Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Mykhaylo Buromenskiy;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger

The applicant , ORG , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and currently lives in GPE , GPE . The respondent Government were represented by their Agent , Mr PERSON .

The applicant signed a sales contract with PERSON on behalf of the open joint stock company , ORG . According to the contract , the company transferred title to its LOC to Mr PERSON On DATE PERSON .

On DATE the company instituted civil proceedings against Mr PERSON ’s successors seeking to have the contract declared null and void .

By a ruling of CARDINAL DATE the judge of ORG ordered that the claim and the relevant documents from the case file be transferred to LOC ( “ the Prosecutor ” ) in order to establish whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against the applicant . On DATE ORG upheld the ruling of the first - instance court .

On DATE the applicant lodged a cassation appeal with ORG in accordance with the procedure prescribed by LAW DATE on the Introduction of Changes to the Code of Civil Procedure . On DATE a panel of CARDINAL judges of ORG of GPE refused to transfer the applicant ’s appeal to a chamber of ORG of GPE for consideration on its merits .

The applicant alleges that he received the final decision of ORG on DATE .

Following the above events , on DATE the Prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on charges of fraud , abuse of power and embezzlement of collective property .

On CARDINAL , DATE and DATE the applicant failed to appear before the investigator .

On DATE a pre - trial investigation was suspended in order to establish the applicant ’s whereabouts . On DATE it was resumed .

On DATE the ORG ’s Assistant issued an arrest warrant against the applicant .

On DATE the applicant was arrested . He was released on CARDINAL November DATE having given a written undertaking not to abscond .

On DATE the applicant challenged the judge sitting in his case . On DATE the case was transferred to ORG .

On DATE ORG remitted the case to the Prosecutor for an additional pre - trial investigation on the ground that it had not been completed .

On DATE the pre - trial investigation was suspended in order to establish the applicant ’s whereabouts .

On DATE the proceedings were resumed . The applicant challenged the investigator .

On DATE the applicant failed to appear before the investigator . The proceedings were suspended .

On DATE ORG rejected an appeal by the applicant against the Prosecutor ’s resolution of DATE . On DATE the ORG of Appeal quashed that ruling and terminated the proceedings in that respect since the first - instance court had no jurisdiction to consider the applicant ’s complaint . On DATE ORG upheld the ruling of ORG .

DATE the applicant acquainted himself with his case file .

On DATE the Prosecutor issued an indictment . On DATE the case was transferred to ORG .

On DATE ORG remitted the case to ORG for an additional pre - trial investigation on the ground that it had not been completed and there had been some procedural omissions .

On DATE the applicant went to GPE , where he currently resides .

On DATE the Prosecutor put the applicant on the list of wanted persons .

Following the above events , the criminal proceedings against the applicant were suspended .

In the period prior to CARDINAL DATE the proceedings in the applicant ’s case were resumed in order to perform certain investigative actions and then , on several further occasions they were suspended again . The applicant , on his own or with the assistance of his counsel , challenged the suspension of the criminal proceedings , the resolution of DATE and the regular inactivity of the domestic authorities throughout the investigations of his criminal case . Some of his complaints and appeals were successful . In particular , on DATE , the investigator of ORG ordered that the head of the local police office seize the original of the notary ’s documents concerning the sale of the company ’s LOC . On DATE the Velykomykhaylivsky Court , following the applicant ’s complaint , found that the above action had not been performed . The court ordered it to be performed . By the same ruling the court ordered that the value of the company ’s premises also be established .

On DATE ORG quashed the ruling of DATE of the investigator of ORG , under which the criminal proceedings had been again suspended , and ordered that the pre - trial investigation be resumed .

On DATE ORG ordered the applicant ’s pre - trial detention . On DATE the ORG of Appeal quashed that ruling .

The pre - trial investigation is still pending .

On DATE the applicant challenged his arrest of DATE and his pre - trial detention . On DATE the applicant challenged the resolution of DATE before the same court .

On DATE the FAC of GPE quashed the resolution of DATE and found the applicant ’s arrest and pre - trial detention to be unlawful . On DATE the NORP ORG , following an appeal by the Prosecutor , quashed the ruling of DATE and terminated the proceedings in that respect on the ground that ORG had no competence to consider the applicant ’s complaints . On DATE ORG rejected a request by the applicant for leave to appeal in cassation .


SARUPICI v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE AND GANEA AND GHERSCOVICI v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Ganna Yudkivska;Ján Šikuta;Josep Casadevall;Nona Tsotsoria

The applicant in the first case , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

The applicants in the second case , Mr PERSON and PERSON Gherşcovici , are NORP nationals , who were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE and PERSON .

All CARDINAL applicants were represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE Ms Gherşcovici ’s husband , PERSON , was found dead in his house .

On DATE Mr PERSON was arrested on unrelated charges . While he was in administrative detention , he was questioned about the circumstances of the death of PERSON On DATE he made a written statement about the commission of the murder , in which he provided details of the circumstances of the murder and the identities of the persons whom he alleged were involved . A lawyer was appointed to represent him and Mr ORG subsequently confessed to having planned the death of PERSON He later stated that PERSON had committed the murder of PERSON

On DATE PERSON was arrested on charges of instigating , aiding and abetting the murder of PERSON

On DATE an arrest warrant was issued in respect of Mr PERSON .

According to PERSON , in DATE he was living with his uncle and aunt in GPE , GPE . On DATE he was arrested by the NORP police in the presence of his uncle and aunt . He alleged that the police officers did not inform him of the reasons for his arrest or provide him with any documents attesting to its lawfulness . Despite the fact that he complied with the request of the police officers , they forcibly twisted his arms behind his back , beat him on the back and handcuffed him . He was searched without a report being drawn up and his mobile phone was seized .

Mr PERSON alleged that he was then taken to GPE police station where he was handed into the custody of the NORP police . The NORP police put the applicant in a car with NORP registration plates and crossed the NORP - Moldovan border at the ORG customs post . He had to sit handcuffed in the back of the car . He was not provided with any extradition request nor did the police officers present him with any document or show his identity papers to the border guards when crossing the border .

According to ORG , PERSON was arrested on DATE in GPE , GPE . On DATE he was brought to PERSON and placed in the remand centre of ORG .

A lawyer was appointed to represent Mr PERSON and on DATE Mr PERSON confessed that he had murdered PERSON He subsequently claimed that police officers had exerted psychological pressure on him and tortured him to make him confess .

Meanwhile , on DATE Mr PERSON lodged a complaint with the prosecutor alleging that he had been ill - treated in order to make him confess and that on DATE he had not been provided with a lawyer of his choice . His complaint was dismissed .

On DATE the prosecutor registered a complaint by Mr PERSON regarding his alleged ill - treatment by police officers while in detention . On DATE a prosecutor informed him that his allegations of ill - treatment had not been upheld and that it had been decided not to institute criminal proceedings . Mr PERSON challenged the decision , attaching statements from his cellmates . On DATE the ORG informed Mr PERSON that there were no new circumstances which could influence the lawfulness of the decision of DATE .

On DATE Mr PERSON lodged a complaint about the ban on receiving visits from his family and other persons .

Meanwhile , on DATE , Mr PERSON ’s lawyer requested ORG to provide him with information concerning the circumstances of PERSON arrest and extradition . On DATE the ORG informed him that there was no information to indicate that Mr PERSON had been arrested on the territory of GPE .

On DATE Mr PERSON asked ORG to conduct an investigation into his alleged unlawful arrest by the NORP police and his abduction by the NORP police on DATE . He named his uncle and aunt as witnesses to the events of that date . By letter of CARDINAL DATE ORG informed PERSON that no violation of the law by the NORP police had been established . On DATE ORG explained that on DATE Mr PERSON had been arrested by the NORP police and denied that Mr PERSON had been brought to GPE police station .

On DATE Mr PERSON complained in writing to ORG of GPE disagreeing with the replies received from the NORP law - enforcement authorities . He requested the institution of criminal proceedings . His request received no response .

In a statement made before a notary public on DATE , PERSON PERSON ’s uncle and aunt stated that on DATE their nephew had been arrested in the town of GPE by GPE and NORP police officers .

On an unspecified date the trial proceedings commenced at ORG . In its judgment of DATE ORG found all CARDINAL applicants guilty of PERSON ’s murder .

The applicants and the prosecutor appealed the judgment .

The appeals were heard before ORG . On DATE the court dismissed the appeals lodged by the prosecutor and by Mr GPE and PERSON . However , it upheld the appeal lodged by PERSON and acquitted her .

Mr GPE , PERSON and the prosecutor appealed the judgment .

On DATE ORG upheld all CARDINAL appeals and ordered that the case against the applicants be retried by ORG .

All CARDINAL applicants were subsequently retried before ORG . On DATE ORG found them guilty of the murder of PERSON

The applicants appealed the judgment .

On DATE ORG upheld the ORG appeals and ordered that the case be retried a second time by ORG . It found that ORG had not complied with the instructions of ORG when retrying the case .

All CARDINAL applicants were retried a second time before ORG . On DATE the court found Mr PERSON and PERSON guilty of the murder of PERSON and acquitted PERSON .

On DATE ORG acquitted PERSON and PERSON PERSON on the ground of lack of elements constituting an offence in their actions and upheld the judgment of ORG of DATE as regards PERSON .

On DATE the Deputy Prosecutor General lodged a request for annulment of the judgment of DATE .

On DATE the plenary of ORG upheld the Deputy Prosecutor General ’s request for annulment and ordered that the case be retried by ORG .

The applicants were retried a third time , this time before ORG . On DATE ORG delivered its judgment in the retrial and acquitted the applicants . The decision was final .

