The applicants in application no . CARDINAL are Mr PERSON and PERSON , NORP nationals who were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE . They were represented before ORG by PERSON and Mr PERSON , lawyers practising in GPE .

The applicant in application no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL is PERSON , a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicants in application no . CARDINAL are PERSON and PERSON , NORP nationals who were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE . They were represented before the Court by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

The facts of the CARDINAL cases under examination , as submitted by the applicants , may be summarised as follows .

The applicants acquired from the ORG apartments that had become ORG property by virtue of the nationalisations carried out by the communist regime in GPE in DATE and the following DATE . The apartments had been nationalised without compensation .

After the adoption of LAW in DATE , in proceedings under section CARDINAL of that law brought by the former pre - nationalisation owners , the applicants’ titles were declared null and void and they were ordered to vacate the apartments .

In DATE , it became possible for the applicants to obtain compensation from the ORG . Compensation was granted in the form of bonds which could be used in privatisation tenders and sold to brokers . Until DATE bonds were traded at price levels CARDINAL of their face value . Their price surged towards DATE and reached PERCENT and more of face value and then fell again . In DATE , it became possible for persons who have not sold their bonds to obtain their full face value directly from the ORG .

The remaining relevant background facts have been summarised in the ORG ’s judgment in the case of ORG and Others v. GPE , nos . CARDINAL , ORG , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , GPE , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , ORG , and CARDINAL , DATE .

In the CARDINAL cases under examination , the claims under section CARDINAL of LAW were brought within the relevant DATE time limit after the adoption of that law in DATE .

The grounds on which the applicants’ titles were declared null and void and the relevant circumstances were as follows .

The courts found , in proceedings that ended by final judgment of ORG of DATE , that the applicants had purchased the property at issue ( a storey in a CARDINAL - storey house ) in DATE , at a time when CARDINAL of the applicants owned another property which could satisfy the applicants’ housing need . It followed that the purchase had been in breach of the requirement that only persons who did not own other real property qualified to purchase ORG housing . In the course of the proceedings the courts also dealt with alleged irregularities in respect of tenancy orders dating from DATE and DATE .

The applicants have not informed the ORG whether they have received compensatory bonds or rented or purchased municipal housing .

The courts found , in proceedings that ended by final judgment of ORG DATE , that the apartment in question had exceeded in size the relevant limits fixed by legislation in respect of a CARDINAL - member family , as the applicant ’s at the time of the transaction ( DATE ) . The courts also found that in breach of the relevant law the apartment had not been offered for sale to the tenants who had been living therein , but directly to the applicant , as a former resistance fighter .

In DATE the applicant unsuccessfully attempted to reopen the proceedings . She vacated the apartment on an unspecified date .

In DATE the applicant was temporarily provided with municipal housing for rent at fixed low rates . She remained there at least until DATE .

In DATE the applicant obtained compensatory bonds with face value MONEY ( ORG ) ( the equivalent of approximately ORG CARDINAL ) . The applicant has not informed the ORG whether she had sold her compensatory bonds and if so at what price .

The courts , in proceedings that ended by final judgment of ORG of DATE , found that the applicants had purchased the apartment at issue in DATE , despite the ORG ’s decision of CARDINAL DATE imposing a moratorium on sales of ORG and municipal property .

The pre - nationalisation owners brought an action against the applicants on DATE . DATE ORG held CARDINAL hearings and admitted evidence .

The hearing listed for DATE was adjourned as the ORG lawyer had been unable to attend . The next and last hearing was held on DATE .

By judgment of DATE ORG granted the claim against the applicants . They appealed .

ORG held a hearing on DATE .

By judgment of DATE ORG quashed the lower court ’s judgment and rejected the claim .

On DATE the plaintiffs , the pre - nationalisation owners , submitted a petition for review ( cassation ) to ORG .

ORG held a hearing on DATE .

By judgment of DATE ORG quashed ORG judgment and referred the case back to that court .

In the renewed examination of the case by ORG , the hearings listed for DATE and DATE were adjourned at the ORG request .

The court held CARDINAL hearings - on DATE , DATE and DATE .

By judgment of DATE ORG quashed ORG judgment of DATE and referred the case back for renewed examination by that court .

ORG held a hearing on DATE , CARDINAL May and DATE . CARDINAL of the adjournments was caused by the plaintiffs’ failure to submit a relevant document .

By judgment of DATE ORG granted the restitution claim against the applicants . They appealed .

Before ORG , the hearing listed for DATE was adjourned owing to illness of CARDINAL of the applicants .

On DATE ORG noted the applicants’ failure to amend their appeal in accordance with procedural requirements introduced in DATE and instructed them to do so .

At the hearing held on DATE the court heard the parties and admitted evidence , including an expert ’s report .

By judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld the lower court ’s judgment of DATE . The applicants submitted a cassation appeal .

ORG held a hearing on DATE .

By judgment of DATE ORG upheld the lower courts’ judgments of DATE and CARDINAL .

The relevant domestic law and practice have been set out in the ORG ’s judgment in the case of ORG and Others v. GPE , cited above .


Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 8;Just satisfaction reserved

ORG The applicant is a NORP citizen , born in DATE . Her early life was marked by disruptive and aggressive behaviour , and she spent several periods in mental hospitals after drug overdoses and bouts of violence .

ORG In DATE , whilst in hospital , she married X , a compulsorily detained patient . They had difficulty in managing their financial affairs and were " manipulative " of staff and patients . Both were discharged from hospital in DATE , but voluntarily remained as out - patients . In DATE , the applicant rejoined her family and had a pregnancy terminated , but following her return to X was again admitted to a mental hospital . On DATE , she gave birth to A.

ORG The local ORG ( " the ORG " ) , which had been involved in providing social - worker support to the applicant and X , considered that it was only a matter of time before A suffered if she remained with them . X was very frequently violent or abusive and the applicant was impulsive , unpredictable and liable to irrational outbursts ; the help received from the social services was apparently not sufficient to reverse these behavioural patterns . Even the separation of X and the applicant , who on the advice of a welfare worker had been admitted to hospital with A as a voluntary patient on DATE , was not expected radically to alter the position .

