SLAVIC UNIVERSITY IN BULGARIA and OTHERS v. BULGARIA

The first applicant is the “ ORG in GPE ” , a NORP legal person ( the “ University ” ) . It is represented before the ORG by Mr A. GPE , a lawyer practising in GPE . The other applicants are CARDINAL students and teachers listed in the annex ( the “ other applicants ” , the “ students ” or the “ teachers ” ) . They have joined the application of the University without filing separate submissions with the ORG .

s , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE ORG , as a result of a private initiative , granted the ORG the status of higher education institution .

On DATE a new LAW was adopted , which introduced a new statutory framework within which higher education institutions were required to function .

By decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG proposed to ORG to revoke the status of a higher education institution of the University . As grounds for its proposal , ORG indicated that , inter alia , ( CARDINAL ) ORG operated without internal rules and regulations , as well as without management bodies , elected in accordance with the law ; ( CARDINAL ) all its general assemblies had not been conducted in conformity with the statutory requirements ; ( CARDINAL ) it had been accepting students in violation of the ORG 's university admission criteria , which were more than the maximum permissible number and for courses which had not been approved by the ORG ; ( CARDINAL ) ORG had been appointing academic staff in violation of the applicable rules ; ( CARDINAL ) it had not had an approved budget prior to DATE and after that had CARDINAL budgets approved by CARDINAL separate and competing administrative bodies ; ( CARDINAL ) it had been operating in violation of LAW as it lacked a balance sheet for DATE and did not have any accounting documents for DATE and DATE . Allegedly the applicants were not officially informed of the procedure undertaken by ORG .

On DATE the ORG appealed against the decision of ORG to ORG .

On DATE ORG refused to examine the appeal . It found that the proposal by ORG had no direct effect on the rights of the University as it was only a proposal to ORG , was not therefore an individual administrative act and was not subject to judicial review . Upon further appeal , the extended panel of ORG , on an unspecified date , refused to examine the appeal on similar grounds .

By decision of DATE ORG revoked the status of ORG as a higher education institution . It authorised ORG to deal with all matters in connection with the revocation of the status of ORG . It expressly addressed the option for the students to continue their studies at other universities , which subsequently led to the adoption by ORG on DATE of a special regulation which specified the procedures related thereto . No reasons for the decision of ORG were given and the applicants were allegedly not informed of the procedure . The decision was promulgated on DATE .

On an unspecified date the ORG appealed against the decision of ORG to ORG , arguing that it was an individual administrative act which was subject to judicial review . On DATE ORG refused to examine the appeal on the basis that acts of ORG were not subject to judicial review . Upon further appeal , on CARDINAL DATE the extended panel of ORG also refused to examine the appeal on similar grounds .

ORG decision of DATE was challenged before ORG by CARDINAL members of parliament . They argued that the decision was unconstitutional , that at the time it was adopted the University had corrected the alleged violations and that its operations had been in compliance with the statutory requirements . On DATE CARDINAL judges from ORG voted in favour of declaring the decision of DATE unconstitutional , whereas CARDINAL judges voted against . Accordingly , as ORG failed to obtain the CARDINAL votes required for a majority decision , the court rejected the challenge by judgment of DATE .

The LAW provides , inter alia , that citizens and organizations shall have the right to set up higher education institutions in accordance with the conditions and procedures established by statute and demands that the education they provide must comply with the requirements set by ORG LAW ) . It also provides that the ORG shall exercise control over all forms and levels of education , including higher education institutions ( LAW ) .

LAW of DATE ( the “ DATE Act ” ) , which was in force at the time the University was established , regulated the establishment and functioning of higher education institutions . It did not differentiate between public and private institutions . The LAW provided that higher education institutions were set up by ORG . It also detailed the different grades of academic staff , determined their hierarchy and their relationship with the institutions . The status of students and their relationship with the higher education institutions was also regulated . LAW was repealed by LAW of DATE .

LAW of DATE ( the “ CARDINAL LAW ) regulates the establishment , functions , management and financing of higher education institutions , which could be public or private .

LAW , as in force during the relevant period , envisaged special control , supervisory and decisionmaking functions for the legislature and the Government . For example , ( CARDINAL ) ORG created , transformed and closed higher education institutions ; ( CARDINAL ) ORG developed and supervised implementation of Government policy in the sphere of higher education ; approved academic qualification grades and the requirements towards all courses ; determined the maximum number of undergraduates and postgraduates taught by each higher education institution and approved the rules for providing students with housing and other social benefits ; ( CARDINAL ) ORG facilitated communication between the ORG and the higher education institutions and maintained the register of approved academic qualifications ; ( CARDINAL ) ORG , a special administrative body created LAW , was designated to monitor , assess and determine whether a particular higher education institution complied with the ORG 's requirements . A lack of an accreditation or receipt of CARDINAL negative assessments from this body was a basis for closing a higher education institution .

LAW , as in force during the relevant period , also regulated the management structure of ORG higher educational institutions , their hierarchy , procedures for appointment , term of office and powers . It also determined the conditions and requirements towards the teaching provided by higher educational institutions . LAW further provided that higher education institutions enjoy academic autonomy , which consisted of academic freedoms , academic self - government and sanctity of the territory of the institutions . Within this context , higher education institutions were required to adopt internal rules and regulations , which would include , inter alia , procedures for internal conflict resolution .


The applicant was born in DATE and lives in Lübbenau .

On DATE ORG ( HBG HolzBerufsgenossenschaft ) refused to recognise the applicant ’s respiratory diseases as an occupational disease ( GPE ) .

On DATE the applicant , represented by lawyer , filed an objection against the aforementioned decision . The objection was rejected on DATE .

On DATE the applicant brought an action in ORG .

On DATE the respondent party submitted the statement of defence and the applicant ’s files .

On DATE ORG requested inter alia reports of CARDINAL doctors the applicant had consulted prior to the proceedings as well as medical documentation regarding the applicant ’s CARDINAL prior stays in hospital . DATE these documents had been obtained in their entirety and ORG submitted the documents to the parties .

On DATE and on DATE ORG asked the applicant to concretise the claim . On DATE the applicant submitted that the aim of the action was to determine that he was suffering from an occupational disease .

On DATE ORG decided to obtain a first expert opinion concerning CARDINAL specific questions and named an expert ( Mr GPE ) . The applicant cancelled the first examination fixed for DATE due to illness . On DATE the expert examined the applicant . On CARDINAL DATE the expert submitted his report of CARDINAL pages , in which he found inter alia that a further expert opinion was necessary .

NORP On DATE ORG decided to obtain another expert opinion on different aspects of the CARDINAL questions and named an expert ( Ms P.H. ) . The expert indicated her willingness to render the expert opinion .

NORP In DATE the applicant changed lawyer .

On DATE the expert PERSON informed ORG that the applicant should first be examined by another expert ( Ms U.R. ) . On DATE the applicant challenged the latter expert on grounds of bias . By letter of DATE ORG rejected this challenge and informed the applicant that it considered the examination necessary . On DATE the applicant informed ORG that he was willing to cooperate .

On DATE the expert ORG submitted her report of CARDINAL pages . On DATE ORG submitted the files to the expert PERSON in order for her to render the requested expert opinion . On DATE PERSON informed ORG that she was unable to give the expert opinion .

On DATE ORG amended its decision of DATE and named another expert ( Mr D.A. ) . On DATE Mr D.A. informed ORG that he was unable to give the expert opinion in a timely manner .

On DATE ORG again amended its decision of DATE and named another expert ( PERSON . ) . On DATE ORG was informed that PERSON . had retired .

On DATE ORG again amended its decision of DATE and named another expert ( Mr GPE ) . On DATE Mr GPE informed ORG that he was unable to give the expert opinion in a timely manner .

On DATE ORG again amended its decision of DATE and named another expert ( PERSON ) . On DATE the latter informed ORG that he was unable to give the expert opinion .

On DATE ORG made a new decision to obtain an expert opinion and named an expert ( PERSON ) . On DATE ORG was informed that PERSON had retired .

On DATE ORG amended its decision of CARDINAL DATE and named another expert ( Mr PERSON ) . On DATE Mr PERSON informed ORG that he was unable to give the expert opinion .

In DATE the applicant changed lawyer . In DATE the new lawyer withdrew from the case . In DATE one of the applicant ’s previous lawyers reappointed herself .

On DATE ORG again amended its decision of CARDINAL DATE and named another expert ( Mr GPE ) . On DATE ORG was informed that the expert had retired .

On DATE the ORG anew amended its decision of CARDINAL DATE and named another expert ( Mr GPE ) . On DATE the expert submitted his report of CARDINAL pages . On DATE the expert supplemented his report .

On DATE the report was submitted to the parties in order to obtain their comments .

On DATE ORG scheduled a hearing for DATE .

On DATE ORG held an oral hearing and rejected the applicant ’s claim . The written judgment was served on the applicant ’s lawyer on DATE .

On DATE the applicant appealed against the judgment .


Violation of Art. 5-3;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE .

On DATE the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of having committed armed robbery . On DATE ORG ( Sąd Rejonowy ) ordered that he be detained on remand in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence in question , the severity of the anticipated penalty and the fear that he might tamper with evidence . The court also observed that other measures designed to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings would be insufficient , given the fact that at the time of the commission of the offence the applicant had already been released under police supervision in another case . That , in the court 's opinion , convincingly showed that only detention could prevent him from committing another offence .

