The application was introduced on DATE by CARDINAL groups of applicants .

The first group included CARDINAL applicants who were parties to the first set of proceedings instituted before the domestic courts : ( CARDINAL ) Mr PERSON ( NORP , GPE ) , ( CARDINAL ) PERSON ( Al Made , GPE ) , ( CARDINAL ) PERSON ( ORG , GPE ) , ( CARDINAL ) PERSON ( ORG ) ; ( CARDINAL ) Mr PERSON ( Ski , GPE ) ; ( CARDINAL ) PERSON ( GPE , GPE ) ; ( CARDINAL ) Mr PERSON ( GPE ) . They are all NORP nationals .

The second group consisted of CARDINAL persons whose names are listed in the Appendix hereto and in respect of whom a second summons was issued before the national courts ( this summons had concerned altogether CARDINAL litigants ) . They are all NORP nationals .

The third group comprises CARDINAL persons whose names are listed in the Appendix and in respect of whom a third such summons was issued ( this summons had concerned altogether CARDINAL litigants ) . CARDINAL of these persons are citizens of GPE , the remainder are NORP nationals .

As the parties of both the second and third group were not allowed to join the case of the first group , they filed a separate action , which was stayed pending the outcome of that brought by the first group . In the light of the result they considered it futile to pursue their action .

On DATE a fourth group of CARDINAL persons , whose names are listed in the Appendix ( CARDINAL of whom are citizens of GPE , CARDINAL of GPE and the remaining are NORP nationals ) , joined the above - mentioned application introduced on DATE . Because of the outcome in the case pursued by the first CARDINAL applicants , they considered bringing any proceedings themselves before the national courts to be devoid of any purpose .

The applicants are represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . The Government are represented by their Agent , Mr PERSON , Attorney ORG ) .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicants have in common that they have a NORP mother and a NORP father and were born during the Second World War . A number of them were registered as children of “ LOC ( which means “ spring of life ” ) .

The “ LOC was a NORP project created by PERSON in DATE , with the aim of taking care of mothers and children who were deemed valuable from “ a racial and genetic ” point of view . Young girls considered " racially pure " were to be offered the possibility to give birth to a child in secret . The child was then to be given to the ORG organisation which was to look after his or her education and adoption . A NORP centre was established in DATE . During the period DATE and DATE , CARDINAL children were born in GPE from a NORP mother and a NORP father . They were referred to as “ war children ” ( krigsbarn ) .

A large number of mothers to war children were marginalised , had great difficulties in obtaining gainful employment and were incapable of providing for the upbringing of their offspring . In many instances their children were placed for adoption , in foster homes or in institutions .

Towards the end of the War and thereafter , various public officials , notably clergymen and medical doctors , expressed publicly negative opinions about the war children . This included allegations to the effect that the latter were defective individuals and potential fifth colonists .

On DATE ORG appointed a ORG ( krigsbarnutvlaget ) to review whether it was desirable to deport the war children and their mothers to GPE and , in any event , what special measures could be taken to integrate the children as ordinary citizens in GPE .

The ORG 's report , which was completed in DATE , advised against deportation and recommended the launching of an extensive and carefully prepared information campaign in order to influence public opinion to become favourable towards the war children and to extend that concept to cover not only those children whose fathers were NORP but also those whose fathers were of other foreign nationalities .

According to information supplied by the ORG , the authorities concluded that in the circumstances at the time such a campaign was neither necessary nor desirable . In this connection the ORG referred to TIME Sixth ORG in DATE , according to which the NORP representative , and secretary - general of ORG , Mr PERSON , stated :

“ The authorities have accepted the consequences of the fact that under NORP law the children are NORP citizens with the same legal position as other children . It is now generally recognised that the war children should fit into society among other children without attention being specially drawn to them . ”

The Government further referred to a Bill to ORG ( ORG . CARDINAL ( DATE ) , page CARDINAL , which stated :

“ ORG made its report in DATE and here proposed a number of measures with a view to solving the different problems that were expected to arise . ORG also proposed a special FAC . None of these measures were implemented , as it was found that the children were quite quickly absorbed by society . Most were taken in by relatives or put up for adoption . It has not been necessary in the interests of either the children or their mothers to take special protective measures . ”

According to the applicants , the authorities were responsible for having actively and passively contributed to war children having been treated as “ free for all ” . This failure had occurred despite the authorities ' having been aware , as it emerged from ORG report , of widespread public opinion that the war children were potential fifth colonists , mentally retarded and carriers of poor genes . As a result , a number of war children had been placed in psychiatric institutions without adequate prior expert assessment . Many had been subjected to discrimination , harassment and ill - treatment in children 's homes , educational establishments , adoptive homes and foster homes and to derogatory treatment in their close social environment .

In his New Year speech to the NORP people on DATE the Prime Minister , PERSON stated :

“ ... [ W]e can not let DATE pass without taking in the injustice suffered by many war children in the Post War area . On behalf of ORG I should like to apologise for the discrimination and injustice to which they had been subjected . ”

The first , second and third groups of applicants , but not the fourth group , submitted briefs about their individual story with their initial application . In connection with the ORG 's oral hearing on DATE most of the applicants in the fourth group submitted such information . On that occasion the applicants in the first group submitted various medical statements and other documents regarding their personal health that were submitted in the domestic proceedings , notably before ORG . Also a number of the applicants in the second group and a few of the applicants in the third and fourth groups submitted such statements , mostly of more recent dates . The documents provided information on their health status and variously also on the applicant 's accounts about their past as war children . For the purposes of the present decision , the ORG considers it sufficient to reiterate the accounts of the first CARDINAL applicants .

The first CARDINAL applicants are members of ORG ) , which was created in DATE and has CARDINAL members . There is also PERSON ( the Norwegian War Children Association ) , set up in DATE and comprising CARDINAL members .

The first applicant , Mr PERSON , was born in DATE . During the War he lived in a children 's home established by the NORP . Thereafter he was placed successively in CARDINAL different homes . For DATE he lived with his grandmother , before being placed with foster parents .

The first applicant submits that while he was living in CARDINAL of the children 's homes , he and a little girl were locked up in a pig house for DATE because , so they were told , they stank . It was scorching hot and when they were released at TIME they were almost unconscious . They were scrubbed with a piassava brush , water and ammoniac . During this treatment they were made to understand that it was due to the fact that they were war children .

Because he was a war child , the first applicant was harassed at school and in his close environment , without anybody trying to stop it . As a DATE he was , with his teacher 's blessing , raped by some older boys at school .

After having finished school at DATE he went off shore . He spent DATE in GPE and then returned to GPE in order to serve his military service . He wished to pursue further education within the ORG , but was dissuaded from doing so because of his background .

When he was DATE he took for the first time formal steps to look into his background , with the assistance of ORG .

During most of his professional life , the first applicant had worked as a driver . From DATE to DATE he ran his own business as a lorry driver . In DATE he went bankrupt and in DATE he was granted a disability pension on account of psychological problems and back pain . In DATE he resumed working as a driver , part time .

Born in DATE , the second applicant , PERSON , lived during DATE with her grandmother , until she was placed with foster parents who had initially asked for a boy . Love and care were totally lacking in the foster home , where she was told that she was ugly , bad , stupid and had heinous genes . She was regularly locked up in a utility room near the hall to wait for her foster father to come home and hit her . On some occasions , in order to prevent her from escaping , she was attached by a dog chain . She was spanked extensively both at home and at school . Once during a geography lesson she was asked to stand up so that the whole class could see what a “ NORP kid ” ( tyskerunge ) looked like . When she was DATE a dentist purposely drilled her gum . At the age of DATE or ten some alcoholics in her neighbourhood marked a swastika with a nail on her forehead and verbally abused her . She fled from her foster parents and went to GPE to see her father , but there she was arrested as an illegal immigrant and was returned to GPE . For a short period she went to secondary modern school , but had to leave . In DATE she applied for a disability pension , which she was granted with effect from DATE . In DATE she published a book about her background .

The third applicant , PERSON , was born in DATE . After the war her mother worked and left her at home DATE unattended , until she was moved to her grandmother 's home in GPE . There she was beaten a lot by her grandmother and her aunts . CARDINAL of her aunts told her that if her mother had stayed away from the NORP her grandmother would not have had to take care of her . It did happen that she was given presents , but she experienced that these could be taken away from her after DATE . Frequently house arrest was imposed upon her . Love and care were missing in her home .

