The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was acting before the ORG both in his own right and as representative of his minor son , who was born on DATE and lives in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the applicant , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant and PERSON , who were an unmarried couple , had a son , PERSON , who was born on CARDINAL DATE . Prior to the birth they had made a joint declaration before the registration officer at ORG on DATE recognising their son .

On DATE , a NORP national , unilaterally decided to take PERSON away to live with her in GPE .

Several sets of proceedings were subsequently instituted .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , ORG granted QUANTITY custody of the child and reserved judgment regarding the applicant ’s right to apply to ORG to determine his rights of access in respect of the child .

On DATE the applicant lodged an application with the President of the GPE tribunal de grande instance , who was the matrimonial causes judge , for joint parental responsibility ( with the mother ) for his son and for the latter ’s habitual residence to be fixed at FAC , where he had lived before leaving GPE with his mother .

In an order of DATE , the judge declared that the applicant was estopped by record from applying for joint parental responsibility and determination of PERSON ’s habitual residence because the judgment of the NORP courts was final . He requested the applicant and PERSON to sign a parental agreement determining the arrangements regarding PERSON ’s relations with his parents , if necessary by having recourse to family mediation . Subject to a better agreement being reached between the applicant and PERSON , he granted the applicant access for the school holidays .

An appeal does not appear to have been lodged against that decision .

On DATE the applicant brought an action against PERSON in the NORP tribunal de grande instance , claiming joint parental responsibility for PERSON

In an order of DATE , the family - affairs judge held that the applicant was doubly estopped by record from bringing the action because there had been a final decision both by ORG on DATE and by the GPE matrimonial causes judge on DATE .

No appeal was lodged against that order .

In a judgment of DATE , ORG sentenced PERSON to a suspended term of imprisonment of DATE and a fine of MONEY for failure to hand over a child and to notify a change of address .

On DATE the applicant applied to the Minister of ORG , designated by GPE as ORG responsible for discharging the duties imposed on GPE by LAW of DATE on ORG ( “ LAW ) . He asked the Minister to assist him in the manner prescribed by that convention in securing the return of his son , born on DATE , whom his mother , a NORP national , had , he alleged , wrongfully removed to GPE on CARDINAL DATE to live with her in GPE .

On DATE the Minister of ORG replied in the following terms :

“ In reply , and on the basis of the information in my possession , the mother alone had parental responsibility at the time of the removal . Accordingly , the removal can not be described as ‘ wrongful’ within the meaning of the aforementioned convention and an application for the child ’s return is in principle bound to fail . ”

On DATE the applicant sought a declaration from ORG that he had had parental responsibility for his son at the time of his abduction by the mother and asked the court to set aside the decision of DATE by which the Minister of ORG had refused to intervene pursuant to LAW .

On DATE ORG rejected the application for the following reasons :

“ It is not ORG function to deal with disputes between private individuals . The submissions must be dismissed as having been made to a court that lacked jurisdiction to entertain them . ...

The question as to whether it fell to the Minister of ORG to intervene in the manner requested necessarily requires an examination of the relations between the NORP ORG and a foreign government . That issue falls outside the jurisdiction of ORG . Accordingly , the submissions can not succeed . ...

On DATE the applicant appealed to ORG .

In a judgment of DATE ORG set aside the judgment of ORG to the extent that it found that the application to have the Minister of ORG ’s decision set aside fell outside the jurisdiction of ORG . However , it rejected the application for the Minister of ORG ’s decision to be set aside for the following reasons in particular :

“ ... in the judgment being appealed against , ORG wrongly declared that it lacked jurisdiction to examine the submissions made by [ the applicant ] against that decision ; in that respect the judgment must be set aside .

Even supposing that LAW , as amended by PERSON no . CARDINAL - CARDINAL of DATE , which is applicable in the instant case , is contrary to the provisions of ORG CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW DATE and the provisions of LAW of DATE , the evidence does not show that [ the applicant ] had parental responsibility for his son on CARDINAL DATE , when the child was taken to GPE by his mother . Accordingly , on that date he did not have rights of custody in respect of the child . It was therefore clear that the conditions required by LAW were not fulfilled ; the Minister was subsequently able , under the aforementioned provisions of LAW , to reject the application for intervention made by the applicant . It follows that [ the applicant ] has no basis on which to argue that , in the decision being challenged , the Minister of ORG wrongly rejected that application ... ”

On DATE the applicant applied to the ORG d’Etat to set aside the judgment of DATE . In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE the ORG d’Etat set aside the judgment of ORG and the judgment of ORG of DATE in so far as it had dismissed the submissions as having been made to a court that lacked jurisdiction to entertain them . It rejected the application lodged by the applicant with ORG and the remainder of the submissions in the application lodged before it for the following reasons in particular :

“ ... [ The applicant ] is ... justified in requesting the ORG to set aside the part of the operative provisions of the judgment of ORG which , after setting aside the judgment delivered at first instance by ORG , dismissed the submissions he had lodged with the court to have the Minister of ORG ’s decision of DATE set aside .

In the circumstances of the present case , an examination under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the PERSON of DATE is necessary in order to dispose of the case on the merits .

... It is incumbent on an administrative court to rule on the submissions [ by the applicant ] to have [ the decision of the Minister of ORG ] set aside . ORG thus wrongly dismissed the submissions as having been made to a court that lacked jurisdiction to entertain them . Its judgment of CARDINAL DATE must be set aside in that regard .

The application lodged by [ the applicant ] with ORG must be heard and determined immediately .

[ The ] provisions [ of LAW , in the applicable version ] which , in a case such as this where the child has been recognised by both parents , provide that parental responsibility is to be exercised by the mother but give the father the possibility , by a decision of the matrimonial causes judge , to exercise that authority himself , either alone or jointly with the mother , and , if appropriate , to have his home designated as the child ’s habitual residence , are not incompatible with the combined requirements of LAW and CARDINAL of LAW by which the right to respect for family life must be secured without discrimination on any ground , such as sex .

... the aforementioned provisions of LAW which determine , in the child ’s interests alone , which of the parents is to exercise parental responsibility for him or her , are not incompatible with the provisions of ORG DATE and CARDINAL of the [ LAW [ of DATE on the Rights of the Child ] , which proclaim the paramount interests of the child and the child ’s right to the protection of the law .

The evidence clearly shows that [ the applicant ] , who does not allege that the aforementioned provisions of the second or third paragraphs of LAW would have been applied in his favour , did not have the exercise of parental responsibility for his son [ PERSON ] when the child ’s mother took him to GPE on CARDINAL DATE . Accordingly , he did not have rights of custody over the child on that date for the purposes of LAW , and , in particular , he did not have a right to determine the child ’s habitual place of residence . Accordingly , the Minister of ORG did not commit any error of law in his decision of DATE in considering that the removal of [ PERSON ] could not be described as ‘ wrongful’ within the meaning of that convention .

... the submissions by which [ the applicant ] sought a stay of ORG decision regarding his application must therefore be dismissed . ... ”

“ A child ’s father and mother are responsible for protecting the child ’s safety , health and morals .

They have a right and a duty to look after , supervise and bring up their children . ”

“ Where a child born out of wedlock has been recognised by CARDINAL of his or her parents , parental responsibility shall vest in the parent who has voluntarily recognised the child . Where the child has been recognised by both parents , parental responsibility shall vest in the mother .

Parental responsibility may be exercised jointly by both parents if they make an appropriate joint declaration before the guardianship judge .

At the request of the father or the mother or ORG , the matrimonial causes judge may modify the arrangements for exercising parental responsibility and decide that it shall be exercised either by CARDINAL of the parents or by the father and mother jointly ; in that event the judge shall indicate with which parent the child shall habitually reside .

The matrimonial causes judge may always grant an access and supervision right to the parent who does not have parental responsibility .

Where parental responsibility is exercised jointly , Articles CARDINAL - CARDINAL and CARDINAL - CARDINAL shall apply as though the child had been born in wedlock . ”

LAW was ratified by GPE on DATE and came into force on DATE , when it also came into force in respect of GPE . The relevant provisions are worded as follows :

“ The objects of the present Convention are :

( a ) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any ORG ; and

( b ) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of CARDINAL ORG are effectively respected in GPE . ”

“ The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where :

( a ) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person , an institution or any other body , either jointly or alone , under the law of the ORG in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention ; and

( b ) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised , either jointly or alone , or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention .

The rights of custody mentioned in sub - paragraph ( a ) above may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision , or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that ORG . ”

“ For the purposes of this Convention :

( a ) ‘ rights of custody’ shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and , in particular , the right to determine the child ’s place of residence ;

( b ) ‘ rights of access’ shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child ’s habitual residence . ”

“ A Contracting State shall designate ORG to discharge the duties which are imposed by the LAW upon such authorities .

“ ORG shall cooperate with each other and promote cooperation amongst the competent authorities in their respective GPE to secure the prompt return of children and to achieve the other objects of this LAW .

