The applicants , PERSON and PERSON , are NORP nationals who were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE and GPE in GPE .

The first applicant works as a commercial clerk ( kaufmännischer Angestellter ) in a private enterprise . He is unmarried and his DATE contributions to the statutory old - age insurance for employees amounted in DATE to ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL and in DATE to ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL .

On DATE the first applicant filed a request to be exempted from his obligation to contribute to the statutory old - age insurance for employees ( gesetzliche GPE ) . He argued that the compulsory insurance violated his right to equal treatment as guaranteed by LAW .

On DATE ORG ( ORG , ORG ) rejected the applicant ’s request , finding that the applicant , as an employee , was subject to the obligatory old - age insurance under LAW ( ORG , see relevant domestic law below ) , and that he did not meet the requirements to be exempted under sections CARDINAL or CARDINAL of that same law .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s objection .

On DATE the applicant lodged a motion with ORG ( ORG ) with a view to being exempted from the obligatory insurance and to being reimbursed his contributions since DATE , alternatively to reduce his DATE contributions to an acceptable degree and to reimburse the exceeding part .

He submitted a statement on political , economic and legal aspects of the compulsory insurance scheme . He argued that the obligatory old - age insurance deprived him of the possibility to provide for old age under a private pension scheme , which would yield considerably higher returns on his investments . The pension which he was likely to receive under the statutory old - age insurance was totally disproportionate when compared to his own contributions . This was partly due to the fact that the contributions under the compulsory insurance were not exclusively used to finance contribution - based pensions , but also to finance so called “ extrinsic benefits ” ( versicherungsfremde ORG , see relevant domestic law below ) , including costs incurred by the NORP reunification .

He further alleged that he was discriminated against when compared to the older generation who currently profited from higher pensions than those which he himself would receive on reaching pension age . Moreover , he complained about discrimination when compared to the group of earners who were not subject to the obligatory insurance system such as self - employed persons and civil servants .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s motion . It noted , first , that the legal provisions for exemption did not apply to the applicant . Secondly , ORG found that the compulsory insurance did not violate the applicant ’s rights under LAW . It noted that the legislator had been granted a wide margin of appreciation when taking measures in the social - political area . ORG was obliged to provide for every citizen ’s basic needs . Accordingly , the legislator was entitled to limit the risk of social neediness by introducing a compulsory insurance scheme . It followed that the compulsory insurance as such did not violate the applicant ’s rights under LAW . ORG finally found that the selection of the group of people who were subject to the compulsory insurance scheme was not arbitrary and thus did not violate the applicant ’s right to equal treatment .

On DATE the Baden - ORG of Appeal ( ORG ) rejected the applicant ’s appeal . Confirming ORG reasoning , that court emphasised that the applicant ’s arguments did not sufficiently take into account the concept of solidarity . Furthermore , ORG referred to the decisions of ORG ( PERSON ) of CARDINAL DATE and of ORG ( Bundesverfassungsgericht ) of DATE , according to which the financing of so - called extrinsic benefits did not violate the applicant ’s rights . The old - age insurance scheme was based on the idea of solidarity and of social compensation ( sozialer PERSON ) which traditionally included an element of social welfare . Even though pension claims had a personal character , they also had to be seen in a distinctly social context . It followed that the legislator was allowed to limit pension claims and to modify benefits as long as these measures served the public welfare and respected the principle of proportionality .

ORG further found that the applicant advocated a position which was focused on the interests of an insured person who did not become unfit for work , who did not need rehabilitation measures and whose contributions did not benefit a surviving spouse . This line of argument neglected the principles of insurance and of solidarity in an unacceptable way . It finally noted that , during proceedings , the legislator had raised the tax - based financing of the extrinsic benefits and had stabilised the rates of contribution .

With his appeal on points of law before ORG , the applicant argued that the insurance system amounted to an expropriation for the following reasons : for the applicant , as a single male , the returns would be lower than his contributions . This was due to CARDINAL factors : the fact that the contributions also covered so - called “ extrinsic benefits ” , including the costs incurred by the NORP reunification , the principle of social compensation , the fact that the impact of the negative growth of population was not compensated by a capital reserve , and the additional costs incurred by women ’s higher life expectancy . He alleged that the legislator had overstepped his competencies under LAW , and that his obligation to contribute to the insurance scheme violated his right to freedom of action and to equal treatment under LAW .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal on points of law . It found , inter alia , that it was acceptable to subject all employees to an obligatory insurance with a view to their typically higher social vulnerability . Accordingly , the obligation did not depend on the individual ORG ability to provide for themselves . The insurance system was justified by the principle of ORG , which obliged the ORG to provide for the risks of life . Obligatory adherence and contributions were necessary to reach this aim , in particular in order to protect the weaker groups of society . ORG did not examine if the assessment of the applicant ’s future benefits could violate his property rights , as this could only be examined at the time the applicant actually touched his benefits .

With respect to the applicant ’s complaint about unequal treatment , ORG found that it was justified to limit the obligatory adherence to the group of employees , because these were typically more in need of security . This followed from the fact that employees were typically dependant on exploiting their own capacity to work in order to earn their living . ORG noted that the legislator had applied similar principles to define the group of self - employed persons who were subject to the obligatory insurance ( section CARDINAL of the sixth book of LAW , see relevant domestic law below ) . It further found that the rate of the obligatory contributions did not put an excessive burden on the applicant , which might amount to a violation of his property right .

The fact that the contributions also covered the so - called “ extrinsic benefits ” did not lead to a violation of the principle of equality , taking into account that these other responsibilities were related to those of the old - age insurance .

In DATE ORG refused to entertain the applicant ’s constitutional complaint .

The second applicant works as an executive employee in a private insurance company .

On DATE the second applicant filed a request to be exempted from his obligation to contribute to the statutory old - age insurance for employees and requested to be reimbursed his contributions .

On DATE ORG ( ORG für GPE , BfA ) rejected the applicant ’s request .

On DATE that same authority rejected the applicant ’s objection .

On DATE the applicant lodged a motion with ORG . He alleged that the obligatory adherence to the insurance scheme amounted to an expropriation and complained about unequal treatment when compared to self - employed persons .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s motion , finding that the differentiation between employees and self - employed persons was not arbitrary , but was justified by the different social vulnerability of these groups . ORG further noted that also self - employed persons were increasingly subject to obligatory insurance schemes , for example to the lawyer ’s insurance . The current rate of contribution was not excessive and thus did not violate the applicant ’s property rights . The applicant had not established a violation of his future pension claims . The mere apprehension that his pension claims might be reduced in the future did not lead to a violation of the applicant ’s present property rights .

On DATE the GPE Social Court of Appeal rejected the applicant ’s appeal , referring mainly to ORG decision .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s complaint against the denial of leave to appeal ( Nichtzulassungsbeschwerde ) as inadmissible . It found that the applicant had failed to establish that the subject matter of his motion was of fundamental importance or that the lower court had committed a procedural error .

