CASE OF ROSENZWEIG AND BONDED WAREHOUSES LTD. v. POLAND

Violation of P1-1;Just satisfaction reserved

The first applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . The second applicant is “ ORG ” , a public company .

On DATE ORG granted a licence to run a bonded warehouse in GPE to the applicant company “ ORG ” .

On CARDINAL DATE the NORP customs office at GPE / PERSON stated in writing that the NORP customs authorities had no objections to the operation of the applicant company .

On DATE a further permit was given for exporting merchandise via the border crossing in GPE by the Director of the local ORG .

NORP The applicant submitted that it had been repeatedly suggested that the company should pay various bribes to the customs officials if it wished to continue its operation undisturbed . The Government did not respond to this submission .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE the Director of the local ORG in ORG stated that from DATE on he would revoke the permit of DATE for exporting merchandise via the NORP border crossing . It was argued that the permit of DATE was not in conformity with an agreement with GPE regarding the border crossings and trans - border movements of goods and persons .

On DATE the customs officers ordered that the headquarters of the applicant company be closed and affixed official seals on its door , preventing it thereby from conducting further business . On DATE the applicant company complained to ORG , submitting that there were no legal grounds on which the permit should be revoked and that the letter of CARDINAL DATE was not an administrative decision , which made it impossible to lodge a formal appeal against it .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE the applicant company reiterated its complaint and stressed that the director of ORG had failed , despite the company 's repeated requests , to give any legal basis for the revocation of the permit . It was argued that the revocation of the permit breached economic freedom as guaranteed by the LAW , and clearly infringed the terms of a valid licence which the company had received from ORG in DATE .

On DATE the applicant company lodged a complaint under LAW about the ORG failure to give a decision following the appeal of CARDINAL DATE . It was submitted that the company had a valid permit given under the provisions of customs law . However , the company 's operation had been de facto rendered impossible by the letter of CARDINAL DATE as it could not run the warehouse if it was not allowed to export merchandise .

NORP In reaction to this complaint , on DATE ORG informed the applicant company that the permit of DATE was of a temporary character . It was to remain valid only until a bridge in nearby PERSON was to be constructed . After the construction of this bridge had been terminated , the border crossing in GPE was to be used only for small trans - border movement of goods and persons . This was to be understood as allowing for crossing of the border by persons , but taking merchandise out of the country via this crossing did not fall within the ambit of the notion of the “ small trans - border movement of goods and persons ” and therefore the permit of DATE had to be revoked under LAW .

The applicant company appealed , submitting that the revocation of the exporting permit would practically mean that the company had to stop its business operation , carried out under the valid licence of DATE .

On DATE the applicant company and the Director of ORG concluded a settlement to the effect that the applicant company would withdraw the appeal it had lodged with ORG against the position taken by ORG in its letter of DATE and the President of the ORG would set aside the decision of the Director of ORG of DATE .

On DATE ORG set the decision of CARDINAL DATE aside and ordered that the question be re - examined by ORG .

By a letter of DATE the NORP customs office at GPE / Oder confirmed that the NORP customs authorities had no legal objections whatsoever against the operation of the applicant company .

On DATE ORG revoked the permit for exporting merchandise by the applicant company via ORG , stating that the GPE border crossing was under NORP law designed only for the socalled “ small trans - border movement of goods and persons ” and that , therefore , no merchandise could be exported via this crossing .

The applicant company appealed .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision of CARDINAL DATE and discontinued the proceedings , considering that the impugned decision had been in breach of applicable provisions of procedural law since it had not been given in any of the types of proceedings on the merits provided for by LAW .

NORP The applicant company requested that the legal meaning of this decision be interpreted . It emphasised that it was important for it to have clarified whether the original permit of DATE was still valid . This , on the plain meaning of the text of this decision , was unclear .

In an interpretative decision of DATE ORG explained that the fact that the decision of CARDINAL DATE had been set aside was to be understood in such a way as to mean that the legal situation existing before this decision had been given still obtained .

The applicant company requested that this issue be re - examined , asking whether the quashing of the decision of CARDINAL DATE , revoking the permit of DATE , was to mean that this permit was still valid .

In a decision of DATE ORG held that the purpose of the decision of DATE was not to decide whether the permit of DATE was still valid . It upheld the decision of CARDINAL DATE .

The applicant company appealed to ORG , arguing that the decisions of ORG lacked clarity . The ORG had set aside the revocation of the permit , but did not confirm whether the original permit was valid . Therefore it was impossible to establish what was the actual legal situation of the company as far as the validity of its permits was concerned . The applicant company emphasised that it was de facto treated by the customs authorities as if the export permit of DATE had been effectively revoked .

In a judgment of DATE ORG quashed the decisions of DATE and DATE . The court found that the decision of DATE lacked clarity in that it did not allow the applicant company to elucidate the fundamental uncertainty as to the legal consequence of this decision . Neither were these doubts dispelled by the decision of DATE in which ORG had failed to explain what was the legal situation of the applicants ' permit to run their business , and in particular , whether it could still rely on the permit of DATE .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG stated that the decision of DATE was to be understood in such a way that the applicant 's rights stemming from the decision of DATE remained intact .

On DATE ORG instituted proceedings in order to have the licence to run the warehouse of DATE set aside , considering that the applicant company had not been conducting its business for a period DATE , without having informed the competent authorities thereof , as required by law .

On DATE ORG set aside the DATE licence to run the warehouse , having found that after DATE the applicant company had ceased its business activities . Under the provisions of LAW , the customs authorities were obliged to withdraw the licence to run the bonded warehouse if the company enjoying such licence was not exercising it for a period DATE .

The applicant company appealed . It argued inter alia that it could not have run the warehouse after DATE , given that ORG had withdrawn its permit for exporting merchandise by the applicant company via ORG , which had made it impossible to continue its business operation .

On DATE ORG , having re - examined the case , discontinued the appellate proceedings . The office observed that the applicant was wrong in confusing the proceedings regarding the validity of the DATE permit with the present proceedings , in which it was the validity of the earlier licence , granted in DATE , which was at issue . The validity of the DATE licence had not been questioned in the previous proceedings and therefore there were no grounds on which to accept that the applicant was prevented to run its business .

It further noted that the proceedings had to be discontinued since on DATE a new ORG Code had entered into force . It provided that various customs licences issued under the old LAW were to remain valid for DATE , during which companies having such licences could lodge new requests to have new licences issued . The applicant company had not submitted such request and the validity of its DATE licence had consequently expired on DATE . Therefore the proceedings would not serve any purpose and should be discontinued .

The applicant company appealed . It argued , inter alia , that when giving the contested decision , ORG had breached the law in that it entirely failed to take into consideration all circumstances relating to the proceedings concerning the withdrawal of the permit to export . These proceedings , which had lasted from DATE until DATE , had rendered it impossible for the company to continue its business operation . Therefore it was unreasonable to revoke the DATE licence on the ground that the company had ceased its business activities .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision of DATE as not being in compliance with law . It considered that ORG had incorrectly held that the proceedings had become devoid of purpose . At the time when they had been instituted , i.e. on DATE , the applicant company 's licence was still valid . It therefore had a legal interest in clarifying its legal situation and to confirm whether it was still authorised to run its business .

On DATE ORG , having regard to the judgment of DATE , set aside the decision of CARDINAL DATE , revoking the DATE licence to run the warehouse .

The applicant company did not resume its operations afterwards . The first applicant submitted that as a result of the withdrawal of the permit and the licence to run the company , described above , it was impossible for him as the principal shareholder and , likewise , for the applicant company , to resume their business operations . It is the withdrawal of those decisions authorising the company to run its business which constitute the basis of the applicant 's claims of pecuniary damage under LAW . The Government did not respond to this argument .


The applicants , Mr PERSON and Mr Boas Kristinn Boasson , are both NORP nationals and were born in DATE and DATE , respectively . They were represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE , GPE .

s , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the ORG convicted them of unlawful hunting and sentenced them to pay a fine of ORG CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL ) each and ordered the suspension of their hunting licences for DATE and the confiscation , for DATE , of their rifles , as well as their prey consisting of CARDINAL mountain grouse .

On DATE ORG refused them leave to appeal , which decision was notified to their lawyer on DATE .

According to the applicants , under NORP law ( LAW of LAW No . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) ) , if an appellant has not been sentenced to imprisonment at first instance or if the fine imposed or the value of the goods confiscated by the latter did not exceed ISK CARDINAL ( at the time of the filing of the application , corresponding approximately to ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) , an appellant wishing to challenge the first instance ruling has to obtain leave to appeal from ORG .


CASE OF SILVER AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM (ARTICLE 50)

Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings

ORG The present case was referred to ORG in DATE by ORG ( " the Commission " ) . The case originated in CARDINAL applications ( nos . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , ORG , CARDINAL , ORG and CARDINAL ) against GPE and GPE lodged with the Commission on various dates DATE by Mr. PERSON , Mr. PERSON , Mrs. PERSON , Mr. PERSON , Mr. PERSON , Mr. PERSON and Mr. PERSON .