In particular , either directly or through any intermediary , they shall take all appropriate measures :

( a ) to discover the whereabouts of a child who has been wrongfully removed or retained ;

( b ) to prevent further harm to the child or prejudice to interested parties by taking or causing to be taken provisional measures ;

( c ) to secure the voluntary return of the child or to bring about an amicable resolution of the issues ;

( d ) to exchange , where desirable , information relating to the social background of the child ;

( e ) to provide information of a general character as to the law of their ORG in connection with the application of the ORG ;

( f ) to initiate or facilitate the institution of judicial or administrative proceedings with a view to obtaining the return of the child and , in a proper case , to make arrangements for organising or securing the effective exercise of rights of access ;

( g ) where the circumstances so require , to provide or facilitate the provision of legal aid and advice , including the participation of legal counsel and advisers ;

( h ) to provide such administrative arrangements as may be necessary and appropriate to secure the safe return of the child ;

( i ) to keep each other informed with respect to the operation of this LAW and , as far as possible , to eliminate any obstacles to its application . ”

“ Notwithstanding the provisions of DATE , the judicial or administrative authority of the requested ORG is not bound to order the return of the child if the person , institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that :

( a ) the person , institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention , or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention ;

In considering the circumstances referred to in this LAW , the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by ORG or other competent authority of the child ’s habitual residence . ”


CASE OF GRAYSON AND BARNHAM v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

No violation of Art. 6-1;No violation of P1-1

David Thór Björgvinsson;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

On DATE the applicant and a co - defendant were convicted with intent to supply QUANTITY of pure heroin , which was seized by the police at the time of arrest . The heroin was assessed to have a wholesale value in excess of ORG and a street value in excess of ORG CARDINAL . The following day the applicant was sentenced to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment .

On DATE , after considering written and oral submissions from the applicant and the prosecution , the judge made a confiscation order under LAW DATE ( “ the DATE LAW : see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) . He held that the applicant had benefited from drug trafficking . In assessing the amount of the benefit the judge took into account , inter alia , the following sums : GBP CARDINAL cash found on the applicant at the time of his arrest ; GBP CARDINAL that the applicant had paid to his brother when a business partnership between them came to an end ; GBP CARDINAL that he had spent , in cash , on buying CARDINAL cars ; a further ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL which he had spent on another CARDINAL cars ; and GBP CARDINAL which was the judge ’s assessment of the cost to the applicant of purchasing the heroin which had led to the conviction . As regards this last sum , the judge , having heard all the evidence at trial , was satisfied that the applicant had been the principal participant in the offence and must have contributed to a large extent to the purchase of the drugs . However , to be fair to the applicant he took as his share CARDINAL of the wholesale value . The judge was further satisfied that so large a consignment would not have represented the applicant ’s first venture into drug trafficking and that he had financed the purchase with the proceeds of previous drug dealing . The applicant failed to rebut this assumption . The final item of expenditure taken into account by the judge was GBP CARDINAL which an associate of the applicant , who claimed to have an income of MONEY DATE , had paid in respect of the applicant ’s legal fees . The judge found that it was the applicant ’s money ; that it was the proceeds of drug trafficking ; and that it demonstrated that the applicant had money elsewhere he was not prepared to reveal .

Next , the judge examined property received by the applicant during the DATE statutory period . The largest element emerged from an analysis of CARDINAL bank accounts which the applicant had held at CARDINAL time or another . The banking records demonstrated unexplained credits to the applicant ’s account in the DATE and DATE which exceeded the turnover of his business as recorded in the accounts by MONEY CARDINAL . During DATE , ending DATE , the bank statements showed deposits at ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL below the business trading turnover . The judge therefore considered whether it was appropriate to take DATE together but decided that this would not be correct . If the applicant had delayed banking some of his DATE profits until DATE , one would have expected to have seen a pattern of very heavy deposits in the first part of DATE , but this was not the case . He concluded that the applicant had benefited to the amount of GBP CARDINAL .

Under the statutory scheme , once the judge had assessed the amount of benefit which the applicant had received from drug trafficking , the burden passed to the applicant to show on the balance of probabilities that his realisable assets were less than the amount of his benefit ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The police , having investigated the applicant ’s background , had found realisable assets of GBP CARDINAL , including the cash found on the applicant at the time of his arrest , a car and some business stock . The judge observed :

“ The fact that the police have traced a certain amount of property is not of itself a reason to find it is the only property available to the [ applicant ] . Also credibility is a real issue . I have given myself a PERSON direction [ that before reliance can be placed on the fact of a person ’s lying , it must be shown to be deliberate ; it must relate to a material issue ; the motive must be a realisation of guilt and a wish to conceal the truth rather than some other reason : R v PERSON [ DATE ] QB CARDINAL ] . This Defendant is cunning , devious and intelligent . He was increasingly unbelievable and offensive to common sense . Giving evidence he sought to mislead at every turn , wary that the truth would reveal assets he did n’t want to and that he had hidden assets prior to conviction . He has lied persistently and blatantly and his credibility is nil . He has only himself to blame if I do not accept his evidence . I am convinced that he has tried to mislead me . I do not accept that there were no other assets , so I have reached the conclusion that the appropriate order be the wholesale value of the drugs , that being £ MONEY . He has not satisfied me that his assets are less than his benefit ... ”

He set an additional ten years’ imprisonment to be served by the applicant if he had not paid within DATE .

The applicant appealed to ORG on the grounds , inter alia , that the trial judge should have adjourned to allow him to submit additional accountancy evidence and that it had been contrary to LAW judge to hold that it was for the applicant to establish , on the balance of probabilities , that his realisable property was less than his benefit . Although he had been represented throughout the trial and confiscation proceedings , he was unrepresented for the appeal and put his arguments before the court in a series of letters written from prison .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal , although it reduced the default sentence of imprisonment from DATE , the statutory maximum , to DATE . The court held that the additional accountancy evidence which the applicant sought to have admitted did not rebut the prosecution case but in fact , to a large extent , supported it . The ORG added that although the accountancy report raised a suggestion of possible double - counting by the prosecution when it came to an analysis of realisable property , that was

“ irrelevant , since the judge ’s order did not depend upon any calculation of realisable property . It depended upon his finding that the applicant had utterly failed to demonstrate that he had not got assets equivalent to his benefit . ”

ORG referred to ORG v. the GPE , no . FAC , ORG CARDINAL-VII , and observed that :

“ In that case the court held that the reverse onus of proof in relation to the statutory assumption at the calculation of the benefit stage is fully Convention compliant . If reverse onus is Convention compliant at the stage at which primary liability is calculated , it is plain that it is equally compliant to require of the defendant evidence to demonstrate that the order for confiscation should be less than the amount of benefit , on the grounds that he does not have enough realisable property to meet it . The level of assets available to a defendant is normally peculiarly a matter within his own knowledge .

In those circumstances , this was , we are satisfied , a large confiscation order . It was , however , one which it was plainly proper for the judge to make . The judge followed the scheme of the LAW in arriving at his conclusions , and in the context of a man who was caught when engaged in importing heroin which had cost MONEY with the prospect of a profit of CARDINAL times that amount , the conclusion that there were large items of unexplained expenditure and hidden assets is , in the circumstances , hardly surprising . ”

On DATE the second applicant was convicted of CARDINAL conspiracy charges involving plans to import large consignments of cannabis into GPE . Neither importation had been successful and the whereabouts of the drugs were unknown . In the course of the trial the jury heard evidence from an undercover police officer , “ PERSON , who , posing as a money launderer , had made contact with the applicant . PERSON ’s evidence was that the applicant had told him that his organisation was expected to receive payment of ORG CARDINAL , of which his personal share would be GBP CARDINAL , which he asked PERSON to help him “ launder ” .

The applicant was sentenced to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment , the judge describing him as the lead organiser in a sophisticated , established and internationally based drug trafficking business .

The confiscation proceedings commenced in DATE , when the first hearing took place to determine the statutory benefit to the applicant from his drug trafficking operations . The applicant was legally represented . He did not give evidence but conceded through his counsel that he had benefited from drug trafficking within the meaning of the CARDINAL LAW . On DATE , the trial judge ruled that the total benefit to the applicant was GBP CARDINAL . This sum included GBP CARDINAL that the applicant had given to PERSON to establish his trust ; various amounts totalling GBP CARDINAL which the applicant had mentioned to PERSON during their conversations ; a car worth GBP CARDINAL ; GBP CARDINAL which the applicant had spent on renovating his house ; GBP CARDINAL which the applicant had told PERSON he had invested in cannabis importation ; GBP CARDINAL with which the applicant had purchased the consignment of cannabis which formed the basis of the first count of which he had been convicted ; GBP CARDINAL with which the applicant had purchased another consignment of cannabis which he had mentioned to PERSON ; a further GBP CARDINAL which related to the cost of purchasing yet another consignment of cannabis which the applicant had discussed with PERSON . The applicant did not appeal against that ruling .