On DATE ORG refused to entertain the applicant ’s complaint .

GPE is divided into QUANTITY books , namely Book One and then Books DATE .

The Sixth Book of the Social Code ( ORG ) deals with the public old - age insurance scheme ( ORG ) .

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) provides that all employees are subject to the obligatory insurance .

Section CARDINAL stipulates that certain groups of self - employed persons are also subject to the obligatory insurance , such as teachers , nursing staff and midwifes , artisans who do not have their own business and persons who mainly work for CARDINAL single customer .

According to section CARDINAL the following groups of persons are not subject to the obligatory insurance : ( CARDINAL ) civil servants and judges ; ( CARDINAL ) employees of public or clerical entities insofar as they have pension claims under the civil servant ’s pension scheme or under comparable church regulations ; ( CARDINAL ) members of religious orders insofar as their maintenance according to the rules of that order is assured .

Section CARDINAL defines certain groups of persons who are exempt from the obligatory insurance , in particular those who are subject to another obligatory insurance scheme or who have claims which are comparable to those of civil servants .

The amount of the pension paid under the insurance scheme mainly depends on the amount of the insured person ’s income and the time of contribution .

Besides the pensions and survivor ’s pensions which are based on the insured person ’s contributions , the insurance also grants benefits which are not based on contributions . These payments , which are also referred to as “ extrinsic benefits ” ( versicherungsfremde ORG ) , include pension claims based on times devoted to the raising of children ( NORP ) , pensions compensating the effects of war and injustice ( Kriegsfolge- und Wiedergutmachungslasten ) and payments relating to the conversion of pensions following the NORP reunification .

The general retirement age is DATE ( section CARDINAL ORG ) . From DATE until DATE , women were entitled to a pension by DATE . In DATE the legislator gradually adapted women ’s retirement DATE .

The financing of the benefits under the statutory insurance is organised in a revolving system under which payments made over DATE are financed from contributions received in DATE ( ORG , see section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ORG ) .

The financing is based on the contributions of the insured persons ( a ) , which are complemented by a tax - financed federal state subsidy ( b ) .

( a ) The contributions are calculated according to the insured person ’s gross wages , which are taken into account up to a certain limit ( GPE ) . This limit is calculated on a yearly basis . In DATE , the limit was set at a yearly income of LAW .

The contribution rates are also fixed on a DATE basis and developed as follows : DATE : PERCENT , DATE : PERCENT ; DATE : PERCENT ; DATE : PERCENT ; DATE : PERCENT ; DATE PERCENT , DATE : PERCENT , DATE : PERCENT ; DATE : PERCENT of the gross income .

The contributions have to be paid in equal shares by the employed person and by the employer ( section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) no . CARDINAL SGB VI ) .

( b ) The ORG contributes to the expenses by tax - financed subsidies ( section CARDINAL ORG ) . On DATE the legislator introduced an additional state subsidy which was aimed at financing those expenses under the insurance scheme , which were not covered by contributions ( see no . CARDINAL above ) . These additional payments amounted in DATE to DEM CARDINAL.CARDINAL billion . In DATE , the overall subsidies covered CARDINAL % and in DATE PERCENT of the overall spending .


No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security;Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security;No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;No violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General}

Anatoly Kovler;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Khanlar Hajiyev;Sverre Erik Jebens

The applicant was born in DATE and lived until his arrest in the town of GPE . He is a former deputy governor of GPE .

On DATE criminal proceedings were instituted against several officials of ORG on suspicion of money laundering and fraud .

On DATE the applicant was arrested in ORG office where he had been invited for questioning . He was transferred to ORG of ORG ( hereinafter DATE the ORG ) . A record of his arrest , drawn up at TIME on DATE and produced by the Government , indicated that certain documents were found and seized from the applicant 's office . Those documents and other evidence , including witness statements , linked the applicant to or placed him in charge of private and ORG - owned enterprises implicated in money laundering and fraudulent activities and served as the basis for suspecting the applicant of having participated in an aggravated fraud . The relevant part of the record read as follows :

“ [ The applicant ] , who is suspected of having committed a serious criminal offence , was arrested according to subparagraphs CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of paragraph CARDINAL of LAW of LAW , and because the pre - trial investigating authorities have sufficient grounds to believe that , if released , he may abscond ... , threaten witnesses , destroy evidence or in any other way obstruct the investigation in the present case . ”

The applicant signed the record , making a handwritten objection to his arrest and the accusations against him .

On DATE a senior investigator of ORG , with the consent of the acting ORG , lodged an application with ORG , seeking authorisation for the applicant 's detention on remand . The application contained a lengthy description of the fraudulent activities of a number of private and ORG - owned enterprises in which the applicant had allegedly taken part . The senior investigator also drew ORG attention to other circumstances warranting the applicant 's detention , namely the likelihood that he would abscond and pervert the course of justice .

On DATE ORG authorised the applicant 's detention , finding that he was accused of having committed a serious crime and that , if released , he might threaten witnesses , destroy evidence and obstruct justice .

The applicant 's lawyer appealed against the decisions authorising the arrest and detention . In particular , she complained that there was no evidence which could serve as grounds for the applicant 's arrest and that if such evidence did exist , it had not been listed in the record of the applicant 's arrest . According to the lawyer , the authorities did not put forward any evidence justifying the conclusion that the applicant was liable to abscond or obstruct justice .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of DATE , holding as follows :

's application is substantiated because [ the applicant ] may threaten witnesses , destroy evidence in the case and obstruct adjudication of the case . ”

DATE , on DATE , ORG rejected the lawyer 's complaint concerning the applicant 's arrest , finding that the arrest had been effected in compliance with LAW of LAW .

On DATE ORG , endorsing the reasons given by ORG , upheld the decision of DATE .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant 's detention until DATE , holding that there were no grounds warranting his release .

The applicant 's lawyer appealed . In particular , she complained that ORG had not put forward any reason necessitating the extension of the applicant 's detention .

On an unspecified date ORG upheld the decision of DATE .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant 's detention until DATE , reasoning that additional time was required to perform certain investigative actions . ORG further held as follows :

“ [ The applicant ] is accused of having committed a serious criminal offence ; the court remanded him in custody because he was charged with a serious criminal offence , thus , there are no grounds for a change or annulment of [ the preventive measure ] .

The court takes into account that the detention is extended only for DATE and DATE .

The court takes into account that [ the applicant ] has minor children , however , in determining the issue of the extension of detention , the court has regard to the fact that [ the applicant ] is charged with an offence under LAW ( b ) of LAW , that is with having committed a serious crime for which the most lenient penalty is DATE imprisonment . ”

The decision of DATE was upheld on appeal .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG extended the applicant 's detention until DATE , citing the same reasons as in the decision of DATE .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of CARDINAL DATE , accepting ORG reasoning that the applicant was charged with serious criminal offences and that the investigating authorities needed additional time .