NORP In particular , the court found that Mr PERSON had signed the written statement of DATE at a time when he had not been arrested for the crime and had not been assisted by a lawyer , which was incompatible with the law . Further , he had not been advised of his right to remain silent . As regards PERSON , the court held that he had been arrested in GPE by the NORP police on DATE , that the authorities had failed to comply with the extradition procedure set out in the relevant mutual legal assistance treaty and that PERSON had been illegally brought into GPE . It also found that lawyers appointed to assist him did not have licences at the relevant time and that his right to a fair trial had therefore been breached . As to the allegations of ill - treatment , the court emphasised the obligation on the authorities promptly to take all reasonable steps at their disposal to investigate allegations of ill - treatment and secure relevant evidence . The court concluded that the investigation conducted by the prosecutor did not meet the requirements of the Convention . Evidence obtained as a result of the ill - treatment was therefore inadmissible .

On DATE the applicants lodged a civil action at ORG claiming damages the violation of their right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time pursuant to LAW . CARDINAL of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicants’ claim . It considered that the criminal proceedings against the applicants were particularly complex , highlighting the seriousness of the charge ; the number of accused in the case ; the prejudicial character of the offence ; and the importance of the process .

On DATE the applicants lodged an appeal . On DATE ORG upheld the appeal . It considered that the proceedings had begun on DATE and had terminated on DATE , when the final judgment acquitting the applicants had been handed down . It found the length of the proceedings to be excessive and attributable to the acts of the authorities . Taking into account the complexity of the case and this ORG ’s case - law under LAW , including the ORG ’s award of MONEY ( ORG ) for proceedings which lasted DATE in PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE , it awarded each of the applicants CARDINAL NORP lei ( approximately EUR CARDINAL ) in damages .

On DATE the applicants lodged a civil action at the ORG claiming damages for violations of their Convention rights pursuant to LAW no . CARDINAL of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . They claimed non - pecuniary damage in respect of , inter alia , unlawful detention ; unlawful arrest ; unlawful subjection to criminal responsibility ; unlawful conviction ; unlawful search and seizure of property ; and unlawful secret investigative measures .

On DATE the applicants were asked by the judge rapporteur , pursuant to Rule CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( a ) of ORG , to confirm whether their claim under PERSON no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE sought compensation in respect of all the complaints lodged before this ORG ; and if not , for which alleged violations of the LAW compensation was sought . In their response , the applicants did not provide the details sought . However , they confirmed that nothwithstanding ORG judgment of DATE in respect of their claim under PERSON no . DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , it was open to them to seek compensation for moral damages suffered as a consequence of the excessive length of the proceedings in the context of their pending civil claim . They also confirmed that the claim remained pending before ORG .

Law No . DATE of CARDINAL DATE provides for compensation for damage caused by the illegal acts of the criminal investigation organs , prosecution and courts to be paid to persons acquitted in criminal proceedings . The relevant provisions of the PERSON were set out in this ORG ’s judgment in ORG v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § DATE , DATE .

PERSON no . DATE , which created a new remedy to address complaints of unreasonable length of proceedings , entered into force on DATE . Further details of the PERSON are set out in this ORG ’s decision in PERSON v. GPE ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE .

The Prosecution Service Act of DATE provides a mechanism to challenge acts of authorities involved in conducting searches , inquiries and pre - trial investigations . Section CARDINAL provides that ORG is entrusted with a number of functions , including supervision of the observance of laws by organs conducting operative search activities , inquiries and pre - trial investigations .

Section CARDINAL of the law provides that the public prosecutor is responsible for examining applications and complaints about violations of rights of individuals and legal entities , except for those complaints which are within the competence of the court . It further stipulates that a decision taken by the public prosecutor can be appealed to a higher public prosecutor or a court .

Article CARDINAL of the Code of Criminal Procedure in GPE , in force until DATE , allowed criminal proceedings to be instituted on the basis of , inter alia , applications or communications from individuals . Pursuant to Article CARDINAL , upon receipt of an application the prosecutor could agree or refuse to institute criminal proceedings , if necessary after a preliminary inquiry into the facts . Article CARDINAL allowed an appeal against the prosecutor ’s decision to a higher prosecutor . Refusal of that prosecutor to annul the decision could be appealed to the court under the procedure set out in Article CARDINAL of the Code .

Article CARDINAL of LAW of DATE ( “ DATE ORG ” ) , in force until DATE , set out the right to complain to a court about decisions , acts and omissions of public authorities . LAW DATE ( “ DATE ORG ” ) , which entered into force on DATE , provides that decisions , actions or inaction on the part of public authorities can be challenged in administrative courts . Article CARDINAL of LAW sets out the right to payment of nonpecuniary damage for unlawful decisions , acts or omissions . Nonpecuniary damage is to be paid irrespective of guilt in cases concerning illegal imprisonment .


The applicant is a NORP national , born in DATE and resident in GPE . He is represented before the Court by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

On DATE , N was charged before ORG ( käräjäoikeus , tingsrätt ) with aggravated narcotics offences concerning QUANTITY of cannabis ( case R CARDINAL ) . He had stated to the police that he had committed several narcotics offences in DATE and incriminated several other people during the police investigations . The case was adjourned until CARDINAL DATE , as the police investigations had not been finished .

N 's case was heard on CARDINAL and DATE . N confessed to ORG that he had dealt in QUANTITY of cannabis . The case was adjourned until DATE as the police investigations continued .

On DATE , N was charged with an additional aggravated narcotics offence which he confessed to . The case ( R CARDINAL ) was again adjourned until DATE .

At the hearing on DATE , N repeated all his statements to the police and stated that he would stand by them . N 's case was joined with another case ( R CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

At some point during the proceedings against N , the applicant had been detained on remand on suspicion of aggravated narcotics offences , apparently on the basis of the information revealed to the police by N. On DATE the applicant was charged with CARDINAL aggravated narcotics offences before ORG . ( The file is incomplete as regards the beginning of the proceedings against the applicant . )

On DATE , there was also a hearing in the case R CARDINAL/CARDINAL against N and CARDINAL other accused , concerning several aggravated narcotics offences . Several charges were brought against N and the co - accused . The case was adjourned until DATE .

At the hearing on DATE before ORG the applicant 's case , which had so far been heard separately from ORG case , was joined to the latter . N stated that he would not repeat all his statements made in the police investigations . The applicant 's legal counsel said that he intended to put some questions to N later .

The next hearing took place on DATE . When asked by the applicant 's legal counsel , N stated that he had not dealt in drugs with the applicant .

On DATE , there was a further hearing in the case , which was again adjourned until DATE . ( The complete minutes of that hearing have not been filed . )

In a hearing on DATE , yet another case was joined to the applicant 's case . There were now a total of CARDINAL accused , including the applicant and ORG stated that at this stage he did not want to repeat everything he had said about some of the accused .

On DATE , there was another hearing in the case before ORG . The public prosecutor submitted several police investigation reports to the court . The applicant 's legal counsel stated that it was his impression that according to N the applicant had not dealt in any drugs . When asked by the counsel , N referred to what he had said before . The case was adjourned until DATE .

On DATE the case was heard again . The public prosecutor submitted new police investigation reports to the court . N refused to comment on any of his statements and stated that he would remain silent . He also stated that he would not answer questions put to him as he “ wanted to reserve an opportunity for all the innocent co - accused to tell the truth ” . The case was adjourned until DATE .

The applicant 's case was heard again on DATE and it was adjourned until DATE .

At the hearing on DATE , co - accused H confessed that he had been CARDINAL of the CARDINAL main financiers of the drug trafficking . The other was allegedly N. The applicant 's legal counsel stressed that N had not stated anything that would incriminate the applicant in the case . ORG convicted N of CARDINAL aggravated narcotic offences and some other offences and sentenced him to DATE and DATE imprisonment . H was convicted of CARDINAL aggravated narcotics offences and some other offences and sentenced to DATE imprisonment . Another co - accused was also convicted of narcotics offences and sentenced to a term of imprisonment . The rest of the case was adjourned until DATE .

On DATE the case was heard again . The public prosecutor submitted to ORG a report , dated on DATE , concerning telecommunications between the accused . The applicant 's counsel gave his closing speech and commented on the report on telecommunications , without requesting a further adjournment on the basis of the report . ORG convicted the applicant of CARDINAL aggravated narcotics offences , committed in complicity with N and another co - accused , and convicted him to DATE imprisonment . The conviction was mainly based on ORG statements supported by some co - accused 's and witnesses ' statements and by circumstantial evidence . The applicant was detained on remand .

The applicant appealed to ORG ( hovioikeus , hovrätt ) , requesting an oral hearing before ORG . He stated , inter alia , that N had repeated several times during the proceedings before ORG that the applicant had not dealt in narcotics with ORG , ORG statements in the police investigations in so far as concerned the applicant had been very vague and had had no reference to any factual situation . The applicant also argued against the value of the report on telecommunications as evidence , as the report had appeared to be incomplete . The applicant named several persons that he wished to be heard before ORG : e.g. a co - accused S and new witnesses J and V as regards the value of the report on telecommunications as evidence , and the co - accused H as regards his confession . On DATE ORG upheld ORG judgment without holding an oral hearing .

On DATE ORG ( korkein oikeus , högsta domstolen ) refused the applicant leave to appeal .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

André Potocki;Ganna Yudkivska;Mark Villiger

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in the village of LOC in the GPE region .

In DATE the local authorities undertook to connect the village to a gas pipeline . Starting from DATE the applicant was entrusted with directing the works . According to him , at that point the public funding was interrupted and the construction was continued at the expense of certain villagers . After the GPE completion in DATE the village council and some of the villagers publicly accused the applicant of embezzling public funds , which , as they claimed , had been allocated to him for the construction works in question .

