Anatoly Kovler;Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE in GPE and now lives in GPE , GPE .

On DATE the applicant relocated from GPE , GPE to GPE . On DATE she registered her temporary residence in GPE and renewed it on DATE , DATE , and DATE .

NORP In DATE she acquired NORP citizenship . On DATE she registered her permanent residence in GPE .

On DATE she lodged an application for payment of a ORG earnings - related pension ( a “ labour pension ” ) with ORG of GPE .

The pension was awarded to her from the date of application . In addition , she was paid the pension for DATE prior to the date of application , because GPE ( her country of origin ) was a party to the Agreement on securing the pension rights of citizens of GPE of DATE ( “ the CIS Agreement of DATE ” ) .

The applicant lodged a lawsuit against ORG of GPE , seeking recovery of unpaid pension payments for DATE ( DATE prior to registration of temporary residence on DATE ) . On DATE the Justice of the Peace for ORG ruled in her favour .

On DATE ORG reversed the judgment on appeal . The appellate court reasoned that , according to the provisions of LAW of DATE , the applicant , as a foreign citizen , could only have requested payment of a labour pension from ORG if she had registered her permanent residence in GPE and received a residence permit . Until DATE she did not have a residence permit or a registered permanent residence in GPE and thus had not satisfied the criteria prescribed by the international agreement and national legislation .

LAW CARDINAL ( Федеральный закон № CARDINAL « О трудовых пенсиях в Российской PERSON от DATE г. ) stipulates in LAW that foreign citizens and persons without citizenship permanently residing in GPE have pension rights equal to those of NORP citizens .

The Legal Status of Foreign Citizens Act DATE ( GPE закон № CARDINAL « О правовом положении иностранных граждан в Российской PERSON от DATE г. ) provides in LAW that a foreign citizen may only be considered permanently residing in GPE if he has acquired a residence permit .

The Agreement on securing the pension rights of citizens of the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States of DATE ( ORG о гарантиях прав граждан государств-участников Содружества независимых государств в области пенсионного обеспечения от CARDINAL марта DATE г. – “ LAW of DATE ” ) regulates the mutual recognition of the pension rights of the citizens of GPE .

According to ORG of DATE the award and payment of a pension are regulated by the law of the country where a pensioner has permanent residence ( DATE , LAW ) .

In the event of relocation of a pensioner to another Member ORG , the payment of a pension is terminated in the country of origin if the same kind of pension is payable to him in the destination country ( LAW .


David Thór Björgvinsson;George Nicolaou;Lech Garlicki;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP Overseas Territories Citizen and NORP and Caicos Islands Belonger , who was born in DATE and lives on GPE , an island in the NORP and GPE . He was represented before the ORG by PERSON , a barrister practising in GPE .

The NORP and GPE ( “ the Territory ” ) are ORG in LOC . At the relevant time , the CARDINAL Constitution set out the rules regarding government of the Territory . The LAW was made pursuant to powers conferred by LAW DATE which allowed Her Majesty to make Orders in Council for , inter alia , the peace , order and good government of the Territory . The LAW provided for a Governor , a ORG and an elected ORG .

The applicant is the former Premier of the NORP and GPE and was , at the relevant time , the elected representative of the LOC constituency and so an elected member of ORG . He is a citizen of the Territory and has been active in politics there for DATE . He became the head of ORG in DATE . He became Premier following elections in DATE and was re - elected in DATE .

NORP In DATE a committee of ORG published a report on LOC . It expressed grave concerns about allegations of corruption in the Territory .

On DATE , the Governor appointed Sir PERSON as Commissioner to conduct an Inquiry into the allegations .

On DATE the Commissioner delivered his Interim Report . He was satisfied that there was a high probability of systemic corruption and/or other serious dishonesty involving past and present elected members of ORG and others in DATE .

On DATE the Governor issued a statement responding to ORG . He indicated that ORG had formed the view that parts of the CARDINAL Constitution would need to be suspended and had decided to take steps to enable it to do so . On DATE he made public a draft ORG which would suspend parts of the CARDINAL Constitution initially for DATE .

The applicant resigned as Premier on DATE . He remained an elected member of ORG .

The Order in Council was subsequently made by Her ORG in the form of the NORP and LAW DATE ( “ the Order ” ) and laid before ORG . The Order provided that parts of the CARDINAL Constitution were suspended and direct rule was assumed over the people of the Territory . In particular , the Order dissolved ORG and removed all elected officials for DATE .

The applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review to challenge the legality of the Order . Regarding the removal of direct rule , the applicant argued that the LAW was inconsistent with the international law principle of self - determination ; that it was inconsistent with the right to stand for election and , once elected , to sit as a member of parliament , guaranteed by LAW No . CARDINAL to the LAW ; that it was contrary to the principle of legality and a disproportionate and irrational response to the alleged crimes of certain elected representatives ; and that it was based on the recommendations of a flawed Inquiry and on recommendations which were themselves ultra vires the Inquiry ’s terms of reference .

A hearing took place in ORG on DATE . Following the hearing , and at the request of the court , the Government confirmed by letter that before bringing the Order into effect they would withdraw the application of LAW No . CARDINAL from the NORP and GPE .

On DATE the ORG refused permission to seek judicial review . Regarding specifically the applicant ’s argument under LAW No . CARDINAL , Lord Justice Carnwath indicated :

“ CARDINAL . ... [ T]his aspect of the argument has in my view been overtaken by events . Following the hearing we have been informed by the Treasury Solicitor that , if a decision is taken to bring the Order into force , the GPE will in effect withdraw LAW . This can be done without Parliamentary sanction . It requires a declaration to ORG under LAW modifying the application of the LAW to the territory by withdrawing the application of LAW . It will be made clear that this is a temporary measure , pending steps to restore the principles of good governance in the Territory . ”

As to potential limitations on the ORG ’s power to make laws for the peace , order and good government of the Territory , ORG examined , inter alia , the special status of human rights in judicial review . He referred to ORG judgment in R ( Bancoult ) v Home Secretary ( No CARDINAL ) [ DATE ] ORG CARDINAL , where that court had examined the statutory language conferring the power , and continued :

“ CARDINAL . Even allowing for the differences between the various speeches [ in GPE ] , those of the majority in my view provide a clear message that the ORG ’s power to legislate for the good government of a territory ... , although in principle subject to judicial review , is in practice not open to question in the courts other than in the most exceptional circumstances , which did not include the abrogation of the basic right relied on in that case . I see no reason to think the rights claimed in this case , important as they are , should be accorded greater weight . ”

The applicant appealed against the refusal of permission to ORG arguing , inter alia , that ORG had erred in finding that the ORG ’s power to legislate was not limited by any requirement to comply with fundamental rights . The appeal was refused on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE , by letter to the ORG of ORG , the Government removed the application of LAW No . CARDINAL to the NORP and GPE .

The Order entered into force on DATE . Following its entry into force , the Governor was responsible for administering the Territory .

Section CARDINAL of the West Indies Act DATE empowers Her Majesty to provide by ORG for the government of the Territory . The relevant part of section CARDINAL ) provides :

“ Her Majesty may by ORG make such provision as appears to Her expedient for the government of any of the colonies to which this section applies , and for that purpose may provide for the establishment for the colony of such authorities as She thinks expedient and may empower such of them as may be specified in the Order to make laws either generally for the peace , order and good government of the colony or for such limited purposes as may be so specified subject , however , to the reservation to Herself of power to make laws for the colony for such ( if any ) purposes as may be so specified . ”

Section CARDINAL makes clear that the power to make an Order includes power to vary or revoke the Order .

The NORP and LAW DATE entered into force on DATE . It dissolved ORG and removed all elected officials for DATE .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial

David Thór Björgvinsson;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza

The applicants were born in DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE respectively and live in FAC .

On DATE ORG ) acting on behalf of the applicants lodged a claim for payment with ORG ( PERSON ) .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE the ORG legal adviser complained about the delay in the proceedings and asked for a hearing date to be fixed .

On DATE the court held the first hearing .

DATE the court held CARDINAL hearings .

On DATE the ORG ( FAC ) declared the defendant insolvent . Consequently , at a hearing held on DATE the trial court stayed the proceedings ex lege .

The proceedings were resumed on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the ORG discontinued the proceedings in the case .

On DATE the ORG acting on behalf of the applicants lodged a complaint with ORG ( Sąd Apelacyjny ) under LAW on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time ( LOC o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki ) ( “ the CARDINAL Act ” ) .

The applicants sought a ruling declaring that the length of the proceedings before ORG had been excessive . They asked for an award of just satisfaction in the amount of MONEY ( ORG ) ( approx . ORG CARDINAL ) .

On DATE ORG dismissed the complaint . The court found that LAW produced legal effects as from the date of entry into force ( DATE ) , its provisions applied retroactively to all proceedings in which delays had occurred before that date and had not yet been remedied . It acknowledged that there had been a delay at the initial stage of the proceedings but found that this situation had ceased to exist when LAW entered into force .

The relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the excessive length of judicial proceedings , in particular the applicable provisions of LAW , are stated in the ORG ’s decisions in the cases of ORG v. GPE no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( dec . ) , § § DATE , ECHR CARDINAL-V and NORP v. GPE no . CARDINAL ( dec . ) , ORG CARDINAL-VIII .


Violation of P1-1;Pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The General Directorate of National Roads and Highways ( PERSON PERSON ) , a ORG body responsible , inter alia , for motorway construction , expropriated CARDINAL plots of land belonging to the applicant in ORG in order to build a motorway . A committee of experts assessed the value of the land and the sum so fixed was paid to him when the expropriation took place .

On DATE the applicant requested increased compensation . Accordingly , on CARDINAL DATE ORG of First Instance awarded him additional compensation of MONEY ( TRL ) ( MONEY ( ORG ) ) , plus interest at the statutory rate applicable at the date of the court ’s decision , running from DATE .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the administration paid the applicant TRL CARDINAL ( approximately ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) in additional compensation , together with interest .

The relevant domestic law and practice are set out in the Aka v. GPE judgment of DATE ( Reports of Judgments and Decisions CARDINAL-VI , § § CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) .


Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;Khanlar Hajiyev;Sverre Erik Jebens

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE .

The applicants have a maintenance claim against their father Mr W ( “ the debtor ” ) . Apparently the debtor fell into arrears with maintenance payments ( ORG ) amounting to the sum of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL . The applicants applied for enforcement of their payment orders to the competent ORG ( Bezirksgericht ) in PERSON . The enforcement order ( PERSON ) provided for the sale of the debtor 's movable property ( Fahrnisexekution ) and granted the applicants a lien on outstanding claims which the debtor held against his own debtors ( PERSON ) .

On DATE the debtor lodged an action under LAW ( Oppositionsklage ) to have the claim underlying the enforcement order dismissed and also applied to postpone enforcement ( PERSON ) until a decision on his action had been reached . In support of his case to have the enforcement order set aside , the debtor stated that during the period of time in which he had not made maintenance payments , the applicants had been living with him and he had paid all their living expenses .

NORP In support of his application to postpone enforcement regarding the sale of movable property , the debtor claimed he would risk losing his property rights over the objects seized for enforcement . He also argued that if a lien against outstanding claims from his own debtors was enforced , the recovery of the money from the applicants , who did not have any funds , would be nearly impossible if the enforcement order was , in fact , set aside .

On DATE ORG , without hearing the applicants , allowed the postponement of enforcement by granting the applicants a lien on outstanding claims if a deposit of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL was lodged with the court but the postponement of the sale of the debtor 's movable property was not granted . On DATE the debtor appealed , claiming that the deposit was too high . The applicants were not notified of the appeal .

The Steyr Regional Court ( PERSON ) quashed the decision , ordering both kinds of enforcement to be postponed until the decision on the action under LAW was rendered and re - setting the deposit at ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL . The applicants were not heard in the proceedings . It held that an appeal on points of law to ORG was not admissible . The applicants , having lost the case on postponement of the enforcement , were obliged to reimburse legal costs amounting to ORG MONEY to the debtor .

The enforcement of court orders is set down in LAW ( Exekutionsordnung ) . In principle , an application for an enforcement order ( Exekutionsbewilligung ) can only be made when the civil right to be enforced is established with final effect ; such a decision establishing a civil right is called a fiat of execution ( ORG ) .

NORP If after a fiat of execution has been passed , new facts emerge which vitiate or weaken the enforceable claim , the debtor can bring an action under LAW . If successful , such an action will set aside the fiat of execution . In the proceedings , LAW ( Zivilprozeßordnung ) will apply .

If an action is brought under LAW , enforcement may also be postponed according to LAW no . CARDINAL of LAW , until a final decision is taken under LAW . The postponement of enforcement is taken in the form of a decision ( ORG ) . According to LAW no . CARDINAL of LAW , such postponement is to be subject to the payment of a deposit by the debtor seeking to have the claim underlying the fiat of execution set aside unless the debtor can show unobjectionable documents supporting his action under LAW . The deposit serves to safeguard the creditor(s ) against damage resulting from delay in the enforcement of the claim .

According to NORP jurisprudence , the amount of the deposit is to be determined according to the likelihood of a successful outcome to the action under LAW , without taking into account the merits of the action under LAW .

Section CARDINAL of LAW stipulates that , unless provided otherwise , the general provisions of LAW ) are applicable to enforcement proceedings .

As a general principle , the opponent does not have the right to be heard if the other party lodges an appeal against a decision ( PERSON ) other than those decisions set out in LAW of the Code of Civil Procedure .

NORP The legal costs have to be borne by the party who loses the case ; in circumstances in which both parties partly lose and partly win a case , the costs will be split proportionately , with the court enjoying a narrow margin of appreciation ( see Sections CARDINAL of the Code of Civil Procedure ) .

While certain court fees are payable upon application for an enforcement order and the bringing of an action under LAW , no such fees are payable for a motion to postpone enforcement . However , appeals against decisions ( PERSON ) have to be signed by a lawyer in principle , who is entitled to remuneration .


Anatoly Kovler;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE in GPE . He is currently serving his sentence in the correctional colony UCh CARDINAL/CARDINAL in the town of GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by Mr PERSON , ORG at ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder and detained in a temporary confinement cell of a local police station .

According to the applicant , from CARDINAL to DATE he was held in custody without food or water . On an unspecified date but apparently immediately after his arrest , he was interrogated and beaten up by police officers and was forced to sign unspecified documents .

According to the trial court and appeal judgments ( see below ) , on CARDINAL DATE the applicant was questioned by the investigator of the local prosecutor ’s office and not by the police officers . The interrogation of CARDINAL DATE took place in the presence of a lawyer , apparently appointed as a legal - aid counsel , who subsequently represented the applicant throughout the domestic proceedings . The applicant pleaded guilty during the interrogation . On DATE , when questioned by the investigator in the presence of counsel , the applicant repeated his confession statements .

During the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty claiming that his confession had been obtained as a result of coercion . When questioned by the trial court , he was unable to cite the names of the police officers who had allegedly ill - treated him , to provide a detailed account of the events or to outline the basic facts his allegations had been based upon .

On DATE the Zheleznodorozhny ORG of PERSON - on - Don of GPE convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment . The court found that the applicant had intentionally killed PERSON , having struck the latter no fewer than thirteen times . The crime had been committed in the flat of PERSON , a friend of the applicant . The court based the conviction , in particular , on the testimony of PERSON . , which she had given during the pre - trial investigation , claiming to have been an eyewitness to the crime . According to her statements , the applicant had demanded money from the victim and had then kicked him continuously for TIME . PERSON . failed to attend the trial . The applicant objected to the reading out of her testimony at the trial . The court rejected his objection . It held , in particular , as follows :

“ The court made all necessary efforts to secure the witness PERSON . ’s presence ; however there is no information about her whereabouts ... It follows from the submissions of investigator PERSON and witness S. that witness PERSON . does not have a permanent place of abode , was temporarily registered at victim Mr T. ’s address , but did not live there even before the latter’ s death ... The case file contains information that PERSON . previously lived with her relatives ; however the court ’s officer visited this address and found out that she had not lived there for a long time . Nobody among those who knew her has information about her current whereabouts . ”

The court also relied on :

- the testimony of PERSON , whom PERSON . told that the applicant had killed Mr T. ;

- testimonies of police officers and investigators who knew from PERSON . and PERSON that the applicant had killed PERSON and who also asserted that , after being arrested , the applicant had confessed to the murder ;

- a forensic expert ’s conclusion that the blood found on the applicant ’s shoes belonged to the victim ;

- a pathologist ’s conclusion that the death of Mr T. had resulted from severe bodily harm caused by repeated kicking ;

- the corpse inspection record and several other documents .

As regards the allegation of duress , the court established that on the date of his arrest the applicant had only been questioned by the investigator of the local prosecutor ’s office . No police officers had interrogated the applicant either on the date of his arrest or later . The interviews of CARDINAL and DATE took place in the presence of the lawyer . The court rejected the applicant ’s allegations of ill - treatment by the police officers as unsubstantiated .

In his grounds of appeal the applicant complained , inter alia , that the trial court had not secured the attendance of PERSON . , who had been the only eyewitness , that he had not been able to examine this witness in court , that his confession had been obtained under duress and that his lawyer had failed to represent him effectively at the trial . He admitted having beaten the victim on the date of his death , but denied intending to kill him .

