was correct that the evidence falsified the assumptions previously made by the trial judge and themselves in the civil proceedings , it would be inequitable and an affront to common sense and justice not to admit it .

The award was however less than the £ MONEY paid into court by the defendants , and thus the applicant became liable to pay a substantial amount of costs .

The applicant petitioned for leave to appeal to ORG , which petition was refused on DATE .


No violation of Art. 8;Violation of Art. 6-1;No violation of P4-2-2;Pecuniary damage - financial award;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - domestic proceedings;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicants were born in DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE respectively . The first applicant couple live in Reggio Emilia and the second in GPE . At the time when they lodged their applications they were deemed to be the adoptive parents of GPE and GPE , NORP nationals who were born on DATE and CARDINAL DATE respectively and were living at ORG in Braşov ( “ the NORP ” ) .

NORP In a final decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG declared that PERSON , who at the time was DATE , had been abandoned . Parental rights over her were assigned to a public welfare institution , L.

On DATE , by a decision of ORG , the child was placed in the care of the NORP .

On DATE , after the entry into force of Government Emergency Ordinance no . CARDINAL on the rules governing adoption ( “ Ordinance no . CARDINAL ” ) , the NORP government entrusted a private association , C. , with the task of finding a family or a person to adopt PERSON . It also instructed ORG to support the C. association in this process and to draw up a psychosocial report on the child .

The first applicant couple informed the C. association of their wish to adopt a NORP child , and were sent a photograph of LOC . They met her for the first time on DATE at the NORP . They were subsequently informed by ORG of the child ’s desire to join them and of her love of music .

On DATE ORG , on a proposal by the C. association , gave its approval to the adoption of GPE by the first applicant couple , and on DATE it referred the file on their application for adoption to ORG , in accordance with section GPE ) of GPE no . CARDINAL .

On DATE the court granted the first applicant couple ’s application . It noted that ORG had given its approval to the adoption and had confirmed that position before the court . Observing that the child was in the care of the ORG , it ordered ORG to amend PERSON ’s birth certificate and to issue her with a new one .

ORG appealed against that decision . On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal as being out of time . The decision became final .

On DATE ORG attested that PERSON ’s adoption was in conformity with the domestic legislation in force and with LAW of DATE on ORG in respect of ORG , and issued the first applicant couple with a certificate to that effect .

On DATE ORG granted the child leave to enter GPE and to reside there permanently and ordered the notification of that decision , inter alia , to the NORP embassy in GPE .

On an unspecified date the Procurator - General lodged an application to set aside ORG decision and ORG judgment . On DATE ORG declared the application inadmissible .

On DATE , following a procedure similar to that outlined in paragraphs CARDINAL above , ORG granted the second applicant couple ’s application to adopt PERSON . It observed that the child , who had been declared to have been abandoned in a final decision of DATE , was in the care of the NORP , and ordered ORG to amend her birth certificate and to issue her with a new one .

On DATE ORG attested that LOC ’s adoption was in conformity with the domestic legislation in force and with LAW of DATE on ORG in respect of ORG , and issued the second applicant couple with a certificate to that effect .

On an unspecified date the first applicant couple made an urgent application to ORG for an order requiring the NORP to hand over the child ’s birth certificate to them and to give them custody of her . On DATE the court allowed their application .

The NORP appealed against that judgment and applied for a stay of its execution , arguing that the requirements for submitting an urgent application had not been satisfied and that the adoption order was not final and had been made in breach of the relevant statutory provisions .

On DATE the court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the child ’s interests and the fact that the adoptive parents lived abroad warranted an urgent examination of the case and that the applicants had therefore complied with the procedural requirements for making an urgent application . The court also found that , according to the documents in the file , the adoption order was final and constituted res judicata . It therefore considered that it was no longer possible for the substantive issues relating to the adoption to be re - examined in the context of the urgent proceedings . The court refused the application for a stay of execution on the ground that it was no longer justified in view of its decision to dismiss the appeal .