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings against the village council , as well as against Mr S. and PERSON , seeking compensation for damages in respect of the aforementioned embezzlement accusations considered by him to be defamatory .

On DATE ORG ( “ the Ivanivka Court ” ) allowed the applicant ’s claim in part .

On DATE the NORP ORG of Appeal ( “ the NORP Regional Court ” ) quashed the aforementioned judgment and remitted the case back to ORG for fresh consideration .

On DATE the case was transferred to ORG ( “ the Kominternivskyy Court ” ) .

The examination of the case was adjourned several times for the followings reasons : the applicant ’s absence or at his lawyer ’s request ( for DATE in total ) ; the adversary party ’s absence ( for DATE ) ; and the judge ’s leave ( for DATE ) .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s claim , as well as the counterclaim of PERSON which she had lodged in the meantime , as unsubstantiated .

On DATE the applicant appealed .

On DATE the ORG dismissed that appeal following a hearing , in which the applicant had participated . It was noted in the ruling that it could be appealed in cassation within DATE after its pronouncement .

On DATE the applicant lodged a cassation appeal , together with a request for renewal of the time - limit . He contended , in particular , that the ruling in question had been served on him with a delay and that he had required additional time for preparing his appeal in cassation given his advanced age and poor health .

On DATE ORG , following a hearing with the applicant ’s participation , refused to renew the time - limit for his appeal in cassation , having found that the reasons advanced by him were not sufficiently serious for that .

On DATE the applicant challenged that ruling on appeal .

On DATE the president of the ORG admitted , in his reply to the applicant ’s complaint about the length of the proceedings , that there had indeed been some delays in dealing with his case by the first - instance court and that the judge in charge had been reprimanded in that regard .

On DATE the ORG found against the applicant , having upheld the decision of the first - instance court .

On DATE the applicant appealed in cassation . He submitted , inter alia , that the adversary party had obtained , without his knowledge , a medical certificate regarding his health which had wrongly been adduced to the case file .

On DATE ORG transferred the applicant ’s appeal in cassation to ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) , in compliance with the legislative amendments .

On DATE ORG held that the lower courts had correctly rejected the applicant ’s request for the renewal of the procedural time - limits .

According to the applicant , the aforementioned ruling was served on him on DATE , following his enquiry with ORG about the case progress of DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a separate compensation claim with ORG against a certain PERSON alleging that she had disseminated defamatory information about him , including in the framework of the above proceedings .

On DATE the applicant challenged the judge dealing with his case .

On DATE his motion was granted , and the case was assigned to another judge .

On DATE ORG stayed the proceedings at the applicant ’s request , pending the receipt of the case file materials in respect of the first set of the defamation proceedings ( see above ) , which the applicant considered to be of relevance for this case .

On DATE the case was transferred to another judge following an increase of the court ’s staff .

In DATE the court resumed the examination of the case . It adjourned its hearing in DATE for DATE because of the defendant ’s failure to attend .

On DATE ORG found against the applicant .

On DATE and DATE ORG and ORG , respectively , upheld that judgment .


Violation of Art. 6-1 with regard to general structure of court martial system;No violation of Art. 6-1 with regard to specific complaints;No violation of Art. 6-3-c;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

In DATE , at DATE , the applicant became a member of ORG , joining the ORG regiment of ORG . In DATE the applicant was posted to ORG ( “ the HCMR ” ) where he was taught to ride a horse . The applicant alleges that during riding lessons he became the target of bullying by other soldiers , including a lance - corporal . According to the applicant , towards DATE the lance - corporal hit him on the side of the head with his fist , causing him to fall and strike his head on the ground . On DATE , DATE after the attack , the applicant reported sick and told the medical officer that the injury to his face had been caused by falling off a horse . On DATE the applicant , who alleges to have feared a further physical attack , went absent without leave . On DATE he wrote to the commanding officer ( “ CO ” ) of the regiment ( a lieutenant - colonel ) , stating , inter alia , that “ [ his ] inability to express sufficient enthusiasm during training sometimes resulted in physical abuse by certain NCOs [ non - commissioned officers ] ” , and asking to terminate his service . He received no reply to this letter .

The applicant was arrested by the civilian police on DATE and taken to the ORG 's barracks at LOC , GPE . DATE he was charged with being absent without leave contrary to section CARDINAL(a ) of the Army Act DATE . On DATE he was remanded in close arrest by ORG , acting as subordinate ORG . On the “ DATE Delay Report ” dated DATE , the reason for the detention is stated : “ Likely to absent himself ... – has already offered bribe to ORG on guard to release him . ” On DATE he appeared before the ORG and was remanded by him in close arrest for an abstract of evidence . He was subsequently released by the ORG into open arrest on DATE . The ORG remanded him for trial by district court martial on DATE .

In a statement dated DATE to ORG , the applicant stated that the attack by the lance - corporal had occurred in DATE prior to his going absent without leave , while in a statement dated DATE he stated that the attack occurred sometime in DATE . The police found that the lance - corporal had left the army and took statements from other soldiers who had been on the same riding course as the applicant . They found that there was no evidence to support his complaint . The applicant subsequently signed a statement saying , inter alia : “ I have come to the conclusion that I just want to get out of the army and get on with my life ... Even though this assault happened , I do not want ORG ... to take any further action concerning the incident . ”

Following the applicant 's remand for trial , the ORG appointed Captain A. as “ defending officer ” . PERSON was an army officer with no legal training , serving as a troop commander with the HCMR . The applicant applied to ORG ( “ ORG ” ) for legal aid to enable him to be represented by a solicitor . On the application form he stated that his DATE income after deduction of tax , rent and national insurance was MONEY ( GBP ) , and that he had no savings or other property of value . The form was countersigned by his ORG . By a letter dated DATE , ORG replied that a charge of absence without leave did not normally warrant legal representation but that either the ORG or the applicant should write setting out his reasons if he considered that , exceptionally , legal aid should be granted . The applicant 's solicitor wrote to ORG on DATE pointing out that the applicant faced a custodial sentence and needed to be represented . ORG offered the applicant legal aid subject to a down - payment of GBP CARDINAL in a letter dated DATE . The Government maintain that he could have paid in CARDINAL DATE instalments of GBP CARDINAL each , but this is disputed by the applicant . On DATE the applicant 's solicitor wrote asking ORG to reconsider the down - payment condition , but on DATE , before ORG had replied , the applicant refused the offer of legal aid and was not , therefore , represented by a solicitor at the court martial .

Also on CARDINAL DATE , the applicant signed a document , addressed “ to whom it may concern ” , in which he made the following statement :

“ This is to certify that I , CARDINAL ORG of ORG no longer wish to be represented at my pending ORG other than by my Defending Officer , Captain [ A. ] .

I have made this decision of my own free will . I understand that all previous correspondence with regard to my application for legal representation will now be ignored . ”

The applicant 's court martial took place at FAC on DATE . The court was composed as follows : a president , ORG FAC of ORG and ORG , who was a permanent president of courts martial ( appointed to his post in DATE and due to remain until his retirement in DATE ) ; Captain PERSON of ORG , GPE ; Captain PERSON of ORG , GPE , GPE and ORG ( Volunteers ) , Reading ; and a legally qualified civilian judge advocate ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . All CARDINAL military officers were outside the command area in which the applicant was serving . The president worked from home when not attending court - martial hearings .

Captain PERSON represented the applicant , who pleaded guilty to the charge of being absent without leave between DATE and CARDINAL DATE . The applicant 's letter of CARDINAL DATE to his ORG was handed to the court , but no other mention was made of the bullying allegedly suffered by him . The applicant was sentenced to dismissal from the army and DATE detention .

After the hearing , PERSON erroneously advised the applicant that if he appealed against the sentence he risked the commencement date for his sentence being put back to the date of dismissal of the appeal . On DATE the applicant instructed a solicitor to represent him . On DATE the solicitor lodged a petition with ORG in its role as the “ reviewing authority ” ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , relying on the facts that the applicant had had no legal representation before the court martial and that his allegations of assault were not presented to the court , either by way of a defence of duress ( which applies when a person charged with a criminal offence can show that , at the relevant time , he reasonably believed that he would be killed or seriously injured if he did not commit the offence ) or in mitigation of sentence . The petition asserted that it was unlikely that the defending officer understood that the applicant might have had a defence on the basis of duress and that the defending officer had indicated that he had been “ ordered ” not to allude to the allegations at the court martial without indicating who had so ordered him . It also mentioned instructions which the defending officer had given about what the applicant ought to do in the event that the court martial should , of its own volition , ask the applicant about the allegations which had been made . It also indicated that the defending officer had advised the applicant that , “ if he appealed , his sentence might well be increased ” . On DATE the petition was introduced , the solicitor wrote to PERSON asking for his comments on it and reminding him that he was subject to the rules of client privilege and should not disclose details of his dealings with the applicant to any third party . Despite this , PERSON provided a statement to ORG , in which he said , inter alia :

“ As [ the applicant 's ] Troop Leader I was asked to represent him at Court Martial , this was the first Court Martial I have attended in any capacity . Although I have had experience in civil cases at both NORP ' and ORG . ...

[ The applicant ] had indicated to me that he had gone absent from the ORG for CARDINAL reason . As expressed in his letter of CARDINAL DATE . He was showing reservations about his enthusiasm , commitment and devotion to duty . ...