She started at ordinary school but was moved to a class for children needing special attention . She was harassed at school . In her local environment people shouted words like “ NORP kid ” or “ løsunge ” . Over DATE she has had great psychological and physical problems . She started to receive a disability pension in DATE . The medical certificate supporting her pension application referred to her traumatic childhood .

The fourth applicant , PERSON , was born in DATE in ORG . She believes that for DATE of her life she was placed in a barracks . Thereafter she was placed in a children 's home . She was washed with scalding hot water , being told by the headmistress that this was the best and only way of cleaning “ NORP children ” with greasy hair . The children 's home deprived her of her liberty and prevented her from having normal social contacts as she was never allowed to receive visits from friends .

Throughout primary school she was placed in a class for children needing special attention . Due to lack of knowledge , she did not manage to complete secondary modern school . She was regularly exposed to violence . During DATE a teacher sexually abused her . This was witnessed by the whole class and led to the teacher 's dismissal . When she married at DATE the priest stated that he thought she should be sterilised . In DATE she started to receive a disability pension .

The fifth applicant , Mr PERSON , was born in DATE . He stayed in a children 's home DATE . As a DATE he was returned to his mother . He went to ordinary primary school before he was placed in a special school for retarded persons , which he completed . It is clear that he should never have been sent to such a school and that the reason for sending him there was his status as a war child . In connection with a medical examination he was subjected to brain - washing by a psychiatrist together with other men who surrounded him in a circle . They told him what a scum of the earth he was and that he should not seek to multiply ; otherwise he would go to hell . He should never assert himself , or else he would be killed . He was raped by CARDINAL of the men .

The fifth applicant was rejected by his stepfather 's family and was harassed by the latter 's children . He was never cared for and had a terrible childhood and youth . As an adult he had a normal life with a good job . The ill - treatment and his attempts to suppress the traumas he had experienced led him into a deep psychotic state in DATE and incapacity to work . In DATE that followed he was committed to a psychiatric hospital a number of times .

The sixth applicant , PERSON , was born in DATE in ORG . At the age of CARDINAL she was taken from her mother and sent to GPE , where she lived with her grandparents until DATE , when ORG returned her to her mother in GPE .

The sixth applicant 's mother had previously been declared unsuited to assume the care for her , which was reflected in the manner she was treated by her mother . The latter continuously ill - treated her by hitting her , making burn marks with an iron , scratching her with needles and such like . From DATE until she turned DATE her stepfather abused her sexually . She fled home . Her physical and psychological suffering gave her an ulcer .

Her grandparents in GPE were loving and caring persons and wished to keep her in their care . Had she been able to grow up with them she would most probably have had a normal life with a normal standard of living .

In GPE she felt it necessary to keep silent about her origins both in her social and her professional environment , due to the negative self - image that had been imposed on her . She is now so damaged from the ill - treatment that she is incapable of carrying out normal work .

The seventh applicant , Mr PERSON , was born in DATE at PERSON . After a certain period he , together with CARDINAL other children , was committed to the NORP ORG in NORP . In DATE he was transferred to ORG , where he stayed until DATE when he was placed in an institution named PERSON at PERSON . After having spent periods at different homes under the mental healthcare services in GPE he returned to ORG in DATE , where he stayed until DATE .

He submits that no expert assessment had been made as to the propriety of his being committed to these various institutions . His being wrongly placed had been a consequence of the authorities ' decision to transfer the children at FAC to PERSON . He was not exposed to any physical abuse , but the fact that he had been considered mentally retarded and had lived together with persons so considered during his entire upbringing had marked him considerably and constituted a great burden for him , substantially reducing his quality of life . He regularly had nightmares and has been suicidal . In DATE he was granted ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL in ex gratia compensation ( billighetserstating ) from the ORG for having received a deficient education .

On DATE the first CARDINAL applicants instituted proceedings before ORG ( tingrett ) . They argued that because of their origin they had been the victims of violations of LAW , DATE and DATE of the Convention . They considered that ORG was responsible for the violations , inter alia because public officials had expressed attitudes towards the war children which had contributed to people adopting a negative perception of them , which in turn had led to infringements having been committed against the children . The ORG had failed to take any action to prevent the abuse , amongst others the measures recommended by ORG . The first CARDINAL applicants sought ( CARDINAL ) a ruling to the effect that the ORG was responsible for violations of their fundamental human rights and ( CARDINAL ) ordering the ORG to pay each of them compensation in an amount not exceeding ORG CARDINAL .

ORG gave a decision and a judgment ( kjennelse og dom ) on DATE with a common reasoning . It observed from the outset that not only did the parties disagree about the manner of resolution of the legal disputes but they also disagreed on what questions ORG should determine . It found that item ( CARDINAL ) of the first CARDINAL applicants ' requests could reasonably be viewed as CARDINAL for a declaratory judgment ( fastsettelsesdom ) , whereas item ( CARDINAL ) ought to be understood as a compensation claim .

ORG considered that the ORG could not be held liable for any actions or omissions referable to the period DATE and the entry into force of the LAW in DATE . Moreover , the various instances of abuse of which the first CARDINAL applicants complained could not be considered a continuing situation either for the purposes of national law ( criminal or tort ) or the Convention . In this regard ORG stressed that it had to be demonstrated in each individual case , as the applicants had attempted to do , that he or she had been the victim of specific violations . The individual plaintiff 's claims ought to be considered individually , and thus it was not decisive whether other war children had or had not been victims of violation over a shorter or longer period . Then ORG went on :

“ The violations to which [ first CARDINAL applicants ] have referred , concern very different offences . They concern different forms of violation – passivity on the part of the Government , statements from public individuals , serious crimes such as rape , and harassment by private individuals . Moreover , the violations have taken place over a period of DATE . These are factors that militate strongly against an ongoing situation as this term is defined in compensation and criminal law .

This being so , in ORG opinion , it can not be assumed that we are dealing with a single ongoing situation , in the sense that abuses committed in DATE are not time - barred as long as the victim can DATE be subjected to a violation of a quite different character . As regards the relationship to the ORG , it is the individual abuses against which the ORG protects the citizens . ”

ORG considered that item CARDINAL of the first CARDINAL applicants ' request was time - barred under LAW relating to LAW ( Lov om foreldelse av fordringer nr . CARDINAL of DATE , hereinafter referred to as “ LAW CARDINAL ” ) , according to which a compensation claim for non - pecuniary damage was time - barred DATE after the injured person had become or ought to have become aware of the damage and the identity of the person responsible or , in any event , DATE after the impugned act or other circumstances giving rise to liability . In addition , a CARDINAL-year rule which was in force until DATE was applicable . ORG was of the view that all of the first CARDINAL applicants ' claims must have been time - barred under the CARDINAL-year rule , which meant that the claims were time - barred at the latest in DATE , DATE after the youngest plaintiff turned DATE . As regards the fifth applicant , he had alleged that the abuse occurred in DATE , DATE before the entry into force of the Convention . ORG added that , due to the long lapse of time , it was impossible to prove the alleged violations ; no witnesses or documentary evidence could be adduced . Therefore the limitation of the claims did not just have a formal reason but also a substantive one .

As regards item CARDINAL of the first CARDINAL applicants ' requests , ORG considered that they did not have an actual legal interest for the purposes of LAW . In reaching this conclusion ORG had regard inter alia to its finding that the first CARDINAL applicants ' compensation claims were time - barred ; that the main criticism against the ORG , namely its failure to take certain measures in the Post War period , fell outside what could be made the subject of a review of the merits of the case ; that the first CARDINAL applicants ' interest in having historical truths ascertained by the judiciary could hardly be achieved given the very great number of war children compared to the number - CARDINAL - of litigants in the proceedings .

