Violation of P1-1;Not necessary to examine Art. 14+P1-1;Pecuniary damage - financial award;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses award - domestic proceedings;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings

Under LAW as worded until DATE the applicant company was liable to value - added tax ( VAT ) on its commercial activity . It paid a total of MONEY ( FRF ) in VAT on its DATE transactions .

Article CARDINAL - a of the Sixth Directive of the Council of the European Communities dated DATE granted an exemption from ORG for “ insurance and reinsurance transactions , including related services performed by insurance brokers and insurance agents ” . That provision was to come into force on DATE .

On DATE the Ninth Directive of the Council of the European Communities dated DATE was notified to ORG . It granted GPE an extension of time – until DATE in which to implement the provisions of Article CARDINAL - a of the Sixth Directive of DATE . Since such directives have no retroactive effect , the Sixth Directive ought nonetheless to have been applied from DATE to CARDINAL DATE .

Relying on the Sixth Directive , the applicant company sought reimbursement of the VAT it had paid for the period from DATE , which it considered had not been due as the Ninth Directive had no retroactive effect . It also brought an action in damages against the ORG for failing to bring NORP law into line with the Sixth Directive within the prescribed period , thereby causing it to sustain damage equal to the amount of the VAT paid . It claimed reimbursement of the VAT paid or , failing that , the amount attributable to the period from DATE to the date the Sixth Directive had come into force .

ORG dismissed its claims in a judgment of DATE . It held , inter alia , that it was clear from LAW that while directives placed an obligation on GPE to achieve a particular result , the choice of the appropriate means of implementing a directive in domestic law lay within the sole discretion of the national authorities , such that individuals and private bodies could not rely directly on a directive to defeat a provision of domestic law .

On DATE a claim by another firm of insurance brokers , ORG , for the reimbursement of ORG paid on its transactions in DATE was dismissed by ORG for the same reasons .

In a further development , the authorities directed in an administrative circular issued on DATE :

“ ... no further action shall be taken to collect sums remaining due at the date of publication of this circular from insurance brokers who have failed to charge value - added tax on their transactions DATE and DATE and have received supplementary tax assessments as a result . ”

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE the ORG d'Etat dismissed an appeal by the applicant company . It held that individuals and private bodies were not entitled to rely on the provisions of a NORP directive that had yet to be transposed into domestic law and declared the action in damages inadmissible , as the applicant company had omitted to apply in the first instance to the tax authorities . The main points in its judgment were as follows .

As regards the first head of claim :

“ LAW DATE makes it clear that , while ORG directives are binding upon each member ORG ' as to the result to be achieved ' and while in order to achieve the prescribed results the national authorities are required to adapt the legislation of the member GPE to comply with the directives addressed to them , it is solely for those authorities to decide how to give effect to the directives in domestic law . Thus , regardless of any instructions they may contain for the member GPE , directives can not be pleaded in aid of tax appeals by nationals of those GPE . It is common ground that appropriate measures to implement the aforementioned Sixth Directive in domestic law had yet to be taken at the time of the relevant reference period for taxation purposes . In these circumstances , the said Directive , which , contrary to what was submitted by the appellant company , does not constitute a regulation within the meaning of the aforementioned LAW , has in any event no bearing on the application of the preceding statutory provisions , in particular , LAW ... ”

As regards the second head of claim :

“ ORG did not rule on the claim made in the alternative during the course of the proceedings by the company for compensation in the sum of ORG CARDINAL . That part of the impugned judgment is therefore defective procedurally and must be quashed .

In the present circumstances , an immediate examination and determination of the claim which the court below omitted to decide is called for .

By virtue of the provisions of Article PERSON of ORG and LAW CARDINAL DATE , proceedings may only be brought in the administrative courts by way of an appeal against a decision . PERSON has not produced any decision that shows that the administrative authority refused to pay it the claimed compensation of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL ; it has not even produced a request to the authority for that amount . Accordingly , in the absence of a prior decision , its claim to compensation is inadmissible ... ”

As the second claim had been dismissed on procedural grounds owing to the applicant company 's failure to apply in the first instance to the tax authorities , the applicant company made a further claim for reparation , this time after following the prescribed procedure . To that end , it had sent the Minister of the ORG a claim for reparation comprising CARDINAL limbs on DATE . In the first , it alleged that the ORG was at fault for failing to transpose the Sixth Directive into domestic law within the prescribed period and for continuing to apply a provision of NORP law that no longer complied with Community law . In the second , it argued that the ORG was strictly liable for failing to maintain an equal distribution of public burdens following the issue of the circular of CARDINAL DATE .

The claim was rejected by the Minister . An appeal by the applicant company to ORG was dismissed on DATE .

In a judgment of DATE ORG , sitting as a full court , quashed part of the judgment of ORG . It held that the ORG had been at fault and ordered it to pay the applicant company compensation for its loss in the sum of ORG CARDINAL , being the amount of NORP overpaid , together with compound statutory interest .

The main points made by ORG in its judgment were as follows :

“ The principle of ORG liability :

Under the provisions of the LAW establishing ORG , and in particular LAW thereof , ORG is required to take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of its obligations under LAW . These include an obligation to nullify all the illegal consequences of a violation of Community law either directly or , in default , by providing effective reparation for the resulting damage . It follows that the fact that a taxpayer which alleges that it has been taxed on the basis of a statutory provision that is incompatible with the objectives of a Community directive has first referred the issue of taxation to the tax court , which refused to accept that such incompatibility could serve as a cause of action , can not by itself render inadmissible a claim made by the taxpayer on the basis of the obligations arising under LAW for reparation for the damage it has sustained as a result of a failure to transpose the objectives of the directive into domestic law .

By Article CARDINAL - a of the Sixth Directive of the Council of the European Economic Communities dated CARDINAL DATE the legislation of member GPE was required from DATE to exempt from value - added tax insurance and reinsurance transactions , including related services performed by insurance brokers and insurance agents . Although the Ninth Directive of DATE , which was notified to ORG on DATE , granted GPE an extension of time – until DATE in which to transpose the provisions of the Sixth Directive , it is construed by ORG of ORG as having no retroactive effect . Thus , the provisions of LAW as worded prior to DATE requiring payment of value - added tax on insurance broking activities of the type carried on by the PERSON company were for the period from DATE to CARDINAL DATE incompatible with the objectives set by the Sixth Directive . Accordingly , contrary to ORG decision , the applicant company 's claim that the ORG is liable for the situation that has thus arisen and should be ordered to make good the loss it has sustained as a result of the illegal situation brought about by its being required to pay value - added tax for the above - mentioned period is well - founded .