[ T]he petition states that I assumed the petitioner had no choice but to plead guilty , as he had been Absent Without Leave . I was unaware that he could have entered a plea of not guilty to the charge on the basis of duress . [ The applicant ] and I did not discuss the allegations of bullying in any great detail . This was because these allegations had been withdrawn by him under interview by ORG .

[ The applicant ] indicated to me that he wanted to drop all the references to the violence by the ORG during his training . This was in order that the trial date would be set significantly earlier and that the trial would be substantially shorter . This led me to advise [ the applicant ] to plead guilty as charged , as I had felt that this gave him his best opportunity to be discharged from the ORG at the earliest date which was , after all , his overall aim . ...

I discussed with the Adjutant my role as the Defending Officer . We talked about the procedural steps of the court martial and my conduct leading up to the trial . It was confirmed to me that a guilty plea would produce an earlier trial date than that of not guilty .

I advised [ the applicant ] that references to his allegations of bullying could prolong and complicate his court martial . The mention of bullying would be introduced as part of his letter to his commanding officer dated DATE , which he agreed could be put forward for the court as mitigation . [ The applicant ] agreed that he did not wish to answer questions about his previous allegations , which he had dropped .

I therefore advised him to refer such questions to me and I would state to the court that this was an avenue down which he did not wish to proceed . ... ”

The petition was refused by the reviewing authority on DATE , in the following terms :

“ ORG has considered the petition submitted by your above - named client , and has denied it for the following reasons .

The down payment for ORG was carefully calculated , and was well in line with the amount the petitioner would have had to pay under the civil system . The certificate signed by him shows clearly that he had decided not to proceed with his application for legal representation . We can not accept that [ the applicant ] was in any way forced to accept this decision . He also appears to have been content to accept Captain [ A. ] as his defending officer .

The complaints about the petitioner being bullied were investigated by the ORG and the allegations could not be substantiated . Indeed it came to light during this investigation that the petitioner had told [ another soldier ] that he planned to go absent because he was merely tired of the training and TIME being worked . In view of the ORG report , ORG must accept that the allegation that the petitioner was subjected to violence by a Non - Commissioned Officer can not be substantiated , and can not be regarded as a mitigating factor .

In considering your complaint that , had the petitioner been advised by a qualified solicitor , he would have been able to plead not guilty on the basis of duress , we had to rely on the advice given by the Judge Advocate General . He stated that a person is subject to duress when words or conduct from another person cause him to fear that he will be killed or seriously injured , if he does not commit the offence . Clearly , the petitioner could never have reasonably believed that he had cause to fear that he would be killed or seriously injured .

ORG notes that the petitioner had dropped his allegations of being subjected to violence by the time he appeared in ORG . All Captain [ A. ] intended to do was to inform the ORG that the petitioner did not wish to proceed with these allegations . In fact the ORG was made aware of them because the letter from ( sic ) the Commanding Officer was read out to them .

We accept that Captain [ A. ] was mistaken in referring the petitioner to the booklet ' Appeals and Petitions after conviction by ORG , which was out of date after DATE . In addition the wrong paragraph was used in his advice to the petitioner . However as we have now received a petition , in spite of this mistaken advice , we believe that no harm has been done . ... ”

On DATE the applicant lodged an application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence to ORG . Leave to appeal was refused by the single judge on DATE , on the grounds that the defence of duress had not been open to the applicant , that he had been properly advised to plead guilty , and that the sentence was not manifestly excessive .

LAW ( “ the LAW ” ) came into effect on DATE , amending LAW DATE ( “ the DATE LAW ) .

NORP Under LAW , the initial decision whether or not to bring a prosecution is taken by the higher authority , who is a senior officer who must decide whether any case referred to him by the accused 's commanding officer should be dealt with summarily , referred to the prosecuting authority , or dropped . Once the higher authority has taken this decision , he has no further involvement in the case .

Where the accused is a member of the army , the role of prosecutor is performed by ORG ( “ the prosecuting authority ” ) . Following the higher authority 's decision to refer a case to it , the prosecuting authority has absolute discretion , applying similar criteria as those applied in civilian cases by ORG , to decide whether or not to prosecute , what type of court martial would be appropriate and precisely what charges should be brought . In addition , it conducts the prosecution ( DATE Act , Schedule I , Part II ) . The prosecution is brought on behalf of the Attorney - General . The current prosecuting authority is ORG . In his role as prosecuting authority , ORG is answerable to the Attorney - General , while in his coexisting role as the army 's senior lawyer he is answerable to ORG ( the army 's principal personnel and training officer , responsible , inter alia , for army disciplinary policy and a member of ORG ) . In pursuit of his latter role , ORG provides some military legal advice to the army chain of command . He does not advise the disciplinary chain of command of the army , this role being reserved to ORG .

ORG is also the responsibility of ORG .

ORG ( now ORG ) , independent of both the higher authority and the prosecuting authority , is responsible for making the arrangements for courts martial , including arranging venue and timing , ensuring that a judge advocate and any court officials required will be available , securing the attendance of witnesses and selecting members of the court . Its officers are appointed by ORG . Before commencement of the court - martial hearing , the power to dissolve it is vested in the responsible court - administration officer . Until DATE the person in charge of ORG was a retired officer . ORG was then created in its place , the head of which is now a serving brigadier .

At the relevant time , a district court martial ( “ DCM ” ) was required to consist of a permanent president of courts martial , not CARDINAL serving military officers of DATE military experience and a judge advocate ( section CARDINAL of LAW as amended by LAW ) . The court - administration officer , commanding officers of the accused , members of the higher authority , investigating officers and all other officers involved in inquiring into the charges concerned were all barred from selection to the court martial ( section CARDINALC(CARDINAL ) of LAW as amended by LAW ) . ORG Rules DATE further provide that an officer serving under the command of : ( i ) the higher authority referring the case ; ( ii ) the prosecuting authority ; or ( iii ) the court - administration officer are ineligible for selection . ORG provide that a court martial is , so far as practicable , to be composed of officers from different units .

NORP The post of permanent president of courts martial ( “ the permanent president ” ) was first created in DATE . Permanent presidents were routinely appointed thereafter to sit on DCMs whenever CARDINAL was available until suspension of the post in DATE , around the time of a ruling by Assistant Judge Advocate PERSON on DATE in ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) that the appointment of permanent presidents meant that courts martial did not have the necessary impartiality and independence for the purposes of LAW . Permanent presidents were selected from the ranks of serving army officers of suitable age and rank . Until DATE , permanent presidents of courts martial held the rank of major . Thereafter their rank was raised to lieutenant - colonel , which resulted in permanent presidents routinely outranking the other serving officers on a ORG , who were never above the rank of major . Legal qualifications or experience were not required . Their appointment was usually expected to be for a period in excess of DATE and was almost without exception the officer 's last posting before his retirement from the army . The Military Secretary ( a senior subordinate of ORG ) had power to terminate the appointment of a permanent president , but this has never happened in practice .

NORP Judge advocates are appointed by the Lord Chancellor and are civilians who must have DATE experience as an advocate or DATE experience as a barrister . A judge advocate 's rulings on points of law are binding on the court and he delivers a summing - up in open court before the court martial retires to consider its verdict . Once the court martial hearing has commenced , the power to dissolve it is vested in the judge advocate . He has a vote on sentence , but not on verdict . Under LAW , the Judge Advocate General lost his previous role of providing general legal advice to the Secretary of ORG I , Part III , sections CARDINAL , DATE and DATE ) .

Each member of a court martial has to swear the following oath :

“ I swear by Almighty PERSON that I will well and truly try the accused before the court according to the evidence , and that I will duly administer justice according to LAW DATE without partiality , favour or affection , and I do further swear that I will not on any account at any time whatsoever disclose or discover the vote or opinion of the president or any member of this court martial , unless thereunto required in the due course of law . ”

Decisions on verdict and sentence are reached by majority vote ( section CARDINAL of the DATE Act ) . The casting vote on sentence , if needed , rests with the president of the court martial , who also gives reasons for the sentence in open court . The members of the court are required to speak , and at the close of deliberations to vote on verdict and sentence , in ascending order of seniority .

All guilty verdicts reached and sentences imposed by a court martial must be reviewed by the “ reviewing authority ” ( section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act as amended by LAW ) . Although the ultimate responsibility rests with ORG , the review is as a matter of practice generally delegated to a senior subordinate of ORG . Post - trial advice received by the reviewing authority from a judge advocate ( different from the one who officiated at the court martial ) is disclosed to the accused , who has the right to present a petition to the authority . The reviewing authority may quash any guilty verdict and associated sentence or make any finding of guilt which could have been made by the court martial , and may substitute any sentence ( not being , in the authority 's opinion , more severe than that originally passed ) which was open to the court martial ( section LAW of the DATE Act as amended by LAW ) . The reviewing authority gives a reasoned decision and its verdict and sentence are treated for all purposes as if they were reached or imposed by the court martial .

There is a right of appeal against both conviction and sentence to ORG ( a civilian court of appeal ) ( section CARDINAL of ORG DATE ) . An appeal will be allowed where the court finds that the conviction is unsafe , but dismissed in all other cases . The court has power , inter alia , to call for the production of evidence and witnesses whether or not produced at the court martial ( section CARDINAL of ORG DATE ) .