On DATE the PERSON - on - Don Regional Court upheld the judgment . As regards the applicant ’s complaints , it found as follows :

“ The appellant ’s arguments that PERSON . ’s statements were vitiated are baseless , as these statements do not contradict other evidence ... The fact that this testimony was taken from PERSON . during the pre - trial investigation does not invalidate their significance as evidence . [ ... ] The allegations of a considerable discrepancy between PERSON . PERSON . ’s statements and the facts revealed by the corpse inspection record , pathologist ’s report and forensic expert ’s conclusion , are unsubstantiated . ”

The appeal court rejected , as unfounded , the complaint about the lawyer ’s ineffectiveness , having observed , in particular , that the applicant had not objected to the lawyer ’s participation in the trial at earlier stages of the proceedings , had not requested another lawyer to represent him and had not complained to the trial court about any particular actions or omissions of the lawyer .

On DATE the deputy Prosecutor General lodged an application for supervisory review with the Presidium of the Rostov ORG . He submitted that the Zheleznodorozhny ORG and ORG had infringed the applicant ’s right to examine witness PERSON . He claimed that a reference to PERSON . ’s testimony be excluded from the judgments .

On DATE the Presidium of ORG granted the prosecutor ’s application . It found that the appeal court had read out the testimony by PERSON . despite the applicant ’s objection , and thus had violated domestic law as regards court procedure in a criminal case . The court observed that at no stage of the proceedings had the applicant been given an opportunity to examine PERSON . and concluded that his right to examine a prosecution witness had indeed been violated . The ORG accordingly found that PERSON . ’s testimony was not to be taken into account and modified the judgments of DATE and DATE by excluding the reference to her witness statements . The ORG examined in detail the other items of evidence in the criminal case , reduced the applicant ’s sentence to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment on the ground that he was in charge of a minor and upheld the remainder of the lower courts’ findings .

According to the applicant , the officers of the correctional colony ORG CARDINAL/CARDINAL had returned the applicant ’s letter to the ORG dated DATE CARDINAL times and had only posted it on DATE . According to the expedition note by the colony , the correspondence was sent to the recipient on DATE .

The ORG received the above letter on DATE .


CASE OF HEANEY AND McGUINNESS v. IRELAND

Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 6-2;No separate issue under Art. 8;No separate issue under Art. 10;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings

At TIME on DATE a large explosion occurred at a ORG checkpoint in GPE . CARDINAL NORP soldiers and CARDINAL civilian were killed and a number of other NORP army personnel were seriously injured .

TIME , NORP police officers on surveillance duty noted a light in a house QUANTITY from the scene of the explosion . At TIME on DATE a warrant was obtained to search the house . At or TIME the police entered the house and found an assortment of gloves ( rubber and knitted ) , balaclavas , caps and other clothing . The CARDINAL men in the house , including the owner and the applicants , were arrested and detained by the police under section CARDINAL of the Offences against LAW ( “ the LAW ” ) . As later noted by ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , it was suspected that the bombing had been carried out by ORG ( an unlawful paramilitary organisation known as the IRA ) and the applicants were , in turn , suspected by the police of membership of that organisation and of involvement in the bombing .

Both applicants were cautioned by police officers in the usual terms , namely that they were not required to say anything unless they wished to do so and they were also informed that anything they did say would be taken down in writing and might be given in evidence against them .

PERSON was then questioned about the bombing and about his presence in the house where he was arrested . He refused to answer the questions put to him . Police officers then read LAW to him and he was requested pursuant to that section to give a full account of his movements and actions TIME on DATE and TIME on DATE . He refused to answer any questions .

PERSON was also questioned about the explosion and about his presence in the house where he was arrested . He refused to answer those questions . He was then requested to account for his movements between CARDINAL a.m. and TIME on DATE . He refused to answer . Police officers then read LAW to him and he was handed a copy of the section and asked to read it . He continued not to answer questions put to him .

On DATE both applicants were brought to ORG in GPE and charged with the offence of membership of an unlawful organisation ( contrary to section DATE the CARDINAL Act ) and of failing to account for their movements ( contrary to section CARDINAL of LAW ) .

On DATE the applicants ' trial in ORG took place . On DATE the applicants were acquitted of the charge of membership of an unlawful organisation but each was convicted of failing to provide an account of their movements during a specified period contrary to section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act . The court rejected their arguments that section CARDINAL must be read as including a right to refuse to provide such information on reasonable grounds and about the confusion caused by police officers giving the usual caution about the right to remain silent and then making a request for information under LAW . Both applicants were sentenced to DATE imprisonment . Their sentences commenced on DATE . They were released on CARDINAL DATE .

The applicants then appealed against their conviction and sentence under LAW to ORG . As regards their conviction , they submitted that ORG had erred in finding that the applicants were not confused as a result of the caution about their right to remain silent and the conflicting request for information under LAW by the same officers . They argued that section CARDINAL should have been read as including the possibility of a refusal to give information based on reasonable excuse . As to their sentence , they argued that the confusion caused by the caution and request for information should have been a mitigating factor ; that there was no evidence that they warranted the maximum sentence ; and that the court failed to take into account the time the applicants had spent in custody prior to their trial .

On DATE the applicants took proceedings in the High Court challenging the constitutionality of section CARDINAL of LAW . The proceedings pending before ORG were consequently adjourned .

By a judgment dated DATE , ORG rejected their application . It based the applicants ' right not to answer questions as regards their movements on LAW rather than on DATE , noting that their case related to suspects in custody and not to accused persons on trial . However , it was considered that section CARDINAL constituted a proportionate interference with the applicants ' right to silence , the objective being to assist police investigations into serious crimes of a subversive nature involving the security of the ORG . In addition , the restrictions were not considered arbitrary or irrational .

ORG also considered that the restriction did not excessively impair the right to silence given the objective pursued by section CARDINAL and the other legal protections applicable to persons in custody under LAW , which protections were afforded to minimise the risk of an accused wrongfully confessing to a crime and to safeguard against the possible abuse of the powers provided by LAW . Those protections were listed by ORG : the requirement that a police officer must have a bona fide suspicion prior to arrest ; the obligation to inform the suspect of the offences under LAW and/or of the scheduled offences of which he is suspected ; the right to legal assistance when reasonably requested ; the right to medical assistance ; the right of access to a court ; the right to remain silent and to be told of that right ; the obligations to provide appropriate cautions to detainees and to abstain from cross - examining a person in detention DATE Act and from unfair and oppressive questioning of such detainees ; and the conditions attaching to any extension of the length of detention under LAW .

By a judgment dated DATE ORG rejected the applicants ' appeal , finding that section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act was not inconsistent with LAW . It was noted that LAW was silent on the use which could be made of statements provided pursuant to requests made under LAW . While ORG had suggested in a previous case ( The People ( Director of Public Prosecutions ) v. PERSON [ DATE ] Irish Reports CARDINAL ) that information lawfully obtained under section CARDINAL might be later used in evidence , ORG expressly reserved its position as to whether that view was correct or not .

ORG considered that the right to silence was a corollary to freedom of expression guaranteed by LAW and that the relevant assessment was to consider the proportionality of the restriction on the right to silence in view of the public order exception to LAW . It noted that LAW was aimed at actions and conduct calculated to undermine public order and the authority of the ORG and that the proclamation made pursuant to section DATE CARDINAL Act remained in force .

As to whether section CARDINAL restricted the right to silence more than was necessary in light of the disorder against which the ORG was attempting to protect the public , the court noted that an innocent person had nothing to fear from giving an account of his or her movements even though such a person may wish , nevertheless , to take a stand on grounds of principle and to assert his or her constitutional rights . However , it considered that the entitlement of citizens to take such a stand must yield to the right of the ORG to protect itself . The entitlement of those with something relevant to disclose concerning the commission of a crime to remain silent must be regarded as of an even lesser order . ORG concluded that the restriction in section CARDINAL was proportionate to the ORG 's entitlement to protect itself .

The applicants ' appeal to ORG in relation to their conviction under LAW has been adjourned generally pending the outcome of the present application .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW provides that no person shall be tried on any criminal charge save in due course of law . By DATE , the ORG guarantees liberty for the exercise , subject to public order and morality , of the right of citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions .

The Offences against LAW is described in its long ( explanatory ) title as an LAW to make provision for actions and conduct calculated to undermine public order and the authority of the ORG and , for that purpose , to provide for the punishment of persons guilty of offences against the ORG , and to establish ORG .

Section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act makes it an offence to be a member of an unlawful organisation as defined in the LAW .

Section CARDINAL deals with the arrest and detention of suspected persons and provides that a member of the police can arrest and detain a person whom he suspects of having committed an offence under LAW or an offence scheduled under Part V of LAW ( the scheduled offences are mainly offences under the firearms and explosive substances ' legislation ) . This power of arrest is a permanent power so that it is not dependent on a section CARDINAL proclamation ( see the following paragraph ) .

Section DATE CARDINAL LAW provides that Part V of that LAW ( which establishes ORG and contains section CARDINAL ) is to come into force by means of a proclamation by the government made when the government is satisfied that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order , and when the government therefore makes and publishes a proclamation to that effect . The proclamation was made in DATE and is still in force . Accordingly , section CARDINAL of LAW has been in force since DATE to date .