Damage :

In view of the fact that insurance brokers are remunerated on the basis of a percentage calculated by the insurers of the premiums paid by the latter 's customers , the value - added tax paid by the Jacques Dangeville company was not passed on to their customers or invoiced . Thus , the damage for which the company is entitled to claim reparation is equal to the amount of the value - added tax it paid for the period from DATE to CARDINAL DATE and comes to ORG . ”

The tax authorities appealed to the ORG d'Etat .

NORP In its pleading lodged on CARDINAL DATE the applicant company set out the following ground of defence :

“ ... in the instant case the rule that taxpayers should bear the tax burden equally has been contravened by the introduction of measures treating people in the same position differently , since a circular dated DATE purported to rule that insurance brokers who had not paid ORG on their transactions DATE and DATE and had received supplementary tax assessments as a result would no longer be required to pay the sums they continued to owe on that account at the date the circular was published .

This is a particularly clear breach of the rule that public liabilities must be borne equally . It is also unjust , as it resulted in discrimination between persons liable to ORG , with those who have paid the tax being adversely affected and those who refrained from doing so deriving a benefit . ”

By a judgment of DATE the ORG d'Etat , sitting as a full court , quashed that judgment and dismissed all the applicant company 's claims . It held that the applicant company was not entitled to seek through an action in damages a remedy it had been refused in tax proceedings in a decision that gave rise to an estoppel by record , namely the judgment of CARDINAL DATE .

The essence of the ORG d'Etat 's decision was as follows :

“ The documents in the file submitted to ORG show that by a decision of CARDINAL DATE the ORG d'Etat , acting in its judicial capacity , dismissed a claim by PERSON seeking reimbursement of value - added tax it had paid for the period from DATE to DATE , inter alia , on the ground that its liability to that tax had arisen from the application of statutory provisions that were incompatible with the objectives of the Sixth Directive of the Council of the European Communities of DATE . The claim by ORG which ORG examined in the impugned judgment was for payment of ' compensation ' in an amount equal to the amount of value - added tax that had thus been paid , by way of reparation for the ' damage ' which that tax liability had caused the company to sustain , on the ground that that damage was attributable to ORG delay in transposing the objectives of the Directive into domestic law . It follows that , as submitted by the Minister of the ORG , ORG erred in law in holding that the fact that the company ' [ had ] first referred the issue of taxation to the tax court ' did not render inadmissible a claim for reparation in which the only alleged damage was the damage resulting from the payment of the tax . The Minister of the ORG 's application to have the impugned judgment overturned is accordingly founded to the extent that ORG upheld in part the claims made by PERSON in its submissions ... ”

On DATE the ORG d'Etat delivered judgment on an appeal lodged on CARDINAL DATE by ORG against ORG judgment of DATE . The ORG d'Etat did not follow the line it had taken in its judgment of CARDINAL DATE in the applicant company 's case , but instead declared ORG 's appeal on points of law admissible , holding that the company was entitled to rely on the provisions of the Sixth Directive and should be granted a release from the contested tax liability – for which there was no statutory basis as the statutory provisions conflicted with the objectives of the Directive – for the sums erroneously paid for the period from DATE to CARDINAL DATE .

The Government Commissioner lodged submissions that were common to the applicant company 's and ORG 's cases . He pointed out that the factual and legal issues in each were identical , saying :

“ ... [ the file in the case of ORG ] raises the same issue of law as that decided by this court on DATE on the appeal of the PERSON company . The period concerned is the same and the applicable instruments identical . The appellant company , which runs the Revert et ORG firm , has an activity as insurance brokers which is indistinguishable from that of the GPE company ... ”

He added :

“ ... I invite you to quash the judgment of ORG which upheld the GPE company 's claims for compensation . It has been that company 's misfortune to have its tax claim decided too early . I am conscious that the resulting outcome in its case may appear unjust . I am , however , mindful that upholding the judgment in its favour would mean your making an exception to the principles on which your decision - making process is based that would unreasonably undermine the stability of legal situations created by judicial decision . CARDINAL isolated case based , moreover , on transitional difficulties , can not serve to justify making such an exception ... ”

In finding in favour of ORG in its judgment of DATE , the ORG d'Etat held as follows :

“ Firstly , by virtue of LAW DATE the member GPE were required to take appropriate measures by DATE in order to bring their systems of value - added tax in line with the objectives of the Directive . Although the Ninth Directive of DATE , which was notified to ORG on DATE , granted GPE an extension of time – until DATE in which to transpose the provisions of the Sixth Directive , it is construed by ORG of ORG as having no retroactive effect . Thus , before DATE it was unable to afford the NORP authorities a defence for their failure to enact provisions complying with the objectives of the Sixth Directive on time .

Further , in so far as they make dealings by insurance brokers liable to value - added tax when the remuneration for them does not take the form of commission or brokerage set by statute or regulations , ORG and CARDINAL - CARDINAL - CARDINALo of LAW , which were enacted by LAW DATE and remained in force until amended by the PERSON of DATE , are not compatible with the objectives of the provisions of sub - paragraph ( a ) of Article CARDINAL of the Sixth Directive , which exempts from value - added tax all insurance and reinsurance transactions performed by insurance brokers or agents . Accordingly , it is to that extent necessary to rule that those provisions of ORG and CARDINAL - CARDINAL - CARDINALo were inapplicable for the period from CARDINAL January to CARDINAL DATE . It follows that the submission by ORG firm , which carries on an activity as insurance brokers , that there was no basis in law for the demand for it to pay value - added tax on its business dealings during the period from DATE to DATE is well - founded .