Nor did ORG find that making a declaratory judgment in the first CARDINAL applicants ' case was warranted by other reasons . In cases concerning , as here , allegations of violations of human rights , this would depend on the character of the violation , whether the proceedings had been instituted within a reasonable time , whether other possible remedies had been exhausted ; the importance of the case for the victim and the jurisprudential value of the ruling . However , in this case the central points of the first CARDINAL applicants ' complaint against the ORG fell outside the temporal scope of the LAW ; the possibilities of the judiciary to review policy choices were very limited ; the pecuniary claims were time - barred ; the applicants had had the opportunity to have their complaints of violations of the LAW examined by the courts ; the case concerned mainly circumstances DATE back in time ; no information had been submitted to the effect that similar proceedings had been instituted in other countries nor that the treatment of war children had been worse in GPE than in other countries , a question to be assessed by researchers ; in order for the CARDINAL out of CARDINAL litigants to succeed in the proceedings it would be necessary to provide documentary evidence beyond the first CARDINAL applicants ' own statements ; as was undisputed by them , the alleged violations were not capable of being proved , whereas criminal liability required proof beyond reasonable doubt and civil liability for misplacement and malpractice in respect of the children raised complicated questions .

In view of the above , ORG found it difficult to see how the first CARDINAL applicants could benefit from further judicial review of the case . The parties were in agreement that the matter had not come to an end . In the view of ORG , it would be best for all the parties involved to leave these issues to historians and politicians , not lawyers .

ORG dismissed ( avviste ) the case by a decision ( kjennelse ) in so far as item CARDINAL of the first CARDINAL applicants ' requests were concerned and rejected the claim against the ORG by a judgment ( dom ) with respect to item CARDINAL . The first CARDINAL applicants had been granted free legal aid in the proceedings and the ORG had made no request for costs .

The first group of CARDINAL applicants then appealed to ORG against ORG decision and judgment .

On DATE the first group of applicants withdrew their appeal against the dismissal by ORG of item CARDINAL and reformulated their appeal against its judgment regarding item CARDINAL . As a result , the former part of the case was discontinued by ORG in a separate decision , whereas the proceedings concerning the latter part were focused on the limitation issue .

By a judgment of DATE ORG , sitting with CARDINAL professional judges and CARDINAL lay judges , unanimously upheld ORG judgment , observing inter alia :

“ [ The first CARDINAL applicants ] argue that their claims in the case are based on Convention violation , and are not claims in damages law in the normal sense . ORG can not see that there is any basis for this argument . GPE 's accession to ORG did not entail an obligation to incorporate the LAW into NORP law ; the ORG mandated NORP authorities , through legislation and otherwise , to safeguard these rights and ensure that they were not interfered with unless authorised under the ORG . [ The first CARDINAL applicants ] have argued that for DATE since the Second World War their human rights have been seriously violated , in part through acts of persons for whom the Government must be seen as directly liable , in part because the authorities had failed to protect the war children and safeguard their rights . The High Court bases its consideration of the time - barring on this claim , without needing to take a position on its merits . [ The first CARDINAL applicants ] argue that these acts and omissions on the part of the authorities have caused them damage of both pecuniary and non - pecuniary nature . The claim advanced here by [ The first CARDINAL applicants ] regarding financial compensation for such injury is , in ORG view , a compensation claim , as this expression is used for example in LAW DATE and section CARDINAL of LAW . ....

[ The first CARDINAL applicants ' ] argument that claims for reparation for breach of human rights are not a damages claim in the normal sense can not therefore succeed . The same applies to the argument that there were previously no statutory powers for the claim under NORP law , but that such powers were not created until the ORG was made part of NORP law in DATE . In this connection it is not necessary to discuss the detailed content of and development of the ORG 's employer liability , the ORG 's non - statutory objective liability and general liability for negligence in relation to public activities in DATE that have elapsed since the Second World War . It follows from the presumption principle that the NORP compensation law must be presumed to be , and to have been , in conformity with our obligations under international law , so that the claims for damages could have been raised before LAW entered into force , possibly in reliance on the rules of the LAW and the case law of ORG .

It must further be regarded as reliable law that the provisions of the Convention are not an impediment to the individual countries ' operating with limitation periods also in areas that are embraced by the ORG 's rules . Such time - barring rules are deemed not to be in conflict with LAW , on the right to have one 's civil rights determined by a court , see ORG judgment in the case of PERSON and Others v. GPE ( judgment of DATE , Reports of Judgments and Decisions DATE , § CARDINAL ) . The time - barring rules must not be such as to make this right in reality illusory , for example by being unreasonably short . In the PERSON case ORG found that it was not incompatible with the LAW that a person 's right to bring a civil action for damages for having being sexually abused as a child lapsed DATE after that person came of age . It is stated in paragraph CARDINAL of the judgment [ ... ] : ' .... Article CARDINAL does not necessarily require that GPE fulfil the positive obligation to secure respect for private life by the provision of unlimited civil remedies in circumstances where criminal law sanctions are in operation . ' As the High Court points out below , [ the first CARDINAL applicants ' ] claims must be regarded as time - barred under the DATE rule of LAW . The High Court finds it clear that a limitation period of such duration is not incompatible with the LAW . A corresponding view of the power of the state to operate with civil - law time - barring rules follows from the ORG 's decision in the case of PERSON v. GPE ( ( dec . ) no . DATE ) with references . Here it was not deemed to give rise to a violation of LAW that the right to bring an action for damages against a physician in connection with a breast operation was limited . Both ORG have also noted that there is a ' limitation period ' also as regards the right to bring cases before the ORG itself , namely the DATE time - limit in former LAW and the current LAW , a time - limit that is applied strictly , see the PERSON decision .

It follows from the PERSON and PERSON rulings that it is not incompatible with LAW [ ... ] or LAW [ ... ] , for the GPE to operate with limitation rules for civil compensation claims . Nor have ORG any general duty to pay damages to those subjected to abuse from private persons , see ORG decision in PERSON v. GPE ( ( dec . ) no . CARDINAL , DATE ) . It must follow from this that , also when a damages claim is brought directly against a ORG , it can be limited under national rules without impediment from the ORG , even if the claim concerns loss and injury in areas covered by the LAW . It is also reliable law that damages claims against public authorities are time - barred under LAW , and that the rule applies regardless of the ground for liability , see ORG ' Foreldelsesloven ' ( LAW ) ( DATE ) p. CARDINAL .

Under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW , compensation claims , including claims made outside contractual relations in respect of non - pecuniary damage , are time - barred DATE after the damaging act or other circumstances giving rise to liability had ceased . The alleged ground for liability on the part of the ORG was [ ... ] that the authorities had not carried out the necessary measures in order to secure the war children 's human rights . As regards failures to act , the starting point for limitation is the time when the duty to act has ceased [ ... ] . Such a duty for the ORG to act should in the view of ORG have ceased at least when the [ The first CARDINAL applicants ] reached the age of maturity , which in the case of the youngest of them was in DATE . After this point in time there could not have been any duty for the authorities to launch an information- or attitude building campaign for persons who were born from a NORP father and a NORP mother in connection with the War , or to carry out other measures for the protection of their human rights . This can not be altered by the fact that the [ first CARDINAL applicants ] have encountered abusive attitudes and speech because of their background even as adults . In this connection there is no basis for the [ first CARDINAL applicants ' ] argument that the ground for liability consists of a continuing situation which has not ceased . That the effects of the damaging acts are durable and arise late does not mean that DATE time - limit does not start to run . ORG adds that , as pointed out by ORG , the considerations which underlie the limitation rules apply fully in cases such as the present , where there would otherwise be question of adjudicating occurrences and causal events dating DATE back in time .

The DATE rule in section QUANTITY of LAW was new when the LAW entered into force on DATE . It has later been amended , without it having any importance here . It follows from the transitional provision in DATE that the [ first CARDINAL applicants ' ] possible claims against the ORG were time - barred at the latest in DATE . The proceedings against the ORG were instituted in DATE . ORG judgment must be upheld . [ ... ] ”

The first CARDINAL applicants sought to appeal against ORG judgment to ORG , but on DATE ORG of ORG refused them leave to appeal , finding it obvious that the appeal had no prospects of success .

In DATE , the second and third groups of applicants ( who had been refused to join the case of the first group ) and the ORG agreed to stay the proceedings in their cases pending a legally enforceable decision in the case brought by the first CARDINAL applicants , which ORG decided to accept .

In CARDINAL decisions taken respectively on DATE and DATE ORG upheld a request by the ORG to dismiss the suits from the second and third groups of applicants on the ground that none of the parties had requested resumption of the proceedings within the statutory DATE time limit .