The ORG therefore applied to a juvenile court for a place of safety order ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) in respect of A. Such an order was made on DATE . On DATE and DATE , the juvenile court made interim care orders ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) in respect of the child and , on DATE , following an application by the ORG to ORG , she became a ward of court ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) .

ORG In DATE , the applicant left X and subsequently , in DATE , obtained a divorce from him .

ORG A was placed in a nursery where the applicant saw her for access CARDINAL times between DATE and DATE . During some of this period the applicant was in a home for battered wives , where she gave indications of violence on QUANTITY occasions .

ORG On DATE , the applicant applied , unsuccessfully , to the ORG pursuant to the wardship jurisdiction for staying access . Following a further application of CARDINAL DATE to ORG , she was permitted CARDINAL ORG access once DATE , initially at the nursery and subsequently at her GPE home . Access visits occurred pursuant to this order until DATE and the applicant ’s overall handling of A was not open to serious criticism . She had in DATE met H , whom she was later to marry and who had a very significant stabilising effect on her ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

ORG The applicant subsequently applied to the ORG pursuant to the wardship jurisdiction for care and control of A. During the DATE hearing , which ended on DATE , she altered her application to CARDINAL for increased access , including staying access . The ORG contended that the existing access arrangements should be retained but not increased . In a report dated DATE , ORG , representing A as guardian ad litem ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , expressed no firm view but hoped that the recent improvement in the applicant ’s behaviour would continue . Evidence was given by CARDINAL doctors , CARDINAL ( who had not met the applicant ) on behalf of the ORG and CARDINAL on behalf of the applicant .

ORG refused the application , terminated the applicant ’s access to A and committed A to the care of the ORG under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . In the course of his judgment the judge made a recommendation , which was formally recorded in his order of DATE and apparently reflected the evidence of CARDINAL of the doctors and the final submission of ORG , that A be adopted . This took the ORG and the applicant by surprise as neither of them had dealt with this possibility in their pleadings . However , the applicant did not exercise her right of appeal ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

ORG It appears that in the light of this recommendation the ORG decided within a short period to place A for adoption . On DATE , the adoption health forms were sent to the appropriate doctor for completion and , between then and DATE , the relevant forms were also sent to the applicant . She received , inter alia , the Explanatory Memorandum required by LAW , the first sentence of which reads : " This Memorandum must be given to the parent ... of a child who is about to be adopted " , and she was therefore informed from this moment of the ORG ’s decision . Indeed , it appears that on DATE a social worker visited the applicant to discuss adoption and her refusal to sign the certificate at the end of the said Memorandum . At this time , the ORG withdrew its social - worker support for the applicant , in the context of her relationship with A , since it was no longer envisaged that this relationship should be nurtured . The ORG subsequently proceeded to seek - and ultimately , on DATE , found - prospective adopters .

ORG On DATE , the applicant married H. Thereafter , her mental and physical position stabilised and , by DATE , there were signs of a substantial improvement in her health . She and her husband persistently but unsuccessfully approached the ORG with a view to re - establishing contact between herself and A , who had remained in a residential nursery . Their interviews with the social services in DATE and DATE were marked by tension and a deterioration of relations with the social workers . In DATE , the ORG informed them that they would be told as soon as a placement for A was found , so that they could put their point of view in court .

ORG In the light of their stable relationship , the applicant and H considered that the ORG was unreasonable in refusing them access to A. They therefore instituted , on DATE , proceedings before the ORG pursuant to the wardship jurisdiction to re - establish access ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . According to ORG report ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , they had , on their solicitors’ advice , deferred making an approach to the courts so that they could show that the applicant ’s health had improved and that she had a stable home . The summons issued for access in favour of the applicant was due to be heard on DATE . On DATE , the court ordered H to file evidence in support of the application within DATE and the ORG to file evidence DATE thereafter . Leave was granted for A to be examined by a psychiatrist nominated by ORG if he saw fit and for all parties to file psychiatric evidence about other parties to the proceedings , including H and A. The summons was then adjourned , with liberty to the parties to restore it .

In subsequent proceedings before ORG , it was agreed that at the hearing on DATE , the ORG , though apparently without mentioning that it had found prospective adopters in DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , had made its intention to place A for adoption quite clear . All the parties seem to have acquiesced in such placement , to be followed by a combined hearing on the adoption and the access questions , which hearing they clearly envisaged would be held in TIME , before the DATE long vacation . In particular , the applicant made no request that the placement be postponed and the ORG raised no objection to filing its evidence within the time - limit set .

ORG On DATE , A was introduced to the prospective adopters for the first time . After a series of visits , the ORG placed her with them on DATE , a fact of which the applicant was not informed .

ORG Allegedly on account of DATE period and the need to seek legal aid , H was late in filing his evidence , which did not reach ORG until DATE .

The Council thereupon failed to meet its deadline of DATE . The applicant ’s solicitor , who had written to ORG on the subject on DATE without receiving a reply , wrote again on DATE indicating that , unless its evidence was lodged within DATE , he would refer the question back to the court . When the ORG telephoned him on DATE to assure him that the filing would be effected within DATE , he replied that this would not be sufficient and that the matter was urgent . However , he did not at this point make any further approach to the court .

In the meantime , on DATE , the solicitor had written to the ORG asking for a report on A ’s condition . Following a reminder dated DATE , the ORG replied on DATE that " A has continued to make good progress and has maintained normal development in all spheres " . No reference was made in that letter , or otherwise , to the fact that A had been placed with prospective adopters . The latter had , on DATE , notified the ORG of their intention to apply for her adoption .

ORG On DATE , the Official Solicitor informed the applicant ’s solicitor in correspondence that he was unable to arrange for his enquiries for the purpose of the access and adoption proceedings to be made until the ORG had filed its evidence ; he described the delay on the latter ’s part as " quite unacceptable " . The applicant ’s solicitor instructed GPE agents with a view to applying for an order directing the ORG to file , and he pressed the ORG again on the matter on DATE . On DATE , he informed the Official Solicitor that the agents were having " extreme difficulty with obtaining dates in GPE [ for a hearing to order the ORG to file evidence ] due to the recent civil service dispute " . The Government have indicated that there does not appear to have been any particular backlog or listing difficulty at that time .

