David Thór Björgvinsson;Giovanni Bonello;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicants , Mr PERSON and PERSON , are NORP nationals who were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE . They were represented before the ORG by PERSON , a firm of solicitors practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON , of ORG .

CARDINAL The applicants traded as builders and roofing contractors under the trade name of ORG and ORG . The business LOC were located at FAC , GPE , GPE . They were subject to a mortgage and loans held by ORG ( “ Barclays ” ) .

The applicants lived , and still live , at FAC , GPE , GPE . That property was also subject to a mortgage in favour of ORG .

On DATE , the applicants appeared at ORG pursuant to a creditor 's petition lodged under section CARDINAL ) of LAW DATE ( “ the DATE ” – see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) . They sought more time to try and settle their debts as their son had agreed to purchase the property at FAC from them for a sum which would have allowed them to satisfy their creditors . The applicants did not have legal representation at the hearing because they could not afford to pay for a solicitor . The court refused their request for more time and made a bankruptcy order against them .

The effect of the order was that the official receiver took charge , on an interim basis , of the applicants ' estate , pursuant to section ORG ) of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The applicants subsequently had discussions with the official receiver 's office and provided details of their financial situation .

NORP In DATE , ORG , the second applicant 's life insurance company , paid to the second applicant the sum of GBP DATE , the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy in her name .

Around the same time , the applicants ' local authority , ORG , obtained a warrant for the arrest of the first applicant for non - payment of business rates and poll tax .

K.C. was subsequently appointed trustee in bankruptcy . Under section CARDINAL ) of LAW , the applicants ' estate vested in him and he was entitled to manage and dispose of the property comprised in the estate as he saw fit .

On DATE , the applicants received a letter from ORG advising them that he had been appointed trustee in bankruptcy . On DATE , unknown to the applicants , ORG registered a caution over the property at FAC under section CARDINAL of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE , GPE contacted the applicants asking them to surrender to him the sums which they had received from ORG . The applicants replied that they were concerned about the outstanding warrant for arrest in respect of the first applicant . They asked GPE to resolve the situation with ORG and advised him that once the warrant had been set aside , they would send him the money received from the insurance company .

K.C. did not assist with the warrant . The applicants wrote to him advising him that they would use the insurance money to remove the threat of the arrest and imprisonment of the first applicant . They subsequently paid GBP CARDINAL of the money obtained from the insurance company to ORG to discharge the outstanding debt . They used the remainder of the money on general living expenses . However , further business rates had accumulated in the meantime and the applicants were concerned that ORG could recommence action for non - payment at any time .

On DATE , the applicants ' solicitor advised them that ORG had agreed to a court order to stay the arrest warrant . On an unknown date , the applicants became aware that ORG had commenced a claim against the second applicant for repayment of GBP CARDINAL ( the sum paid to the second applicant by ORG ) plus interest and asking for further information about the payment made to ORG . On DATE , the second applicant was informed that she had been denied legal aid to contest the proceedings because any sums awarded would become the property of her creditors .

On DATE , ORG advised the applicants that it would be content to discuss restructuring their debt provided that there was agreement that the property at FAC be sold .

On DATE , ORG ordered the second applicant to pay to GPE , as trustee in bankruptcy , the sum of GBP CARDINAL plus costs , a total of ORG .

The official receiver subsequently applied for an order postponing the discharge of the second applicant from bankruptcy until such time as she had paid the sum of ORG MONEY ( composed of the sum of GBP CARDINAL being the balance of monies received from the insurance policy payment once the business rates had been paid plus the sum of GBP CARDINAL , a debt to the applicants ' business which had been paid directly to the second applicant ) or until DATE had elapsed , whichever was earlier .

On DATE , ORG offered to restructure the applicants ' debt owed to it by way of a remortgage . It was agreed that the property at FAC would be sold and the applicants undertook to sign all documentation necessary to effect the sale .

On DATE , ORG advised the applicants that he was considering applying to the court to extend their bankruptcy because of lack of co - operation . He provided no details of their alleged failure to cooperate .

On an unspecified date in DATE , the property at FAC was sold for GBP CARDINAL . The sale was arranged by ORG and the applicants signed the documentation as agreed . The applicants considered that the sale proceeds were MONEY CARDINAL less than the value of the property . PERSON was aware of ORG ' intention to sell the property for this sum . The second applicant subsequently sought to have ORG removed as trustee in bankruptcy on the ground that he was incompetent . She was denied legal aid because any sums awarded would become the property of her creditors .

On DATE , ORG restructured the applicants ' debt , setting aside some of the interest owed and allowing the remainder of the debt to be repaid over a period of DATE . This was done with the knowledge of GPE

On DATE , the first applicant was discharged from bankruptcy .

On DATE , ORG issued a notice to creditors of a meeting of creditors to be held on DATE . The notice advised that GPE considered that he had realised as much of the estate as was practically possible and that he was applying to be released as trustee . He commented in the notice that there was no equity in the property owned by the applicants .

On DATE , a creditors ' meeting was held , at which ORG was released from his duties as trustee .

On DATE , the second applicant was discharged from bankruptcy .

The applicants subsequently applied for a certificate of their discharge from bankruptcy , which was provided to both applicants in DATE .

NORP In DATE , the applicants wished to purchase a new house . In the course of negotiations , it was discovered that there was a caution recorded on ORG in favour of GPE in respect of the property at FAC . The applicants applied to have the caution removed . ORG wrote to the official receiver asking whether there was any objection to the removal of the caution from the ORG .

On DATE , ORG wrote to the applicants advising that , no reply having been received from the official receiver , the caution in favour of GPE would be cancelled DATE .

On DATE , a caution was registered in ORG against the property at FAC by the official receiver 's office .

In DATE , the applicants sought to have the caution removed but the official receiver objected .

On DATE , GPE was appointed by the official receiver as trustee in bankruptcy for the applicants .

On DATE , GPE sent a notice of a creditors ' meeting . He noted that at the time that GPE obtained his release as trustee , there was no equity in the matrimonial home . GPE intended therefore to investigate and realise the beneficial interest in the matrimonial home .

On DATE , a creditors ' meeting was held at which the ORG 's disbursements and remuneration were agreed and it was agreed to administer the bankruptcy on a joint basis .

On DATE , an application was made to register a caution against the property at FAC in favour of GPE

On DATE , GPE 's solicitors wrote to the applicants enclosing CARDINAL schedules showing the sums required to discharge all bankruptcy costs and liabilities . CARDINAL schedule showed the sum owed where only liabilities in respect of creditors who had made a claim against the estate were included and amounted to GBP CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL ; the other showed the sum owed where all known creditors , whether or not they had made a claim , were included and amounted to ORG . Both schedules calculated the amount actually claimed by creditors to be ORG . The amount not yet claimed , and included in the second schedule , was GBP CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL . The remainder of the sums in the CARDINAL schedules was composed of costs and expenses of the official receiver and the trustee in bankruptcy , fees payable to ORG ( “ ORG ” ) and statutory interest at the rate of MONEY from DATE to CARDINAL DATE . In the first schedule , the statutory interest amounted to GBP CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL ; in the second schedule , it amounted to ORG CARDINAL . The solicitors advised that if the applicants were unable to procure such sums within DATE , they might wish to consider a voluntary sale of the property at FAC .

On DATE , the applicants replied to the solicitors , asking for clarification of the CARDINAL different sums . They also provided further information requested .

On DATE , the solicitors replied explaining the CARDINAL different sums and acknowledging receipt of the further information .

On DATE , GPE sent a letter to the applicants to fix an appointment to value the property at FAC .

On DATE D.C. 's solicitors wrote again enclosing CARDINAL further schedules , CARDINAL for the first applicant and CARDINAL for the second applicant , setting out details of their creditors , as previously disclosed by the applicants .

On DATE , the applicants were advised by their solicitors that they would not get legal aid in order to contest GPE 's caution registered against the property at FAC .

On DATE , the applicants wrote to GPE 's solicitors asking for a final settlement figure . They indicated their intention to raise funds by obtaining a mortgage over the property at FAC and advised GPE of the possibility of obtaining further sums from a member of their family . They disputed some of the figures provided in the schedules and asked for an extension of the DATE period ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) which they considered too short in light of the longevity of the bankruptcy .

On DATE the solicitors replied , noting that pursuant to a change in the law the trustee in bankruptcy was required to take steps to deal with the property at FAC by DATE . They extended the deadline for response from the applicants to DATE . As to the sums required to settle the applicants ' debts , the solicitors confirmed that the final figures were those appearing in the schedules provided by letter of DATE .

On DATE , the applicants wrote to GPE 's solicitors indicating that they had engaged the services of a mortgage broker and would be in touch as soon as they had made arrangements .

On DATE the solicitors wrote noting that they had heard nothing since the letter of DATE and asking for confirmation of the terms proposed by CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the applicants replied to the solicitors indicating that they were still seeking a mortgage and asking for further clarifications .

On DATE , the solicitors wrote again , responding to the applicants ' queries and seeking a response by CARDINAL DATE . They indicated that they reserved their position as to whether to commence possession and sale proceedings in the event that no satisfactory response was received .

On DATE , the applicants wrote to GPE 's solicitors asking how much money would be required to settle the bankruptcy proceedings .