NORP In DATE , the judge resumed the proceedings to assess the applicant ’s realisable assets . The applicant and his wife gave evidence , to the effect that their only asset was their house in GPE , which they owned jointly . The applicant claimed to have been entirely unsuccessful in his attempts at drug dealing and to have earned a living by singing in bars . Since his conviction his wife was living with their son in GPE and supporting herself with a cleaning job . The defence submitted that there was no evidence capable of supporting a finding of assumed “ hidden ” assets and such would lead to a risk of injustice . Of the total benefit figure , it was submitted that PERCENT was expenditure and PERCENT received had been dissipated over DATE of the applicant ’s imprisonment in GPE and GPE and in GPE . His car , worth GBP CARDINAL , had also been confiscated by the NORP authorities .

On DATE , the judge made his ruling . He explained that :

“ In reaching my determination I have to apply the scheme laid down by LAW , subject to ensuring from the evidence before me that in applying any reverse burden of proof there is no ascertained real or serious risk of injustice resulting from this . Essentially I have to weigh whether the evidence relied on by the defendant is both clear and cogent . In my judgment , it is not , because it fails to explain truthfully what the applicant did in relation to his drug trafficking activities . ”

The judge found that the applicant and his wife had lied about their activities and their sources of income . The applicant had not explained what had happened to the various consignments of cannabis he had had under his control . The judge continued :

“ In any event , as I do not find PERSON and PERSON are truthful witnesses on material facts I am unable to accept their evidence that no cash assets exist from Mr PERSON ’s substantial international drug trafficking .

He has failed to explain truthfully what he did and what he did with what he earned from what he did . That has been his choice and if it leaves as it does , this ORG with no clear and cogent evidence to persuade it that the benefit is not fully realisable , the responsibility for that is Mr PERSON ’s and Mr PERSON ’s alone .

It was his choice whether he told the truth in his evidence and no - one else ’s . [ Counsel for the defence ] relies on the lack of assets discovered by the GPE police ... It is , in my view , not surprising , particularly operating in foreign jurisdictions , that investigators find difficulty in tracing cash assets derived from drug trafficking . It is because of this , indeed , that the scheme of LAW is what it is .

Whilst I accept [ defence counsel ’s ] other submission , that the vast majority of the benefit I assessed , it was on the basis of expenditure on the drugs , that does not explain what happened in the end to those drugs upon which that sum was expended . Unless , which I do not , I was to find that Mr PERSON lived as he did in GPE for all those years , never ever successfully importing cannabis from GPE to anywhere at all . ”

He made a confiscation order equal to the amount which he had assessed as the benefit , namely GBP CARDINAL , with DATE , CARDINAL months’ imprisonment if the applicant had not paid within DATE .

The applicant appealed against the judge ’s ruling regarding his realisable assets , asserting that LAW applied also when the judge came to assess realisable property , and that it required the prosecution at least to make out a prima facie case of realisable assets before the burden of proof shifted to the defendant . It was asserted by the applicant ’s counsel that there was a difference between cases where the prosecution had proved benefit at the first stage by evidence and cases where the benefit had been calculated through the use of assumptions . In the second type of case , the assumptions continued to have effect when calculating realisable assets .

In its judgment of DATE , ORG rejected this argument , holding as follows :

“ In our judgment the correct approach for the court to take when dealing with confiscation proceedings at the second stage is the same whether the benefit has been proved by evidence in addition to the statutory assumptions . Once the prosecution has established the benefit there is no requirement on it to provide a prima facie case . At the second stage the burden of proof shifts to a defendant to establish , if he can , his realisable assets to the satisfaction of the court . By the second stage a defendant will know exactly how the court has determined benefit attributable to him and must prove by evidence what his realisable assets are . It is for him to show why the confiscation order should not be ‘ the value of ( his ) proceeds of drug ORG . If he proves that he has no , or appreciably less , realisable assets than the amount of the benefit determined by the court the order will be made in a lesser sum . Provided the judge keeps well in mind the principle that the risk of serious injustice to the defendant must be avoided and does not just pay lip service to that principle the order will be in the amount assessed as either the amount of benefit or such other sum as the defendant shows represents his realisable assets .

To hold that the prosecution must , in some way , show a prima facie case that the defendant has hidden assets in our judgment would defeat the object of the legislation . It is designed to enable the court to confiscate a criminal ’s ill - gotten gains . The expression ‘ hidden assets’ is indicative of the fact that the prosecution can have no means of knowing how and where a defendant may have dealt with or disposed of the proceeds of his criminal activities . ”

ORG found , however , that the judge had made an error of calculation and reduced the order to GBP CARDINAL .

On DATE , ORG refused to certify a point of law of general public importance for appeal to ORG concerning LAW .

The CARDINAL Act set out a scheme for the confiscation of the proceeds of drug trafficking in respects of offences committed before DATE . Where all the offences charged or indicted in the proceedings were committed after that date , the DATE Act no longer applies and instead the sentencing court will impose a confiscation order under LAW DATE .

Section CARDINAL of the DATE Act provided that a ORG should make a confiscation order in respect of a defendant appearing before it for sentencing in respect of CARDINAL or more drug - trafficking offences , whom the court found to have received at any time any payment or other reward in connection with drug trafficking .

Under LAW , the confiscation order had to be set at a sum corresponding to the proceeds of drug trafficking assessed by the court to have been gained by the defendant , unless the court was satisfied that , at the time the confiscation order is made , only a lesser sum could be realised .

At the first stage of this procedure , the onus was on the prosecution to establish that the defendant had benefited from drug trafficking . However , section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW required the court to assume that any property appearing to have been held by him at any time since his conviction or during DATE on which the criminal proceedings were commenced was received as a payment or reward in connection with drug trafficking , and that any expenditure incurred by him during the same period was paid for out of the proceeds of drug trafficking . This statutory assumption could be set aside by the defendant in relation to any particular property or expenditure if it was shown by him to be incorrect or if there would be a serious risk of injustice if it were applied ( section CARDINAL ) ) . At the second stage of the procedure , the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that the amount that might be realised is less than the amount of benefit ( see PERSON , paragraphs CARDINAL below ) . The required standard of proof applicable throughout proceedings under LAW was the balance of probabilities ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ) .

The appellant in NORP v. PERSON ( [ DATE ] CARDINAL Cr App R ( S ) CARDINAL ) had , over DATE , defrauded CARDINAL women into parting with sums of money totalling in excess of GBP QUANTITY . He pleaded guilty to a number of offences of dishonesty . The judge made a confiscation order under LAW DATE ( which set out a scheme for the confiscation of the proceeds of crimes other than drug trafficking ) . The benefit was assessed as the GBP CARDINAL that the appellant had received from the women , adjusted to GBP CARDINAL on the assumption that he would have invested it in such a way as to preserve its value against inflation at least . The police were unable to identify any significant assets held by or on behalf of the appellant or to trace where the stolen money had gone , and claimed that he must have hidden it , since he did not appear to have lived extravagantly or spent large sums of money . The appellant claimed that he had lost a considerable part by gambling , but there was no evidence to corroborate his claims . The trial judge found the appellant ’s evidence to be evasive and dishonest but nonetheless decided to reduce the benefit figure by GBP CARDINAL as an acknowledgement that some of the money had probably been spent over DATE . The appellant appealed to ORG , contending inter alia that the judge had been wrong to place the burden on the appellant to establish that his realisable assets were less than the amount of the benefit .

ORG held that LAW made it clear that , while the burden of proving the benefit was on the prosecution , it was for the defendant to establish on the balance of probabilities that the amount that might be realised was less . ORG observed that , as a matter of principle ,

“ ... it is likely that an offender may take steps to make the proceeds of crime difficult to trace . Once it is proved that he has received the benefit , it is pragmatic , and entirely fair to the defendant , to place upon him the onus of showing ( to the civil standard ) that he no longer has the proceeds or that their extent or value has diminished ” .

It continued :

“ We stress that the scheme of the LAW requires the court to perform CARDINAL distinct and discrete tasks . First , to determine the benefit . Secondly , to determine the amount that might be realised at the time the order is made , which may be very different . Further , the amount that might be realised may be quite unrelated to the identifiable proceeds of the offence , e.g. a lottery win , inheritance , or other lawfully acquired property . In the end , the task of the court at the second stage is to determine the amount ‘ appearing to the ORG to be the amount that might be realised . But once the benefit has been proved , it is permissible and ought normally to be the approach of the court , to conclude that the benefit remains available until the defendant proves otherwise ... ”

In NORP v. GPE [ DATE ] ORG CARDINAL , ORG unanimously held that the confiscation scheme under LAW was compatible with LAW . In NORP v. ORG [ DATE ] EKHL CARDINAL it reached a similar conclusion as regards the confiscation scheme applicable under LAW DATE to the proceeds of other types of crime . Lord PERSON , with whom the other Law Lords agreed , observed in PERSON :

“ It is a notorious fact that professional and habitual criminals frequently take steps to conceal their profits from crime . Effective but fair powers of confiscating the proceeds of crime are therefore essential . The provisions of LAW are aimed at depriving such offenders of the proceeds of their criminal conduct . Its purposes are to punish convicted offenders , to deter the commission of further offences and to reduce the profits available to fund further criminal enterprises . These objectives reflect not only national but also international policy . GPE has undertaken , by signing and ratifying treaties agreed under the auspices of ORG and ORG , to take measures necessary to ensure that the profits of those engaged in drug trafficking or other crimes are confiscated : see ORG in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances ( DATE ) ; ORG , Search , Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from ORG , GPE , CARDINAL DATE . These LAW are in operation and have been ratified by GPE .

