No violation of Art. 6-1;Remainder inadmissible

Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Ineta Ziemele;Ján Šikuta;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Nona Tsotsoria

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

NORP In DATE the applicant became CARDINAL of the executives of a limitedliability company , A.

In DATE the applicant joined a joint - stock company , B. , and became the Chairman of its Board of Directors . DATE , company ORG acquired a share in company A.

Companies A. and B. were private financial institutions involved mainly in soliciting and accepting money from the public on a large scale for the promise of unusually high returns . PERSON and B. were not banks and operated on the basis of various private - law contracts .

On DATE the applicant left GPE for GPE after terminating his business activities in companies A. and B.

The applicant was subsequently charged with fraud and other offences in GPE in connection with his business activities in companies A. and PERSON , arrested in GPE ( DATE ) and extradited to GPE ( DATE ) , where he was detained pending trial and subsequently tried and convicted . The details are described below .

NORP In DATE legislation ( Law no . QUANTITY . ) was enacted in GPE for the establishment of ORG súd ) with criminal jurisdiction ratione personae over certain public officials and ratione materiae over corruption , organised crime and other serious offences .

Appeals against judgments and decisions of ORG would be determined by ( the Special Division of ) ORG ( Najvyšší súd ) .

On DATE the new Criminal Code ( Law no . PERSON . - “ the new ORG ” ) and LAW no . PERSON . - “ the new ORG ” ) entered into force to replace the old LAW ( Law no . QUANTITY . , as amended - “ the old GPE ” ) and the old Code of Criminal Procedure ( Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL Coll . , as amended - “ the old ORG ” ) .

The new ORG provides for a new penalty scale for the offences of which the applicant was convicted .

The new ORG provides for new rules in respect of the maximum permitted length of pre - trial detention .

On DATE ORG ( Ústavný súd ) found that the legislation establishing ORG was contrary to LAW .

On DATE the judgment ( nález ) of ORG was published in LAW , upon which the impugned legislation ceased to have legal effect .

At the same time , on DATE , a new piece of legislation ( PERSON no . CARDINAL Coll . ) entered into force , establishing ORG ( Špecializovaný trestný súd ) . It has criminal jurisdiction to try serious offences such as , for example , wilful , deliberate and premeditated murder , manipulation in public procurement , counterfeiting , corruption , organised crime and terrorism . Except where provided otherwise , ORG replaced ORG .

The details are described below .

On DATE a criminal investigation was commenced into actions related to the business of companies A. and B.

On DATE the applicant and CARDINAL others were charged with conspiracy ( LAW of the old ORG ) , fraud ( LAW and CARDINAL of the old ORG ) , violation of binding business practices ( LAW ORG ) and unauthorised business activities ( LAW ORG ) .

The charges were based on the suspicion that , through their involvement in companies A. and PERSON , they were criminally liable for misleading advertising and providing banking services without a banking licence and for accepting and failing to repay the equivalent of CARDINAL euros’ ( ORG ) worth of investment from CARDINAL clients with the knowledge that it was economically impossible to repay them .

On DATE ORG ruled that the victims were not allowed to take part in the proceedings as third parties claiming damages . As to the exercise of the remainder of their procedural rights , common legal representatives were appointed .

On DATE ORG ( Úrad špeciálnej prokuratúry ) of ORG prokuratúra - “ the Special Prosecutor ” ) indicted the applicant to stand trial on the above charges in ORG ( PERSON súd ) , which at that time had the powers of ORG ( s právomocou PERSON súdu ) .

Without a formal decision , the case file was later transmitted to ORG in Pezinok .

At the pre - trial stage , on DATE , the applicant ’s lawyers were denied access to certain information in the investigation file on the ground that giving them access could lead to obstruction or endangerment of the investigation . That position was upheld by ORG ( PERSON prokuratúra – “ the Regional Prosecutor ” ) in a letter of DATE .

On completion of the pre - trial stage , on DATE CARDINAL February and DATE , from TIME to TIME and from TIME , the applicant was allowed to consult the case file . It then comprised CARDINAL pages . The total time allotted for the consultation amounted to TIME .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON - expertízny ústav ) was appointed to secure data in electronic form from the information systems of companies A. and PERSON was done by means of inspections of the LOC of companies A. and B.