On DATE the ORG prolonged the applicant 's detention . It reiterated the grounds originally given for his detention . Referring to the fact that more lenient preventive measures had not prevented the applicant from having committed another offence , the court considered that there was a reasonable risk that the applicant would abscond . Furthermore , it considered that since the applicant had not admitted the charge and that there had been other persons involved in the offence who had remained at large , there was a reasonable risk of collusion .

In the course of the investigation , the applicant 's detention was several times prolonged by ORG ( Sąd Apelacyjny ) . The court reiterated the grounds originally given for his detention and stressed that keeping him in custody was necessary to secure the process of obtaining evidence . The relevant decisions were given on DATE ( prolonging the applicant 's detention until DATE ) and DATE ( prolonging his detention until DATE ) . The applicant 's appeals against those decisions DATE in which he contested the reasonableness of the charge against him – were rejected by ORG ( Sąd Najwyższy ) .

On DATE ORG prolonged the applicant 's detention DATE which had meanwhile exceeded DATE time - limit set for detention pending the investigation under LAW of LAW until DATE . It considered that the case was “ particularly complex ” within the meaning of Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Code .

On DATE the ORG prolonged his detention until DATE . On DATE ORG ordered that that term should further be prolonged until DATE . The court reiterated the previous grounds given for the applicant 's detention and added that the case was very complex , given that CARDINAL further suspects had in the meantime been charged and detained in the case and that several other potential suspects were still being searched for .

In the meantime , new charges were laid against the applicant .

Further prolongation of the applicant 's detention pending the investigation were ordered by ORG on DATE ( up to DATE ) and on DATE ( up to CARDINAL DATE ) . In its decision of DATE , ORG relied on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged and the severity of anticipated penalty . It also considered that there was a reasonable risk that the applicant and the other CARDINAL detained co - suspects , if released , might obstruct the proceedings or attempt to evade justice , having regard to the nature and the scale of the offences with which they had been charged ( numerous counts of armed robberies ) and the number of suspects involved . In its decision of DATE , ORG added that the prolongation of detention was justified by the need to obtain DNA evidence .

On CARDINAL DATE the Gdańsk Regional Prosecutor ( Prokurator Okręgowy ) indicted the applicant on CARDINAL charges comprising , among other things , numerous counts of armed robbery before ORG ( PERSON ) . The bill of indictment listed CARDINAL charges brought against CARDINAL accused , who were all remanded in custody . The case - file comprised CARDINAL volumes . The prosecution asked the court to hear evidence from CARDINAL witnesses . It appears that the principal witness was a certain ORG , who had been indicted together with all the defendants but gave evidence against them .

The trial began on DATE . However , as at DATE the reading out of the bill of indictment by the prosecution was still continuing .

During the trial , ORG prolonged the applicant 's detention several times . The relevant decisions were given on DATE ( extending his detention up to DATE ) , on DATE ( ordering his continued detention until DATE ) , on DATE ( prolonging that period until DATE ) , CARDINAL DATE ( extending his detention until DATE ) , on DATE ( prolonging his detention until DATE ) , on DATE ( prolonging his detention until DATE ) , on DATE ( extending that term until DATE ) , on DATE ( extending that term until DATE ) , on DATE ( ordering his continued detention until DATE ) and on DATE ( extending that period until DATE ) . As at the latter date , CARDINAL of the CARDINAL accused were still detained on remand and the trial court had heard most of the prosecution witnesses .

In all those decisions ORG considered that the original grounds given for the applicant 's detention were still valid . It stressed that keeping him in custody was necessary in order to prevent him – and his co - defendants – from evading justice or tampering with evidence .

In its decision of DATE , ORG found that holding the applicant and his CARDINAL co - defendants in custody was the only measure which would prevent them from obstructing the trial , having regard to the nature of the offences in question , the severity of the anticipated penalty and the fact that such attempts had been made in the course of the investigation . It also instructed the trial court to increase the number of hearings held DATE .

In its decision of DATE , ORG considered that the applicant 's detention was justified under LAW since that provision established a presumption to the effect that the likelihood of a severe penalty being imposed on the applicant might induce him to obstruct the proceedings .

In its decision of DATE , ORG observed that up to DATE the main reason for the delays in the trial was the obstructiveness of the defendants and the abuse of the rights of the defence .

On DATE the trial court made a severance order with a view to expediting the proceedings , and thereafter CARDINAL defendants ( ORG , GPE , GPE and GPE ) , who in the meantime had been released from detention , were to be tried separately from other defendants .

The applicant repeatedly , but unsuccessfully , asked for release and appealed against the decisions prolonging his detention . He maintained that the length of his detention was unreasonable and contested the charges against him , stressing that they were based on unreliable evidence from ORG

It appears that the applicant is still in detention pending trial .

From DATE to DATE and from DATE to DATE ( i.e. for DATE , DATE and DATE ) the applicant served a sentence of imprisonment imposed in other criminal proceedings . He was , however , simultaneously remanded in custody in the present case .

The Code of Criminal Procedure of DATE , which entered into force on DATE , defines detention on remand as CARDINAL of the so - called “ preventive measures ” ( środki zapobiegawcze ) . The other measures are bail ( poręczenie majątkowe ) , police supervision ( dozór policji ) , guarantee by a responsible person ( poręczenie osoby godnej zaufania ) , guarantee by a social entity ( poręczenie społeczne ) , temporary ban on engaging in a given activity ( zawieszenie oskarżonego w określonej działalności ) and prohibition to leave the country ( zakaz opuszczania kraju ) .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL sets out the general grounds for imposition of the preventive measures . That provision reads :

“ CARDINAL . Preventive measures may be imposed in order to ensure the proper conduct of proceedings and , exceptionally , also in order to prevent an accused 's committing another , serious offence ; they may be imposed only if the evidence gathered shows a significant probability that an accused has committed an offence . ”

Article CARDINAL lists grounds for detention on remand . It provides , in so far as relevant :

“ CARDINAL . Detention on remand may be imposed if :

( CARDINAL ) there is a reasonable risk that an accused will abscond or go into hiding , in particular when his identity can not be established or when he has no permanent abode [ in GPE ] ;

( CARDINAL ) there is a reasonable risk that an accused will attempt to induce [ witnesses or co - defendants ] to give false testimony or to obstruct the proper course of proceedings by any other unlawful means ;

NORP If an accused has been charged with a serious offence or an offence for the commission of which he may be liable to a statutory maximum sentence of DATE imprisonment , or if a court of first instance has sentenced him to DATE imprisonment , the need to continue detention to ensure the proper conduct of proceedings may be based on the likelihood that a severe penalty will be imposed . ”

The Code sets out the margin of discretion as to the continuation of a specific preventive measure . Article CARDINAL reads , in so far as relevant :

“ CARDINAL . Detention on remand shall not be imposed if another preventive measure is sufficient . ”

Article CARDINAL , in its relevant part , reads :

“ CARDINAL . If there are no special reasons to the contrary , detention on remand shall be lifted , in particular if depriving an accused of his liberty would :

( CARDINAL ) seriously jeopardise his life or health ; or

( CARDINAL ) entail excessively harsh consequences for the accused or his family . ”

The DATE Code not only sets out maximum statutory time - limits for detention on remand but also , in LAW , lays down that the relevant court – within those time - limits – must in each detention decision determine the exact time for which detention shall continue .

Article CARDINAL sets out time - limits for detention . In the version applicable up to DATE it provided :

“ CARDINAL . Imposing detention in the course of an investigation , the court shall determine its term for a period not exceeding DATE .

The whole period of detention on remand until the date on which the first conviction at first instance is imposed may not exceed DATE .

Only ORG may , on application made by the court before which the case is pending or , at the investigation stage , on application made by ORG , prolong detention on remand for a further fixed period exceeding the periods referred to in DATE , when it is necessary in connection with a stay of the proceedings , for the purpose of a prolonged psychiatric observation of the accused or a prolonged preparation of an expert report , when evidence needs to be obtained in a particularly complex case or from abroad or when the accused has deliberately prolonged the proceedings , as well as on account of other significant obstacles that could not be overcome . ”

On DATE paragraph CARDINAL was amended and since then the competence to prolong detention beyond the time - limits set out in paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL has been vested with the court of appeal within whose jurisdiction the offence in question has been committed .


Aleš Pejchal;André Potocki;Ann Power-Forde;Ganna Yudkivska;Helena Jäderblom;Johan Hirschfeldt;Mark Villiger;Paul Lemmens

NORP The applicant , ORG , is a NORP limited liability company , which has its seat in GPE . The applicant company was represented before the Court by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON , of ORG .

NORP The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP The applicant company runs the restaurant ORG ( ORG ) in the centre of GPE . On DATE , ORG ( Socialtjänstnämnden ) decided to revoke ORG ’s licence to serve alcoholic beverages on its premises . The decision was based partly on several reports from ORG regarding disorder and excessive serving of alcohol on the LOC and partly because the restaurant had served liquor by the bottle after TIME ( which was prohibited ) . Moreover , the applicant company had failed to report to the authorities that its parent company , which was also its majority owner , was subject to liquidation as well as to report changes in the ownership structure of this company .