On DATE the applicants filed with the ORG 's registry copies of CARDINAL research reports published in DATE , CARDINAL entitled GPE og krigsbarna- En historisk undersøkelse av statsmyndighetenes behandling av krigsbarna i de første etterkrigsårene ( the ORG and the War Children , a historic survey of the war children 's treatment by the ORG authorities during DATE ) by Mr PERSON and the other entitled PERSON levekår , En registerbasert undersøkelse ( War Children 's Conditions of Life , a Register Based Survey ) , by Mr PERSON .

The first report is an extensive study running to CARDINAL pages . It included ( on p. CARDINAL ) the information set out here below .

In DATE , CARDINAL NORP war children whom the NORP had taken to GPE for adoption had been brought to GPE , where they had been adopted . On DATE the Government had issued a provisional decree ( provisorisk anordning ) depriving mothers who had married NORP after DATE and their children of their NORP citizenship indefinitely , following which most of these women were deported . On DATE the Government decided to stop the deportation project .

The provisions of the above decree had later been included in an LAW DATE . On DATE the Act had been amended so as to make it possible for war children to re - acquire NORP citizenship ; this did not apply to their mothers regardless of whether they continued to live in GPE . On DATE a new LAW had been adopted , repealing the above - mentioned provisions . Under the new LAW the mothers could re - acquire NORP citizenship and the children could have this restored as of right when they turned DATE or on application to the Government .

In the Act on Child Allowances adopted on DATE war children were in effect excluded , which situation persisted until the entry into force on DATE of ORG , both adopted on DATE .

The second report stated ( in a summary on p.CARDINAL ) that the living conditions of war children were a complex matter . On the one hand there were a number of findings that indicated that many of the war children had worse living conditions than others of the same age . The mortality during the period from DATE until present was clearly higher among the war children . The mortality related to suicide was higher , as was that caused by heart and blood illnesses . A number of war children had become disability pensioners at a relatively young age . On the whole it suggested that a considerable proportion had health problems and , as a result , a lower quality of life . The divorce rate was clearly higher among the female war children than others . Fewer had higher education , the average income level was lower , and wealth was clearly less .

On the other hand there were several similarities between the war children and other persons of the same age , such as the frequency of marriage , the divorce rate among men and the frequency of parenthood . Many war children appeared to have had a life as ordinary people : they had an ordinary education , an average income , acceptable accommodation , were married and had children .

As regards the position of war children and their mothers under NORP law on citizenship and maintenance support , the Government submitted to the ORG inter alia what is stated here below .

In order to avoid dual citizenships it followed from section CARDINAL of LAW of DATE that a NORP citizen would loose his / her citizenship if he / she gained another citizenship . The exemption to the rule was if he / she still lived in GPE . The general state of law in LOC prior to the Second World War was that a wife would be accorded her husband 's citizenship after marriage . After the war it was deemed as offensive to the general sense of justice if NORP women , married to NORP , who therefore had become NORP citizens , should retain their NORP citizenship if they still lived in GPE . The aim of the DATE decree , transformed into state law in DATE , was to make it possible for the Government to send the spouses , both being NORP ( or NORP ) citizens out of GPE . Other countries had parallel legislation at the time .

Most of the amendments ( in DATE and DATE ) to LAW only applied to children of NORP mothers married to NORP nationals . Since most of the war children were born outside wedlock , they were not within the scope of this legislation . The same was the case as regards the LAW on financial aid to mothers . This LAW only applied to children of married women who had lost their NORP citizenship and did not discriminate against war children born outside wedlock . No acts were passed in the period after the war which would entail a clear discrimination of war children born outside of wedlock .

By DATE , mothers and children who had been deprived of their NORP citizenship because the mother had married a NORP national could reacquire their lost citizenship .

As from DATE , benefits for war children who in effect had fallen outside the DATE legislation because they were not NORP citizens could be sought under PERSON Insurance Act and LAW , adopted in DATE . Pursuant to these Acts , the ORG was to advance child alimony to all children , including children with NORP fathers . Prior to these Acts the NORP authorities did not advance child alimony from any fathers , regardless of their nationality .

LAW DATE , section CARDINAL - CARDINAL reads :

“ An employer is liable for damage caused intentionally or negligently during an employee 's performance of work or functions for the employer , taking into account whether the requirements , which the aggrieved person can reasonably make to the activity or service , have been neglected . The liability does not comprise damage or injury caused by the fact that the employee has exceeded the reasonable limits of his duties , considering the nature and range of the activity and the character of the work or function .

For the purpose of these provisions , the term ' employer ' means the public authorities and anybody who employs a person in his service , whether for gainful activity or not .

For the purpose of these provisions , the term “ employee ” means anybody who performs work or functions in the service of an employer . The term ' employee ' includes ' ombudsmann ' in public service , officers and privates in military service and other persons performing compulsory service for public authorities , and inmates , patients and the like who take part in work in the prison authority 's establishments , in health institutions etc . ”

Under this provision , the ORG , as an employer , can be held liable irrespective of whether it has acted with negligence . Furthermore , the employee / employees do not have to be identified and the employer can be held liable if the cumulative acts of its employees fulfil the criteria laid down in section CARDINAL - CARDINAL .

Prior to LAW , an individual could hold the ORG responsible for acts of its employees under general principles of law , developed in particular in judicial jurisprudence . LAW was aimed at codifying those principles .

According to the Government , the ORG , like private individuals , could also be held liable for damage caused by negligence , under the general principles on the law of tort . This could arise in relation to a variety of activities , including notably decision making and the exercise of its different supervision and control functions .

Financial claims , including claims for damages , may be lost through limitation . LAW of DATE section CARDINAL regulates the limitation period for claims for damages . The relevant parts of the section read :

“ CARDINAL . Claims for damages or redress shall be subject to a limitation period of DATE from the date on which the injured party obtained , or should have himself acquired , necessary knowledge of the damage and the person responsible .

Nevertheless , the limitation period shall be DATE after the commission of the tort or other ground for liability ceased . ... ”

Until DATE section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) also contained DATE limitation rule , which read :

“ CARDINAL . Nevertheless , the limitation period shall be at DATE from the date on which the damage occurred , or DATE after the commission of the tort or other ground for liability ceased . .... ”

Even if an individual war child can not prove that he / she fulfils the legal criteria for obtaining damages from an individual or the ORG , he / she can apply for ex gratia compensation ( billighetserstatning ) from the ORG with respect to injury suffered , either due to the acts or omissions of public authorities or for instance criminal acts by individuals . This is meant to be the last resort to obtain damages when a person has suffered harm or distress . It is sufficient that the application describes the circumstances that form the basis for the claim , and if possible document these with for instance a doctor 's or psychologist 's certificate , testimony from family , friends or others that have knowledge of the applicant 's situation etc . In particular if the events occurred quite some time back , as would be the case in relation to many war children , there are no strict requirements as to the evidence for the acts / omissions that form the basis for the claim . Furthermore , the relevant ORG has an obligation to look into and examine the case . The arrangement of ex gratia compensation is not subject to any statutes of limitation .

Whether the claim for compensation is granted is based on a test of reasonableness . It is in particular relevant if the public authorities can be blamed for the harm . It is sufficient that a public body is to blame ; the identification of the wrongdoer among the public official is not a condition . Even where the authorities were not to be blamed , compensation has been awarded , inter alia in cases of personal injury due to criminal acts committed before the Regulation concerning criminal injuries compensation ( forskrift om voldsoffererstatning ) was passed on DATE .

The amount of compensation awarded ex - gratia is based on an assessment of reasonableness . It does not attempt to cover all economic losses . The committee set to determine applications for ex - gratia compensation , composed by CARDINAL former ORG Judge and CARDINAL members of ORG , may award up to ORG CARDINAL CARDINAL ( in DATE ) . Cases where it is deemed necessary to award a higher amount or which are of a specific political nature are to be assessed by ORG .

On DATE new rules for ex gratia compensation for war children entered into force and new guidelines were published . As a result , the possibility for war children of obtaining such compensation was expanded ; for example , injury caused by bullying was included in the guidelines . The more serious types of infringements against war children were already covered by the existing guidelines , such as sexual assault , wrongful placement in an institution , inadequate schooling and reproachable conduct on the part of employees in the child protection services , within or outside the orphanage . In such cases , compensation is awarded if the circumstances are made sufficiently probable and if they have caused particular suffering , loss etc for the war child . The fact that the individual is a war child does not in itself qualify for compensation .

