Mr. PERSON , an NORP citizen , for DATE farmed , with the help of members of his family , land at FAC Vicenza ) of which he was the tenant .

In DATE , the owner entered into a preliminary contract with a certain Mr. PERSON for the sale of the property at a price of CARDINAL GPE . In accordance with section CARDINAL of ORG no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE - " PERSON per lo sviluppo della proprietà coltivatrice " ) , he informed Mr. PERSON of the conclusion of this contract .

Mr. PERSON gave notice of his intention to exercise the right of pre - emption ( " diritto di prelazione " ) conferred on him by LAW . Nevertheless , by deed dated DATE , the owner sold the land to the brother - in - law of Mr. PERSON for the price that had been agreed with the latter .

On DATE , Mr. PERSON brought an action before ORG seeking the re - sale of the land to him by the new owner ( azione di riscatto ) . He complained of the failure to respect his right of pre - emption and alleged that the price indicated in the contract was fictitious : according to ORG valuation , the land was in fact only worth CARDINAL GPE . The applicant stated that he was willing to offer the new owner the price actually paid or , alternatively , the price shown in the sale contract or , in the further alternative , such price as ORG might determine .

The defendant pleaded that the action was inadmissible since Mr. PERSON had not made an unconditional offer of the price mentioned in the contract . He also claimed that the plaintiff could in any event no longer avail himself of his right of pre - emption as he had not paid the said amount within the DATE period laid down by LAW no . CARDINAL .

ORG gave judgment on DATE . It held that Mr. PERSON was entitled to have the land re - sold to him at the price specified in the contract , such price to be paid not DATE and DATE from the date on which the judgment became final .

On DATE , the new owner appealed to ORG which , after postponing the hearings CARDINAL times at the request of both parties , reversed ORG decision by a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , which was deposited in ORG registry on DATE . ORG found that although Mr. PERSON ’s action had been admissible , he was estopped from availing himself of his right to obtain a re - sale since he had not paid the price stated in the sale contract within DATE of the commencement of the proceedings at first instance . It held that this time - limit had to apply , by analogy with the rules on the exercise of the right of pre - emption ( section CARDINAL of Act no . CARDINAL ) .

On DATE , Mr. PERSON appealed on points of law to ORG . The respondent lodged a cross - appeal ( ricorso incidentale ) on DATE and the applicant filed a reply thereto ( controricorso ORG ricorso incidentale ) on CARDINAL DATE .

On a date which it has not been possible to trace ( see paragraph CARDINAL in fine above ) , the President of the CARDINALrd ORG of ORG directed that the hearings be held on DATE . The applicants claimed that previously Mr. PERSON had twice asked for the case to be dealt with , but that for reasons beyond their control they were unable to prove this .

On DATE , Mr. PERSON filed a supplementary memorial ; under LAW , he was permitted to do so up to DATE before the hearings .

On DATE , ORG postponed the hearings : as section CARDINAL of Act no . CARDINAL had given rise to conflicting judicial decisions , it considered it preferable to await the ruling of ORG on other appeals bearing on the same point .

ORG was to have sat on DATE , but in fact did not give judgment until DATE . On DATE , the CARDINALrd ORG applied that decision and dismissed Mr. PERSON ’s appeal ; it confirmed ORG interpretation of LAW no . CARDINAL . The full text of the judgment was made public by being deposited in ORG registry on DATE . LAW , which save for some rare exceptions applies to all civil court judgments , whether rendered at first instance , on appeal or on cassation , in fact provides ( translation from the NORP ) :

" The judgment ( sentenza ) shall be made public by being deposited in the registry of the court which delivered it . The Registrar shall record at the bottom of the judgment that it has been deposited , adding the date and his signature ; within DATE , he shall advise the parties ( parti che si sono costituite ) of the deposit by means of a written notice which shall contain the operative provisions of the judgment . "

Under LAW no . CARDINAL of DATE ( rules on the application of LAW and transitional provisions ) , the deposit has to be effected within DATE of the examination of the case .

On DATE , the judgment was served on Mr. PERSON by the respondent and thereupon became enforceable .

Anyone can consult or obtain copies of the judgments of ORG on application to its registry . If judgments contain features that are novel from the point of view of interpretation of the law , they may be published .


Violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance;Legal assistance of his own choosing);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - award

David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza

The applicant was born in DATE . He is currently serving a prison sentence in PERSON prison .

On DATE the applicant was arrested and his apartment was searched by the police . He was subsequently remanded in custody from DATE until DATE . In a judgment of DATE the ORG found the applicant guilty of burglary and sentenced him to CARDINAL and a half years’ imprisonment . The applicant , who was at that time in detention for the purposes of another criminal case against him , was represented before the court by a legalaid lawyer , GPE

On DATE the lawyer submitted his appeal to the court . By a letter of DATE the court , apparently unaware of the fact that the applicant remained in detention in connection with another criminal case , informed the applicant that the appeal submitted by the lawyer had been declared admissible . This letter was sent by registered letter to the applicant ’s home address and served on his wife . The court considered it to have been properly served on the party as required by the applicable laws . The appeal itself was neither sent to the applicant nor served on him .

On CARDINAL DATE the court sent another letter to the applicant ’s home address , informing him that his legalaid lawyer had been replaced by another one , ORG This letter was not collected from the post office within the statutory period and was returned to the registry of the court . The court considered , in compliance with the applicable provisions of criminal procedure , that it had been properly served on the applicant .

Subsequently , the court sent a summons to the hearing before the appellate court to the applicant ’s home address . It was not served on him as he remained in detention .

The new legalaid lawyer did not get in touch with the applicant . The applicant learned from CARDINAL of the inmates in GPE prison that an appeal had been lodged in his case and that a hearing was soon to be held . On DATE he wrote a letter to the court requesting it to postpone the hearing and to be brought before the court . He also submitted his own arguments in support of the appeal .

On DATE a hearing was held , in the applicant ’s absence , before ORG . The court dismissed the lawyer ’s appeal .

On DATE the applicant was informed by the registry of the court that his request of DATE and his appeal had been submitted to the court after the hearing of DATE . On DATE the applicant complained to the court that he had been unable to participate in the hearing .

On DATE a copy of the judgment given by the appellate court was sent to the prison where the applicant was detained at that time .