On DATE the applicant 's lawyer applied for the applicant 's release under his own recognisance not to leave the town . The lawyer argued that the need to hold the applicant in custody had long ceased to exist as the pre - trial investigation had been closed . The lawyer further pointed to circumstances making the applicant 's absconding improbable : the applicant had CARDINAL minor children and permanent places of residence and work , and before his arrest the investigating authorities had summoned him on several occasions and he had never defaulted .

On DATE ORG dismissed the request for release . It held that the applicant had been charged with aggravated fraud , money laundering , unlawful possession of ammunition and forgery of documents . DATE ORG upheld the decision , endorsing ORG findings .

On DATE ORG held a preliminary trial hearing , at which the applicant 's lawyers petitioned for the applicant 's release and discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against him . ORG dismissed the request for release because the applicant was charged with serious criminal offences , and if released , could abscond or obstruct establishment of the truth . ORG listed the first trial hearing for DATE .

NORP The applicant 's lawyers , PERSON , PERSON and PERSON , appealed .

On DATE ORG returned the statement of appeal to PERSON , stating that the applicant had refused her services .

DATE the president of Lawyer 's office no . CARDINAL of ORG informed ORG that PERSON and the applicant had signed an agreement according to which PERSON had been entrusted with the authority to appeal against the decision of QUANTITY DATE . PERSON statement of appeal against the decision of QUANTITY DATE was enclosed .

On DATE ORG accepted PERSON statement of appeal and sent it to ORG . DATE ORG , having heard the arguments by PERSON and PERSON , upheld the decision of DATE . The appeal statement lodged by PERSON was examined by ORG on DATE and dismissed as unsubstantiated .

At the trial hearing on DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's lawyer 's application for the applicant 's release .

DATE the lawyer lodged an appeal against ORG decision .

On DATE ORG , relying on LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW , discontinued the appeal proceedings , finding that the release application had been examined and dismissed at the trial hearing and that such a decision was not amenable to appeal .

On DATE ORG held a trial hearing . At that hearing the applicant 's lawyer asked for the applicant 's release under his own recognisance . ORG dismissed the request , noting that there were no grounds for the release .

The applicant 's lawyer , invoking LAW , appealed against the decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of CARDINAL DATE . ORG held that the grounds warranting the applicant 's detention had not changed and , thus , the request for release had been dismissed lawfully .

On DATE ORG dismissed another application for the applicant 's release . It held that no new grounds authorising the applicant 's release had been established . That decision was upheld on appeal on DATE by ORG , which endorsed ORG reasoning .

On DATE the applicant 's lawyer requested the applicant 's release on a written undertaking not to leave the town . ORG refused to examine the request , finding that it was a mere restatement of the lawyer 's previous release applications .

At the trial hearing on DATE the applicant unsuccessfully asked ORG to release him . On DATE ORG examined the lawyers ' appeal against the decision of DATE , upholding that decision as lawful . ORG confirmed ORG opinion that there were no grounds authorising the applicant 's release .

On DATE ORG adjourned the proceedings because the applicant 's co - defendant was ill . The lawyers unsuccessfully petitioned for the applicant 's release . On DATE ORG upheld the decision of DATE because there were no new grounds justifying the release .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant 's detention until DATE . The relevant part of the decision read as follows :

“ [ The applicant ] is accused of having committed intentional mercenary and serious crimes . The circumstances which served as the basis for remanding [ the applicant ] in custody have not changed . New circumstances justifying [ the applicant 's ] release ... have not appeared .

The trial investigation has not been finished , [ the court ] continues to examine the evidence . If released , the accused may obstruct establishment of the truth in the case , abscond or commit new crimes . ”

On DATE ORG endorsed the reasons given by ORG on DATE and upheld that decision .

NORP On DATE ORG extended the applicant 's detention until DATE for the same reasons as in the decision of CARDINAL DATE . That decision became final on DATE , when ORG upheld it on appeal , finding that ORG had taken into account all relevant factors , including the applicant 's personality , and that it had lawfully extended the detention .

On DATE ORG found the applicant guilty of aggravated fraud , unlawful possession of ammunition and forgery of documents and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment .

On DATE ORG amended the judgment of DATE , discontinued the criminal proceedings on the forgery charge due to the expiration of the statutory limitation period and reduced the sentence by DATE .

On TIME CARDINAL DATE the applicant 's car was shot at several times . The applicant , his DATE daughter , his bodyguard and his driver were in the car . The applicant was wounded , his bodyguard received serious injuries and the driver was killed .

On DATE the applicant gave a press conference , at which he accused Mr M. , an ORG general and candidate in the upcoming election of ORG , of having tried to kill him .

A complaint lodged by PERSON with ORG led to the institution of criminal proceedings against the applicant on a charge of criminal libel on DATE .

On DATE the applicant , in the presence of his lawyer , PERSON , was served with the final text of the bill of indictment and was questioned as the accused . On the same day PERSON began studying the case file , in compliance with the requirements of LAW . DATE the applicant and PERSON finished reading the file and made handwritten notes to that effect in a case file record .

On DATE the applicant was committed to stand trial before the Justice of the Peace of the CARDINALth ORG of GPE , which , at the applicant 's and PERSON request , fixed a preliminary hearing for DATE .

At the first trial hearing , held on DATE , the applicant successfully asked the Justice of the Peace to adjourn the proceedings to allow his lawyer to study the case file . On DATE the Justice of the Peace granted another request by the applicant and allowed CARDINAL other lawyers retained by the applicant to enter the proceedings .

A number of trial hearings were held DATE and DATE , at which the applicant was mostly represented by Ms GPE .

At the trial hearing on DATE the applicant notified the Justice of the FAC that he no longer intended to participate in the trial and that he had terminated his contracts with all his lawyers . On DATE the Justice of the FAC decided to proceed with the examination of the case in the applicant 's absence , dismissed CARDINAL of the applicant 's lawyers from the proceedings and ordered that PERSON , the applicant 's third counsel , should continue representing him . The ORG adjourned the hearing until TIME . After the lunch break , the hearing resumed . PERSON read out the applicant 's repeated refusal of her services and left the courtroom , without waiting for the ORG 's response to it .

On DATE the Justice of the Peace held that PERSON had committed contempt of court because she had left the courtroom without permission . The ORG also sent a notification to the President of ORG concerning PERSON actions and asking him to ensure that she attended the following hearing .

PERSON attended the following hearing . She informed the Justice that she refused to assist the applicant , referring to his refusal of her services .

At the following hearing , on DATE , PERSON defaulted . The Justice of the Peace issued an interim order and again notified ORG of PERSON actions .