It is clear that LAW was passed in furtherance of a legitimate aim and that the measures are rationally connected with that aim ... The only question is whether the statutory means adopted are wider than is necessary to accomplish the objective . Counsel for the appellant submitted that the means adopted are disproportionate to the objective inasmuch as a persuasive burden is placed on the defendant . ORG [ DATE ] CARDINAL WLR CARDINAL , CARDINAL carefully considered this argument and ruled :

‘ The onus which is placed upon the defendant is not an evidential one but a persuasive one , so that the defendant will be required to discharge the burden of proof : see Lord Hope ’s third category of provisions in R v Director of Public Prosecutions , Ex Kebilene , [ DATE ] CARDINAL ORG CARDINAL , CARDINAL . This is therefore a situation where it is necessary carefully to consider whether the public interest in being able to confiscate the ill - gotten gains of criminals justifies the interference with the normal presumption of innocence . While the extent of the interference is substantial , ORG has clearly made efforts to balance the interest of the defendant against that of the public in the following respects :

( a ) It is only after the necessary convictions that any question of confiscation arises . This is of significance , because the trial which results in the conviction or convictions will be one where the usual burden and standard of proof rests upon the prosecution . In addition , a defendant who is convicted of the necessary offence or offences can be taken to be aware that if he committed the offences of which he has been convicted , he would not only be liable to imprisonment or another sentence , but he would also be liable to confiscation proceedings .

( b ) The prosecution has the responsibility for initiating the confiscation proceedings unless the court regards them as inappropriate ...

( c ) There is also the responsibility placed upon the court not to make a confiscation order when there is a serious risk of injustice . As already indicated , this will involve the court , before it makes a confiscation order , standing back and deciding whether there is a risk of injustice . If the court decides there is , then the confiscation order will not be made .

( d ) There is the role of this court on appeal to ensure there is no unfairness .

It is very much a matter of personal judgment as to whether a proper balance has been struck between the conflicting interests . Into the balance there must be placed the interests of the defendant as against the interests of the public , that those who have offended should not profit from their offending and should not use their criminal conduct to fund further offending . However , in our judgment , if the discretions which are given to the prosecution and the court are properly exercised , the solution which ORG has adopted is a reasonable and proportionate response to a substantial public interest , and therefore justifiable.’ ( Emphasis supplied )

For my part I think that this reasoning is correct , notably in explaining the role of the court in standing back and deciding whether there is or might be a risk of serious or real injustice and , if there is , or might be , in emphasising that a confiscation order ought not be made . The ORG accepted that this is how the court , seized with a question of confiscation , should approach its task . In my view this concession was rightly made .

In agreement with the unanimous views of ORG in PERSON v GPE No CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) CARDINAL DATE I would hold that Part VI of the CARDINAL LAW is a proportionate response to the problem which it addresses . ”

LAW , to which GPE is a party , states in DATE that :

“ CARDINAL . Each ORG shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of :

a ) Proceeds derived from offences established in accordance with LAW , paragraph CARDINAL , or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds ;

b ) Narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances , materials and equipment or other instrumentalities used in or intended for use in any manner in offences established in accordance with LAW , paragraph CARDINAL .

Each ORG shall also adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable its competent authorities to identify , trace , and freeze or seize proceeds , property , instrumentalities or any other things referred to in paragraph CARDINAL of this article , for the purpose of eventual confiscation .

Each ORG may consider ensuring that the onus of proof be reversed regarding the lawful origin of alleged proceeds or other property liable to confiscation , to the extent that such action is consistent with the principles of its domestic law and with the nature of the judicial and other proceedings .

The provisions of this article shall not be construed as prejudicing the rights of bona fide third parties .

Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the measures to which it refers shall be defined and implemented in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the domestic law of a ORG . ”

The above Convention , which entered into force in DATE , aimed to facilitate international co - operation and mutual assistance in investigating crime and tracking down , seizing and confiscating the proceeds thereof . Parties undertake in particular to criminalise the laundering of the proceeds of crime and to confiscate instrumentalities and proceeds ( or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds ) .


The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the applicant , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE a person sued the applicant for defamation before ORG . On DATE the plaintiff extended his action . He claimed that the applicant should be ordered to abstain from alleging that he had stolen objects which formed part of his personal belongings and which were kept by the applicant . The plaintiff further claimed that the applicant should apologise for her above statements and that she be ordered to pay him CARDINAL NORP korunas ( SKK ) in compensation for non - pecuniary damage resulting from the interference with his personality rights .

On DATE the applicant requested the exclusion of ORG judge dealing with the case with reference to the conduct of the latter . On DATE ORG decided that ORG judge was not biased .

On DATE ORG granted the plaintiff ’s action . The applicant was ordered to revoke her statement that the plaintiff had stolen the property in question , to abstain from such statements in the future and to apologise in writing to the plaintiff . ORG further decided that the applicant had to pay SKK CARDINAL,CARDINAL to the plaintiff in compensation for non - pecuniary damage and to reimburse the plaintiff ’s costs amounting to SKK CARDINAL,CARDINAL .

On DATE the applicant appealed . She stated that the judgment had been served on her on CARDINAL DATE . On DATE the applicant submitted the reasons for her appeal .

On DATE ORG rejected the appeal on the ground that it had been lodged belatedly . The decision stated , with reference to the relevant provisions of LAW , that the first instance judgment was to be considered as having been served on DATE , that is on DATE after it had been deposited at the post office . ORG noted that the deposition of the judgment at the post office , of which the applicant was notified in writing , had been preceded by CARDINAL unsuccessful attempts to serve it on the applicant in person at her address .

On DATE the applicant filed an appeal on points of law . She relied on Section CARDINAL ) of the Code of Civil Procedure and argued that ORG conclusion concerning the date of service of the first instance judgment was erroneous .

The applicant further requested that she should be exempted from the obligation to pay the costs of the proceedings concerning her appeal on points of law and that a lawyer should be assigned to her by the court . She explained that she was handicapped and that her only income was an invalidity pension amounting to SKK DATE . The applicant concluded that her financial and social situation did not allow her to incur any costs in the context of the proceedings .

On DATE the Bánovce nad ORG exempted the applicant from the obligation to pay the court fees in respect of the proceedings on her appeal on points of law . It further dismissed her request that a lawyer be assigned to her .

In its decision ORG noted that the court fee due by the applicant amounted to SKK CARDINAL,CARDINAL , that is CARDINAL of her DATE income . The court therefore considered it justified to exempt the applicant from the obligation to pay it .

As to the applicant ’s request that a lawyer be appointed to represent her , ORG established , with reference to the relevant regulations , that an advocate was entitled to charge the applicant LAW for representing her in the proceedings on her appeal on points of law . It held that the applicant could afford to pay that sum and that her DATE income would in such a case still remain over the statutory minimum which then corresponded to SKK CARDINAL,CARDINAL .

On DATE the applicant appealed . She claimed that her living costs and expenditures on medicaments did not allow her to pay the fees of a lawyer . On DATE ORG rejected the appeal on the ground that it had been lodged out of time .

On DATE the applicant filed an appeal on points of law against ORG decision of DATE . She argued that she had appealed in time . The applicant also claimed that she should be exempted from the obligation to pay the court fees in respect of her appeal on points of law and that an advocate should be appointed to represent her .

On DATE ORG invited the applicant , with reference to LAW and to ORG above decision of DATE , to appoint a lawyer within DATE . The letter further stated that the proceedings would be discontinued in the event that the applicant failed to comply with the request .

The applicant received ORG letter on DATE , and on DATE she replied that she could not comply with the request within the time - limit fixed as she was to start a cure in the Piešťany spa as from DATE . The applicant further stated that she did not know when the cure would end . A certificate attached to the applicant ’s letter indicated that the cure was to DATE as from DATE .

On DATE ORG discontinued the proceedings on the applicant ’s appeals on points of law . The decision stated that the applicant had been notified about the dismissal of her request for an advocate to be assigned to her by ORG on DATE . Accordingly , she had had enough time to appoint a lawyer of her own choice or , as the case might be , to ask ORG or ORG to assign a lawyer to her . ORG concluded that the applicant ’s conduct indicated that she had no genuine interest in complying with the formal requirements for her appeals on points of law to be proceeded with .

In a letter dated DATE and sent on DATE the applicant asked the president of ORG to assign a lawyer to her in the proceedings on her appeals on points of law . She explained that she was handicapped and indigent .

On DATE the vice - president of ORG replied to the applicant , with reference to LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW of DATE , that an advocate could be assigned only to persons who were denied legal assistance . The letter further stated that the applicant had not shown that advocates had refused to represent her .

On DATE the applicant again requested that the president of ORG assign a lawyer to her .