The applicant appealed against the decision and asked to have its alcohol licence back . On DATE , ORG ( länsrätten ) of GPE held an oral hearing in the case during which the CARDINAL shareholders of the applicant company and its parent company were heard as CARDINAL witnesses , CARDINAL at the request of the applicant . Both the shareholders and CARDINAL of the witnesses , the liquidator of the applicant ’s parent company , were heard about the circumstances relating to the liquidation and the applicant company ’s ownership structure . The court also had written evidence at its disposal , inter alia , the applicant company ’s register of shareholders from DATE and its DATE report from DATE .

On DATE , the court partly granted the applicant company ’s appeal in that it repealed the revocation of the licence but gave the applicant company a warning instead . In its reasoning , the court stated that it was common ground between the parties that there had been changes in the ownership structure of the parent company and that this company had been liquidated . However , in the court ’s view , these circumstances were not reason enough to revoke ORG ’s licence to serve alcoholic beverages since the restaurant business was still run in the same way by the same persons . Turning to the issue of public disorder , the court noted that it was undisputed that disorder had occurred on CARDINAL different occasions and endorsed ORG view that this constituted grounds for revoking ORG ’s licence to serve alcoholic beverages . However , having regard to the fact that almost all of the incidents had occurred during student parties , and to the applicant company ’s assurance that such parties would never take place again , as well as the applicant company ’s implementation of new policy documents , it found specific reasons to believe that the applicant company had a genuine will to deal with the problems which had previously occurred and , consequently , that the intervention could be limited to a warning .

ORG appealed to ORG ( kammarrätten ) of GPE which , on DATE , decided to grant leave to appeal . The applicant company , as well as ORG , requested that an oral hearing be held in the case . The applicant company asked to hear the CARDINAL shareholders previously heard before ORG and CARDINAL witnesses , CARDINAL of whom were to be heard in person before the court . CARDINAL of the witnesses , an advocate , had not been heard before ORG and he was to testify that there was no reason to revoke the applicant company ’s alcohol licence due to the changes in the ownership structure or the liquidation of the main shareholder .

On DATE , ORG rejected the applicant company ’s request for an oral hearing as being unnecessary and invited the applicant company to make its concluding submissions in the case , at the latest on DATE . The applicant company was granted an extension of time - limit and finalised its submissions in writing on DATE .

On DATE , ORG repealed ORG judgment and ruled in favour of ORG . The judgment was based on the fact that changes in the ownership structure and the shareholder ’s liquidation had not been reported to the relevant authority . Additionally , it noted that a number of police reports indicated that repeated disruptions of public order had occurred , such as fighting and serving alcoholic beverages to young people and that people had been so intoxicated that the police had taken them into custody , including a person who was DATE at the time . In the court ’s view , it was an aggravating circumstance that the disruptions of public order were primarily related to student parties , involving mostly young people . Moreover , it was noted that a waitress , on DATE , had left a pitcher of liquor on a table for guests at the restaurant after TIME ORG , referring to the fact that the applicant company had previously received warnings for failing to respect the rules for serving alcoholic beverages , did not find any specific reasons to limit the intervention to a warning .

The applicant company appealed to ORG ( Regeringsrätten ) and requested the court to hold an oral hearing . In response to a question by the court , the applicant company specified that it requested the oral hearing only if leave to appeal was granted .

On DATE , ORG refused leave to appeal .

The basic provisions mainly applicable in the present case are laid down in LAW ( Alkohollagen , GPE ) . On DATE , this Act was replaced by a new Alcohol Act ( CARDINAL:CARDINAL ) . Hereafter , reference is made to the older , now repealed , Act , which was in force at the time relevant to the present case .

An overriding principle of the LAW is restraint in connection to serving alcoholic beverages . In accordance with LAW , section CARDINAL , of the LAW , the sale of beverages falling under the LAW shall be conducted in such a manner that harmful effects are prevented as far as possible . Any person engaged in the sale of alcoholic beverages shall ensure that order and sobriety prevail at the point of sale . Under LAW , LAW , of the LAW , the serving of alcoholic beverages shall be conducted with restraint and may not lead to inconvenience with respect to public order and sobriety . Under GPE guidelines for licences to serve alcoholic beverages , neither serving nor consumption of entire bottles of spirits ( helrör ) is allowed after QUANTITY

NORP Moreover , a person to whom a licence has been granted shall notify the licensing authority in the event of any change in the activity significant for the supervision . Notice shall also be given of important changes of ownership . Notice shall be given in advance . If the circumstances giving rise to the duty of notification could not have been foreseen , notification shall instead be made without delay ( LAW , section CARDINAL ) .

The municipality shall revoke a licence to serve alcoholic beverages if such inconveniences as referred to in LAW , section CARDINAL , occur more than occasionally ( LAW , section CARDINAL , point CARDINAL ) . The municipality shall also revoke a licence to serve alcoholic beverages if the licensee does not comply with the provision of the LAW applying to the service or licence , or with applicable provisions or conditions pursuant to LAW ( ibid , point CARDINAL ) .

Instead of revocation , a licence may be issued with a warning if , for special reasons , a warning is deemed sufficient ( LAW , section CARDINAL ) . In accordance with the travaux préparatoires ( Government PERSON , p. CARDINAL ) , an example of such special reasons is that the licensee has taken appropriate measures to correct the circumstances so that it may be assumed that the business will in future be operated in accordance with the applicable provisions .

Appeal against a decision rendered by ORG under LAW lies to the administrative courts . However , in these cases leave to appeal is required for ORG to consider an appeal on the merits against a decision or judgment delivered by ORG a of ORG , ORG , hereinafter “ the DATE LAW ) . Likewise , leave to appeal is required for ORG to consider on the merits an appeal against a decision or judgment delivered by ORG ( LAW of LAW ) .

Section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL LAW is worded as follows :

“ The procedure shall be in writing .

Where it may be assumed to be advantageous for the investigation or promote the expeditious determination of the case , the processing may include an oral hearing regarding certain issues .

In ORG and ORG an oral hearing shall be held if requested by an individual party to the proceedings , unless it is unnecessary or there are particular reasons against holding a hearing . ”

The possibility for an individual party to obtain an oral hearing on request under those circumstances is not available in the proceedings before ORG .

The travaux préparatoires to the DATE Act emphasise that an oral procedure can be advantageous for the investigation of a case in CARDINAL respects in particular . Firstly , such a hearing may be needed in order to examine a witness , expert or party or in cases where a party has difficulty expounding his or her claim in writing . Secondly , an oral hearing may be needed to clarify the positions taken by the parties in the case and perhaps eliminate unnecessary or meaningless points of dispute . In the latter case , the procedure is typically of a preparatory nature . Moreover , the oral form of procedure envisaged in the DATE Act is not to be seen as an alternative to the written form , but rather as a complement to that form ( see the Government PERSON , p. CARDINAL ) .

Furthermore , the travaux préparatoires to the DATE Act underlined , in connection with the provision in section QUANTITY concerning the right of a party to an oral hearing in certain cases , that while serious consideration should be given to the wishes of a party for such a hearing , the party could hardly be allowed to have a decisive influence in the matter . The question of whether a hearing is necessary should primarily be assessed in the light of the existing investigation of the case , but it should also be possible to accord significance to other factors , for example , if the case is very important for the party and a hearing would give him a better understanding of the importance of the decision to be given in the case . CARDINAL particular reason not to arrange an oral hearing could be that the case is of a trivial nature or that the costs of the hearing are high compared to the value of the object of dispute ( see Government PERSON , p. CARDINAL ) .

NORP In DATE ORG has set aside a number of decisions on appeal and referred cases back to the administrative courts of appeal because of the lack of an oral hearing in the lower courts ( see , for example , RÅ DATE ref . CARDINAL , RÅ DATE note DATE , RÅ DATE note CARDINAL , RÅ DATE note CARDINAL and RÅ DATE note CARDINAL ) .

A comprehensive summary of the issue of compensation for violations of the Convention in the NORP legal order can be found in GPE ( [ dec . ] , no . CARDINAL , DATE ) and PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) .


Violation of Art. 5-3;Violation of Art. 6-1;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

On DATE the applicant was charged with fraud under LAW and CARDINAL of LAW , it being alleged that in DATE and DATE , he had deceived ORG ( Česká komerční banka ) and ORG ) by concluding CARDINAL loan contracts for CZK CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL and CZK CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL , without informing the banks that he had previously incurred debts of CZK CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL , CZK CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL and CZK CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL . On DATE , the applicant was arrested .

On DATE ORG ( okresní soud ) ( “ the ORG ” ) ordered the applicant ’s detention on remand under LAW of LAW , with effect from DATE , stating that the applicant could influence witnesses who had not been heard by the police . At the same time , the court refused to release the applicant on bail or on oath . The applicant challenged the order claiming that he was prepared to satisfy his creditors and did not intend to abscond or influence the witnesses . He repeated his request to be released , invoking his health problems .

On DATE ORG ( krajský soud ) ( “ the ORG ” ) , referring to LAW , noted that the applicant was under threat of a heavy prison sentence which justified the concern of the court that he would abscond and evade the criminal proceedings . It further noted that the applicant had already been prosecuted , had abused alcohol in DATE and would probably not be able to compensate for the damage he had caused to the banks immediately . The court refused to release the applicant on bail .