By section QUANTITY the government may declare that a particular class or kind of offence is a scheduled offence for the purpose of LAW and such offences are to be tried by ORG established under LAW .

Section CARDINAL of the DATE LAW as follows :

“ CARDINAL . Whenever a person is detained in custody under the provisions in that behalf contained in Part IV of this LAW , any member of the [ police ] may demand of such person , at any time while he is so detained , a full account of such person 's movements and actions during any specified period and all information in his possession in relation to the commission or intended commission by another person of any offence under any section or sub - section of this LAW or any scheduled offence .

NORP If any person , of whom any such account or information as is mentioned in the foregoing sub - section of this section is demanded under that sub - section by a member of the [ police ] , fails or refuses to give to such member such account or any such information or gives to such member any account or information which is false or misleading , he shall be guilty of an offence under this section and shall be liable on summary conviction thereof to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months . ”

Under the terms of the Good Friday Peace Agreement of DATE , the government committed to initiating a wide ranging review of , inter alia , LAW with a view to reform and dispensing with those elements of LAW which would no longer be required . The Minister for ORG , ORG has , with government approval , established a committee to examine all aspects of the LAW against ORG and to report to the Minister with recommendations for reform . The committee has already commenced its work .

In the PERSON case cited above , the accused had been arrested under section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act and had made certain statements to the police . The defence argued that because of the basis of his arrest PERSON ( section CARDINAL ) , the existence of LAW and even though no section CARDINAL requests had actually been made , the accused was bound under penalty to give an account of his movements . Accordingly , the statements which had been made by him were involuntary and not therefore admissible . The court did not find this argument persuasive since no section CARDINAL requests had in fact been made . It went on to point out that , even if section CARDINAL had been relied on by the police , the defence submission was not well - founded because of previous NORP case - law which had held that statements obtained in accordance with NORP law , even a law which made it a criminal offence to refuse to answer , were not inadmissible in any legal proceedings .

The Garda Siochana ( police ) Handbook contains relevant legislation and commentaries and is published by ORG of Ireland in association with ORG . The commentary on section CARDINAL of LAW in the sixth edition ( DATE ) provides as follows :

“ The fact that the accused is bound under threat of penalty to answer questions lawfully put under section CARDINAL does not render the resultant answers or statements inadmissible in evidence . ”

The judicial authority for that proposition was noted in the handbook as being found in the PERSON case cited above and the earlier NORP case - law approved in the PERSON case .

In the case of ORG ( In the matter of ORG and LAW DATE , [ DATE ] CARDINAL NORP Law Reports DATE CARDINAL ) ORG found that a confession of a bank official obtained by inspectors as a result of the exercise by them of their powers under LAW of LAW DATE would not , in general , be admissible at a subsequent criminal trial of that official unless , in any particular case , the trial judge was satisfied that the confession was voluntary . ORG considered that compelling a person to confess and then convicting that person on the basis of the compelled confession would be contrary to LAW . That court also found that any other evidence obtained as a result of information provided under LAW of LAW would be admitted in evidence in a subsequent trial if the trial judge considered , in all the circumstances , that it would be just and fair to admit it .


Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions);Non-pecuniary damage - award

Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra;Nona Tsotsoria

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She is a seconddegree disabled person .

On an unspecified date during the NORP period , the ORG allocated to the applicant a flat in GPE on the right of tenancy .

NORP In DATE the applicant ’s niece , who had moved to GPE to study , obtained registration at the applicant ’s flat with the latter ’s consent . In DATE she moved back to the town of GPE without cancelling her registration . In DATE the applicant ’s niece was married , and she gave birth to CARDINAL children in DATE and DATE respectively . Upon the applicant ’s consent , the children were also registered at the applicant ’s flat so that they could receive medical care from her address .

On DATE the applicant acquired ownership of the flat , which was notarised on DATE .

In DATE the applicant ’s niece passed away . Her registration at the applicant ’s flat was subsequently cancelled .

On DATE the applicant applied to the Kanaker - Zeytun ORG of GPE ( hereafter ORG ) seeking to cancel the children ’s registration .

By a letter of DATE ORG informed the applicant of its refusal to cancel the children ’s registration on the ground that , according to the relevant rules , the registration of minors could be cancelled only together with the cancellation of the registration of one of their parents ; upon an application by the parents or the children ’s lawful representatives ; in connection with studies ; or upon a relevant court order .

On an unspecified date , the applicant contested this refusal before the courts , seeking to oblige ORG to deregister the children and claiming that the latter had never lived in her flat .

On DATE the ORG and ORG of GPE dismissed the applicant ’s complaint , finding that the refusal was lawful as ORG had acted in accordance with Government Decree no . CARDINAL of DATE . According to the text of the judgment , the parties had been duly notified of the hearing but had failed to appear . According to the applicant , she was not notified of that hearing .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal on the same ground . According to the text of this judgment , the applicant and her representative made oral submissions at the court hearing . According to the applicant , neither she nor her representative was given the opportunity to make any oral submissions . It further appears that the children ’s father was present at the appeal hearing and petitioned to dismiss the applicant ’s claim .

On an unspecified date , the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law .

On DATE ORG dismissed her appeal finding that :

“ According to LAW , if no agreement is reached regarding the termination of the right of use of accommodation , this right can be terminated upon the owner ’s request through court proceedings by paying compensation equivalent to the market value .

In such circumstances , the arguments raised in the appeal on points of law are unsubstantiated , since the right of use of accommodation enjoyed by [ the children ] can be terminated only in accordance with LAW ... ”

According to LAW , apartment buildings and accommodation in other constructions situated on the territory of GPE comprise the housing fund .

According to LAW , citizens are entitled to receive accommodation in houses of the ORG and the public housing fund through a prescribed procedure .

According to Article DATE , on the basis of the decision to allocate accommodation in a building of the ORG or public housing fund , the relevant executive committee shall provide the citizen with an order which shall serve as the sole basis for occupying the allocated accommodation .

According to LAW , the accommodation tenancy agreement in respect of the buildings of the ORG and public housing fund shall be concluded in writing , on the basis of the accommodation order , between the lessor , namely , the organisation managing the maintenance of the building , and the tenant , namely , the citizen in whose name the voucher has been provided . Accommodation in the buildings of the ORG and public housing fund shall be used in accordance with the accommodation tenancy agreement .

According to LAW , the tenant ’s family members who live with him shall equally enjoy all the rights and bear all the responsibilities stemming from the accommodation tenancy agreement .

According to LAW , the tenant ’s family members include his spouse , their children and parents . Other individuals may be recognised as the tenant ’s family members , if they live with the tenant and run a common household .

According to LAW , the tenant has the right , with the consent of members of the family residing with him , to accommodate his spouse , children , parents and other persons in the accommodation occupied by him . Persons who have been accommodated in the accommodation according to this Article shall acquire the right of use of that accommodation equally with other persons residing there , unless some other agreement has been reached , at the time when these persons were accommodated , between the tenant and members of his family residing with him .

According to LAW , in case of the tenant ’s or his family member ’s temporary absence , the accommodation shall be kept for them for a period not exceeding DATE . A person may lose his right of use of accommodation by a court decision as a result of being absent for a period exceeding the prescribed time - limit on the basis of an application filed by the tenant or other permanent users of the accommodation in question .

According to LAW , the place of residence of minors under the age of CARDINAL shall be considered the place of residence of their lawful representatives , such as , inter alia , their parents .

According to LAW , the right of use implies the possibility afforded by law to reap the useful natural qualities of a property and to “ benefit ” from it .

According to LAW , as in force at the material time , the family members of the owner of accommodation and other individuals have the right to use the accommodation , if that right has been registered in accordance with the procedure prescribed by LAW .

According to LAW , as in force at the material time , the right of use of accommodation shall originate , be implemented and terminated through a notarised written agreement with the owner . If no agreement is reached regarding the termination of the right of use of accommodation , this right can be terminated upon the owner ’s request through court proceedings by paying compensation equivalent to the market value .

In accordance with LAW , as in force at the material time , a person enjoying the right of use of accommodation can demand that any person , including the owner , eliminate the breaches of his right in respect of the accommodation .

According to LAW , flats in buildings of the ORG and public housing fund shall be sold as private property to the tenants of the flats in question and their family members indicated in LAW , if there is written consent from all the adult family members . The flat may be sold to them as a common property , if they so wish .

According to LAW , as in force at the material time , registration and deregistration of citizens shall be implemented for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for the enjoyment by them of their rights and freedoms as well as for the performance of their obligations before the ORG and other citizens .

According to LAW , as in force at the material time , citizens shall be registered at CARDINAL address at their temporary or permanent place of residence .

According to LAW , as in force at the material time , accommodation in respect of which a citizen does not have the right of ownership , tenancy or sub - tenancy , and which is not his permanent place of residence shall be considered his temporary place of residence .