The role of permanent president was examined by ORG ( which has the same composition as the civilian ORG ) in NORP v. PERSON and another and in NORP v. PERSON ( [ DATE ] ORG GPE and GPE ) CARDINAL ) . The court dismissed the appellants ' complaint that the position of permanent presidents on courts martial violated LAW because permanent presidents lacked the necessary independence and impartiality . The court declined to follow the reasoning of Assistant Judge Advocate PERSON in ORG . Lord Justice Laws , delivering the judgment of the court , said :

“ CARDINAL . Mr Mackenzie of course relies on the decision of Assistant Judge Advocate General PERSON in ORG . His judgment was given as we have said on DATE , by way of a ruling in a then current court martial upon objections raised on behalf of the defence to the ORG [ Permanent President ] sitting as a member of the court . The judge advocate 's essential reasoning appears at pp . CARDINAL of the transcript , after he had correctly directed himself as to LAW CARDINAL standards to be applied ( the numbering attached to the judge advocate general 's text is ours , not his ) :

' CARDINAL . I am concerned as to the terms of appointment of these Permanent Presidents . It seems to me that there is no fixed time limit other than a time which may be quite short DATE , CARDINAL or DATE ; certainly DATE is probably too short to ensure full independence , DATE may be suitable – I express no comment on that .

NORP I am concerned as to their training . This reference to their visiting the APA [ ORG ] , I suspect that is mistyping , nevertheless it is there in their current job description and I must be concerned with the perception of bias , and it does not look appropriate , in my view , for Permanent Presidents to be told they should attend a briefing from ORG .

NORP I am concerned obviously with their potential removal . Clearly anybody exercising judicial or quasi - judicial functions should be free from arbitrary removal , and there should be some sort of guarantee that the removal would only be on the basis of some sort of misconduct within that particular office . There is no security , therefore , it would seem to me , that applies to Permanent Presidents at the present time in their role .

I am also obviously concerned with the question of reporting , whether it be DATE – which I doubt ; it is more likely to be DATE , or perhaps on the renewal of their appointment – I can not say , but certainly there is some reporting that appears to take place , and it seems to me again that is a significant difficulty which affects the perception of independence .

Now , I have specified those CARDINAL [ in fact , CARDINAL ] as being the main concerns that I have ... those particular concerns are sufficient in my view for me to rule that in the particular circumstances of the system as it now stands , the appointments of Permanent Presidents do not give rise to an independent and impartial tribunal . '

The judge advocate was at pains to insist that his ruling was ' limited to this particular case ' ; but its reasoning plainly applies at least to all DCMs presided over by a ORG .

Mr Mackenzie sought to build on the reasoning in ORG with a series of further points ... In particular , he submitted that ( a ) there were no objective regulatory provisions governing the ORG 's appointment , beyond the ordinary procedures for staff appointments ; ( b ) ' the medium rank of ORG prevents such officers from being immune from general ORG influence ' ... ; ( c ) the ORG is senior in rank to the other officers on the court martial ... , and would be likely to exert a substantial influence over them .

It is convenient to deal with this last point first . In ORG the judge advocate stated at CARDINAL - D ( referring to junior members of a ORG ) :

' Speaking for myself , having of course sat in on many , many sentencing matters with Permanent Presidents , I can say that I have found that the junior members ... the fact that they happen to be junior in rank , has not prevented them from being very robust in their sentencing arguments . '

As judge advocate he would not , of course , have participated in the court 's deliberations upon conviction . It is to be noted that by paragraph CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of ORG the junior officer is required to speak first in the course of any court martial 's deliberations . The provision is plainly intended to ensure that junior members ' genuine opinions are put forward .

Upon this point , PERSON argument does not go to the particular position of the PERSON at all , but rather to the differences in rank among the members of the court martial , whether the president is a ORG or not . As such we doubt whether it is open to him . But we are clear in any event that there is no merit in it . If the argument were right , it would presumably mean that Article CARDINAL ) required that the members of a court martial should be officers of the same rank . That can not be the law . The notion , were it accepted , that it is reasonable to fear that between joint decision - makers of different rank there is a systematic likelihood that the more junior may be unduly influenced by the perceived views of the more senior would , surely , be an unlooked for and unwelcome side - effect of the ORG 's beneficent regime . We consider it perfectly reasonable to suppose that junior officers would regard it as their duty to speak with their own voice , and that the modern culture of the ORG would promote that very point of view . We do not think it would be reasonable for the accused soldier to entertain any different perception . This point is a bad one .

The argument as to the ORG 's medium rank and ' general ORG influence ' falls to be disposed of in like manner . But there is another point to be made . The way this argument is formulated DATE ' the medium rank of ORG prevents such officers from being immune from general ORG influence ' – amounts , looked at rigorously , to an allegation of actual bias ( whether unconscious or not ) . It is not , or not only , a matter of the appearance of the thing or of the presence or absence of objective guarantees . It is a delicate way of saying that such medium - ranking officers are relatively prone to take a prosecution line . That is quite a serious allegation , for which there is not a whisper of any supporting evidence . And in our view it is simply patronising to suggest that an officer in the rank of Lieutenant - Colonel ... will have his judgment on the concrete facts of a particular case affected by anything so amorphous as ' general ORG influence ' .

In our judgment Mr LOC 's further submission about the absence of any specific regulatory provision goes nowhere , unless it supports an argument to the effect that the PPCMs lack sufficient tenure in office for this court to be satisfied that the Article CARDINAL requirements of independence and impartiality are met . ...

... we should dispose of point ( CARDINAL ) in ORG . This rested in the judge advocate 's understanding that ORG PPCMs were required , as a training exercise , to visit and be briefed by ORG . In fact the judge advocate himself reported ( CARDINAL ) the assurance given to him that no such visits took place . Lt Col Stone states in terms that he has never visited the ORG . From the judge advocate 's reasoning in ORG it looks as if there must have been some rogue document or documents in circulation ; but there is obviously nothing of substance in the point . ”

Lord Justice Laws concluded as follows on the appellants ' complaint about the position of permanent presidents ( at paragraph CARDINAL ) :

“ ... We consider that the conditions upon which PPCMs have been appointed , and held office , have involved no violation of Article CARDINAL ) , and in particular there was no violation on the facts of these cases . We should first collect the facts which have weighed with us . ( CARDINAL ) The PPCMs effectively operated outside the ordinary chain of command . They advisedly lived their professional lives largely in isolation from their ORG colleagues . ( CARDINAL ) While Mr Havers rightly accepted that there was no ' written guarantee ' against removal , there is in fact no record of a ORG ever having been removed from that position . Removal from office , we may readily infer , would only take place in highly exceptional circumstances which have never eventuated . ( CARDINAL ) The appointment was the officer 's last posting , offering no prospect of promotion or preferment thereafter . Neither of the PPCMs in these cases entertained any such prospect , hope or expectation . ... ( CARDINAL ) The term of these PPCMs ' appointments was for DATE ... ( CARDINAL ) There have been no reports on ORG PPCMs since DATE . ... ”

In NORP v. PERSON ( [ DATE ] ORG Reports CARDINAL ) , ORG examined , inter alia , the compatibility of a NORP general court martial with section CARDINAL(d ) of LAW , which provides :

“ CARDINAL . Any person charged with an offence has the right

( d ) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal . ”

A general court martial consisted of CARDINAL voting members , who were joined by a judge advocate who was called upon to determine questions of law or mixed law and fact during the trial . The judge advocate was appointed to the general court martial by the Judge Advocate General on an ad hoc basis .

ORG concluded that the judge advocate did not possess sufficient security of tenure to satisfy the requirement of “ independence ” under section CARDINAL(d ) of the Charter . PERSON , delivering the leading judgment of the court , commented as follows :

“ ... the judge advocate was appointed solely on a case by case basis . As a result , there was no objective guarantee that his or her career as a military judge would not be affected by decisions tending in favour of the accused rather than the prosecution . A reasonable person might well have entertained an apprehension that a legal officer 's occupation as a military judge would be affected by his or her performance in earlier cases ... [ or ] that the person chosen as judge advocate had been selected because he or she had satisfied the interests of the executive , or at least has not seriously disappointed the executive 's expectations , in previous proceedings . ...

Military judges who act periodically as judge advocates must therefore have a tenure that is beyond the interference of the executive for a fixed period of time . ”

He went on to note that amendments to NORP court - martial procedures , which had come into force subsequent to the proceedings at issue in the case , had corrected deficiencies in the judge advocate 's security of tenure , providing for appointment for a period of DATE .


Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;Khanlar Hajiyev;Loukis Loucaides

The applicants , Mr PERSON , PERSON , PERSON Fedorova and Mr PERSON , are NORP nationals who were born in DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE , GPE .

The respondent Government were represented by PERSON , Representative of GPE at ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE CARDINAL of the applicants , PERSON , was called up by the military authorities to take part in the emergency operations at the site of the GPE nuclear plant disaster . The applicant was engaged in the operations until DATE and , as a result , suffered from extensive exposure to radioactive emissions . In DATE , after an expert opinion established a causal link between the applicant ’s disability and his involvement in the GPE events , Mr PERSON was put on a waiting list for additional housing . As he was not offered any , in DATE he brought court proceedings against ORG , ORG and ORG .

On DATE ORG partly found in the applicant ’s favour and ordered ORG to grant the applicant additional housing in a form of a separate room . Both parties appealed against the judgment ( the applicant requested to be provided with a separate flat instead of a room ) .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment and on DATE it became enforceable .

On DATE ORG instituted enforcement proceedings .

On DATE Mr PERSON ’s representative in the domestic proceedings , PERSON , applied to ORG in order to withdraw the writ of execution .

On DATE the writ of execution was returned to the applicant ’s representative and the enforcement proceedings were terminated due to the applicant ’s withdrawal of the writ .

Subsequently , the applicant applied to the court requesting it to amend the way of the execution of the judgment of ORG of DATE .

On DATE ORG changed the way of execution of the judgment of DATE and ordered the defendant to pay the applicant CARDINAL CARDINAL , MONEY ( RUB ) for the purchase of additional housing in a form of a separate room with a living surface of CARDINAL m² .