On DATE the applicant was charged with CARDINAL further acts of fraud , pursuant to LAW , which he had allegedly committed between CARDINAL DATE and DATE . The damage was estimated at CZK CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL .

On DATE ORG ( krajský státní zástupce ) formally indicted the applicant before ORG . A preliminary hearing was held on DATE . The court decided to send the case back to ORG for further investigations and the taking of evidence . On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) quashed this decision and ordered ORG to deal with the case .

On DATE the President of the ORG ( předseda senátu ) of ORG informed the applicant ’s representative that it would be impossible to deal with the case before DATE , because of the overwhelming workload of the court and the chamber dealing with the case .

On DATE the Vice - President of ORG ( místopředseda soudu ) transferred the applicant ’s case to another chamber which would be able to deal with it without delay . On DATE ORG decided to transfer the case to ORG , pursuant to Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL and CARDINAL § CARDINAL(a ) of LAW , as it appeared from the primary evidence and witness statements that the offences had been committed in GPE . On DATE ORG refused to deal with the case on the grounds that the indictment had been lodged with ORG which had already held the preliminary hearing , and that CARDINAL of the banks concerned had its seat in the PERSON region . On DATE ORG decided that ORG was competent to deal with the case .

On DATE ORG scheduled substantive hearings for DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE . The hearing held on DATE was adjourned ( no new date being fixed ) as the court considered it necessary to hear further witnesses and to obtain further documentary evidence . On DATE the substantive hearing continued and was adjourned until DATE because of the applicant ’s request to take further evidence .

On DATE ORG convicted the applicant of fraud under LAW and CARDINAL of LAW and sentenced him , inter alia , to DATE imprisonment . On DATE ORG , after a public hearing on DATE , upheld this judgment .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention on remand until DATE . The court held that the detention was necessary , within the meaning of LAW , as there was a danger that the applicant would abscond . It stated that the extension of the charges against the applicant would necessitate further investigation , including the hearing of employees of the banks concerned and the gathering of further documentary evidence .

On DATE ORG , at ORG request , extended the applicant ’s detention on remand until DATE , having regard to the further investigations and the risk that the applicant would abscond .

On DATE ORG , at ORG request , extended the applicant ’s detention on remand until DATE . ORG submitted that the investigating authorities had not been provided with an accounting expert ’s report or with the statements of CARDINAL witnesses living in GPE . The court found that the applicant ’s release would frustrate or impede the purpose of the criminal proceedings . The applicant appealed against this decision , claiming that his company , “ GPE ” , had begun to meet its outstanding debts . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s complaint and upheld the findings of ORG .

On DATE , at the end of the preliminary hearing , ORG decided , under LAW , to keep the applicant in custody on the grounds that the reasons for his original detention continued to apply . On DATE ORG upheld this decision .

On DATE the President of ORG requested ORG to grant an extension of the applicant ’s detention on remand until DATE , stating that the indictment had only been preferred on DATE and that the court had repeatedly had to deal with the applicant ’s requests for release . He noted that the consideration of the case - file had been concluded on DATE , when his court had decided to send the case back to the prosecutor for further investigations and to keep the applicant in detention . He further noted that , in view of the nature and extent of the further investigations , and in the event that the court ’s decision were to be upheld , the examination of further evidence would take DATE . He also stated that the chamber was overburdened with work until DATE .

On DATE the High Court granted the request and extended the applicant ’s detention on remand until DATE , pursuant to LAW . It referred to the complex character of the case and the necessity to examine further evidence . The court stated inter alia that , given the legal classification of the applicant ’s offence , he was likely to be sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment if convicted . It also noted that , having numerous contacts abroad and being in debt , the applicant might abscond . It considered , therefore , that the applicant ’s detention was necessary within the meaning of LAW . On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) upheld this extension and found that the applicant ’s alleged health problems were not sufficient to convince the court that the applicant would not abscond .

On DATE ORG , at the request of the President of ORG , extended the applicant 's detention on remand until DATE , pursuant to LAW . The reasons given for the extension were similar to those given for the previous extension . The court noted that the length of the proceedings was due to the length of the investigation and the complexity of the case .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint against this decision with ORG . He contested the High Court ’s arguments and noted that his detention had lasted DATE , that the indictment had been presented DATE and that no substantive hearing had been held so far . On DATE ORG rejected the complaint , upholding the findings of ORG .

On DATE the President of ORG requested ORG to extend the applicant ’s detention on remand until DATE , pursuant to LAW . He stated that during the substantive hearing the applicant had changed his defence strategy and that this had required a hearing of further witnesses living in GPE , who would not appear before the court but would be heard by the NORP authorities in DATE . He noted that the applicant had acknowledged that he had voluntarily suppressed certain facts upon the advice of his legal representative . The President of the ORG further stated that the fear of the applicant ’s absconding was reinforced by the fact that , if he left the country for GPE , he could acquire NORP citizenship , which would prevent the NORP authorities from seeking his extradition .

On DATE ORG granted the request . On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s complaint against this decision and upheld ORG findings that the nature of the offence with which the applicant had been charged , and his contacts abroad , substantiated the reasons for his detention under LAW .

On DATE ORG , at the request of the President of ORG , ordered the applicant 's continued detention on remand until DATE , for reasons similar to those given for the previous extension . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s challenge to this extension .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention on remand until DATE . The court stated that it could not deal with the applicant ’s appeal against conviction until DATE . It further stated that , having regard to the extent of the applicant ’s criminal activities , the damage caused by him , the length of the sentence of imprisonment which the applicant faced if his conviction were upheld and the danger of his absconding , there was the risk that , if released , he would impede or frustrate the purpose of the criminal proceedings . The court did not find any particular delay in the proceedings .

On DATE ORG upheld the High Court ’s decision . It found that the reasons invoked by ORG were relevant and sufficient within the meaning of LAW . The court noted that the judgment of ORG , by which the applicant had been sentenced to DATE imprisonment , had not yet come into effect and held that the applicant ’s detention was necessary in order to prevent his absconding . The decision to extend it until DATE was therefore justified under LAW .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s request for release , finding that the evidence taken during the investigation created a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences . It therefore considered his detention necessary within the meaning of LAW . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s complaint against this decision , referring to its findings of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) and stating that the reasons for the applicant ’s detention continued to apply .

On DATE the applicant lodged a further request for release . He submitted inter alia that his detention prevented him from taking any steps to compensate for the losses he had caused . On DATE ORG rejected the request . On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s complaint against this decision .

On DATE the applicant lodged his third request for release , denying that he had committed the offences . On DATE ORG rejected his request , referring to the establishment of the facts of the case and the state of the investigation , and found that the applicant ’s detention on remand was justified under LAW . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s complaint against this decision .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s request for release of DATE , in which the applicant referred to his aggravated health problems and complained about unjustified delays in the investigation . The court stated that the reasons for the applicant ’s detention continued to apply and that his health problems did not allay the court ’s concern that he would abscond or evade the criminal proceedings . It further noted that his detention on remand did not endanger the applicant ’s health or life .

The applicant lodged a complaint against ORG decision . He submitted that he had not concluded the loan contracts with any fraudulent intention and that he was taking steps to compensate for the damage caused . He therefore contested the court ’s reasoning that he would abscond or evade the criminal proceedings . On DATE ORG rejected the complaint , upholding the applicant ’s detention on remand pursuant to LAW . The court noted that the applicant had been convicted in the past , risked a heavy prison sentence , had allegedly profited from his criminal acts ( CZK CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) , had personal and business contacts abroad and was an alcoholic .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant lodged a new request for release , maintaining his innocence and offering as guarantor a NORP national . On CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed his request , stating that , having regard to the seriousness of the criminal offence with which the applicant had been charged , any surety proposed by him was unacceptable . On DATE ORG upheld this decision .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s further request for release .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s request for release of DATE . The court referred to its previous decisions relating to the applicant ’s detention and added that his health problems did not , in themselves , constitute a reason for his release when CARDINAL of the reasons for his detention still applied . The applicant lodged a complaint against this decision , contending that the threat of a lengthy prison sentence and his contacts abroad could not in themselves justify the fear that he would abscond , in particular since his passport had been seized by the authorities . He stressed that , before the criminal prosecution had officially been brought , he had not shown any intention to abscond or evade the proceedings . On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s complaint .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request for release submitted on DATE . On DATE ORG upheld ORG dismissal .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s further request for release referring to the reasons given in its previous decisions . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s complaint against this decision . As to his claim that ORG had not considered the reasons for his detention on remand but had just referred to its previous decisions , it emphasised that ORG was not required to repeat the facts which had already been sufficiently elaborated in its previous decisions , when the applicant ’s arguments and the reasons for his detention remained unchanged .

NORP On DATE the applicant submitted another request for release , claiming that his health problems were incompatible with his continued detention and excluded any risk of his absconding . On DATE ORG dismissed the request , stating that the reasons for the applicant ’s detention remained unchanged and that the applicant ’s health was not jeopardised by his remand in custody , as confirmed by the report of the prison health centre ( zdravotní středisko věznice ) of DATE .