According to LAW , as in force at the material time , the place where a citizen lives permanently or predominantly shall be considered his permanent place of residence .

According to LAW , a citizen ’s application to be registered at a temporary place of residence can be refused if there is no written consent from , inter alia , the owner of the accommodation . Minor children shall be registered , irrespective of whether there is written consent from the owner , at the place of registration of one of the parents or their lawful representative .

According to LAW , the registration of minors below the age of DATE who live with their parents shall be made through a relevant entry in the accommodation card or the parent ’s registration card on the basis of the GPE identity documents and the minor ’s birth certificate .

According to Paragraph CARDINAL , the registration of citizens registered at a temporary or permanent place of residence shall be cancelled in case of , inter alia , change of place of residence , death , or if the documents and information which served as a basis for the registration were false . The authorities in charge of registration shall cancel the citizen ’s registration at the permanent place of residence on the basis of documents within DATE and make a relevant entry in his passport .


Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies);Preliminary objection dismissed (ratione personae);Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Art. 5-1;Violation of Art. 5-3;Violation of Art. 5-4;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger;Volodymyr Butkevych

The applicant was born in DATE and is currently detained in prison no.CARDINAL , the GPE region .

On DATE the applicant , a minor at the time , was arrested on suspicion of having killed his grandmother and robbed her apartment together with a Mr G.

On DATE the applicant was formally charged with murder and aggravated robbery .

NORP ORG ( NORP міський суд – “ the ORG ” ) held a hearing on DATE , in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer . It ordered the applicant ’s pre - trial detention on the ground that he might abscond if released because he was suspected of having committed serious crimes .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s pre - trial detention for up to a total of DATE . It found that there was sufficient evidence on which to found a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed serious offences .

In DATE the applicant ’s lawyer requested the investigator to replace the applicant ’s detention with a less restrictive preventive measure . By a ruling of DATE , the request was rejected on the ground that the applicant was suspected of having committed serious crimes and might prevent the establishment of the truth in the case .

On DATE ORG ( Прокурор міста Керч ) sent the case file , together with the bill of indictment , to ORG for the trial proceedings .

On DATE the judge of ORG held a committal hearing at which the applicant ’s lawyer lodged a new request for release , stating that the applicant was a minor ; had no previous convictions ; could not obstruct the collection of evidence or destroy it ; had positive aspects to his character ; permanently resided in GPE ; did not DATE and could not – try to abscond due to the lack of resources or relatives in other parts of the country ; and , lastly , that there was no indication that he would reoffend if released . ORG committed the applicant for trial on charges of murder and aggravated robbery . In its committal order the court also rejected the applicant ’s request for release and extended his detention during the trial proceedings without giving any grounds .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer lodged another request with ORG for the applicant ’s release on the same grounds as DATE . According to the Government , it was considered and rejected on DATE .

On DATE ORG referred the case back for additional pre - trial investigation . The court also rejected the applicant ’s request for release , noting that he was suspected of having committed serious crimes and there were no grounds for applying a less restrictive preventive measure to him .

NORP In DATE the applicant ’s lawyer lodged CARDINAL requests with the investigator for the applicant ’s release . Both requests were rejected on the ground that the applicant was suspected of having committed serious crimes and might prevent the establishment of the truth in the case .

On DATE ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) considered the investigator ’s request for the applicant ’s further detention . The court decided that further investigative actions were required in respect of the applicant and his co - accused and , given that the applicant was accused of serious crimes , there were sufficient grounds for his further detention . The court accordingly extended the applicant ’s detention to DATE .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer submitted a request to the investigator for the applicant ’s release .

On DATE the request was rejected on the ground that the applicant was suspected of having committed serious crimes and might prevent the establishment of the truth in the case .

In DATE the investigation was completed and the case was referred to ORG .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer requested ORG to replace the applicant ’s detention with an obligation not to abscond as there was not enough evidence on which to found a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed a crime . He also reiterated the arguments in support of the applicant ’s release set out in his previous requests of CARDINAL May and DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) .

At a committal hearing of DATE , ORG rejected the request on the ground that the reasonableness of the suspicion could be verified only during the trial proceedings . It committed the applicant for trial on charges of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery and maintained his detention during the trial proceedings , noting that there were no grounds for replacing the applicant ’s detention by a different preventive measure .

On DATE ORG convicted the applicant and PERSON of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery and sentenced them to DATE and CARDINAL years’ imprisonment respectively .

On DATE ORG quashed that judgment and remitted the case to ORG for further investigation . The court did not make any ruling on the applicant ’s further detention .

NORP In DATE the applicant ’s lawyer submitted a request to the investigator for the applicant ’s release . The request was rejected on the ground that the applicant was suspected of having committed serious crimes .

On DATE ORG committed the applicant for trial . The court further maintained the applicant ’s detention without giving any grounds .

On DATE the applicant lodged a request for his release with ORG , based on the same arguments as in his requests of CARDINAL May and DATE and DATE . His request was rejected by ORG on DATE without any reasons .

On DATE ORG found the applicant and PERSON guilty of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery and sentenced them to DATE and CARDINAL years’ imprisonment respectively .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of DATE .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer filed a request for the applicant ’s release with the Governor of the Simferopol Pre - Trial Detention Centre ( the Simferopol SIZO ) . The request was based on the argument that the term of the applicant ’s detention pending trial , as authorised by ORG in the detention order of DATE , had expired on DATE ( DATE after his arrest ) and that no new decision had been taken extending this term .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE the Governor of the PERSON informed the applicant ’s lawyer that the applicant had been moved to the ORG temporary detention centre ( “ the GPE ” ) on DATE . He further stated – referring to LAW that in any event there were no grounds for the applicant ’s release as the time - limit referred to in the above request was applicable only to pretrial proceedings . However , as from DATE , the date when the bill of indictment was sent to the court ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , the applicant ’s detention had been classified as detention during trial . Consequently , the applicant could not be released on the ground of the expiry of the DATE time - limit referred to .

On DATE the applicant lodged CARDINAL administrative complaints : CARDINAL with GPE ORG against the Simferopol SIZO and the other with ORG against ORG in respect of his allegedly unlawful detention after DATE .

On DATE the Simferopol Zheleznodorozhny ORG rejected the applicant ’s administrative complaint against the administration of the Simferopol SIZO about his allegedly unlawful detention after CARDINAL DATE on the ground that a complaint of that nature should be considered in the criminal proceedings and not in administrative proceedings .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of the first - instance court .

On DATE ORG quashed the decisions of the lower courts and remitted the case to the first - instance court for consideration on the merits on the ground that criminal procedural law did not provide for the possibility of challenging the failure of a prison administration to release a suspect or accused .

The proceedings are still pending .

On DATE ORG considered the administrative complaint brought by the applicant against ORG for being held in their temporary detention centre ( “ the NORP ITU ” ) from DATE . The court found in part for the applicant , having established that his detention there without a valid court order was contrary to LAW and therefore unlawful . The court rejected the applicant ’s request for release , however , stating that at the time of consideration of the case the applicant ’s detention was maintained by a court order and that it could not decide the issue in civil ( administrative ) proceedings .

On DATE ORG set aside the decision of the first - instance court on the ground that LAW obliged the head of a penitentiary institution to free a detainee only if no decision on continued detention was made during the pre - trial investigation . It further noted that :

“ The law does not require the head of the pre - trial detention facility to free an accused in respect of whom the term of pre - trial detention has expired but no decision of the court has arrived imposing a preventive measure in the form of detention during the trial proceedings in the case . ”

The court concluded that the administration of ORG could act only within its competence and had done so . The court further noted that the reference by the first - instance court to a violation of LAW was unsubstantiated and that the applicant ’s detention DATE had not been contrary to LAW .

On DATE ORG , acting as a court of cassation , upheld the decision of ORG .

The relevant provision of the LAW reads as follows :

“ Every person has the right to freedom and personal inviolability .

No one shall be arrested or held in custody other than pursuant to a reasoned court decision and only on grounds and in accordance with a procedure established by law .

In the event of an urgent necessity to prevent or stop a crime , bodies authorised by law may hold a person in custody as a temporary preventive measure , the reasonable grounds for which shall be verified by a court within TIME . The detained person shall be released immediately if he or she has not been provided , within TIME of the moment of detention , with a reasoned court decision in respect of the holding in custody .

Everyone who has been arrested or detained shall be informed without delay of the reasons for his or her arrest or detention , apprised of his or her rights , and from the moment of detention shall be given the opportunity to personally defend himself or herself , or to have the legal assistance of defence counsel .

Everyone who has been detained has the right to challenge his or her detention in court at any time .

Relatives of an arrested or detained person shall be informed immediately of his or her arrest or detention . ”

NORP The pertinent provisions of the Code provide , in so far as relevant , as follows :

“ Detention during pre - trial investigation shall not exceed DATE .