A subsequent appeal by the ORG was likewise dismissed by ORG in a final judgment of DATE .

The first applicant couple sought to have the decisions of DATE and DATE enforced by the bailiffs at ORG . On DATE the bailiffs notified the ORG that it was required to hand over the child ’s birth certificate to the applicants and to give them custody of her by DATE . The president of the court subsequently ordered a stay of execution pending a ruling on the ORG ’s objection to enforcement ( see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the ORG lodged an objection to the enforcement of the decision of DATE , arguing that the operative provisions were unclear and that the adoption order had not complied with the relevant statutory provisions . It also applied for a stay of execution .

On DATE the court dismissed the objection on the ground that the operative provisions of the decision were clear and did not give rise to any problems regarding execution . As to the second limb of the objection , the court held that the impugned decision constituted res judicata and that , accordingly , it was not possible to re - examine the merits of the case in the context of an objection to enforcement . The court also dismissed the NORP ’s application for a stay of execution .

The NORP appealed to ORG , which dismissed the appeal on DATE as being ill - founded .

On DATE the first applicant couple asked the bailiffs at ORG to resume the enforcement procedure , having regard in addition to the fact that ORG had in the meantime dismissed PERSON application to set aside .

On DATE the bailiffs notified the NORP that it was required to hand over the child ’s birth certificate to her adoptive parents and to give them custody of her by DATE .

On DATE they again served notice on the NORP , requesting it to comply by DATE .

The ORG lodged an objection with ORG to the enforcement of the decisions in the first applicant couple ’s favour , arguing that the urgent application procedure was intended to deal with temporary situations and that , in the present case , the execution of the decision in the urgent proceedings would , on the contrary , have permanent consequences . The first applicant couple contested those submissions and sought the imposition of a fine for failure to execute a final judgment , together with a penalty for delay .

On DATE the court allowed the application for a provisional stay of execution until the hearing on DATE . On that date it extended the stay of execution until the date of the following hearing , scheduled for DATE . When DATE arrived , the court again extended the stay of execution until the hearing on DATE , on which occasion it dismissed the applications by the NORP and the applicants as being ill - founded . The court held that the issue raised by the NORP went to the merits of the case , which had already been determined in a judgment that constituted res judicata . It also dismissed the first applicant couple ’s claim on the ground that they had neither proved that the ORG had acted in bad faith nor established the extent of the damage they had sustained .

On DATE the bailiffs notified the NORP that it was required to hand over LOC ’s birth certificate to the first applicant couple and to give them custody of her as her adoptive parents , warning it that if it did not do so they would resort to coercion .

On an unspecified date the ORG lodged an objection to enforcement with ORG , by means of urgent proceedings issued against the first applicant couple , on the ground that an action to set aside the adoption order was pending in ORG , as was an application for a review of the order , and that a criminal complaint concerning the adoption process had been lodged . The ORG further requested a stay of execution .

On DATE the court found against the NORP , holding that since an ordinary objection to enforcement had already been dismissed , there were no longer any grounds for bringing a similar action under the urgent procedure . As to the merits , it noted that the adoption order and the decision on the applicants’ urgent application were final and binding , and that it was immaterial that an application to have them set aside or reviewed was pending .

On an unspecified date the ORG applied to the President of ORG for a stay of execution . On DATE that application was refused .

On DATE at TIME the bailiffs at ORG arrived at the NORP building , accompanied by police officers . The doorman refused to let them in and locked the door . TIME the director of the NORP and his deputy came to the entrance and informed the bailiffs and police officers that the child was not on the centre ’s premises but had gone on an excursion outside the city . Following a check , PERSON was not found inside the building .

The bailiffs pointed out to the director of the ORG that he was required to let LOC join the applicants .

On DATE the bailiffs ordered the NORP to return the child ’s birth certificate and to allow her to join the applicants within DATE , and informed it that in the event of it refusing they would resort to coercion .