On DATE , GPE 's solicitors wrote advising that GPE would be unable to agree a settlement with the applicants without the approval of the creditors . However , the applicants were invited to provide details of any settlement they wished to propose and any offer made would be put to creditors .

On DATE , GPE 's solicitors wrote inviting the applicants to make an offer by DATE . This deadline was extended to CARDINAL DATE at the applicants ' request . On DATE , the deadline was extended , unprompted , by GPE 's solicitors to DATE . In the event that no offer was made by that date , the solicitors advised that they were instructed to issue proceedings for possession and sale of the property at FAC without further notice .

On DATE , the applicants replied denying that GPE had any right or interest in the property at FAC . However , they offered GBP CARDINAL to settle matters .

By letter of CARDINAL DATE , GPE 's solicitors replied noting the offer made and asking for the applicants ' best offer by DATE .

The applicants replied on DATE asking for clarification of what would be an acceptable amount to settle the bankruptcy proceedings .

GPE 's solicitors replied on DATE indicating that they were not in a position to suggest an appropriate amount and giving the applicants until DATE to make their best offer .

On DATE , GPE 's solicitors wrote to the applicants noting that the applicants ' final offer of ORG would be insufficient to meet the costs , fees and expenses of the bankruptcy and that there was little incentive for creditors to accept the offer . The solicitors enclosed a schedule showing , by way of example , the estimated sum required in order to ensure creditors a dividend of GBP MONEY per GBP CARDINAL . The sum came to GBP CARDINAL . The applicants were given until DATE to consider the level of their offer .

On DATE , the applicants faxed a letter to GPE 's solicitors offering GBP CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL in final settlement . They indicated that they would require some time to gather the funds together .

On DATE , GPE 's solicitors wrote reminding the applicants that the sum of GBP PERSON was specified merely as an example and that it would have to be referred to creditors for consideration . On DATE , the applicants confirmed that they wished their offer of ORG to be put to creditors . On DATE , GPE 's solicitors noted the applicants ' offer and agreed to put it to the creditors .

On DATE , GPE referred in a letter to the relevance of the length of time which had elapsed since the bankruptcy orders were first made , to the fact that there was little or no equity in the property at the time of the making of the orders and for some time subsequently and to his efforts to approach the matter on a “ conciliatory basis ” .

On DATE , GPE 's solicitors wrote to the applicants confirming that their offer of ORG had been accepted by the creditors . ORG was to take place by DATE at the latest .

On DATE , the applicants ' solicitors provided them with forms of assignment transferring the trustee 's interest in the property at FAC from GPE to the applicants . The applicants also arranged to remortgage the property to obtain funds . On DATE , the applicants were advised that the transaction had been completed .

LAW DATE sets out the procedure to be followed in bankruptcy and the powers of the trustee .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the LAW provides that the function of the trustee is to :

“ ... get in , realise and distribute the bankrupt 's estate in accordance with the following provisions of this LAW ; and in the carrying out of that function and in the management of the bankrupt 's estate the ORG is entitled , subject to those provisions , to use his own discretion . ”

Section CARDINAL provides that the bankrupt 's estate comprises all property belonging to or vested in the bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruptcy , excluding items necessary to the bankrupt for use personally by him in his employment , business or vocation or for satisfying the basic domestic needs of the bankrupt and his family .

The duration of the bankruptcy is defined in section CARDINAL as beginning on DATE the bankruptcy order is made and continuing until the individual is discharged .

Discharge is dealt with in section CARDINAL , which , at the relevant time , provided that :

“ ( CARDINAL ) Subject as follows , a bankrupt is discharged from bankruptcy—

( b ) ... by the expiration of the relevant period under this section .

( CARDINAL ) That period is as follows—

( b ) ... the period of DATE beginning with the commencement of the bankruptcy . ”

NORP However , under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) , where the court is satisfied on the application of the official receiver that an undischarged bankrupt has failed or is failing to comply with any of his obligations , the court may order that the relevant period under section FAC ) shall cease to run for such period , or until the fulfilment of such conditions , as may be specified in the order .

Section CARDINAL sets out the effect of a discharge and provides as follows :

“ ( l ) Subject as follows , where a bankrupt is discharged , the discharge releases him from all the bankruptcy debts , but has no effect—

( a ) on the functions ( so far as they remain to be carried out ) of the trustee of his estate , or

( b ) on the operation , for the purposes of the carrying out of those functions , of the provisions of this Part ;

and , in particular , discharge does not affect the right of any creditor of the bankrupt to prove in the bankruptcy for any debt from which the bankrupt is released .

( CARDINAL ) Discharge does not affect the right of any secured creditor of the bankrupt to enforce his security for the payment of a debt from which the bankrupt is released . ”

Under sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL , at any time when there is no trustee in bankruptcy appointed , the official receiver is the receiver and manager of the bankrupt 's estate .

Section CARDINAL makes special provision for the bankrupt 's home . It provided , at the relevant time , as follows :

“ ( l ) Where any property consisting of an interest in a bankrupt 's dwelling house which is occupied by the bankrupt or by his spouse or former spouse is comprised in the bankrupt 's estate and the ORG is , for any reason , unable for the time being to realise that property , the ORG may apply to the court for an order imposing a charge on the property for the benefit of the bankrupt 's estate .

( CARDINAL ) If on an application under this section the court imposes a charge on any property , the benefit of that charge shall be comprised in the bankrupt 's estate and is enforceable , up to the value from time to time of the property secured , for the payment of any amount which is payable otherwise than to the bankrupt out of the estate and of interest on that amount at the prescribed rate .

( CARDINAL ) An order under this section made in respect of property vested in the trustee shall provide , in accordance with the rules , for the property to cease to be comprised in the bankrupt 's estate and , subject to the charge ( and any prior charge ) , to vest in the bankrupt . ”

Section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act provides that :

“ Where any premises comprised in a bankrupt 's estate are occupied by him ... on condition that he makes payments towards satisfying any liability arising under a mortgage of the LOC or otherwise towards the outgoings of the LOC , the bankrupt does not , by virtue of those payments , acquire any interest in the LOC . ”

Section CARDINAL provides that :

“ ( CARDINAL ) At any time when proceedings on a bankruptcy petition are pending or an individual has been adjudged bankrupt the court may stay any action , execution or other legal process against the property or person of the debtor or , as the case may be , of the bankrupt .

( CARDINAL ) Any court in which proceedings are pending against any individual may , on proof that a bankruptcy petition has been presented in respect of that individual or that he is an undischarged bankrupt , either stay the proceedings or allow them to continue on such terms as it thinks fit .

( CARDINAL ) After the making of a bankruptcy order no person who is a creditor of the bankrupt in respect of a debt provable in the bankruptcy shall—

( a ) have any remedy against the property or person of the bankrupt in respect of that debt , or

( b ) before the discharge of the bankrupt , commence any action or other legal proceedings against the bankrupt except with the leave of the court and on such terms as the court may impose . ”

DATE . Under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) , ORG has the power , exercisable at any time , to review the order for bankruptcy , to vary it or to revoke it .

Section CARDINAL provides that if a bankrupt or any of his creditors or any other person is dissatisfied by any act , omission or decision of a trustee of the bankrupt 's estate , he may apply to the court ; and on such an application the court may confirm , reverse or modify any act or decision of the trustee , may give him directions or may make such other order as it thinks fit .

The Enterprise Act CARDINAL introduced changes to LAW . It entered into force on DATE .

Section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act was amended to reduce the period of bankruptcy prior to discharge from DATE .

Section CARDINAL was also amended to limit the value of a charge on a bankrupt 's property to “ the charged value ” , which was defined as “ the amount specified in the charging order as the value of the bankrupt 's interest in the property at the date of the order plus interest on that amount from the date of the charging order at the prescribed rate ” .

Finally , a new section CARDINAL was introduced into LAW and provides as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) This section applies where property comprised in the bankrupt 's estate consists of an interest in a dwelling - house which at the date of the bankruptcy was the sole or principal residence of—

( a ) the bankrupt ,

( b ) the bankrupt 's spouse ...

( CARDINAL ) At the end of the period of DATE beginning with the date of the bankruptcy the interest mentioned in subsection ( CARDINAL ) shall—

( a ) cease to be comprised in the bankrupt 's estate , and

( b ) vest in the bankrupt ( without conveyance , assignment or transfer ) .

( CARDINAL ) Subsection ( CARDINAL ) shall not apply if during the period mentioned in that subsection—

( a ) the ORG realises the interest mentioned in subsection ( CARDINAL ) ,

( b ) the trustee applies for an order for sale in respect of the dwelling - house ,

( c ) the trustee applies for an order for possession of the dwelling - house ,

( d ) the trustee applies for an order under LAW in LAW in respect of that interest , or

( e ) the ORG and the bankrupt agree that the bankrupt shall incur a specified liability to his estate ( with or without the addition of interest from DATE of the agreement ) in consideration of which the interest mentioned in subsection ( CARDINAL ) shall cease to form part of the estate .

( CARDINAL ) Where an application of a kind described in subsection ( CARDINAL)(b ) to ( d ) is made during the period mentioned in subsection ( CARDINAL ) and is dismissed , unless the court orders otherwise the interest to which the application relates shall on the dismissal of the application—

( CARDINAL ) The court may substitute for DATE mentioned in subsection ( CARDINAL ) a longer period—

( a ) in prescribed circumstances , and

( b ) in such other circumstances as the court thinks appropriate . ”

NORP Under transitional provisions , DATE period in respect of pre - commencement bankruptcies commenced on DATE and therefore terminated on DATE .