On DATE the vice - president of ORG reiterated the position set out in her letter of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the applicant asked ORG to assign a lawyer to her in the proceedings on her appeal on points of law against ORG decision of DATE . She explained that she was indigent and that her mobility was reduced . The applicant further stated that she would not contact an advocate directly , and that she considered indecent and discriminatory the requirement that she should show that CARDINAL advocates had refused to represent her prior to addressing her request to ORG . The applicant reiterated her request on DATE .

On DATE an enforcement officer informed the applicant that proceedings had been brought with a view to enforcing the above ORG judgment of DATE .

The applicant filed an objection to the enforcement . She argued that it had no legal ground as she had not offended the plaintiff . The applicant further contested the costs of the enforcement .

On DATE the Bánovce nad ORG dismissed the applicant ’s objection to the enforcement . It found that the applicant still owed the sum in question , and there existed no impediment to the enforcement . ORG further found that the applicant ’s objection to the costs of the enforcement was justified .

On DATE the enforcement officer issued an order under which the sum due by the applicant was to be withdrawn from the applicant ’s invalidity pension . Subsequently the order was quashed as the costs of the enforcement had not been determined in it correctly .

On DATE a new enforcement order was issued . The sum owed by the applicant has been enforced by DATE instalments of SKK CARDINAL,CARDINAL deducted from her invalidity pension . The applicant was informed that the sum which had already been enforced under the above order of DATE would be deducted from the sum due by her .

On DATE the applicant requested that the enforcement proceedings be discontinued . She argued that the costs of the enforcement had been indicated erroneously in the order of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the applicant submitted to ORG , at the latter ’s request , documents concerning her health .

On DATE ORG requested the applicant to inform it whether she had apologised to the plaintiff and abstained from further defamatory statements in his respect as ordered by the judgment of DATE .

On DATE the applicant informed the court that she had sent the plaintiff a registered letter of apology . The applicant further pointed out that the above ORG letter of DATE had been erroneously sent to her mother ’s place in ORG Bebravou and not to her permanent address in GPE .

In a separate letter of DATE the applicant complained to the Minister of ORG that ORG had failed to examine her complaint about the enforcement officer dealing with her case .

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) provides that courts may appoint a representative to a party to the proceedings , at the latter ’s request , provided that he or she meets the requirements for waiver of court fees and that such an appointment is necessary for the protection of the party ’s interests . Pursuant to paragraph CARDINAL of LAW , the president of the court ’s chamber shall appoint an advocate to represent a party in circumstances set out in the first paragraph when the protection of the party ’s interests so requires .

Pursuant to LAW ( f ) , an appeal on points of law is available when a party has been prevented , by the appellate court ’s conduct , from acting before the court .

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) provides , inter alia , that in proceedings on an appeal on points of law the plaintiff has to be represented by an advocate or a commercial lawyer unless he or she has legal qualification .

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( PERSON o advokácii ) of DATE provides that everybody has the right to legal assistance and can ask any advocate for it .

Paragraph CARDINAL of LAW provides that an advocate is entitled to refuse legal assistance to a person only for serious reasons permitting the advocate to conclude that he or she can not provide such assistance in an appropriate manner . This does not apply to cases when an advocate was assigned to represent a person , for example under LAW . An advocate shall explain the reasons for which he or she refused to provide legal assistance to a client . ORG shall examine whether such a refusal was justified .

Under paragraph CARDINAL of LAW , a person whose request for legal assistance has been turned down can ask ORG to appoint an advocate to represent him or her .

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) , as in force since DATE , provides that citizens are entitled to legal assistance at a reduced cost or free of charge when it is justified by the client ’s personal or material situation or by other particular reasons .


Violations of Art. 3;Violation of Art. 13 (no remedy in respect of ill-treatment);Violations of Art. 5-1;Violation of Art. 6-1;No separate issues under Art. 5-4 and 13 (no right to appeal);Pecuniary damage - financial award;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings

Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;Khanlar Hajiyev;Snejana Botoucharova;Sverre Erik Jebens

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the police started an investigation into a murder case in which they identified L. as a suspect . It was believed that PERSON was the applicant 's boyfriend .

On DATE the police decided they would search for PERSON at the applicant 's home .

On DATE , TIME , the police arrived at the applicant 's flat , apparently to conduct a search , but since they failed to produce a warrant she would not let them in .

On DATE , CARDINAL DATE , at TIME , CARDINAL policemen in plain clothes were waiting for the applicant at her door . CARDINAL of them produced the identity card of a police major LOC and demanded to enter the applicant 's flat . As they still had no warrant , the applicant again refused to let them in . The policemen insisted and the applicant fell into a heated discussion with them during which both sides exchanged threats and insults . Ultimately , the major ordered the applicant 's arrest . His subordinates , P. and PERSON , seized the applicant , turned her upside down and , while continuing to intimidate her , threw her into a car with no police markings on it . In the struggle the applicant was pushed against the door and hurt her leg and her head ; she also banged her head against the car when she was being pushed into it . On the way , the major PERSON threatened the applicant , saying that he would beat her family and loot her flat while searching it .

The applicant was taken to the GPE district police station in PERSON - on - Don . She was not informed why she had been taken to the police station . According to the ORG 's subsequent accounts , it was to fill in the official report on her forceful resistance to the police . However , in the police report it was stated that she was brought in for questioning .

At the police station , the applicant was brought before the Deputy Head of ORG who questioned her about the whereabouts of “ her husband ” . The applicant told him that she had never been married , and after that he started strangling her with his hands and several other policemen started beating her . For TIME they administered kicks and blows to her legs , threw her across the room , beat her with a baton and hit her head against the walls . While beating her they accused her of telling lies , insulted her and threatened her with rape and violence against her family .

The applicant requested that her relatives be informed about her detention ; she also requested medical assistance and permission to contact a lawyer , but all her requests were refused .

At the end of the applicant 's interrogation , the deputy prosecutor of the district of GPE , NORP , happened to visit the police station and enter the room where the applicant had been beaten . The applicant seized this opportunity to complain about her arrest and the beating . He listened to her and suggested that she write him a complaint about her unlawful arrest , but he discouraged her from complaining about ill - treatment . The applicant claimed that she wrote her complaint on the spot and handed it to NORP

After that , at TIME , the applicant was taken home because the police wanted to conduct a search of her flat . The applicant 's neighbour PERSON , who was summoned as a witness , was told that they were looking for PERSON , and she confirmed that PERSON did not live there . The police insisted on searching the flat , however it transpired that they still did not have a search warrant and the applicant again refused to let them in . After a short struggle the applicant was again seized and carried to the car upside down with her head banging on the walls and the staircase . She was taken back to the GPE district police station where she was again beaten up , intimidated and accused of hiding PERSON She was then placed in a detention cell .

The applicant was kept in the detention cell until TIME on DATE . Although this fact has never been in dispute , no record concerning this period of the applicant 's detention could be found .

On DATE at TIME the applicant was subjected to a personal search and the keys to her flat were seized . Later on DATE the prosecutor of the district of GPE issued a warrant to search the applicant 's flat and it was carried out .

On DATE the applicant was brought before an officer who , without introducing himself , said to her “ DATE ” . Subsequently the applicant learned that it was Judge PERSON of ORG of PERSON , and that “ DATE ” meant a DATE sentence for the administrative offence of forceful resistance to the police . On DATE the applicant was taken to a special centre for administrative detention .

On DATE , when the applicant 's release after the DATE detention was due , the police major PERSON who had arrested her checked her out of the detention centre , took her to the GPE district police station and ordered her to wash the floor in the police station hallway . When she had finished doing so he released her .

On DATE the applicant underwent a forensic examination by a medical expert who established that she had multiple bruises on the face and legs , abrasions on the face , jaw , neck and legs , and a traumatic oedema of the soft tissues of the head .

On DATE the Human Rights Commissioner of the GPE regional governor 's office filed , on the applicant 's behalf , a complaint with the Head of ORG of GPE and another one with the prosecutor of GPE . They requested an investigation into the applicant 's alleged ill - treatment by the police and her allegedly unlawful detention ; they also enclosed the applicant 's detailed account of the events and the forensic report of DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a claim for damages with ORG of GPE , alleging ill - treatment by the police and challenging her arrest and the search of her flat .

On DATE the Deputy Head of ORG of GPE informed the applicant that an internal inquiry had been conducted in view of her complaint and that her allegations had been found to be unsubstantiated . The conclusions of the internal inquiry were forwarded to the prosecutor 's office . However , she was also informed that some unspecified police officers had been charged with disciplinary offences . The Human Rights Commissioner received a similar reply .

On DATE the applicant received a letter from the deputy prosecutor of the district of GPE , NORP , whom she had met at the police station ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . He informed the applicant that her complaint against the police had been forwarded to him by the GPE prosecutor 's office and that he had decided that no criminal investigation in respect of the accused police officers was to be opened .

On DATE the prosecutor of the district of GPE , PERSON . , informed ORG , apparently following their official inquiry , that no documents concerning the applicant 's arrest and detention could be found .

On DATE the deputy prosecutor of the GPE prosecutor 's office confirmed that decision .