On DATE the applicant requested legal aid for the purpose of preparing a cassation appeal against the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . On DATE he submitted a detailed complaint to ORG about the fact that he had not been properly notified of the hearing , that the legalaid lawyer had been replaced without his knowing it , that he had neither been served with a copy of the appeal nor informed that it had been accepted for examination , and that he could not participate in the hearing . He was of the view that his defence rights had thereby been breached and that the conviction was in any event not safe , given the errors committed by the first - instance court in the assessment of the evidence .

On DATE PERSON , the same lawyer who had represented the applicant before the appellate court , was assigned to the case . On DATE the court , referring to LAW , informed the applicant that he had not been entitled in law to have a copy of the lawyer ’s appeal served on him , and that the summons had been served at his home address .

On DATE the applicant submitted his own cassation appeal to ORG . He reiterated the procedural complaints which he had made in respect of the appellate proceedings . He also argued that the court had failed to take into consideration circumstances pointing to his innocence .

On DATE the applicant was informed that he had been granted legal aid for the purposes of the cassation proceedings . On DATE PERSON notified the court and the applicant that he had found no grounds on which to prepare a cassation appeal . The applicant was served with this letter on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint against ORG with ORG . He submitted , essentially , that he should not have been assigned to represent him in the cassation proceedings , given what had happened in the proceedings before the appellate court . On DATE he requested the court to accept his own cassation appeal for examination .

ORG answered on DATE , stating that ORG had been right to refuse to prepare a cassation appeal in the applicant ’s case .

On DATE the applicant lodged further pleadings in support of his cassation appeal dated DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the ORG refused to accept the applicant ’s cassation appeal as it had not been prepared and signed by a lawyer as required by law . The applicant appealed . On DATE the court summoned him to have that appeal submitted by a lawyer .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE ORG informed the applicant that a legalaid lawyer was , under the applicable laws , entitled to refuse to prepare a cassation appeal .

On DATE the ORG refused to accept for examination the applicant ’s appeal against the decision of DATE , finding that it should have been submitted by a lawyer . On DATE an appeal by the applicant against that decision was dismissed by ORG .

On DATE the ORG found the applicant guilty of attempted car theft and sentenced him to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment . The applicant appealed . On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal .

On DATE the applicant issued a request to have both judgments quashed and his case re - examined by the first - instance court . He argued that new evidence had emerged , namely the statement of ORG , who had confessed to the crime of which the applicant had been found guilty .

On DATE ORG dismissed the request . The court found PERSON ’s statement “ implausible ” .

In DATE a new Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted . Article CARDINAL of the Code provided that an appellate court could order that a defendant be remanded in custody ( under NORP law remand in custody is terminated only by a secondinstance judgment ) and be brought to the courtroom to attend a hearing before that court .

Article CARDINAL of LAW Procedure reads :

“ § CARDINAL . A court of appeal shall not be allowed to conduct evidentiary proceedings pertaining to the merits of the case .

§ CARDINAL . In exceptional cases the appellate court may , if it finds the completion of a judicial examination necessary , nevertheless accept new evidence directly at the hearing , if this will expedite the judicial proceedings and there is no necessity to conduct the whole of the proceedings , or a major part thereof , anew . Before the hearing the court may issue an order on the admission of evidence . ”

In DATE ORG adopted a resolution stating that during a hearing before an appellate court a defendant should at least have an opportunity to defend him- or herself , or to be represented by a defence lawyer ( DATE , PERSON ) .

In a judgment of DATE ORG stated that it was mandatory to bring the defendant to a hearing before the appellate court , regardless of whether he or she had made a relevant request ( V KKN CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

In a judgment of DATE ORG stated that in cases in which the arguments made in the statement of appeal were limited to challenging exclusively the legal aspects of a case or where only the sentence was challenged , a decision not to bring a defendant represented by a lawyer before the appellate court was correct ( III KKN CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

In DATE Article CARDINAL of the Code was amended , in response to the ORG ’s judgment in the case of Belziuk v. GPE ( Reports of Judgments and Decisions CARDINAL ) . The amended provision read :

“ The appellate court shall order an accused , who is detained , to be brought to the appellate hearing , unless it finds that the presence of his lawyer is sufficient . If the court decides not to bring an accused who has no defence counsel to the hearing it shall appoint for him ex officio a legal - aid lawyer . ”

In DATE ORG examined the ORG ’s request for clarification of issues relating to the presence of the accused at the appeal hearing . In its resolution of DATE the court expressed the view that the right to a fair hearing demanded that the person convicted by the first - instance court should be informed of his right to request to be brought before the appellate court , and should be brought to such a hearing . ORG stated :

“ ... Finally , it should be underlined that even if the accused requests to be brought to an appeal hearing , the court may establish that the presence of the lawyer at the appeal hearing would be sufficient . If the accused does not have counsel , it is necessary to appoint a legalaid lawyer for him , whose presence at the hearing would be obligatory . It should however be noted that if an accused deprived of liberty requests to be brought to an appeal hearing , granting such a request should be a rule ... Finding that the presence of the lawyer would be sufficient could occur in particular if the appeal hearing concerned only questions of law . ”

On DATE extensive amendments to LAW , adopted in DATE , entered into force . Under LAW CARDINAL as amended it became obligatory for an appellate court to inform the accused of his or her right to request leave to attend the hearing before that court . However , proceedings in which hearings before the trial court started before DATE were to be governed by the provisions of the Code as they stood before that date .

ORG has examined , in numerous judgments , cassation appeals based on the allegation that the absence of an accused at the appeal hearing was a flagrant breach of law that could significantly affect the substance of the ruling in question , within the meaning of Article CARDINAL of the Code of Criminal Procedure .

ORG on many occasions found that a refusal to bring the accused to the appeal hearing was a flagrant breach of law that could significantly affect the substance of the second - instance judgment . In such cases , ORG quashed the appeal judgment and remitted the case ( judgment of DATE , III KKN CARDINAL/CARDINAL , judgment of DATE , III KKN CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . In a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG held that when the defendant remanded in custody was unable to have effective contact with his legalaid lawyer and was not summoned to the hearing before the appellate court because the summons had been sent to his home address , the defendant ’s defence rights had been breached . This breach was of such a serious character that the judgment of the appellate court given in the applicant ’s absence , even when he was represented by the lawyer , had to be quashed .