On DATE the applicant ’s further request for release was dismissed by ORG .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s last request for release . On DATE ORG rejected his complaint against this decision .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal ( ústavní stížnost ) with ORG ( GPE PERSON ) against ORG decision of DATE , by which his detention on remand had been extended until DATE . He complained in particular that his continued detention on remand was not justified and that ORG had not dealt with the case properly when examining the existence of reasons for extending his detention . He invoked LAW základních práv a svobod ) .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal . The court accepted that the risk of a lengthy prison sentence could not constitute the sole ground for detention on remand . It stated , however , that in the applicant ’s case there were other facts justifying the fear of his absconding , and held that the applicant ’s state of health did not exclude this possibility . It referred to CARDINAL medical reports of CARDINAL May and DATE .

On DATE the applicant introduced a second constitutional appeal , this time against the decision of ORG of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) upholding the decision to extend his detention on remand until DATE . He alleged violations of LAW CARDINAL(c ) and CARDINAL and LAW , in that the reasons for his detention invoked by the courts were not sufficient or relevant . He claimed inter alia that the decisions extending the detention were not based on the real facts of his case and that there was no justification for extending his detention beyond DATE . He also claimed that the excessive workload of the court dealing with his case , the insufficient number of judges and administrative difficulties could not justify the delays in the proceedings .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s second constitutional appeal as being manifestly ill - founded . However , it found that ORG and ORG had infringed the principle of the economy of proceedings in that they had been unable to resolve the question of their geographical jurisdiction . It also considered that , in general , the delays in the proceedings could not be justified by the applicant ’s regular requests for release . The court stated , nevertheless , that in the present case not all of the applicant ’s requests had been reasonable . It held that the case was particularly complex and that the reasons for the applicant ’s detention continued to apply . The court noted that the decisions extending the applicant ’s detention beyond DATE had been taken in accordance with LAW and that it was clear from the evidence available that these decisions had been taken on the basis of the facts established at the material time . The court concluded that the length of the applicant ’s detention on remand , extended until DATE , could not be considered unreasonable within the meaning of Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL and CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Convention .

On DATE the applicant introduced a third constitutional appeal against the decision of ORG of DATE , as confirmed by ORG on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , by which his detention had been extended until DATE . He alleged violations of NORP CARDINAL § CARDINAL and CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Convention .

On DATE the applicant lodged a fourth constitutional appeal , this time against the decision of ORG of DATE , claiming that there was no reason to extend his detention on remand beyond DATE , in violation of his rights guaranteed by LAW ) and QUANTITY CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Convention . He submitted that his criminal case was not complex , that the delays in the proceedings could not be explained by the overwhelming workload of the courts or by the fact that he had used his right to request release . Rather the courts had conducted the proceedings in an inappropriate manner , including their dispute over territorial competence .

DATE . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . It recalled its findings in its previous decisions and considered that , even though the court of first instance had not proceeded in accordance with the principle of the economy of proceedings after the applicant ’s indictment , it could not be said that the applicant ’s constitutional rights and freedoms had been breached .

On DATE , ORG also rejected , as manifestly ill - founded , the applicant ’s third constitutional appeal . The court found that it was similar to his previous constitutional appeals and did not contain any new arguments supporting his allegations of a violation of his constitutional rights and freedoms .

The relevant provisions of LAW read as follows :

Article CARDINAL

“ An accused person may be remanded in custody only if there exist specific grounds to believe that he

a ) will abscond in order to evade prosecution or punishment , in particular if his identity can not be immediately established , if he has no permanent residence or if he is under the threat of a heavy punishment ; … . ”

CARDINAL

Pursuant to LAW , the competent authorities shall give priority to cases involving a person ’s detention on remand and deal with them as speedily as possible .

Under LAW , an accused person is entitled to request his release at any time . Decisions on such requests are to be taken without delay . In case of dismissal , a request for release may be re - introduced DATE after the relevant decision has become binding if it is based on the same reasons .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL provides that an accused person ’s detention on remand shall not exceed DATE . If it is not possible , because of the complexity of the matter or for other serious reasons , to complete the criminal proceedings within this period , and if the release of the accused person would jeopardise or substantially complicate the achievement of the aim of the proceedings , ORG may extend the detention for the necessary period .

Under LAW , a person ’s detention on remand shall not exceed DATE . In cases of particularly serious offences , within the meaning of LAW , the maximum period of detention on remand is DATE .

Article CARDINAL provides that the accused person and the victim have the right to request the public prosecutor at any time during the investigation to eliminate delays or any defect in the investigation procedure . The public prosecutor must deal with the request immediately .

Article CARDINAL provides for criminal proceedings to be brought before the court in the region where the offence was committed .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL(a ) provides that , after a preliminary hearing , a court should transfer the case to another court if it is not competent to deal with the case itself .

Under LAW , if the accused person is remanded in custody , the court holding a preliminary hearing must also decide on the person ’s continued detention .


The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . The respondent Government were represented by PERSON , their Agent .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant filed an action for damages with ORG . He claimed CARDINAL NORP korunas ( SKK ) from his neighbour on the ground that snow which had fallen from the roof of the latter ’s house had damaged his fence in DATE . The amount claimed was based on an expert ’s opinion of DATE elaborated at the applicant ’s request . In his action the applicant stated that , upon the municipal office ’s order of DATE , the neighbour had fixed the fence in a provisional manner . In the applicant ’s view , the repair had not been carried out properly . He therefore considered himself entitled to compensation .

On DATE the ORG heard CARDINAL witnesses .

On DATE the applicant challenged the judge . The ORG branch office of ORG dismissed the request on DATE .

On DATE the judge examined the damaged fence in the presence of the parties . Hearings before ORG were held on DATE and on DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the action with reference to witness statements according to which the defendant had repaired the applicant ’s fence . The applicant appealed on DATE .

On CARDINAL DATE the ORG branch office of ORG adjourned the case as the applicant had challenged the presiding judge . On DATE ORG found that the judge concerned was not biased .

On DATE the ORG branch office of ORG quashed the first instance judgment and instructed ORG to appoint an expert with a view to determining the damage .

On DATE ORG adjourned the case pending the submission of an expert opinion .

On DATE the applicant challenged the ORG judge . On CARDINAL DATE the ORG branch office of ORG found that the applicant ’s request was unsubstantiated .

On DATE ORG appointed an expert and instructed him to assess the damage . On DATE the expert informed ORG that the applicant had not allowed him to inspect the property in question . On DATE ORG informed the applicant that he was obliged to co - operate with the expert .

On DATE the case was taken over by a different judge following the transfer of the judge who had originally dealt with it to a different court .

On DATE the expert informed ORG that the applicant had prevented him from entering his property . He was therefore not in a position to elaborate an opinion .

On DATE ORG asked the police to assist the expert . This request was revoked after the applicant had informed the court , on DATE , that he did not wish to be disturbed by third persons entering his property .

On DATE the expert appointed by ORG concluded in his opinion that the damage which the applicant had suffered amounted to SKK CARDINAL,CARDINAL . The opinion was based on the material included in another expert opinion which had been elaborated at the applicant ’s request in DATE .

On DATE ORG delivered a decision on the expert ’s fees . The applicant appealed and contended that the appointment of the expert had been superfluous and that the opinion submitted by the expert appointed by the court was erroneous .

On DATE ORG delivered a judgment in which it ordered the defendant to pay compensation as claimed by the applicant , namely FAC . The compensation granted to the applicant was lower than the assessment made by the expert appointed by the court , as FAC was bound by the applicant ’s claim .

On DATE the applicant appealed . He claimed , with reference to the length of the proceedings , SKK CARDINAL in compensation for non - pecuniary damage . The applicant also claimed the reimbursement of the fees of the expert whom he had asked to assess the damage in DATE .

On DATE the defendant submitted his observations on the applicant ’s appeal .

On DATE the ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal against the judgment of DATE . It noted that under the relevant provisions of ORG a plaintiff lacked standing to appeal against a first instance judgement by which his or her claim was allowed in full . In the same decision ORG upheld ORG decision on expert ’s fees of DATE .


Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON ( PERSON oğlu Əhmədov ) , is an NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

He was represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE police officers took the applicant and his brother from the applicant ’s home to the Surakhani FAC in connection with the investigation of the murder of an acquaintance of the applicant with whom he had had a brief business relationship in GPE DATE before . After their arrival at the police station , the applicant and his brother were arrested for hooliganism and , on DATE , the ORG sentenced them to CARDINAL days’ administrative detention .

According to the applicant , he was heavily beaten and ill - treated in police custody with the aim of extracting a confession from him . He did not however give any self - incriminating or confession statement .

On DATE the applicant was heard by the investigator as a witness in connection with the murder case . He was questioned in particular about his relationship with the victim . According to the record of questioning , the applicant stated that he had fallen in the street on DATE before his arrest by the police .

According to the medical record drawn up on DATE , on DATE an X - ray examination of the applicant ’s ribcage was carried out . The reason of this examination was not specified in the record . It was noted in the record that the applicant had not been examined or registered by a doctor . The medical record which is composed of CARDINAL sentences reads as follows :

“ On DATE an X - ray examination of the ribcage was carried out . He was not examined or registered by a doctor . ”

The record did not mention the results of the X - ray examination .

At DATE CARDINAL days’ administrative detention the applicant ’s brother was released , but the applicant remained detained on suspicion of involvement in the murder .