On DATE ORG examined the applicant 's claim and held that the search of the applicant 's flat , the initial arrest and the DATE detention had been lawful . The court found that the police had acted lawfully , as authorised by the prosecutor , and that it was necessary for the investigation into the murder case . As to the allegations of ill - treatment , the court referred to the prosecutor 's refusal to open a criminal investigation in respect of the police officers and to the conclusion of the internal police inquiry that no ill - treatment had been established . It dismissed the forensic report as irrelevant and held that the allegations of ill - treatment were unsubstantiated .

On DATE ORG examined the applicant 's appeal and upheld the earlier findings .

On DATE the applicant attempted to challenge her DATE detention before ORG . She alleged that she was not informed of the name of the officer who took the decision to detain her and that he did not ask her any questions , did not inform her of any charge against her , did not explain the purpose of her appearance before him and did not give her a copy of his decision concerning her detention .

On DATE the same judge who imposed the DATE detention informed the applicant that no ordinary appeal could be brought against that decision , and that it could only be challenged by the prosecutor 's extraordinary appeal .

On DATE the applicant filed a complaint with ORG and ORG . She challenged the refusal to consider her claim in civil proceedings .

On CARDINAL DATE the President of ORG replied to the applicant that , on the evidence of the file , her detention had been lawful as it had been imposed for the administrative offence in accordance with substantive and procedural law .

On DATE the applicant filed another appeal with ORG against the decision on her detention .

On DATE the Acting President of the Rostov ORG replied that no appeal against a decision on administrative detention was provided for by law .

The applicant subsequently tried to challenge the above decisions , but none of her claims were accepted , the ground given being that the courts lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter . The last decision in this respect was taken on DATE by ORG .

On DATE the prosecutor 's office of the district of GPE instituted a criminal investigation into the circumstances of the applicant 's arrest and her TIME detention and into her allegations of ill - treatment .

On DATE the prosecutor of GPE filed of his own motion a request with the President of ORG to quash the decision of DATE by which the applicant had been convicted of an administrative offence . He stated that the applicant 's resistance to the police did not constitute an administrative offence because the police had acted unlawfully and that the detention was in any event a disproportionate punishment .

On DATE the President of the Rostov ORG granted the request and quashed the decision on the grounds that the judge who had convicted the applicant whether she was guilty of any administrative offence . It was found that no forceful resistance had taken place , because the police were carrying out an investigation and not safeguarding public order when the applicant resisted . It was also held that the police had acted in violation of the procedural law .

On DATE the prosecutor 's office of the district of GPE terminated the criminal investigation into the alleged ill - treatment and unlawful arrest and detention on the ground that the police officers had not committed any unlawful act .

On DATE ORG quashed the termination order of CARDINAL DATE and resumed the criminal investigation concerning the ill - treatment and the unlawful arrest . The prosecutor 's office of the district of GPE was given DATE to complete the investigation under the supervision of ORG . The relevant parts of this decision read as follows :

“ [ The applicant ] consistently maintained that she objected to the unlawful entry of the police into her flat and the unlawful search in the absence of a prosecutor 's warrant , and had therefore been subjected to unlawful arrest and detention and beaten up ...

The medical examination revealed numerous injuries caused by beating ... the time of origin and the cause of which corroborate [ the applicant 's ] statements ... The investigation has not established the circumstances in which these injuries were caused .

The reports on the administrative offence and on the applicant 's arrest of CARDINAL DATE ... contain fraudulent statements concerning the participation of the attesting witnesses ... These circumstances have not been fully investigated , although they served as a basis for the applicant 's administrative arrest . The decision of CARDINAL DATE dispensing with criminal proceedings against [ the police officer who issued the reports ] ... is unfounded . ”

In their letter of DATE , the ORG submitted that the investigation was still in progress . The parties have not provided any update concerning the criminal investigation thereafter .

The relevant provision of LAW ( PERSON об административных правонарушениях РСФСР ) , in force until DATE , read as follows :

“ Forceful resistance to a lawful order or demand by a police or a voluntary brigade serviceman , ... shall be punished by a fine of CARDINAL times the minimum wage ... or by DATE corrective labour ... or if these measures are considered insufficient , by DATE imprisonment . ”

The relevant parts of LAW in force at the material time provided as follows :

“ A witness shall be summoned for questioning by a written notice served on him personally , or in his absence to an adult member of his family ...

The notice shall contain the name of the person called as a witness , indicate where , before whom , on what date and at what time he is due to appear and the consequences of a failure to appear . A witness may also be summoned by telephone or telegram . ”

“ The questioning of a witness takes place at the place of investigation . An investigator may decide to question a witness at the witness 's location . ”

The relevant part of LAW adopted by referendum on DATE provides as follows :

“ CARDINAL . Everyone has the right to liberty and personal security .

Arrest , detention and placement in custody shall be subject to a court decision . No one may be detained longer than TIME before the court decision is taken . ”

LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) provided that the police could subject a person to an administrative arrest to prevent an administrative offence , to establish a person 's identity , to issue a document certifying that an administrative offence had been committed , if it was necessary and could not be done on the spot , and to ensure effective proceedings or the enforcement of administrative sanctions . Article CARDINAL provided , in particular , that the term of administrative arrest should not exceed TIME , except for certain categories of offenders , including those who forcefully resisted the lawful order of the police , who could be detained as long as necessary until their case was considered by a district ( city ) judge or a senior police officer . Article CARDINAL set out the requirements for the arrest report .

The Administrative Code did not provide for an appeal against the administrative arrest if imposed by a judge . The relevant provisions read as follows :

“ ... The decision of a district ( city ) court or judge to impose an administrative sanction is final and not subject to appeal in the administrative proceedings ... ”

“ The decision of a district ( city ) judge to impose an administrative sanction under [ Article CARDINAL ] may be changed or quashed by the same judge following a prosecutor 's extraordinary appeal , or by a president of a superior court , of his own motion . ”


Ganna Yudkivska;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . The respondent Government were represented by their Agent , PERSON , of ORG .

On DATE the applicant 's son died while he was completing his military service as a private in the NORP army ( the “ private ” ) .

On DATE the private 's commanding officer informed the applicant that his son had accidentally electrocuted himself when , together with CARDINAL other army privates , he had tried to open a transformer in an electrical substation . The private 's body was delivered to his family DATE . While preparing the body for burial his family discovered various wounds , bruises and an alleged cigarette burn .

The applicant 's son was buried on DATE .

A preliminary investigation was opened into the death of the applicant 's son on DATE .

An autopsy was performed on DATE . The autopsy report contained the following information in respect of the death of the applicant 's son :

“ On DATE at TIME in the village of GPE , while [ the private was ] working with a high voltage transformer and at a moment when he was standing holding a metal rod , he received an electric shock . ... The immediate attempts to resuscitate him were unsuccessful . ”

The autopsy concluded the following :

“ The death of the [ private ] was caused by severe cardiovascular failure resulting from the effects of electricity on the body . This [ finding ] is supported by the place where the death occurred , the signs on the body of a quick death such as cyanosis of the face ; spotted haemorrhaging under the mucous membranes of the eyelids , under the pleurae of the lungs , under the outer coating of the heart and under the mucous membrane of the renal pelvis ; significant blood stagnation in the internal organs ; swelling of the brain and the lungs ; and , in particular , the presence of an electrical burn mark in the area of the right palm . ”

On DATE the GPE regional military prosecutor 's office terminated the preliminary investigation into the death of the applicant 's son . It concluded that on DATE the private , together with CARDINAL other army privates , had decided to remove the cover of an electrical transformer at an electrical substation with the aim of stealing copper cables . In the process , the private had used a metal rod to lever the cover open , but when he touched it he had been electrocuted . Based on the findings of the medical report and the testimonies of the CARDINAL army privates who had witnessed the event , the public prosecutor 's office concluded that there was a lack of evidence of an offence and terminated the preliminary investigation . A technical report into the incident had also been commissioned , which reached the following conclusion :

“ the CARDINAL [ army privates ] entered the building of the [ electrical ] substation without the necessary qualifications and training and were operating there [ in an environment of ] QUANTITY [ of electricity ] ” .

A letter dated DATE was sent to the private 's mother informing her of the decision of the public prosecutor 's office .

On DATE the applicant appealed against that decision . He argued that the investigation had been superfluous , its findings inconclusive and that it had failed to satisfactorily address and account for all the bruises and wounds found on the body of his son .

On DATE the military appellate prosecutor 's office quashed the decision of CARDINAL DATE and remitted the case for further investigation . As a result , witnesses were once again questioned during DATE .

The results of the additional preliminary investigation were presented to the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the preliminary investigation into the death of the applicant 's son was once again terminated by the GPE regional military prosecutor 's office , whose decision was upheld by the military appellate prosecutor 's office on DATE .

On DATE , DATE , ORG , sitting in camera , upheld the above decisions to terminate the preliminary investigation into the death of the applicant 's son . The applicant was informed of this in a letter dated DATE . The letter was sent by registered post on DATE , but it is unclear when it was received .

