The applicant is a NORP citizen , born in DATE . He resides in GPE , GPE . Before the ORG the applicant is represented by PERSON PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

A.

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant is the owner of a fishing vessel . In DATE he was fishing in LOC during which he exceeded the quota limits concerning maximum catch laid down in the relevant legislation . By indictment of CARDINAL DATE the applicant was therefore charged with having exceeded the permitted fishing quotas contrary to Act No . CARDINAL of DATE concerning the regulation of certain fisheries , section CARDINAL in conjunction with section CARDINAL , pursuant to which the prosecutor requested that the applicant pay a fine . Furthermore , the prosecutor demanded confiscation of the profits stemming from the illegal catch , estimated at CARDINAL DKK .

During the proceedings before ORG ( byretten ) of PERSON the applicant did not challenge the factual circumstances but maintained in particular that the amount to be confiscated should be reduced .

By judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG found the applicant guilty of the charges brought against him . The judgment reads in its relevant parts as follows :

( Translation )

kilogramme cod and as this would lead to a value which corresponds best with the real value of the illegal catch . Furthermore , the court finds it appropriate to fix the amount to be confiscated , in accordance with normal practice , without deductions of the amount paid to the crew . Finally , [ the applicant ’s ] lack of knowledge or misunderstanding of the quota , which appears clearly from section CARDINAL § CARDINAL , cf . § CARDINAL , can not be taken into consideration . ...

Pursuant to LAW of LAW an amount of CARDINAL DKK shall be confiscated from [ the applicant ] . ”

The applicant was fined CARDINAL ORG .

The applicant appealed against the judgment to ORG ) maintaining that the fine and , in particular , the amount confiscated were disproportionate to the offence committed .

By judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld ORG judgment . As regards the calculation of the amount confiscated ORG referred to previous caselaw of ORG ( Højesteret ) .

On DATE ORG granted the applicant leave to appeal to ORG before which the applicant maintained that the amount confiscated ought to be reduced . He did not , however , challenge the fine imposed .

By judgment of DATE ORG upheld ORG judgment . The judgment reads in its relevant parts as follows :

( Translation )

“ CARDINAL judges express the following opinion :

The amounts confiscated from [ the applicant ] pursuant to LAW of LAW are fixed as the sales value of the illegal catch , solely with deduction of costs connected with landing and sale ( landing costs ) . This conforms with previous case - law , cf . inter alia ORG judgment of DATE ... .

In evaluating whether there are grounds for changing this practice , account should be taken of the fact that in cases of illegal fishery , substantial consideration is to be given to the preventive function of the confiscation . In this connection , it is worthy of note that it is presupposed in the fisheries legislation that confiscation of the value of the illegal catch is a normal reaction ... .

The accused 's assistants on the fishing trip in question were remunerated with a share of the net value of the catch and have , objectively speaking , contributed to the offences . It depends on the circumstances of the legal relation between the parties whether , in case of confiscation , [ the applicant is ] entitled to demand repayment of the wages . We find that no deduction should be allowed for expenses pertaining to wages when fixing the confiscation amounts . Apart from the costs relating to fuel and ice , which can to a certain extent be attributed to the illegal catch , the remaining costs referred to by [ the applicant ] may be characterised as general costs which should not be taken into consideration either when fixing the amounts to be confiscated .

Thus , we do not find sufficient reasons to change previous case - law according to which the amounts to be confiscated in cases like the present are fixed - unless special circumstances prevail - as the sales value of the illegal catch with the deduction solely of landing costs . Therefore we vote for upholding ORG judgment . ”

CARDINAL judges voted in favour of reducing the amount confiscated by allowing the deduction of certain additional costs .

PERSON Relevant domestic law

The relevant parts of LAW of LAW ( straffeloven ) read as follows :

( Translation )

“ § DATE ( CARDINAL ) The proceeds gained from any criminal act , or a sum equivalent thereto , may , either wholly or in part , be confiscated . Where there is no means of establishing the size of such an amount , a sum thought to be equivalent to the proceeds gained may be confiscated .

( CARDINAL ) The following objects may also be confiscated where this must be regarded as necessary in order to prevent further offences , or where additional special circumstances make further offences likely :

CARDINAL ) objects which have been used , or were intended to be used , in a criminal act ;

CARDINAL ) objects produced by a criminal act ; and

CARDINAL ) objects with respect to which a criminal act has otherwise been committed .

( CARDINAL ) In place of confiscation of the objects referred to in subsection ( CARDINAL ) above , a sum may instead be confiscated which is equivalent to their value or a part thereof .

( CARDINAL ) In place of confiscation under subsection ( CARDINAL ) above , arrangements concerning the objects may instead be decided upon for the purposes of preventing further offences .