It has been accepted that bullying may be particularly hard to prove after a long time . Thus , for war children ORG accepted a special arrangement , whereby up to ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL may be awarded on the basis of a credible personal statement . If there is documentation of more serious damage due to bullying , a higher amount may be awarded .


Violation of Art. 6;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Anatoly Kovler;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant had a quarrel with his neighbours and stabbed CARDINAL of them with a screwdriver causing him fatal injury . On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant . He was charged under LAW of LAW ( Уголовный кодекс РСФСР ) with “ deliberate infliction of physical injury leading to the victim ’s death ” .

On DATE the Kuntsevskiy ORG of GPE examined the case at first instance . It requalified the applicant ’s actions and found him guilty of “ murder committed in circumstances where excessive force was used in self - defence ” under LAW of the newly enacted LAW of GPE кодекс PERSON ) , which had entered into force on DATE . The court sentenced the applicant to a prison term of DATE and DATE , which was calculated from DATE , when he was detained pending trial .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of DATE at final instance .

While serving his sentence the applicant attempted to institute supervisory review proceedings against these decisions . His request was rejected by the Vice - President of ORG on DATE .

In DATE the applicant was released after having served his sentence .

On DATE the Vice - President of ORG of GPE lodged an application for supervisory review ( протест в порядке надзора ) of the court decisions of DATE and DATE . In the application it was stated that although he had been indicted under LAW § CARDINAL of the old LAW , the applicant had been tried and convicted under a different provision , namely , LAW of LAW . The new charge , as it was further argued , was more serious than the original charge as it implied , unlike the first one , an intention to cause death . However , LAW Уголовно-процессуальный кодекс РСФСР ) prevented the trial court from amending charges unless it was to the benefit of the accused .

On DATE the ORG of ORG granted the application for supervisory review . The ORG decided to quash the court decisions on the grounds put forward in the application and to remit the case for a new examination at first instance .

On DATE the ORG found the applicant guilty under LAW of the old LAW of “ deliberate infliction of physical injury leading to the victim ’s death ” . The court sentenced the applicant to a prison term of DATE . In deciding the actual term to be served , the court deducted from this period the prison term of DATE and DATE already served by the applicant . On DATE the applicant started serving the remainder of the prison sentence .

On DATE the Vice - President of ORG of GPE lodged an application for supervisory review of the court decisions of DATE and DATE . The application sought to have the case remitted for a new court examination .

On DATE the ORG of ORG decided to grant the application . The ORG found that :

“ ... the sentence was quashed by the decision of the ORG of ORG of DATE ... on the grounds that LAW had been violated as the court qualified [ the applicant ’s ] actions under a provision under which he had not been indicted , thus violating [ the applicant ’s ] right to defence ...

In accordance with LAW , the imposition of a more severe penalty or application of a more serious criminal law on a new examination of a case at first instance [ after it has been remitted by the appellate court ] is allowed only if the initial sentence was quashed upon the prosecutor ’s appeal ... on the grounds of an excessively lenient penalty ...

Therefore , in the new examination of the case the court was not allowed to qualify [ the applicant ’s ] actions under a more serious provision and impose a more severe penalty than initially imposed ... ”

The ORG decided once again to quash the court decisions and to remit the case for a new examination at first instance . It ordered the applicant to be released .

On DATE the Kuntsevskiy ORG of GPE examined the charges against the applicant and found him guilty under LAW of “ inflicting serious injuries in circumstances where excessive force was used in self - defence ” . The court sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment . Taking into account the prison terms already served , the court concluded that the punishment had already been executed .

No appeal was lodged against the judgment of DATE , which became final .

The RSFSR Criminal Code of DATE provided that deliberate infliction of physical injury leading to the victim ’s death was punishable by DATE imprisonment . Article CARDINAL provided that infliction of serious injuries in circumstances where excessive force was used in self - defence was punishable by DATE imprisonment .

LAW of GPE , in force since DATE , provides that murder committed in circumstances where excessive force was used in self - defence is punishable by up to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment ( LAW ) . The LAW provides that criminal liability and the applicable penalty are determined by the law in force at the time of commission of the criminal act and that retrospective application of a law or penalty is not permissible unless it is to the advantage of the accused ( ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) .

Article CARDINAL of the DATE Code of Criminal Procedure ( Уголовно-процессуальный кодекс РСФСР ) , applicable at the relevant time , provided that a case was examined in court only on the charge put before the court . The charge could be amended by the court provided that this did not worsen the defendant ’s situation and did not violate his or her right to defence .

Section VI , LAW , of the LAW regulated the supervisory review procedure which allowed certain officials to challenge a judgment , which had entered into force , and have the case reviewed on points of law and procedure . The supervisory review procedure is to be distinguished from proceedings which review a case because of newly established facts .

Pursuant to Section CARDINAL a judgment entered into force and was subject to execution as of DATE when the appeal ( cassation ) instance issued its judgment .

Section CARDINAL provided that the power to lodge an application for a supervisory review ( an extraordinary appeal ) may be exercised by the President and Vice - Presidents of ORG of GPE , ORG and his Deputies , in respect of any judgment other than those of the Presidium of ORG , and by the Presidents of the regional courts in respect of any judgment of a regional or subordinate court . A party to criminal or civil proceedings may solicit the intervention of such officials for a review .

Section CARDINAL laid down a limitation period of DATE during which an application calling for the supervisory review of a conviction judgment could be brought , if such an application sought a harsher penalty . The same limitation period applied to an application brought against an acquittal . It ran from DATE when the conviction or the acquittal entered into force .

According to Sections CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL , the application for supervisory review was considered by the presidium of the relevant court which examined the case on the merits , not being bound by the scope and grounds of the application . The presidium could either dismiss the application and thus uphold the earlier judgment , or grant the application . In the latter case it had to decide whether to quash the judgment and terminate the criminal proceedings , to remit the case for a new investigation , or for a new court examination at any instance , to uphold a first instance judgment reversed on appeal , or to amend and uphold any of the earlier judgments .

Section CARDINAL provided that imposition of a graver punishment or application of a harsher criminal law in the examination of a case at first instance was allowed only if the initial sentence had been quashed upon supervisory review on the grounds seeking imposition of a graver penalty .


The applicant , born in DATE , presently resides in GPE , GPE . In his application form , he states that he has NORP nationality .

a.

On DATE the applicant arrived in GPE . He requested asylum DATE . He stated that he is an ethnic NORP from NORP in GPE . As from DATE he served in the NORP army . In DATE he was taken prisoner by NORP troops and held in captivity for DATE . In DATE Kakanj was occupied by NORP troops who started an ethnic cleansing of the village . In DATE he deserted from his military unit and travelled to PERSON where he joined another unit . In DATE he absconded also from that unit and left for GPE . He arrived in GPE via GPE . During his journey he used his NORP passport which he tore apart upon arrival in GPE . The applicant claimed to be a citizen of GPE only . He feared that , if deported to GPE , he would be sent back to GPE .

On DATE ORG ( ORG invandrarverk ) rejected the applicant 's request and ordered his deportation to GPE . Finding that the applicant held both NORP and NORP citizenship , the ORG referred to a decision concerning asylum seekers with such double nationality taken by ORG on DATE . According to the decision , the prevailing situation in GPE rendered deportations to that country impossible . Consequently , in assessing applications from these asylum seekers , the crucial question was whether they could be afforded protection in GPE . ORG noted that , according to available information , there was no reason to assume that GPE would not afford the applicant protection . Further , persons in the applicant 's situation did not risk to be sent from GPE to GPE against their will . Neither was there any risk that NORP citizens in general would be forced to take part in armed conflict . Moreover , the applicant had failed to show that he would risk persecution or other harassment if deported to GPE .

The applicant appealed to ORG ( Utlänningsnämnden ) . On DATE ORG granted the applicant a temporary residence permit until DATE and quashed the deportation order . In so doing , the ORG referred to a Government decision of CARDINAL DATE according to which the worsened situation in GPE constituted an impediment to the deportation of asylum seekers to that country .