ORG By judgment of CARDINAL DATE , ORG held that the stopping by the prison authorities of a number of letters written by or addressed to the applicants had given rise to violations of ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL ( article CARDINAL , LAW ) of the Convention . It also held that the refusal of a petition by Mr. Silver for permission to seek legal advice had constituted a breach of LAW ( article DATE ) ( Series A no . CARDINAL , paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL - CARDINAL of the reasons and points CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the operative provisions , pp . DATE ) .

The only outstanding matter to be settled is the question of the application of LAW ) in the present case . Accordingly , as regards the facts , the ORG will confine itself here to giving the pertinent details ; for further particulars , reference should be made to paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL of the above - mentioned judgment ( ibid . , pp . CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) .

ORG In a memorial filed on CARDINAL DATE , the applicants had claimed , as just satisfaction under LAW ) , " general " damages for violation of their rights and reimbursement of specified costs and expenses ; a claim for " special " damages had also been put forward in the names of Mr. Silver , Mr. PERSON and Mr. PERSON .

The Government of GPE ( " the Government " ) had replied in writing to the said memorial on DATE .

In its judgment of CARDINAL DATE , the ORG reserved the question of the application of LAW ) , the written procedure on that issue not then having been concluded ( paragraphs CARDINAL of the reasons and point CARDINAL of the operative provisions , pp . DATE ) .

ORG In accordance with the Orders and directions of the President of the ORG , the registry subsequently received the following documents :

( a ) on DATE , letter of CARDINAL DATE from the Secretary to ORG , with which was enclosed a further memorial of the applicants ;

( b ) on DATE , comments of the Government on the last - mentioned memorial ;

( c ) on DATE and DATE , from the Secretary to ORG , copies of letters of DATE and CARDINAL May which he had received from the applicants’ lawyers .

In his letter of DATE , the Secretary to ORG indicated that its Delegates had no observations on the issues arising under LAW ) , considering them to be matters to be left to the ORG ’s judgment . Further particulars of the ORG claims and of the ORG ’s position relative thereto are set out below in the section " As to the law " .

ORG Having consulted , through the PERSON , the Agent of the Government and the Delegates of the Commission , the ORG decided on DATE that there was no call to hold hearings .


CASE OF YASSAR HUSSAIN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-2 - Presumption of innocence);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed

Ján Šikuta;Josep Casadevall;Kristaq Traja;Matti Pellonpää;Nicolas Bratza;Rait Maruste

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE - on - Trent .

The applicant was arrested on DATE on suspicion of having intimidated witnesses . In an identity parade held the same afternoon , he was positively identified by CARDINAL of the CARDINAL witnesses . The applicant states that this witness accepted in her original statement of evidence to the police that she was a heroin user and an inherently unreliable witness . The applicant was subsequently charged with CARDINAL counts of doing acts tending and intended to pervert the course of public justice .

The applicant pleaded not guilty on DATE and the trial was adjourned to the NORP - on - ORG on DATE . On that date no judge was available and the trial was moved to DATE . On DATE of the trial the witness who had identified the applicant did not attend and the trial had to be aborted . At the re - listed trial on DATE , Counsel for the ORG addressed the court in the following terms :

“ When this matter was listed for trial in DATE , [ L. ] attended on DATE . She was n't called to give evidence and did n't come back on DATE . Certainly , that caused some concern . I think it is fair to say , at different stages of the entire case , she has blown slightly hot and cold .

[ L. ] indicated to the police when they contacted her recently and , in fact , again DATE , that she was reluctant to give evidence . She has attended court DATE and with my learned friend 's permission , I have had the chance to sit down and have a chat to her .

Your Honour , the reality is that she does not want to give evidence . She has personal reasons I do n't propose to divulge in open court . She has formed a new relationship . She has moved on . She is trying very hard to put the events of this entire case behind her . She has satisfied the police who spoke to her DATE and satisfied those who instruct me that no threats have been made toward her in relation to DATE 's proceedings . She insists that there has been no contact from [ the applicant ] or others acting on his behalf . We do n't feel that , due to the nature of this allegation , she ought to be compelled to give evidence in this case .

Your Honour , there has been a very full discussion and the view we have taken is that without her evidence , plainly , we ca n't proceed . I offer no evidence . Verdicts must follow . ”

The applicant was duly acquitted . On his counsel 's application for a defendant 's costs order , the judge refused to make an order and stated :

“ That order will be refused . There is clear evidence on the court papers . The ORG have taken the view that they are not going to compel this witness although there is compelling evidence in respect of those matters . It is a discretion which I am afraid I am not going to exercise in your favour . ”

The applicant 's attempted appeal was dismissed on DATE as “ to be appealable as a sentence , the order must be contingent upon conviction . As the defendant 's costs order only arises when a prosecution is unsuccessful , it can not be a sentence and can not be appealed at ORG ” .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(b ) of LAW DATE provides that where

“ ... any person is tried on indictment and acquitted on any count in the indictment ORG may make a defendant 's costs order in favour of the accused ” .

Practice Direction ( Crime : Defence Costs ) [ DATE ] CARDINAL WLR CARDINAL , which was in force at the time of the applicant 's trial , provided that :

“ Where a person is not tried for an offence for which he has been indicted or committed for trial or has been acquitted on any count in the indictment , the court may make a defendant 's costs order . Such an order should normally be made whether or not an order for costs inter partes is made , unless there are positive reasons for not doing so , as where , for example , the defendant 's own conduct has brought suspicion on himself and has misled the prosecution into thinking that the case against him is stronger than it is . ”

As noted above , no appeal lies to ORG against a refusal of a defendant 's costs order .

By virtue of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW DATE , ORG may not exercise its power of judicial review over ORG in matters relating to “ trial on indictment ” .

An argument that the incorporation of the Convention into GPE law required a remedy against a refusal of a defendant 's costs order was rejected in R ( PERSON ) v. ORG [ DATE ] EWHC Admin CARDINAL , in which Lord Justice PERSON stated that

“ ... unless and until ORG decides to remove the anomaly , that an acquitted defendant has no right of appeal against the refusal of a defendant 's costs order , however unjust the refusal may be , he has no Convention right of challenge to his decision in an LANGUAGE court and he is still bound to go to GPE if he wishes to make the assertions he sought to raise unsuccessfully in the ORG ” .


CASE OF TRAJKOSKI AND OTHERS v. "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA"

No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Procedural aspect)

Javier Borrego Borrego;Margarita Tsatsa-Nikolovska;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger;Snejana Botoucharova;Volodymyr Butkevych

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in NORP .

In a number of administrative proceedings , the applicant challenged the lawfulness of administrative decisions related to the construction and operation of a petrol station that was located QUANTITY from his home . He also brought criminal charges against the state officials who took the relevant decisions and against the manager of the petrol station .

On DATE at TIME the applicant , accompanied by his wife and Mr PERSON , went to the NORP police station to report the possibility of a fire and explosion at the petrol station as a result of alleged improper handling of petrol stocks at the time . Upon their arrival , they had parked their car in front of an access ramp on the street in front of the police station . At the warden ’s request , the applicant had moved his car to a car park situated behind the “ LOC ” hotel . After the applicant had entered the police station , the same officer had pushed him backwards . In his initial submission , the applicant stated that a gun had also been pointed at his head . CARDINAL or QUANTITY police officers had arrived at the scene and had assaulted him , grabbing him by his arms , legs and hair and throwing him against the stairway . They had continued hitting and beating him all over his body . During the beating , the police officers had used offensive language .

The ORG submitted that the applicant had parked his car in front of the entrance of the NORP police station on a street on which no traffic and parking had been allowed . They further maintained that he had failed to move his car despite having been ordered to do so by the police officers on duty . The applicant had then entered the police station without identifying himself . He had ignored the ORG verbal order that he leave the building . He had actively resisted when police officers took him out of the station .

A medical certificate ( “ the first certificate ” ) issued on DATE at TIME indicated that the applicant had sustained several bodily injuries which did not qualify as grievous . A tranquilliser was prescribed . That certificate did not specify the possible origin of the injuries , their timing or the way in which they had been inflicted .

After communication of the case , the applicant obtained another medical certificate issued on DATE by ORG which described the applicant ’s injuries , noted on the first certificate , in the following terms : slight redness on the right temple , a scratch on the right ankle and a toe . In addition , it was noted that his right elbow and the left side of his hip were tender .

After communication , the applicant also obtained a forensic expert report of CARDINAL DATE concerning his post - incident trauma . That report , which was based on the medical records and the applicant ’s statement , indicated that , after the incident , the applicant had a bruise on his left elbow , a scratch on his left shinbone and bruises on his face below his left eye and on his left hip .

No court decision about the incident at issue has been given against the applicant .

On DATE the applicant asked the Sector to investigate the incident . On DATE the ORG drew up a report giving a factual account of the incident . It established that the applicant had been taken out of the building after he had ignored the ORG verbal order to that effect . He had actively resisted the police officers and he had behaved in an arrogant manner . It found that there had been no abuse of power by the police in their attempts to subdue the applicant . It further stated that on DATE an application for misdemeanour proceedings had been submitted against the applicant under the LAW on minor offences against public order . That application indicated , inter alia , that policemen had grabbed the applicant by his arms and taken him outside the police LOC .