However , for the period from DATE to DATE the company is not entitled to rely on the incompatibility of ORG and CARDINAL - CARDINAL - CARDINALo of LAW with the objectives of the provisions of sub - paragraph ( a ) of LAW , as the time - limit by which GPE was required to bring its legislation into line with that Directive was extended to QUANTITY DATE by ORG . Subsequently , the applicant company was rightly charged value - added tax for the period from DATE to DATE on the basis of the provisions of ORG and CARDINAL - CARDINAL - CARDINALo of LAW that remained applicable .

It follows from the foregoing that the sole valid submission made by ORG firm is that ORG erred in its impugned judgment in dismissing its claim for the periods from DATE and DATE to DATE ... ”

As regards the principle of the “ precedence of the ORG legal system ” , see , among other authorities , the following judgments of ORG of ORG ) : Case CARDINAL/CARDINAL , GPE v. ORG [ DATE ] ORG Reports ( ORG ) CARDINAL ( “ By contrast with ordinary international treaties , the ORG treaty has created its own legal system which , on the entry into force of the treaty , became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member GPE and which their courts are bound to apply ” ) ; CARDINAL , ORG v. Amministrazione italiana delle ORG [ DATE ] ECR CARDINAL ; and LAW , ORG delle ORG dello ORG [ DATE ] ECR CARDINAL .

CJEC , CARDINAL , PERSON en Loos v. PERSON [ DATE ] ECR CARDINAL :

“ Independently of the legislation of Member GPE , Community law not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage . ”

CJEC , Case CARDINAL/CARDINAL , ORG and GPE [ DATE ] ECR CARDINAL , paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL :

“ The right to repayment of amounts charged by a Member ORG in breach of the rules of Community law is the consequence and complement of the rights conferred on individuals by the ORG provisions as interpreted by the ORG . Whilst it is true that repayment may be sought only in the framework of the conditions as to both substance and form laid down by the various national laws applicable thereto , the fact nevertheless remains that those conditions may not be so framed as to render virtually impossible the exercise of rights conferred by Community law . ”

CJEC , Case CARDINAL/CARDINAL , PERSON v. PERSON [ DATE ] ECR CARDINAL , paragraphs CARDINAL , DATE and CARDINAL :

“ Wherever a directive is correctly implemented , its effects extend to individuals through the medium of the implementing measures adopted by the Member ORG concerned ... However , special problems arise where a Member ORG has failed to implement a directive correctly and , more particularly , where the provisions of the directive have not been implemented by DATE prescribed for that purpose ... A Member ORG which has not adopted the implementing measures required by the directive within the prescribed period may not plead , as against individuals , its own failure to perform the obligations which the directive entails . ”

CJEC , Joined Cases C-CARDINAL/CARDINAL , PERSON , C-CARDINAL/CARDINAL , C-CARDINAL/CARDINAL and C-CARDINAL/CARDINAL , PERSON and others v. PERSON GPE [ DATE ] ECR I-CARDINAL , paragraph CARDINAL :

“ Failure to take any measure to transpose a directive in order to achieve the result it prescribes within the period laid down for that purpose constitutes per se a serious breach of Community law and consequently gives rise to a right of reparation for individuals suffering injury ... ”

ORG , Joined Cases ORG and C-CARDINAL/CARDINAL , PERSON and PERSON v. GPE [ DATE ] ECR I-CARDINAL , paragraph CARDINAL :

“ A further basis for the obligation of Member GPE to make good such loss and damage is to be found in LAW , under which the Member States are required to take all appropriate measures , whether general or particular , to ensure fulfilment of their obligations under Community law . Among these is the obligation to nullify the unlawful consequences of a breach of Community law . ”

CJEC , Case CARDINAL/CARDINAL , Fantask and others v. Industriministeriet [ DATE ] ORG , paragraphs CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL :

“ By its seventh question , the national court essentially asks whether Community law prevents a Member ORG from relying on a limitation period under national law to resist actions for the recovery of charges levied in breach of the Directive as long as that Member ORG has not properly transposed the Directive ... The ORG has thus acknowledged , in the interests of legal certainty which protects both the taxpayer and the authority concerned , that the setting of reasonable limitation periods for bringing proceedings is compatible with Community law . Such periods can not be regarded as rendering virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law , even if the expiry of those periods necessarily entails the dismissal , in whole or in part , of the action brought ( see , in particular , Case CARDINAL/CARDINAL ORG v. ORG [ DATE ] ECR DATE , paragraph CARDINAL , Case CARDINAL/CARDINAL Comet v. ORG [ DATE ] ECR CARDINAL , DATE and DATE , and Case CARDINAL ORG [ CARDINAL ] ECR I-CARDINAL , paragraph CARDINAL ) ... The reply to the seventh question must therefore be that Community law , as it now stands , does not prevent a Member ORG which has not properly transposed the Directive from resisting actions for the repayment of charges levied in breach thereof by relying on a limitation period under national law which runs from the date on which the charges in question became payable , provided that such a period is not less favourable for actions based on Community law than for actions based on national law and does not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law . ”

CJEC , Case CARDINAL/CARDINAL , GPE v. PERSON [ DATE ] ECR CARDINAL , paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL :

It is necessary to emphasise , as the ORG has already done on several occasions , that Community legislation must be unequivocal and its application must be predictable for those who are subject to it . Postponement of the date of entry into force of a measure of general application , although the date initially specified has already passed , is in itself liable to undermine that principle . If the purpose of an extension is to deprive individuals of the legal remedies which the first measure has already conferred upon them , such an effect in practice raises the question of the validity of the amending measure .

However , such a question of validity could arise only if the intention to produce the above - mentioned effect were expressly stated in the amending measure . That is not so in the case of the Ninth Directive . The text of that Directive merely extends the period for transposing the Sixth Directive into national law in favour of those Member GPE which were unable to complete , within the period initially prescribed , the legislative procedure required for amending their legislation on value - added tax . It contains nothing to indicate that the extension alters the position of economic operators in relation to transactions carried out by them prior to the entry into force of the measure altering the period allowed for implementation .

It follows that the Ninth Directive must be interpreted as not having retroactive effect in that regard .