On DATE the applicant submitted a new application for a residence permit . He referred to his previous statements and added that , being an ethnic NORP , he could not return to the NORP - dominated Kakanj or to any other part of GPE . He risked punishment for having deserted from the NORP army . Moreover , he could not go to GPE where he had no place to live . His NORP passport did not entitle him to full civic rights in GPE and he would thus be forced to return to GPE .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant 's new application and ordered his deportation to GPE . ORG had regard to guiding decisions taken by ORG and found that the applicant should not be sent back to PERSON . With regard to the possible deportation to GPE , the ORG noted that no circumstances had been invoked by the applicant which could lead to the conclusion that he was unable to go to GPE . Consequently , ORG reiterated the conclusions drawn in its previous decision concerning the applicant . Furthermore , ORG found that there were no reasons of a humanitarian nature to grant the applicant a residence permit .

On DATE ORG upheld ORG decision .

In medical certificates issued by the psychiatric clinic at the hospital in GPE on DATE and DATE physicians ORG and ORG stated that the applicant suffered from anxiety and suicide thoughts . He had been treated with antidepressant medication . As from DATE he had been treated at the clinic for a post - traumatic stress syndrome . ORG found that the applicant was in need of qualified psychiatric care and that there was a considerable risk that he would commit self - destructive acts . The clinic submitted the certificate of DATE to ORG and requested that the enforcement of the deportation order be suspended .

On DATE ORG decided not to suspend the enforcement of the deportation order .

Relevant domestic law

Under LAW of LAW ( Lagen om psykiatrisk tvångsvård , DATE ) , such care shall be terminated at the request of the competent police authority whenever the person placed in care is ordered to be deported . This presupposes , however , that the chief physician finds that the alien 's condition allows that the deportation takes place . According to LAW , no appeal lies against the chief physician 's decision .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial

András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Nona Tsotsoria;Vladimiro Zagrebelsky

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

In DATE the applicant and his wife bought a flat . In DATE the applicant ’s wife initiated divorce proceedings against the applicant and in DATE the divorce was pronounced .

In the meantime , on DATE , the applicant brought an action before ORG , asking for compensation in an amount equal to CARDINAL the value of the flat he and his former wife had bought in DATE . On DATE the court dismissed the case as it found that it did not have jurisdiction ratione materiae , and sent the file to ORG . However , on DATE the ORG dismissed the case as it also found that it lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae , and sent the file back to ORG .

Finally , on DATE , having regard to the statements of both parties’ witnesses and an expert report to assess the contribution made by the parties to the flat , and in view of the facts of the previous divorce action , ORG dismissed the case . It held that the applicant and his former wife had been living in separate houses when the flat in question was bought . Moreover , the applicant was unemployed and unable to provide even a basic level of financial support for his wife . It was concluded that , given his financial situation , the applicant could not have contributed enough to the purchase of the flat in question to be entitled to claim a share in it . The court further noted that , at the time of purchase , the legal matrimonial regime was the system of separation of property and the title deed of the flat was registered in the wife ’s name .

On DATE and DATE respectively , ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal and rectification requests .


The applicants , PERSON , PERSON , PERSON and PERSON , are NORP nationals , who were born in DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE respectively . They live in GPE . The third applicant is the son of the first CARDINAL applicants , who are a married couple . The fourth applicant is the daughter of the second applicant . The applicants were represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

As the first applicant was suspected of being a member of a criminal organisation involved in drug trafficking , the GPE public prosecutor ’s office instituted proceedings against him on DATE for the application of preventive measures available under LAW no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE and LAW no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE , as amended by Act no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE . The public prosecutor ’s office also requested the seizure of a number of assets belonging to the first applicant and/or the other applicants .

In an order of DATE the President of the division of the GPE ORG specialised in preventive measures ordered the seizure of the assets in question , which included CARDINAL vehicles , several plots of land and flats , CARDINAL private company shares and numerous documents . He noted that the inspections carried out by the national anti - mafia brigade ( ORG ) showed a discrepancy between the first applicant ’s financial means and his legal business activities and declared income .

During the proceedings before the special division the first CARDINAL applicants and numerous witnesses were questioned . PERSON and financial experts’ reports were drawn up and transcripts of certain tapped telephone conversations were filed with the court registry . The court also ordered the production of certain documents relating to other judicial proceedings brought against the first applicant and/or other persons suspected of belonging to mafia - type organisations . All the applicants , represented by a lawyer of their choice , participated in the proceedings for the application of preventive measures .

In an order of DATE that was deposited with the registry on DATE the division of ORG specialised in preventive measures decided to place the first applicant under police supervision , combined with an order for compulsory residence in the district of GPE for DATE . The special division also ordered confiscation , pursuant to section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) , third paragraph , of Act no . CARDINAL of DATE , of the ORG previously seized assets .

The judges of the special division pointed out first of all that DATE the first applicant had been convicted on a number of occasions of fraud , incitement to prostitution , assault , duress , false imprisonment , gross indecency in a public place , uttering worthless cheques , illegal possession of firearms , fraudulent bankruptcy and criminal association . It also emerged from a number of documents found at the first applicant ’s house that he was in close contact with persons involved in organised crime . Furthermore , proceedings for usury and mafia - type criminal association were pending against the first applicant . Admittedly , in the criminal proceedings for criminal association the applicant ’s pre - trial detention had been revoked ; however , that fact did not prevent the judges from considering it “ reasonably probable ” that he was involved in a criminal association , that he lent money at excessive interest rates and that he had made death threats in the event of non - payment . Continued detention of an accused was justified where there was a “ very high probability ” that they were guilty , whereas the application of preventive measures could be based on a lesser degree of probability .

With regard to the PERSON family ’s financial situation , the special division of the court observed that it was difficult to reconstruct the history of the various economic activities carried out by the first applicant because he had not kept official accounts of all his operations . In any event , it was clear from the evidence produced that at least part of the first applicant ’s considerable fortune had been unlawfully acquired , since it was the proceeds from his offences of fraudulent bankruptcy , uttering worthless cheques , illegal trading in diamonds , and usury . Moreover , the applicants had not supplied proof that the seized assets had been lawfully acquired . Admittedly , part of the assets officially belonged to the second , third and fourth applicants ; however , the special division found that the ORG family ’s entire fortune had been created by the first applicant , who , being the subject of numerous judicial proceedings , had subsequently considered it preferable to transfer certain assets to the couple ’s CARDINAL children for no consideration and to make his wife a partner in his business activities .

The applicants appealed against the order of DATE .

In an order of CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld the district court ’s decision . It observed , inter alia , that the special division of the court had found that the first applicant was a danger to society on the basis of statements made in other judicial proceedings by certain pentiti of the ORG , which had been corroborated by substantial evidence and showed that the first applicant had moved in criminal circles at least until DATE . The transcription of the tapped telephone conversations showed , furthermore , that the first applicant had severely threatened his debtors . With regard to his submission that his financial means could be explained exclusively by his legal activities as a businessman , ORG held that the ORG family ’s fortune had been amassed from the proceeds of criminal activities . Furthermore , the lack of accurate documentation made it impossible to assess the real profits which the first applicant had made from certain business transactions . There was also evidence showing that the ORG family ’s legal activities had been started up , developed and maintained with the proceeds of criminal offences committed by the first applicant .

ORG observed lastly that , according to case - law of ORG , assets which were the subject of a preventive measure concerning property should not formally belong to the person deemed to be a danger to society , since the latter could simply use them de facto as if he were the owner . In the instant case the first applicant had not maintained that the transfer of certain assets to the third and fourth applicants had made it impossible for him to use them as he wished . With regard to the second applicant , even if it was true that she had been involved in a number of business activities , the first applicant had nonetheless maintained a primordial role in the management and organisation of those activities .

The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law . In a judgment of DATE that was deposited with the registry on CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicants’ appeal , holding that ORG had given logical and proper reasons for all the points in dispute between the parties .