Under LAW of the LAW , an accused may appoint a lawyer to represent him or her in criminal proceedings . If he or she can not afford lawyers’ fees , a request for legal aid may be made under LAW of the LAW . Legal representation for the purposes of cassation proceedings is mandatory . In its decisions of CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE ORG expressed the view that when a legalaid lawyer refused to represent a convicted person before ORG , the appellate court was not obliged to assign a new lawyer to the case ( II KZ CARDINAL/CARDINAL , II KZ CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

Under LAW of the LAW , an accused may appoint a lawyer to represent him or her in criminal proceedings . If he or she can not afford lawyers’ fees , a request for legal aid may be made under LAW of the Code .

A grant of legal aid expires upon a judgment of an appellate court . A new decision on legal aid has to be made if the convicted person wishes to institute further proceedings in order to lodge a cassation appeal with ORG . The relevant part of Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the LAW provides :

“ A defence counsel appointed under the legalaid scheme in the cassation proceedings ... shall prepare and sign a cassation appeal ... or shall inform the court , in writing , that he or she has not found any grounds for lodging a cassation appeal ... If a cassation appeal ... is lodged , the defence counsel is entitled to represent the defendant in the subsequent proceedings . ”

In its decision of CARDINAL DATE ( V ORG CARDINAL , OSNKW CARDINAL/CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) ORG stated that cassation proceedings had a special character in that the judgment essentially became final after it had been upheld by the appellate court . Bearing in mind the special character of these proceedings , the court was of the view that at this stage the mere fact that the convicted person was granted legal aid was sufficient to ensure an effective exercise of his or her defence rights . It was the lawyer ’s task to analyse the case and establish whether there were grounds on which to lodge a cassation appeal against the judgment of the appellate court . If the lawyer was of the opinion that there were no grounds on which to do so , there was no legal basis in LAW that would either oblige the lawyer to prepare such an appeal against his or her better judgment , or to oblige the court to assign another lawyer to prepare such an appeal in the case .

NORP In its decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG stated that the refusal of a legalaid lawyer to lodge a cassation appeal did not constitute a valid ground for granting retrospective leave to lodge such an appeal by another lawyer out of time ( V ORG CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . It confirmed this ruling in a further decision of DATE . ORG observed that the court could only assign a new legalaid lawyer to the case if it were shown that the first lawyer had been negligent in his or her task of assessing whether a cassation appeal had any prospects of success . If this were not the case , a court was not obliged to assign a new legalaid lawyer to represent the convicted person and its refusal was not subject to appeal ( III KZ CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . ORG reiterated its position in a number of other decisions ( e.g. II KZ CARDINAL/CARDINAL , PERSON CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

The Code of Criminal Procedure provides as follows :

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL

“ Summonses , notices and other court correspondence whose date of service activates the running of procedural time - limits shall be served on the addressee by mail or by personal delivery by an official of the agency effecting the service , or if necessary by the police . ( ... ) ”

Article CARDINAL

“ § CARDINAL . Documents shall be served personally on the addressee . ”

§ CARDINAL . If the addressee is temporarily absent from his or her address , a document shall be served upon an adult member of the household of the addressee ( ... ) ”

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL

“ If service can not be effected as prescribed in LAW , the document dispatched by mail shall be left with the nearest post office ( ... )

§ CARDINAL . The person serving the court document shall notify the addressee that it has been left [ at the post office ] by affixing a relevant notice to the door of the addressee ’s apartment , specifying where and when the document has been left and stating that it should be collected within DATE . ”

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL

“ Addressees deprived of their liberty shall have the document served through the administration of the penal institution . ”

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL

“ If an addressee declines to accept the document , or refuses or is unable to sign the receipt , the person effecting the service shall make an appropriate note on the receipt and service shall then be considered to have been effected . ”


CASE OF EFSTATHIOU AND MICHAÏLIDIS & Co. MOTEL AMERIKA v. GREECE

Preliminary objection rejected (non-exhaustion);Violation of P1-1;Pecuniary damage - financial award;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses (Convention proceedings) - claim dismissed

The first applicant was born in DATE and lives in LOC . The second applicant is a commercial partnership with its registered office in GPE ( northern GPE ) .

On DATE , by means of a joint decision of the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Public Works ( no . CARDINAL ) , the NORP State expropriated property covering a total surface area of CARDINAL sq . m , with a view to improving certain sections of the main road between the towns of GPE and GPE in GPE . The expropriation affected QUANTITY . m of land belonging to the first applicant and CARDINAL sq . m belonging to the second ( entered in the land register as plots nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL respectively ) . The administrative authorities decided that the applicants should not receive any compensation in respect of CARDINAL sq . m of plot no . CARDINAL and QUANTITY . m of plot no . CARDINAL , as they were deemed to have derived benefit from the construction of the road .

On DATE the ORG applied to ORG for an assessment of the provisional unit amount of compensation per square metre . The first applicant was not summoned to appear in court .

On DATE the court determined the provisional amount of compensation for plot no . CARDINAL . It also assessed the amount of special compensation for the unexpropriated parcels of land at MONEY ( GRD ) ( judgment no . ORG ) .

The applicants subsequently applied to ORG for the assessment of the final amount of compensation for the expropriation . In their observations , they submitted that the irrebuttable presumption in law that owners of property fronting a public highway derived benefit from the expansion of the highway was contrary to LAW .

In an interlocutory decision of DATE ORG observed that , in assessing the unit amount of compensation for property expropriated with a view to building a main road , the court merely determined the amount , without considering whether and to what extent the adjoining owners had an obligation to contribute to the expropriation costs pursuant to LAW no . CARDINAL . It ordered an expert assessment of the real value of the expropriated property ( judgment no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

On DATE ORG assessed the final unit amount of compensation for the expropriation of plots FAC . CARDINAL and CARDINAL at GRD CARDINAL per square metre . It also assessed the final amount of special compensation for the unexpropriated parcels of plot no . CARDINAL at FAC CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( judgment no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

On DATE the applicants appealed on points of law . They argued that the fact that ORG had merely determined the amount of compensation for the expropriation , without considering whether and to what extent the adjoining owners had an obligation to contribute to the expropriation costs , was contrary to LAW , LAW No . CARDINAL .

In a judgment of DATE ORG dismissed the appeal , at least in so far as it concerned the present case ( judgment no . CARDINAL ) .