Subsequently , the applicant petitioned ORG to request the reopening of the preliminary investigation . The petition was dated DATE ( “ CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL ” in the document ) , but the applicant himself indicated on the copy he provided to the ORG that he had made a mistake in the date . In it the applicant referred to his appeal of CARDINAL DATE and argued that the subsequent investigation had also been flawed as it had failed to comply with the instructions given by the higher prosecutor 's office . Thus , he asked ORG to quash the decisions of the GPE regional military prosecutor 's office and the military appellate prosecutor 's office and to propose the reopening of the preliminary investigation on the basis of the amendments of LAW CARDINAL DATE ( “ CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL ” in the document ) . The applicant filed his petition on an unknown date , but in order to process it the supreme cassation public prosecutor 's office requested the case file from the regional military prosecutor 's office on DATE ; it was sent on DATE .

On DATE the supreme cassation public prosecutor 's office rejected the applicant 's petition and informed him that preliminary investigations terminated by court decisions were not subject to reopening . On DATE , the supreme cassation public prosecutor 's office sent the case file back to the regional military prosecutor 's office .

The applicant filed a second petition with ORG to request the reopening of the preliminary investigation , dated DATE . In order to process it , the supreme cassation public prosecutor 's office requested the case file from the regional military prosecutor 's office on CARDINAL DATE ; it was sent on DATE .

On DATE the supreme cassation public prosecutor 's office once again rejected the applicant 's petition but also informed him that the decisions to terminate the preliminary investigation were correct in so far as there was a lack of evidence of an offence .

The relevant provisions of LAW and of LAW , as well as the practice of the domestic courts , have been summarised in the inadmissibility decision in the case of PERSON GPE ( dec . ) ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE ) .


Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Luis López Guerra;Nona Tsotsoria

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by PERSON PERSON Schüller , a lawyer practising in GPE .

NORP The applicant is married to a GPE national . CARDINAL children have been born to the couple , in DATE , in DATE and in DATE . The children have GPE nationality .

Mr A. was also the applicant in the case of NORP v. the GPE ( no . CARDINAL ) . The following is taken from the ORG ’s admissibility decision in that case , adopted on CARDINAL DATE , and its judgment , delivered on DATE .

NORP In his native GPE the applicant opposed the regime of Colonel PERSON , which at that time held power there .

The applicant entered the GPE in DATE and applied for asylum . He was met with a refusal . He exhausted the available domestic remedies without success . In the course of the domestic proceedings secret intelligence reports were prepared by the intelligence and security service , ORG ( Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst – “ ORG ” ) and its successor , ORG ( Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst – “ LAW ” ) . Details are provided in the ORG ’s judgment PERSON the GPE , no . CARDINAL , LAW DATE , DATE .

The applicant was CARDINAL of CARDINAL individuals tried in GPE as members of an organisation suspected of , among other things , recruiting NORP militants for jihad ( NORP holy war ) against countries including the GPE . The “ GPE jihad trial ” , as the proceedings were dubbed , attracted considerable media attention and the applicant ’s identity became known . The applicant and his co - accused were acquitted of all charges on DATE , after the trial court had excluded evidence based on secret intelligence withheld from the defence .

On DATE , the Minister for ORG ( Minister PERSON ) imposed an exclusion order ( ongewenstverklaring ; CARDINAL of LAW ( Vreemdelingenwet DATE ) , see paragraph CARDINAL below ) on the applicant on the ground that he constituted a threat to national security . As a consequence of this decision , the applicant could no longer be lawfully resident in the GPE and was subject to expulsion . The decision itself was based largely on secret intelligence not disclosed to the applicant .

The applicant lodged an objection ( bezwaar ) against this decision , which the Minister for ORG rejected on DATE . The applicant appealed ( beroep ) to ORG ( rechtbank ) of GPE , which dismissed the appeal on DATE . The applicant lodged a further appeal ( hoger beroep ) with ORG of ORG ( GPE bestuursrechtspraak PERSON , “ ORG ” ) , which was rejected on summary reasoning on CARDINAL DATE .

The applicant lodged an application ( no . CARDINAL ) with the ORG . As relevant to the present case , the applicant complained that his expulsion to GPE , if effected , would violate his rights under LAW .

In its judgment of DATE ( no . CARDINAL , A. v. the GPE ) , the ORG held as follows ( paragraph references omitted ) :

“ CARDINAL . The applicant fears detention and ill - treatment in GPE on account of his political opposition activities , and the nature of the charges for which he had been tried in the GPE and which trial had been widely reported in the media .

The ORG observes from the materials in its possession and the materials submitted by the parties that the overall human - rights situation in GPE continues to give rise to serious concerns . Where it concerns the position of persons detained in GPE , materials from both governmental and nongovernmental sources indicate the existence of a real risk for detainees in GPE to be subjected to torture and/or ill - treatment ( ... ) which – according to the most recent report of ORG are said to occur routinely ( ... ) .

As to the risk that the applicant will be detained if expelled to GPE , the ORG notes that , in the applicant ’s own submissions , the opposition group for which he had been active had started having problems with the NORP regime as from DATE or DATE whereas he had not encountered any problems from the side of the NORP authorities when he left GPE at DATE via an official border crossing - point , holding his own authentic passport . As apparently persons leaving or entering GPE are subjected to strict controls by border control officials , the ORG considers that in these circumstances it has not been established that the applicant had attracted the negative attention of the NORP authorities on account of his alleged opposition activities prior to his departure from GPE .

Where it concerns the risk of the applicant being detained in GPE for having stood trial in the GPE on suspicion of involvement in an NORP extremist network active in the GPE , the ORG notes that the applicant was acquitted in these proceedings . However , these criminal proceedings attracted considerable media attention and the applicant ’s name and nationality were disclosed in several printed media reports . ORG also notes that on DATE , shortly after the prosecution had withdrawn its appeal against the applicant ’s acquittal in the criminal proceedings , the NORP mission in the GPE was informed by ORG [ Vreemdelingenpolitie ] that the applicant had been placed in GPE detention [ vreemdelingenbewaring ] for removal purposes .

The ORG further notes that , according to reports of ORG and ORG , the NORP authorities oppose militant forms of ORG and that , according to information gathered by ORG [ i.e. PERSON GPE ] , the NORP authorities often have a good insight in the activities and contacts of NORP abroad . Against this background and the strict controls of persons seeking to enter GPE , the ORG considers it sufficiently plausible for the purposes of LAW that the applicant would be identified and detained for questioning after his arrival in GPE entailing a real risk of being subjected to treatment in violation of LAW at the hands of the NORP authorities .

In view of the above , the ORG considers that substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the applicant would face a real risk of treatment proscribed by LAW if expelled to GPE . Given this finding , the ORG does not find it necessary to examine the remaining issues raised by the applicant under this provision .

The ORG finds therefore that , in the circumstances of the present case , the applicant ’s expulsion to GPE would breach LAW . ”

NORP The regime of Colonel PERSON was overthrown in DATE . On DATE Colonel PERSON himself was captured and killed . ORG , the internationally recognised interim authority , declared the country liberated DATE .

GPE is now governed under a transitional constitution , LAW , which was promulgated on DATE . According to LAW , GPE is an independent democratic state in which power derives from the people ; ORG is the state religion ; and sharia ( NORP law ) is the principal source of legislation . DATE provides that GPE shall be a multi - party democracy .

Parliamentary elections were held in DATE . The NORP parliament , ORG , was sworn in on DATE .

The facts of the present case , as submitted by the applicant , may be summarised as follows .

After the ORG had given its judgment of DATE , the applicant asked ORG ( Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst ) of ORG ( PERSON ; renamed ORG and ORG ( PERSON ) after DATE ) to reconsider the applicant ’s exclusion order . He questioned , in particular , the relevance of the secret intelligence which was by then DATE . He also submitted information on his family life , in particular the state of health of his wife who suffered from post - traumatic stress disorder as a result of police raids on the couple ’s home carried out in DATE and DATE to arrest the applicant .

On DATE the Minister for ORG ( Minister PERSON , ORG , by this time the successor to the Minister for ORG ) wrote to the applicant ’s counsel informing him of his refusal to have the secret intelligence report on the applicant , which dated from DATE , updated by the ORG .

On DATE the Minister for ORG gave his decision .

The Minister noted that the applicant was not yet entitled to the lifting of the exclusion order in any case , since he had not spent CARDINAL consecutive years outside the GPE . There was accordingly no need to have the secret intelligence report updated . He referred in this connection to the ORG ’s judgment of DATE , in which it had been held that the decision to deny the applicant the status of refugee as well as the decision to impose an exclusion order on him did not , as such , concern a right or freedom guaranteed under the Convention ( loc . cit . , § CARDINAL ) and also that the secret intelligence report and the underlying materials did not , as such , concern the applicant ’s fear of being subjected to ill - treatment in GPE but only whether he was posing a threat to GPE national security ( loc . cit . , § CARDINAL ) .

The fact that LAW prevented the applicant ’s expulsion to his country of origin did not affect the exclusion order . An alien subject to such an order was under an obligation to leave the country . Only if the alien was able to prove that LAW constituted a durable obstacle to his return , and that there was no other foreign country where he could settle , and that in the individual case the exclusion order was disproportionate , could the exclusion order be lifted at the alien ’s request . The applicant had failed to seek refuge in any foreign country and had failed to explain why he could not travel to countries other than GPE where he had spent time earlier .