On DATE the applicant was questioned by the investigator as a suspect . It was suspected that the applicant and a friend of his ( TIME ) had contracted CARDINAL other suspects ( ORG and ORG ) to murder the victim in exchange for a certain sum of money . According to the record of the questioning of CARDINAL DATE , the applicant denied his involvement in the murder , stating that he had never ordered the murder of the victim . He also stated that there had been no conflict between him and the victim ; however A.M. had had a conflict with the victim . The applicant did not raise any complaint concerning his alleged ill - treatment by the police .

On DATE ORG and ORG were also questioned by the investigator . In their submissions , ORG and ORG admitted that they had murdered the victim , who was a taxi driver . On DATE of the murder , they had taken the victim ’s taxi as clients and , once outside the city , had asked the victim to stop the car and stabbed him with a knife . ORG and ORG stated that the applicant and A.M. had contracted them to kill the victim in exchange for money . TIME was questioned on DATE by the investigator and he described the applicant as the person behind the murder .

On DATE the applicant maintained his initial position that he had never ordered the victim ’s murder . Also on DATE , ORG and ORG were again questioned by the investigator . In their submissions , they reiterated their previous statements , stating that the applicant had pointed out the victim ’s taxi to them and that the applicant and TIME were behind the murder . On DATE , A.M. again made an incriminating statement against the applicant .

On the basis of the investigation the applicant was charged with having committed the offence of premeditated murder .

Following his ORG arrest the applicant ’s father complained to the prosecution authorities that they had been ill - treated by the police . He claimed that his sons had been heavily beaten and ill - treated in police custody and that police officers had asked him for a bribe in the amount of MONEY ( ORG ) in order to release his sons from the police station . He said that he had not had enough money to pay the sum demanded and had managed to pay MONEY . According to the applicant ’s father , the applicant ’s brother was released following the payment of the latter amount to police officers at the Surakhani FAC , but the applicant remained in detention as he could not pay the total amount of the bribe .

By a decision of DATE the investigator at ORG instituted criminal proceedings under LAW ( excess of authority ) on the basis of the complaints by the applicant ’s father .

On DATE the investigator at ORG decided to terminate the criminal proceedings under LAW . The investigator found that the applicant ’s father had failed to prove his allegations . As regards the complaint relating to the applicant ’s ill - treatment in police custody , the investigator confirmed the existence of injuries to the applicant ’s left ribcage and left ear . However , he stated that these injuries were due to a fall that the applicant had had in the street before his arrest . In this connection , the investigator noted that the applicant had stated when he was heard as a witness that he had fallen in the street . The investigator also relied on the submissions of the police officers , who denied ill - treating the applicant . The relevant part of the decision reads as follows :

“ It appears from the record drawn up on DATE by the policeman on duty PERSON at FAC No . CARDINAL of the Surakhani ORG that at his arrival at the police station PERSON stated that he had had a fall in PERSON street where he lived and had hurt his left ribcage and left ear . In this connection , a record was drawn up in the presence of LOC [ the applicant ’s brother ] and the officers at the police station and it was signed by ORG and PERSON . PERSON who was questioned as a witness during the investigation of the criminal case carried out by the Surakhani ORG stated that he had had a fall .

The head of Police Station No . CARDINAL of the Surakhani ORG PERSON stated that ... after his arrival at the police station PERSON [ the applicant ] stated that he had been injured because of a fall and he was suffering and that a record was drawn up on DATE at the police station and PERSON and PERSON signed it . Neither during their transportation to the police station , nor during their stay there , were PERSON and PERSON subjected to physical force and they did not sustain injuries ...

The deputy head of Police Station No . CARDINAL of the Surakhani ORG PERSON Alihuseyn oglu confirmed the submissions of PERSON .

The agents of Police Station No . CARDINAL of the Surakhani ORG Tagiyev Azer Abbaseli oglu , PERSON , PERSON QUANTITY and GPE PERSON submitted that they had gone on DATE at TIME to PERSON street DATE , in GPE , where ORG and PERSON resided , to invite them to come to the police station . ORG and PERSON who came to the police station at their request committed acts of hooliganism in front of the police station and this fact was documented and the relevant record on the existence of the injuries on the person of PERSON when he was taken to the police station was drawn up . They did not use physical force against anyone ...

Therefore , it was not established during the investigation that PERSON and PERSON ... had been beaten in the police station ... ”

The applicant did not appeal against the above decision to terminate the criminal proceedings .

In the meantime , the charges of premeditated murder against the applicant had been brought before ORG for examination . During these proceedings the applicant protested his innocence , submitting that he had been beaten by the police and that a criminal investigation against the police officers in this respect was pending before the prosecuting authorities . In the course of the trial ORG and ORG likewise stated that they had been beaten and ill - treated in police custody , maintaining that their testimony in the pre - trial investigation had been extracted by this ill - treatment . On DATE ORG ordered an examination of ORG and of ORG by a forensic expert . According to the forensic reports of DATE , there was no sign of ill - treatment on their person .

On DATE , i.e. prior to the termination of the criminal investigation concerning the applicant ’s alleged ill - treatment ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , ORG found the applicant , TIME , ORG and ORG guilty of premeditated murder . The applicant was convicted under ORG CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ( complicity in premeditated murder ) and sentenced to DATE imprisonment . The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows :

“ The submissions of PERSON [ the applicant ] that TIME , ORG and ORG were partial towards him in their statements which indicate that he had ordered the murder of the victim ; that GPE and GPE killed the victim at the request of TIME because the latter had had a conflict with the victim and the submissions of TIME that ORG and GPE killed the victim at the request of PERSON [ the applicant ] in exchange for CARDINAL NORP manats and deleting a rental debt of CARDINAL NORP manats because there had been a conflict between the applicant and the victim in GPE and the victim refused his consent to the marriage between his sister and the applicant ’s brother were examined and the submissions of PERSON [ the applicant ] were not confirmed by any other evidence in the case file .

The video recordings and other documents in the case file confirm that the statements of ORG , GPE , PERSON [ the applicant ] and TIME were freely taken by the investigator in the presence of their lawyers .

The arguments put forward by PERSON and DATE in support of their defence which were completely and objectively examined in detail during the court investigation should be dismissed as they are unjustified and rebutted .

The statement and the documents written by ORG in favour of PERSON [ the applicant ] , as well as the statement given by ORG in the courtroom , have been examined in the court investigation and they could not be accepted as evidence because they had been done under pressure as ORG ’s family lived in a house belonging to PERSON [ the applicant ] . ”

The judgment was silent as to the applicant ’s alleged ill - treatment .

The applicant appealed against ORG judgment maintaining his innocence and reiterating that he had not been involved in the murder in question .

According to the record of the hearing held on DATE before ORG , ORG stated that he had not intended to kill the victim but had just wanted to frighten him . He further stated that the applicant did not know anything about the murder and that TIME was behind the murder . PERSON also retracted his previous testimony against the applicant at the hearing . In his submissions before the court , TIME denied his involvement in the murder , but admitted that he had pointed out the victim ’s taxi to ORG and ORG However , he described the applicant as the person behind the murder .

On DATE ORG upheld ORG judgment . The relevant part of the judgment which is almost identical in its wording to the first - instance court ’s judgment reads as follows :

On DATE , i.e. DATE after the proceedings concerning the alleged ill - treatment of the applicant had been terminated ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , ORG quashed ORG judgment of DATE and remitted the case for fresh examination . The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows :

“ After having heard the lawyer ’s submissions in favour of the applicant ’s cassation appeal and the applicant ’s submission in favour of his own cassation appeal and against the other co - accused , as well as the prosecutor ’s submissions against all the cassation appeals and having examined the arguments and the facts of the case , the panel of the court considers that the appeals should be partially granted , the judgment of ORG should be quashed and the case should be sent for a new appellate examination .

In accordance with LAW , the cassation court examines the cassation appeal and protest on the merits and verifies only the lawfulness of the applicability of the criminal law and provisions of this LAW on legal issues .

The panel of the court considers that although a number of violations of procedural law had been committed at the investigation stage of the proceedings , these violations had not been fully examined and duly assessed at the CARDINAL court instances .

In accordance with Article CARDINAL of LAW , information , documents and other items obtained through the use of violence , threats of violence , deceit , torture or other cruel , inhuman or degrading acts shall not be accepted as evidence in a criminal case .

It appears from the case file that PERSON sustained moderate bodily injury because of the use of physical force against him at the investigation stage , and criminal proceedings were instituted in this connection by ORG . It follows that the statements were extracted from him by force during the investigation and that , as he was not willing to give the statements the investigator wanted , he was subjected to physical force .

Moreover , the detainees ORG and ORG also stated in their cassation appeals that their testimony had been extracted from them by force at the investigation stage .

Section CARDINAL of the decision of the Plenum of ORG in ORG in ORG of DATE provides that unlawfully obtained evidence can not be used in the administration of justice and for this reason , when examining cases , the courts guided by the provisions of the criminal procedural law , as well as the explanations of LAW of the decision of the Plenum of ORG of DATE , shall not in any case use unlawfully obtained evidence .

As it transpires from the case file the detainees ORG and ORG did not confess in their statements that they had been ordered to kill the victim and only ORG stated that he had been ordered to frighten the victim for preventing him from going to GPE . Although in his statements made at the investigation stage he submitted that he had received this order from the detainees PERSON [ the applicant ] and DATE , in his statement made during the examination of the case at the first - instance court and in his appeal to the appellate court , he noted that this order had been given solely by TIME However , instead of dismissing these submissions by examining them with other evidence , both court instances refused to consider this evidence without any justification concluding that these statements had been transferred to him by the relatives of PERSON [ the applicant ] ...