On DATE the Justice of the Peace found the applicant guilty of aggravated libel and sentenced him to DATE probation . The Justice of the FAC based its judgment on testimonies by the victim and CARDINAL witnesses who had attended the press conference given by the applicant , a written record and audio and video recordings of the press conference , a letter from ORG indicating that it had no information concerning participation by PERSON in any illegal activities and a record of the applicant 's questioning . The Justice of the Peace held , in particular :

“ ... the court characterises the actions of [ the applicant ] ... as dissemination of false information defaming the honour and dignity of another person and damaging his reputation , connected to accusation of that person of having committed an especially serious criminal offence , because he , by oral statements [ addressed ] to a number of persons , disseminated false information concerning the organisation by PERSON of the attempted murder of [ the applicant ] . He disseminated that information in an affirmative rather than a presumptive manner . Furthermore , [ the applicant ] knew that PERSON was a top ranking governmental official who , at the time the statement was made , was running for election as Governor of GPE , thus any discreditable information could damage his reputation in some way . The statements made by [ the applicant ] were false ... unfounded and unsubstantiated : at the time the statements [ were made ] no criminal proceedings were instituted against PERSON and no other investigative measures were taken by law enforcement agencies ; the statement did not contain references to any reliable evidence or documents proving the truthfulness of the statement , or any reference to sources of information on the basis of which [ the applicant ] had concluded that PERSON had participated in the criminal offence committed against him . ORG , [ the applicant ] understood that , but he publicly and intentionally made the above - mentioned statement in the presence of representatives of the mass media , accusing PERSON of having committed an especially serious crime , thereby defaming the victim , his honour and his dignity , and [ the applicant ] , in his official position as the deputy Governor of GPE , must have been aware of that .

At the meeting of the administration of GPE of DATE , [ the applicant ] only put forward one piece of evidence to substantiate his statement about Mr NORP involvement in the attempted murder : DATE before the [ attempted murder ] General PERSON had threatened him ( [ the applicant ] ) in the presence of a deputy president of ORG , PERSON , and a deputy prosecutor of GPE , PERSON This submission ... was examined in the course of the trial but was not proven , because PERSON and PERSON , questioned as witnesses in open court , did not confirm it . The court does not see any reason not to trust those witnesses . No other evidence proving the truthfulness of [ the applicant 's statement ] was presented .

The court also notes that [ there is evidence confirming ] the defendant 's intention to disseminate the false statements publicly ( whatever his reasons ) and thus to negatively influence people 's opinion of the victim , in order to damage his reputation before the election : firstly , the affirmative , rather than presumptive character of the statement ; the content of the [ the applicant 's ] speech before and after the libellous statement ; the dissemination of the false information at the meeting of the administration of GPE , that is , to individuals who had no right to institute criminal proceedings and verify the statement ; the fact that the statement was made on several occasions ... after the attempted murder ... and in the course of the pre - trial investigation ... Moreover , the false character of the statement made by [ the applicant ] was confirmed by his confession made at a press conference on DATE , during which he had confirmed that as far as he knew Mr PERSON had not participated in the attempted murder , and [ the applicant ] had apologised . ”

The applicant and his CARDINAL lawyers appealed against the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . In particular , they complained that the Justice of the Peace had proceeded with the trial after the applicant refused to participate , and that it had forced PERSON to represent the applicant despite the fact that he had refused the assistance of his QUANTITY lawyers , including PERSON . PERSON also filed a separate appeal against the interim orders of CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE ORG , in the presence of the applicant and his CARDINAL lawyers , upheld the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . As regards the applicant 's complaint concerning his defence rights , ORG held that under NORP law a lawyer could not refuse to represent a defendant if he had already undertaken such a responsibility . However , the defendant could refuse legal assistance . Such a refusal would not be binding on the court , if the defendant , at the same time , asked for the case to be determined in his absence . Thus , the Justice of the Peace had lawfully ordered that PERSON should continue representing the applicant because the latter had not wished to participate in the trial , had refused the assistance of his lawyers and had not asked the trial court to appoint another lawyer .

On DATE ORG upheld the interim orders of CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE ORG , in the final instance , upheld the judgments of DATE and DATE and the interim orders of CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE . The applicant and CARDINAL of his lawyers attended the hearing .

Until DATE criminal - law matters were governed by LAW of DATE , “ the old CCrP ” ) . From DATE the old ORG was replaced by LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL of DATE , “ the new CCrP ” ) .

“ Preventive measures ” include an undertaking not to leave a town or region , a personal guarantee , bail and remand in custody ( LAW CCrP , LAW ) .

LAW of DATE provides that a judicial decision is required before a defendant can be detained or his or her detention extended ( Article CARDINAL ) .

Under the old ORG , a decision ordering detention could be taken by a prosecutor or a court ( LAW , CARDINAL and DATE ) .

The new ORG requires a judicial decision by a district or town court on a reasoned request by a prosecutor , supported by appropriate evidence ( LAW CARDINAL , CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) .

When deciding whether to remand an accused in custody , the competent authority is required to consider whether there are “ sufficient grounds to believe ” that he or she would abscond during the investigation or trial , obstruct the establishment of the truth or reoffend ( LAW CCrP ) . It must also take into account the gravity of the charge , information on the accused 's character , his or her profession , age , state of health , family status and other circumstances ( LAW CCrP , LAW ) .

Before DATE , remand in custody was authorised if the accused was charged with a criminal offence carrying a sentence of DATE imprisonment or if there were “ exceptional circumstances ” in the case ( Article CARDINAL ) . On DATE the old ORG was amended to permit defendants to be remanded in custody if the charge carried a sentence of DATE imprisonment , if they had previously defaulted , had no permanent residence in GPE or their identity could not be ascertained . The amendments of DATE also repealed the provision that permitted defendants to be remanded in custody on the sole ground of the dangerous nature of the criminal offence they had allegedly committed . The new ORG reproduced the amended provisions ( Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL and CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) and added that a defendant should not be remanded in custody if a less severe preventive measure was available .

The Codes make a distinction CARDINAL types of remand in custody , the first being “ during investigation ” , that is , while a competent agency – the police or a prosecutor 's office – is investigating the case , and the second being “ before the court ” ( or “ during judicial proceedings ” ) , at the judicial stage . Although there is no difference in practice between them ( the detainee is held in the same detention facility ) , the calculation of the time - limits is different .

After arrest the suspect is placed in custody “ during investigation ” . The maximum permitted period of detention “ during investigation ” is DATE but this can be extended for DATE in “ exceptional circumstances ” . Under the old ORG , extensions were authorised by prosecutors of ascending hierarchical levels , but they must now be authorised by judicial decisions , taken by courts of ascending levels ( under the new CCrP ) . No extension of detention “ during investigation ” beyond DATE is possible ( LAW CCrP , LAW of the new ORG ) .

The period of detention “ during investigation ” is calculated up to the date on which the prosecutor sends the case to the trial court ( Article CARDINAL of the old CCrP , Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the new CCrP ) .