ORG On DATE , the ORG informed the solicitor that the relevant affidavits were substantially complete and would be signed in DATE . On DATE , he nevertheless served a summons , returnable on DATE , on the ORG to order it to comply with ORG direction of DATE . On DATE , the ORG acknowledged by telephone receipt of the summons and stated that the evidence would be available by DATE . However , it was not . The registrar directed the ORG to file within DATE and ordered costs against it .

CARDINAL affidavits were filed by ORG and were received by the applicant ’s solicitor on DATE . On DATE , he and his client became aware for the first time that A had been placed for adoption during DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The ORG filed a further affidavit on DATE . The Official Solicitor received copies of these affidavits on DATE .

ORG Until DATE , ORG had also been unaware of ORG ’s placement for adoption . On DATE , the applicant ’s solicitor asked him if his report on the child was now prepared . On DATE , he replied that no arrangements had yet been made to visit the parties nor had a consultant psychiatrist been instructed ; he had , however , been informed by the ORG that the prospective adopters of A had instructed solicitors and proposed to apply to ORG for leave to commence adoption proceedings ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The Official Solicitor stated : " if this is the case it seems to me that it would be more sensible for your client ’s application for access and the application for adoption to be heard together , but as soon as I have heard from the foster GPE solicitors the exact position I shall write to you further . " The applicant ’s solicitor replied on DATE , stressing that since the ORG had for so long taken no steps in relation to the proposed adoption proceedings , it should not further delay the hearing of his client ’s application for access . On DATE , the Official Solicitor confirmed that he would arrange " in the near future " for the visits and the instruction of the psychiatrist .

ORG There followed correspondence between the applicant ’s solicitor and the solicitors acting for the prospective adopters of A as to whether it was necessary to seek leave to initiate adoption proceedings in the light of the adoption recommendation recorded in ORG order of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The changed since then and that leave should therefore be sought anew , A still being a ward of court . The latter stated that they were ignorant of the proceedings taken thus far in wardship but considered that the adoption and access issues should be decided at the same time . By letter of DATE , the Official Solicitor confirmed that he agreed with the second approach since it would save costs .

ORG On DATE , the applicant ’s solicitor again pressed the Official Solicitor to proceed in the matter since no further steps had been taken with regard to the proposed adoption proceedings and this was delaying the hearing of his client ’s application for access . He was informed by ORG on DATE that the latter had received a draft of the evidence to be submitted in relation to the proposed adoption . According to the Government , ORG could not commence his enquiries for the combined purpose of the access and the adoption proceedings until he had received this evidence . It appears that the originating summons for the adoption was in fact issued on DATE and that the evidence of the prospective adopters was filed on CARDINAL DATE and received by ORG on DATE .

The Official Solicitor appears to have commenced his formal enquiries on DATE and on DATE he confirmed to the applicant ’s solicitor that a psychiatrist ’s report was in the course of preparation , on receipt of which the wardship and adoption reports would be prepared and filed . By DATE , ORG had completed his enquiries and it was possible to fix a date for the hearing . The parties - without reference to ORG , who would have preferred an earlier date - chose DATE , the first available date in term - time ; they made no attempt to ask the court to certify the case as fit for vacation business , which could have enabled it to be heard in DATE or DATE .

ORG The hearing before ORG was actually held on DATE and DATE . On DATE , the judge made an adoption order in respect of A ( who was de - warded ) , dispensed with the applicant ’s consent to the adoption ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and refused her access to A.

In a long and detailed review , the judge described the case as " difficult and painful " , in particular because the circumstances before him in no way arose from any fault or blameworthy conduct on the applicant ’s part . As regards the delays since the proceedings were issued on DATE , he noted that DATE both the applicant ’s solicitor and ORG had been " trying their best to obtain the evidence from ORG " and that on DATE , when that evidence was filed , the applicant and her advisers learned for the first time of A ’s placement for adoption . Whilst taking the view that ORG had " acted with all reasonable promptness " , he described the ORG ’s delay , though not deliberate , as " quite deplorable " , adding that the apology made by its legal department " does not assist [ the applicant ] whose case was seriously prejudiced by this delay " . He pointed out that " [ in adoption proceedings ] delay is a potent weapon and courts and practitioners must be vigilant to ensure that the position of natural parents is not prejudiced thereby " . Nevertheless , the result of the delay here was that when the case came before the court , A , who was aged DATE and DATE , had been with the prospective adopters for DATE and had not seen her mother since DATE , CARDINAL years previously .

Having taken account of the marked improvement in the applicant ’s general circumstances , the judge summarised her case as follows : since everyone was agreed that she was now capable of coping with a child , there was no reason why she should not have A back or at least be allowed to attempt a re - introduction to her ; the procedures and delays in both the wardship and the adoption applications had been such as to deny justice to her and also to A ; in particular , since DATE the ORG had closed its mind to any possible rehabilitation and had ceased to provide her with any support , being intent on taking A from her and placing A for adoption .

However , the judge held that in deciding whether the applicant ’s withholding of her consent to the adoption was unreasonable , he had to take account of the facts as they existed at the date of the hearing . Referring to section CARDINAL of LAW DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , he noted that the welfare of the child was the first and paramount consideration outweighing all others , but recognised that , in accordance with the case - law of ORG , " the claims of the natural parents must be given great weight " and that consideration had to be given , albeit to a much lesser extent , to the interests of the prospective adopters .

On the question of access , the judge recognised that , where the " statutory guillotine " of adoption was implemented , its purpose was to sever all connection with the natural parents and to establish a fresh legal relationship with the adoptive parents . He could find no reason to justify the applicant ’s re - introduction to A in the circumstances and therefore ordered that no access be granted .

ORG An appeal by the applicant from this decision was dismissed on DATE by ORG , which also refused leave to appeal to ORG . ORG recognised its very limited function in appeals in adoption cases and the limited extent to which it could override the opinion of the first - instance judge , who had heard the witnesses . Having stressed the painful nature of the case and the applicant ’s legitimate sense of grievance arising from the delay , ORG recalled that both the judge and it had to deal with the situation existing at the time of the hearing . It added : " CARDINAL may make one ’s criticisms of the conduct of the ORG , but the fact remains that we are dealing here with the life of another human being and that is not to be decided in awarding pluses and minuses to parties on the conduct of litigation . "

ORG The applicant sought leave from ORG to appeal to ORG but this was refused on DATE . A subsequent request by her for legal aid with a view to establishing whether she had a cause of action in damages against the ORG for its delay in filing evidence was also unsuccessful .