Moreover the panel of the court considers that the motive for the crime was not completely and clearly established ... ”

ORG re - examined the criminal case . At the hearings before ORG the applicant denied his involvement in the murder of the victim . He maintained that he had been beaten by the police and that he had never said that he had fallen in the street .

NORP In the course of the proceedings before ORG , ORG and ORG stated that the murder of the victim had not been ordered by the applicant and TIME , and that their statements to that effect given during the investigation had been extracted by force . However , they also stated that the applicant and TIME had asked them to beat and frighten the victim in order to prevent him from going to GPE . GPE and GPE lastly stated that they had not intended to kill the victim and had only stabbed him in the leg , but that the victim had died as a result of the injuries to his leg . In his submission before ORG , DATE also stated that the applicant had only asked ORG and ORG to beat and frighten the victim .

On DATE ORG delivered a new judgment on the merits . The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows :

“ The panel of the court concludes ... that the statements of ORG and ORG given at the investigation stage , according to which PERSON [ the applicant ] and PERSON ordered them to kill the victim , were not true .

It appears from the case file that the detainees were subjected to violence , that they were beaten and sustained injuries , and that a criminal investigation was instituted in this connection .

For this reason , the panel of the court decides under LAW not to admit the statements given during the investigation by ORG and ORG

The panel of the court , based on the above - mentioned facts , considers that the detainees’ actions were not correctly classified by the first - instance court and that PERSON [ the applicant ] and TIME did not intend to kill the victim and they did not give such an order .

The detainees ORG and ORG also did not intend to kill the victim and did not want such a consequence . They only intended to frighten the victim . ”

ORG convicted the applicant on the basis of the testimony given before the court by the other accused and reclassified his conviction under ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ( complicity in the premeditated infliction of physical damage by a group of persons and resulting in the victim ’s death ) . The applicant was sentenced to DATE imprisonment .

On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a cassation appeal claiming his innocence .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld ORG judgment of DATE and dismissed the applicant ’s cassation appeal . It appears from ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE that the applicant complained before the cassation court about the assessment of the evidence by the lower court claiming his innocence . This part of the judgment reads as follows :

“ In the cassation appeal lodged by the advocate of the detainee PERSON [ the applicant ] it was requested that the appellate court ’s judgment of CARDINAL DATE be quashed and that the criminal proceedings be closed . The appeal was supported by the allegations that PERSON [ the applicant ] had been convicted on the basis of the incorrect statement of the other accused TIME , that the preliminary investigation in connection with this case had been biased , that PERSON [ the applicant ] involvement in the crime had not been proved in court by reliable evidence , that the court had not correctly assessed the evidence , had not taken into consideration the statement of ORG and ORG according to which PERSON had not ordered them to kill the victim , had incorrectly concluded that PERSON had participated in the crime and that the judgment of ORG was not based on reliable evidence ” .

As to the reasoning of ORG , the relevant part of the judgment reads as follows :

“ The appellate instance court examined the appeal by conducting a court investigation . It correctly determined the facts of the case , the degree of participation of the detainee PERSON [ the applicant ] in the commission of the crime and his role in this regard and correctly classified his acts by the criminal law by completely and objectively examining in detail the arguments of the appeal , by analysing and assessing , as required by the law , the collected evidence .

In order to reach this conclusion , the appellate court in its decision , in support of its finding that PERSON had committed the crime , also referred to the statements of TIME , ORG and GPE , clarified the contradictions between these statements and correctly assessed them .

Moreover , the appellate court also substantiated its findings on this case by testimonies of witnesses and other objective facts of the case . ”

DATE ) of LAW reads as follows :

“ No one shall be subjected to torture or ill - treatment . No one shall be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment . ... ”

DATE the LAW provides :

“ Unlawfully obtained evidence shall not be used in the administration of justice . ”

Information , documents and other items , if there is no doubt as to their accuracy , their source and the circumstances in which they were obtained , may be accepted as evidence ( Article CARDINAL ) . Article CARDINAL of the ORG provides that information , documents and other items can not be accepted as evidence in a criminal case if they were obtained in the following circumstances : if the accuracy of the evidence is or may be affected by the fact that the parties to the criminal proceedings were deprived of their rights protected by law , or those rights were restricted through a violation of their constitutional human or civil rights and liberties or of other requirements of LAW ( LAW ; through the use of violence , threats of violence , deceit , torture or other cruel , inhuman or degrading acts ( Article CARDINAL ) ; and where the rules governing investigations or other procedures have been seriously violated ( Article CARDINAL ) . Article CARDINAL of the ORG provides that information , documents and other items obtained in the circumstances described in LAW are to be regarded as invalid and may not be used to prove any circumstance with a view to determining a charge correctly .

Chapter LII of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( “ the CCrP ” ) lays down the procedure by which parties to criminal proceedings could challenge actions or decisions of the prosecuting authorities before a court . Article CARDINAL provides that the victim or his counsel can challenge actions or decisions of the prosecuting authorities concerning , inter alia , refusal to institute criminal proceedings or to terminate criminal proceedings . The judge examining the lawfulness of the prosecuting authorities’ actions or decisions can quash them if he or she finds them to be unlawful ( Article CARDINAL ) . The decision of the judge on the lawfulness of the prosecuting authorities’ actions or decisions can be disputed before an appellate court in accordance with the procedure established in ORG CARDINAL of the CCrP.

The relevant part of the decision of the ORG of ORG reads as follows :

“ ... Unlawfully obtained evidence can not be used in the administration of justice . For this reason , when examining cases courts ... shall not under any circumstances use unlawfully obtained evidence . The court , if it considers that evidence submitted by the prosecution or the investigating authority has been unlawfully obtained , shall give an opinion on the acts of the person having violated the law which excludes in all cases such impugned evidence from the body of evidence in the case ... ”


Preliminary objection rejected (estoppel);Violation of Art. 6-1;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings

Mr PERSON , a NORP national born in DATE , is a computer engineer . He is a haemophiliac and has received numerous blood transfusions .

A test carried out on DATE showed that the applicant had been infected with the human immunodeficiency virus ( HIV ) . He is classified as having reached stage II of the CARDINAL stages of infection on the scale of ORG .

On DATE the applicant submitted a preliminary application for compensation to the Minister for ORG , ORG . He sought compensation for the medical disorders of all kinds he had suffered on account of his infection . This application was rejected on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision with ORG , seeking compensation for the damage sustained as a result of the ORG ’s failure to take appropriate measures to prevent his infection with HIV . On DATE he produced a supplementary pleading .

NORP The Minister of Health lodged his defence on DATE . This was communicated to the applicant on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the applicant was served with an order referring the case to the ORG d’Etat . ORG was then designated as the competent court . The application was registered at ORG on DATE .

On DATE ORG gave an interlocutory judgment , holding that “ the ORG is liable in respect of haemophiliacs who were infected with HIV in the course of transfusion of non - heat - treated blood products during the period of liability defined above , that is DATE and DATE ” and that “ there are grounds for ORG to order the ORG to pay compensation for the whole of the damage suffered ” .

ORG also ordered a medical report to determine when it had been discovered that PERSON was HIV - positive and whether he had received blood derivatives during the period of the ORG ’s liability . The expert filed his report on DATE .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE the court dismissed the applicant ’s claim , on the ground that no causal connection had been proved between his infection and the administration of non - heat - treated blood products during the period of the ORG ’s liability , DATE and DATE .

On DATE ORG of the ORG d’Etat gave CARDINAL landmark judgments , fixing CARDINAL DATE as the start of the period of the ORG ’s liability and awarding the victims compensation at a flat rate of MONEY ( ORG ) ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the applicant appealed against the judgment of DATE to ORG , requesting application of this new case - law to his own case .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG decided , in accordance with the above - mentioned case - law of the ORG d’Etat , that the ORG was liable for the damage sustained by the applicant as a result of the transfusions .

It awarded PERSON CARDINAL . However , since he had accepted an offer of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL made to him in respect of the same damage by ORG and GPE , ORG decided that the balance of the compensation owed was ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL . It calculated interest on the basis of that sum with effect from CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL–CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the applicant appealed on points of law to the ORG d’Etat . He complained in particular of the way ORG had calculated the interest .

On DATE PERSON lodged an application ( no . DATE ) with ORG , complaining of the length of the compensation proceedings and relying on LAW CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Convention . On DATE the Commission adopted a report pursuant to LAW noting that the parties had reached agreement on a friendly settlement of the case ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the reporting judge at the ORG d’Etat filed his report . On DATE the case was allocated to a government commissioner .

The case was listed for a hearing on DATE .

On DATE the ORG d’Etat gave a judgment quashing ORG judgment of DATE in so far as that court DATE notwithstanding the PERSON d’Etat ’s case - law on the question ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) – had deducted from the sums the ORG was to pay Mr Leterme the amount of compensation to be paid by ORG and Haemophiliacs in the event of Aids being diagnosed . It remitted the case to ORG .

The file was received by ORG on DATE .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE the senior registrar at the court informed the applicant that the case had been remitted to that court by the ORG d’Etat and asked him to submit his observations within DATE . The applicant ’s observations were filed at the court registry on DATE .