Access to the materials in the file is to be granted DATE before the expiry of the authorised detention period ( LAW CCrP , LAW of the new ORG ) . If the defendant needs more time to study the case file , a judge , at the request of a prosecutor , may grant an extension of the detention until such time as the file has been read in full and the case sent for trial ( LAW CCrP , LAW ( CARDINAL ) of the new ORG ) . Under the old ORG , such an extension could not be granted for DATE .

DATE . Under the old ORG , the trial court was entitled to refer the case back for “ additional investigation ” if it found procedural defects that could not be remedied at the trial . In such cases the defendant 's detention was again classified as “ during investigation ” and the relevant time - limit continued to apply . If , however , the case was remitted for additional investigation but the investigators had already used up all the time authorised for detention “ during investigation ” , a supervising prosecutor could nevertheless extend the detention period for DATE , starting from the date on which he or she received the case . Subsequent extensions could only be granted if the detention “ during investigation ” had not exceeded DATE ( Article CARDINAL ) .

From the date the prosecutor refers the case to the trial court , the defendant 's detention is classified as “ before the court ” ( or “ during judicial proceedings ” ) .

Before DATE the old ORG set no time - limit for detention “ during judicial proceedings ” . On DATE a new Article , CARDINAL - CARDINAL , entered into force which established that the period of detention “ during judicial proceedings ” could not generally exceed DATE from the date the court received the file . However , if there was evidence to show that the defendant 's release might impede a thorough , complete and objective examination of the case , a court could – of its own motion or at the request of a prosecutor – extend the detention by no longer than DATE . These provisions did not apply to defendants charged with particularly serious criminal offences .

The new ORG provides that the term of detention “ during judicial proceedings ” is calculated from the date the court received the file up to the date on which judgment is given . The period of detention “ during judicial proceedings ” may not normally exceed DATE , but if the case concerns serious or particularly serious criminal offences , the trial court may approve CARDINAL or more extensions of no longer than DATE each ( LAW CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) .

Under the old ORG , the detainee or his or her counsel or representative could challenge the detention order issued by a prosecutor , and any subsequent extension order , before a court . The judge was required to review the lawfulness of and justification for a detention or extension order DATE after receipt of the relevant papers . The review was to be conducted in camera in the presence of a prosecutor and the detainee 's counsel or representative . The detainee was to be summoned and a review in his absence was only permissible in exceptional circumstances , if the detainee waived his right to be present of his own free will . The judge could either dismiss the challenge or revoke the pre - trial detention and order the detainee 's release ( LAW ) . An appeal to a higher court lay against the judge 's decision . It had to be examined within the same time - limit as appeals against a judgment on the merits ( Article CARDINAL in fine ) .

Under the new ORG , an appeal may be lodged with a higher court within DATE against a judicial decision ordering or extending detention . The appeal court must rule on the appeal within DATE of its receipt ( LAW ) .

Upon receipt of the case file , the judge must determine , in particular , whether the defendant should be held in custody or released pending the trial hearings ( LAW and LAW CCrP , LAW ) and LAW ( CARDINAL ) of the new ORG ) and rule on any application by the defendant for release ( LAW CCrP ) .

At any time during the judicial proceedings the court may order , vary or revoke any preventive measure , including remand in custody ( LAW CCrP , LAW of the new ORG ) . Any such decision must be given in the deliberation room and signed by all the judges on the bench ( LAW ORG , LAW ) .

DATE . An appeal against such a decision lies to a higher court . It must be lodged within DATE and examined within the same time - limit as an appeal against the judgment on the merits ( Article CARDINAL of the old CCrP , LAW of the new CCrP ) .

Under the old ORG , within DATE after receipt of the case file ( if the defendant was in custody ) , the judge was required to do one of the following : ( CARDINAL ) to fix the trial date ; ( CARDINAL ) to refer the case back for further investigation ; ( CARDINAL ) to stay or discontinue the proceedings ; or ( CARDINAL ) to refer the case to a court having jurisdiction to hear it ( Article CARDINAL ) . The new ORG empowers the judge , within the same time - limit , ( CARDINAL ) to refer the case to a competent court ; ( CARDINAL ) to fix a date for a preliminary hearing ; or ( CARDINAL ) to fix a trial date ( Article CARDINAL ) . In this last case , the trial proceedings must begin no later than DATE after the judge has fixed the trial date ( LAW CCrP , LAW ) . There are no restrictions on fixing the date of a preliminary hearing .

The duration of the entire trial proceedings is not limited in time .

Under the old ORG , the appeal court was required to examine an appeal against the first - instance judgment within DATE after it was lodged . In exceptional circumstances or in complex cases or in proceedings before ORG this period could be extended by DATE ( Article CARDINAL ) . No further extensions were possible .

The new ORG requires the appeal court to start examining an appeal DATE after it is lodged ( Article CARDINAL ) .

Article CARDINAL of the new CCrP , in so far as relevant , reads as follows :

“ CARDINAL . Participation of legal counsel in the criminal proceedings is mandatory if :

CARDINAL ) NORP the suspect or the accused has not waived legal representation in accordance with LAW ;

CARDINAL ) NORP the suspect or the accused is a minor ;

CARDINAL ) NORP the suspect or the accused can not exercise his right of defence by himself owing to a physical or mental handicap ;

CARDINAL ) the court proceedings are to be conducted [ in the absence of the accused ] in accordance with LAW of this Code ;

CARDINAL ) NORP the suspect or the accused does not speak the language in which the proceedings are conducted ;

CARDINAL ) the suspect or the accused faces serious charges carrying a term of imprisonment DATE , life imprisonment or the death penalty ;

CARDINAL ) NORP the criminal case falls to be examined by a jury trial ;

CARDINAL ) the accused has filed a request for the proceedings to be conducted [ without a hearing ] under LAW of this Code ;

In the circumstances provided for by paragraph CARDINAL above , unless counsel is retained by the suspect or the accused , or his lawful representative , or other persons at the request , or with the consent , of the suspect or the accused , it is incumbent on the investigator , prosecutor or the court to ensure participation of legal counsel in the proceedings . ”

Article CARDINAL of the Code provides that a suspect or an accused may refuse legal assistance at any stage of criminal proceedings . Such a waiver may be accepted only if made on the initiative of the suspect or the accused . The waiver must be filed in writing and must be recorded in the official TIME of the relevant procedural act . The refusal of legal assistance may not strip the suspect or accused of the right to ask to be assisted by counsel during further procedural actions in the criminal case . The admission of a lawyer may not lead to the repetition of procedural actions which have already been performed by that time .

The presence of a defendant at the trial is mandatory unless , in a case which does not concern a grave criminal offence , the defendant petitions the court for the case to be examined in his absence ( LAW and CARDINAL of the new CCrP ) .