The answer to the question raised should therefore be that in the absence of the implementation of the Sixth ORG , CARDINAL/CARDINAL/EEC , of CARDINAL DATE , on ORG , it was possible for the provision concerning the exemption of the negotiation of credit ... to be relied upon by a credit negotiator in relation to transactions carried out DATE and DATE ... ”

Judicial Assembly , DATE , ministre PERSON v. ORG , PERSON :

“ ... LAW establishing ORG dated DATE , which does not contain any provision empowering bodies of ORG to make regulations on public - policy grounds that are directly applicable in the member GPE , provides that the coordination of provisions laid down by law or regulation ' providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy , public security or public health ' shall be assured by directives issued by ORG on a proposal from the ORG and after consulting the ORG . It is clear from LAW DATE that while such directives are binding upon each member ORG ' as to the result to be achieved ' and while in order to achieve the prescribed results the national authorities are required to adapt the legislation and regulations of the member GPE to comply with the directives addressed to them , it is solely for those authorities to determine the form implementation of the directives will take and to decide , subject to supervision by the domestic courts , how to give effect to the directives in domestic law . Thus , regardless of any instructions they may contain for the member GPE , directives can not be pleaded in aid of appeals by nationals of those GPE against individual administrative acts . It follows that Mr PERSON submission to ORG in support of his application for an order quashing the Minister of the ORG 's decision of CARDINAL DATE , on the ground that it contravened the provisions of the Directive issued on DATE by ORG with a view to coordinating , in accordance with the conditions laid down by LAW , the special measures taken to control the movement and residence of aliens on grounds of public policy , public security or public health , is unfounded . Accordingly , in the absence of any contention that the regulatory measures taken by ORG in order to comply with the directives issued by ORG are unlawful , the decision to be taken on PERSON appeal can not under any circumstances turn upon the interpretation of the Directive of DATE . It follows , without there being any need to examine the grounds of the appeal , that the Minister of the ORG 's submission is well - founded , namely ORG erred in its impugned judgment of DATE in referring to ORG of ORG the issues concerning the interpretation of that Directive and staying the proceedings pending ORG decision ... ”

Judicial Assembly , DATE , ORG , p. CARDINAL :

“ By LAW no . CARDINAL - CARDINAL of DATE governing LAW the territory of the Republic forms a single constituency ' for the purposes of the election of the NORP representatives to ORG . By virtue of that statutory provision , taken together with ORG and CARDINAL of the LAW of DATE , which lay down that the overseas départements and territories are integral parts of GPE , those départements and territories are necessarily included in the single constituency within which the election of representatives to ORG takes place . Article CARDINAL - CARDINAL of LAW of DATE establishing ORG provides : ' LAW shall apply to GPE . ' The aforesaid rules set out in LAW DATE are not incompatible with the clear provisions of the aforementioned LAW ... ”

Judicial Assembly , CARDINAL DATE , ORG S.A. ORG , PERSON , p. CARDINAL :

“ LAW establishing ORG provides : ' Member GPE shall progressively adjust any ORG monopolies of a commercial character so as to ensure that when the transitional period has ended no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists between nationals of Member GPE . ' LAW dated DATE , which was issued with a view to implementing those provisions with regard to manufactured tobacco and the provisions of LAW , which prohibits quantitative restrictions and all measures having equivalent effect , provides : ' Manufacturers and importers shall be free to determine the maximum retail selling price for each of their products . This provision may not , however , hinder implementation of the national systems of legislation regarding the control of price levels or the observance of imposed prices . ' As ORG of ORG ruled in finding infringements in its judgments of DATE and CARDINAL DATE , the only provisions whose application is reserved by LAW are provisions of national legislation of a general nature that are intended to curb increases in prices . The aforementioned provisions of section CARDINAL of LAW of DATE confer on the government a special power to fix the price of tobacco imported from member GPE of ORG , independently of the application of the national legislation regarding the control of price levels . They thus enable the government to fix the sale price of imported tobacco in conditions that were not contemplated by LAW DATE and are incompatible with the objectives set out in that Directive . It follows from this that LAW of DATE referred to above , which was issued on the basis of section CARDINAL of the Law of CARDINAL DATE , which must be regarded as inapplicable , is itself devoid of statutory basis . In view of the foregoing , the Minister of ORG and the ORG was not entitled in law tacitly to reject the applications by the companies ORG GPE and ORG for permission to raise the price of products they imported or distributed as wholesalers by CARDINAL on DATE . Accordingly , the said decisions must be quashed ... ”

Mixed Division , CARDINAL DATE , Administration des douanes v. ORG cafés PERSON , PERSON , ( Court of Cassation , Bulletin no . CARDINAL ) :

“ ... LAW , which , by virtue of LAW , ranks above legislation , establishes a separate branch of law which is integrated into the legal systems of the member GPE . Owing to that special characteristic , the branch of law set up by the LAW is directly applicable to nationals of those LAW and binding on their courts ... Accordingly , ORG decision that LAW should be applied in the instant case , to the exclusion of LAW , even though the latter provision is the more recent , was correct and not beyond ORG powers ...

Since , in the Community legal system , infringements by member ORG of their obligations under LAW DATE are actionable under LAW , the plea of lack of reciprocity is not available in the domestic courts ... ”

Extracts from Institutions administratives – Droit administratif , by PERSON and PERSON , published by PERSON , GPE , DATE , pp . CARDINAL :

“ ORG drew the logical conclusions from the fact that the CARDINAL legal systems are superimposed : in the event of a conflict between a statute and a Community norm , only the latter is applicable , even if it is prior in time . Consequently , NORP courts will refuse to apply LANGUAGE law if it is contrary to NORP law . In other words , they carry out a form of verification of the compatibility of the statute with Community law that is very similar to a review of constitutionality . Basically , the reasoning of ORG extends the principle established by LAW that international treaties take precedence over statutes . ORG relies on CARDINAL series of arguments : firstly , implicit in the initial treaties is a move towards abandonment of sovereignty by the GPE and the creation of genuine supra - sovereignty in favour of the ORG bodies . Secondly , since the national courts are responsible for applying the provisions emanating from that supra - sovereignty directly , they can not give precedence to domestic law as , in this system , it is necessarily infra - sovereign ( Court of Cassation , ORG cafés PERSON , CARDINAL DATE ... ) .