On an unspecified date , the applicant brought before the public prosecutor criminal charges against Mr P.R. , a police officer who had allegedly participated in the incident , for having ill - treated him while on duty . It can not be established whether the applicant complained about other policemen as well .

The Government stated that on DATE the public prosecutor requested that additional inquiries be made by ORG ( “ the Ministry ” ) . The latter submitted an official report about the incident in reply . No evidence was submitted in support of that assertion .

On CARDINAL DATE the public prosecutor rejected the applicant ’s complaint , arguing that the alleged offence was not considered to be a crime that could be prosecuted upon his motion . It was established that on DATE the applicant had parked his car in front of the entrance of the NORP police station , blocking the police ORG way . He had shouted at police officers and threatened to set the petrol station on fire . Mr P.R. and Mr GPE , another police officer , had ordered the applicant to move his car . After having questioned Mr P.R. and other police officers , including PERSON ORG , who had been present at the scene at the time , the public prosecutor established that Mr P.R. had not ill - treated the applicant , nor had the latter been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment . No gun had been pointed at him by Mr P.R. or by any other police officer . It was finally concluded that Mr P.R. had not committed the offence complained of or any other prosecutable act .

On DATE the applicant lodged a subsidiary criminal complaint against Mr P.R. and CARDINAL other unidentified police officers with ORG ( “ the trial court ” ) . He complained that he had been shouted at , insulted , beaten and dragged across the floor and that as a result he had sustained light bodily injuries and bruises . He requested that the trial court hear statements from him , his wife and PERSON , who had been an eyewitness to the incident , as well as from Mr GPE

On DATE the trial court requested that the applicant make his complaint more specific by providing the names of the unidentified police officers .

On DATE the applicant informed the trial court that he was unable to discover the identities of the remaining police officers . He pointed out that CARDINAL of them had been a warden and the other a guard at the time of the events . He further maintained that the trial court could officially request information about their identities and that he would easily be able to confirm it afterwards .

On DATE the trial court rejected the applicant ’s subsidiary complaint as incomplete , namely because he had not identified the remaining QUANTITY police officers . No comment was made as to the charges against Mr P.R.

On DATE the applicant appealed against that ruling , arguing that the trial court had failed to investigate his allegations , and that he had no effective way of discovering the identities of the police officers concerned but that he would be able to identify them in a line - up .

On DATE ORG upheld the trial court ’s ruling .

On DATE the public prosecutor informed the applicant that there were no grounds for lodging a request for the protection of legality with ORG .

Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( “ the LAW ” ) provides that an indictment should contain , inter alia , personal information about the person accused .

In accordance with section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the LAW , the president of the adjudicating panel examines whether the indictment has been duly completed , and if it has not , he / she shall return it to the claimant , who shall to rectify it within DATE . If an injured party does not comply with that time - limit , the prosecution shall be considered as having been withdrawn and the proceedings shall be suspended accordingly .

Other statutory provisions relevant to the present case are described in the PERSON case ( see PERSON v. the former GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL , DATE ) .


Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant was born out of wedlock . In DATE her father PERSON was ordered , on the initiative of the social services and by a decision of a ORG ( käräjäoikeus , tingsrätten ) , to pay child support until the applicant 's CARDINALth birthday .

On DATE the Paternity Act came into force . The transitional provisions in LAW state that paternity proceedings with regard to a child born before the entry into force of the LAW had to be initiated within DATE , that is , before DATE . Moreover , no claim could be examined after the death of the father . No such restrictions exist for children born after the entry into force of LAW .

In DATE the applicant 's mother and ORG agreed on DATE of child support . The agreement was certified by the social services . The applicant attained majority in DATE .

PERSON died in DATE and the applicant found out that he had never been legally registered as her father . All of the parties had always been under the impression that paternity had been established when the duty to pay child support was ordered by ORG .

In DATE the applicant brought a civil claim against ORG legal heir and requested ORG to confirm the paternity . She stated that neither she nor her mother had known that they needed to bring a claim against PERSON to establish paternity , nor did they know that there was a time - limit . They further stated that the social services had been obliged by law to inform them of these issues . No such information had been given to them although the mother of the applicant 's CARDINAL - sister had been informed at the relevant time .

ORG ordered DNA tests to be performed on the applicant , her mother and PERSON 's CARDINAL brothers . The test was conclusive as to the paternity , with PERCENT certainty .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's claim . The court stated that the transitional provision with regard to the death of the father was no longer relevant in the case as modern technology enabled testing that had not been possible in DATE when the LAW had been enacted . PERSON 's death was thus no longer an obstacle for bringing a paternity claim against him . However , the claim had been brought after the expiry of the DATE time - limit . The reason why the claim had been brought late was that the applicant and her mother had been mistaken about the legal character of the child support decision but this mistake was not of a kind that would have justified a derogation from the DATE time - limit . The time - limit itself was not unreasonable or discriminatory nor was it incompatible with the LAW , the LAW or ORG on the Rights of the ORG . The court thus concluded that the applicant 's claim was time - barred .

On DATE ORG ( hovioikeus , hovrätten ) upheld ORG decision on the same grounds as the latter .

NORP The referendary of ORG considered in her report ( mietintö , betänkande ) that , since it had been established with DNA tests that PERSON was actually the biological father and since the applicant had a CARDINAL - sister born in DATE who had been acknowledged by ORG in DATE , it would not be against the spirit of the LAW to allow the establishment of paternity with regard to the applicant . Furthermore , she considered that applying the DATE rule in the specific circumstances would put the daughters in unequal positions with regard to inheritance and family relations . She referred to LAW as well as to LAW .

The applicant appealed to ORG ( korkein oikeus , högsta domstolen ) . On DATE ORG granted leave to appeal .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's claim in its precedent judgment ORG on the following grounds :

“ LAW , on which [ the applicant 's ] claim is based , entered into force on DATE . According to section CARDINAL of LAW , the provisions of LAW are also applied when the child is born before the entry into force of the LAW , unless otherwise provided in LAW . When the child was born before the entry into force of LAW , proceedings for the establishment of paternity must be initiated , in accordance with LAW , within the time - limit of DATE from the entry into force of LAW . According to the same provision , proceedings can no longer be initiated if the man is deceased .

[ The applicant ] requested in her action directed against the heir [ ORG ] of [ R.J. ] , who had died in DATE , that it be confirmed that [ R.J. ] was her father . [ The applicant ] was born out of wedlock on DATE and thus before the entry into force of LAW . According to section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL , of LAW , proceedings for the establishment of the paternity of [ R.J. ] should have been brought within the DATE time - limit from the entry into force of LAW , that is , at the latest on DATE . [ The applicant ] initiated the proceedings only on CARDINAL DATE . Therefore the lower courts rejected her action as time - barred .

The above - mentioned DATE time - limit applies only to those children who were born before the entry into force of LAW . Those children who were born after the entry into force of LAW can initiate proceedings for the establishment of paternity without any time - limits or any restriction related to the death of the man .

The question is first of all whether the time - limit in question , which prohibits [ the applicant ] having paternity established , puts her , contrary to LAW , paragraph CARDINAL , of the LAW , in a different position without acceptable justification , due to her date of birth and thus her age , to those children who were born out of wedlock after the entry into force of LAW . Only in the case that the answer to this question is in the affirmative , can the question of whether [ ORG 's ] death prevents the establishment of his paternity arise .

It can be stated that the purpose of the time - limit in section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL , of LAW is that the child or its guardian decides to initiate the paternity proceedings within a reasonable time after the entry into force of the LAW . Taking into account the interests of different parties , the legislator has considered DATE as a reasonable and sufficient time - limit . This time - limit can be motivated by legal certainty considerations .

Before the entry into force of LAW , paternity of a child born out of wedlock could normally be established only if the man acknowledged his paternity . The paternity could be established by a court decision against the man 's will only on very limited occasions and mainly when the child was considered as an engagement child in accordance with section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL , of LAW , section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL , of LAW , as in force at the relevant time . On other occasions the man , who by having intercourse with the mother could have made her pregnant , could only be held liable to pay to the child alimony in accordance with LAW out of Wedlock ( CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . A child who had not been acknowledged or who was not an engagement child had no right to inherit from its father or the father 's relatives .

The aim of LAW and of the concurrent legislative reform of the rights of a child was to guarantee the legal equality of children regardless of their descent . Therefore the provisions of LAW were made applicable also to children born before the entry into force of the LAW . According to section CARDINAL of LAW , children born out of wedlock had the same legal standing regardless of whether they were born before or after the entry into force of LAW . The fact that an alimony issue had been decided by a court before the entry into force of the LAW did not prevent bringing proceedings for the establishment of paternity . Children also received the same right , irrespective of their descent , to inherit from their fathers and the fathers ' relatives .