In cases in which it is impossible to complete the investigation of the case within the period provided for by Part CARDINAL of this Article and there are no grounds for discontinuing the preventive measure or replacing it with a less restrictive measure , the period of detention may be extended :

( CARDINAL ) DATE by a judge of the court which issued the order for the application of the preventive measure ;

( CARDINAL ) to DATE - in cases of serious and especially serious crimes ... by a judge of an appellate court ;

( CARDINAL ) to DATE - in particularly complex cases involving especially serious crimes ... by a judge of ORG of GPE ; ...

... The period of detention during pre - trial investigations shall expire on DATE the court receives the case file ; however , the time taken by the accused and his representatives to study the criminal case file shall not be included in the calculation of the period of detention ...

... In the event that the case is returned by the court to the Prosecutor for a supplementary investigation the period of detention shall be calculated from the moment the case is received by the Prosecutor and shall not exceed DATE . The period specified shall be further extended by taking into account the time the accused was held in detention before the referral of the case to the court , in accordance with the procedure and within the time - limit prescribed by Part CARDINAL of this Article .

Save where the period has been extended pursuant to the procedure established by this LAW , in the event of the expiry of the maximum period for detention as a preventive measure allowed by Parts CARDINAL of this Article , the body of inquiry , the investigator , or the prosecutor shall be obliged to release the person from custody without delay .

Governors of pre - trial detention centres shall promptly release from custody any accused in respect of whom a court order extending the period of detention has not been received by the time the period of detention allowed by Parts CARDINAL , CARDINAL and Six of this Article expires . They shall notify the person or body before whom the case is pending and the prosecutor supervising the investigation ”

Article CARDINAL

Terms of committal proceedings

“ A committal hearing shall be held within DATE or , in complex cases , DATE of receipt of the case file by the court . ”


Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Khanlar Hajiyev

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is an NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON . He was represented before the Court by Mr P. de Goederen , a lawyer practising in Bad Ischl . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Ambassador PERSON , Head of ORG at ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant was interviewed at the ORG ( ORG and on an unspecified date preliminary investigations ( FAC ) were instituted against the applicant and CARDINAL others . They were suspected of continuous aggravated fraud under LAW ( schwerer gewerbsmässiger Betrug ) by setting up and managing a gambling system which was based on a pyramid scheme . According to the report , the players were formally partners or employees of companies managed by the co - accused and had to pay a certain sum in order to obtain a place on the list of players . The money was used to participate in national lotteries .

On DATE the public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment .

On an unspecified date the case was remitted to the investigating judge and the preliminary proceedings were reopened .

DATE and DATE CARDINAL of the co - accused lodged several requests for the acceleration of the proceedings ( Fristsetzungsantrag ) under LAW of LAW ( GPE - organisationsgesetz ) . In particular he requested that ORG be ordered to hold a hearing , which was of no avail .

The main proceedings started on DATE before ORG .

On DATE the ORG decided to separate those parts of the proceedings which concerned GPE , GPE , GPE and GPE , for reasons of procedural expediency .

ORG , on DATE , rejected the applicant ’s complaint against this decision , holding that such complaints could only be raised in a plea of nullity once the proceedings were terminated .

On DATE ORG convicted the applicant of continuous aggravated fraud and sentenced him to imprisonment of DATE . However , it held that the applicant was not involved in the creation of the pyramid scheme and the sentence was therefore suspended on probation for DATE .

The applicant appealed against the judgment in so far as the sentence was concerned . ORG lodged a plea of nullity and an appeal against this judgment . The co - accused also lodged a plea of nullity . On DATE ORG withdrew the plea of nullity but maintained the appeal .

On DATE the applicant lodged a LAW request , which was dismissed on DATE . ORG held , furthermore , that the proceedings concerning GPE , GPE , GPE and GPE could not be continued until the decision on ORG appeal was taken .

ORG , on DATE , rejected the co - accuseds’ plea of nullity and referred the case to ORG to decide on their and ORG appeal .

On DATE ORG considered the appeals against ORG judgement of DATE . It partly granted the applicant ’s appeal against sentence . It found that the proceedings including the appeal proceedings had lasted unreasonably long and that taking this excessive duration into account the sentence imposed on the applicant had to be reduced . While the offence of continuous aggravated fraud under LAW carried a minimum sentence of DATE imprisonment , ORG , applying LAW , which allowed for an extraordinary reduction of a sentence under special circumstances , reduced the applicant ’s sentence to DATE suspended on probation for a period of DATE .

On DATE the ORG informed the applicant that the proceedings on the charges against him concerning GPE , GPE , GPE and GPE , separated from the main proceedings on DATE , had been discontinued .


Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE his summer house in GPE , GPE , was blown up by unknown perpetrators .

On DATE he instituted civil proceedings before ORG ( PERSON ) seeking damages from GPE for his damaged property .

On DATE ORG gave judgment partly allowing the applicant ’s claim .

On DATE the defendant appealed against the first instance judgment .

Pursuant to ORG ( LAW ( ORG o izmjeni PERSON o obveznim odnosima ) , ORG stayed the proceedings on DATE .

On DATE the “ Damage from ORG Demonstrations Act DATE ” ( Zakon o odgovornosti za štetu nastalu uslijed terorističkih akata i javnih demonstracija ) entered into force . It provides that proceedings which were stayed pursuant to ORG Act DATE will resume . However , it is uncertain if and when the applicant ’s proceedings before ORG have resumed .

The relevant part of LAW ( Zakon o obveznim odnosima , ORG nos . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) read as follows :

“ Responsibility for loss caused by death or bodily injury or by damage or destruction of another ’s property , when it results from violent acts or terror or from public demonstrations or manifestations , lies with the ... authority whose officers were under a duty , according to the laws in force , to prevent such loss . ”

The Civil Obligations ( Amendments ) Act DATE ( Zakon o izmjeni PERSON o obveznim odnosima , ORG no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , hereinafter “ the DATE LAW ) entered into force on DATE . The relevant parts of that Act read as follows :

“ Section CARDINAL of LAW ... shall be repealed . ”

“ Proceedings for damages instituted under LAW shall be stayed .

The proceedings referred to in sub - section CARDINAL of this section shall resume after the enactment of special legislation governing responsibility for damage resulting from terrorist acts . ”

The relevant part of LAW ( Zakon o parničnom postupku , ORG nos . CARDINAL , GPE , CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) provides :

“ Proceedings shall be stayed :

( CARDINAL ) where another statute so prescribes . ”

The “ Damage from Terrorist Acts and Public Demonstrations Act DATE ” ( Zakon o odgovornosti za štetu nastalu uslijed terorističkih akata i javnih demonstracija , ORG no . CARDINAL , hereinafter “ the DATE LAW ) entered into force on DATE . It provides that proceedings which were stayed pursuant to LAW will resume and defines circumstances in which GPE is liable for damage resulting from terrorist acts and public demonstrations .


The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , born in DATE and living in GPE ( GPE ) . He is represented before the ORG by Mr J. Groen , a lawyer practising in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the applicant , may be summarised as follows .

Together with his mother and brother , the applicant moved from GPE to the GPE in DATE where they joined the applicant ’s father , who was living there since DATE and who died in DATE . In DATE , after the death of his brother , the applicant married – obliged by NORP tradition – his brother PERSON widow . After the latter ’s expulsion from the GPE in DATE , the applicant divorced her . In the meantime , the applicant had started a relationship with PERSON , a NORP national . CARDINAL children , PERSON and PERSON , were born out of this relationship on DATE and CARDINAL DATE , respectively . On DATE the applicant was granted a permanent residence permit ( vergunning tot vestiging ) .

On DATE , the applicant was driving a getaway car after an armed robbery . During the car ’s pursuit by the police CARDINAL of the persons in the car driven by the applicant shot and killed a policeman . On DATE , ORG ( ORG ) convicted the applicant of participation in a robbery and of being an accessory to the killing of a police officer and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment .

At around the same time his partner lost the care and custody of their children because of her heroin addiction and her incapacity to provide for their care . A childcare organisation was appointed guardian of the children . The oldest child was placed in the care of the applicant ’s mother . The youngest child was initially placed in a children ’s home and , at DATE , in a foster family . In prison the applicant had regular contacts with his children to the extent that this was possible . He also made arrangements with the childcare organisation in order to enable him to see the children after his release .

On DATE the applicant ’s residence permit was revoked and he was declared an undesirable alien ( ongewenste vreemdeling ) by the ORG Secretary of ORG ( ORG ) . The applicant ’s request for revision ( herziening ) of that decision was rejected on DATE by the ORG Secretary .

The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision with ORG of ORG ( Afdeling PERSON ) . He argued , inter alia , that his expulsion would constitute a breach of Article CARDINAL of the Convention since he would no longer be able to exercise his family life with his children .