On DATE at TIME a bailiff , accompanied by the first applicant couple and their lawyer , went to the NORP building . In the report drawn up on that occasion the bailiff stated that the centre ’s doormen had detained them all inside the building . He also indicated that he had telephoned the police station and that , after he had explained the incident to PERSON , the latter had replied that he should have called the police before attempting enforcement . The bailiff lastly noted that it was impossible to provide the necessary legal assistance for the procedure and that an objection to the enforcement had been lodged . He stated that the enforcement attempt had ended at TIME

The NORP brought an urgent application in ORG for a stay of execution on the ground that it had lodged a fresh objection to enforcement with the court . On DATE the court dismissed the application as being ill - founded .

The ORG lodged an objection with ORG to the enforcement of the decisions in favour of the first applicant couple , on the ground that an application to have the adoption order set aside was pending in ORG . The ORG has not been informed of the outcome of those proceedings .

The NORP brought an urgent application in ORG for a stay of execution on the ground that it had lodged a fresh objection to enforcement with the court . In a judgment of DATE , the court allowed its application and provisionally ordered a stay of execution .

It appears from the evidence produced that the stay of execution was ordered for a period lasting until DATE . A further stay of execution was subsequently ordered , from DATE to CARDINAL DATE .

On an unspecified date the second applicant couple made an urgent application to ORG for an order requiring the NORP to hand over PERSON ’s birth certificate to them and to give them custody of her . On DATE the court allowed their application .

That judgment was upheld on appeal by ORG in a final judgment delivered on DATE .

On DATE the ORG lodged an objection with ORG to the enforcement of the decision of CARDINAL September CARDINAL , arguing that the operative provisions were unclear and that the adoption order had not complied with the relevant statutory provisions . It also applied for a stay of execution .

The court allowed that application and granted a stay of execution until DATE , on which date it dismissed the objection on the ground that the operative provisions of the decision were clear and did not give rise to any problems regarding execution . As to the second limb of the objection , the court held that the impugned decision constituted res judicata and that , accordingly , it was not possible to re - examine the merits of the case in the context of an objection to enforcement .

That judgment was upheld by ORG in a final decision delivered on DATE on an appeal by the NORP .

The second applicant couple sought to have the decisions of DATE and DATE enforced by the bailiffs at ORG . On DATE , DATE and DATE the bailiffs notified the NORP that it was required to hand over PERSON ’s birth certificate to the applicants and to give them custody of her .

On DATE the ORG lodged an objection to the enforcement of the decisions in the second applicant couple ’s favour . They applied several times to ORG for a stay of execution , arguing that decisions on urgent applications were generally intended to deal with temporary situations but that , in the present case , the execution of the decision in the urgent proceedings would , on the contrary , have permanent consequences . The second applicant couple contested those submissions and sought the imposition of a fine for failure to execute a final judgment , together with a penalty for delay .

The court ordered a stay of execution from DATE to DATE , from DATE to DATE and from DATE , and on the last - mentioned date it dismissed the GPE ’s objection and the second applicant couple ’s application as being manifestly ill - founded . The court held that the issue raised by the NORP went to the merits of the case , which had already been determined in the decision of DATE that constituted res judicata . It also dismissed the adoptive GPE claim on the ground that they had neither proved that the ORG had acted in bad faith nor established the extent of the damage they had sustained .

On DATE the bailiffs enjoined the NORP to hand over PERSON ’s birth certificate to the second applicant couple and to give them custody of her , warning it that if it did not do so they would resort to coercion .

On an unspecified date the ORG lodged an objection to enforcement with ORG , by means of urgent proceedings issued against the second applicant couple , on the ground that an action to set aside the adoption order was pending in ORG , as was an application for a review of the order , and that a criminal complaint concerning the adoption process had been lodged . The ORG applied in addition for a stay of execution .

On DATE the court refused its application , holding that since an ordinary objection to enforcement had already been dismissed , there were no longer any grounds for bringing a further , similar action . As to the merits , it noted that the adoption order and the decision on the second applicant couple ’s urgent application were final and binding , and that it was immaterial that an application to have them set aside or reviewed was pending .