In accordance with section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of Act no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE , during the proceedings for the application of preventive measures against a person suspected of belonging to a mafia - type organisation , “ ORG may issue a reasoned decision , even of its own motion , ordering the seizure of property at the direct or indirect disposal of the person against whom the proceedings have been instituted , when there is sufficient circumstantial evidence , such as a considerable discrepancy between his lifestyle and his apparent or declared income , to show that the property concerned forms the proceeds from unlawful activities or their reinvestment . Together with the implementation of the preventive measure the ORG shall order the confiscation of any of the goods seized in respect of which it has not been shown that they were lawfully acquired . ... The ORG shall revoke the seizure order when the application for preventive measures is dismissed or when it has been shown that the property in question was lawfully acquired . ”


Violation of Art. 6-1 (length);Remainder inadmissible

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in the village of ORG in GPE .

On DATE the applicant sued the GPE central district hospital for damages caused by medical malpractice .

On DATE judge F. of ORG was assigned to the case . DATE and DATE ORG held QUANTITY hearings .

At the hearing of CARDINAL DATE the applicant notified ORG that his medical papers could have been forged and asked for an investigation into this issue . His request was granted .

The investigation was completed on DATE and on DATE ORG received the expert report and held a hearing .

The following hearing was held on DATE . The applicant successfully asked ORG to order a medical expert examination . The proceedings were stayed until DATE .

Of CARDINAL hearings listed DATE and DATE , CARDINAL hearing was adjourned because the applicant defaulted and CARDINAL was adjourned upon the defendant 's request .

DATE no hearings were listed because judge PERSON had resigned . Judge PERSON was assigned to the case . The examination of the case re - commenced .

On DATE ORG held a hearing . The court again ordered a medical examination and stayed the proceedings . After the proceedings had been resumed , a hearing was listed for DATE . It was , however , adjourned because the applicant wanted to amend his claims .

The following hearing , listed for DATE , was adjourned due to dismissal of judge PERSON On DATE the case was re - assigned to judge I.

From DATE to DATE no hearings were held because judge ORG was on leave or the defendant did not attend on DATE fixed .

The hearings listed for DATE and DATE were postponed upon the applicant 's request .

At the following hearing of CARDINAL DATE the applicant successfully challenged judge PERSON case was re - assigned to judge K.

Of CARDINAL hearings listed DATE and DATE , CARDINAL hearing was adjourned because the defendant did not attend , CARDINAL was postponed due to the judge 's illness , QUANTITY hearings were adjourned because witnesses defaulted and CARDINAL were postponed due to the applicant 's illness .

From DATE to DATE QUANTITY hearings were held . It appears that each hearing lasted TIME because the applicant did not feel well .

Of CARDINAL hearings fixed DATE hearings were adjourned because the applicant was ill or wanted to call additional witnesses and study the case - file .

From DATE to DATE no hearings were held because the judge was on leave .

DATE and DATE ORG held CARDINAL hearings . The hearings lasted TIME because the applicant provided ORG with a medical report according to which he could not effectively participate in a hearing if it lasted TIME .

From DATE to DATE ORG did not fix hearings due to the defendant 's requests and the judge 's absence .

Eighteen hearings were held DATE and DATE . Each hearing lasted TIME because the applicant felt ill and could not effectively participate .

On DATE the ORG of ORG dismissed the applicant 's action against the hospital as unsubstantiated . The applicant and his representative left the courtroom at the beginning of the hearing .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment on appeal .


Preliminary objection partially accepted (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies);Preliminary objection partially dismissed (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies);No violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 13;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

On DATE the applicant filed with ORG ( PERSON ) an action against ORG He claimed that in DATE he and his then wife made a contract with ORG with the effect that the applicant and his wife would provide ORG with all care until her death and ORG gave the applicant and his wife a flat in GPE for their use . Subsequently , another contract was made to the effect that the applicant and his wife would pay some of ORG ’s debts and that ORG would make a testament leaving to the applicant ’s wife the ground floor of a house in GPE with a garden . In DATE the applicant and ORG made CARDINAL additional contracts whereby ORG sold to the applicant a house in GPE . The contracts were not entered into the land registry . ORG stayed in the house and denied the applicant ’s property rights . By his action the applicant sought a declaration concerning his property rights . He also asked the court to issue an interim measure so as to prevent ORG from selling the property in question .

It transpires from the case file that sometime in DATE ORG died but had beforehand sold the property in question to third persons .

NORP Before DATE when the ORG entered into force in respect of GPE , several hearings were adjourned because the applicant ’s counsel did not appear .

NORP The hearing scheduled for DATE was also adjourned because the applicant ’s counsel did not appear . The postal receipt indicated that he had changed his address but had failed to inform the court .

The next hearing scheduled for DATE was again adjourned at the request of the applicant ’s counsel who informed the court that he had had no contact with the applicant .

At the hearing of CARDINAL DATE the applicant appeared in person and asked the court to adjourn the next hearing because he had instituted several proceedings with ORG and would prefer not to have to travel from GPE to GPE too often .

On DATE the applicant informed the court that he had obtained NORP citizenship .

On DATE the applicant filed a criminal complaint with ORG against the presiding judge alleging that she committed the offence of negligent performance of duty in dealing with his case . He alleged that the judge had been ignoring his numerous requests to speed up the proceedings and his request for an interim measure .

On DATE the applicant filed a request with ORG ( PERSON ) seeking that the presiding judge be dismissed from her office and repeating his allegations from the criminal complaint filed against her .

On DATE the applicant filed a motion with the president of ORG challenging the presiding judge for bias and once again repeating his allegations from the criminal complaint against her .

On DATE the president of ORG rejected the applicant ’s motion of DATE as unfounded .

The next hearing was scheduled for DATE . According to ORG attempted to serve the notice of the hearing date on the applicant at the address indicated in his claim . The receipt slip showed that the applicant was unknown at that address . ORG informed the court that the applicant did not live at the other address where he was registered . The court then posted the notice on its public notice - board .

NORP Since the applicant did not appear at the hearing scheduled for DATE the court stayed the proceedings ( mirovanje postupka ) .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE ORG informed the applicant that his allegations against the presiding judge had been unfounded .

On DATE ORG terminated the proceedings because the applicant had not sought that the proceedings be resumed .

On DATE the applicant filed an action against Lj . Š. for payment of CARDINAL NORP PERSON ( HRK ) , with ORG ( PERSON ) .

By default judgment of CARDINAL DATE the first instance court granted the applicant ’s claim . On DATE the appellate court quashed that judgment and remitted the case to the first instance court .

On DATE and DATE the applicant asked the first instance court to schedule a hearing , but did not submit PERSON . Š. ’s address . Therefore , the court requested her address from ORG which was , however , unable to provide the requested address .

On CARDINAL DATE the court invited the applicant to submit PERSON . Š. ’s address . The applicant did so on DATE .

As neither party appeared at the hearing scheduled for DATE the court stayed the proceedings ( mirovanje postupka ) .

On DATE the applicant filed a motion to resume the proceedings ( prijedlog za povrat u prijašnje stanje ) .

At the next hearing on DATE the court heard the applicant and after that resumed the proceedings .

The next hearing scheduled for DATE was adjourned because ORG . Š. did not appear . The postal receipt indicated that she had changed her address . The applicant submitted her new address . Lj . Š. ’s counsel submitted a receipt of payment relevant for the applicant ’s claim . The applicant asked the court to adjourn the hearing because he wished to submit his reply .

Since the applicant failed to appear at the hearing scheduled for DATE the court stayed the proceedings . Lj . ORG ’s counsel appealed against that decision .

On DATE ORG ( Županijski sud u GPE ) upheld the decision to stay the proceedings .

The proceedings were resumed before ORG which scheduled the next hearing for DATE . At that hearing the court allowed the applicant at his request to submit documentation in support of his claim within DATE .

The next hearing scheduled for DATE was adjourned .

At the hearing on DATE the court invited the applicant to specify his claim within DATE .

At the hearing on DATE the court heard the applicant and again invited him to specify his claim .

The ORG notes that neither party has referred to any further steps in the proceedings since the hearing on DATE and therefore must assume that the proceedings are still pending before the court of first instance .

On DATE the applicant filed with ORG an action against ORG seeking a declaration concerning his property rights .

NORP Before DATE the court of first instance exempted the applicant from the payment of the court fees and rejected his request to be entirely exempted from the payment of costs and expenses in the proceedings . Several hearings were adjourned .