The applicant further requested the President of ORG ( ORG ) in summary proceedings ( kort geding ) to issue an interim measure allowing him to await the outcome of the appeal proceedings before to ORG . This request was rejected by the President of ORG on DATE . The President , noting that financial difficulties had led the applicant to become involved in the facts of which he had been convicted and that he wished to maintain his relationship with his seriously heroin - addicted partner , held that recidivism could not be excluded .

On DATE the applicant was expelled to GPE . He travelled back to the GPE on CARDINAL DATE , allegedly because his mother and his children had difficulties living without him . He further made arrangements with the childcare organisation in order to see his youngest child .

On DATE , ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal against the decision of CARDINAL DATE . It held that the interference with the applicant ’s family life with his children was justified under the second paragraph of LAW , in particular on the ground of prevention of disorder . It found that neither the applicant ’s submissions about the interest of himself and his children in his continued stay in the GPE nor his personal circumstances should be given an overruling importance by the ORG Secretary .

On DATE , the applicant was convicted of unlawful residence in the GPE as an undesirable alien and sentenced to CARDINAL months’ imprisonment . On DATE , he requested the ORG Secretary of ORG to revoke the decision declaring him an undesirable alien .

On DATE , the applicant was expelled to GPE and , on DATE , the ORG Secretary rejected his request of DATE .

After having returned for a second time to the GPE , the applicant was expelled to GPE on DATE . On DATE , the applicant was again convicted of unlawful residence in the GPE as an undesirable alien . He was sentenced to CARDINAL months’ imprisonment .

After having returned for a third time to the GPE , the applicant was expelled to GPE on DATE .

On DATE , the applicant filed a new request with the ORG Secretary of ORG to revoke the decision declaring him an undesirable alien . This request was rejected on DATE . On DATE , after having returned to the GPE for a fourth time , the applicant was expelled to GPE .

On DATE the applicant married a NORP national , Ms. PERSON , in GPE . In DATE , his spouse filed a request for a provisional residence visa ( machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf ) on behalf of the applicant for the purpose of “ stay with spouse ” . The PERSON local police issued a positive opinion on the condition that the applicant complied with the requirements for the stated purpose , one of these being no criminal record .

After the provisional residence visa had been issued in DATE , the applicant entered the GPE on DATE . On DATE , he applied for a residence permit ( vergunning tot verblijf ) and , for this purpose , signed a declaration in NORP stating that he had never had any dealings with the police or the criminal justice authorities ( antecedentenverklaring ) . On DATE , he was granted a residence permit .

On DATE the ORG Secretary withdrew the applicant ’s residence permit , holding that both the provisional residence visa and the residence permit had been issued erroneously , as DATE pursuant to LAW ( b ) and ( c ) of LAW persons having been declared an undesirable alien are not eligible for residence permits . In addition and , according to his own statement , hoping that this would remain unnoticed , he had signed a declaration that he had no criminal record .

The applicant ’s objection ( bezwaar ) to the decision was rejected by the ORG Secretary on DATE . On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision with ORG ( Arrondissementsrechtbank ) sitting in GPE . He also filed a request for an interim measure prohibiting his expulsion pending the appeal proceedings . On DATE , the President of ORG granted the interim measure on grounds of the ORG Secretary ’s failure to submit necessary documents in time .

On DATE , following a hearing held on DATE , ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal . It held that the applicant ’s residence permit to stay with a NORP spouse had been withdrawn on correct grounds , since DATE by signing the declaration on criminal antecedents – the applicant had provided incorrect information . Recalling that the applicant had stated that he had signed this declaration in the hope that it would not be noticed that he had had dealings with the GPE criminal justice system and that he had served a DATE prison sentence and thus would obtain a residence permit , ORG concluded that he had willingly misinformed the authorities .

Insofar as the applicant relied on LAW NORP spouse and his CARDINAL children , ORG considered , taking into account the applicant ’s conviction in balancing the interests involved as required under LAW , that the interests of the GPE authorities outweighed those of the applicant . ORG held that , after ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE , no new facts or circumstances had become apparent prompting a different finding .

On an unspecified date , the applicant returned or was expelled to GPE .

Under LAW ( Vreemdelingenwet ) , an alien can be declared undesirable by the Minister of Justice when he or she has been convicted of an offence punishable by a prison sentence of DATE or more .

Article CARDINAL of LAW ( GPE ) provides that an alien who stays in the GPE knowing that he has been declared an undesirable alien commits a criminal offence punishable by CARDINAL months’ imprisonment or a fine of MONEY .

According to LAW ACARDINAL/CARDINAL.CARDINAL of FAC ( Vreemdelingencirculaire ) , a body of immigration directives drawn up and published by ORG , a decision declaring a person an undesirable alien shall – upon a request thereto from the person concerned –be lifted after DATE residency abroad where the decision declaring this person an undesirable alien has been taken on grounds of a conviction of serious violent crimes or drug dealing . This period is DATE where the decision is based on a conviction for other crimes .


David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE on GPE . He was unrepresented before the ORG . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant ’s wife died on DATE . On DATE , the applicant made a claim for widows’ benefits namely ORG and ORG . Subsequently the applicant was informed that his claim had been disallowed as he was not a woman . This decision was confirmed by an appeal tribunal on DATE . The applicant did not appeal further as he considered or was advised that such a remedy would be bound to fail since no such social security benefit was payable to widowers under GPE law .

The domestic law relevant to this application is set out in Runkee and White v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL , DATE .


The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a GPE national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He is represented before the ORG by PERSON , solicitor , of Messrs. PERSON and PERSON , GPE .

The applicant was convicted at ORG in GPE on DATE of CARDINAL counts of conspiracy to supply class A and class B drugs , namely ecstasy , amphetamine and cannabis resin . He was sentenced to DATE imprisonment for supplying class A drugs and , concurrent thereto , DATE imprisonment for the supply of class B drugs . In connection with the sentence , ORG on DATE granted leave to appeal and reduced the individual sentences to DATE and DATE respectively , to run consecutively . Leave to appeal against conviction was refused on DATE .

CARDINAL of the issues in the case concerned the disclosure of materials held by the prosecution on which they did not intend to rely . The applicant and his co - defendants had been subject to intensive police observations at CARDINAL or more stages of the conspiracy , DATE and DATE , and at various times some of them ( but not the applicant ) were found in possession of amounts of drugs worth , variously , £ MONEY , £ MONEY , £ MONEY , £ MONEY , £ MONEY and £ MONEY ( CARDINAL ) , £ MONEY and £ MONEY . Much of the evidence was recordings of telephone calls made by defendants , and references by CARDINAL of the defendants to another . The applicant , in his defence , accepted that he knew some of the people who had been arrested in possession of drugs in the case , but contended that he had not known what was going on , and had never been involved in any way with drugs . He said that he had had business dealings with some of the people that he would not have wanted the authorities to know about . Before and during the trial , the applicant applied for disclosure of the unused material in the form of the many covertly obtained tapes of conversations and observation material not already in evidence . He maintained that he needed the information to put in context the extracts from the recordings and details of all observations relied upon by the prosecution . Rulings were made by Judge PERSON , before the trial on DATE , and by the trial judge , Judge PERSON during the trial . The rulings ( summarised by ORG ) were to the effect that :

- the court had no power to order further primary disclosure – that was a matter for the prosecution 's judgment under LAW DATE ( “ CPIA ” ) ;

- in the absence of any particular issue in the applicant 's defence statement in respect of which the prosecution could be shown to have reasonable cause under LAW ORG to believe that there was undisclosed prosecution material which might reasonably be expected to assist the defence case , such disclosure would not be ordered ;

- in the circumstances it was not appropriate or necessary to order the further disclosure sought or for the trial judge to examine it or for himself to verify the prosecution 's compliance with their secondary disclosure duty , and

- the ORG scheme of prosecution disclosure was not contrary to LAW .

The applicant was convicted on DATE and sentenced to a total of DATE imprisonment .

Leave to appeal against conviction was refused by a single judge on DATE , and ORG heard the renewed application on DATE . Before ORG , the applicant challenged the way in which material had been withheld by the prosecution . In particular , he claimed that the prosecution was not entitled to withhold material that , when put in context with the material relied on by the prosecution , might have put the latter in a different light . ORG noted that the applicant ( unlike a co - defendant who raised similar issues ) had served a defence statement under LAW ORG which raised in general terms the nature of his defence , namely that he would contend that he know nothing of the drugs . The defence statement had also stated that he would contend that the balance of the audio recordings not already disclosed would put the conversations in their true context . Counsel for the prosecution , in reply , contended that the disclosure had complied with the scheme set up by Sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the ORG and the relevant LAW , and that the initial primary disclosure itemised CARDINAL of documents or bundles of documents drawn from a mass of documentary material running to CARDINAL of pages . The unused audio material alone amounted to over TIME of listening . He added that the defence had been served , by way of primary disclosure , with further schedules of discloseable material in the course of the trial as such material came into the police 's hands . The prosecution further contended that without identifiable issues as to what the undisclosed material might relate to , it could not properly make secondary disclosure . The prosecution also pointed out that , in order to put the conversations which were relied on in context , TIME of conversation before and after each of the incriminating passages had been included in the served audio tapes and transcripts . ORG held as follows :

“ There is no power in the court to direct primary disclosure , and , even if there were , it is difficult to see how the court could approach its task without knowledge of what , if any , issues were going to be taken with the prosecution case . The scheme of the [ CPIA ] is to rely on the prosecutor at that stage to disclose to the defence any unused material which in his or her opinion might undermine the prosecution case , but not to disclose everything available regardless of any conceivable relevance .