On DATE the bailiffs again notified the NORP that it was required to hand over the child ’s birth certificate to the second applicant couple and to give them custody of her .

On DATE and DATE a bailiff went to the NORP building , accompanied by the second applicant couple and police officers . He noted that PERSON was not on the centre ’s LOC .

The NORP lodged an objection with ORG to the enforcement of the decisions in the second applicant couple ’s favour on the ground that an application to have the adoption order set aside was pending in ORG . The ORG has not been informed of the outcome of those proceedings .

The NORP made an urgent application to ORG for a stay of execution of the adoption order on the ground that it had lodged a fresh objection to enforcement with the court . In a judgment of DATE , the court allowed its application and provisionally ordered a stay of execution .

On an unspecified date the NORP brought CARDINAL actions in ORG against the applicants , ORG and ORG , seeking to have the adoption orders for both of the children set aside on the ground that they were not lawful as it had not given its prior consent .

On DATE the court found against it on the ground that the sole requirement for the children ’s adoption had been the approval of ORG , which exercised parental rights over them in accordance with section CARDINAL of Government Emergency Ordinance no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( “ Ordinance no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ” ) . The court observed that ORG had given its consent to the adoptions and had notified its position to the court dealing with the applicants’ applications for adoption .

DATE . The NORP appealed against that decision . At a hearing on DATE in ORG , ORG submitted that the opposing party ’s numerous applications to the domestic courts were an abuse of process in that they were not in the children ’s best interests , namely integration into a family , but were intended to delay and hinder the adoption process , thereby prolonging the children ’s current placement in institutional care .

The NORP requested that the cases be referred to ORG for a ruling on the constitutionality of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) and ( CARDINAL ) of Ordinance no . CARDINAL , concerning consent to adopt . On DATE ORG declared the plea of unconstitutionality inadmissible on the ground that it had already given a ruling , on DATE , on the constitutionality of the statutory provisions cited by the ORG .

In a final judgment of CARDINAL DATE , ORG declared the ORG ’s appeal against the judgment of DATE void for failure to satisfy procedural requirements . It observed that the centre had omitted to state reasons for its appeal within the statutory period and held in that connection that the plea of unconstitutionality which it had raised at the hearing on DATE in respect of certain provisions of Ordinance no . CARDINAL did not dispense it from having to satisfy the statutory formal requirements . The judgment of DATE accordingly became final and no ordinary appeal lay against it .

On an unspecified date the applicants lodged a criminal complaint with the public prosecutor ’s office at ORG against the director of the ORG , alleging false imprisonment of the children .

On DATE the public prosecutor ’s office informed the applicants that it had decided on DATE not to institute criminal proceedings in the case .

On DATE the applicants filed another complaint against the NORP management with the public prosecutor ’s office at ORG , levelling accusations of , among other things , false imprisonment of their adopted daughters , in breach of LAW . They also expressed their disagreement with the decision of DATE not to institute criminal proceedings .

A report drawn up by the ORG police on DATE stated that in connection with the investigation opened following the applicants’ criminal complaint , police officers had visited the NORP , where they had interviewed PERSON and the director . It was noted in the report that the child , who was DATE on the date of the interview , had expressed the wish to remain in the centre and had refused to join the family of her adoptive parents , whom she had never met .

On DATE the public prosecutor ’s office at ORG discontinued the proceedings against the director of the GPE .

DATE . On DATE Florentina , represented by counsel and by PERSON , director of the NORP , as her guardian , brought an action in ORG against the first applicant couple , ORG and ORG , seeking to have the order for her adoption revoked and relying on LAW no . CARDINAL . In the alternative , she sought MONEY for non - pecuniary damage if the adoption order was not revoked . Submitting that she had never met the first applicant DATE her adoptive parents DATE either before or after the date on which the adoption order had been made , she stated that she had seen them only once , on DATE , when they had come to try to take her away from the NORP against her will , accompanied by their lawyer and the bailiff .