Chapters CARDINAL of the new CCrP regulate procedure for lodging and examining appeals against judgments taken by justices of the peace . In particular , LAW establishes that a district court , when examining an appeal against a judgment taken by a justice of the peace , should conduct a judicial investigation which includes examination of the parties ' submissions and evidence , including the hearing of witnesses , experts , and so on . The district court may , at the parties ' request , hear new witnesses , authorise an expert examination , and collect material evidence and documents , even if the justice of the peace previously refused to perform those procedural actions . The district court may not dismiss a party 's request pertaining to examination of new evidence on the ground that such a request was also dismissed by the justice of the peace .


The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a civil action with ORG ( Sąd Rejonowy ) asking for discontinuation of the construction works carried out on an adjacent plot of land .

On DATE ORG gave judgment .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against this judgment with ORG ( PERSON ) . On DATE ORG gave judgment and upheld the first - instance judgment .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer lodged a cassation appeal with ORG ( Sąd Najwyższy ) .

On DATE ORG refused to examine the cassation appeal , considering that it had been manifestly ill - founded . That decision was served on the applicant on DATE .

On DATE , the date on which the application was lodged with the ORG , the proceedings were pending before ORG .

On DATE the Law of CARDINAL DATE on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time ( LOC o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki ) ( “ the CARDINAL Act ” ) entered into force . It lays down various legal means designed to counteract and/or redress the undue length of judicial proceedings .

Section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act reads , in so far as relevant :

Section CARDINAL reads , in so far as relevant :

“ CARDINAL . A complaint about the unreasonable length of proceedings shall be lodged while the proceedings are pending . ... ”

Section CARDINAL provides for measures that may be applied by the court dealing with the complaint . It reads , in so far as relevant :

“ CARDINAL . The court shall dismiss a complaint which is unjustified .

NORP If the court considers that the complaint is justified , it shall find that there was an unreasonable delay in the impugned proceedings .

At the request of the complainant , the court may instruct the court examining the merits of the case to take certain measures within a fixed time - limit . Such instructions shall not concern the factual and legal assessment of the case .

NORP If the complaint is justified the court may , at the request of the complainant , grant ... just satisfaction in an amount not exceeding PLN CARDINAL,CARDINAL to be paid by ORG . If such just satisfaction is granted it shall be paid out of the budget of the court which conducted the delayed proceedings . ”

Section CARDINAL lays down transitional rules in relation to the applications already pending before the ORG . It reads , in so far as relevant :

“ CARDINAL . Within DATE after the date of entry into force of this law persons who , before that date , had lodged a complaint with ORG ... complaining of a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time guaranteed by LAW ... , may lodge a complaint about the unreasonable length of the proceedings on the basis of the provisions of this law if their complaint to ORG had been lodged in the course of the impugned proceedings and if the ORG has not adopted a decision concerning the admissibility of their case .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) adopted a resolution ( no . III SPP CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) in which it ruled that while LAW produced legal effects as from the date of its date of entry into force ( DATE ) , its provisions applied retroactively to all proceedings in which delays had occurred before that date and had not yet been remedied .


Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant initiated civil proceedings against the local administration seeking formal acknowledgment of his entitlement to child benefits and the relevant arrears .

On DATE the ORG of GPE ( “ the ORG ” ) dismissed his claims finding that he was not eligible for the sought benefits . The applicant appealed against the judgment .

On DATE ORG summoned the applicant to appear at the appeal hearing fixed for DATE . There is no evidence that the summons was dispatched or that the applicant indeed received it .

On DATE ORG examined and dismissed as unfounded the applicant ’s appeal . The applicant was absent from the appeal hearing , and the appeal court did not examine the question of his due notification at the hearing .

According to the applicant , on DATE he inquired about the date of the appeal hearing at the registry of ORG and was told that ORG had already examined and dismissed his appeal .


Angelika Nußberger;Dean Spielmann;Elisabet Fura;Ganna Yudkivska;Karel Jungwiert

NORP The applicant , PERSON Lysaya , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE , in the GPE region . She was represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON .

NORP The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant ’s husband , PERSON , who had no previous criminal record , was apprehended on suspicion of theft . The same day he confessed to having been an accomplice in a theft committed with CARDINAL other individuals .

On DATE the prosecutor of ORG charged the applicant ’s husband with theft and decided to place him in FAC of ORG ( the ORG ) in cell no . CARDINAL , which he shared with CARDINAL other detainees , PERSON , PERSON and PERSON .

On DATE the applicant ’s husband was examined by a medical team at his own request . A doctor gave him an injection of chloromazine , finding that the applicant ’s husband was suffering from minor bodily injuries and hallucinations as a result of alcohol intoxication .

On DATE at TIME the ORG administration requested medical assistance for the applicant ’s husband . He was transferred by ambulance at TIME to the emergency unit of ORG , where he died on DATE .

According to the autopsy report of DATE , the applicant ’s husband died from serious multiple bodily injuries , namely ; head and chest injuries , a brain haemorrhage , a broken chest bone , broken ribs on both sides , injuries to his lungs inflicted by fragments of broken ribs and chest bones , and an internal haemorrhage into the kidneys and stomach .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG against the officers of ORG for murdering her husband .

On DATE ORG instituted criminal proceedings into the death of the applicant ’s husband .

On DATE the Prosecutor of ORG sent a petition to the Head of ORG , referring to violations of regulations in the Antratsyt ITT , in particular the placing of persons without any previous criminal record with those who had been convicted before , and failure of the ORG officers to comply with their duties properly and to react effectively to breaches of discipline by detainees . The ORG requested that the officers responsible for the situation involving the applicant ’s husband be disciplined .

On DATE the ORG conducted an internal inquiry , which resulted in disciplinary sanctions against some of the police officers . The results of the disciplinary proceedings were reviewed and overruled on DATE by ORG , which issued an order acknowledging that the failure of the officers of the LOC police station to isolate the applicant ’s husband and the violation of police regulations had led to serious circumstances . They decided to impose stricter disciplinary sanctions on those responsible and their superiors . As a result , CARDINAL officers were downgraded in their positions , CARDINAL officers were warned about their partial non - compliance with the requirements of their posts , and CARDINAL more officers were reprimanded .

On DATE the investigation charged Mr S. with inflicting bodily harm on the applicant ’s husband .

On DATE an additional forensic medical examination was ordered by the investigator to define which injuries had been inflicted on the applicant ’s husband by each of his cellmates .

On DATE the investigation charged PERSON with inflicting bodily harm on the applicant ’s husband .

On DATE the investigation conducted an on - site reconstruction of the crime with Mr S.

On DATE the additional forensic medical examination was carried out .

On DATE the prosecutor Zh . refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers of ORG for lack of proof of their involvement in the crime

On DATE the applicant filed a claim for damages against Mr S. , PERSON and PERSON .

On DATE the investigation charged PERSON . with inflicting bodily harm on the applicant ’s husband .