The machinery for testing the objectivity and adequacy of that disclosure , given the prosecution 's incomplete knowledge at that stage of what issues lie ahead , is the scheme of secondary disclosure . Once those issues are identified by the defence in a defence statement , if they are so identified , the prosecutor can then revisit his duty of disclosure , better informed than he was at the primary stage , to form a view as to what further disclosure justice requires in the form of material that might reasonably be expected to assist the defence . If , in the light of his then knowledge , he still does not make adequate disclosure , that is when the court can step in , and stay in . It can then consider the material for itself and direct further disclosure if it considers justice requires it .

That is the machinery , and that machinery was invoked here over a number of applications in the course of the trial ; and the judges , true to the scheme of the LAW , ruled as they did . In our view , there is nothing in the machinery that violates the LAW or the jurisprudence of ORG , that is , of tying prosecution disclosure to material that is relevant to the issues of guilt or innocence . There is nothing in the ORG or ORG jurisdiction to equate the notion of a fair trial , including the requirement of the prosecution to prove its case , with the notion that the defence , while keeping its cards close to its chest , can demand sight of all the prosecution material , however irrelevant to any issue that could be guessed at .

As to [ the ] more modest proposition that more of the audio tapes should have been disclosed to enable [ the applicant ] to put seemingly incriminating conversations into a more innocent context , it seems to us there are CARDINAL answers . First , additional context was provided as [ counsel for the prosecution ] has told us , in recorded passages before and after the incriminating words . Second , the words , in the context of what the police had seen as well as heard and the drug finds they made at or about the times of the conversations , were not seemingly incriminating , but plainly incriminating . Any innocent exchanges at other times – and no doubt there were many of them – could not have saved the passages on which the prosecution relied for the purpose of the defence . Third , it is to be remembered that these were lengthy conspiracies , punctuated by serious drug finds with which [ the applicant and a co - defendant ] visibly and audibly , in greater or less measure , were clearly involved . The patterns of their criminality were plainly established . There is , in our view , no arguable substance in this ... ground of appeal ... ”

ORG then dealt with a further ground of appeal . CARDINAL alleged co - conspirators had been tried separately from the applicant and his co - defendants , and in the course of their trial , they had applied for certain prosecution disclosure . The judge ordered disclosure , and the prosecution was unwilling to comply . As a result , the prosecution offered no evidence against all the defendants in that case . The applicant , unaware of the nature of the undisclosed material that caused the collapse of the prosecution in the co - conspirators ' case , claimed that if he had been tried with the CARDINAL other men ( as might have happened ) , the result would have been an abandonment of the prosecution against him . He also claimed that evidence of events in DATE ( concerning the supply of ecstasy tablets to one of the co - conspirators ) should not have been included in the prosecution case against him . The applicant asked ORG to investigate the nature of the disclosure that the prosecution had declined to make in that case , with a view to ordering its disclosure for the applicant 's own appeal if the court considered it would have assisted his defence . ORG replied :

“ We have looked at transcripts of the relevant public interest immunity hearings in question in the [ other ] proceedings and , in the absence of the [ applicant and his counsel ] , we have heard submissions about the matters referred to in them from [ counsel ] on behalf of the prosecution . [ Counsel ] was also the lawyer in charge of this prosecution and familiar with , and closely involved throughout in , the process of prosecution disclosure . Having explored the matter thoroughly with him , we are satisfied that none of the matters that led to the collapse of the prosecution in the [ other ] case in any way overflowed into or tainted the conduct of the police investigation in this case . The CARDINAL investigations , though overlapping in relation to CARDINAL or more overt acts of supply [ of drugs ] , were conducted by CARDINAL entirely separate police teams , separately directed and located , notwithstanding that institutionally they form part of ORG . Accordingly , we are satisfied that there is no arguable case for the grant of leave on this proposed ground . ”

A review of the domestic law on disclosure of evidence by the prosecution can be found in the ORG 's judgment in the case of PERSON and PERSON ( PERSON and PERSON v. GPE , nos . ORG and ORG , § § DATE , CARDINAL DATE ; confirmed by ORG on DATE ) . The duty of primary disclosure is contained in LAW DATE ( “ the CPIA ” ) , and requires the prosecution “ to disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not previously been disclosed to the accused and which in the prosecutor 's opinion might undermine the case for the prosecution against the accused ” , or give a statement that there is no such material . The provision as to a defence statement is at LAW , and requires the defence , after primary disclosure under LAW , to give a defence statement to the court and prosecutor “ ( a ) setting out in general terms the nature of the accused 's defence , ( b ) indicating the matters on which he takes issue with the prosecution , and ( c ) setting out , in the case of each such matter , the reason why he takes issue with the prosecution . ” The prosecution 's duty of secondary disclosure derives from LAW , and requires the prosecution , after the accused has given a defence statement under LAW , to “ disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not previously been disclosed to the accused and which might be reasonably expected to assist the accused 's defence as disclosed by the defence statement given under LAW ... ” , or to give a written statement that there is no such material .

The review by the trial court of the prosecution 's disclosure ( referred to at § DATE of the ORG 's judgment in PERSON and PERSON ) is governed by LAW ORG , which provides for the possibility of a defence application to the court for disclosure where the defence have reasonable cause to believe that there is prosecution material which might reasonably be expected to assist the defence as disclosed by the LAW statement .

The provisions of the ORG replaced the earlier , common law rules on disclosure .

In DATE , the Attorney General issued LAW which set out in more detail the way in which primary and secondary disclosure , and defence disclosure , should operate .

In R v. H and R v. C ( [ DATE ] ORG CARDINAL ) ORG noted that “ In some countries provision is made for judicial oversight of criminal investigations . That is , for better or worse , entirely contrary to NORP practice . Instead , the achievement of fairness in a trial on indictment rests above all on the correct and conscientious performance of their roles by judge , prosecuting counsel , defending counsel and jury ” .


Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä;Sverre Erik Jebens;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is an NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE . He was represented before the ORG by Mr F. Shiels of the ORG firm in GPE .

In DATE the applicant was tried on the charges of possession of firearms and ammunition with intent to endanger life , and of membership of a proscribed organisation . The only evidence against him at trial was an admission recorded in the police notes of his interrogation . The applicant denied in court that he had made such admissions , and challenged the veracity of the police records . He further argued that he had been physically ill - treated and subjected to intimidation during his arrest . CARDINAL police officers took the stand to vouch for the truthfulness of what they asserted was a contemporaneous record of the interrogation . The applicant was convicted of the charges and received concurrent sentences of DATE . His appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed DATE . The applicant spent DATE in prison .

In DATE the applicant sought review of his conviction by ORG ( ORG ) . It arranged for expert analysis of the interview notes , which established that these had been modified at some later stage . This was sufficient for the ORG to refer the case to ORG , which ruled on DATE that the conviction could not be regarded as safe and quashed it accordingly .

The ORG also referred the conduct of the CARDINAL police officers to ORG ( ORG ) , who in turn asked ORG to investigate . The latter did so and recommended prosecution of the officers for perjury . The ORG did not follow the recommendation . When asked by the applicant ’s solicitor to give reasons for this , he explained that an experienced lawyer within his office as well as an independent senior counsel had come to the view that there was no reasonable prospect of obtaining a conviction .

The applicant sought judicial review of the ORG ’s refusal to give specific , detailed reasons . The matter was finally disposed of by ORG in a judgment of DATE , which reiterated its previous case law that the ORG is not bound by the rules of procedural fairness and thus not required to provide reasons for not prosecuting in a particular case . The court considered itself bound to follow its previous case law that the general policy of not giving reasons was neither irrational nor aberrant . Nor could it be concluded that in this particular case that the ORG ’s failure to depart from his general policy was unreasonable .

The applicant also advanced an argument based on LAW . He contended that compelling him to serve a lengthy prison sentence on the strength of evidence that he knew to be false was inhuman and degrading . ORG did not examine this argument , since it related to facts occurring long before LAW came into force .

On DATE ORG of ORG refused leave to appeal .

The applicant pursued a claim for compensation following the quashing of his conviction . The claim was rejected by the Secretary of ORG for GPE . The applicant has informed the ORG that subsequently , in DATE , the Minister of ORG decided to make an ex gratia payment to him .