In a judgment of DATE , ORG , to which the case had been referred by ORG , dismissed PERSON ’s action as being ill - founded . On the basis of the written evidence submitted by the parties , the court considered that it was in the claimant ’s interests for the adoption order not to be revoked . It noted that she had not in any way established , through her guardian , that her adoptive parents had shown a lack of interest in her ; on the contrary , it appeared from the evidence that they had taken numerous steps for her to be able to join them in GPE . The court accordingly rejected the statements by PERSON and FAC , who had given evidence in support of the child in their respective capacities as her “ substitute ” “ mother ” and “ aunt ” at the GPE .

The court further noted that the adoption order had satisfied the relevant statutory requirements and pointed out that ORG , which , under section CARDINAL of Ordinance no . CARDINAL , had exercised parental rights on the date on which the application for adoption had been lodged with the court , had found the adoption to be in the child ’s interests and had given its approval .

That judgment was upheld on an appeal by the claimant in a final judgment delivered by ORG on DATE after a public hearing which PERSON had attended , represented by counsel and by her guardian .

In an unappealable decision of DATE , ORG dismissed an application by PERSON to set aside its final judgment of DATE .

On DATE GPE , relying on section CARDINAL of Ordinance no . CARDINAL , brought an action in ORG against the second applicant couple , ORG and ORG , seeking to have the order for her adoption revoked .

At the hearing on DATE , PERSON stated in the presence of her guardian that she did not know her adoptive parents and did not wish to move to a different country as she was satisfied with her life at the GPE , where the conditions were good .

In a judgment of DATE , the court allowed her application , relying in particular on the statements by her “ mothers ” and “ aunts ” at the NORP , who confirmed that she had been residing there since DATE and was being provided with a sound education and good living conditions . Noting that there was no evidence of the emotional ties that should have formed between the adoptive parents and the child after the final decision of DATE , the court revoked the order for LOC ’s adoption by the second applicant couple and decided that the child should revert to the name she had used before DATE .

Although an appeal lay against that judgment , the defendants did not avail themselves of that possibility , and the judgment thus became final .

On DATE the C. association requested ORG to revoke its decision to place the children in the care of the NORP . On DATE the ORG informed it that as a result of the final orders of DATE for the adoption of the children by the applicants , the decision on their placement had been implicitly revoked and that any such request would be superfluous .

On DATE ORG , in reply to a request from the applicants , informed them that it was not empowered to take the necessary steps for the children to be returned to them . It indicated that it had ceased to have any powers in the matter on the date on which the certificate attesting that the adoption order conformed to the relevant national and international rules had been issued .

On DATE the applicants lodged a complaint with the ORG committee responsible for examining administrative abuses , on account of the NORP authorities’ failure to execute final decisions .

The applicants sought assistance on DATE from the NORP embassy in GPE and on DATE from ORG .

On DATE they lodged a petition with the President of GPE , the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice .

On DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE they complained to ORG about the situation resulting from the failure to execute the adoption orders .

On DATE and on DATE , DATE and DATE they travelled to GPE in the hope of seeing their adopted daughters , but to no avail .

They regularly sent the girls letters in NORP and presents , encouraging them to write back in NORP as they had learnt the language while waiting to see them again , and telling them that their greatest wish was to have them by their side to give them love and affection .

It appears from the observations submitted by the parties that the ORG , where the children are resident , is a private institution licensed by ORG and entrusted with the tasks of providing a home for orphans or abandoned children , taking care of them and giving them an education .

Reports by the national authority responsible for monitoring the activities of welfare institutions attest to the following : the material and sanitary conditions at the NORP are good ; medical assistance is provided there in the form of regular check - ups by doctors and permanent supervision by the medical staff ; the centre runs special programmes including educational , sports and recreational activities for the children in its care ; the children attend schools in the area around the centre and are integrated into the ORG education system ; children at the centre demonstrating particular sporting and artistic abilities are encouraged to develop them ; numerous practical activities are arranged ; the centre is structured into groups of CARDINAL children who are closely supervised by employees assigned to act as “ substitute parents ” ; and the centre employs a full - time psychologist .