Violation of Art. 6-1 (length);Violation of Art. 13;Remainder inadmissible;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses (domestic proceedings) - claim dismissed;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in Cork . He is a medical doctor . In DATE a formal complaint was made to the police by a former female patient that she had been indecently assaulted by the applicant and that he had made video recordings . On DATE a search warrant was obtained . On DATE his home , clinic and consulting rooms were searched . Videos were found reflecting matters similar to those about which the woman had complained . Pills obtained by a prescription made out to , and using the medical card of , another patient were found although that patient knew nothing of the pills . A replica pistol and blank ammunition were found . The applicant was questioned . He admitted that he had obtained pills in that manner for DATE .

In DATE ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) was informed of a number of complaints against him by CARDINAL former female patients and , in DATE , the police confirmed to the ORG that they were investigating allegations of indecent assault by the applicant . In DATE the ORG received written complaints from those CARDINAL patients alleging sexual assault and blackmail . On DATE ORG ( “ the Committee ” ) of the ORG decided that there was a prima facie case for the holding of an enquiry .

On DATE ORG made an order ( unpublished ) restraining him from practising pending the outcome of the inquiry . On DATE ORG ordered the removal of the applicant ’s name from the register of practitioner ’s and restrained him from practising pending the inquiry and all consequent proceedings . ORG also agreed that the ORG could make public the “ sequence of events ” including the orders of DATE and CARDINAL DATE . ORG issued a press release on DATE which included the applicant ’s name , the terms of those CARDINAL ORG orders and details of how an individual could complain to the ORG about a medical practitioner . Further complaints ( CARDINAL ) were then received from other former female patients of the applicant , of which CARDINAL made formal statements to the police .

The applicant left GPE for DATE to avoid the publicity but kept in contact with the police through his solicitor . On DATE he attended with his solicitor , and by prearranged appointment , at a police station to enquire as to whether there were criminal charges pending against him . He claims that he was informed that no charges were pending . However , on DATE when he voluntarily attended the same police station with his solicitor , his solicitor insisted on attending the interview , the police refused and , given the dispute , arrested the applicant ( under LAW DATE – for the proper investigation of a crime - on suspicion of sexual assault of a former patient ) during which period the applicant saw his solicitor . The period of lawful detention expired that TIME : that TIME he appeared voluntarily before a High Court judge in his habeas corpus application . That application was later determined against him .

On DATE the Chief State Solicitor advised the applicant that certain summonses had issued against him . The applicant was served at his solicitor ’s office . The charges concerned the pills , replica pistol and ammunition found . On DATE these charges were , pursuant to his application , struck out for lack of evidence .

On unspecified dates , certain former patients , also complainants in the criminal proceedings , initiated civil actions against the applicant alleging sexual assault . These proceedings are defended by the applicant .

On DATE the applicant informed the ORG that the criminal proceedings had been favourably disposed of and that the pending civil actions against him ( by patients who had not complained to ORG ) would be vigorously defended : he asked for the resumption of the disciplinary inquiry . A hearing was held on DATE and the ORG rejected his request to hold the inquiry in public . The applicant ’s request for leave to apply for judicial review of that decision was rejected by ORG but was granted by ORG ( DATE ) . ORG ( DATE ) and then ORG ( DATE ) rejected the substantive judicial review application and appeal , respectively . When it became subsequently clear that sexual assault charges would be pursued against him , the ORG proceedings were stayed .

In DATE the applicant was served with a routine summons under LAW DATE ( in order to allow them to dispose of the blank ammunition and the replica pistol ) . That summons lapsed as it was returnable for a bank holiday .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on foot of a warrant ( issued on DATE ) in respect of an alleged sexual assault of a former patient on a date between DATE and CARDINAL DATE . A list of all charges concerning CARDINAL complainants was read to him later in the police station : he was thereby formally charged with CARDINAL offences of a sexual nature . He was brought before ORG TIME to considerable media attention . Bail was opposed but granted on condition that he report to a police station every DATE TIME . His passport was impounded .

On DATE he unsuccessfully applied for a copy of the statement grounding the application for his arrest warrant . On DATE he was given leave to apply for judicial review for an order prohibiting his prosecution on CARDINAL grounds , including “ gross and inexcusable delay ” . A stay on prosecution was granted pending the determination of the judicial review proceedings .

In DATE and DATE the respondents submitted a statement of opposition and CARDINAL affidavits . On DATE an order for discovery was made against the respondents . In DATE , DATE and DATE the proceedings were adjourned on the application of the respondents . In DATE the respondents filed their first affidavit of discovery and in DATE the applicant requested further discovery . The proceedings were adjourned CARDINAL times DATE at the respondents’ request . On DATE the respondents requested the hearing of the substantive matter ; on DATE they filed a further affidavit of discovery ; on DATE the applicant issued a motion requesting further and better discovery ; and on DATE the respondents requested that a date be fixed for the substantive hearing .

On DATE ORG ordered the applicant to file an affidavit listing those documents over which he disputed the respondents’ assertion of privilege . The applicant filed an affidavit on DATE but it was later found not to have complied with the order of CARDINAL DATE . In response , the respondents filed affidavits on DATE . On DATE the High Court heard the applicant ’s motion for further discovery , ordered the respondents to make further discovery by DATE and the matter was adjourned to DATE . On DATE the applicant filed an affidavit complaining , inter alia , about delay in the case . On DATE , and further to the respondents’ submission that another affidavit and discovery would be soon ready , the matter was adjourned to CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the applicant was informed that a further adjournment would be applied for by the respondents . On DATE the adjournment was accorded by ORG ( until DATE ) . The applicant filed an affidavit on that date again complaining about delay . The respondents filed further affidavits in DATE and DATE as did the applicant on DATE . On DATE a further adjournment was accorded , with the applicant ’s consent on the basis that the respondents furnish him with all non - contested documents by DATE . On DATE ORG ordered him to clarify within DATE the documents in respect of which he contested the privilege claimed by the respondents . On DATE the applicant filed a further affidavit .

On DATE the hearing of the application for further and better discovery resumed . At this hearing the applicant indicated that he disputed privilege in relation to the ORG statements and the medical reports . The court ordered the respondents to make the ORG statements available to the applicant ( with addresses blocked out ) . It made no order as regards the respondents’ medical reports and indicated that it would provide the first available date for the hearing of the substantive judicial review matter .

In DATE the substantive judicial review hearing was fixed for DATE . However , on DATE , the respondents filed another CARDINAL affidavits . As a result , the substantive hearing had to be adjourned . Both parties were in agreement that the case should not be re - listed until ORG had given judgment in a case which was relevant to one ( not delay ) of the grounds of review ( “ the related case ” ) .

In the meantime , the procedural disputes continued . The applicant disputed the claimed privilege during a hearing from CARDINAL to CARDINAL DATE . During a hearing on DATE , DATE and DATE the applicant sought further inspection of the respondents’ documents . On DATE ORG refused this application . It noted that , while the respondents had been “ grossly in delay ” in filing the affidavits in DATE , the information contained therein had not added anything material to the case . It also noted that the applicant had not complied with ORG order of CARDINAL DATE to specify which of the documents , in which the respondents were claiming privilege , were being disputed .

ORG gave judgment in the related case in DATE . The applicant ’s substantive hearing was set down for DATE . It ended on DATE and judgment was reserved .

On DATE the High Court delivered its judgment refusing the relief ( prohibition of prosecution ) sought by the applicant . It found that both parties were at fault for the delay caused by the discovery process : the applicant for not being more focused as to the documents he required ( and in particular not complying with the order of CARDINAL DATE ) ; the respondents for being slow to furnish discovery . It also stated that the respondents had been entirely to blame for the adjournment of the proceedings on DATE . However , it considered that this default had not caused any significant delay because the proceedings had to be adjourned anyway to await the judgment in the related case . Accordingly , by judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG removed the stay on prosecution and ordered the applicant to pay the ORG ’s costs .

In DATE the applicant appealed ( against the refusal of the prohibition order and the order for costs ) . In DATE ORG heard the appeal . On DATE it rejected the appeal concerning the refusal of the prohibition order . It considered that some of the delay in the judicial review proceedings was the fault of the applicant ( for not complying with the order of CARDINAL DATE ) ; some was necessary ( in order to await the judgment in the related case ) ; some was caused by ORG ( “ ORG ” ) ( in particular the adjournments they sought during the protracted discovery process ) ; and some was caused by ORG ( in failing to deliver judgment for DATE ) . It held that it could only take into account the delay for which the ORG was responsible .

As to the “ considerable delay ” of ORG in delivering judgment , it said :

“ ... it is a complete misunderstanding of the decision of ORG in PERSON v. GPE [ no . CARDINAL , ORG CARDINALX ( extracts ) ] to treat it as authority for the proposition that , in a case such as the present , the right of the public , as represented by the ORG , to the trial of serious offences can be defeated by a delay for which the prosecuting authorities bore no responsibility . The decision of the majority of the [ C]ourt in PERSON ... does not have the effect of entitling a party in the domestic courts to relief which would otherwise not be available to him . ”

On DATE ORG affirmed the costs order of ORG and required the applicant to pay the respondents’ costs .