On DATE the applicant studied the case file , which contained all the procedural decisions taken prior to that date .

On DATE the investigation was completed and the criminal case was sent to ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) for examination .

On DATE ORG held a preparatory hearing and accepted the case for examination .

On DATE , ORG for ORG allowed the applicant ’s request for assistance in the protection of her rights in the proceedings and authorised Mr PERSON to act in the criminal proceedings as a “ public accuser ” in her interests . The same day the above - mentioned NGO requested ORG to admit PERSON as a “ public defender ” in the criminal proceedings concerning the death of the applicant ’s husband .

NORP In the course of the proceedings , the applicant alleged that her husband had been tortured by the police , had had a broken skull and metal objects under his nails . On DATE an additional forensic medical examination , ordered by the court , provided further clarifications in relation to the previous expert opinions . The expert confirmed that the applicant ’s husband had sustained numerous injuries , but denied the existence of the broken skull and presence of metal objects under the nails of the victim , as alleged by the applicant .

On DATE ORG found PERSON and PERSON . guilty of inflicting bodily injuries on the applicant ’s husband , causing his death . The court also found that the police officers had had no reason to beat the applicant ’s husband , as he had already pleaded guilty by the time of the incident . It also found that the applicant ’s husband had been suffering from chronic alcoholism and had been very aggressive towards the other cellmates . It found that the injuries had been inflicted by the persons who were held in the same cell with the applicant ’s husband , who had been defending themselves against his aggressive behaviour , which had been caused by his alcohol - related dependence ( delirium tremens ) . The court stated that the applicant ’s husband had sustained the following injuries on DATE : a cerebral haemorrhage , haemorrhage of both eyelids , left auricle and lips , a broken nose , an injury to the lower eyelid , abrasion of the lumbar region , a haemorrhage of the right kidney capsule and bruises to the lumbar region , all of which amounted to “ moderate bodily injuries ” for the purposes of assessing the impact on his health . The court further established that on DATE the applicant ’s husband had been severely beaten by PERSON and had had a conflict with other detainees . Moreover , it found that on DATE Mr S. had tied the applicant ’s husband up with a shirt and left him lying injured on the floor of the cell until TIME . The court sentenced PERSON and PERSON . to DATE , DATE of imprisonment . The judgment also mentioned that no civil claim had been lodged in the case .

On DATE ORG made a separate ruling concerning shortcomings in the work of investigation . It noted that the allegations of the applicant as to signs of torture had not been fully checked at the pre - trial stage and therefore the court had had to order an additional forensic examination to verify the applicant ’s allegations ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , although that examination could have been carried out at the pre - trial stage .

On DATE Mr S. lodged an appeal in cassation with ORG . Not denying the fact that he had beaten the applicant ’s husband , he claimed that he had acted in self - defence and therefore requested a re - examination of the case .

Having been informed that Mr S. had lodged an appeal against the judgment of DATE , the applicant decided not to appeal against that judgment . She did not submit any written submissions to the appeal of Mr S. According to the applicant she had expected to present her arguments orally , but she had not been duly notified of the date of the hearing . According to the Government , the relevant notification had been sent to the applicant .

Following amendments to LAW , which entered into force on DATE and introduced CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction in lieu of CARDINAL , ORG ( now ORG ) examined the case as a second , appellate instance on DATE . PERSON , who had allegedly found out about the hearing by chance , was not allowed to present his arguments to ORG , since he was not legal counsel for the applicant or any other party , while the procedural figure of public accuser , in which capacity Mr PERSON had entered the proceedings in the first instance , had been completely abolished following the above - mentioned amendments to LAW . The court , in the absence of the parties , upheld the judgment of DATE with minor amendments . It found no evidence that injuries had been inflicted on the applicant ’s husband by police officers .

The applicant appealed in cassation to ORG . She maintained that her husband had been killed by the police officers and the sentenced persons had confessed to a crime that they had not committed . She further complained that she could not present her arguments to the court of appeal as she had not been duly summoned to it .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal in cassation against the judgment of DATE and the decision of DATE , respectively , as being unsubstantiated . It also found the conclusions of the lower courts well - founded .

Prior to DATE the criminal proceedings in GPE had comprised CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction : a first - instance court and a court of cassation . After a judgment had been given by a first - instance court , the parties had DATE to lodge an appeal in cassation .

The Code defined the roles of “ public accuser ” and “ public defender ” , which were introduced in NORP times with the aim of achieving a more active participation of the public in criminal proceedings . Under LAW representatives of non - governmental organisations and groups of employees could participate in judicial proceedings ( not at the stage of investigation ) both on the side of the prosecution and on the side of the defence . The court could rule to allow a representative of an NGO to participate as a “ public accuser ” in the court hearings on behalf of his or her organisation . Under the said Article the public accuser was entitled to give testimonies , to examine evidence , make requests , express his or her opinion about the requests of other participants in the proceedings , to request withdrawals , to take part in the court deliberations , and give his or her opinion . The public accuser was not entitled to appeal against a judgment of a court in a criminal case in which he or she had participated . The role of public accuser was complementary to that of the prosecutor and the representative of the aggrieved party .

Following LAW of DATE ( which entered into force on DATE ) , criminal proceedings are examined at CARDINAL or CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction depending on the seriousness of the case . If the case was first decided in a local court , the decision is appealable to the regional court of appeal and then to ORG , as a court of cassation . The LAW also repealed the provisions concerning the roles of “ public accuser ” and “ public defender ” in their entirety .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property

Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Elisabet Fura;Josep Casadevall;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE , the applicant lodged with ORG an action for recovery of possession ( acţiune în revendicare ) of a plot of land that , although recorded in the land register ( cartea funciară ) as belonging to ORG , she claimed she had inherited it from ORG who had received it from the ORG in exchange for another plot of land .

The CARDINAL courts that dealt with the case found in favour of the applicant . ORG gave its decision on DATE . Upon appeals by ORG , ORG upheld it on DATE and ORG on DATE , the latter by means of a final and irrevocable decision .

NORP Before all the courts that dealt with the case , ORG argued that certificate no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE , used by the applicant in order to prove her ownership title , was false as it contained a series of irregularities .

The first - instance court and the appeal court rejected the argument on the ground that the defendant had not brought evidence to prove the allegations . Moreover , the courts noted that , according to the information in their possession , no criminal proceedings had been started on the matter .

The court of last resort rejected ORG request that the proceedings be stayed until the courts had ruled on the nullity of the certificate ( procedure described at CARDINAL below ) . On the merits , it noted as follows :

“ The [ defendant ’s ] allegations about the existence of irregularities in certificate no . DATE of CARDINAL DATE ... seem well - founded . However , this certificate established a prima facie case [ început de probă scrisă ] which entitled the firstinstance court to examine additional evidence ; witness testimonies confirmed that the property title in dispute had been transferred from the ORG to ORG , who exercised public and peaceful possession without causing any nuisance ... This situation is also confirmed by the evidence on the consolidations of land that had taken place . The fact that the exchange of land occurred is undoubtedly proved by letter no . CARDINAL of DATE , issued by ORG ... , which can not be contested ... ”

It also noted that the criminal investigation into the alleged forgery of the DATE certificate had been terminated on DATE as the time - limits for criminal responsibility had expired . However , ORG considered that the evidence adduced , in particular the letter of ORG CARDINAL DATE , rendered that investigation devoid of relevance in any case .