On DATE and DATE a NORP employee who worked at the centre ’s bakery was convicted by ORG and given prison sentences for sexually abusing children in the NORP ’s care aged DATE . PERSON and GPE were not involved .

A number of articles in the ORG local newspaper PERSON reported that after her visit to the NORP on DATE , Baroness PERSON , rapporteur for ORG , had expressed the view that children in the centre ’s care should not travel abroad to join their adoptive families because the ORG had formed a genuine family in which the children received a good upbringing and education . The articles also reported that Mr PERSON , the ORG ’s founder , had stated that none of the children would be leaving the centre as they had all become members of his family and that it was time to stop “ exporting ” NORP children .

It appears from the evidence produced by the parties that LOC and GPE regularly go to school , visit their close acquaintances and travel abroad on trips organised by the NORP . In particular , LOC is currently attending ORG , where she is taking violin and piano lessons , while PERSON is being encouraged by the NORP staff to develop her skills in dance and sport .

Photocopies of PERSON ’s passport reveal that she went on a trip to GPE and GPE in DATE .

A video recording submitted by the ORG and produced with the assistance of a psychologist at the centre where the children are living indicates that they have not received any detailed practical information about the ongoing proceedings for their adoption or about the identity of their adoptive parents . It does not appear from the recording that they have been prepared for the possibility of leaving the NORP and joining the applicants’ families . During the recording LOC , in particular , expressed her desire to be part of a traditional family , but was also hesitant as to her adoption by the applicants , which she said that she had initially wanted .

It is uncertain whether , before the applicants’ visit to the centre in DATE , the children received the letters which they had been writing to them in NORP for DATE .

It appears from the recording that the girls do not currently wish to travel to GPE to join the applicants , whom they know only vaguely , but would prefer to remain at the GPE , where they seem to have established social and emotional ties with the other children and with the “ substitute ” “ mothers ” and “ aunts ” .

The following provisions and aspects of international law and practice are relevant to the present case .

“ An adoption within the scope of the Convention shall take place only if the competent authorities of the ORG of origin –

( a ) have established that the child is adoptable ;

( b ) have determined , after possibilities for placement of the child within the ORG of origin have been given due consideration , that an intercountry adoption is in the child ’s best interests ;

( c ) have ensured that

NORP the persons , institutions and authorities whose consent is necessary for adoption have been counselled as may be necessary and duly informed of the effects of their consent , in particular whether or not an adoption will result in the termination of the legal relationship between the child and his or her family of origin ,

NORP such persons , institutions and authorities have given their consent freely , in the required legal form , and expressed or evidenced in writing ,

the consents have not been induced by payment or compensation of any kind and have not been withdrawn , and

the consent of the mother , where required , has been given only after the birth of the child ; and

( d ) have ensured , having regard to the age and degree of maturity of the child , that

NORP he or she has been counselled and duly informed of the effects of the adoption and of his or her consent to the adoption , where such consent is required ,

NORP consideration has been given to the child ’s wishes and opinions ,

NORP the child ’s consent to the adoption , where such consent is required , has been given freely , in the required legal form , and expressed or evidenced in writing , and

NORP such consent has not been induced by payment or compensation of any kind . ”

“ Central Authorities shall take , directly or through public authorities or other bodies duly accredited in their ORG , all appropriate measures , in particular to –

( b ) facilitate , follow and expedite proceedings with a view to obtaining the adoption ;

( c ) promote the development of adoption counselling and post - adoption services in their GPE ;

“ Accreditation shall only be granted to and maintained by bodies demonstrating their competence to carry out properly the tasks with which they may be entrusted . ”

“ Any decision in the ORG of origin that a child should be entrusted to prospective adoptive parents may only be made if –

( a ) ORG of that ORG has ensured that the prospective adoptive parents agree ;

( b ) ORG of the receiving ORG has approved such decision , where such approval is required by the law of that ORG or by ORG of the ORG of origin ;

( c ) the Central Authorities of both GPE have agreed that the adoption may proceed ; and

( d ) it has been determined ... that the prospective adoptive parents are eligible and suited to adopt and that the child is or will be authorised to enter and reside permanently in the receiving ORG . ”

“ ORG of both GPE shall take all necessary steps to obtain permission for the child to leave the ORG of origin and to enter and reside permanently in the receiving ORG . ”

“ CARDINAL . The transfer of the child to the receiving ORG may only be carried out if the requirements of LAW have been satisfied .