In DATE the applicant was informed by the police that , in light of ORG judgment , the prosecution would proceed before ORG on DATE . On DATE , the prosecutor withdrew charges concerning CARDINAL complainants but maintained the charges of sexual assault concerning CARDINAL complainants . The prosecution sought and was granted an adjournment ( until DATE ) to allow it to prepare a Book of Evidence after which it was envisaged that the charges would be transferred for trial on indictment . On DATE ORG lifted his bail conditions . It ordered the transfer of the charges to ORG for trial on indictment . ORG refused to conduct a preliminary examination of the charges under Part II of LAW DATE ( which provision had been repealed by Part III of LAW DATE in DATE ) . On DATE the High Court granted leave to seek judicial review of this refusal by ORG .

A medical report dated DATE concluded that the applicant ’s advanced age and the ongoing prosecution “ have affected his physical and mental condition to such an extent that at this point in time his capacity to defend himself is impaired ” . ORG disciplinary proceedings and the civil assault actions have been adjourned pending the criminal proceedings .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Art. 8;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;Khanlar Hajiyev;Sverre Erik Jebens

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE , QUANTITY girls of DATE were raped and stabbed to death in GPE , a recreation area in the city of GPE . CARDINAL young men were later convicted of the crimes and sentenced to DATE of imprisonment respectively for rape and murder committed in particularly aggravating circumstances . The case received intense and extensive coverage in the national media .

In DATE the applicant had been convicted of murder , attempted murder and CARDINAL instances of assault , all committed by the use of knife in DATE in GPE . He had been sentenced to DATE imprisonment and to CARDINAL years’ security measures ( sikring ) ( which under the relevant law at the time , could be imposed where it was established that the person concerned was not mentally ill ( and thus criminally liable ) but had an underdeveloped and permanently impaired mental capacity and that , because of this condition , there was a clear risk of his or her committing further criminal offences ) . Shortly before the expiry of the security measures on DATE , the public prosecutor had requested a prolongation , which a first instance court had granted in DATE for a period of DATE ( but which an appellate court refused in DATE ) . In DATE the applicant had been released from security detention ( lukket sikring ) and had been placed under supervision at liberty ( DATE sikring ) . Thereafter he had lived in GPE , partly in a camping cabin and partly in his family ’s cabin by the river and had been working at a protected workplace for persons on rehabilitation scheme . He was a substance abuser and was connected to a group which used to gather at the so - called “ Acid Knoll ” , a place in the recreation area where the murders had taken place .

During the early stages of the murder investigation , the applicant and a number of other previously convicted persons were interrogated as witnesses . The police ’s interest in the applicant attracted considerable media attention .

DATE after the murder , the police collected the applicant from his workplace and brought him to the police station . The police interrogated him for TIME until TIME on DATE , and then brought him to his home . The interrogation became known to the press and was presented in the national media on CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE together with information about his criminal trial in DATE and the imposition of security measures in his case . In their issues published on those dates , CARDINAL national newspapers , GPE , ORG and PERSON , reported on the applicant but without stating his identity .

Also a national television channel , the TVCARDINAL , gave extensive reports . In a news broadcast on DATE , at TIME ( while the applicant was being interrogated ) , it stated :

“ Possibly the most special candidate of these persons ( former convicted , ORG ’s addition ) is precisely this DATE because of his past and because he has been seen in the area where the murder occurred , at the time when it occurred , but so far there are no suspects , and it is precisely that which now is a little exciting in this case . Habitually , this type of investigation takes a long time , but when one carries out this type of alibi checkups , the case may soon take a new and special turn . ”

In a news broadcast on DATE , TIME , TVCARDINAL reported that members of the press had followed a DATE murderer from GPE in his footsteps . Then ensued an interview with the applicant , during which he was filmed from behind and partly from the side , on his way to the so - called “ Acid Knoll ” in the GPE area .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG published information about the applicant ’s place of residence , in a report which also contained an interview with him .

On DATE , the newspaper PERSON , which is mainly a subscription newspaper ( CARDINAL subscribers ) and the principal district newspaper on the southern coast of GPE , published a report on the PERSON case . The front page carried the following headline and introduction :

“ Convicted Murderer : I am completely innocent

AT WORK : At TIME , a DATE convicted murderer from GPE toddled off to the bus to return to work . TIME , he had been driven home by the police , after having been interrogated for TIME concerning his movements on DATE , DATE when C and D were killed .

ALIBI : - I am completely innocent , said the DATE to PERSON in TIME of DATE . The man says he has an alibi for TIME . The DATE , who was seen by several witnesses in GPE on DATE , is probably the most interesting of several criminally convicted persons whose movements are now being checked by the police .

SENTENCE TO SECURITY MEASURES : In DATE , the DATE was sentenced to DATE imprisonment and DATE security measures [ sikring ] for CARDINAL murder by knife , CARDINAL attempted murder and several other acts of violence , with knife . The term of security measures [ sikringstid ] imposed on him expired on DATE , but as late as in DATE , he was sentenced to DATE of security measures . The judgment has been appealed against . ”

Inside the newspaper at page CARDINAL appeared an article entitled

“ Murder convict returns to work DATE ”

With the subtitle :

“ I am completely innocent ”

The article contained a brief interview with the applicant , in which he stated that he had nothing to do with the matter and that he had witnesses . Next to the article appeared a large photograph showing the applicant from the side while entering a bus , not showing his head and the upper part of his bust inside the bus . A caption stated that DATE was on his way to work at TIME and : “ ‘ I am completely innocent ` ” , says the previously murder convicted man who DATE was interrogated for TIME . ”

Underneath on the same page , the paper reproduced another article entitled :

“ Sent home after QUANTITY interrogation ”

The introduction stated :

“ At TIME DATE a DATE murder convict was fetched by the police at his workplace . TIME he was brought to his home ”

The article was accompanied by a large photograph of “ the DATE ” , with his head blurred , accompanied by CARDINAL police officers .

The article stated that the police had collected him at his workplace in TIME CARDINAL DATE for a TIME long interrogation . It described inter alia the background for the police ’s interest in the applicant , reiterating that he had purportedly been seen by several witnesses in GPE on TIME when the QUANTITY girls had disappeared . Furthermore , reference was made to the factual background of his conviction in DATE . The following sub - titles were used : “ Seen by the police ” , “ Released for DATE ” , “ Berserk with a knife ” , and “ Victims at random ” .

The article further quoted statements by a Chief Constable , Mr A. Pedersen , underlining that there “ were still no suspects in the case ” and that all of the people summoned for questioning had “ formal status as witnesses in the case . ” This point was further elaborated on in an interview with the Chief Constable on the same page , entitled “ No one imprisoned DATE . ”

In yet another article appearing under the heading “ Have got the murderer in the papers ” , the Chief Constable was quoted to have said to Verdens Gang that “ the police have received so much information of substance that they have the answer in their documents to the question who had murdered the CARDINAL young girls . ”

The PERSON case was also the main item on the front page of PERSON on DATE , with the heading “ DNA traces found at murder place ” . The article reiterated that according to the preliminary autopsy report , both of the girls had been sexually abused , that they had been murdered with a pointed and sharp penetrating arm , most probably with a knife . Page CARDINAL of the paper contained an interview with some neighbours of DATE , entitled “ Neighbours fear prejudgment ” , published together with a photograph of a residential development site . The article named a specific residential development area , Q , and its precise location , Z , stating that it was the “ nearest neighbour to the DATE convicted of murder . ”

In a further article on the same page , under the heading “ They want to know where I am ” , the paper mentioned the name of the street where the applicant lived ( Y ) , that of his neighbourhood ( Z ) , and that of the company where he worked . The article rendered a statement by the applicant maintaining his innocence and informing that the police had wanted to know his whereabouts but had let him in peace . Next to the article appeared a photograph of the applicant seen from behind , at a relatively long distance , on his way down towards the Z - river , with the caption : “ The DATE murder convict on his way home DATE ” .

On the same page appeared an article headed “ Searching for a locally known murderer ” , which quoted Chief Constable PERSON as stating inter alia that the main emphasis of their investigation had been based on the belief that the murderer(s ) had been locally known but that a wider NORP focus had also been discussed . He had added that it was dangerous to concentrate the investigation on a specific milieu .

At the material time , PERSON was published in TIME , whereas ORG , ORG were published in TIME .

NORP In DATE , after the arrest of the actual perpetrators in the GPE case , the applicant , represented by a lawyer , demanded that PERSON apologise for its coverage and compensate him for pecuniary and non - pecuniary damage he had sustained . As the newspaper refused , in DATE the applicant ’s lawyer brought on his behalf defamation proceedings before ORG ( tingrett ) against PERSON , its editor - in - chief , Mr PERSON and journalist PERSON applicant claimed compensation for pecuniary and non - pecuniary damage .

By a judgment of DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s action .

The applicant then appealed to ORG ( lagmannsrett ) . He waived his claim for pecuniary damage , which matter was formally discontinued ( hevet ) , but maintained his claim for non - pecuniary damage .