NORP The secret intelligence report , which dated from DATE , was still sufficiently up - to - date and determinative of danger to justify the exclusion order . The applicant ’s family life did not make any difference . The pertinent information , including the reports on the medical state of the applicant ’s wife , had already been known at the time of the appeal against the exclusion order itself and did not , therefore , constitute relevant new facts ; nor was the subsequent birth of CARDINAL further children justification for making an exception . The refusal to lift the exclusion order was therefore not contrary to LAW .

NORP The applicant lodged an objection ( bezwaar ) against the Minister ’s decision .

In addition , the applicant applied to ORG of GPE for a provisional measure ( voorlopige voorziening ) .

The objection was dismissed by ORG on DATE , on behalf of the Minister of the ORG and ORG ( Minister PERSON en GPE ) .

NORP The applicant lodged an appeal with ORG of The Hague .

On DATE ORG of GPE , sitting in ‘ s - Hertogenbosch , gave its decision . It found that the ORG ’s judgment of DATE did not of itself require the exclusion order to be revisited . However , the exclusion order had been based on the assumption that the applicant could return to GPE , which assumption had been found by the ORG to be incorrect ; this meant that the decision of CARDINAL DATE would have to be overturned . The matter had now to be reviewed in the light of the fact that the applicant was prevented by operation of LAW from returning to GPE .

ORG first went into the question whether the original exclusion order could stand . In this connection , it held that an exclusion order required the person concerned to leave the GPE of his or her own accord , whether to his or her country of origin or to another country . The applicant had failed to establish that there was no country other than GPE for him to settle . He had likewise failed to establish that there was no country other than GPE to which his wife and children could , or would , follow him . This meant that the Minister of the Interior and ORG could reasonably argue that the exclusion order would have been given even if it had been known at the time that the applicant could not return to GPE .

ORG then considered whether the Minister of the Interior and ORG had acted reasonably by failing to lift the exclusion order . It noted in this connection that the applicant had clearly not met the requirement of CARDINAL consecutive PERSON residence abroad . Since the applicant had not established that LAW constituted a durable obstacle to his return to GPE – “ durable ” meaning that it prevented the applicant ’s expulsion to that country for a period of DATE and that there was no other foreign country for him to settle , the Minister of the Interior and ORG had been entitled in reason to consider that the impossibility of expelling the applicant to GPE did not require the exclusion order to be lifted .

Since LAW had been taken into consideration in the proceedings concerning the exclusion order itself , the question now was whether there had been any relevant changes in the applicant ’s situation requiring ORG to allow him to exercise his family life in the GPE . Taking the view that the birth of CARDINAL more children since the end of the first set of proceedings changed nothing in principle , ORG found none .

ORG accordingly overturned the decision of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) but left its legal consequences in place .

In a simultaneous but separate decision , ORG dismissed the applicant ’s application for a provisional measure ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) as manifestly ill - founded .

The applicant lodged an appeal with ORG .

On DATE ORG gave a decision dismissing the appeal on summary reasoning .

Section CARDINAL of LAW ( Vreemdelingenwet DATE ) provides that a foreign national may be declared an undesirable alien , entailing the imposition of an exclusion order , on the ground , inter alia , that he or she poses a danger to national security . An exclusion order entails a ban on residing in or visiting the GPE .

Exclusion orders , as well as expulsion orders , can be challenged in administrative law appeal proceedings under the terms of LAW ( Algemene wet bestuursrecht ) . Such appeal proceedings do not have an automatic suspensive effect .

Article CARDINAL of LAW ( GPE ) provides that an alien who stays in the GPE in the knowledge that he or she is subject to an exclusion order commits a criminal offence punishable by CARDINAL months’ imprisonment or a fine of QUANTITY .

An exclusion order may be revoked , upon request , if the alien concerned has been residing outside the GPE for a period of DATE ( section DATE of LAW ) . Such revocation entitles the alien to seek readmission to GPE territory subject to the conditions that are applicable to every alien .


DIMITROVSKA v. "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA"

Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger;Volodymyr Butkevych;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She was represented before the Court by Mr PERSON , a retired lawyer from GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant 's husband , Mr NORP , brought a civil action against ORG ( “ NORP ” ) in the former GPE claiming salary arrears and other employment - related allowances .

On DATE ORG rejected PERSON claim as falling outside its competence . That decision was confirmed by ORG of DATE . On DATE ORG granted PERSON appeal on points of law and remitted the case for re - examination . It held that the NORP courts had been competent to decide the case , in particular as it had involved obligations enforceable in the ORG .

On DATE ORG Instance dismissed PERSON D. 's claim . On DATE he appealed .

On DATE Mr NORP died .

On DATE ORG dismissed PERSON appeal .

On DATE the applicant requested the public prosecutor to lodge an application for the protection of legality ( барање за заштита на законитоста ) with ORG . On DATE the public prosecutor informed the applicant that there were no grounds for using that remedy .


The applicants , Mr PERSON and PERSON , are a married couple . They are NORP nationals who were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE . They were represented before the Court by Ms S. Land , a lawyer practising in GPE .

On DATE , the applicants applied for asylum in the GPE . They claimed that the first applicant had attracted the negative attention of the NORP authorities for having publicly criticised the latter . The second applicant ’s asylum claim was mainly based on the first applicant ’s alleged problems . On DATE , the Deputy Minister of Justice ( ORG ) rejected the applicants’ asylum request . Their objection ( bezwaar ) against this decision was declared inadmissible by the Deputy Minister on DATE for having been filed out of time . The ORG subsequent appeal was rejected on DATE by ORG ( arrondissementsrechtbank ) of GPE sitting in ‘ s - Hertogenbosch .

On DATE , the applicants filed a new asylum request based on newly emerged facts and circumstances within the meaning of Article CARDINAL of LAW ( PERSON ) . This new request was rejected on DATE by the Deputy Minister , who noted , inter alia , that the first applicant had submitted and relied on a summons issued by ORG , addressed to his father and relating to the applicant , whereas – according to an individual official report ( individueel ambtsbericht ) drawn up on DATE by the Minister of ORG on an inquiry carried out – this document was not authentic . As the applicants had failed to react to the conclusion set out in this individual report , the Deputy Minister concluded that no credence could be attached to the applicants’ asylum account . The applicants unsuccessfully challenged this decision in administrative appeal proceedings . The final , negative decision on this second asylum request was taken on DATE by ORG of The GPE sitting in PERSON .

On DATE , the applicants filed a third asylum request based on , inter alia , an allegedly authenticated copy of a judgment given on DATE by ORG in which the first applicant had been convicted and sentenced for political opposition activities .

The final , negative decision on this third asylum request was given on DATE by ORG ( Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak ) of ORG ( PERSON ) in which it rejected the ORG appeal against the refusal of the Minister for ORG ( Minister PERSON Integratie ; the successor of the Deputy Minister of ORG ) to grant them asylum . As regards the copy of the judgment relied on by the applicants , ORG held that the copy submitted did not constitute a “ new fact ” warranting a reconsideration of the applicants’ asylum claim as – for want of reference materials – its authenticity could not be determined by ORG ( ORG ) whilst the applicants had not demonstrated by means of evidence and arguments that it was an authentic NORP document and had given contradictory accounts about the manner in which it had been obtained .

On DATE , the respondent Government were requested under Rule CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( a ) of ORG to draw up an individual official report on , inter alia , the authenticity of the NORP judgment of DATE relied on by the applicants in their third asylum request .

Following certain steps taken by the respondent Government , apparently aimed at the applicants’ actual expulsion to GPE , the ORG decided on DATE to indicate to the Government , under Rule CARDINAL of ORG and until further notice , not to expel the applicants . The ORG further endorsed the request to ORG under Rule CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( a ) .

By letters of CARDINAL and DATE , the respondent Government informed the ORG that , according to the findings of an inquiry carried out in GPE , the judgment of DATE was not an authentic document .

The applicants’ brief comments in reply contained in their letter of CARDINAL DATE did not address the findings of the inquiry conducted in GPE . The applicants merely informed the ORG that they seemed to be eligible for a GPE residence permit under a general amnesty arrangement set out in the new ORG ’s coalition agreement ( coalitieakkoord ) of CARDINAL DATE .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property

Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Sverre Erik Jebens

The applicant was born in DATE and lived in PERSON , a town in LOC .

In DATE the applicant subscribed to a ORG savings scheme for buying a car . The ORG failed to fulfil its obligation , and the applicant sued ORG .

On DATE the ORG of ORG awarded the applicant MONEY ( RUB ) . This judgment became binding on DATE but was not enforced .

On the ORG ’s request , on DATE ORG of GPE quashed the judgment on supervisory review and rejected the applicant ’s claim . The ORG found that the courts below had ignored a crucial material law .

Under LAW of DATE , a bailiff must enforce a judgment within DATE . Under section QUANTITY of LAW of DATE , ORG must enforce a judgment within DATE .