The Central Authorities of both GPE shall ensure that this transfer takes place in secure and appropriate circumstances and , if possible , in the company of the ... adoptive parents .

“ GPE Parties that recognise and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration and they shall :

( a ) Ensure that the adoption of a child is authorised only by competent authorities who determine , in accordance with applicable law and procedures and on the basis of all pertinent and reliable information , that the adoption is permissible in view of the child ’s status concerning parents , relatives and legal guardians and that , if required , the persons concerned have given their informed consent to the adoption on the basis of such counselling as may be necessary ;

( b ) Recognise that inter - country adoption may be considered as an alternative means of childcare , if the child can not be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or can not in any suitable manner be cared for in the child ’s country of origin ;

“ An adoption shall be valid only if it is granted by a judicial or administrative authority ( hereinafter referred to as the ‘ competent authority’ ) . ”

“ CARDINAL . ... an adoption shall not be granted unless at least the following consents to the adoption have been given and not withdrawn :

( a ) the consent of the mother and , where the child is legitimate , the father ; or if there is neither father nor mother to consent , the consent of any person or body who may be entitled in their place to exercise their parental rights in that respect ;

( b ) the consent of the spouse of the adopter .

NORP The competent authority shall not :

( a ) dispense with the consent of any person mentioned in paragraph CARDINAL of this Article , or

( b ) overrule the refusal to consent of any person or body mentioned in the said paragraph CARDINAL ,

save on exceptional grounds determined by law .

“ CARDINAL . Adoption confers on the adopter in respect of the adopted person the rights and obligations of every kind that a father or mother has in respect of a child born in lawful wedlock .

Adoption confers on the adopted person in respect of the adopter the rights and obligations of every kind that a child born in lawful wedlock has in respect of his father or mother .

When the rights and obligations referred to in paragraph CARDINAL of this Article are created , any rights and obligations of the same kind existing between the adopted person and his father or mother or any other person or body shall cease to exist . ... ”

In her report to ORG , Baroness PERSON of GPE , noting with satisfaction the progress made by GPE in consolidating the rule of law and respect for human rights , emphasised in her capacity as rapporteur that the situation of children in GPE required further improvements . She noted that the fate of children in institutions remained a major cause for concern and a problem in terms of fundamental rights , with an impact on the accession procedure .

The following provisions and aspects of domestic law and practice are relevant to the present case .

“ ( CARDINAL ) ORG is a special measure for the protection of the child ’s interests , establishing a parental relationship between the adopter and the adopted person and family ties between the child and the members of the adopter ’s family .

( CARDINAL ) An adoption order shall take effect on the date when a judicial decision [ granting the application for adoption ] becomes irrevocable . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) The following shall be required for an application for adoption to be granted : ( a ) the consent of the adopted person ’s parents or , as appropriate , parent ... ; ( b ) the approval of ORG for the child ’s place of residence ; ( c ) the consent of the child if he or she is DATE ; ( d ) the consent of the person or family adopting the child .

( CARDINAL ) NORP If ... the child has been declared to have been abandoned in a final court decision , the consent referred to in section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) shall not be necessary . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) The court shall decide on the application for adoption in private , as a panel of CARDINAL judges ...

( CARDINAL ) The following shall be summoned to attend the hearing : ORG which approved the adoption , representing the child ; the person or family wishing to adopt ; and ORG . State Counsel ’s attendance shall be compulsory . ...

( CARDINAL ) The court may examine any evidence admitted by law .