The ORG d'Etat rejects such reasoning ( PERSON d'Etat , CARDINAL DATE , Syndicat général des fabricants de semoule de GPE ... ; PERSON d'Etat , CARDINAL DATE , ministre PERSON v. PERSON ... ) . It has shown itself to be ' essentially a national jurisdiction , which is persuaded of the excellence of the national system and has resolved to act as the guardian of national legality ' ( C .- A. Colliard , ORG administratif français et le droit communautaire , ORG offerts à PERSON , GPE , GPE , DATE , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON ORG d'Etat et l'ordre juridique communautaire ' , ORG [ Studies and documents of the ORG d'Etat ] , DATE , p. CARDINAL ; Reports and ORG of the ORG d'Etat , ' PERSON communautaire et droit français ' , ORG , DATE , p. CARDINAL ) , notably in CARDINAL ways . Firstly , it has proscribed all verification of the compatibility of legislation with Community law : according to a Government Commissioner , the administrative courts ' may not criticise or disregard a statute , even on the ground that it violates international law or , more particularly , Community law ' . Secondly , on a more specific point , the PERSON d'Etat has chosen not to follow the case - law of ORG of ORG that has blurred the distinction between regulations and directives ... The PERSON d'Etat affirms , on the contrary , [ that ] ' regardless of any instructions they may contain ' [ directives ] can not be pleaded in aid of an application for review of an individual act . Directives do , however , impose an obligation on the national authorities to adapt their legislation and regulations so as to comply with the directive ( see PERSON , cited above ) . Consequently , nationals of member GPE may challenge the validity of domestic regulatory measures by reference to the Community directives which they purport to implement or which they disregard . ”


Preliminary objections dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Preliminary objections dismissed (Article 34 - Victim);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for private life);No violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Non-pecuniary damage - award

George Nicolaou;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicants are of GPE ethnic origin . The first applicant , PERSON , was born in DATE . The second applicant , PERSON , was born in DATE . The third applicant , PERSON , was born in DATE . She died on DATE . Her CARDINAL children , PERSON , Mr PERSON and PERSON , expressed the wish to pursue the application in the third applicant ’s stead .

The applicants were sterilised in the gynaecology and obstetrics department of ORG in GPE ( GPE s poliklinikou GPE – “ FAC ” ) , a medical institution which was then under the authority of ORG .

The first applicant was sterilised on DATE .

According to the first applicant , after her admittance and preliminary checks , the gynaecologist in the hospital ordered her to be transferred to theatre for a Caesarean section . She was asked to write down names for her future child on a piece of paper . The first applicant was subsequently transferred to theatre and a Caesarean section was performed on her . During the operation , the first applicant was sterilised by tubal ligation . This was the applicant ’s second delivery , and also her second delivery by Caesarean section .

When she woke up from the anaesthetic , the first applicant was told that she had given birth to a girl .

The first applicant submitted that she had not been given any further details about the delivery , nor was she told that she had undergone tubal ligation and that she had been sterilised .

The next morning she was approached by the doctor treating her , who came into her room and asked her to sign a document . The first applicant was told that she had to sign the document because she had undergone a Caesarean section and all women who had Caesarean sections had to sign it .

On DATE the first applicant was transferred to a hospital in PERSON due to an inflammation as a post - surgery complication . On DATE she underwent further surgery due to a serious infection and sepsis . This operation was considered life - saving . During the operation the doctors performed a hysterectomy on the first applicant .

The first applicant first learned that she had been sterilised during her second delivery , while reviewing her medical files with her lawyer on DATE . The medical file contained a form entitled “ Request for authorisation of sterilisation ” . The form had been filled in using a typewriter . It was dated DATE and had been signed by the first applicant .

DATE form contained the decision of the district sterilisation committee at ORG dated DATE . This decision approved the first applicant ’s sterilisation . It indicated that the sterilisation was required for medical reasons , that the applicant had CARDINAL children , that she had earlier given birth by Caesarean section , and that she had a small pelvis . The conditions laid down in the CARDINAL Sterilisation Regulation had been met in relation to the applicant ’s sterilisation . The decision was signed by the president of the committee , the district medical specialist on the issue and the secretary to the sterilisation committee .

The first applicant submitted that her sterilisation had been contrary to NORP law , as at the relevant time she was DATE and her legal guardians had not consented to the operation .

The first applicant has been living in constant fear that her partner will leave her because she is not able to bear him any more children .

The second applicant was sterilised in FAC on DATE . The sterilisation was performed on her during her second delivery by Caesarean section . Shortly after being admitted to ORG , she was transferred to a ward , where she was approached by a nurse who told her that the delivery would have to be by Caesarean section . The Caesarean delivery was then performed . During the operation medical staff of ORG also performed a tubal ligation on the second applicant .

At the date of delivery the second applicant was DATE ( that is to say , a minor ) and not legally married . She submitted that neither she nor her parents had been advised of her sterilisation prior to it , and that they had never signed any document consenting to it . According to their statements in the course of civil proceedings on the second applicant ’s action ( for further details see below ) , the second applicant and her parents stated that the medical staff had informed them orally after the operation .

The second applicant learned DATE , during a criminal investigation , that her medical record contained a form entitled “ Request for sterilisation ” with her signature dated DATE . The form lists as the reason for the sterilisation “ multiple varicose veins in the pelvis minor ” and indicates that the applicant had given birth to CARDINAL children by Caesarean section . The same document contains a decision by the district sterilisation committee approving the request and dated DATE .

When the second applicant ’s partner learned that she would not be able to have another child due to the sterilisation , he left her . Due to her inability to have more children , her social status in her community has fallen and , as a result , it was very difficult for the second applicant to find a new partner .

The second applicant currently has a partner , but she is worried about the future of this relationship because she and her partner want to have a child together and her partner is complaining about her infertility . The second applicant is also suffering serious medical side - effects from her sterilisation .

The third applicant was sterilised in FAC on DATE . The sterilisation was performed during her fourth delivery , when she delivered her fourth and fifth children ( twins ) . It was her first delivery by Caesarean section .

Prior to her delivery the third applicant had regular pre - natal checkups with the chief gynaecologist in ORG . She was told that her pregnancy would be risky because she was expecting twins . In DATE of her pregnancy she was informed that she would have to deliver by Caesarean section .