ORG The applicant referred the matter to ORG , who has the task of investigating complaints made by a member of the public claiming to have sustained injustice in consequence of maladministration in connection with action taken by a local authority in the exercise of its administrative functions .

The applicant alleged maladministration , in that from DATE the ORG had ceased to support her and had thereafter refused to take account of her improved condition and her increasing ability to look after A. She also complained that the ORG ’s conduct had been such as to ensure that she did not have the opportunity of looking after the child and that it had refused to examine fully a request by the applicant and H to be considered as foster or adoptive parents .

In his report of CARDINAL DATE , ORG recognised that it was " certainly not for [ him ] to question the merits of [ the ] court decisions in these proceedings " . He concluded that the applicant ’s complaints revealed no maladministration except in respect of the ORG ’s delay in filing evidence . He stated :

" It is quite clear from this investigation that part of the delay in getting the matter before the ORG was caused by the ORG , and this has already been criticised by the Judge . This delay was unreasonable and amounts to maladministration , but I must consider what injustice flowed from it . In many cases it could be that the longer the delay , the more difficult it would be for a ORG to break a bond with prospective adoptive parents - the ORG after all have to consider what is best for the child at the time they come to their decision . Here , however , it is not so simple . [ The applicant ] felt she was getting better , so to some extent the longer the time for her to improve , the greater would be her chances of success before the ORG . I have read the decision of ORG very carefully , but it seems to me that it is very unlikely indeed that the decision would have been different even if the ORG had acted more quickly . "

ORG In DATE , the applicant and H discovered A ’s whereabouts and the identity of the adoptive parents and made various attempts to contact the child , either at home or at school . In consequence , the adopters instituted wardship proceedings with a view to obtaining an injunction preventing such contacts . The failure , on numerous occasions , of the applicant and H to abide by ORG orders in this respect has led to contempt of court proceedings against them . Requests by them to the local authority for permission to see A - who remains a ward of court - have been unsuccessful , as have applications to ORG for leave to issue a summons for access .

ORG In the law of GPE and GPE , there are a number of different and partially co - ordinated procedures for dealing with the welfare of children . Whilst the oldest of these is the wardship jurisdiction of ORG , it has for DATE co - existed with , but not been ousted by , various statutory provisions whereby a child who is at risk may be put into the care of a local authority .

Although the terms are not wholly accurate , the legislation is commonly divided into CARDINAL categories : the first provides for " compulsory care " , by establishing machinery whereby a local authority can obtain a court order committing a child to its care ; the second concerns " voluntary care " , the machinery here being originally designed to meet an emergency situation without the need of recourse to the courts . At any given time , there are CARDINAL children in public care in GPE and GPE , of whom CARDINAL are not living with their parents or a relative .

The statutory provisions have been amended on several occasions and many of them were repealed and replaced by LAW ( " LAW " ) , a consolidating measure the greater part of which came into force on DATE . In the following summary of the law in force at the time of the present case , the original enactments are cited first and any corresponding provision of the DATE Act in force at the relevant time is indicated in square brackets .

By way of general background information , the summary covers all CARDINAL of the procedures referred to above ( namely those relating to compulsory care , voluntary care and wardship ) , but in the present case it was the machinery for compulsory care and , above all , the wardship jurisdiction of ORG which were directly relevant .

ORG The principal statute concerning compulsory care is ORG " LAW " ) , as amended by LAW DATE and then partly replaced by LAW ; it enables a local authority to obtain , as a temporary measure , a " place of safety order " and , as longer - term measures , a variety of other orders .

ORG Under section CARDINAL ) of the CARDINAL Act , any person , including a local authority , may apply to a justice of the peace for authority to detain a child and take him to a place of safety ; the justice may grant the application if he is satisfied that the applicant has reasonable cause to believe , inter alia , that the child ’s proper development is being avoidably prevented or neglected or his health is being avoidably impaired or neglected or he is being ill - treated , or that he is exposed to moral danger .

A " place of safety order " so granted lasts for a maximum of DATE and can not be extended . The person detaining the child must as soon as possible take such steps as are practicable for informing his parent of the detention and the reason for it .

If the local authority wishes to retain the child in protective surroundings after the DATE period , it has either to make the child a ward of court ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) , or to institute care proceedings under LAW ( see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) , or to apply to a justice or a GPE court for an interim order under section PERSON ) ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) ; if an application of the last kind is refused , the child ’s immediate release " may be ordered " .

ORG Under sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) of the DATE Act , a local authority which reasonably believes that there are grounds for making an order as to the care and control or supervision of a child is , subject to certain exceptions , under a duty to institute care proceedings by bringing the child before a juvenile court .

ORG In care proceedings instituted by a local authority , the parties are the local authority and the child , but not the latter ’s parents . The child is entitled , subject to his means , to legal aid and it is open to him to have his parents conduct the case on his behalf either directly or through a lawyer . If the child is of sufficient competence , he may decide that he wishes to be separately represented .

A natural parent who is not acting on behalf of the child is entitled to be notified of and to attend the hearing and to give and call evidence challenging the allegations made by the local authority . As a matter of practice , the court will also allow such parent to cross - examine witnesses on behalf of the local authority and to have separate legal representation .

ORG If the court before which the child is brought is satisfied that one of the grounds specified in LAW exists and that the child is in need of care or control which he is unlikely to receive unless an order is made , it may make , inter alia , a supervision order , a care order or an interim order . The specified grounds include those on which a place of safety order may be made ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

ORG A supervision order is an order placing the child under the structured supervision of the local authority ; subject thereto , he may continue to live with his parents .

ORG A care order is an order committing the child to the care of the local authority . The latter will have the same powers and duties with respect to the child as his parent or guardian would have apart from the care order ( section CARDINAL of the DATE Act [ ORG ) of the DATE Act ] ) , except that it can not cause the child to be brought up in any religious creed other than that in which he would otherwise have been brought up and it can not agree to the child ’s adoption .