( CARDINAL ) The consent of the child , if he or she is aged DATE or more , shall be obtained in court . ”

“ The child shall acquire the surname of the person who adopts him or her . ... Pursuant to an irrevocable decision by the court that makes the adoption order , the relevant registry office shall draw up a new birth certificate for the child , on which the adoptive parents shall be entered as the biological parents . The previous birth certificate shall be retained , with a marginal note referring to the issuing of the new document . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) ORG adoption order may be set aside or revoked in accordance with the law .

( CARDINAL ) An adoption order may be revoked at the request of the child , if he or she is aged DATE or more , or of ORG for the child ’s place of residence , if revocation is in the child ’s best interests .

( CARDINAL ) The court [ revoking an adoption order ] shall also rule on the surname which the child is to take after the adoption order has been revoked . ”

“ In order to ensure the best interests of a child in difficulty , ORG may order :

( e ) the placement of the child in the care of a specialist public welfare institution or a licensed private institution . ”

“ If the child has been declared to have been abandoned in a final judicial decision ... parental rights shall be exercised by the county council , through ORG . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) ORG shall be structured and shall act as a specialist body under the authority of the Government with the purpose of supervising and supporting activities for the protection of children ’s rights through adoption and ensuring international cooperation in this field .

( CARDINAL ) ORG shall be the central NORP authority responsible for assuming the obligations laid down in LAW DATE on ORG in respect of ORG ... ”

“ ORG shall act as a specialist body of the central Government , with legal personality and under the authority of ORG and ORG . ”

“ The ORG shall have the following duties :

( f ) proposing that the relevant authorities suspend or terminate any activities that pose a serious and immediate danger to the health or physical or psychological development of children , and withdrawing the operating licences of the legal entities responsible ;

( g ) taking action to prevent or put an end to the consequences of any acts or deeds contrary to the principles and rules laid down in international treaties on children ’s rights and adoption to which GPE has acceded ... ”

“ [ From the date on which the adoption order becomes final ] , the rights and obligations of the adopted person in relation to the adopter shall be the same as those of a child born to a married couple in relation to his or her parents ... ”

“ Children below the age of majority shall live with their parents ... ”

“ Parents shall be entitled to request that their child be returned to them by any person having unauthorised custody of the child . The courts shall refuse to grant such a request if this would not be in the child ’s interests . The child shall be consulted if he or she is aged DATE or more . ”

These provisions were repealed and replaced by Government Emergency Ordinance no . CARDINAL on adoption ( see paragraph CARDINAL , point CARDINAL , above ) .

“ CARDINAL . False imprisonment shall be punishable by a prison sentence of DATE .

NORP If ... the victim is a minor , the penalty shall be a prison sentence of CARDINAL . ”

“ CARDINAL . Anyone whose legitimate interests have been adversely affected by measures and decisions taken during criminal proceedings may lodge a complaint .

“ Complaints about measures or decisions taken by the public prosecutor or under his orders shall be submitted to ORG . ”

ORG allowed an objection that section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) and ( CARDINAL ) of Government Emergency Ordinance no . CARDINAL on the rules governing adoption was unconstitutional on the ground that , in the case of a child who had been judicially declared to have been abandoned , it did not require the prior consent of the person or body entitled to exercise parental rights over the child in question .

“ CARDINAL . Treaties lawfully ratified by ORG shall form an integral part of the domestic legal order . ”

“ CARDINAL . The constitutional provisions on ORG rights and liberties shall be interpreted and applied in accordance with LAW and with the covenants and other treaties to which GPE is a party .

NORP In the event of conflict between the covenants and treaties on fundamental human rights to which GPE is a party and domestic laws , the international instruments shall prevail . ”

“ All proceedings relating to the adoption of NORP children by persons and families of foreign nationality shall be suspended ... for a period of DATE from the date on which this Ordinance comes into force . ”

“ During the period referred to in LAW , ORG and ORG shall review the rules governing international adoption , in order to bring the national legislation into line with the relevant international law and practice . ”