DATE LAW provides :

“ CARDINAL . Property shall be protected by the ORG ; rights deriving therefrom , however , may not be exercised contrary to the public interest .

No one may be deprived of his property unless it is for the public benefit , which must be duly proved , in the circumstances and manner laid down by law and only after full compensation corresponding to the value of the expropriated property at the time of the court hearing on the provisional determination of compensation . In cases in which an application is made for immediate final assessment of compensation , regard shall be had to the value of the expropriated property at the time of the court hearing of the application ... ”

Legislative Decree no . CARDINAL of DATE and CARDINAL DATE is the main legislative provision governing expropriations . It applies the principles set out in the constitutional provisions . By LAW , compensation is calculated by reference to the real value of the expropriated property on the date of publication of the decision giving notice of the expropriation .

Paragraph CARDINAL of that Article provides :

“ Where part of a property is expropriated and the part remaining in the owner 's possession suffers substantial depreciation in value or is rendered unusable , the judgment in which compensation is assessed shall also include a determination of the special compensation for that part . This special compensation shall be paid to the owner together with the compensation for the expropriated part . ”

The relevant provisions of LAW no . CARDINAL of DATE and CARDINAL DATE on the obligations of adjoining owners where major roads are built are worded as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) Where a major road QUANTITY wide is built in an area not covered by a town development plan , adjoining owners who derive a benefit shall be required to pay for an area QUANTITY wide , thus contributing to the cost of expropriating the properties bordering the road . However , the area to which this obligation applies shall not exceed half the surface area of the property concerned .

( CARDINAL ) For the purposes of this section , adjoining owners whose properties front the roads that have been built shall be deemed to have derived benefit .

( CARDINAL ) Where those entitled to compensation on account of an expropriation are themselves liable for payment of part of that expropriation , there shall be a set - off between rights and obligations . ”

For a long time , this presumption that the benefit derived from road improvements amounted to sufficient compensation was regarded as irrebuttable . Following the ORG 's judgments in GPE and Others v. GPE , PERSON and Others v. GPE ( judgments of DATE , Reports of Judgments and Decisions PERSON ) and PERSON v. GPE ( [ ORG ] , no . GPE , § DATE , ORG CARDINAL-II ) , the national courts now accept that the presumption is no longer irrebuttable . Consequently , the owners concerned may apply to the civil courts for a declaration that they have not derived benefit within the meaning of the law cited above and , where appropriate , for additional compensation ( see judgment no . DATE of ORG , which , ruling on a similar application in another case , ordered an expert assessment of whether the applicants , as adjoining owners , had actually derived any benefit from the expropriation of their property ) .


Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 6-3-c;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award

Matti Pellonpää;Nicolas Bratza;Simon Brown

On DATE the applicant appeared before the magistrates ' court , charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm and failing to answer bail . He was legally represented . The applicant elected to be tried in ORG . The stipendiary magistrate therefore adjourned the proceedings to enable a committal hearing to take place at DATE and proceeded to consider whether the applicant should be granted bail . During the course of that consideration , the applicant “ reacted adversely ” in court , causing a disturbance which led the magistrate to conclude that there existed a future risk of a breach of the peace by him . The magistrate therefore made an order binding the applicant over to keep the peace and to be of good behaviour under the Justices of the Peace Act CARDINAL .

The applicant was “ bound over ” in his own recognisance of QUANTITY ( GBP ) together with a surety of ORG . The precise terms of the order were found by ORG ( in the later judicial review proceedings ) to be unclear . However , ORG proceeded on the assumption that the order of the magistrates ' court had fixed a period of DATE imprisonment in default of the applicant 's own recognisance and/or a suitable surety . The magistrate did not give any opportunity for the applicant or his representative to make submissions about the terms of the order before it was imposed .

It appears that later on DATE on which the binding over order was imposed , in the absence of both the applicant and his representative , the surety presented himself to the magistrate , who himself took the recognisance . The magistrate appears to have deemed the proposed surety unsuitable and to have done so on the ground that he did not have any readily available money . The applicant was committed to custody on DATE for DATE . ORG later noted that he had remained in custody until DATE or a little later .

On DATE the applicant was granted leave to apply for judicial review of the decision to impose the binding over order .

On DATE ORG granted the application for judicial review . The nature of the applicant 's case was stated by ORG to be as follows :

“ It is not suggested by Mr. PERSON , for the applicant , that the magistrate had no power under [ the Justices of LAW ] or common law to impose a binding over order without consent , to require a surety or to impose a sentence of imprisonment in lieu . What is suggested is that there was a breach of natural justice or procedural irregularity in the way in which the magistrate dealt with the matter , without investigating further , or giving specific opportunity to the applicant or his legal representative to make representations about the terms of any binding over order . ”

The Divisional Court ( Lord Justice PERSON and Mr Justice PERSON ) agreed that the binding over order had been procedurally irregular and granted a declaration to that effect . During the course of their judgments , the judges of ORG held that :

( a ) NORP previous domestic case - law had established that there were circumstances where failing to hear a defendant or his representative prior to imposing a binding over order containing a requirement of a recognisance could amount to a breach of the rules of natural justice . Mr Justice PERSON quoted , inter alia , the headnote of the case of NORP v. ORG ex parte ORG [ DATE ] CARDINAL QB CARDINAL that :

“ ... although there was no general obligation upon a court to afford a defendant an opportunity to be heard prior to binding him over , it was a breach of the rules of natural justice , unless the recognisance was of a trivial sum , for a court to bind a person over without inquiring into his means and giving him an opportunity to make representations as to the size of the recognisance . ”

( b ) the position where there was a requirement for a surety was even clearer . A surety required the separate approval of the court as to his suitability . This was outside the control of the person to be bound over and yet could have drastic consequences for him where , as in the present case , it resulted in his serving a period of imprisonment imposed as an alternative ;

( c ) in such circumstances , magistrates needed to take particular care lest , in effect , they imposed a binding order which amounted to an automatic sentence of imprisonment without appreciating what they were doing ;

( d ) a defendant ought not to be put at peril of a prison sentence in default of finding a surety unless he had first been specifically invited to address the magistrates ' court upon that point ;