The Paternity Act thus meant that the legal status of children born out of wedlock was fundamentally changed and that they received an equal status with children born within wedlock . The entry into force of the Act did not , however , automatically ex lege change the children 's legal status . If a man did not acknowledge a child , paternity proceedings had to be initiated in respect of a child born out of wedlock and the action could only be granted if there was sufficient evidence of the biological paternity . In this respect the provisions are the same as concerning children born after the entry into force of the LAW .

The fact that LAW was made applicable also to children born before the entry into force of the LAW created uncertainties as to whether new claims , which had not even been possible under the previous legislation and for which there had thus been no need to be prepared , were going to be presented on the basis of events that had maybe taken place long before the entry into force of the LAW . It was important for a man to know , inter alia , who his heirs were in order to dispose by will of their shares . This also had consequences for the man 's relatives as the establishment of paternity had an effect on their rights because of the child 's right to inherit .

The number of persons who could be concerned by the change of legal status provided for in LAW was considerable . Proceedings for the establishment of paternity could be initiated within the above - mentioned DATE time - limit irrespective of the age of the person born out of wedlock . The establishment of paternity could change legal relationships created DATE . The change of the man 's legal status due to the establishment of paternity can lead to an annulment of previous decisions also in cases when the children are born after the entry into force of LAW . The retroactive application of the provisions concerning establishment of paternity in respect of children born before the entry into force of the LAW and the effects that it has on legal relationships created under the earlier provisions may create even bigger and more significant problems . The probability of such problems is greater the more time has elapsed since the entry into force of the LAW . There are thus strong reasons for having the time - limit in section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL , of LAW .

The provision containing the time - limit has not been conducive to creating confusing interpretations but , on the contrary , it is unambiguous and strict . In its precedent judgment ORG CARDINAL:CARDINAL the court has examined an action for the establishment of paternity although it had been brought later than within the DATE time - limit from the entry into force of LAW and the man was deceased . However , the case concerned a child who had had the status of a child born within wedlock when the LAW entered into force and who could only initiate proceedings for the establishment of the paternity of another man after the paternity of the mother 's husband had been annulled . [ In the applicant 's ] case there were no legal obstacles for initiating the proceedings .

LAW has now been in force for DATE . All children born before its entry into force have been adults for some time . It is probable that the paternity of almost all children born then out of wedlock has already been established in CARDINAL way or another with a final court decision or otherwise in accordance with the time - limit provided in section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL of LAW . The legal status of these children has also been determined accordingly . The legal situation can be regarded as established . For these reasons , and especially having regard to the time elapsed since the entry into force of LAW , this time - limit has DATE an even more significant role in providing legal certainty .

It has not been claimed that [ the applicant ] and the putative father [ R.J. ] had ever lived together nor has there ever been any family relationship between them or any other close relationship . [ The applicant ] was already DATE when she initiated the proceedings . Taking into account [ ORG 's ] death and the circumstances as a whole , the establishment of his paternity would have significance only in relation to the applicant 's right to inherit . The international conventions by which GPE is bound , such as the Convention on the Rights of the LAW CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) and ORG MONEY ) , and their case law , do not support such interpretation that the literal application of section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL , of LAW would be incompatible with these LAW in the present case .

On the above - mentioned grounds ORG considers that section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL , of LAW does not put [ the applicant ] , who was born before the entry into force of LAW , in a different position without acceptable justification , due to her date of birth and thus her age , to those children who were born out of wedlock after the entry into force of the LAW . The application of the DATE time - limit in that provision is thus not incompatible with the prohibition of discrimination provided in DATE , paragraph CARDINAL , of the LAW .

The referendary of ORG stated in her report that refusing to establish the applicant 's paternity would be unconstitutional and would involve discrimination . The referendary proposed that the ORG disregard the time - limit on the basis of DATE LAW .

The LAW of Finland ( perustuslaki , grundlagen , Act no . GPE ) , Article CARDINAL , paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL , guarantees to everyone equality before the law and forbids discrimination of any kind :

“ Everyone is equal before the law .

No one shall , without an acceptable reason , be treated differently from other persons on grounds of sex , age , origin , language , religion , conviction , opinion , health , disability or other reason that concerns his or her person . ... ”

Article CARDINAL , paragraph CARDINAL , of the LAW guarantees to everyone the right to have one 's case dealt with by a court of law :

“ Everyone has the right to have his or her case dealt with appropriately and without undue delay by a legally competent court of law or other authority ... ”

Article CARDINAL of the LAW gives a court of law the right to give primacy to LAW when the application of an Act would conflict with LAW :

“ If , in a matter being tried by a court of law , the application of an Act would be in evident conflict with the LAW , the court shall give primacy to the provision in LAW . ”

According to LAW , LAW , subsection CARDINAL , of LAW ( oikeudenkäymiskaari , rättegångsbalken ; Act no . CARDINAL ) :

“ A minor who has attained DATE of age shall have an independent right of action and right to be heard in a matter concerning his or her person , parallel to that of the person responsible for his or her care and custody or his or her other legal representative . ”

According to section CARDINAL of the LAW Born out of Wedlock ( laki avioliiton ulkopuolella syntyneistä lapsista , lagen om barn utom äktenskap , Act no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , a child born out of wedlock had a father , if a man acknowledged paternity , but paternity could not be established against a man 's will . According to section CARDINAL of the same Act , such defendant was deemed to be the person liable to provide child support to the child if he had had sexual intercourse with the child 's mother at the time when the child was possibly conceived . However , such an action was to be dismissed if it was manifestly improbable that the child was conceived as a result of that sexual intercourse .

As the children born out of wedlock were put in a substantially worse position than the children born in wedlock , there was a need to guarantee equal treatment of all children before the law ( see government proposal HE ORG ) . This became the main aim of the new LAW of DATE ( isyyslaki , lagen om faderskap , Act no . DATE ) which repealed LAW of DATE .

Section CARDINAL of the Paternity Act provides that paternity is established either by acknowledgement or by a court decision . According to section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL , the child has a right to institute proceedings with a view to having paternity established .

Section CARDINAL of LAW of LAW ( laki isyyslain toimeenpanosta , lagen angående införande av lagen om faderskap , Act no . DATE ) provides that the provisions of the LAW shall also apply if the child was born before the entry into force of the LAW , unless otherwise provided below . LAW provides that if a man , pursuant to LAW out of PERSON , enacted before the entry into force of LAW , has committed or been obliged by a final judgment to pay child support to a child born out of wedlock who has not the status of an acknowledged child , the provisions in sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of this Act shall apply to the investigation of paternity , actions for the establishment of paternity and the exercise of the child 's right to be heard .

Sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW of LAW provide as follows :

“ The child welfare supervisor shall attend to the investigation of paternity as provided in LAW , if a child born before the entry into force of this LAW has not reached DATE and the mother or the legal guardian of the child has expressed a wish that the child welfare supervisor attend to the investigation of paternity . After a man has acknowledged his paternity , the provisions in LAW ; section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL ; and section CARDINAL of the LAW shall apply to the obligation of the child welfare supervisor to attend to the investigation of paternity , and to the enforcement of acknowledgement . ”

“ A child or his or her legal guardian shall have the right of action for the establishment of paternity as provided in LAW . The child welfare supervisor shall not be entitled to exercise the child 's right to be heard without a separate authorisation . Proceedings for the establishment of paternity must be initiated within DATE from the entry into force of LAW . However , no proceedings may be instituted if the man is deceased . ”

It appears from the drafting history of LAW ( see Report of ORG PERSON , p. CARDINAL ) that considerations of legal certainty underlay the decision to restrict the right of action . The entry into force of the LAW opened up an opportunity to initiate proceedings that did not exist at the time when the children in question were conceived . The legislator considered that putative fathers ' legal security required rapid elimination of uncertainty about possible claims being brought against them on the basis of LAW . The restriction that a man 's death prevented the initiation of proceedings was justified by the argument that in such cases it was usually no longer possible to obtain sufficient evidence of the man 's paternity .

ORG has held on several occasions that the DATE time - limit in question is to be strictly applied . An exception has been made in a case where the paternity of the mother 's husband had to be annulled first and , as a result of that , the child would have become fatherless if the time - limit had been strictly respected ( see PERSON ) .

In its precedent case ORG CARDINAL-II-CARDINAL ORG considered that the DATE time - limit in section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL , of LAW was not such a time - limit that could be restored by seeking extraordinary remedies ( menetetyn määräajan palauttaminen , återställandet av försutten fatalietid ) .


Angelika Nußberger;Ann Power-Forde;Dean Spielmann;Elisabet Fura;Ganna Yudkivska;Karel Jungwiert

NORP The applicant company , PERSON limited liability company , is a NORP legal entity registered in ORG .

NORP In DATE an IT company lodged a claim with ORG against the applicant company seeking the cancellation of a contract and return of property .

By a decision of DATE , the court found against the applicant company . On DATE the Dnipropetrovs’k ORG of Appeal dismissed the applicant company ’s appeal and upheld the decision of the first - instance court .

By a decision of DATE , ORG , upon the applicant company ’s appeal , quashed the decisions of the lower courts and found in favour of the applicant company .