By a judgment of DATE , ORG , sitting with CARDINAL judges , found that an ordinary reader could perceive the impugned press reports published by the PERSON on DATE and DATE as pointing to the applicant as a possible perpetrator of the murders of the QUANTITY girls in GPE . ORG observed that , although the paper had not mentioned the applicant by name , it ought to have been possible for those who knew him in advance to recognise him , in particular from the photograph taken of him from behind and from the information about his residence- and work places contained in the CARDINAL DATE issue . It was hard to derive anything specific about the strength of the suspicion . Although it was true that formally speaking the applicant had only been given witness status , seen as a whole the report was capable of giving the ordinary reader the impression that the paper regarded the applicant as a person who already at an early stage of the investigation had stood out as the most probable perpetrator among those who had been in the police ’s search light . ORG moreover noted a number of other aspects of the publications confirming this impression . It concluded that the impugned publications were defamatory in the sense of LAW .

As to the question whether the publications were unlawful ( rettstridig ) , ORG was of the view that it generally should fall within the ORG ’s margin of appreciation to strike a fair balance between the interests in protection of freedom of speech under LAW and the interests in protection of reputation under LAW , bearing in mind also the presumption of innocence under LAW . On the particular facts of this case , ORG considered that there was undoubtedly a great public interest in the investigation of the murders and in the pursuit of the culpable persons . However , with CARDINAL votes to CARDINAL , ORG found that , on balance , the interests in allowing the publications weighed more heavily than those against and that the impugned news coverage had therefore not been unlawful .

The dissenting member found that the “ identification ” of the applicant and its extensive press coverage by PERSON had been unlawful and that he should be awarded compensation under section CARDINAL of LAW DATE , namely ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL by the newspaper and ORG CARDINAL each from the editor - in - chief and from the journalist .

The applicant appealed against ORG application of the law to ORG , alleging that it entailed a violation of Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Convention . He maintained that in its coverage on CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE the PERSON had portrayed him as the perpetrator of the most aggravated offences seen in modern times in GPE . He had not consented to the media coverage which had been a great burden to him . He had lost his job and home and suffered from serious psychological problems .

By a judgment of DATE ORG , by CARDINAL votes to CARDINAL , found in favour of the respondents and rejected the applicant ’s claim .

Mr Justice PERSON , whose reasoning was endorsed in the main by the other judges in the majority , inter alia concurred with ORG finding that , the PERSON ’s focus on the applicant as a previously convicted knife killer , his presence in GPE on DATE when the criminal acts had been committed and the investigation of the applicant , for an ordinary reader must have been perceived as if he could be suspected of having committed the murders . It had already been publicly known that the perpetrators of the murders had used pointed penetrating weapons against the girls . This information together with the rendering of parts of the judgment by which the applicant had been convicted in DATE and the security measures case , were likely to harm his good name and reputation and to expose him to hatred and contempt , thus fulfilling the objective constitutive elements in LAW . On these points Mr Justice PERSON stated :

“ ( CARDINAL ) Taking as a starting point the wording , typography , the internal context and the use of photographs it must be ascertained how the report and articles were likely to be understood by the ordinary reader .... The statements must be considered in the context of the whole report they are part of .

( CARDINAL ) The High Court unanimously found that the factual information had to be considered in the context of the other content of the reports and the articles published on CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE , and concluded :

‘ In ORG opinion the conclusion of the interpretation is that PERSON pointed to [ the applicant ] as a possible perpetrator of the murders of the QUANTITY girls in GPE . His name is not stated , but it was possible for those who previously knew [ the applicant ] to recognize him in particular because of the photograph taken of him from behind and because of the information about where he lives and the work place in the report dated DATE It is difficult to evaluate how strong the suspicion created was . Even though it is correctly underlined that the police had given [ the applicant ] only a witness status without formally charging or suspecting him , in the High Court ’s view the report as a whole was capable of giving the ordinary viewer the impression that the newspaper considered [ the applicant ] to be a man who already at this early stage in the investigation stood out as the most likely perpetrator among the persons who were in the police ’s search light.’

( CARDINAL ) ORG , amongst other aspects , emphasised that in the front page story of CARDINAL May it was stated that [ the applicant ] was ‘ probably the most interesting of several convicted persons whose movements are now being checked by the police’ , that he had been questioned for TIME after having been collected by the police at his work place , and that the report was illustrated with ORG ’s photograph of [ the applicant ] with his head blanked , being escorted by CARDINAL police officers . ORG found that the photograph created associations of arrest . This was presented together with the information that , after having been brought home , another police car with a dog patrol had arrived at the house , had passed by in low speed , had turned and had vanished in the dark . In addition to this the newspaper rendered statements by a police inspector to PERSON that the police had received much information with substance , and that the answer to who had killed the CARDINAL little girls was to be found in the police records . Also the rendering on DATE that the police were looking for a locally known murderer with a greatly deviant personal character , in the High Court ’s opinion supports the view that the applicant may be a person with the special character that are a requisite for committing such a heinous crime . ORG did not find that the rendering of [ the applicant ] ’s denial and of the ORG warning against prejudging were sufficient to weaken the suspicion created by the newspaper coverage as a whole .

( CARDINAL ) I concur with ORG in that the focus by PERSON on [ the applicant ] as a previously convicted knife killer , his presence in GPE that afternoon the misdeed was carried out , and the investigation of him , for an ordinary reader must have been perceived as if he could be suspected of having committed these killings . It was already publicly known that the perpetrator(s ) had used knives when the girls were killed . This information , together with the description of parts of his criminal conviction from DATE and the security measures [ sikring ] , was likely to harm [ the applicant ] ’s good name and reputation and to expose him to hatred and contempt . The objective description of the offence in LAW is therefore fulfilled .

( CARDINAL ) The adversary party has stated that the reports in PERSON of DATE and DATE did not contribute to identify [ the applicant ] beyond that occurred in TVCARDINAL in TIME CARDINAL May , where he was interviewed and filmed from behind and from the side while walking towards GPE . My comment to this is that PERSON in connection with the reports of CARDINAL DATE about [ the applicant ] informed about ‘ the DATE old’s’ work place and place of residence . The photograph from DATE depicting [ the applicant ] entering a bus , a new photograph of DATE showing [ the applicant ] with the same jacket and with a plastic bag on his way home ‘ to the house in .... [ the applicant ] ’s road at Z’ , and the article from the newly constructed housing area in Æ at Z , may have led to more people in the near environment becaming aware of [ the applicant ] ’s identity . ”

As to the further question whether the allegations were unlawful ( rettstridige ) , Mr Justice PERSON observed inter alia

“ ( DATE ) It is self - evident that the rapes and killings in GPE on DATE , DATE were of great public interest . The news media had a duty to report , and the public had a right to receive , information about the misdeed , the investigation and the progress in the case . It is clearly a matter of public interest that previously convicted felons are in the police ’s searchlight , and that interrogations and other police work is taking place to check witnesses out of the case or to charge them . In the near environment it may be of public interest to be informed about the fact that a previously convicted killer in the area in respect of whom a case concerning prolongation of security measures was pending , has been brought in by the police for questioning .

( CARDINAL ) This must however be weighed against the interest of privacy and the protection of reputation , when the media circles in and identifies CARDINAL or a few previously convicted persons being under investigation . At this stage the public normally has no legitimate interest to receive detailed information about previously convicted persons and their identity , hereunder descriptions of the criminal offences for which they have been convicted . However , in this very special case people living in the vicinity had a particular interest in knowing that a person who had previously been found guilty of murder and of violent assault and who had been sentenced to security detention , was living in the area , so that they could protect their own and their children ’s interests .

( CARDINAL ) The character of the allegation and , in particular , its seriousness is an important factor in the balancing exercise to be carried out when determining whether the interests of protection of personal life justify an interference with the freedom of expression , see NORP case - law reports ( PERSON ( FAC . ) ) DATE p. CARDINAL on pp CARDINAL - CARDINAL . In accordance with the case - law of ORG and ORG a distinction ought to be made between statements of fact and value judgments , because only statements of fact may be susceptible to proof . Normally statements which may be understood to mean that a person is or may be suspected of a criminal offence must be considered to be statements of facts which need to be proven .

( CARDINAL ) The respondents have argued that the impugned statement only concerns whether the unnamed CARDINAL DATE ‘ is probably the most interesting among several previously convicted felons whose movements are now being checked by the police’ . The leader of the investigation has later confirmed that the applicant was the most interesting person on whom efforts were deployed at the beginning of the investigation . The statement is alleged to have been correct , and its publication is claimed not to be unlawful .

( CARDINAL ) When CARDINAL , as I do , has reached the conclusion that the newspaper ’s reports and articles considered as a whole left the impression that [ the applicant ] could be a suspect in the case , the evidence must concern whether he has committed the crime he has been accused of . It is not sufficient that the newspaper gave an accurate description of the factual circumstances adduced to show that there was a basis for suspicion . As an exception to this general rule case law has accepted the publication of charges . Here the evidence is acceptable when it is proven that the reporting of the charge in itself is correct , see ORG . DATE p. CARDINAL ( PERSON ) . There is no corresponding exception for reporting on suspicion .

( CARDINAL ) In this case PERSON has not rendered a suspicion stated by others . The newspaper coverage and the articles mainly consist of reporting on the judgment from DATE , the relevant preventive supervision case [ sikringssak ] and the statements made by leaders of the investigation . It appears clearly that the applicant has been interrogated as a witness and that neither he nor anyone else is under investigation as a suspect . The most direct statement indicating suspicion is attenuated in its form in that [ the applicant ] according to the newspaper is ‘ probably the most interesting of several criminally convicted persons whose movements are now being checked by the police’ . His statements in an interview published on DATE about his being completely innocent , has been published in the head line on top of the front page .