( e ) the magistrate did not expressly invite or give opportunity for any submissions , or indeed any discussion between the applicant and his representative , about the proposed terms of the binding over order before he imposed it . While the magistrate stated during the course of the judicial review proceedings that he would have been prepared to listen to anything that the applicant 's representative would have wished to say , ORG accepted that the applicant 's representative was effectively presented with a “ fait accompli ” of a nature which she had not come across before . In responding to an argument put forward on behalf of the magistrate that an advocate was under a duty to bring any procedural irregularity to the attention of the court during the hearing and not reserve such matter to be raised on appeal , ORG said :

“ That is of course right , but it assumes that the advocate appreciates that what happens does amount to a procedural irregularity and understands at the time the nature of the point . Here [ the applicant 's representative ] does not appear to have had the confidence of whatever belief she had that something was not quite right , she did not raise the matter , and I do not think that the applicant should suffer from any failure , if there was any on her part , to react as another advocate , perhaps more familiar with this area of the law and practice , might have done . ”

( f ) had the applicant or his representative been able to make submissions about the proposed order the magistrate might have been persuaded to impose different terms . Mr ORG stated :

“ What PERSON [ counsel for the respondent ] has submitted is that it can not be shown that it would have made any difference if the magistrate had given to the applicant [ and his counsel ] an opportunity to make representations . However , it seems to me certainly not beyond the bounds of possibility , that if a proper opportunity had been given to [ the applicant 's counsel ] to consider and address the matter after brief discussion between herself , the applicant and the friend [ the proposed surety ] the stringency of the proposed order - particularly in the alternative ... it had of DATE imprisonment - would have been one of the points on which she would have focused ; the risk and consequences of a suitable surety being found , and in particular , of the friend at court ... not being regarded as suitable might well also have been highlighted .

PERSON did not seek to controvert that . The magistrate might , in such circumstances , have been persuaded to a different result . This is all , of course , speculative , but speculation though it may be , the reason why it is speculation is that the magistrate failed , in my judgment , to give the applicant or , on his behalf , [ the applicant 's representative ] proper time or a proper opportunity to address the terms of the proposed bind over order , particularly so far as they involved a requirement that the applicant produce a surety in the sum of £ CARDINAL . ”

Magistrates have powers to bind over at common law and under the Justices of LAW . These powers allow magistrates , at any stage in proceedings before them , to bind over any participant in the proceedings if they consider that the conduct of the person concerned is such that there might be a breach of the peace or that his or her behaviour has been contra bonos mores .

The Justices of LAW provides , in so far as relevant , as follows :

“ CARDINAL . No action shall lie against any justice of the peace ... in respect of any act or omission of his -

( a ) in the execution of his duty -

( i ) as such a justice ;

( b ) with respect to any matter within his jurisdiction .

An action shall lie against any justice of the peace ... in respect of any act or omission of his -

( a ) in the purported execution of his duty -

( i ) as such a justice ;

( b ) with respect to a matter which is not within his jurisdiction ,

if , but only if , it is proved that he acted in bad faith . ”


The applicant is a NORP national , born in DATE and living in GPE . He is represented before the Court by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE

A.

In DATE the applicant purchased PERSON , a house and garden in GPE , GPE , for GBP CARDINAL . At that time the property was in open countryside and according to the structure plan prepared pursuant to ORG DATE ( “ the DATE LAW ) , no significant development was planned for the area . The value of properties in the GPE increased substantially , and by DATE PERSON was worth MONEY . On DATE , and again on DATE , the applicant was granted mortgage advances secured against his property .

In DATE , pursuant to the DATE Act , ORG proposed amendments to the structure plan , to permit a large development ( ORG , henceforth “ the Plan ” ) consisting of CARDINAL , CARDINAL homes , a business park and an international science park . A consortium , ORG , consisting of a number of national and international companies , was formed to develop the Plan . In DATE the Secretary of ORG modified and approved the structure plan . In DATE representatives of ORG and the Consortium met with small land - owners and assured them that their properties would be purchased at full value . The applicant ’s property is situated within the area of the proposed science park and in DATE planning permission was granted to convert it into a hotel .

In DATE the applicant ’s marriage failed . He appointed a firm of chartered surveyors to act on his behalf in negotiations for the sale of his property . On DATE they reported an offer of GBP CARDINAL , which they recommended should be refused since it was some GBP CARDINAL short of the market value at that time .

By DATE the Consortium had acquired PERCENT of the land covered by ORG , which was disclosed on all searches made by potential purchasers , thus putting small home - owners such as the applicant in a weak bargaining position . In DATE the applicant became unemployed and had difficulties in making his mortgage repayments . His attempts to sell PERSON continued to be unsuccessful and by DATE , the chartered surveyors advised that the property was virtually unsaleable . In DATE , the applicant owed the bank in excess of GBP CARDINAL . The property was repossessed and has remained vacant ever since . The bank report that in DATE they received an offer of GBP CARDINAL . The applicant has been advised that , but for the Plan , PERSON ’s market value would be around GBP CARDINAL .

In DATE Professor PERSON advised the applicant that he has no right under ORG DATE , Part VI , to require the local authority to purchase his property since the developers of the proposed science park are private rather than public authorities , and since PERSON has been capable of use as a family home ( “ reasonably beneficial use ” ) throughout the relevant period ( see below ) .

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

Where a proposed development is to be undertaken by a public authority , the “ planning blight ” that ensues may in some circumstances give rise to compensation . Thus ORG DATE ( “ the DATE LAW ) , Part VI , LAW , gives an owner a right to require the planning authority to buy his property where , as a result of a planning decision , the land has become “ incapable of reasonably beneficial use ” ( sections CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) .

LAW further provides in Part VI , LAW , that owners have a right to require the planning authority to purchase land affected by “ planning blight ” , namely land “ which may be required for the purposes of the functions of a government department , local authority or statutory undertakers , or of ORG ” or land in an “ action area ” selected by the local authority for comprehensive treatment ( Schedule CARDINAL , paragraph CARDINAL ) and ( b ) ) .

ORG in his report on the problems of blight caused by LOC ( ORG CARDINAL , DATE ) pointed out that the statutory definition of planning blight is much narrower than the actual problem of blight caused by uncertainty over an area ’s future .


The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant lodged with ORG ( Sąd Rejonowy ) a counterclaim for payment against the “ LAW operative ( PERSON “ PERSON ” ) . The proceedings for payment instituted by the housing co - operative had been pending since DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a motion for joinder of the cases .