On DATE ORG of GPE , upon the IT company ’s cassation appeal , quashed the ruling of ORG on the ground that its findings had been unfounded and erroneous , and upheld the decision of the Dnipropetrovs’k ORG of Appeal . In taking this decision , ORG noted :

“ ORG of GPE , with regard to the provisions of ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the LAW of GPE , does not consider it necessary to remit the case for fresh examination to the first - instance court . This would be contrary to the provisions of LAW and sections QUANTITY and CARDINAL of the Law of GPE “ On LAW of GPE ” [ LAW ] regarding the status of ORG of GPE and its task to ensure the administration of justice in accordance with the law . It would further cause a constitutionally unacceptable need to quash the lawful decision of the court of appeal . In this regard , the list of possible outcomes of cassation appeals against decisions of ORG of GPE envisaged in LAW is not considered a legal impediment to adopting the decision . ”

On DATE the decision of ORG was sent to the applicant company .

The relevant extract of the LAW of GPE reads as follows :

“ State power in GPE is exercised on the principles of its division into legislative , executive and judicial power .

Bodies of legislative , executive and judicial power exercise their authority within the limits established by this LAW and in accordance with the laws of GPE . ”

“ In GPE , the principle of the rule of law is recognised and effective .

The LAW of GPE has the highest legal force . Laws and other normative legal acts are adopted on the basis of LAW and shall conform to it .

The norms of LAW are norms of direct effect . Appeals to the court in defence of the constitutional rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen directly on the grounds of LAW are guaranteed . ”

“ In GPE the system of courts of general jurisdiction is formed in accordance with the territorial principle and the principle of specialisation .

ORG is the highest judicial body in the system of courts of general jurisdiction ... ”

“ ... The main principles of judicial proceedings are :

CARDINAL ) NORP legality ... ”

The relevant provisions of the LAW ( in its wording of DATE ) read as follows :

“ The court , exercising justice based on the rule of law shall ensure the protection of the rights and freedoms of natural persons , the rights and legitimate interests of legal persons , and the interests of society and of the ORG as guaranteed by LAW and by the law . ”

“ CARDINAL . ORG of GPE is the highest judicial body within the system of courts of general jurisdiction ...

ORG of GPE shall :

CARDINAL ) review ... the cases under the cassation procedure in the situations established by law ...

CARDINAL ) exercise other powers pursuant to the law . ”

Section CARDINAL of the Act dealt with the competences of ORG .

The Code of Commercial Procedure ( formerly : Arbitration Procedure ) was significantly reworded on DATE . At that time , a fourth level of jurisdiction was introduced into commercial procedure . According to the relevant provisions of the LAW , a cassation appeal to ORG , similar to that found in other member ORG , and a second ( or repeated ) cassation appeal to ORG was available to the parties in a commercial case . Commercial procedure was the only judicial procedure of GPE where a fourth level of jurisdiction existed and where ORG acted as a second - instance court of cassation ( in criminal and civil proceedings it acted as an ordinary court of cassation and in administrative and administrative offences proceedings it performed only extraordinary review ) . The relevant legislation was changed in DATE and the competence of ORG in commercial cases was limited to the review of a case in the event of inconsistencies in judicial practice or in the event that a decision is adopted by an international tribunal .

The relevant provisions of LAW ( in its wording of CARDINAL DATE ) read as follows :

“ A commercial court shall nullify proceedings in the case , if

CARDINAL ) a dispute is not subject to examination in the commercial courts of GPE ; ... ”

“ The parties to a case and ORG have the right to appeal in cassation to ORG of GPE against a resolution of ORG of GPE adopted following the review of a decision of a first - instance commercial court that has entered into force , or a resolution of ORG [ as well as the ruling of ORG of GPE on return of the appeal ( request for review ) in cassation ] . ”

“ ORG of GPE reviews in cassation the resolutions [ or rulings ] of ORG of GPE if they are appealed against :

CARDINAL ) NORP on the basis of the application by ORG of GPE of a law or normative act which contravenes LAW ;

CARDINAL ) where a decision contravenes decisions of ORG of GPE or of a higher court of a different specialisation on the issue of the application of the norms of substantive law ;

CARDINAL ) where it is revealed that ORG of GPE has applied the same provision of the law or any other normative act differently in similar cases ;

[ DATE ) due to the inconsistency of the resolutions or rulings with the international treaties of GPE agreed as binding by PERSON of GPE ; ]

CARDINAL ) where an international judicial body whose jurisdiction is recognised by GPE finds that a resolution [ or ruling ] has violated the international obligations of GPE . ”

“ ... The resolution [ or ruling ] of ORG of GPE shall be reviewed in cassation on the basis of the rules for consideration of the case in the first - instance commercial court , save for

“ ORG of GPE , following consideration of an appeal in cassation , or a request for review in cassation lodged by ORG against a resolution [ or ruling ] of ORG of GPE , shall be entitled to :

CARDINAL ) NORP leave the resolution [ or ruling ] unchanged and dismiss the appeal ( request ) ;

CARDINAL ) NORP quash the resolution and remit the case to the first - instance court for further consideration [ or quash the ruling and remit the case for further consideration to ORG ] ;

CARDINAL ) NORP quash the resolution [ or ruling ] and nullify the proceedings in the case . ”

“ The resolutions [ or rulings ] of ORG of GPE shall be quashed if they contravene LAW , international treaties agreed as binding by PERSON of GPE , or if the substantive law has been misapplied otherwise . ”

“ ... A resolution of ORG of GPE shall be final and shall not be subject to appeal . ”

“ Instructions , contained in the resolution of ORG of GPE , shall be binding for the first - instance court during a new consideration of the case [ and for ORG of GPE during consideration of the materials of the appeal in cassation or the request for review in cassation ] .

The resolution of ORG , following a re - examination of the case on the basis of an appeal in cassation against the resolution [ or ruling ] of ORG of GPE shall not include instructions as to the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence , the superiority of CARDINAL type of evidence over another , the norms of substantive [ or procedural ] law which shall be applicable or the kind of decision that shall be adopted as a result of the further consideration of the case . ”

Section CARDINAL of the LAW provides for general measures to be taken by the domestic authorities to eliminate underlying problems which led to finding of a violation by the ORG and reasons for similar applications in the future .

Section CARDINAL foresees the application of the ORG and the case - law of the ORG as a source of law by the NORP courts in adjudication of cases before them .


Preliminary objection rejected (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Art. 6-1;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in ORG .

In DATE the applicant started working for FAC in ORG and until DATE she formally occupied the positions of dormitories supervisor and facilities and social activities coordinator . In fact , throughout this period the applicant was working – under the instructions of her manager – as a typist at the local section of ORG . This scheme had apparently been devised because the staff tables did not provide for a typist position .

Accordingly , the applicant 's employment agreements and job descriptions did not mention her actual duties , which included mostly typewriting . This arrangement was apparently never called into question by the applicant or her employer .

DATE the applicant worked as an inspector at the human resources department of the Station .

In DATE or in DATE the applicant 's employer , acting pursuant to a medical recommendation on the nature of work she was fit to perform , moved her to a different position – internal mail carrier .

In DATE the applicant started experiencing pain in her hands and arms . Initially she was losing the sensitivity in her fingers and could not hold objects . With the passage of time the pain got stronger and her hands started to swell and tremble , especially after long periods of typing .

NORP In DATE the applicant was examined by ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) at ORG . In a decision of DATE the ORG found that the applicant was suffering from vegetative polyneuropathy of the upper limbs , a disease which features on the Table of Occupational Diseases . However , the ORG , relying solely on the applicant 's job descriptions , concluded that the positions she had occupied ( dormitories supervisor , facilities and social activities coordinator ) did not entail increased strain on her upper limbs . Accordingly , it qualified her disease as non - occupational , finding no causal link between the conditions of work and the disease . Apparently the ORG refused to examine evidence ( including affidavits ) submitted by the applicant to prove her actual duties .

The applicant appealed to ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) , arguing that her de facto duties were different from the ones enumerated in her job descriptions . As no witness testimony was admissible , she again submitted affidavits from her managers to the effect that she had actually worked as a typist . On DATE the ORG dismissed the appeal , fully endorsing the reasons of the ORG . Apparently it refused to take into account any other evidence purporting to establish the actual duties of the applicant .

NORP In DATE the applicant was admitted for treatment at ORG in GPE . On DATE the ORG at ORG examined the applicant and found that she suffered from osteohondrosis cervicalis . It also reached the conclusion that the disease was not an occupational one , being unrelated to the duties of the applicant as set out in her job descriptions .

The applicant appealed against this decision to the ORG . By a decision of CARDINAL DATE it upheld the ruling as to the non - occupational character of the applicant 's disease and fully endorsed the ORG 's reasons .

On DATE the applicant brought an action against her employer under LAW of DATE . She alleged that the disease of her hands had developed as a result of her work . In fact , DATE she had worked as a typist , even though her job descriptions did not reflect that . The rulings of the ORG and the ORG that her disease was not workrelated were based solely on these job descriptions ; the commissions had not inquired into the reality of the situation . She requested the court to summon witnesses to testify about her real duties and to appoint an expert to establish the occupational character of her disease .