On DATE the applicant sent the new writ of execution to ORG .

On DATE the applicant ’s wife , on his behalf , concluded a sale - purchase agreement of a separate room with a living surface of CARDINAL m² .

On DATE the agreement was registered by ORG in accordance with the official procedure and the applicant received an ownership certificate for the room .

On DATE the sum awarded to the applicant for the purchase of the housing was transferred to the seller ’s account .


CASE OF ANAGNOSTOPOULOS AND OTHERS v. GREECE

Violation of Art. 6-1 as regards the right to a fair hearing;Violation of Art. 6-1 as regard the length of proceedings;Not necessary to examine Art. 13;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - domestic proceedings;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The first applicant is a lawyer and retired major - general of the NORP army . The seventh applicant is a retired major - general of the NORP army . The other applicants are retired officers of the NORP police force .

NORP In DATE the Minister of ORG and the Minister of ORG authorised the granting , from DATE , of an award for meritorious service ( επίδoμα ευδόκιμης παραμovής ) to colonels and their superior officers . The award was fixed at PERCENT of the main salary . That ministerial decision was subsequently confirmed by the NORP parliament ( PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

The applicants accordingly lodged claims for an increase in their pensions in accordance with the provisions of PERSON no . DATE . They lodged their applications on DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE respectively .

Their claims were rejected by ORG ( PERSON τoυ PERSON ) on DATE , CARDINAL DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE respectively , on the ground that the applicants had retired before DATE , the date on which Law no . DATE came into force .

The applicants appealed to ORG ( PERSON ) , which dismissed their appeals as ill - founded ( decisions ORG . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE , DATE , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE , CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL respectively ) . In particular , ORG considered that the award in question could not be considered to be part of the main salary . Accordingly , it could not be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the pensions of officers having retired before the entry into force of the statute providing for the award .

NORP On DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE respectively , the applicants appealed on points of law to ORG , sitting as a full court , which was the court having jurisdiction to examine their appeal .

On DATE the NORP parliament adopted PERSON no . CARDINAL , which excluded the award in question from the calculation of pensions paid to officers having retired before DATE , declared any relevant claim statute - barred and any relevant judicial proceedings pending in any court to be null and void . That PERSON was confirmed by PERSON no . CARDINAL of DATE .

On DATE ORG , sitting as a full court , upheld a claim lodged by another police officer who had also retired before DATE , and ordered that his pension should be increased ( judgment no . DATE ) . That judgment marked a reversal of the case - law of ORG . It was followed by CARDINAL other judgments along the same lines .

In judgments dated DATE ( applicants nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL and DATE ) , CARDINAL DATE ( applicant no . CARDINAL ) , DATE ( applicant no . CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL DATE ( applicants ORG . CARDINAL and DATE ) , ORG , sitting as a full court , dismissed the applicants ' appeals on the ground that they were ill - founded . ORG pointed out in particular that the award in question could not be considered as a general salary increase ; accordingly , it could not be granted to officers having retired before the entry into force of Law no . DATE . ORG noted , subsidiarily , that even supposing that the award in question could be considered as a general salary increase and the proceedings not declared null and void under to Law no . CARDINAL , the applicants ' claims were manifestly ill - founded because the provisions of the above - mentioned statute applied retrospectively .


Preliminary objection rejected (six month period, non-exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of P1-1;Just satisfaction reserved

The late PERSON heirs PERSON and PERSON are NORP nationals born in DATE and DATE and resident in GPE . The estate of PERSON also acts as an applicant .

The applicants are the owners of the real property ORG ( registered as number ORG ; “ the ORG mansion ” ) in the village of the same name , currently part of the city of Tammisaari ( PERSON ) .

The applicants claim ownership in the form of a right of permanent usufruct ( in NORP vakaa hallinta - oikeus ; in NORP ständig besittningsrätt ) in respect of the property PERSON ( registered as number CARDINAL ) in the village of the same name , also within the city limits of Tammisaari . The property comprises CARDINAL hectares of water and some islands totalling QUANTITY . The islands originally belonged to the NORP Crown ( “ Crown land ” ; kruununluontoinen maa , jord av krononatur ) .

Around DATE the then owners of the ORG mansion ( kartano , säteri ) were afforded the right to make use of the ORG - Högholm islands in return for an DATE levy ( sääntönäisvero , stadga or stadgad ränta ) . The levy was collected from DATE . That arrangement was maintained by a decision of the ORG of the then GPE on CARDINAL DATE . The decision noted the following :

( In NORP ) “ ... så emedan dessa holmar äro påförde stadgade räntor och sedan medlet af DATE århundradet opåtaldt innehafts ... pröve VI skäligt förklara desamma skola som hitintills förbliva under sagde säteri ... emot erläggande af de förre stadgade räntorne , hvarom anteckning likväl bör i jordeboken införas ... ”

( Translation into LANGUAGE ) “ ... since these islands are subject to payment of an annual levy and have been made use of in an undisturbed manner since the middle of the last century ... we find it reasonable that they should remain , as heretofore , attached to the said mansion ... in return for payment of the DATE levy , which should be entered into the land register ... ”

When land taxation was abolished in DATE the duty to pay a levy was replaced by a liability to pay ORG wealth tax ( varallisuusvero , förmögenhetsskatt ) . Up to DATE the levy had amounted to the equivalent of MONEY ( ORG ) at DATE ’s value .

The PERSON - Högholm property was formed through a supplementary land - parcelling procedure in DATE . At the same time it was registered as ordinary real property instead of ORG land , the ORG being indicated as its owner . According to the record of the land parcelling the owner description was incomplete , but the property was leased to the ORG mansion . During the land - parcelling proceedings the owners of the ORG mansion submitted that they did not question the ORG ’s ownership . However , they claimed that they had a right of disposal ( dispositionsrätt in NORP ) .

The owners of the ORG mansion made use of the ORG - Högholm islands and the surrounding waters in an undisturbed manner until DATE , when ORG granted fishing rights to a third party without PERSON consent .

In DATE PERSON initiated proceedings with a view to having his ownership of the PERSON - Högholm property confirmed . In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( kihlakunnanoikeus , häradsrätten ) found it established that the claimant and the previous owners of the ORG mansion had been enjoying a right of permanent usufruct in respect of the property , that right having developed into ownership .

ORG judgment was quashed by ORG ( hovioikeus , hovrätten ) on CARDINAL DATE . The appellate court found that the ORG had originally let the islands to the then owners of the ORG mansion . This lease had been maintained in DATE . The ORG had thus never given up its ownership , but had simply tacitly consented to the ORG mansion ’s use of the property , initially subject to payment of a rent or levy and later subject to payment of wealth tax .

On DATE ORG ( korkein oikeus , högsta domstolen ) refused leave to appeal .

The registration ( lainhuuto , lagfart ) of the ORG as the lawful owner of the property in DATE was challenged by PERSON in a new civil suit seeking to obtain confirmation of his right of permanent usufruct in respect of the PERSON - Högholm property and DATE should that right be deemed to have developed into ownership DATE confirmation of his ownership . PERSON died on DATE and his estate continued the lawsuit .

In a judgment of DATE ORG confirmed the applicants’ right of permanent usufruct and revoked the ORG ’s title to the property .

ORG judgment was quashed by ORG on DATE on grounds similar to those relied on in its earlier judgment . It found , inter alia , that :

( a ) the ownership issue had been finally settled in the first set of proceedings ;

( b ) the first reference to the islands of ORG and PERSON had appeared in a judgment book ( tuomiokirja , dombok ) of GPE in DATE , and a DATE payment had been made in respect of the islands ;

( c ) it could be deduced from the written material submitted to ORG that the islands had been leased to the owner of the ORG mansion in DATE ;

( d ) in DATE the owner of the ORG mansion had attempted to transform the islands from ORG land into tax land ( see “ Relevant domestic law and practice ” below ) , but the official list of land thus transformed – drawn up in DATE had not included the islands ;

( e ) in DATE the ORG had decided that the islands were to remain under the control of the ORG mansion in return for the prescribed payments , rather than the lease being put up for tender for DATE , as had been suggested in the light of the practice with regard to certain other plots of ORG land ;

( f ) the owners of the ORG mansion had enjoyed undisturbed possession of the islands until DATE , when the ORG had granted a fishing licence to a third party in respect of the waters surrounding the islands ; and

( g ) a right of permanent usufruct in respect of ORG land continued to be recognised under NORP law , on condition that there was a clear legal basis for the right .

ORG concluded that originally the ORG had leased the islands to the ORG mansion , and that the ORG had upheld that lease in its decision of CARDINAL DATE . The payment of rent ( in NORP vuokranmaksu ) had later ceased and the mansion had paid tax in respect of the property , just as in respect of any other real property belonging to it . The ORG ’s decision had not established any right of permanent usufruct in favour of the ORG mansion , and the applicants had not presented any evidence of any other acquisition upon which such a right could be founded .

On DATE ORG refused leave to appeal .

Meanwhile , following PERSON death in DATE , PERSON and PERSON had declared that the PERSON - Högholm property formed part of the overall estate of the deceased for the purposes of the inventory of his possessions ( perukirja , bouppteckning ) . Inheritance tax was levied inter alia in respect of the PERSON - Högholm property .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE ORG requested the applicants to vacate the ORG property . The applicants have apparently not yet complied with the request and no enforcement proceedings have been initiated to date . At the hearing before the ORG on DATE the ORG argued that the letter in question amounted to the termination of the lease . The nature of the letter was disputed by the applicants .