On DATE the court held a hearing ; however it did not give any decision on the applicant 's motion .

After DATE and DATE , on DATE , the court gave a decision that the case should be examined separately in another set of proceedings and returned the statement of claim to the applicant because of procedural shortcomings . The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) quashed the first - instance decision and remitted the case .

On an unspecified date ORG again returned the statement of claim to the applicant because of procedural shortcomings . The applicant lodged another interlocutory appeal .

On DATE ORG quashed the contested decision and remitted the case .

Hearings scheduled for DATE and DATE were adjourned as another case had been given priority .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG gave a default judgment .

On DATE the court supplemented the judgment by ordering its immediate enforceability .

On DATE the defendant filed an objection ( sprzeciw ) against the default judgment .

On DATE ORG quashed the order of immediate enforceability .

On DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE ORG held hearings . Hearings scheduled for DATE and DATE were adjourned due to the absence of CARDINAL of the witnesses . On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the court held hearings .

The case is still pending before the first - instance court .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG under LAW on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time ( LOC o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki ) ( “ the CARDINAL Act ” ) .

The applicant sought a ruling that the length of the proceedings before ORG had been excessive and an award of just satisfaction in the amount of MONEY ( ORG ) ( approx . MONEY ( ORG ) ) .

On DATE ORG dismissed the complaint . The court did not analyse the conduct of the trial court . It limited its consideration to the applicant 's conduct , namely to the fact that she had made use of her procedural rights , which , in the court 's view , had led to delays in the proceedings .

The relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the excessive length of judicial proceedings , in particular the applicable provisions of LAW , are stated in the ORG 's decisions in the cases of ORG v. GPE no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( dec . ) , § § DATE , ECHR CARDINAL-V and NORP v. GPE no . CARDINAL ( dec . ) , ORG CARDINAL-VIII and the judgment in the case of GPE v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , ORG CARDINAL


André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Ann Power-Forde;Dean Spielmann;Elisabet Fura;Ganna Yudkivska

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE . He was represented before ORG by ORG , a law firm practising in PERSON . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON , ORG Attorney .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant has been serving his sentence in the closed section of Dob Prison since DATE .

As regards the facilities available to the applicant in the cells and common areas , as well as the health care regime in the prison , the conditions imposed on the applicant regarding activities outside the cells and contact with the outside world , see the ORG ’s decision in the case of PERSON and PERSON v. GPE ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL etc . , DATE .

The applicant has been held in different cells . Until DATE he was held in FAC in cells measuring QUANTITY , in which the number of inmates varied between CARDINAL sixteen ( QUANTITY of personal space available to each inmate ) . During this time he was on CARDINAL occasions placed in Block DATE for DATE altogether , mostly for security reasons . There , he was held in cells accommodating CARDINAL inmates at a time , while most of the time each inmate had QUANTITY of personal space , and never CARDINAL . The applicant was held in the same conditions in FAC DATE and DATE . Afterwards he was placed in ORG , where he was held in cells measuring QUANTITY and accommodating CARDINAL inmates ( QUANTITY of personal space available to each inmate ) .

The applicant has completed his primary education in prison , and is continuing with secondary education , including food - preparation and catering classes . During DATE of his imprisonment he worked in ORG ( agricultural activities and metalwork ) , later he attended work therapy sessions .

The applicant suffers from hepatitis C. Further to the results of the blood test which confirmed that he had this disease , received on DATE , he was referred to a specialist in order to undergo an examination . He underwent an abdominal ultrasound in DATE . On DATE , following the applicant ’s notifying the prison doctor about his hepatitis C infection , he was again referred to the specialist and underwent a further abdominal ultrasound . The doctor specialised in this field found that the applicant was chronically ill with hepatitis C , and should undergo appropriate medical treatment . A liver biopsy was scheduled for DATE , but was postponed . DATE , the applicant was hospitalised in ORG in order to undergo a liver biopsy .

According to a report dated DATE drawn up by a prison doctor , the applicant had been treated in the prison clinic on CARDINAL occasions for various medical problems . He had not raised the issue of hepatitis C when visiting the prison doctor until DATE . The additional report by the aforementioned doctor dated DATE read , as far as relevant , as follows :

“ [ The applicant ] had not shown interest in continuing treatment and had not mentioned anything connected to the treatment of hepatitis C until DATE . The disease had not manifested itself during that period . In the opinion of the representative for the patient ’s rights , PERSON , ... the patient ’s rights under LAW had not been breached [ in the applicant ’s case ] . LAW of the aforementioned LAW states that in order to obtain health care of good quality , the patient should actively participate in his or her treatment . PERSON certainly had not actively participated in his treatment . ”

The applicant had also been visiting the prison psychiatrist and had for a while been undergoing methadone - maintenance treatment .

According to the information submitted by the Government , in DATE CARDINAL prisoners in GPE prison were tested for hepatitis B and C , and CARDINAL were tested for HIV . CARDINAL were diagnosed with hepatitis B , and CARDINAL with hepatitis C. In DATE CARDINAL prisoners in GPE prison were tested for hepatitis B and C , while CARDINAL were tested for HIV . CARDINAL was diagnosed with hepatitis B , and CARDINAL with hepatitis C. No one was diagnosed with HIV .

For the relevant domestic law and practice , see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL - CARDINAL of the ORG ’s judgment in the case of ORG and Others v. GPE ( nos . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE ) , and paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL of ORG and PERSON GPE ( nos . CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL , DATE ) , as well as PERSON and Others , cited above .

In addition , LAW ( Official Gazette no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , entry into force on DATE ) provides for procedures for dealing with complaints concerning , inter alia , inadequate medical treatment or care . In accordance with the provisions of that LAW , a patient can lodge a complaint directly with a health - care provider . If unsatisfied , he or she can complain to ORG . Ultimately , a patient whose complaint has been unsuccessful can challenge the decisions made in his or her case before ORG . The LAW also regulates the work of the Representative for Patients’ Rights , whose main role is to assist , provide advice to and represent patients in the exercise of their rights provided therein .