DATE former managers of the applicant – testified during the trial . They stated that the applicant had in fact worked as a typist , in accordance with the orders of her employer , and provided details about her workload .

CARDINAL expert witnesses were appointed by the court to give conclusions about the applicant 's state of health and about the occupational or nonoccupational character of her disease . The first expert concluded that the applicant was suffering from vegetative neuropathy of the hands . The second expert submitted a report in which she stated that the cause for the applicant 's disease could be her conditions of work , as described by her managers . Both experts confirmed their conclusions at a public hearing on DATE .

The Rouse District Court gave judgment on DATE , dismissing the applicant 's action . It stated , inter alia :

“ ... the court considers the action to be ill - founded . The prerequisites for finding the employer liable under LAW ... are a valid employment agreement and a convincingly established occupational disease . The occupational character of the disease is determined by the special medical commissions ... The existence of a finding [ made by the ORG and ascertaining the occupational character of the disease ] is an absolute precondition for holding the employer liable under LAW . The specific character of the [ subjectmatter of the inquiry ] has led the legislature to establish specialised medical bodies to give a conclusion as to the type [ of the disease ] and as to the causal link between the conditions of work and the disease . In the case at hand the [ ORG and the ORG ] have concluded that the [ applicant 's ] disease was not occupational and was not related to her conditions of work ... [ T]he court examining the dispute under LAW may rule as to the occupational character of the disease only if no medical documents have been issued by the [ ORG ] . ”

The applicant appealed to ORG . On DATE that court upheld the lower court 's judgment in the following terms :

“ The [ ORG ] judgment is well - founded . After assessing the collected and relevant evidence , ORG correctly concluded that the occupational character of the [ applicant 's ] disease , ... which is CARDINAL of the prerequisites for holding her employer liable under LAW , has not been convincingly established . The firstinstance court has correctly decided that the occupational character of the disease may be established by the court only if no documents have been issued by the specialised medical bodies ... ORG has taken into account that in the case at hand these bodies have reached the categorical conclusion ... that the disease of the [ applicant ] was not related to her working conditions and was thus not occupational . ”

NORP The applicant lodged a petition for review with ORG . That court dismissed the petition in a final judgment of DATE . It held :

“ The acts issued by the specialised medical bodies indicate that [ the applicant 's ] disease was not occupational , i.e. no causal link was found between the disease and the working conditions . The expert witnesses ' conclusions do not alter this finding . The [ first expert ] concluded that the disease “ vegetative polyneuropathy of the hands ” features on the table of occupational diseases . This fact is not at issue , but the [ employer 's ] liability under LAW presupposes not only the existence of the respective disease , but also the establishment of a causal link between the disease and the conditions of work . This causal link has not been established by the [ second ] expert either . In her report she found that activities related to type - writing are a prerequisite for the development of vegetative polyneuropathy . However , the fact that typewriting is in general a prerequisite for this disease does not prove the existence of a causal link between the [ applicant 's ] conditions of work and [ her ] disease .

... The specialised medical bodies are the administrative organs empowered by law to ascertain the existence of an occupational disease and the causal link between the disease and the [ conditions of ] work . The [ lower ] courts correctly held that the circumstances that [ these organs ] are authorised to examine may be examined by the court having cognisance of the action under LAW only in the absence of findings made by these organs . The [ applicant ] has not established before the specialised medical bodies the existence of a causal link between [ her ] disease and the conditions of work as a typist ... Therefore the conclusions of the [ lower ] courts that her action is unfounded are correct . ”

Article CARDINAL of LAW of DATE , which regulates the liability of the employer toward the employee for damage which has occurred as a result of an occupational accident or disease , reads as follows :

“ CARDINAL . NORP The employer shall be liable for damage [ resulting from ] an occupational accident or disease which has caused a temporary or permanent disability or death of the employee , irrespective of whether it has been brought about through fault [ of the employer ] or of another employee .

NORP The employer shall owe compensation amounting to the difference between the quantum of the damage – pecuniary and nonpecuniary , including lost profits , – and the [ amount of the ] benefits and/or pension [ provided to the employee ] by the social security . ”

At the relevant time occupational diseases were defined by Regulation No . CARDINAL of the Minister of ORG ( “ SG ” ) , issue CARDINAL of DATE , amended , GPE , issues CARDINAL and CARDINAL of DATE ) and by ORG , issue CARDINAL of DATE , amended , GPE , issue CARDINAL of DATE and issue CARDINAL of DATE ) . The ORG defined occupational diseases as “ impairments of the health arising exclusively or predominantly from the harmful factors of the conditions of work or of the work process and which have been listed in the Table of Occupational Diseases ” ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ) . The Table listed the diseases , the conditions of work causing them , and the types of work in the performance of which they could occur . For a disease to be regarded as occupational , it had to ( a ) be listed in the Table ; ( b ) stem from the exposure to certain dangerous conditions of work ( e.g. noise , vibrations , radiation ) , exhaustively enumerated in the Table ; and ( c ) the types of work ( e.g. typist , miner , driver ) involving exposure to these conditions had to be enumerated in the Table , the enumeration not being exhaustive .

The DECs and the ORG were established by the abovementioned Regulation No . CARDINAL under the authority of ORG .

The DECs were responsible for determining the occupational character of a disease ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the Regulation ) . Their members were appointed by the medical directors of the respective hospitals ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the Regulation ) .

The ORG heard appeals against decisions of the DECs ; its members were appointed by the Minister of Health ( section CARDINALa(CARDINAL ) of the Regulation ) . The findings of the ORG in respect of the occupational character of the disease were binding on other medical bodies dealing with occupational expertise issues ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the Regulation ) , but the Regulation did not provide that they were binding on the courts .

The members of the commissions – who were exclusively medical professionals – were remunerated under privatelaw service contracts with ORG ( sections GPE ) , CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of the Regulation ) .

There were no detailed rules regulating the procedure before the commissions . The ORG provided only that they had to proceed on the basis of an examination of the person concerned and of medical documents ( section CARDINAL of the Regulation ) , making no provision for witness testimony or other evidence . No hearings were held .

Article CARDINAL of the LAW provides :

“ CARDINAL . The courts shall review the lawfulness of the administration 's acts and decisions .

Physical and legal persons shall have the right to seek judicial review of any administrative act or decision which affects them , save in the cases expressly specified by statute . ”

The Administrative Procedure Act ( “ the ORG ” ) governs the procedure for issuing “ administrative acts ” and for judicial review of such acts . Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the Act defines “ individual administrative acts ” as “ acts issued [ by public authorities ] , which create rights or obligations for , or affect rights or legitimate interests of , individuals or legal entities , as well as the refusals to issue such acts ” . By sections CARDINAL of the LAW , all “ administrative acts ” , save those relating to the security of the country or specifically enumerated by statute , are subject to judicial review . The application for judicial review must be lodged within a specified timelimit , which varies depending on whether the “ administrative act ” was an express act or a tacit refusal and on whether before being appealed against before a court it was appealed against before a higher administrative authority ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) , read in conjunction with sections CARDINAL , DATE and DATE of the Act ) . Only if it is alleged that the “ administrative act ” is null and void , the application for judicial review is not limited by time ( section CARDINAL ) of the Act ) .

In its interpretative judgment no . CARDINAL of DATE in constitutional case no . CARDINAL ( GPE , issue CARDINAL of DATE ) ORG gave a binding interpretation of LAW . It held , inter alia , that that LAW 's provision encompassed all administrative acts regardless of their character or theoretical qualification . The exclusion of a given administrative act from judicial review could only be done by statute . “ All administrative acts ” meant “ without exception ” . Only internal acts which did not affect in any way physical or legal persons outside the respective administration were not covered by the constitutional provision .

The former ORG has held that the decisions of the special medical commissions were not “ administrative acts ” within the meaning of the ORG , which could be appealed against before a court , but rulings of special bodies subject only to a hierarchical appeal within the respective administration ( опред. № CARDINAL от DATE г. , ORG , III г.о. ) .

In a series of decisions and judgments starting with a reported decision of CARDINAL DATE in which it quashed a decision of ORG declaring an appeal against the decision of a special medical commission inadmissible , ORG , which succeeded ORG after the reform of DATE , started allowing judicial appeals against the decisions of special medical commissions . In contrast with the holding of the former ORG , it held that the commissions ' decisions were affecting the rights of the persons examined and were therefore “ administrative acts ” within the meaning of the ORG . The general rule under LAW being that administrative acts were subject to judicial review unless otherwise provided by statute , the commissions ' decisions were appealable before a court . In a number of those decisions and judgments the court also relied on LAW and , in particular , its “ access to a court ” requirement ( опред. № CARDINAL от CARDINAL февруари DATE г. по адм. д. № DATE г. , ORG , ORG ; опред. № CARDINAL от DATE г. по адм. д. № CARDINAL г. , PERSON , ORG ; опред. № CARDINAL от CARDINAL февруари DATE г. по адм. д. № DATE г. , ORG , ORG ; опред. № CARDINAL от DATE г. по адм. д. № CARDINAL г , ORG , ORG ; реш. № CARDINAL от CARDINAL януари DATE г. по адм. д. № CARDINAL г. , ORG , ORG ; реш. № CARDINAL от DATE г. по адм. д. № CARDINAL г. , PERSON , петчленен състав ) .


Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Art. 6-1;No violation of Art. 6-3

Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Khanlar Hajiyev

The applicant was born in DATE and is at present serving a DATE sentence in FAC .

On DATE ORG received an anonymous telephone call from a man who reported the disappearance of his neighbour GPE , the applicant 's wife , since DATE . On DATE the police carried out an in situ inspection of the flat and the adjacent premises where GPE had lived and collected samples of bloodstains and other biological particles found there . DNA testing on the bloodstains carried out on DATE showed that these samples belonged to the victim , the applicant and another male person . Meanwhile , on DATE a ORG investigating judge issued a warrant for the search of the applicant 's flat in order to identify possible objects connected with a criminal offence which was not specified . The search was carried out by the police on DATE but no items of interest were found .

On DATE at TIME the applicant was arrested by the police and placed in police custody on suspicion of murdering his wife ( PERSON ) in GPE at DATE and disposing of her body at the garbage disposal tip near the town of GPE . He was first interviewed by the police . The applicant 's statement to the police in which he confessed to murdering his wife was subsequently excluded from the case file as inadmissible evidence on the ground that he had not been legally represented .

At TIME , the applicant was brought by the police officer who had previously interviewed him before an investigating judge of ORG ( istražni sudac ORG ) and was questioned in the presence of a GPE Deputy ORG Attorney . The written transcript of the interview shows that the applicant had been warned about his right to remain silent and to be legally represented . After replying that he had understood the warnings , he chose to defend himself in person . He then stated that he was “ not experiencing any mental crisis , that he was aware of everything that he was saying and that the police officers had treated him correctly ” and then denied that he had murdered his wife but instead stated that he had found her dead and then disposed of her body out of fear that he would be accused of her murder . The applicant also stated that he had been listening to the judge 's dictation for the official record and that his words had been faithfully conveyed , adding that he had no objections as to the content of the written transcript , which he duly signed . The applicant was then placed in pre - trial detention where he remained until his conviction . The parties agree that upon his arrival he was seen by a doctor and that no injuries were recorded .

On DATE an investigation was opened against the applicant in ORG on a suspicion that he had murdered his wife , PERSON and on DATE a lawyer , PERSON , was officially appointed to assist the applicant . On DATE the defence counsel appealed against the decision to open an investigation , arguing that there had been no relevant evidence that the applicant had murdered PERSON On DATE the appeal was dismissed by a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG .

On DATE the investigating judge heard evidence from CARDINAL witnesses in the presence of the applicant 's counsel . On DATE the applicant 's pre - trial detention was extended by ORG . The applicant 's counsel lodged an appeal which was dismissed by ORG on DATE .

Meanwhile , on CARDINAL May CARDINAL the same investigating judge again interviewed the applicant , this time in the presence of his officially appointed defence counsel . The applicant was warned that he had the right to remain silent . However , he repeated his previous statement and added some details as to how he had disposed of his wife 's dead body . He signed the written transcript of the interview .

On DATE a confrontation between the applicant and a witness was organised before the investigating judge , in the presence of the applicant 's officially appointed counsel . The applicant stated that on the critical occasion he had twice hit his wife . He also stated that he had asked the witness present to help him dispose of his wife 's dead body . However , he denied that he had killed her .

On DATE the applicant informed ORG that he was represented by CARDINAL defence counsel of his own choosing . Consequently , in a decision of DATE the officially appointed defence counsel was relieved of his duties .

On DATE the applicant sent a letter to ORG investigating judge , withdrawing the previous confessions he had made before that judge . He alleged that during his interview by the police on DATE he had confessed to having murdered his wife because he had been threatened and beaten by QUANTITY police officers . They had punched him in the stomach , ears and head and slapped him several times . He named CARDINAL of the officers . They had , he alleged , also threatened him with further beatings if he retracted his confession before the investigating judge . For fear of further beatings , he had made a statement on CARDINAL occasions before the investigating judge in which he had confessed to having disposed of the dead body of his wife , even though that was not true .

On DATE the investigating judge excluded , inter alia , the transcript of the applicant 's interview by the police from the case file .

On DATE the GPE State Attorney 's ORG ( GPE državno odvjetništvo GPE ) filed a bill of indictment against the applicant in ORG , charging him with the murder of his wife at DATE , and the applicant was thus committed to stand trial .

During the trial proceedings the applicant , represented by CARDINAL lawyers of his own choosing , decided to remain silent . ORG trial panel heard evidence from witnesses , including ORG , in the presence of the applicant and his counsel , obtained forensic and other relevant reports and in its judgment of DATE found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment . The findings as to the applicant 's guilt relied on the statements of the applicant given by him before the investigating judge on CARDINAL occasions as well as on the other evidence such as a DNA analysis of the bloodstains found in the applicant 's home and hearsay evidence given by CARDINAL of the witnesses . The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows :

“ The defendant 's confession during the investigation and the evidence given by witnesses ORG and ORG indicate that TIME at DATE the police arrived at the applicant 's flat on account of the fact that music was being played too loud , while the fact that PERSON had actually died was twice confirmed by the defendant during the investigation . Furthermore , the witness ORG said that the defendant had told him that he had killed his wife and asked him to help him transport her dead body to PERSON in order to throw it into the sea .

A careful analysis of the defendant 's statements given on CARDINAL occasions during the investigation and of all other evidence presented at the hearing led this court to conclude that the defendant had acted as described in the operative part of this judgment and that all the statutory elements of the crime in question , in both its objective and subjective aspects , had thus been fulfilled .

During the investigation , the defendant , as mentioned above , twice confirmed the death of his wife , whose body has never been found .

... [ witness ] ORG , who has no sensible motive for laying any blame on the defendant , has , during the entire proceedings , expressly stated that the defendant , DATE after the critical day at DATE , had ... told him as follows : ' After you had left TIME , I killed her . ' And when [ O.M. ] had asked ' Whom ? ' , the defendant had answered ' NORP ' and had asked him to transport her dead body with his car to PERSON in order for the defendant to throw it into the sea , which the witness had refused .

... [ during ] an in situ inspection of the [ defendant 's ] flat traces of her [ the defendant 's wife ] bloodstains were found ... ”

The applicant and his counsel both appealed against the judgment . In his personal appeal the applicant complained , inter alia , of the fact that the judgment relied on the statements given by him before the investigating judge even though he had subsequently retracted them and had informed the investigating judge that he had given these statements under duress . His lawyers had moreover appealed on the same basis . In a judgment of DATE ORG ( PERSON ) upheld the applicant 's conviction . The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows :

“ .. the fact that PERSON had died was twice confirmed by the defendant in the statements given by him during the investigation . He described in detail how he had disposed of the dead body of his wife D , and the first - instance court correctly accepted this part of the statement while at the same time dismissing the part of his statement in which he denied murdering his wife . In this connection the defendant 's allegations that his statements during the investigation had been given as a result of the threats and beatings by the police and that he had told the investigating judge what the police had instructed him to say are unfounded . No basis for such allegations can be found in the evidence or the case file . On the contrary , when first questioned by the investigating judge the defendant expressly stated that he was not in a state of mental crisis , that he was aware of what he was saying and that the police officers of ORG had treated him correctly . ”

The subsequent constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant was dismissed by ORG on DATE .

The relevant part of LAW ( ORG nos . DATE Zakon o kaznenom postupku ) provides as follows :

( CARDINAL ) Where not otherwise provided by law , the ORG Attorney shall bring a criminal prosecution where there is a founded suspicion that an identified individual has committed a criminal offence liable to official prosecution and where there are no statutory obstacles for prosecution of that person . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) All ORG bodies and all legal entities are obliged to report criminal offences liable to official prosecution , whether they have been informed thereof or have learned about such offences on their own .

“ ( CARDINAL ) A criminal complaint shall be lodged with a competent ORG Attorney in writing or orally .

( CARDINAL ) Where a criminal complaint has been lodged with a court , a police force or a ORG Attorney lacking competence , they shall receive the complaint and immediately forward it to the competent ORG Attorney . ”


Violation of Article 14+P1-1 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property)

David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

His wife died on DATE . His claim for widows’ benefits was made in DATE . On DATE the applicant was informed that he was entitled to Widowed Parent ’s ORG ( “ ORG ” ) . However , on DATE he was informed that he was not entitled to a Bereavement Payment on the ground that the benefit did not exist at the time of the applicant ’s wife ’s death . The applicant did not appeal as he considered or was advised that such a remedy would be bound to fail since no such social security benefits were payable to widowers under GPE law .