The third applicant arrived at FAC in TIME of DATE after she had begun having contractions . She was admitted to the gynaecology ward at TIME and spent TIME there . At TIME on DATE she was taken to theatre . A nurse gave her a pre - medication injection as a precursor to the anaesthetic . The applicant felt that her head was spinning . A nurse , with the doctor standing beside her , asked the third applicant to sign a paper . Because she was feeling dizzy as a result of the injection , the third applicant was unable to read what was written on the paper . The nurse told the applicant that she had to sign it as she was going to have a Caesarean delivery .

The third applicant submitted that she had signed the document without understanding its contents .

On DATE the third applicant was discharged from ORG at her own request . She stated that the hospital had asked her to sign a document prior to her discharge . She was given no time to read the document when signing it . In reply to a question from the applicant , the doctor stated that the paper confirmed that she had been sterilised . The doctor refused to give any further explanation to the applicant .

The discharge report indicates that the third applicant was sterilised during the Caesarean delivery . It was DATE , on DATE , during questioning at a police station , that a police investigator showed the applicant the request for sterilisation , which appeared to include her signature .

The form had been filled in using a typewriter and was dated DATE . The second part contains the decision of the sterilisation committee dated DATE approving the operation as compliant with the CARDINAL Sterilisation Regulation . The document states that there were “ medical reasons ” for the operation and that the applicant had already had CARDINAL children .

With a view to describing the overall situation and context in which they had been sterilised , the applicants submitted that they had received inferior treatment during their stay in ORG . In their view , racial prejudice on the part of medical personnel had played a significant role in the quality of the treatment they received .

NORP In particular , the applicants stated that they had been accommodated separately from nonRoma women , in what were called “ Gypsy rooms ” . They had been prevented from using the same bathrooms and toilets as nonRoma women , and could not enter the dining room , where there was a television set . The second applicant had also experienced verbal abuse from health care personnel during her stay in ORG .

With reference to the Body and Soul Report ( see below ) , the applicants stated that the chief gynaecologist at ORG had admitted that patients were categorised and separated according to their “ adaptability ” and level of hygiene . That categorisation was carried out by him on an individual basis . According to the ORG and Soul Report the same physician had also stated that GPE did not know the value of work , that they abused the social welfare system and that they had children simply to obtain more social welfare benefits .

The Government disputed the above allegations . They relied , inter alia , on a statement by a gynaecologist at ORG that there had been no deliberate segregation of GPE women . On the contrary , due to the similarity of their habits GPE women themselves asked to be placed in rooms together ; they even moved without authorisation to other rooms for that purpose . There were also cases where GPE women with a higher social status requested isolation from other patients of GPE origin .

NORP In response to the publication by ORG and Soul : Forced and Coercive Sterilization and Other Assaults on ORG in GPE ( “ the Body and Soul Report ” ) , FAC GPE initiated a criminal investigation of the alleged unlawful sterilisation of several women , including the CARDINAL applicants .

The first and third applicants joined ORG in their criminal complaint and , together with the second applicant , also acted as witnesses and injured parties in the proceedings .

The proceedings were formally brought by the regional criminal investigation department in ORG on DATE .

In a decision of CARDINAL DATE the regional criminal investigation department in GPE , to which the case had been transferred , discontinued the criminal investigation , finding that the alleged events underlying the investigation had not occurred and that nothing indicated that any offence under LAW had been committed .

On DATE the applicants and CARDINAL others lodged a complaint against the police investigator ’s decision of DATE . On DATE the regional prosecutor ’s office in ORG dismissed it , holding that injured parties , including the applicants , were not entitled to lodge complaints against the decision of CARDINAL DATE . In a separate letter of DATE the regional prosecutor addressed the arguments of the complainants and found that the police investigator ’s decision had been lawful and correct .

On DATE the applicants requested ORG to submit a complaint of a breach of law to ORG . ORG considered it a request for review of the lawfulness of the criminal proceedings . On DATE it informed the applicants that their request had been refused , and that ORG fully approved the proceedings and the decision to terminate the investigation .

On DATE the ORG quashed the decision given by the regional prosecutor ’s office in PERSON on DATE , for the reasons set out below .

On DATE a public prosecutor of the regional prosecutor ’s office in ORG dismissed a further complaint against the police investigator ’s decision of DATE . The public prosecutor found that all the available and necessary evidence had been gathered with a view to determining the issue . It had not been shown that the medical doctors concerned had taken unauthorised actions with a view to preventing the birth of children , or that they had otherwise acted in a manner contrary to the law .

Following ORG judgment of DATE ( see below ) the PERSON regional prosecutor ’s office , on CARDINAL DATE , quashed the investigator ’s decision of DATE to discontinue the criminal proceedings .

Subsequently , the police investigator examined and cross - examined the applicants and the medical staff . On DATE the investigator again discontinued the proceedings , concluding that no criminal offence had been committed .

On DATE the applicants lodged a complaint . They argued that the investigator had failed to deal with all relevant aspects of the case and had not remedied the shortcomings to which ORG had pointed in the judgment of DATE .

On DATE the ORG regional prosecutor ’s office dismissed the ORG complaint , holding that the sterilisations had been carried out in accordance with the law then in force , and that the applicants had been duly advised of their sterilisation . No objective or subjective appearance of any criminal offence had been established in any of the individual cases of sterilisation .

On DATE the applicants complained about that decision to ORG .

On DATE the latter replied that no reason had been found to reach a different conclusion . In particular , the prosecuting authorities had considered all relevant aspects of the case and had correctly concluded that no criminal offence had been committed . ORG expressed the view that , contrary to what the prosecuting authorities at lower level had held , the applicants could not be considered injured parties for the purpose of the criminal proceedings , as they had suffered no harm to their health , nor any other damage , and their rights had not been infringed .

On DATE and DATE respectively the first and second applicants claimed damages from ORG . They relied on Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of ORG and claimed that they had been unlawfully sterilised by the defendant ’s employees . The third applicant brought a similar action with FAC on DATE .

The cases were examined by courts at CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction . It was established that the GPE municipality was to be considered the defendant once ORG had ceased to exist . The ORG claims were determined as follows .