( CARDINAL ) When an association is dissolved by judgment , its capital , documents , protocols etc . may be confiscated . ”


Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Elisabet Fura;Josep Casadevall

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the Court by Mr J. Södergren , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr B. GPE , of ORG .

NORP The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP Since DATE the applicant has been a member of ORG ( PERSON arbetslöshetskassa ) .

NORP In DATE , for some unknown reason , the applicant either did not qualify for unemployment benefit or ceased to qualify for it . Accordingly , in order to discuss different employment programmes , the applicant had a meeting with his unemployment officer at ORG ( ORG ) . The unemployment officer informed the applicant that by virtue of a “ re - qualification ” option set out in sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ( NORP om arbetslöshetsförsäkring , CARDINAL ; hereinafter “ the DATE LAW ) , the applicant could re - qualify for DATE of unemployment benefit if he worked as a trainee for the municipality for TIME per month for “ QUANTITY calendar DATE ” .

Accordingly , the applicant signed a contract and on DATE began work as a trainee for the municipality at a plant for recycling electronic devices . The contract stipulated that the training programme was to end on DATE . During this period it appears that the applicant was paid by ORG .

On DATE ORG passed a law ( no . PERSON ) which amended section CARDINAL of LAW , thereby abolishing the re - qualification option through trainee work . The law entered into force on DATE , that is , DATE before the applicant ’s training programme was scheduled to end , and had the effect that in future only conventional employment could re - qualify for a further unemployment benefit period .

The applicant maintained that during DATE , when he became aware of the amendment to LAW , he tried several times in vain to contact his officer at ORG and ORG , because if the amendment were applied strictly and formally , he would be disqualified from a further period of unemployment benefit . Thus he wanted the finishing date of his trainee work contract , namely DATE , to be brought forward , since in his view , in accordance with the provisions of the original section CARDINAL of LAW , he would have fulfilled the requirement of working TIME per month for “ DATE ” by DATE .

After the applicant had concluded the training programme , he requested a further period of unemployment benefit . His request was refused by ORG on DATE , and again on DATE , because he did not fulfil the criteria set out in section CARDINAL of LAW .

The applicant appealed to ORG ( länsrätten ) in GPE . On DATE his request for an oral hearing in order to hear evidence from the officials at ORG and ORG was refused .

By a judgment of DATE ORG found against the applicant . It reiterated that , under the transitional provisions of the amendment to LAW , only a training programme completed by DATE could qualify for a further unemployment benefit period . The applicant had completed his trainee work on DATE , thus his situation was not covered by the transitional provisions .

On DATE , following a further appeal , ORG ( kammarrätten ) in GPE granted the applicant leave to appeal against the first - instance judgment . The appellate court also requested an opinion from ORG ( ORG för arbetslöshetsförsäkring )

NORP The applicant requested an oral hearing before ORG . He stated that he wanted to hear the head of ORG as regards the date on which the ORG had become aware of the amendment to LAW and its implications . He also wanted to ask him certain questions of a complex nature , for instance whether it would be considered a breach of official duty if an official of the ORG had advance knowledge of legislative amendments but refused to inform a member of the ORG thereof . By a decision of DATE , the court found an oral hearing unnecessary and refused the applicant ’s request .

On DATE the applicant made further submissions in writing , including a request for compensation for loss of income caused by the unpredictable decision of ORG to amend the legislation .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld the judgment of ORG , stating as follows :

“ Firstly , [ the applicant ’s ] request for compensation for loss of income must be considered as a claim for damages . As it is not for ORG to examine such a claim , the applicant ’s request in this respect is refused .

The question in the case is how section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL of LAW – [ the requirement ] that the individual must have participated in and , unless hindered by special reasons , completed vocational training mentioned therein – should be understood . Due to the ambiguity of the notion carried out previously used , the notion completed was chosen to clarify that , in addition to having participated in a training programme , it was a condition that such programme be finished . The purpose of the provision was to prevent that an insured person , when he had participated for a sufficiently long period of time , would be able to cut short the programme in order to obtain unemployment benefit instead ( Government Bill CARDINAL/CARDINAL:CARDINAL , annex CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . In these circumstances , and since the transitional provision of the amendment which entered into force on DATE unambiguously states that the conditions in section CARDINAL of LAW must have been fulfilled at the date of the entry into force , ORG finds that the appeal must be rejected . ”

A request by the applicant for leave to appeal to ORG ( Regeringsrätten ) was refused on DATE .