( CARDINAL ) In balancing the competing interests in the concrete case I have with some doubt found that it was not unlawful for PERSON on DATE and CARDINAL DATE to publish that [ the applicant ] was the most interesting of several convicted persons investigated by the police , even though this in the context may be perceived to mean that he was or could be a suspect . The monstrous sexual offences and consequent killings in GPE were of particularly great public interest throughout the country , especially in GPE and in the LOC counties . The people in the vicinity around GPE and in the vicinity where [ the applicant ] lived , had a particular interest in receiving continuous and concrete information about the investigation .

( DATE ) In my opinion the journalist and the editor have not been negligent . The intense and extensive interest shown by the national news media directed against [ the applicant ] before PERSON ’s own publishing , his own statements to the media and the public interest justified the publication of the information about [ his ] workplace and place of residence and the use of anonymous photos of his person . When considering the question of negligence , I also emphasize that the coverage and articles were balanced , that their main content consisted of reporting true factual information , and that the police underlined that no one was under suspicion and that the [ applicant ] ’s view was presented clearly . I add that since this case presented itself at the early stage of the investigation , the newspaper had no cause to investigate further if [ the applicant ] could be the perpetrator .... ”

Mrs Justice Coward , whose opinion was endorsed in the main by the other judge of the minority , stated , amongst other :

“ ( CARDINAL ) There was obviously public interest attached to the investigation in the GPE case . The nation was shocked , and it was a task for the media to inform of the crimes and the work of the police . In ORG it was agreed that it must be allowed to impart an information that a previously convicted felon was in the police ’s search light and had been subjected to a long interrogation - even though the reporting would make it possible to understand who this was for those who had special knowledge or for those who carried out investigations on their own . I too agree with that . The disagreement in the ORG concerned whether the further identification provided by PERSON - in particular by revealing the workplace and residence was justified .

( CARDINAL ) In assessing the character of the allegation it is a point that this constituted an affirmation of suspicion , which when considering the seriousness is different from an accusation of being the perpetrator . But , on the other hand , the suspicion was related to particularly heinous crimes . The crimes aroused strong feelings of abhorrence and hatred in the population , and it is difficult not to think that it must have been awful to have been exposed to suspicion for having committed them . I agree with the High Court minority when it states that ‘ strong reasons for protecting the privacy militate for protecting the identity of an individual who for different reasons has come in the search light of the police in the investigation of criminal cases . This consideration is , not the least , important in serious criminal cases where great public interests are attached to clearing up the ORG . And precisely a person like [ the applicant ] , who with his background more easily than others would be suspected , had a special need for the protection offered by the presumption of innocence .

( CARDINAL ) I can not see that it betters things , as stated by PERSON , that [ the applicant ] was given the opportunity to declare his innocence on the front page of the newspaper ’s issue of CARDINAL DATE : ‘ Convicted murderer : I am completely innocent’ . It emerges from this report that none of ‘ a not insignificant number of people’ being checked in the case were under suspicion . However , neither this was likely to weaken the suspicion towards [ the applicant ] as the likely perpetrator . I agree with ORG - all CARDINAL justices - when it states :

‘ Not in the least the High Court finds that the total search light directed against [ the applicant ] is important . He represents both the starting point and most of the reporting done by PERSON covering the PERSON - case DATE . Given the reluctance the press in accordance with the ethics of journalism usually show by not identifying individuals being in the police ’s search light , this to a large extent must strengthen the ordinary reader ’s impression of [ the applicant ] as being the most possible perpetrator.’

( CARDINAL ) I can not see that the total reporting by PERSON should be considered balanced , even though the factual information taken apart had not been incorrect , [ the applicant ] had been given the opportunity to claiming his innocence and the police ’s statement that no one was to be suspected had been referred to . When it comes to heinous crimes of such gravity as here , in my opinion the press should not be allowed to publish untrue suspicions against identifiable individuals , even though the coverage should otherwise be characterized as being balanced .

( CARDINAL ) I add that [ the applicant ] was persecuted by assertive media people against whom he found it difficult to protect himself . That he at no point accepted to be identified , must be obvious .

( CARDINAL ) The difference of opinion between the majority and the minority of ORG was related to the significance of other media identifying [ the applicant ] . In TIME of CARDINAL DATE TVCARDINAL showed a report where he was filmed from behind and somewhat from the side . On DATE Dagbladet informed that he worked in a protected workplace in GPE and lived in his brother ’s cabin in Y at Z. The newspaper also showed a photo of him taken from behind . PERSON went the furthest in publishing identifying information about [ the applicant ] - in particular by revealing his workplace and residence , but besides this the articles in this most important district newspaper must have made it possible for more people to identify him than those who watch TVCARDINAL or read PERSON .

( CARDINAL ) The High Court minority point to an important consideration in emphasising at the end stating the need for the individual to be protected from collective media pressure :

‘ The minority also attaches considerable weight to the fact that the coverage in ORG appeared as an extensive and independent contribution from the newspaper and that the damaging effect for [ the applicant ] and the problems caused for him must have been caused by the total pressure from the media coverage during a short and concentrated period of time where PERSON ’s contribution was of particular significance . The minority is inclined to accept that [ the applicant ] had become ‘ free game’ as a result of the fact that some media had identified him . Such a solution is not adequate for protecting each individual against libellous reporting in mass media and does not coincide with the independent responsibility each newspaper has in circumstances where judicial and ethical press norms may be under challenge due to a situation of competitiveness .’

( CARDINAL ) I concur with this , and conclude - in accordance with the vocabulary used by ORG - that a pressing need existed for interfering with the freedom of expression in the way of a reaction to the coverage by PERSON .

( CARDINAL ) The conditions for compensation in accordance with section CARDINAL of LAW have been fulfilled . Since I am aware that I represent a minority , I see no reason to go into detail with regard to the amount of compensation . However , in view of PERSON ’s pleadings I point to the fact the harm caused by the offence to a large extent must be objectified : Also people who are socially marginalised must enjoy effective protection against libellous allegations . Like the minority in ORG , I vote for compensating [ the applicant ] with ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL from the newspaper and ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL from the editor . The contribution from the journalist was more peripheral , and she should not be ordered to pay compensation . ... ”

In DATE the applicant brought defamation proceedings against ORG ) before ORG claiming compensation with regard to TVCARDINAL ’s news coverage on DATE of the PERSON case . ORG found for TVCARDINAL and rejected the applicant ’s claims . On an appeal by the applicant , on DATE ORG upheld the applicant ’s claim that the news coverage constituted unlawful defamation and ordered the defendants to pay him ORG CARDINAL in compensation for non - pecuniary damage and discontinued the case with regard to his claim for pecuniary damage . As regards the contents of the disputed broadcasts and their defamatory effect , ORG made similar findings in the TVCARDINAL case as made by the appellate courts in the present case . In finding the defamation unlawful it had regard to several factors , notably ORG ’s national as opposed to local media role , unlike that of PERSON , the potency of the televised medium , the rule of caution applicable to the press with regard to identification of person regarding coverage of early stages of criminal investigations and the fact that , although aware of an autopsy report made available on DATE revealing that the murders had involved rape , TVCARDINAL had in the TIME news of that date continued to focus on the applicant notwithstanding the fact that his DATE criminal conviction had not concerned sexual offences . TVCARDINAL had also been the first medium to insinuate suspicion against the applicant and to identify him in its broadcasts and had taken the lead in this regard . On DATE ORG refused TVCARDINAL leave to appeal .

Conditions for holding a defendant liable for defamation are set out in LAW of LAW , LAW which provides :

“ Any person who , by word or deed , behaves in a manner that is likely to harm another person ’s good name and reputation or to expose him to hatred , contempt , or loss of the confidence necessary for his position or business , or who is accessory thereto , shall be liable to fines or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year . If the defamation is committed in print or in broadcasting or otherwise under especially aggravating circumstances , imprisonment for a term not exceeding DATE may be imposed . ”

A limitation to the applicability of LAW follows from the requirement that the expression must be “ unlawful ” ( “ rettsstridig ” ) . While this is expressly stated in LAW , LAW has been interpreted by ORG to include such a requirement .

For further specific information on the relevant national law , reference is made to CARDINAL to CARDINAL and CARDINAL of PERSON and GPE v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , ORG DATE ...

The Appendix to the Recommendation Rec(CARDINAL)CARDINAL of ORG to member states on the provision of information through the media in relation to criminal proceedings ( Adopted by ORG on DATE at the NORP meeting of ORG ) contains the following principle of particular interest to the present case :

“ Principle CARDINAL - Protection of privacy in the context of on - going criminal proceedings

The provision of information about suspects , accused or convicted persons or other parties to criminal proceedings should respect their right to protection of privacy in accordance with LAW . Particular protection should be given to parties who are minors or other vulnerable persons , as well as to victims , to witnesses and to the families of suspects , accused and convicted . In all cases , particular consideration should be given to the harmful effect which the disclosure of information enabling their identification may have on the persons referred to in this LAW . ”


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial

Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Khanlar Hajiyev

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in the village of PERSON , GPE .