ORG An interim order is a care order limited to a specified period not exceeding DATE ; it may be renewed on application ( section QUANTITY of the DATE Act ) . It may be made if the juvenile court hearing the care proceedings is not in a position to decide which of the other specified orders ought to be made ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ) or , alternatively , during the currency of a place of safety order ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The powers and duties of the local authority under an interim order are the same as under a full care order ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

ORG A full care order normally terminates when the child in question attains the age of DATE ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(b ) of the DATE Act ) .

In addition , under sections CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ) , the juvenile court may , on application by the child or his parent on the child ’s ( but not his own ) behalf and if it considers it appropriate , discharge the care order and may , on discharging it , make a supervision order in respect of the child . Such applications may be made DATE or , with the juvenile court ’s permission , more frequently ( section ORG ) ) . The paramount consideration in deciding whether to discharge the order is the interests of the child .

ORG Under sections CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ORG of the DATE Act , the child in respect of whom the care order was made , or his parent on the child ’s ( but not his own ) behalf , may appeal to ORG against the making of a care order , against the refusal of an application to discharge a care order or against the making of a supervision order on its discharge . ORG will review the decision by way of re - hearing the case . From ORG a further appeal may , with leave , be made to ORG by way of case stated ; thereafter an appeal lies to ORG and , in rare cases , to ORG .

The local authority has no general right to appeal against a juvenile court ’s refusal to make a care order , except on a point of law to ORG .

ORG The principal statute concerning voluntary care is LAW DATE ( " LAW " ) , as amended by LAW DATE and then replaced by LAW . This legislation in effect enables a parent to place his child into the care of a local authority ; at the initial stage the authority acquires no special status in relation to the child but a different situation may arise subsequently .

ORG LAW the DATE LAW ] imposes on the local authority a duty to receive into its care a child under DATE where it appears , inter alia , that his parents or guardian are for the time being or permanently prevented by illness , incapacity or other circumstances from providing for his proper accommodation , maintenance and upbringing and that the intervention of the authority is necessary in the interests of the child ’s welfare . Whilst the authority must , save as otherwise provided in the LAW , keep the child in its care so long as his welfare requires it and he has not attained the age of DATE , it is also under a duty to endeavour to secure the resumption of parental care where this appears consistent with the child ’s welfare .

ORG LAW the DATE LAW ] specifies that it does not entitle the local authority to keep the child in care if any parent or guardian desires to take over that care . However , if the child has been in care throughout DATE , no person may take him away unless he has given CARDINAL days’ notice of his intention to do so or has the authority ’s consent ( section CARDINAL(CARDINALA ) [ CARDINAL ) ] ) .

Moreover , if a parent requests the return of the child , the authority is not compelled to comply regardless of his welfare ( ORG v. ORG [ DATE ] CARDINAL All England Law Reports CARDINAL ) . If it then considers the transfer of care to the parent to be inconsistent with that welfare , it may either pass a parental rights resolution ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) or apply to make the child a ward of court ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) .

ORG If it appears to a local authority in relation to any child who is in its care under LAW [ CARDINAL of the DATE Act ] that , inter alia , a parent of his is unfit to have the care of the child on account , notably , of his habits or mode of life or of having consistently failed without reasonable cause to discharge the obligations of a parent , the local authority may resolve that there vest in it the parental rights and duties with respect to that child ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) [ CARDINAL ) ] ) . The rights and duties which so vest are all rights and duties which by law the mother and father have in relation to a legitimate child and his property , including " a right of access " but excluding the right to agree or refuse to agree to the making of an adoption or certain related orders ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the DATE Act [ CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ] and section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW DATE ) .

Before passing a parental rights resolution , the local authority must consider a report from its ORG on the desirability of assuming parental rights , which report should contain all the material necessary for the proper exercise of the authority ’s discretion . In deciding the matter , the authority is to regard the interests of the child as of paramount importance and the views of the parents on the proposal are to be taken into account .

ORG If the parent has not already consented in writing to the parental rights resolution and his whereabouts are known , he must be served with notice of it , indicating his right to object by counter - notice within DATE ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ) [ CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ] ) . If such objection is made , the resolution lapses on the expiry of DATE from service of the counter - notice ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) [ CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ] ) . However , within that period , the local authority may " complain " to a juvenile court , in which event the resolution will not lapse until the complaint is determined ; on hearing the complaint , the court may order that the resolution is not to lapse , provided that it is satisfied that the grounds for the resolution were made out when it was passed and subsist at the time of the hearing and that the continuation of the resolution is in the child ’s interest ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) [ CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) ] ) .

ORG A parental rights resolution continues in force until the child attains the age of DATE , unless it is previously rescinded by the local authority or terminated by a juvenile court ( section CARDINAL of LAW [ CARDINAL of the DATE Act ] ) .

The parent concerned , even if he did not originally object to the parental rights resolution , may apply to a juvenile court for its discharge . The court may grant the application if it is satisfied that there were no grounds for the making of the resolution or that it should be terminated in the child ’s interests ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(b ) [ CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(b ) ] ) . An application based on the original foundation for the resolution can , however , be entertained only if lodged within DATE of its adoption ( section CARDINAL of the Magistrates’ Court Act DATE ) .

ORG Under section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act [ CARDINAL of the DATE Act ] , an appeal ( by the parent or the local authority ) lies to ORG of ORG from the making by a juvenile court of an order confirming ( under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) [ CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ] ) or discharging ( under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(b ) [ CARDINAL ) ] ) a parental rights resolution , or from a juvenile court ’s refusal to make such an order . A further appeal lies to ORG and , with leave , to ORG .

ORG of ORG has an inherent jurisdiction , independent of statutory provisions and deriving from the prerogative power of the ORG acting in its capacity as parens patriae , to make a child a ward of court .

ORG The effect of wardship is that custody , in a broad sense , of the child is vested in the court itself ; it assumes responsibility for all aspects of his welfare and may make orders on any relevant matter whatsoever , notably as regards the care and control of and access to the child and his education , religion or property . In making such orders , the court is required to treat the child ’s welfare as the " first and paramount consideration " ( Guardianship of Minors Act DATE , section CARDINAL ) . Unless terminated earlier by order of the court , the wardship continues until the child attains his majority .