At the hearing on DATE the GPE counsel asked the court to order the applicant to deposit a security for the GPE costs and expenses because the applicant was not a NORP citizen .

At the next hearing on CARDINAL DATE the court invited the applicant to submit a certificate on his residence in GPE .

On DATE the applicant informed the court that he was unable to submit the requested certificate .

On DATE the applicant informed the court that he had obtained NORP citizenship .

On DATE ORG pronounced judgment rejecting the applicant ’s claim .

The applicant appealed against the judgment . On DATE ORG rejected the appeal as being out of time . The applicant appealed against that decision . On DATE ORG quashed the first instance decision rejecting the applicant ’s appeal .

The ORG notes that neither party has referred to any further steps in the proceedings and therefore must assume that the proceedings are now pending before ORG upon the applicant ’s appeal against the first instance judgment of DATE .

On DATE the applicant filed with ORG ( PERSON ) an action against PERSON for payment of HRK CARDINAL .

DATE . On DATE the applicant was invited to submit a declaration of means in connection with his application for the exemption from the payment of the court fees .

The applicant filed a motion challenging the presiding judge for bias . His motion was dismissed by the President of the court on DATE . However , the case - file was assigned to another judge .

At the next hearing on CARDINAL DATE GPE replied to the applicant ’s claim .

As the judge retired , the case was assigned to another judge .

At the hearing on DATE the court invited the applicant to specify his claim .

The next hearing scheduled for DATE was adjourned due to the applicant ’s illness .

At the hearing of CARDINAL DATE the court again invited the applicant to specify his claim . On DATE the applicant complied with the court ’s request .

NORP In DATE the judge went on maternity leave . In DATE the case was assigned to another judge .

The next hearing scheduled for DATE was adjourned because PERSON did not appear .

At the hearing on DATE the court concluded the proceedings .

On DATE the court pronounced judgment partly granting and partly rejecting the applicant ’s claim .

On DATE and DATE , respectively , PERSON and the applicant filed their appeals against the judgment .

On DATE the appellate court quashed the first instance judgment and remitted the case to the GPE court for re - trial .

At the next hearing on DATE the court decided to hear the parties at the hearing scheduled for DATE .

At the hearing on DATE the court stayed the proceedings because the applicant did not appear . The applicant then asked the court to resume the proceedings .

The ORG notes that neither party has referred to any further steps in the proceedings and therefore must assume that the proceedings are still pending before the court of first instance .

On DATE the applicant filed with ORG an action against A.J.J. concerning certain compensation claims .

The court exempted the applicant from the payment of the court fees .

On DATE A.J.J. ’s counsel filed a request that the applicant be ordered to deposit a security for ORG ’s costs and expenses because the applicant was not a NORP citizen .

DATE . At the hearing on DATE A.J.J. ’s counsel repeated the previous request . The applicant opposed that request .

It seems that ORG had filed written submissions concerning the applicant ’s claim before the hearing on DATE when the court invited the applicant to reply to A.J.J. ’s submissions within DATE . The applicant did not submit any reply .

On DATE the case was transferred to another judge because the previous judge had resigned .

On DATE the court rejected ORG ’s request that the applicant deposit the security for her costs and expenses .

On DATE appealed against the above decision .

In the meantime , on DATE , the applicant informed the court that he had obtained NORP citizenship .

On DATE appeal was sent to the applicant for reply .

At the hearing on DATE the parties agreed that , since the applicant had obtained NORP citizenship , there was no need for further examination of ORG ’s appeal .

DATE . At the next hearing on DATE the court stayed the proceedings as the applicant did not appear .

On DATE the applicant filed an application to resume the proceedings .

The next hearing scheduled for DATE was adjourned because the applicant did not appear .

At the hearing on DATE the court heard the applicant in connection with his application that the proceedings be resumed .

On DATE the court rejected the applicant ’s request to resume the proceedings and terminated the proceedings . This decision became final on DATE .

The relevant parts of LAW of LAW on LAW ( entered into force on DATE , published in ORG no . CARDINAL of DATE hereinafter “ the DATE LAW ” – PERSON o PERSON ) read as follows :

( CARDINAL ) The Constitutional Court shall examine a constitutional complaint even before all legal remedies have been exhausted in cases when a competent court has not decided within a reasonable time a claim concerning the applicant ’s rights and obligations or a criminal charge against him ...

( CARDINAL ) If the constitutional complaint ... under paragraph CARDINAL of this Section is accepted , the ORG shall determine a time - limit within which a competent court shall decide the case on the merits ...

( CARDINAL ) In a decision under paragraph CARDINAL of this LAW , the Constitutional Court shall fix appropriate compensation for the applicant in respect of the violation found concerning his constitutional rights ... The compensation shall be paid from the ORG budget within a term of DATE from the date when the party lodged a request for its payment .

Decision of the Constitutional Court of DATE , no . PERSON reads as follows in its relevant parts :

D E C I S I O N

The ORG rejects the constitutional complaint .

R e a s o n i n g

The constitutional complaint was filed pursuant to LAW of LAW on LAW ( Official Gazette no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL-consolidated legislation , hereinafter LAW ) .

It appears from the constitutional complaint and the enclosed documents that on DATE the applicant , as a plaintiff , filed a claim before ORG seeking damages from ORG from GPE . The applicant ’s claim was rejected by ORG final judgment no . Pn-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ( ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal as unfounded by its judgment No . Gž-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ) . The applicant ’s request for revision was rejected as inadmissible by virtue of ORG decision No . Rev-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE .

The applicant complains under LAW of the LAW that the excessive length of civil proceedings ( DATE ) infringed his right to fair trial within a reasonable time ...

ORG has established that the applicant has exhausted all available legal remedies within the meaning of Section CARDINAL § § CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW because the proceedings have been concluded ...

Section CARDINAL of LAW provides that ORG must reject a complaint when the conditions set out for considering the merits of the complaint have ceased to exist .

Since , for the above mentioned reasons , the conditions for considering the applicant ’s complaint set out in LAW have ceased to exist , the ORG has decided to reject the complaint pursuant to LAW ...

“ R J E Š E NJ E

PERSON tužba se odbacuje .

O b r a z l o ž e nj e

PERSON tužba podnijeta je temljem odredbe članka CARDINAL . stavka CARDINAL . ORG zakona o PERSON sudu PERSON ( “ ORG novine ” , broj QUANTITY , u daljnjem tekstu : PERSON )

Iz obrazloženja ustavne tužbe i priložene dokumentacije proizlazti da je podnositelj , kao tužitelj , dana CARDINAL . lipnja DATE . godine , podnio Općinskom sudu u LOC tužbu protiv GPE osiguranja d.d . iz GPE , kao tuženika , radi naknade štete . ORG zahtjev podnositelja odbijen je pravomoćnom presudom PERSON u GPE , broj : Pn CARDINAL - CARDINAL od CARDINAL . siječnja DATE . godine ( PERSON u GPE presudom broj : Gž CARDINAL od CARDINAL . kolovoza DATE . godine odbio je žalbu podnositelja kao neosnovanu . ) . PERSON pravomoćne presude podnositelj je izjavio reviziju , koja je odbačena kao nedopuštena rješenjem ORG PERSON , broj : PERSON CARDINAL od CARDINAL . siječnja DATE . godine .

PERSON u ustavnoj tužbi ističe povredu odredbe članka CARDINAL . PERSON jer smatra da mu je zbog nerazumno dugog trajanja parnice ( CARDINAL godina ) povrijeđeno pravo na pošteno suđenje ...

Ustavni sud je utvrdio da je u slučaju podnositelja ustavne tužbe iscrpljen pravni put u smislu odredbi člnaka CARDINAL . stavaka CARDINAL . i CARDINAL . PERSON zakona jer je sudski postupak pravomoćno okončan ...

ORG članka DATE . ORG zakona propisuje FAC rješenjem odbaciti ustavnu tužbu u slučajevima ORG ne postoje pretpostavke za odlučivanje o biti stvari .

S obzirom da iz navedenih razloga ne postoje pretpostavke navedene u člnaku CARDINAL . stavku CARDINAL . ORG zakona za odlučivanje o podnesenoj ustavnoj tužbi , na temelju odredbe članka DATE . ORG zakona , riješeno je kao u izreci . ”