As an employee of a ORG - owned company , in DATE the applicant and his family were granted a room in a shared flat . After his dismissal in DATE , the company sought his eviction . In DATE the company was reincorporated as a limited liability company .

On DATE the applicant brought proceedings against the company asserting his right to live in the room . According to the Government , the applicant ’s claim was received by ORG on DATE . The respondent sought the applicant ’s eviction .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , ORG rejected the applicant ’s claim and ordered his eviction . On DATE ORG upheld the judgment . The applicant obtained a stay of execution of the eviction order . On DATE the ORG of ORG quashed the above judgments by way of supervisory review and remitted the case for fresh examination .

Thereafter ORG examined the case twice and rendered CARDINAL judgments . Each time ORG quashed the judgments and remitted the case for fresh examination . It appears that in the meantime the applicant resettled and the respondent company withdrew their claim for eviction .

On CARDINAL DATE the LAW entered into force in respect of GPE .

In yet another round of the resumed proceedings , the applicant confined his claim to asking the court to require the respondent to provide him with housing . By a judgment of DATE , ORG granted this claim and ordered the company to provide the applicant with a flat . On DATE ORG upheld the judgment . The respondent sought supervisory review . On DATE the Presidium of ORG quashed the above judgments by way of supervisory review and remitted the case for re - examination .

In the resumed proceedings , the applicant amended his claim and sought to substitute the respondent by the new company . On DATE ORG required the company to provide the applicant with housing . On DATE ORG quashed the judgment on appeal and remitted the case for fresh consideration .

On DATE ORG issued a new judgment in the applicant ’s favour . On DATE ORG set aside this judgment on appeal and ordered a new examination of the case . The district judge was on DATE leave from DATE to CARDINAL DATE . CARDINAL hearing was adjourned due to the applicant ; CARDINAL hearings were adjourned at the respondent ’s request . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s claim . On DATE ORG upheld the judgment . The applicant sought supervisory review . On DATE the Presidium of ORG quashed the above judgments and remitted the case for fresh examination .

DATE and DATE a number of hearings were scheduled and adjourned mostly because the respondent failed to attend or sought adjournments . Several hearings were adjourned because of the applicant . CARDINAL hearing was adjourned in view of the judge ’s illness . By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , ORG rejected the applicant ’s claim . On DATE ORG upheld the judgment .


The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , born in DATE and living in PERSON . He is represented before the ORG by Mr J. Neumayer , a lawyer practising in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant was arrested on DATE on suspicion of blackmail . On DATE he was released on bail . On DATE he was partly acquitted by ORG ( PERSON ) . Upon his appeal he was fully acquitted by ORG ( Oberlandesgericht ) on DATE .

On DATE , the applicant filed an action requesting compensation for his detention on remand under the DATE Compensation ( Criminal Proceedings ) Act . ORG dismissed the applicant ’s claim on DATE . Upon the applicant ’s appeal , ORG , on DATE , quashed the decision of ORG and referred the case back to it .

On DATE , ORG dismissed the applicant ’s action for a second time . Upon the applicant ’s appeal , ORG again quashed the decision of ORG and referred the case back to this court on DATE .

On DATE , ORG dismissed the applicant ’s action for a third time . The applicant ’s appeal of DATE was dismissed by ORG on DATE .

Section CARDINAL of LAW ( PERSON ) , which has been in force since DATE , provides as follows .

" ( CARDINAL ) If a court is dilatory in taking any procedural step , such as announcing or holding a hearing , obtaining an expert ’s report , or preparing a decision , any party may submit a request to this court for the superior court to impose an appropriate time - limit for the taking of the particular procedural step ; unless sub - section ( CARDINAL ) of this section applies , the court is required to submit the request to the superior court , together with its comments , forthwith .

( CARDINAL ) If the court takes all the procedural steps specified in the request within DATE after receipt , and so informs the party concerned , the request is deemed withdrawn unless the party declares within DATE after service of the notification that it wishes to maintain its request .

( CARDINAL ) The request referred to in sub - section ( CARDINAL ) shall be determined with special expedition by a chamber of the superior court consisting of CARDINAL professional judges , CARDINAL of whom shall preside ; if the court has not been dilatory , the request shall be dismissed . This decision is not subject to appeal . "


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review)

Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Ján Šikuta;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra;Nona Tsotsoria

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE and CARDINAL and DATE the applicant was charged with attempted murder , robbery and fraud respectively .

On DATE the applicant was indicted to stand trial in ORG ( PERSON súd ) on those charges .

On DATE ORG remitted the case to ORG ( “ the PPS ” ) for the taking of further evidence , in particular in respect of the mental health of the key witness . That decision was upheld by ORG ( Najvyšší súd ) on DATE , following an interlocutory appeal by the PPS .

On DATE the applicant was again indicted to stand trial on the charges mentioned above .

On DATE ORG ( Okresný súd ) held a meeting with a view to making an initial assessment of the indictment ( predbežné prejednanie obžaloby ) . At the conclusion of the meeting , ORG ordered a hearing of the indictment ( hlavné pojednávanie ) for DATE .

NORP In the course of the trial the applicant ’s initial charges were requalified and , on CARDINAL DATE , ORG found him guilty of a number of offences , including oppression , unlawful restriction of liberty and robbery , and sentenced him to DATE in prison . The judgment was , however , quashed on appeal and the case was remitted to ORG for reexamination . The ORG has not been informed of any further developments in the case , or of its outcome .

On DATE the applicant was arrested and on DATE he was remanded in detention pending trial on the murder charge . He was detained under LAW ( c ) and CARDINAL of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( “ ORG ” ) ( PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL Coll . , as applicable at the relevant time ) as he was facing a charge carrying a penalty of imprisonment for DATE or more and there was a risk that he would continue offending . The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal ( sťažnosť ) against the remand decision , which was declared inadmissible as belated on DATE .

The applicant ’s first request for release was dismissed by ORG on DATE and , following his interlocutory appeal , by ORG on DATE . The decisions were taken in private ( neverejné zasadnutie ) .

Meanwhile , on DATE the ORG had requested judicial authorisation for an extension of the applicant ’s detention until DATE . The request was acceded to by ORG on DATE and , following an interlocutory appeal by the applicant , by ORG on DATE . The decisions were taken in private .

On DATE , when the applicant ’s case was remitted to the PPS for the taking of further evidence ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , ORG also ruled that the applicant should remain in detention . That decision was upheld by ORG on DATE following an interlocutory appeal by the applicant . The decisions were taken in private .

On or around CARDINAL or DATE , the applicant again requested release . The request was dismissed by ORG on DATE and , following an interlocutory appeal by the applicant , by ORG on DATE . The decisions were taken in private .

On DATE the applicant lodged an application arguing that , at the preparatory meeting on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , ORG had failed to make a ruling concerning his continued detention .

On DATE the relevant Chamber of ORG ruled that the applicant ’s detention should continue ; this was confirmed by a ruling on DATE by which the President of the ORG corrected what was termed a clerical error in the decision of DATE . The decisions were taken in private .

On DATE ORG dismissed interlocutory appeals by the applicant against both the decision of DATE and that of DATE . The decisions were taken in private .

ORG accepted the applicant ’s objection that mistakes had occurred on the part of ORG in that it had failed to rule on his detention during the meeting of DATE and in that it had made the ruling of DATE with reference to the wrong provisions of the ORG .

However , those errors were merely technical in nature , had been remedied , and had resulted in no prejudice to the applicant .

At the same time , ORG rejected a request by the applicant for release in return for a pledge LAW CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( b ) of the ORG that he would live in accordance with the law .

On DATE the applicant challenged the above - mentioned decisions in ORG ( Ústavný súd ) by way of a complaint ( sťažnosť ) under LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL Coll . , as amended ) .

On DATE the complaint was declared inadmissible as having been lodged outside the statutory DATE time - limit .

On DATE the applicant filed a third request for release , which was received at ORG on DATE , and which he amended on DATE .

In its later observations in reply to the applicant ’s constitutional complaint ( see paragraphs CARDINAL et seq . below ) , ORG submitted as follows :

“ ... no decision had been taken in respect of [ the request for release ] , which was explained by the ... judge as being because he had considered [ the request for release ] to be a supplement to the [ applicant ’s ] interlocutory appeal against the decision of DATE ” [ see paragraph CARDINAL above ] .

In the absence of any decision , on CARDINAL DATE the applicant requested that his submissions of DATE and DATE be responded to . The request was lodged with ORG , which transmitted it to ORG , where it was received on DATE .

On DATE ORG held a public session ( verejné zasadnutie ) at which it ordered the applicant ’s immediate release , finding that his detention was no longer justified . The written version of the order refers to the applicant ’s “ request for release ” , the release to be “ based on ORG decision [ to quash the convicting judgment ] ” ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , without any further specification .

The order was implemented immediately .

The applicant lodged a new complaint under LAW . No copy of it has been submitted to ORG . However , from the summary of the complaint in ORG judgment ( nález ) ( see below ) , the following can be established .

The complaint was received at ORG on DATE . It was assessed to be a separate complaint from the complaint of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph DATE above ) . Upon an invitation by ORG , the applicant ’s lawyer provided further and better particulars on DATE .

The applicant challenged ORG handling of his request for release of CARDINAL DATE , alleging a violation of his rights under LAW and CARDINAL of the LAW , as well as the constitutional counterpart of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time under LAW .