Meanwhile , in DATE ORG ( Nyland ) had certified that the owners of the ORG mansion had covered all the reforestation and other costs relating to the ORG - Högholm islands and had also collected the full yield from the forestry activities carried out on the islands .

At the time of lodging their application with the ORG the applicants were allegedly still obliged to pay wealth tax on the PERSON - Högholm property . In DATE the Government informed the ORG that the taxation authorities would correct the relevant property register ( maatilarekisteri , jordbruksregistret ) with effect from DATE . The ORG would then be indicated as the rightful owner of the PERSON - Högholm property .

According to the Government , there were no regulations in force in DATE governing the transfer of ownership of ORG land , nor was there any consistency in the contracts concerning such transfers . The scope of each contract and the rights contained therein had therefore to be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of each case . As a rule , it was not possible to transfer the ownership of ORG land before it had been transformed into privately owned land ( perinnöksiosto , skatteköp ) . It was nevertheless possible to establish various rights relating to the enjoyment of the property and benefiting private individuals , municipalities or the ORG . For example , the ORG could transfer a so - called permanent and exclusive right of possession in respect of the land , subject to a payment . Such a right required the land to be used for a specific purpose , and the ORG was entitled to regain possession of it either on payment of compensation or without having to redeem it . Over time the ORG ’s title to the land could change into an ordinary one , whereas it was not , for example , possible to change the amount of the payment ( stadga ) collected from the holder of a right attaching to the property .

Provisions on the procedure for transferring ORG land to private individuals were later included in specific Acts of ORG , such as Act no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( eräiden kruununluontoisten tilojen ja tilanosien järjestelystä annettu laki , lag om reglering av vissa lägenheter och lägenhetsdelar av krononatur ) . These Acts did not , however , govern all ORG land or all cases where a right of usufruct had been attached to it .

In the DATE LAW ( maakaari , jordabalken ORG ) the special characteristics of ORG land are only dealt with in the provisions concerning property registration , the aim being to ensure that the registered data correspond as far as possible to the existing situation . Title may now be established in respect of former ORG land . Any right of permanent usufruct , leasing right or other form of enjoyment of property may also be registered . A title of ownership may not be registered in respect of an estate which is already subject to a permanent right of possession ( see section CARDINALa of the LAW on the Implementation of the Land Code ( laki maakaaren voimaanpanosta , lagen om införande av jordabalken CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

Many scholars have supported the view that the permanent right of possession may be regarded as tantamount to actual ownership . Domestic courts have not accepted this view , preferring to focus on the purpose of the original transaction , even in cases where a right of usufruct was being enjoyed over a long period and in an undisturbed manner . Reference may be made to ORG judgment no . CARDINAL .

It was possible to lease land belonging to the ORG , either for a certain period of time or indefinitely . Rights based on such lease contracts have not been transformed into ownership by means of specific legislation to that effect . Nor has the long - term de facto enjoyment of a property been considered to constitute a basis for ownership or a right of permanent usufruct in respect of land subject to a lease contract . The fact that the owner of the land has been passive or has tacitly accepted that another person uses the land does not entail a transfer of ownership . Transfer of ownership requires a transaction .

For taxation purposes , leased ORG land has been regarded as the tenant ’s possession whenever he or she has been enjoying the right to use the property in spite of the ORG ’s formal ownership . Thus , according to the Income and LAW ( laki tulo- ja omaisuusverosta , lagen om skatt på inkomst och förmögenhet ; Act no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , section CARDINAL ; Act no . DATE , section DATE ; and Act no . CARDINAL , section CARDINAL ) :

“ [ CARDINAL property for which taxes shall be paid includes the assets of the person liable to pay taxes , subject to the restrictions set out below .

The assets shall also include :

( CARDINAL ) any right of usufruct in respect of real property , whether or not its validity has been defined in time or it remains valid during the holder ’s lifetime ; any timber - felling rights ; and any other right to make use of real property belonging to someone else . ”

The existing LAW ( varallisuusverolaki , förmögenhetsskattelagen DATE ) contains a comparable provision ( section CARDINAL ) .

Anyone wishing to adjust the amount of their tax assessment must make a request to that effect in accordance with LAW ( verotusmenettelylaki , lagen om beskattningsförfarande DATE ; LAW ) .

According to the applicants , the right to perpetual usufruct did exist in DATE and was explicitly established , given that transfer of ownership per se was prohibited in respect of ORG land . A right of usufruct was granted permanently until DATE , when the ORG Collegium ( in NORP ) decided to let ORG land for a fixed period of DATE following a tendering procedure in the form of an auction . As the right claimed by the applicants in respect of the PERSON - Högholm property had been established well before , LAW was irrelevant to this case . The nature of the payment collected from the then owners of the ORG mansion ( in NORP stadga or stadgad ränta ) was DATE , which is evidenced by the fact that it was entered in the column of land tax in the land register , and replaced by wealth tax in DATE .

The nature of ORG land is described in the relevant preparatory work on the DATE LAW Government PERSON ) . Real property was historically divided into ORG land , exempted land and tax land ( in NORP krono- , frälse- och skattejord ) . Land tax was levied only on ORG land and tax land . The distinction between ORG land and tax land was abolished by the DATE LAW which entered into force on DATE . As is evidenced by section DATE of LAW ( CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) and its drafting history , the concept of perpetual usufruct nevertheless remained recognised and may also be registered .

NORP The preparatory work on LAW made clear that in examining historical rights to ORG land it must be established whether the ORG ’s intention when preparing the relevant contract was to transfer ownership per se or to grant a right of usufruct in respect of the land . If evidence of a transfer of ownership can not be provided , a right of perpetual usufruct is registered as a special right . For land registration purposes such a right is treated as a leasing right , and its holder may put it up as collateral ( section DATE , subsection CARDINAL , of LAW ) . A right of perpetual usufruct is nevertheless more extensive than a leasing right in that it entitles its holder to use and possess the land at his or her sole discretion and prevents the landowner from having his or her ownership registered or putting the land up as collateral ( section CARDINALa , subsection CARDINAL , of LAW ) .

According to section CARDINAL ) of GPE ( maanvuokralaki , jordlegolagen CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , which is applicable only to agreements made after DATE , a termination of lease must , if the addressee does not give his acknowledgment in writing , be effected in the presence of witnesses or in another demonstrable manner , and must specify the date on which the lease will end .


Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;Khanlar Hajiyev;Sverre Erik Jebens

The applicants , PERSON and PERSON Radionova , are NORP nationals , mother and daughter , who were born in DATE and DATE respectively . They live in GPE . They were represented before the ORG by PERSON . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by PERSON , former Representative of GPE at ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

In DATE the second applicant joined the ballet dance department of a state - run choreography school in GPE .

According to the applicants , on DATE her classical dance teacher , PERSON , allegedly hit her on her forehead , temple and chest for performing an exercise incorrectly . The next day she was taken to town hospital no . DATE and diagnosed with concussion . She received in - patient treatment .

The hospital reported the incident to the police . The ORG district police department conducted an inquiry . In particular , it questioned the second applicant , the teacher and the second applicant 's parents . PERSON stated that she had regularly corrected the second applicant 's posture during her lessons but had never hit her . The police department considered that the acts of PERSON were to be classified as battery , which was punishable under LAW and pertained to cases of private prosecution which , LAW , had to be instigated by court on a victim 's request . Therefore , on DATE the police refused to instigate criminal proceedings .

According to the applicants , on DATE the same teacher PERSON allegedly pushed the second applicant onto her back and insulted her in her classmates ' presence .

On DATE the second applicant saw a psychiatrist , who diagnosed her with neurotic depression syndrome and an anxiety neurosis with suicidal intentions , which had originated in a psychologically traumatic situation . She received appropriate treatment .

On DATE the first applicant lodged a complaint with the school administration in respect of the events of DATE and DATE requesting that an end be put to her daughter 's exposure to violence and moral pressure by the teacher .

On DATE the first applicant complained about the incident of DATE to the GPE Zheleznodorozhniy district police department .

On DATE the school administration informed the first applicant that the teacher would continue the class but would avoid physical contact with the second applicant .

On DATE the GPE district police department decided not to pursue the matter .

On DATE the first applicant complained about PERSON 's behaviour to ORG town authority .

On DATE the ORG district prosecutor 's office examined the first applicant 's appeal and ordered the police to initiate criminal proceedings .

In DATE the second applicant left the choreography school .

On DATE ORG informed the first applicant that they had not detected any wrongdoing by the teacher or the school administration in respect of her daughter .

In the course of the criminal proceedings instituted by the police investigators questioned witnesses , including PERSON and the second applicant 's other classmates , and ordered a number of forensic medical examinations .

According to medical experts ' report no . CARDINAL of DATE , on DATE the second applicant had suffered concussion which could have been caused by a hard blunt object . The resultant damage to her health was classified as mild , because the injury had been followed by a short - term health disorder which had not exceeded DATE .

According to experts ' report no . CARDINAL of DATE , drawn up following a thorough psychological and psychiatric examination of the second applicant by CARDINAL psychiatrists and CARDINAL psychologist , the second applicant had not and did not suffer from a chronic mental disorder . In DATE and DATE she had suffered from an anxiety neurosis which had originated in a stressful situation , from which she had fully recovered .

According to medical experts ' report no . CARDINAL of DATE , no injuries or mental disorder as a result of the incident of DATE had been established .

On DATE an investigator of the LOC police department ordered a comprehensive medical examination with a view to establishing the second applicant 's injuries or mental disorders , their cause and gravity , and if there was a causal link with the incident of CARDINAL DATE . According to the investigator 's records , on DATE the first applicant refused to allow her daughter to undergo the examination .