Where there are exceptional circumstances making it impracticable or undesirable for the ward to be , or continue to be , under the care of his parents , the court may make an order committing him to the care of the local authority ( LAW DATE , section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ) , subject to the power of the court to give directions ( Matrimonial Causes Act DATE , section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) ) . In such circumstances , custody of the child remains with the court and it is for the court , and not the local authority , to take major decisions regarding the ward ’s future ; it retains , inter alia , jurisdiction to make orders for access to the child .

PERSON proceedings may be instituted by anyone who can show an appropriate interest in the child ’s welfare . An application for a wardship order has to be made by originating summons . The child becomes a ward immediately the summons is issued but the wardship automatically lapses after DATE unless within that time an appointment is made for the hearing of the summons . This appointment is normally held before a registrar who , subject to an appeal to a judge , may give interim directions on such matters as access to the child and may decide that other interested parties be joined in the proceedings .

A judge will hear contested wardship proceedings and also applications - which can be made at any time by any party - for the variation or discharge of an existing wardship order or for directions on such matters as access to or the education of the child . From the judge ’s order , an appeal lies to ORG and thence , with leave , to ORG .

The child may be represented in wardship proceedings by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court ; this is usually the Official Solicitor , who is a full - time public employee entirely independent of the executive .

Under the Rules of ORG , it is possible to seek an order expediting the proceedings , notably if a party thereto is dilatory .

ORG The functions of a local authority in child - care matters are exercised and decisions are taken either by its ORG or by a sub - committee or an officer to whom powers have been delegated . At the time relevant to the present case , the practice varied from authority to authority , there being no precise requirements or guidance even of a non - statutory kind , and much depended on the nature or gravity of the decision to be taken . Whether the child is in its care by virtue of the DATE [ DATE ] or LAW , the local authority must give first consideration to the need to safeguard and promote the child ’s welfare throughout his childhood , and must so far as practicable ascertain his wishes and feelings regarding the decision and give due consideration to them , having regard to his age and understanding ( section CARDINAL of LAW DATE [ CARDINAL ) of the DATE Act ] ) .

Authorities’ decisions in this area are , in fact , often based on the outcome of case reviews or case conferences . The authority is under a statutory duty to review the case of each child in its care at DATE intervals ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the DATE Act ) and , as a matter of practice , the child ’s position will in addition be regularly examined at case conferences . Reviews and conferences will be attended notably by the social workers responsible and senior officials of the authority ’s ORG , as well as by such other persons as health visitors , doctors and police officers .

ORG A parent may on occasion be allowed or invited to attend a case review or case conference or part thereof , although he has no legal right to do so . His contacts with the social workers constitute the most usual channel for the communication of his views on matters to be decided by the authority .

In the absence of legal proceedings , the parent can not compel the local authority to produce or permit inspection of TIME of its relevant meetings or reports produced thereat , although the authority has a discretion to allow such inspection . In proceedings for judicial review ( but not in juvenile court proceedings ) , the court may order the pre - trial disclosure of such documents , but only after leave to institute the proceedings has been obtained ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) ; however , this would be a rare occurrence , the general rule being that the documents are privileged and not open to inspection .

ORG A parent whose child is in the care of a local authority is not automatically deprived of access to him . The continuation of access is , however , a matter within the discretionary power of the authority ( per Lord PERSON in ORG [ DATE ] CARDINAL All England Law Reports CARDINAL ) . Thus , under LANGUAGE law , the question whether and to what extent a parent is to have access to his child who is in public care was , at the relevant time , within the competence of the local authority to decide , without any application to a court .

Both the DATE [ CARDINAL ] Act and the DATE Act reflect the general idea that continuation of parental access to children in public care is in many cases normal and desirable : the former allows the local authority to contribute to the costs of parental visits and the latter makes special provision for certain cases where the parents have not visited the child during a certain period of time .

ORG The statutory remedies described in paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above , whereby a parent may challenge or seek the discharge of a care order or a parental rights resolution , are directed to the order or resolution as such , there being , at the relevant time , no specific statutory remedy whereby he could contest the isolated issue of a decision to restrict or terminate his access to his child .

A decision of a local authority concerning access can , however , be challenged by way of an application for judicial review . Anyone who wishes to make such an application must first seek , normally within DATE of the decision , the leave of the court . The circumstances where judicial review will lie may be briefly summarised as follows :

( a ) the authority acted illegally , ultra vires or in bad faith ;

( b ) the authority failed to take into account relevant considerations , took account of irrelevant considerations or came to a decision to which no reasonable authority could have come ( Associated Provincial Picture Houses , Ltd. v. ORG [ DATE ] CARDINAL ORG Bench Reports CARDINAL ) ;

( c ) the authority failed to observe statutory procedural rules or to act fairly ( see notably R v. ORG , ex parte C and R v. GPE , ex parte B , ORG , DATE ) .

The remedy of judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in question but rather the decision - making process itself , and the court will not act as a " court of appeal " from the body involved . Thus , where on a successful application for judicial review the court quashes an authority ’s decision , it will normally remit the matter to the authority for reconsideration ; it may , however , also direct the authority to reach a conclusion in accordance with the court ’s findings ( Rules of ORG , Order CARDINAL , rule ORG ) ) .

ORG In certain circumstances , the wardship jurisdiction may also be invoked to question the decisions of a local authority or a juvenile court relating to a child in the former ’s care . The general rule is that the prerogative power of the Crown is not for all purposes ousted or abrogated by the exercise of the duties and powers conferred on local authorities by legislation . In the leading case of ORG , ORG examined the relationship between the wardship jurisdiction and the authorities’ statutory powers . Their Lordships were unanimously of the view that the courts had no reviewing powers as to the merits of local authority decisions , notably on such matters as access to the child : the general inherent power of the court in its wardship jurisdiction was available to fill gaps or supplement the powers of local authorities but not to supervise ( except on judicial review principles ; see paragraph CARDINAL above ) the exercise of discretion within the field committed to them by statute . Sometimes , however , the local authority itself may invite the supplementary assistance of the court and the wardship may then be continued with a view to action by the court .