Violation of Art. 10 as regards the first period;No violation of Art. 10 as regards the second period;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Costs and expenses partial award - domestic proceedings;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant is a limited liability company with its seat in GPE . On DATE it applied to ORG , ‘ ORG ) for GPE , GPE and ORG for a licence to set up and operate a television transmitter in the GPE area .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request . It referred to LAW DATE guaranteeing the independence of broadcasting ( GPE über die GPE der ORG , ' LAW ) , which provides that broadcasting shall be authorised by federal legislation and noted that such legislation had only been enacted in respect of ORG ( Österreichischer Rundfunk , ‘ the ORF’ ) and within the field of regional radio broadcasting . However , no legislation had been adopted in respect of regional television . It followed that the authorisation could not be granted .

On DATE ORG Bundesministerium für öffentliche ORG ) dismissed the applicant 's appeal .

On DATE the applicant filed a complaint with ORG ) . Referring to the judgment by ORG in the case of PERSON and Others v. GPE ( of DATE , Series A no . CARDINAL ) , the applicant argued that the ORG 's decision was in breach of its right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by LAW . In particular , it submitted that LAW , if interpreted in a way compatible with LAW , allowed everyone to broadcast freely unless restrictions were laid down by law . As no law regulating private television broadcasting had been enacted , the refusal of an authorisation to set up and operate a television transmitter lacked a legal basis . Alternatively , if one followed the approach of ORG judgment of DATE , namely that any broadcasting had to be explicitly authorised by federal legislation , the current legal situation was unconstitutional as the legislator had failed to enact legislation except for the ORG and private regional radio broadcasting .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's complaint . Confirming its decision of DATE , it repeated that , according to LAW , broadcasting had to be authorised by federal legislation . So far federal legislation had been enacted for radio and television broadcasting by the ORG and for terrestrial broadcasting of regional radio programs . ORG ( PERSON ) contained the legal basis for passive and , following ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE , also active cable broadcasting of radio and television programs as of CARDINAL DATE . However , no legislation had been enacted for terrestrial broadcasting of television programs , apart from the legislation referring to the ORG . As a result of this legal situation other broadcasters than the ORG were not allowed to organise terrestrial television broadcasting .

The Constitutional Court observed that , in the present case , this licensing system was directly prescribed by constitutional law and therefore not subject to review by ORG . Moreover , the unlawfulness of terrestrial broadcasting of television programs by private broadcasters originated from the legislator 's failure to enact the corresponding implementing legislation . Since this failure was comprehensive and did not only refer to specific areas or questions , ORG had no power to review the constitutionality of the legislator 's failure to enact the implementing legislation . Only ORG was competent to find in a legally binding way whether or not the impossibility of terrestrial television broadcasting by stations other than the ORG was in breach of the Convention .

According to ORG ) of CARDINAL DATE the " right to set up and operate telecommunications installations is vested exclusively in the federal authorities ( GPE ) " ( section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ) . The latter may however confer on natural or legal persons the power to exercise that right in respect of specific installations ( section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ) . No licence is required in certain circumstances , including the setting up of an installation within the confines of a private property ( section CARDINAL ) .

The Telecommunications Law of DATE was annulled by LAW ( section CARDINAL in conjunction with section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ) with effect of DATE . According to section DATE ( CARDINAL ) of the DATE LAW , the DATE Telecommunications Law continued to apply to requests for setting up and operating telecommunications installations which were made before its entry into force .

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of the DATE LAW provides that radio signals must be retransmitted in full to users immediately after being picked up .

Under section CARDINALa of the Ordinance , in the amended version in force since DATE ( Official Gazette - Bundesgesetzblatt - no . CARDINAL ) the bearers of a licence to operate a shared aerial may , without having to seek further permission , send text via the cable network , using their own equipment ( paragraph CARDINAL ) . By means of this type of teletext it is possible , inter alia , to impart information to the members of a community or the population of a region in the form of alphanumeric symbols , other graphical signs or pages of teletext . This is an additional service provided to subscribers .

These provisions were set aside by ORG judgment of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

According to LAW

Broadcasting shall be governed by more detailed rules to be set out in a federal law . Such a law must inter alia contain provisions guaranteeing the objectivity and impartiality of reporting , the diversity of opinions , balanced programming and the independence of persons and bodies responsible for carrying out the duties defined in paragraph CARDINAL .

Broadcasting within the meaning of paragraph CARDINAL shall be a public service . “

The Law of DATE on ORG ( Bundesgesetz über die LOC die ORG PERSON ) established ORG with the status of an autonomous public - law corporation .

It is under a duty to provide comprehensive news coverage of major political , economic , cultural and sporting events ; to this end , it has to broadcast , in compliance with the requirements of objectivity and diversity of views , in particular current affairs , news reports , commentaries and critical opinions ( section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ( CARDINAL ) ) , and to do so via CARDINAL television channels and CARDINAL radio stations , CARDINAL of which must be a regional station ( section CARDINAL ) . Broadcasting time must be allocated to the political parties represented in the national parliament ( section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ) .

A supervisory board ( ORG ) rules on all disputes concerning the application of the above - mentioned law which fall outside the jurisdiction of an administrative authority or court ( sections CARDINAL and DATE ) . It is composed of CARDINAL independent members , including CARDINAL judges , appointed for terms of DATE by the President of the Republic on the proposal of ORG .

In a judgment of DATE ORG held that the freedom to set up and operate radio and television broadcasting stations was subject to the powers accorded to the legislature under paragraph CARDINAL in fine and paragraph CARDINAL of LAW . LAW had instituted a system which made all activity of this type subject to the grant of a licence by the federal legislature . This system was intended to ensure objectivity and diversity of opinions , and would be ineffective if it were possible for everybody to obtain the requisite authorisation . As matters stood , the right to broadcast was restricted to the ORG , as no implementing legislation had been enacted in addition to the law governing that organisation .

On DATE ORG decided that LAW of DATE did not cover “ passive ” broadcasting via cable , in other words the broadcasting in their entirety by cable of programmes picked up by an aerial . Consequently , the mere fact that such programmes originated from a foreign station and were directed principally or exclusively at an NORP audience could not constitute grounds for refusing the licence necessary for this type of operation .

The Regional Broadcasting Law of DATE ( ORG - gesetz ) , which came into force on DATE , governs the licensing of local and regional terrestrial radio stations .