The proceedings were terminated by the police several times on the ground that there was no evidence of PERSON 's guilt . Those decisions were quashed on the first applicant 's appeals by the ORG district prosecutor 's office and by the ORG district court on the ground that the investigation was incomplete .

On DATE the district prosecutor wrote to the police department pointing out the defects of the investigation in the case and the investigator 's negligence . The prosecutor indicated that the police administration should take measures to eliminate the breaches of law and take disciplinary action against the investigator in charge .

According to the applicants , as a result of the concussion the second applicant suffered from asthenoneurotic syndrome , which caused frequent headaches and nausea . In connection with that , she underwent in - patient treatment on several occasions in DATE . She was kept under observation by a neuropathologist .

According to the investigator 's records , on DATE the first applicant again refused to allow her daughter to undergo the medical examination .

On DATE the police terminated the proceedings in view of the absence of evidence that PERSON had committed the crime , the lack of a causal link between the damage to the second applicant 's health and the events of CARDINAL DATE and DATE and the first applicant 's refusal to allow the second applicant to undergo the medical examinations .

On DATE ORG dismissed a complaint by the first applicant against this decision . The court found that the first applicant had failed to submit the second applicant 's medical records necessary for obtaining the additional expert 's opinion ordered by the police .

An appeal by the first applicant was disallowed on DATE by ORG . The appeal court ruled that under LAW the time - limit for the prosecution of minor offences provided by ORG CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW involving minor damage to the health was DATE , and that this term had expired in this case .

On an unspecified date the first applicant brought an action against the FAC district police department for non - pecuniary damage allegedly caused by the inefficient investigation . On DATE ORG of GPE did not find that the conduct of the police in the course of the investigation had been unlawful . It stated that the damage to the second applicant 's health ( the craniocerebral injury and the depressive neurosis ) had been caused at the choreography school and not by the investigating authority . The court dismissed the claim as unsubstantiated . On an appeal by the first applicant , ORG upheld the judgment on DATE .

In another set of proceedings brought by the applicants , on DATE ORG awarded the applicants MONEY ( RUB ) by way of compensation for nonpecuniary damage to be paid by the choreography school . It found no causal link between the second applicant 's concussion diagnosed on DATE and her subsequent illnesses and the alleged attacks by PERSON on DATE and DATE . It found that the concussion had been selfinflicted by the second applicant 's striking herself accidentally on the left temple with a purse with metal coins , as was confirmed by CARDINAL witnesses . The court stated that the damage had been caused on the school LOC and during the lessons as a result of the insufficient supervision by the teaching staff and that the school should therefore be held responsible . The judgment was executed in DATE .

On DATE the GPE regional prosecutor 's office quashed , on the direction by ORG office , the decision to terminate the criminal proceedings of DATE on the ground that the investigation was incomplete . It was noted that the comprehensive medical examination ordered by the investigating authority had never been carried out and that an additional interview be held with the second applicant 's former classmate PERSON , who had initially confirmed that PERSON had hit the second applicant but had later retracted her statements .

The proceedings recommenced . The applicants appealed against the prosecutor 's decision of DATE arguing that the prosecutor 's office should have acknowledged the violation of the second applicant 's rights by the flawed investigation instead of reopening the proceedings against the law . On DATE ORG examined the appeal . It noted the defects of the “ endless investigation , of which the applicants had undoubtedly got tired ” , the fact that the last decision to discontinue the proceedings had only been quashed after ORG at ORG had intervened , and at the same time stressed the need to conduct an objective investigation in order to deliver a lawful and well - founded decision in the case in the interests of the applicants and PERSON It upheld the prosecutor 's decision . The applicants appealed to ORG .

The proceedings appear to be pending .

On DATE the first applicant was allegedly assaulted by third persons . As a result of the incident she had a bruise on her left eye . She called the police , who kept her waiting for TIME before registering her complaint . On DATE the police refused to institute criminal proceedings . The applicant brought proceedings against the police claiming damages on account of their failure to respond properly to her complaint . By a final decision of ORG of DATE she was awarded MONEY in compensation .


The applicants are CARDINAL inhabitants of the coastal town of GPE ( see Appendix I ) , of whom CARDINAL claim to be the owners of real property in the area ( see PERSON ) . They are represented before the ORG by an environmental association named ORG ( GPE za očuvanje kulturne i prirodne baštine FAC ” ) , with its seat in GPE and the aim to promote preservation of the environment and of cultural and historical monuments . The respondent Government are represented by their Agent , Ms Š. Stažnik .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

Within the framework of a project to protect the Kaštel Bay of LOC , the ORG is constructing a sewer network , with an outlet near the coastal town of GPE .

On DATE ORG ( ORG zaštite okoliša i prostornog uređenja ; “ the Ministry ” ) granted the company ORG a building permit for constructing the sewer outlet in GPE .

On DATE the applicants filed a motion for re - opening of the above administrative proceedings ( prijedlog za obnovu postupka ) with the Ministry . They claimed not to have been afforded the opportunity to participate in those proceedings , which had violated their constitutional rights and international environmental treaties as the sewer would not be equipped with a proper biological purification system .

On DATE the ORG requested the applicants to substantiate their complaints and submit additional documents . The applicants replied on DATE .

On DATE the ORG dismissed the applicants’ motion , finding that they had failed to prove their locus standi or to substantiate their allegations as required by the relevant legislation .

On DATE the applicants brought an action in ORG ( ORG ) against the ORG ’s decision . On DATE ORG quashed the ORG ’s decision . In its judgment , ORG stated that , due to the fact that they lived in the area of possible negative impact of the building works , the applicants could not have been denied locus standi in the case .

Currently , the proceedings concerning the applicants’ request to reopen the administrative proceedings are again pending before ORG .

On DATE the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint , seeking to have the building permit quashed . They submitted that the permit violated some of their constitutional rights , including freedom of movement , as well as the right to work and to protection of health . Moreover , in their constitutional complaint the applicants requested an interim measure in order to stop the ongoing building works .

On DATE ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) declared the applicants’ constitutional complaint inadmissible for non - exhaustion of legal remedies .

On DATE the applicants requested ORG ( PERSON ) to issue an interim measure in order to stop the building works . On CARDINAL DATE the court scheduled an on - site inspection for CARDINAL DATE . Following the inspection , on DATE the court experts submitted an offer , charging CARDINAL NORP kunas ( HRK ) for their opinion . The applicants never advanced the amount sought ; the proceedings are still pending .

Sometime in DATE , CARDINAL of the CARDINAL applicants lodged a civil action with ORG seeking compensation for damage resulting from the construction of the sewer outlet . The proceedings are still pending before the first - instance court .

With a view to securing the building site , the police cordoned off the area . On DATE several applicants , while swimming , approached the visibly marked area . The police intervened , preventing the applicants from approaching the site .

Section CARDINAL of LAW ( Zakon o obveznim odnosima , ORG nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , DATE , DATE and CARDINAL ) , provides for a so - called ecological action and , insofar as relevant , reads as follows :

Everyone may request another person to remove a source of danger , which might cause substantial damage to him or to other persons or to sustain from an activity which causes disturbance or might cause damage ...

NORP The court shall , at the request of an interested person , order appropriate measures to be undertaken , for prevention of damage or disturbance or removal of the source of danger , at the expense of the possessor of the source of such danger ...

NORP If damage occurs while performing an activity in the general interest , for which a permit of the competent authority has been obtained , one may seek compensation for such damage as exceeds only the usual limits ... ”

In its decisions PERSON of DATE , ORG found that the owner of agricultural land near a factory chimney had the right to compensation for damage to his products ruined due to chimney emissions .

In its decision PERSON CARDINAL/CARDINAL - CARDINAL of DATE , ORG ruled that the owners of a house had the right to compensation for damage suffered due to the construction of a nearby road . The damage they sustained included the drop of the value of their property .

Section CARDINAL of LAW ( Zakon o općem upravnom postupku , ORG nos . CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) provides that a party to the administrative proceedings is a person , at whose request the proceedings have been instituted , or a person against whom the proceedings have been instituted , or any other person who can participate in the proceedings with a view to protecting his or her rights or interests .

Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW provides that in simple matters an administrative body is obliged to issue a decision within DATE following the lodging of the party ’s request . In more complex cases , an administrative body is obliged to issue a decision within DATE after the request was lodged . LAW of the same LAW enables a party whose request has not been decided within the periods established in the previous paragraph to lodge an appeal , as if his or her request had been denied .

Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW ( Zakon o upravnim sporovima , ORG nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL and DATE ) provides that , if a second - instance authority fails to issue a decision on an appeal by the party within DATE , and within DATE following the repeated request , the party may lodge an action with ORG as if his or her request had been dismissed . The same applies to the failure of a first - instance authority to issue a decision , if no appeal against that decision is allowed .

The relevant part of CARDINAL of LAW on LAW ( Ustavni zakon o PERSON , ORG no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , of CARDINAL DATE ; “ the LAW ” ) reads as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) The Constitutional Court shall examine a constitutional complaint whether or not all legal remedies have been exhausted if the court with jurisdiction fails to decide a claim concerning the applicant ’s rights and obligations or a criminal charge against him or her within a reasonable time ...

( CARDINAL ) If a constitutional complaint ... under paragraph CARDINAL of this section is upheld , the Constitutional Court shall set a time - limit within which the court with jurisdiction must decide the case on the merits ...

( CARDINAL ) In a decision issued under paragraph CARDINAL of this section , the Constitutional Court shall assess appropriate compensation for the applicant for the violation of his or her constitutional rights ... The compensation shall be paid out of the ORG budget within DATE from the date a request for payment is lodged . ”