On DATE the court decided to proceed without waiting for observations from the Minister of Health , ORG and ORG and Haemophiliacs .

On DATE Mr Leterme ’s lawyer wrote to the President of ORG to draw his attention to the length and protractedness of the proceedings and the urgency of the case , given the applicant ’s state of health . No reply was forthcoming .

On DATE the case was allocated to a reporting judge .

On DATE the applicant lodged a further application with the Commission ( no . CARDINAL ) , registered on DATE , complaining that the proceedings were still pending before ORG .

In separate proceedings the applicant had submitted a claim to ORG and GPE that had been set up by LAW of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

In a decision of CARDINAL DATE the ORG awarded PERSON compensation of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL , of which ORG CARDINAL were to be paid in CARDINAL equal DATE instalments and FRF CARDINAL if and when Aids was diagnosed . From that sum FRF CARDINAL,CARDINAL already paid out by the ORG public and private solidarity funds was to be deducted .

On DATE the applicant appealed to ORG .

On DATE ORG gave a judgment in which it ruled that the ORG ’s offer was satisfactory , formally noted that it undertook to pay the sum of FRF CARDINAL , subject to deduction of ORG CARDINAL , and specified that payment of the additional compensation would be conditional on the onset of Aids being diagnosed .

On DATE ORG paid the applicant ORG CARDINAL .

On DATE ORG dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant against ORG judgment of DATE .

The Act of DATE making miscellaneous social - welfare provisions set up special machinery for the compensation of haemophiliacs and transfusion patients who had been infected following injections of blood products . Section CARDINAL provides :

“ I. Victims of damage resulting from infection with the human immunodeficiency virus caused by transfusion of blood products or injection of blood derivatives carried out within the territory of the NORP Republic shall be compensated in the manner set out below .

II . ...

III . Full compensation for the damage defined in subsection I shall be provided by ORG , having legal personality , presided over by a serving or retired divisional president or judge of ORG and administered by a compensation board .

PERSON NORP In their claims for compensation , victims or their heirs shall provide proof of their infection with the human immunodeficiency virus and of the transfusion of blood products or injections of blood derivatives .

Victims or their heirs shall communicate to the ORG all the information in their possession .

Within DATE of the receipt of a claim , a period which may be extended at the request of the victim or his heirs , the ORG shall consider whether the conditions for payment of compensation have been fulfilled . It shall investigate the circumstances under which the victim was infected and make any necessary inquiries , which may not be resisted on grounds of professional secrecy .

V. The Fund shall be required to make an offer of compensation to any victim referred to in subsection I within a time - limit laid down by decree , which may not exceed DATE from DATE on which the ORG receives full proof of the damage ...

VI . The victim shall inform the Fund of any judicial proceedings pending . If legal proceedings are brought , the victim shall inform the court of his application to the ORG .

VII . ...

ORG . The victim shall not be entitled to take legal action against ORG unless his claim for compensation has been dismissed , no offer has been made to him within the time - limit referred to in the first paragraph of subsection V , or he has not accepted an offer made to him . Proceedings shall be brought in ORG .

ORG . The Fund shall be subrogated , for an amount no higher than the sums paid out , to the victim 's rights against the person liable for the damage and against persons required , for whatever reason , to make full or partial reparation for that damage , within the limits of those persons ' liabilities . However , the ORG may institute proceedings on the basis of that subrogation only where the damage is attributable to negligence .

The ORG may intervene in proceedings in the criminal courts , even if it does not do so until the appeal stage , where the victim or his heirs have claimed compensation as a civil party in proceedings pending against the person or persons responsible for the damage defined in subsection I. In such cases it shall be considered a full party to the proceedings and may have recourse to all the remedies available in law .

ORG If the acts which caused the damage have given rise to criminal proceedings , the civil court shall not be required to defer its decision until there has been a final decision by the criminal court .

X. Unless otherwise provided , the provisions governing the implementation of this section shall be laid down in a decree issued after consultation of the ORG d’Etat .

ORG . NORP ...

ORG . The Compensation Fund 's sources of revenue shall be specified in a subsequent Act .

XIII . ...

ORG . ... ”

In CARDINAL judgments of DATE ORG of the ORG d’Etat decided that “ the ORG was wholly liable in respect of persons who were infected with the human immunodeficiency virus following transfusion of non - heat - treated blood products DATE and DATE ” ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

NORP In a series of landmark judgments of CARDINAL DATE the ORG d’Etat ruled that payment of the sum proposed by ORG and Haemophiliacs in the event of Aids being diagnosed was “ a latent possibility subject to the onset of the disease ” and that accordingly ORG had “ made an error of law in deducting it from the sums it ordered the ORG to pay in compensation for the same damage ” .

At the material time ORG contained , inter alia , the following provisions :

“ Except in cases concerning public works , proceedings may not be instituted in ORG otherwise than in the form of an appeal against a decision ; such an appeal shall be lodged within DATE of the notification or the publication of the contested decision .

Where no reply is forthcoming from the relevant authority for DATE , that silence is to be construed as a decision rejecting the complaint .

“ The President of ORG or of ORG , or a judge delegated by CARDINAL of them , may , where the existence of an obligation can not seriously be contested , award an advance to a creditor who has filed an application on the merits in the court in question . He may , even of his own motion , make the payment of the advance subject to the lodging of a security . ”

“ Immediately after the application instituting the proceedings has been registered by the registry , the president of the court or , in GPE , the president of the division to which the application has been transmitted , shall appoint a rapporteur .

“ Where CARDINAL of the parties or the administrative department has been asked to submit observations and has not complied with the time - limit laid down pursuant to Articles R.CARDINAL and ORG of this LAW , the president of the court or division shall issue a formal notice to comply .

In the event of force majeure , a final extension of time may be granted .

If the formal notice to comply has no effect or if the final time - limit given is not complied with , the court shall give judgment . ”

Article R.CARDINAL

“ Where a final notice to comply relates to an administrative department of the ORG , it shall be sent to the authority with competence to represent the ORG ; in other cases it shall be sent to the party or his representative if he has appointed one . ”

“ A member of ORG or ORG may be assigned by the competent court or by the latter 's president to carry out any investigative measures other than those provided for in DATE of this chapter . ”

Decree no . CARDINAL - CARDINAL of DATE applies to all proceedings pending at the date of its publication . It lays down provisions for the implementation of section QUANTITY of the Act of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) :

“ Part II

Provisions relating to actions seeking to establish liability brought against those responsible for the damage defined in subsection I of section CARDINAL of the aforementioned LAW DATE

In order to bring the action by subrogation provided for in subsection ORG of section CARDINAL of the aforementioned LAW DATE , the ORG may intervene in proceedings in any of the administrative or ordinary courts , even if it does not do so until the appeal stage . In such cases it shall be considered a full party to the proceedings and may have recourse to all the remedies available in law .

The registries of the administrative and ordinary courts shall send the ORG by registered post with recorded delivery a copy of the procedural documents submitting to those courts any initial or additional claim for compensation of the damage defined in subsection I of section CARDINAL of the aforementioned LAW DATE .

Within DATE of receipt of the letter referred to in LAW , the ORG shall inform the president of the relevant court by ordinary mail whether or not it has received a claim for compensation with the same purpose and , if so , what stage the procedure has reached . It shall also state whether or not it intends to intervene in the proceedings .

Where the victim has accepted an offer made by ORG , the latter shall send the president of the court a copy of the documents in which the offer was made and by which it was accepted . The Fund shall , where relevant , indicate the stage reached in proceedings instituted in ORG under the provisions of Part I of this decree and forward any judgment delivered by that court .

The registry shall notify the parties of the information communicated by the ORG .

The registry shall send the ORG copies of the decisions given at first instance and , where relevant , on appeal in proceedings in which the ORG has not intervened .

The provisions of ORG CARDINAL to CARDINAL shall be applicable to cases pending on the date of entry into force of [ this ] decree ... ”

On DATE PERSON lodged an application with the Commission , registered on DATE under file no . CARDINAL , in which he complained of the length of the compensation proceedings and relied on LAW . On DATE the Commission adopted a report in which it noted , pursuant to LAW :

On DATE the applicant ’s representative informed the ORG that the applicant was prepared to accept the sum of CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) NORP francs for non - pecuniary damage , to which were to be added the costs and expenses he had incurred before the Commission , the whole to be paid within DATE of the adoption of the ORG ’s report , with interest in the event of delayed settlement . On CARDINAL DATE he informed the ORG that the costs came to ORG CARDINAL .

In a letter of DATE the Agent of the Government informed the ORG that the Government were prepared to settle the case on the basis of a payment of ORG CARDINAL .

On DATE the ORG noted that the parties had reached agreement on the terms of a settlement . It also stated the opinion , having regard to LAW , that the parties had reached a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for human rights as defined in the LAW .

The text of the applicant ’s declaration that he accepted the friendly settlement , signed by him on DATE , reads as follows :

“ I acknowledge that the payment of these sums will constitute full and final compensation in respect of all the damage alleged in my application and will likewise cover all the ORG fees and other costs I have incurred in this case .

I therefore agree to withdraw from these proceedings and to waive the right to bring any further proceedings on this account against ORG in the NORP and international courts . ”