On DATE FAC rejected the first applicant ’s claim as statute - barred . On DATE the ORG quashed that decision .

Subsequently the ORG heard the parties and witnesses , obtained the opinion of an expert and took documentary evidence . On DATE it dismissed the first applicant ’s claim . In the judgment it admitted that the first applicant ’s sterilisation had not been life - saving surgery . As the applicant had been under the age of majority , her GPE approval should have been obtained prior to the surgery .

With reference to the expert opinion , the court further established that the reason for the first applicant ’s permanent infertility was the hysterectomy . That operation had been carried out as a life - saving intervention DATE after the delivery , for reasons which were unrelated to the sterilisation . The operation had thus had no lasting consequences for the first applicant . The court concluded that there was no causal link between the breach of the first applicant ’s rights in the context of her sterilisation and its alleged effect on her health , private and family life and position in society .

The first applicant appealed . She argued that she had been deprived of the ability to have children by her sterilisation on DATE . The subsequent hysterectomy could not absolve the defendant from liability for her unlawful sterilisation . She contested ORG argument that the sterilisation had not permanently deprived her of the ability to conceive .

On DATE ORG upheld the first - instance judgment . It held that ORG had established the relevant facts and had applied the law correctly . A causal link between the unlawful sterilisation of the first applicant and the damage which she alleged she had thereby suffered had ceased to exist with the performance of the hysterectomy . ORG concluded that during the short period between the sterilisation and the hysterectomy the first applicant could not have suffered any damage resulting from an impairment of her position in society , contrary to her allegation . Without further specification the judgment indicated that the first applicant might have suffered damage of a different nature , but that this was not the subject matter of the proceedings .

On DATE ORG rejected the action of the second applicant . On DATE ORG quashed that decision .

Subsequently the ORG heard the parties and witnesses and examined documentary evidence . It also obtained the opinion of an expert , the second applicant having previously challenged several other experts appointed by that court .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the action . On the basis of the expert opinion it established that the second applicant had not suffered serious damage to her health and that the operation had not affected her life and position in society . The judgment stated that the second applicant could become pregnant , for example by means of sterilisation reversal surgery or by assisted reproduction . The applicant had been living with her second partner for DATE and she had not shown that her social life had been impaired . Finally , ORG held that , had the second applicant shown that her health had been damaged as a result of her sterilisation , she would have been entitled to MONEY ( ORG ) in compensation under the relevant law .

On DATE ORG quashed that judgment as erroneous . It held that the hospital staff had acted contrary to the law in that they had not obtained the approval of the second applicant ’s legal guardians prior to her sterilisation .

On DATE ORG ordered the defendant to pay ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL to the second applicant . It found no reason to avail itself of its right under Regulation CARDINAL/CARDINAL to grant a higher award .

On DATE ORG upheld ORG judgment of DATE while holding second applicant ’s argument that it was not clear whether she could become pregnant as a result of sterilisation reversal surgery or assisted reproduction , and that such methods were not accessible to her . For the appeal court , it had not been reliably established that the second applicant and her partner would have had children if she had not been sterilised . Finally , ORG held that the award could not be increased on the ground of the alleged impairment of the applicant ’s position as a member of a socially excluded ORG . That issue was to be assessed from the perspective of cultural norms shared in society as a whole , under which infertile men and women were no longer subject to denigration and mockery .

On DATE ORG discontinued the proceedings in respect of the third applicant . It held that under the relevant law the right claimed had been extinguished upon her death .

On DATE the applicants lodged a complaint with ORG . They referred to the above decisions by the police investigator of the regional criminal investigation department in PERSON and the regional prosecutor ’s office in PERSON of DATE and DATE respectively , and alleged that their rights under LAW , DATE , DATE , DATE and CARDINAL of the ORG and several constitutional provisions had been breached .

On DATE ORG found that the regional prosecutor ’s office in PERSON had violated the applicants’ rights under LAW and CARDINAL of the Convention , in that it had erroneously rejected their complaint against the police investigator ’s decision of DATE without addressing its merits . ORG quashed the decision of the regional prosecutor ’s office of DATE and ordered that authority to examine the ORG complaint . That order , together with the finding of a violation of the ORG ’s office in ORG to reimburse the applicants’ costs and expenses in the constitutional proceedings .

On DATE the applicants complained that the authorities involved in the above criminal investigation had failed to ensure that those responsible for their sterilisation were prosecuted and that the applicants were awarded compensation . The applicants alleged a violation of Articles CARDINAL , DATE , DATE and CARDINAL of the Convention . They also relied on several constitutional rights .

On DATE ORG found that by its decision of CARDINAL DATE the regional prosecutor ’s office in PERSON had violated the applicants’ rights under LAW and CARDINAL of the LAW in their procedural aspect ,

The Constitutional Court quashed the decision in issue and ordered the regional prosecutor ’s office to re - examine the case , taking into account the applicants’ rights under LAW and CARDINAL of the LAW . The decision indicated the issues which the prosecuting authorities were required to clarify .

ORG awarded the equivalent of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL to each of the applicants . It ordered the regional prosecutor ’s office to reimburse the applicants’ costs .

DATE . On DATE the applicants complained under Articles CARDINAL , DATE , DATE and CARDINAL of the Convention about the PERSON regional prosecutor ’s decision of DATE and the fact that their case had not been investigated in a prompt and efficient manner . The applicants indicated that they had also complained about that decision to ORG by way of an extraordinary remedy , and that the latter had not yet replied to them .

On DATE the applicants sent ORG a copy of the letter of ORG of DATE rejecting their complaint about the regional prosecutor ’s decision .

ORG rejected the ORG complaint on CARDINAL DATE . It held that the decision of the ORG regional prosecutor ’s office of DATE had been reviewed by ORG at the ORG request . Any interference with the applicants’ rights which ORG was entitled to examine in the context of the proceedings complained of therefore stemmed from the decision ORG had given on DATE . Since the applicants had exclusively challenged the decision of the regional prosecutor ’s office , and since ORG was bound by the way in which they had specified the subject matter of their complaint , the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the complaint .

On DATE the first applicant complained about the proceedings leading to ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE . She alleged a breach of ORG , DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE of the LAW , as well as of her rights under several other international treaties and LAW .