On an unspecified date the applicant ’s ownership title was recorded in the land register .

On DATE ORG lodged with ORG an action against the applicant , seeking that the CARDINAL DATE certificate above be set aside because it contained irregularities . The applicant argued that the issue was res judicata in so far as the courts ruling on the action for recovery of possession had already dealt with the matter .

The case was transferred to ORG which , on DATE , allowed the action , established that the document was false and set it aside .

Appeals by the applicant were rejected successively by ORG , on DATE , and by ORG , in a final decision of DATE .

Following the ruling of ORG , ORG sought the revision of the final decision of CARDINAL DATE ( cerere de revizuire ) . It also asked the Procurator General to lodge an application with ORG to have that decision set aside ( recurs PERSON anulare ) .

In a final decision of DATE , ORG allowed the Procurator General ’s request , noted that the DATE certificate had been declared false , quashed all the decisions rendered in the action for recovery of possession and , ruling on the merits , rejected the initial action on the ground that the applicant had failed to prove her ownership title .

ORG considered as follows :

“ Although according to LAW the judges have an obligation to use all legal means in order to prevent any error in establishing the truth , by a correct determination of facts and application of law , the court of last resort rejected as ill - founded the request for a stay in the proceedings , although the ruling in the [ parallel ] action for nullity was essential for adopting a lawful decision . ”

On DATE , at ORG request , ORG took note of ORG decision and struck off the request for revision .

The relevant provisions of LAW read as follows :

“ A final decision ... shall be revised in the following cases :

NORP ... if the decision was adopted based on an act which was declared false either during or after the proceedings . ”

“ The Procurator General may , of his own motion or on an application by the Minister of ORG , apply to ORG for a final decision to be quashed on any of the following grounds : ...

NORP when the decision in question has seriously infringed the law by giving a wrong solution on the merits of the case , or when the decision is manifestly illfounded ; ... ”

Article CARDINAL has been repealed by LAW no . CARDINAL of DATE .


András Sajó;Guido Raimondi;Ineta Ziemele;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre

The applicants , whose particulars are set out in the appendix , are NORP nationals . They are the parents and siblings of Mr ORG who disappeared in DATE . The applicants were represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG and as they appear from the documents submitted by them , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE ORG was performing his military service in the town of GPE when he went missing . No information was given to the family about his disappearance by the military authorities and the family became aware of it when his father PERSON – who is the first applicant – tried to contact him .

On DATE ORG petitioned the NORP prosecutor and asked the prosecutor to find his son . On DATE the prosecutor concluded that ORG had not disappeared but gone absent without leave ( ORG ) , and closed the investigation . The prosecutor ’s decision was communicated to Mr Özsüren on DATE .

In the meantime , and on subsequent dates , steps were taken by the military authorities to find ORG who , in their opinion , had gone AWOL .

On DATE the first applicant , ORG , sent a letter to the commander of ORG , and asked for his son to be found . Pursuant to Mr Özsüren ’s request an administrative investigation was conducted at the military barracks where ORG disappeared , but that investigation did not yield any results . The investigators recommended that military judges instigate a judicial investigation .

In DATE the military authorities instituted a criminal case against ORG for having gone AWOL , and issued a warrant for his arrest .

Nothing has been heard from ORG since his disappearance and the criminal proceedings against him are still pending in absentia .


Violation of Art. 3;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE , GPE .

Police officers from the anti - terrorist branch of ORG arrested the applicants on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation , the ORG ( ORG Party ) , and placed them in custody on CARDINAL and DATE respectively . Both applicants alleged that they had been beaten and insulted by policemen on the way to ORG .

On DATE the public prosecutor attached to ORG ordered the extension of the applicants ' custody period until DATE .

The applicants alleged that during their interrogation by the police , they had been kept blindfolded and forced to give information about persons they did not know . They were allegedly subjected to various forms of ill - treatment by police officers . They claimed they were beaten , strung up by the arms , threatened with death and given electric shocks .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicants were allegedly forced to sign police statements about their activities in the ORG and their connections with other ORG members .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicants were examined by ORG medical expert along with CARDINAL other detainees . In his report , the institute 's doctor noted that there were no signs of beating , force or violence on the bodies of the applicants , whereas he had spotted certain signs of injury on the bodies of CARDINAL other detainees .

On CARDINAL DATE the first applicant underwent a second medical examination in prison . According to the prison doctor 's report , the applicant had fading bruises on his body and ecchymoses on his left foot . The applicant was later transferred to ORG where another medical expert examined him . In a report dated DATE , it was concluded that the applicants ' injuries , as cited in the report of the prison doctor , would prevent him from carrying out his work for DATE .

On DATE the prison doctor also examined the second applicant . In his report , the doctor noted the presence of abrasions on the penis , pain in the chest and ecchymoses under the left eye . He also noted that the applicant had described a feeling of pain while chewing and pain on both shoulders .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicants were brought before the public prosecutor attached to ORG . In their questioning they denied their police statements and rejected the allegations against them .

On DATE they were brought before ORG , where they repeated their denials in relation to the statements taken by the public prosecutor . The court ordered the applicants ' detention on remand on account of the nature of the accusations against them and of the evidence already available .

On DATE the public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against the applicants in ORG and charged them with carrying out acts aimed at the separation of a part of LOC .

On DATE the applicants filed a complaint with the PERSON public prosecutor 's office alleging that they had been subjected to various forms of ill - treatment during their detention in police custody .

By decisions of CARDINAL and CARDINAL September CARDINAL the PERSON public prosecutor declined to bring any criminal proceedings against the police officers , because of a lack of evidence against them .

On DATE the applicants filed an appeal with ORG against this decision .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal lodged by the second applicant on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to commit the police officers for trial . The court , however , upheld the appeal in respect of the first applicant .

On DATE ORG filed an indictment with ORG accusing CARDINAL police officers from ORG of inflicting ill - treatment on the first applicant .

On DATE ORG acquitted the QUANTITY police officers on the ground that there was no sufficient and convincing evidence which would enable the court to convict the accused . The court reasoned that the complainant could not identify the police officers since he had allegedly been kept blindfolded while being tortured and that ORG report stated that no lesions had been seen on his body . It further noted that ORG report had been given DATE after the alleged incident and that the accused had denied the allegations .

The Criminal Code makes it a criminal offence to subject an individual to torture or ill - treatment ( Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL respectively ) .