The foregoing limits on ORG powers apply only where the wardship proceedings concern a child who is already in public care . If he is not , ORG can examine fully such questions as access and make such order as it considers to be in his best interests .

ORG The inability of parents to approach the courts , save as explained above , where decisions are made by a local authority affecting access to their children led ORG , in ORG Social Security Adjudications Act CARDINAL , to modify the law on this point .

Under the new provisions - which came into force on DATE , that is after the events giving rise to the present case - , a local authority may not refuse to make arrangements for access to a child in care and may not terminate such arrangements unless it has first given notice to the parent . The latter then has a right to apply to a juvenile court for an access order , requiring the local authority to allow access subject to such conditions as the court may specify . Where an access order has been made , there is a right to apply for variation . An appeal against the juvenile court ’s decision lies to ORG . Any court dealing with the matter must regard the welfare of the child as the first and paramount consideration .

This new remedy applies only to decisions refusing or terminating access ; in all other cases , the nature and extent of access remain within the local authority ’s discretion .

ORG In DATE , the Government published a Code of Practice on Access to Children in Care . This document stresses the importance of involving the child ’s natural parents in the local authority ’s decision - making process in this area and of informing them fully and promptly as to the substance of decisions concerning access .

ORG A court can not make an adoption order in respect of a child unless , inter alia , it is satisfied that each parent freely and unconditionally agrees ( LAW DATE , section CARDINAL ) . However , such agreement may be dispensed with upon a number of grounds specified in that section , notably that the parent is withholding consent unreasonably or has persistently failed without reasonable cause to discharge his parental duties . In reaching any decision relating to the adoption of a child , a court must have regard to all the circumstances , first consideration being given to the need to safeguard and promote his welfare throughout his childhood ( Children Act DATE , section CARDINAL ) .

Adoption proceedings in respect of a child who is a ward of court may not be instituted without the leave of ORG . On an application for leave , the court ’s function is to consider whether the proposed adoption application is one that might reasonably succeed , the merits of the matter being examined subsequently , once leave has been granted and after compliance with the requirements concerning notices and reports .


The applicants were born in DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE .

The applicants are heirs of the late A.B. who died on DATE . The first and the second applicant are his children , and the third and the fourth applicants are his grandchildren ( children of his other daughter ) .

In the context of inheritance proceedings following PERSON 's death , on DATE his former wife , PERSON , brought a civil action against the applicants in ORG ( PERSON ) . PERSON sought her share in co - ownership of a house on the account of certain investments she had made while living in common law marriage ( izvanbračna zajednica ) with the deceased .

In the period between the entry into force of the LAW in respect of GPE and the rendering of the first - instance judgment , ORG held CARDINAL hearings .

At the hearing held on CARDINAL DATE the applicants moved for evidence to be taken in order to prove that PERSON had not lived in a common law marriage with the plaintiff and that he had reconstructed his house independently with his own means . On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the court heard CARDINAL and CARDINAL witnesses respectively .

ORG then requested certain witnesses to be heard before other courts . In reply , it received TIME of the witness testimonies from ORG and ORG .

On DATE the applicants filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that there had been no common law marriage between the plaintiff and the late A.B.

The next hearing was held on DATE at which the court heard CARDINAL witnesses .

At the next hearing held on DATE the court heard the second and the third applicant and adjourned the hearing for DATE , when the first applicant again sought for a number of witnesses to be heard .

At the next hearings held on DATE and CARDINAL DATE the court heard yet more witnesses and on DATE it closed the main hearing .

On DATE the court gave judgment dismissing both PERSON 's action and the applicants ' counterclaim . On appeal , on DATE ORG ( Županijski sud u ORG ) quashed the first - instance judgment and remitted the case finding that it was necessary to establish the plaintiff 's citizenship .

NORP In DATE the first and the second applicant filed a constitutional complaint concerning the length of the proceedings . On DATE ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) declared their complaint inadmissible because ORG had in the meantime , on DATE , quashed the first - instance judgment and remitted the case .

In the resumed proceedings , on DATE the President of ORG accepted the applicants ' request for withdrawal of the first - instance judge and assigned another judge to hear the case .

The court held hearings on DATE and DATE .

On DATE the court adopted a decision declaring the plaintiff 's action inadmissible , because as a foreign national , she had not obtained the necessary permissions for acquisition of property in line with the domestic legislation . At the same time , ORG concluded that the applicants ' counterclaim had been withdrawn . PERSON appealed against that decision but on DATE ORG dismissed her appeal .

The relevant part of section CARDINAL of LAW on LAW ( Ustavni zakon o PERSON , ORG no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , of CARDINAL DATE ; “ the LAW ” ) reads as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) The Constitutional Court shall examine a constitutional complaint whether or not all legal remedies have been exhausted if the court with jurisdiction fails to decide a claim concerning the applicant 's rights and obligations or a criminal charge against him or her within a reasonable time ...

( CARDINAL ) If a constitutional complaint ... under paragraph CARDINAL of this section is upheld , the Constitutional Court shall set a time - limit within which the court with jurisdiction must decide the case on the merits ...

( CARDINAL ) In a decision issued under paragraph CARDINAL of this section , the Constitutional Court shall assess appropriate compensation for the applicant for the violation of his or her constitutional rights ... The compensation shall be paid out of the ORG budget within DATE from the date a request for payment is lodged . ”


Violation of Art. 6-1 (fair hearing);Remainder inadmissible;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in Riihimäki .

The applicant was the Administrative Director and a deputy board member in a company initially called ORG , later ORG ( henceforward ORG ) . It bought , sold and rented out computers . It was declared bankrupt on DATE .

In ORG , the public prosecutor charged the applicant with inter alia debtor dishonesty on the grounds that he allegedly had participated , while the company was already in serious financial difficulty , in arranging for the company to be bought essentially with its own money by another company . It was alleged that the applicant put together this plan with CARDINAL other persons , NORP and PERSON , CARDINAL of whom owned the purchasing company , and that the purpose of the purchase , which made no commercial sense , was to divert money away from the debtors of ORG . The indictment concerning count CARDINAL read :

“ On DATE ORG bank account contained MONEY [ ORG ] . Before , the balance was ORG CARDINAL . For the return sale and the onward sale of the information technology equipment and the leases mentioned in count CARDINAL , ORG IS ORG credited PERSON 's account with ORG .