It provides for the allocation of CARDINAL regional radio licence for each of the ORG and of CARDINAL such licences for GPE and for the allocation of local radio licences as required by local demand ( section CARDINAL ) . Any programme has to comply with the principles of objectivity and diversity of opinions ( section CARDINAL ) .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG set aside with effect from DATE , a passage in the second sentence of LAW ( CARDINAL ) of ORG and its section CARDINALa , i.e. the rules limiting cable distribution to the retransmission of programmes produced by others ( " passive cable broadcasting " ) and the transmission of text , on the ground that it was contrary to LAW . In that connection ORG referred explicitly to the judgment given by ORG DATE in the case of PERSON and Others v. GPE ( loc . cit . ) . Since DATE the transmission via cable of original programmes ( " active cable broadcasting " ) has accordingly been legal , just as passive cable broadcasting already was .

The DATE Cable and Satellite Broadcasting Act ( Kabel- und ORG ) , which entered into force on DATE , provides that satellite broadcasting requires a licence by ORG ( section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ) . Cable broadcasting has to be notified to the authority . The notification has to show that the requirements of sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL are complied with ( section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) ) . Cable and satellite broadcasters have to be NORP nationals or legal persons with seat in GPE ( section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ) . Certain legal persons such as public law institutions , the political parties and the ORG are excluded from cable and satellite broadcasting ( section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ) . The owners of domestic or foreign DATE newspapers or DATE periodicals are also excluded from cable and satellite broadcasting ( section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ) . When filing a request for a satellite broadcasting licence , the applicant has to show that the requirements of sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL are complied with ( section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ) . Further , except where the programme will specialise in a particular area , the applicant has to show that it will comply with the following requirements . It has to respect the principles of objectivity and diversity of opinions and shall reflect public , cultural and economic life of the broadcasting area in an adequate way . Further , it shall give relevant groups of society as well as relevant organisations a possibility to express their opinions ( section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) and section CARDINAL ) .


Angelika Nußberger;Dean Spielmann;Elisabet Fura;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mykhaylo Buromenskiy

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . On DATE the applicant authorised PERSON , his mother , to represent him before ORG . The applicant ’s mother in her turn was represented by PERSON PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE , and by PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the applicant , may be summarised as follows .

According to the applicant ’s mother , on DATE she lodged a complaint with the Suvorivsky ORG ( ORG районний відділ ORG міського управління GPE внутрішніх справ PERSON області ) that a certain teenager had beaten up the applicant , a minor at that time . No copy of this complaint is available .

On DATE the applicant tried to commit suicide by jumping from the roof of a multi - storey building . He survived , but suffered numerous serious injuries , and is now physically disabled .

According to the applicant , he was being bullied by a certain DATE , who extorted money from him and beat him up .

According to the Government , the fact that the applicant had fallen from the roof was noted in a register of reported offences of the Suvorivsky ORG ( журнал реєстрації повідомлень про злочини ) and all the necessary investigations were carried out . It was decided not to institute criminal proceedings .

On DATE the ORG , following “ an additional verification ” , again decided not to institute criminal proceedings .

On DATE this decision was quashed by a prosecutor , allegedly following a complaint by the applicant ’s mother on DATE , and the case was remitted for additional investigation . On DATE the applicant ’s mother was informed about it by letter . No copies of the decisions taken were attached to that letter .

By letter of DATE the applicant ’s mother was informed that on DATE and DATE the Suvorivsky ORG had quashed the refusals to institute criminal proceedings , taken on an unknown date and on DATE , and remitted the case for further investigation . No copies of the decisions taken were attached .

On DATE the Suvorivsky ORG again refused to institute criminal proceedings for lack of evidence of a crime . On DATE the Suvorivsky ORG informed the applicant ’s mother that “ following her complaint registered on DATE , it had been decided not to institute criminal proceedings ” without indicating any dates or attaching any decisions .

On DATE the applicant ’s mother , after an inquiry from this ORG , requested ORG to provide her with copies of the refusals to institute criminal proceedings . In reply , she was informed that on DATE the case file materials had been destroyed , as the period they were kept in storage had expired . No copies of the above decisions are consequently available .

After the case had been communicated to the respondent Government , on DATE a police officer questioned the applicant . The Government state that this questioning took place on the initiative of officials of ORG of GPE , after ORG at the ORG had , in order to prepare observations on the present case , requested the ORG to provide all materials related to the case .

The Government submitted a photocopy of the applicant ’s explanations , written by the police officer and signed by the applicant . It is mentioned there that the applicant owed Y. a certain amount of money . The applicant spent some time at a computer club , met Y. on his way back , then climbed up to the roof of a certain building , and after some time jumped down . Nobody pushed the applicant or incited him to jump from the roof .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE the applicant submitted that he had indeed been visited by CARDINAL policemen , who had questioned him and his mother separately . However , the applicant states that because of his poor vision and the illegible handwriting he did not read the text written by the police officer , but signed it believing that the police officer had noted the applicant ’s words correctly .

According to the applicant , at the material time he was being constantly bullied by Y. and ORG They beat and humiliated him , so he decided to commit suicide .

“ ... A resolution by an investigator or body of inquiry refusing to initiate criminal proceedings can be appealed against to the relevant prosecutor and , if that ruling was issued by the prosecutor , to a higher prosecutor . An appeal shall be lodged by the person whose interests have been infringed or by his or her representative within DATE of the date of receipt of the ruling .

A resolution by an investigator or body of inquiry refusing to initiate criminal proceedings can be appealed against by the person whose interests have been infringed or by his or her representative to court under procedure prescribed by LAW ... ”

“ Within DATE of notification , a decision of a body of inquiry , investigator or prosecutor not to institute criminal proceedings can be appealed against by an interested party or their representative to the district ( town ) court within whose area of jurisdiction the authority which took the decision falls ... ”

“ An appeal against a decision of a body of inquiry , investigator or prosecutor not to institute criminal proceedings shall be examined [ by a court ] sitting with a single judge within DATE of being lodged .

The judge shall request the materials on the basis of which the decision not to institute criminal proceedings was made , examine them , and inform the prosecutor and the appellant of the date on which the hearing of the appeal has been listed .

Having examined the case , the judge ... may take CARDINAL of the following decisions :

CARDINAL ) NORP to set aside the decision not to institute criminal proceedings and to remit the case for further preliminary inquiries ...

CARDINAL ) NORP to dismiss the complaint ... ”