The relevant domestic law and practice are described in the ORG ’s judgment in the case of PERSON v. the GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , ORG CARDINAL-IV .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Art. 6-1;Non-pecuniary damage - award

András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Guido Raimondi;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Kristina Pardalos;Nona Tsotsoria

NORP By letter of CARDINAL DATE , ORG informed the applicant that his permits to keep and carry a firearm for defence purposes as well as a hunting rifle had been revoked because on DATE the applicant had been listed in an “ operational records file ” ( policijos operatyvinė įskaita ) , a database containing information gathered by law - enforcement authorities ( see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL in ' Relevant domestic law ' below ) . The applicant was informed that he was to hand in these firearms to the authorities and would receive money for them .

On DATE the applicant requested GPE to order the removal of his name from the operational records database . The applicant stated that he had only discovered that his name had been so listed from the aforementioned police letter .

On DATE the GPE District Court refused the applicant 's request , finding that he should have brought his claims before the administrative courts .

The applicant appealed to ORG , arguing that he had never been informed of the reasons for the listing of his name in the operational records file and requesting that it be removed . The applicant also asked the court to order the police to provide him with all the written materials concerning the listing of his name .

On DATE the ORG found that it was necessary to decide which court DATE of general or administrative jurisdiction DATE was competent to hear the applicant 's case .

On DATE GPE city police officials instituted criminal proceedings on charges of theft when acting in an organised group ( LAW of LAW ) . The applicant was charged on DATE and placed under house arrest .

On DATE the special chamber responsible for questions of jurisdiction , composed of the judges of ORG and ORG , decided that the applicant 's case should be examined by the administrative courts .

On DATE the applicant was charged with covering up a crime committed by others ( Article CARDINAL of LAW ) . In particular , the investigators suspected that in DATE and DATE the applicant had helped to hide stolen cars on the premises of the company where he worked as the director . In his application the applicant maintained that this was not a fresh charge against him but a substitution for the previous charge of theft ( see paragraph QUANTITY above ) .

On DATE GPE ordered that the applicant be released from house arrest .

On DATE ORG allowed the applicant 's action , holding that the listing of his name in the police file was contrary to the principles of the presumption of innocence and the rule of law . Having reviewed the classified materials submitted by the police , the court found no evidence showing that the applicant had been engaged in any criminal activity . The court also noted the absence of any accusatory judgment against the applicant . On the contrary , testimony to his positive attributes , submitted to the court by environmental protection agencies and non - governmental associations , showed the applicant 's goodwill and dedication ( principingumą ) to protecting nature . For the above reasons , the court ordered the NORP police officials to remove the applicant 's name from the operational records file .

On DATE the GPE police appealed . They contended that , when listing the applicant 's name in an operational records file , the police had respected the applicable rules . In their appeal they observed that the file had been submitted to ORG and that the judges had acquainted themselves with that information . Lastly , the police noted that criminal proceedings on charges of theft had been pending and that the applicant was one of the accused .

On DATE ORG quashed the lower court 's decision and returned the case for fresh examination . It was noted that the lower court had erred in law and failed to consider certain relevant evidence . The appellate court emphasised that , when adopting a decision , the lower court had to evaluate all the evidence which had been presented at the hearing and to determine which circumstances had been established and which had not . In particular , the lower court had not properly examined the circumstances relating to the criminal proceedings on charges of theft and had failed to evaluate the applicant 's procedural position in them . ORG stressed that it was indispensable to examine all the circumstances relevant to the dispute over the listing of the applicant 's name in the operational records file .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's claim . The court admitted that a person listed in police records could be negatively affected in a number of ways , for example , he could lose the right to carry a firearm or face restrictions when applying for certain jobs . However , the court noted that having examined the “ written evidence ” in the case , as well as having examined , in the judges ' chambers , the operational file on the applicant , the listing of the applicant 's name in the police file had been lawful and justified . Whilst acknowledging that it had not been possible to disclose the operational file to the applicant , the court noted , nevertheless , that the applicant had been able to substantiate his claims by providing evidence or by asking the court to obtain the relevant materials when it had not been possible for him to obtain them himself . It concluded that he had not adduced any proof in support of his claim that the listing of his name in the operational file was unlawful .

The applicant appealed , noting the lower court 's observation that the listing of his name in the police file could entail negative consequences for him . The applicant also submitted that he was an inspector of nature protection ( gamtos apsaugos inspektorius ) and that he had been attacked by poachers on numerous occasions . Consequently , were the guns to be taken away from him , it would be too dangerous for him to pursue that activity . Furthermore , the applicant alleged that the gun was necessary for defending his family – living in a remote and insecure rural area DATE and also for his job , as he occasionally transported large sums of money from his company 's safe to the bank .

The applicant argued that he had had no access to the information which had served as the basis for the listing of his name in the police file . No reasons , except for theories ( išskyrus prielaidas ) had been disclosed to him . Relying on the above , the applicant submitted that his rights of defence had been breached and that the file on him should be destroyed .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's appeal , upholding the reasoning of the lower court . It noted that , “ having evaluated the written evidence in the case and the operational file [ which under the PERSON on State Secrets could not be disclosed to the defence ] , it had been possible to conclude that the listing of the applicant 's name in that operational file had been reasonable and lawful ” .

On DATE the criminal investigation in respect of the applicant on account of suspected theft was discontinued due to statutory limitations .

Article CARDINAL of the LAW provides that the dignity of a human being is to be protected by law . LAW states that the private life of a human being is inviolable and that information concerning it may be collected only following a reasoned court decision and only in accordance with the law . The law and the courts are to protect anyone from any arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her private life or from encroachment upon his or her honour and dignity . LAW provides that property is inviolable and that ownership rights are protected by law . Property may be taken only for the needs of society in accordance with the procedure established by law and must be fairly compensated . Under LAW , a person whose constitutional rights or freedoms have been violated has the right to apply to a court . LAW provides that each human being may freely choose a job or occupation .

LAW ( Operatyvinės veiklos įstatymas ) ( as in force until DATE ) described “ operational activities ” as being intelligence and counter - intelligence activities conducted by institutions and authorised by the ORG to combat organised crime . Under LAW of the LAW , an “ operational records file ” is the data on individuals , events and other targets obtained during the process of operational activities , with the intention of providing information to operational entities .

Under LAW , possible reasons for commencing operational activities would be the existence of preliminary information about a crime which was being planned or had already been committed against the ORG , about another kind of major crime , about an individual who was planning or who had committed a crime , about an individual 's links to a criminal organisation , or about the activities of foreign intelligence services .

DATE of the PERSON provided :

ORG “ CARDINAL . Information obtained during the course of operations may be disclosed during court proceedings with prior authorisation from ORG or the Deputy Prosecutor General designated by him . Use of information obtained during the course of operations for purposes other than those for which it was intended is prohibited .

ORG Information obtained during the course of operations may be used as evidence in a criminal case in accordance with the formalities and procedure established by LAW .

If , during the course of proceedings , information about an individual obtained using special equipment is disclosed , the individual has the right to lodge a complaint and contest the use of that information in court , on the grounds that the information was obtained illegally . In such instances the court has the right to disclose excerpts from the reasoned authorisation request [ to start an operational activity ] in order to prove the legality of that authorisation . ”

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of the PERSON on the Control of Arms and Ammunition ( ORG ir šaudmenų kontrolės įstatymas ) provided at the material time that arms and ammunition could not be acquired or possessed by a person who did not have an impeccable reputation . According to LAW ( CARDINAL ) of that PERSON , a person was not regarded as having an impeccable reputation if his or her name had been listed in an operational records file . LAW provided that , after a firearms licence had been revoked , the arms and ammunition were to be taken from the person concerned and sold through ORG ( a ORG agency ) or through other companies authorised to sell them .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of the PERSON on ORG ( NORP ir turto saugos įstatymas ) provides that a person whose name is listed in an operational records file is not eligible to work as a security officer .

The relevant part of ORG ( PERSON bylų teisenos įstatymas ) provides as follows :

“ CARDINAL . Evidence in an administrative case is all factual data found admissible by the court hearing the case and based upon which the court finds ... that there are circumstances which justify the claims and rebuttals of the parties to the proceedings and other circumstances which are relevant to the fair disposal of the case , or that there are no such circumstances ...

As a rule , factual data which constitutes a ORG or official secret may not be used as evidence in an administrative case , until the data has been declassified in a manner prescribed by law . ”

In the judgment of DATE in case no . MONEY - CARDINAL , ORG stated , in so far as relevant to the present case , that :

“ as a rule , factual data which constitutes a ORG or official secret may not be used as evidence in an administrative case until it has been declassified ( LAW of ORG ) . Therefore , in the absence of other evidence , the [ lower ] court 's reliance on solely written information provided by ORG which was marked as secret had no legal basis ” .

On DATE ORG adopted a ruling on the compatibility with LAW CARDINAL § CARDINAL of ORG , and LAW and CARDINAL of the Law on State Secrets . It ruled that no decision of a court could be solely based on information which constituted a ORG secret and which was not disclosed to the parties to the case . In the ruling no . ACARDINAL - CARDINAL/CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ORG confirmed the above principles .