According to a mutual agreement between [ NORP , the applicant and PERSON ] , [ PERSON ] , on behalf of PERSON , immediately after ORG IS ORG had sold the worthless ORG shares for ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL to PERSON , owned by [ PERSON ] , withdrew money from ORG bank account leaving ORG CARDINAL .

The sale by ORG IS ORG of the ORG shares to PERSON was actually financed by funds belonging to ORG itself . [ PERSON ] , on behalf of ORG , lent ORG CARDINAL to the insolvent PERSON ... . Those moneys were used in order to pay for the ORG shares .

The transfer in the bookkeeping accounts of the information technology equipment ... from ORG back to ORG IS PERSON was a condition for the purchase of the ORG shares . Accordingly , on DATE , by the joint measures of [ NORP , the applicant and PERSON ] , ORG CARDINAL was withdrawn to the detriment of ORG debtors leaving a balance in the account of ORG . Of that amount , ORG CARDINAL was withdrawn to the benefit of ORG IS ORG and the remaining over FIM CARDINAL,CARDINAL to the benefit of [ PERSON ] . This took place in accordance with an agreement made by him , [ NORP ] and [ the applicant . ] There were no acceptable reasons for the withdrawals .

The mutual understanding between [ the CARDINAL men ] had risen before and in connection with the purchase . ”

On DATE , while convicting the applicant of CARDINAL counts of an accounting offence and sentencing him to a suspended term of DATE imprisonment , ORG rejected the charge of debtor dishonesty on count CARDINAL , on the grounds that it had not been shown that there had existed an agreed plan or that the applicant had been aware of the origin of the money used for the purchase . PERSON , who in the pre - trial investigation had testified that there had been such a plan , had retracted his statement in ORG .

NORP The prosecutor appealed , charging the applicant again with debtor dishonesty . There was an oral hearing , in which however count no . CARDINAL was not addressed .

On DATE , ORG of its own motion convicted the applicant of aiding and abetting debtor dishonesty and imposed on him a suspended term of a total of DATE imprisonment .

It found that it was undisputed that NORP had been the chairman of ORG board of directors and the applicant a deputy board member , authorised to act on behalf of the company and the administrative director until DATE , when PERSON had become a board member . NORP who on behalf of ORG IS ORG signed the documents relating to the sale of the ICC / Cedro Oy shares was a board member in the first - mentioned company , of which the applicant was also a board member . It was further undisputed that PERSON stated in the pre - trial investigation that during the negotiations with the applicant it had become apparent to him that it would be his job to close down the companies in question . On DATE ORG IS ORG bought back the information technology equipment ( which it had sold earlier ) . As a result , ORG bank account contained a balance of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL on DATE . Following this , PERSON withdrew the said ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL from the account . Of that amount , PERSON borrowed ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL without surety . It never repaid the loan ( ORG judgment pages CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) .

Contrary to ORG , ORG held that it had been clearly shown that the applicant , given his position in the company at the time of the offence under count CARDINAL , his training and experience , and the fact that he had taken an active part in the transactions , had known about the financial difficulties in DATE at the latest ( page CARDINAL ) . Further , it had been clearly shown , having regard to the pre - trial statements of NORP , PERSON and the applicant and other evidence , that the CARDINAL of them had planned the transaction together . However , the applicant did not , in ORG view , hold a significant enough position of power in ORG to be convicted as a principal offender . As he had furthered the act of NORP and PERSON , he was guilty of having aided and abetted that act .

On DATE , ORG refused the applicant leave to appeal . On DATE it rejected his extraordinary appeal .

Chapter CARDINAL , Article CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) , of LAW , in force at the relevant time , provided that a person who , during or before the commission of an offence by someone else , intentionally furthers the act through advice , action or exhortation , shall be convicted of aiding and abetting the principal offence . The sentence imposed on the person who aids and abets shall be reduced to CARDINAL of the maximum penalty prescribed for the principal offence .

The present case was commenced and therefore also concluded under the then provisions on criminal procedure in LAW ( oikeudenkäymiskaari , rättegångsbalken ) . The rule according to which an accused might not be convicted of an offence other than the one with which he or she had been charged was not included in the legislation until the coming into force on DATE of LAW ( laki oikeudenkäynnistä rikosasioissa , lagen om rättegång i brottmål ; Act no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . The rule was however established through case - law and it was codified upon the enactment of LAW .

LAW , section CARDINAL , of LAW provides that the court may only pass a sentence for an act for which a punishment has been requested . The court is not bound by the heading or the reference to the applicable provision in the indictment . The court is however bound by the conduct described in the indictment . The prosecutor is under an obligation to define the alleged offence and the accused must be provided with an opportunity to defend himself or herself within the limits of the indictment .

Chapter DATE , Article CARDINAL , of LAW in force at the relevant time ( Act no . ORG ) required ORG to hold an oral hearing when it was needed . An oral hearing could be limited to only a part of the appeal . Article CARDINAL provided that ORG could not , on the basis of a reassessment of evidence , change ORG judgment in respect of a charge without holding an oral hearing unless the sentence was only a fine or the oral hearing was , particularly in view of the legal protection of the defendant , manifestly unnecessary .

According to ORG precedent ( Year Book CARDINAL II CARDINAL ) on the application of LAW , LAW , ORG should not have altered ORG acquittal following a reassessment of the evidence without holding an oral hearing , as a hearing was not to be considered clearly unnecessary , having regard in particular to the fact that the defendant had contested the charge . ORG had imposed a term of imprisonment on the accused .

According to the terms of the reservation made by GPE in accordance with LAW , as in force at the relevant time , GPE could not guarantee a right to an oral hearing insofar as NORP laws at the time of the events in issue did not provide such a right . This applied , inter alia , to proceedings which were held before ORG .

LAW , LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , of LAW reads in relevant part :

“ Leave to appeal may be granted only if it is important to bring the case before ORG for a decision with regard to the application of the law in other , similar cases or because of the uniformity of legal practice ; if there is a special reason for this because of a procedural or other error that has been made in the case on the basis of which the judgment is to be reversed or annulled ; or if there is another important reason for granting leave to appeal . ”