On DATE ORG declared the complaint manifestly ill - founded . It held that ORG judgment was not arbitrary or otherwise contrary to the first applicant ’s rights .

On DATE the second applicant alleged a breach of , inter alia , Articles CARDINAL , CARDINAL , DATE , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Convention in the context of the proceedings leading to ORG judgment of DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the complaint as manifestly ill - founded . It held that the manner in which the ordinary courts had determined the amount of compensation due to the second applicant was not arbitrary or otherwise contrary to her fundamental rights and freedoms .

The applicants referred to a number of publications pointing to a history of sterilisation of GPE women , which had originated under the NORP regime in GPE in DATE and which they believed had influenced their own sterilisation . They also referred to the Body and Soul Report and a number of other reports and statements by human rights organisations , both in GPE and abroad , including governmental and inter - governmental bodies , requesting the NORP authorities to conduct an impartial and fair investigation of the allegations of forced and coerced sterilisation of GPE women in GPE , or criticising the absence of such an investigation ( for further details see also GPE v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL - CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE ) .

DATE . The Government cited a report of CARDINAL DATE drawn up by a group of experts established by ORG with a view to investigating allegations of unlawful sterilisations and segregation of GPE women ( for further details see GPE v. GPE , cited above , § § DATE ) .

In their opinion on the ORG and Soul Report representatives of ORG and ORG admitted that the requirement of prior informed consent to sterilisation had been absent from the regulatory framework in GPE at the relevant time . However , in the case of GPE women it was frequently the only opportunity for medical personnel to inform them about contraception and sterilisation shortly before or during delivery . According to the opinion , the medical practitioners involved in sterilisations acted in good faith and in accordance with the law in force .

In a letter dated DATE the director of ORG contested the allegation that GPE women had been forcibly sterilised in his hospital . The letter contained the following information .

In the area covered by ORG the post - natal mortality rate of GPE children had fallen from QUANTITY per thousand in DATE to CARDINAL per thousand in DATE . The majority of deliveries in the hospital concerned GPE women ; the perinatal mortality rate was around CARDINAL per thousand , approximately the same as in other hospitals within the region .

The GPE settlement in NORP ( where the first and second applicants lived ) was outside the area served by ORG . However , its staff did not refuse to treat inhabitants of that settlement , as it was closer than the hospital to which they administratively belonged . DATE women from NORP settlement had given birth by vaginal delivery and CARDINAL GPE women ( that is , PERCENT ) had delivered by Caesarean section . The ratio was PERCENT nationwide .

During the same period CARDINAL GPE women had given birth in the hospital , of whom CARDINAL ( that is , PERCENT ) had undergone a Caesarean section . There had been a further CARDINAL deliveries by women who were not of GPE origin . Of the latter , CARDINAL women ( that is , PERCENT ) had delivered by Caesarean section .

DATE and DATE there had been CARDINAL sterilisations performed on women of GPE origin and CARDINAL sterilisations of non - Roma patients . All patients had been duly advised and had signed the relevant request .

Furthermore , ORG had carried out CARDINAL procedures on GPE women who were experiencing difficulty in conceiving . In several cases the patients had become pregnant thereafter .

The letter also mentioned the case of a GPE woman who had delivered her eighth child in DATE . As she had been brought to the hospital in a state of shock , the staff could not inform her about sterilisation prior to delivery , which was carried out by Caesarean section . No sterilisation was performed and she was subsequently advised to undergo sterilisation after the post - natal period . The patient did not follow the medical advice . DATE she was brought to the hospital with bleeding , DATE after the scheduled date of delivery of her ninth child . Due to severe haemorrhagic shock she could not be saved .

The relevant domestic law and practice , as well as pertinent international documents , are set out in detail in GPE v. GPE , cited above , § § DATE and GPE v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE .

In addition , the following information is relevant in the present case .

The relevant provisions of LAW read as follows :

“ CARDINAL . Everyone shall be liable for any damage he or she causes by breach of a statutory duty .

Damage is considered to have been caused by a legal person ... when it has arisen in the context of an activity carried out by other persons whom [ that legal person ] has entrusted with carrying out that activity ” ...

“ Indemnification for damage to health shall consist of a lump - sum payment for suffering and impairment of one ’s position in the society . ”

In DATE ORG considered its second periodic report on GPE , which covered the period from DATE to DATE . In its concluding observations the ORG expressed deep concern about allegations of continued involuntary sterilisation of GPE women . It recommended that GPE should :

“ ( a ) Take urgent measures to investigate promptly , impartially , thoroughly and effectively all allegations of involuntary sterilization of GPE women , prosecute and punish the perpetrators and provide the victims with fair and adequate compensation ;

( b ) Effectively enforce the Health - care Act ( DATE ) by issuing guidelines and conducting training of public officials , including on the criminal liability of medical personnel conducting sterilizations without free , full and informed consent , and on how to obtain such consent from women undergoing sterilization . ”


András Sajó;David Thór Björgvinsson;Françoise Tulkens;Guido Raimondi;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

NORP The applicant was born in DATE and lives in LOC .

In DATE ORG of Highways seized a plot of land belonging to the applicant without any formal expropriation , for the construction of a highway . The applicant brought an action before ORG to obtain compensation for the de facto expropriation of his property . He requested MONEY ( TRY ) as compensation from the court and reserved his right to increase this claim in due course .

On DATE ORG awarded the applicant TRY CARDINAL as compensation for the de facto expropriation of his land , as requested , plus interest . The applicant initiated execution proceedings before ORG to obtain that amount ( file no . CARDINAL ) .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of the first - instance court .

The applicant subsequently brought an additional action ( “ ek dava ” ) before ORG to obtain further compensation for his land in the light of the expert report obtained during the previous proceedings , which had valued the land at a rate higher than that initially requested by him .

On DATE ORG awarded the applicant TRY CARDINAL , plus interest . The applicant initiated another set of execution proceedings before ORG to obtain the amount awarded ( file no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of ORG .

On DATE the administration paid TRY CARDINAL and CARDINAL respectively to the files before ORG . According to the information provided by the applicant , there has been no outstanding debt in the execution files .