Before the amendments introduced by law no . PERSON , section CARDINAL of LAW stipulated that , in order to become eligible for unemployment benefit , the insured had to “ have had gainful employment for DATE and carried out work for TIME per calendar DATE ” over a period of DATE immediately prior to the date of unemployment . Section CARDINAL of the Act , entitled “ re - qualification requirement ” , stipulated that time during which the insured had participated in and completed – unless hindered by special reasons – vocational training was equal to “ gainful employment ” ( as set out in section CARDINAL of the Act ) .

The amendments introduced by law no . PERSON abolished the re - qualification option set out in section DATE , which had the effect that trainee work could no longer be considered equal to “ gainful employment ” unless completed by DATE .

Under the transitional provisions , employment programmes which previously re - qualified for a further unemployment benefit period would continue to qualify , if they had been completed by the time the amending law entered into force , and if a request for unemployment benefit had been submitted DATE .


Giovanni Bonello;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki

On DATE the applicant lodged with ORG an action against his former employer , concerning his social insurance entitlements .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's action .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant appealed . On DATE ORG dismissed his appeal .

On DATE the applicant was served with the judgment with its written grounds . The court informed him at the same time that he had DATE as of the date of the service of the judgment ( until DATE ) to lodge a cassation appeal .

In his letter of CARDINAL DATE , received by the court on DATE , the applicant requested the court to appoint a legalaid lawyer for the purposes of lodging a cassation appeal .

On DATE the applicant was granted legal aid . In a letter of the same date the court requested ORG to assign a legal - aid lawyer to the case . This letter was served on the addressee on DATE . A legal - aid lawyer was assigned to the case on DATE .

NORP In his fax of DATE to ORG the applicant requested the court to extend the statutory time limit for lodging the cassation appeal in his case . He explained that he had been trying to find a lawyer ; to no avail . Finally , he stated that he was “ delighted with the legal - aid lawyer assigned to his case , who was superb ” .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE to ORG , the legal - aid lawyer stated that she had found no points of law on which a cassation appeal in the applicant 's case could be based and submitted a legal opinion as to why a cassation appeal did not , in her view , offer any prospects of success . A copy of that letter was sent to the applicant on DATE .

NORP In his letter of DATE , served on ORG on DATE , the applicant requested that the case be reexamined by that court . The applicant also applied to have the power of attorney of the defendant enterprise invalidated for the purpose of safeguarding the equality of arms in the proceedings as he intended to present his case to the court without legal representation .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE the President of ORG of the ORG informed the applicant that there were no grounds on which to envisage a re - examination of the case in which a final and valid judicial decision had been given .

The relevant domestic law and practice concerning the procedure for lodging cassation appeals with ORG against judgments of the appellate courts are stated in the ORG 's judgments in the cases of PERSON v. GPE , no . GPE , CARDINAL DATE ; PERSON GPE , no . CARDINAL , DATE ; PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE ; PERSON GPE , no . GPE , DATE ; ORG v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , DATE .

On DATE amendments to LAW , adopted on DATE ( LOC o zmianie ustawy PERSON postępowania cywilnego oraz ustawy Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych ) , entered into force . Under the amended text of Article CARDINAL QUANTITY , the timelimit for lodging a cassation appeal with ORG was extended DATE .

ORG has repeatedly held that a request for leave to appeal out of time was the only method by which a cassation appeal submitted after the expiry of the timelimit could be admitted for examination ( DATE , II CZ CARDINAL ; CARDINAL DATE , II UZ CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . In a further series of decisions ORG considered that it would be unfair for the legally - aided party to be penalised for the fact that legalaid applications could not be processed quickly enough to make it possible for a cassation appeal to be lodged within DATE counted from DATE of service of the judgment on the party . The parties waiting for legal - aid services can not be held at fault for shortcomings in the system . A party who was obliged to have recourse to legal aid should not be put in a worse situation than that of a person who did not seek it . A request to appeal out of time should therefore be submitted within DATE from the date on which the legalaid lawyer could obtain effective access to the case file or had an effective possibility of drafting an appeal ( DATE , II UZ CARDINAL ; DATE , I ORG CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , or from the date when the lawyer was informed that he had been assigned to the case by ORG DATE , PERSON ; CARDINAL DATE , PERSON CARDINAL ; CARDINAL DATE , PERSON ) ;

In a resolution adopted by a bench of CARDINAL judges of ORG on DATE ( III CZP CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) that court acknowledged that there had been discrepancies in the manner in which the beginning of the DATE time limit for submitting an application for leave to appeal out of time by legally - assisted parties had been determined . The court was of the view that applications for leave served the purpose of making access to ORG for legally - aided parties genuine and effective . Hence , the beginning of the timelimit could not be determined in a mechanical manner in all cases . The courts should instead examine the circumstances of individual cases as a whole and determine that date bearing in mind the genuine possibility for a lawyer to examine the case and prepare a cassation appeal .