The applicant claimed the equivalent of CARDINAL euros ( ORG ) in compensation , citing “ a particularly arbitrary and grave violation of [ his ] rights ” .

On DATE the complaint was declared admissible .

In its observations in reply to the complaint , which were filed with ORG on DATE , ORG made the submission cited above ( see paragraph CARDINAL ) .

On DATE ORG found a violation of the applicant ’s rights under LAW . It observed , inter alia , that it was clear from the title and content of the applicant ’s submission of DATE that it was a request for release and not a supplement to his interlocutory appeal against the decision of DATE . It had been the responsibility of ORG to deal with it accordingly , with priority and adequate expeditiousness , which it had failed to do .

ORG awarded the applicant the equivalent of approximately EUR CARDINAL , and the reimbursement of his legal costs , by way of just satisfaction . The amount of just satisfaction was determined “ on an equitable basis ” and with reference to LAW , the “ character of the violation found ” , the “ length of ORG inactivity ” , and the fact that the applicant had been released in the meantime .

In so far as the applicant had invoked LAW , the Constitutional Court observed that the case concerned matters of procedure falling within the ambit of LAW , and not the former provision , taken in conjunction with LAW ) of the LAW . Similarly , as no determination of the merits of the case was involved , the constitutional equivalent of LAW was not applicable .

The relevant part of LAW reads as follows :

Everyone shall have the right to compensation for damage caused by an unlawful decision of a court , other ORG organ or an organ of public administration , or by wrongful official action .

The conditions and details ... shall be provided for by an Act of ORG . ”

Article CARDINAL reads as follows :

“ CARDINAL . ORG shall decide on complaints by natural or legal persons alleging a violation of their fundamental rights or freedoms ... unless the protection of such rights and freedoms falls within the jurisdiction of a different court .

If ORG finds a complaint justified , it shall deliver a decision stating that a person ’s rights or freedoms as set out in paragraph CARDINAL have been violated by a final decision , specific measure or other act and shall quash that decision , measure or act . If the violation that has been found is the result of a failure to act , ORG may order [ the authority ] which has violated the rights or freedoms to take the necessary action . At the same time it may remit the case to the authority concerned for further proceedings , order that authority to refrain from violating the fundamental rights and freedoms ... or , where appropriate , order those who have violated the rights or freedoms set out in paragraph CARDINAL to restore the situation to that existing prior to the violation .

In its decision on a complaint ORG may grant appropriate financial compensation to a person whose rights under paragraph CARDINAL have been violated .

The liability for damage or other loss of the person who has violated the rights or freedoms as referred to in paragraph CARDINAL shall not be affected by ORG decision . ”

LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL Coll . , as amended ) governs the organisation of ORG , the procedure before it and the status of its judges .

An individual complaint under LAW is made subject to the rule of exhaustion of ordinary remedies , which is formulated in the relevant part of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) as follows :

“ CARDINAL . ORG ] [ individual ] complaint is not admissible if the complainant has not exhausted legal remedies or other legal means which a statute effectively provides to [ the complainant ] with a view to protecting [ the complainant ’s ] fundamental rights or freedoms , and which the complainant is entitled to use under special statute .

The Constitutional Court shall not declare ORG ] [ individual ] complaint inadmissible even if the condition under paragraph CARDINAL has not been fulfilled , if the complainant establishes that [ the complainant ] has not fulfilled this condition for reasons worthy of particular consideration . ”

Under section CARDINAL ) , when dealing with individual complaints , in the event of a finding of a violation of a fundamental right or freedom :

“ ORG may also grant appropriate financial compensation to the person whose fundamental right or freedom has been violated . ”

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) provides that :

“ If ORG quashes a final and binding ( právoplatné ) decision , measure or act and remits the matter for further proceedings , [ the authority ] which issued the decision , decided on the measure or carried out the act is liable to examine and determine the matter anew . In such proceedings or procedure [ it ] shall be bound by the legal view of ORG . ”

NORP In connection with CARDINAL other individual applications under the ORG , ORG produced a report dated DATE concerning the existence of an enforceable right to compensation , as required by LAW , in respect of detention in contravention of LAW and the Constitutional Court ’s practice in awarding appropriate financial compensation .

The report and case - law references contained therein may be summarised as follows .

Awarding appropriate financial compensation under LAW is an optional remedy in respect of a violation by a public authority of fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals or legal entities which has been found by ORG . The purpose of appropriate financial compensation is to complete the protection of the fundamental right violated in instances where it has been established that the violation occurred in such a way as to call for a level of protection greater than a mere finding of a violation or , as the case may be , order by ORG that the case be dealt with by another authority instructed to avoid a similar violation of the fundamental right in question ( cases nos . PERSON CARDINAL/CARDINAL and PERSON CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

The question of an award of appropriate financial compensation arises in particular where it is not possible to remedy a violation of a right or freedom by way of quashing the impugned decision or measure or by restoring the status quo ante ( case no . I ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

The purpose of appropriate financial compensation is to reduce the loss felt as a result of the violation of the fundamental right , the Constitutional Court determining the award of compensation on an equitable basis and taking into account the circumstances of the individual cases concerned ( mutatis mutandis , case no . III ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

As regards the system of remedies in respect of detention in violation of LAW , by virtue of LAW , the liability of a person who has violated rights or freedoms as referred to in paragraph CARDINAL of that Article for damage or other loss is not to be affected by ORG decision , including on appropriate financial compensation . This provision is of particular relevance in correlation with the right to compensation for damage ( including nonpecuniary damage ) caused by a public authority under LAW .

The provision of LAW , which allows for an award of appropriate financial compensation , is a special and autonomous remedy which is independent of LAW . It does not constitute a lex specialis and , therefore , an award or non - award of appropriate financial compensation under LAW does not preclude a claim for compensation for pecuniary or non - pecuniary damage under sections CARDINAL , DATE and CARDINAL of LAW .

LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) was enacted on DATE and became operative on DATE . It provides for the liability of the ORG for damage which has been caused by , inter alia , unlawful arrest , detention ( zadržanie ) or other deprivation of liberty ( section ORG ) ) ; decisions concerning remand in custody ( väzba ) ( section CARDINAL ) ) ; and wrongful official action ( section CARDINAL ) ) .

Pursuant to section CARDINAL , where a decision on arrest , detention or any other deprivation of liberty has been quashed as being unlawful , or where there has been wrongful official action in that context , the person affected by it is entitled to compensation for damage .

The right to compensation for damage caused by a decision concerning pre - trial detention is vested in the person who has been detained , provided that the criminal proceedings against him or her have been dropped ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) ) , or he or she has been acquitted ( section CARDINAL ) ) , or the matter has been referred to another authority ( section CARDINAL ) ) .

However , no such right arises when the person concerned has himself or herself given cause to be remanded in custody ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) ) .

Section CARDINAL , which deals with compensation for damage caused by wrongful official action , provides :

“ CARDINAL . The ORG is liable for damage caused by wrongful official action . Wrongful official action includes a public authority ’s failure to take action or issue a decision within the statutory time - limit , general inactivity in the exercise of public authority , unjustified delays in proceedings , or other unlawful interference with the rights and legally recognised interests of individuals and legal entities .

The right to compensation for damage caused by wrongful official action is vested in the person who sustained the damage . ”

A claim for damages under the LAW has first to be raised by the injured party with the authority liable for the damage in question with a view to its preliminary assessment ( section CARDINAL ) ) . Should that authority fail to satisfy the claim within DATE of its reception , the injured party is free to assert the claim in court ( section DATE ) ) .

Section CARDINAL defines the manner and extent of compensation for damage . It provides in its relevant part :

“ CARDINAL . Damage and lost profit shall be compensated for , unless special legislation provides otherwise .

In the event that the finding of a violation of a right alone is not adequate compensation in view of the loss caused by the unlawful official action or wrongful official conduct , monetary compensation shall also be awarded for non - pecuniary damage , if it is not possible to compensate for it otherwise . ”

Under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) , unless otherwise provided for by special legislation , disputes concerning matters regulated by LAW are to be decided upon by the courts .

In a judgment dated DATE ( in case no . CARDINAL CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , ORG allowed an action for damages by CARDINAL individuals against the ORG under LAW and ordered the defendant to pay the costs of their defence in connection with a criminal trial that had ended with their acquittal .

On DATE the Banská Bystrica Regional Court upheld the judgment following an appeal by the defendant .

On DATE ORG allowed an appeal ( case no . MONEY ) in connection with an action by an individual against the ORG under LAW for damages , awarding him a sum of money in compensation for non - pecuniary damage caused by his remand in custody in the context of a criminal trial that had ended with his acquittal .

In a judgment dated CARDINAL DATE ( case no . CARDINALC CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , the GPE I ORG allowed an action for damages by an individual against the ORG under LAW and awarded the claimant a sum of money in compensation for non - pecuniary damage caused by wrongful official action in connection with his detention pending a criminal trial .

The impugned wrongful official action concerned the extension of the claimant ’s detention pending trial .

The action was preceded by a ORG judgment given on DATE ( case no . I. ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) in which ORG had found a violation of the claimant ’s rights under LAW and CARDINAL in connection with the same facts . However , ORG did not award the claimant damages as he had made no claim for damages .