DATE and DATE statements were taken from CARDINAL witnesses .

On DATE C. was asked to analyse financial data concerning companies A. and B. in the capacity of an expert on accounting and taxation .

Pursuant to a Decree on Appointment ( menovací dekrét ) issued by the President of ORG on DATE , C. was appointed on the same date as a sworn expert and made a solemn declaration in that capacity .

Prior to his indictment ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , on DATE , ORG upheld a decision of the investigator to dismiss a request by the applicant for a number of items of further evidence to be taken .

During his trial , on DATE and DATE , the applicant asked for CARDINAL items of additional oral and documentary evidence to be taken .

On DATE the Special Court ruled that the evidencetaking be concluded .

In the judgment of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , ORG held that the applicant ’s requests for further evidence to be taken had to be refused , partly because they concerned matters which had already been unequivocally established as fact and partly because they concerned matters that were not relevant . ORG concluded that it had taken all evidence necessary for a lawful decision .

On DATE ORG upheld a first - instance decision of ORG to dismiss the applicant ’s challenge to the jurisdiction of ORG . The applicant had mainly contended that he had been indicted in ORG and that no formal decision had been taken to transfer the case to ORG . ORG found that all statutory requirements for ORG to have jurisdiction over the applicant ’s case had been met and that the case had been transferred to ORG by operation of law , which necessitated no formal decision .

The applicant brought a challenge of bias against Judge NORP , who was the President of ORG trying him . The applicant alleged that Judge PERSON had previously taken unlawful decisions in respect of his detention . The challenge was dismissed as manifestly ill - founded by ORG on DATE and , following an interlocutory appeal by the applicant , by ORG on DATE .

The applicant also brought challenges of bias against the President and the members of ORG trying him . The applicant argued that they had previously been involved in deciding on his detention and that , at a hearing , the President had remarked that he “ [ was ] fed up with procedural motions being brought by [ one of the applicant ’s lawyers ] ” . The challenges were dismissed as unfounded by ORG on DATE and CARDINAL DATE .

A subsequent complaint by the applicant under LAW was declared inadmissible as manifestly ill - founded on DATE . It was noted that the mere fact that a judge had decided on detention did not disqualify him or her from determining the merits in the absence of special circumstances , and that the latter had not been established in the applicant ’s case . The defence strategy was found to be marked by attempts to obstruct the proceedings . Against that background , the remark of the President of ORG was within his prerogative , namely that of organising the proceedings and managing the conduct of the parties .

On DATE ORG found the applicant guilty of conspiracy and fraud under the provisions of the old ORG and sentenced him to DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment .

The applicant appealed , arguing ( i ) that ORG was unconstitutional and did not provide guarantees of a fair trial before an impartial and independent tribunal established by law ; ( ii ) that in any event it had been unlawful to transfer his case from ORG to ORG without a judicial decision ; ( iii ) that he had not had adequate time to study the case file and thus to prepare his defence ; ( iv ) that the witness evidence and other evidence obtained through inspections of business LOC ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and DATE above ) before he was charged ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) was procedurally inadmissible ; ( v ) that it was unlawful for the court to take into account pre - trial statements of witnesses who had not been heard by the court in person ; ( vi ) that further evidence should have been taken as he had proposed ; ( vii ) that the applicable procedures had not been followed in the appointment of C. as an expert witness and in the preparation of his report ; ( viii ) that he had not engaged in any unauthorised business ; and ( ix ) that in any event he should have been tried under the new ORG , as its provisions were more lenient .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the appeal . It held ( i ) that the jurisdiction of ORG had been duly established by law ; ( ii ) that C. had been properly appointed after other sworn experts had excused themselves ; ( iii ) that other persons had merely assisted C. in the preparation of his report but had not themselves provided any expert evidence ; ( iv ) that the witness statements and other evidence taken prior to charging the applicant had been obtained lawfully in the framework of criminal proceedings against CARDINAL or more persons unknown ; ( v ) that no additional evidence was necessary in order to establish the relevant facts ; ( vi ) that the defence strategy had been obstructive and had contributed to the length of the proceedings and detention ; ( vii ) that taken as a whole the new ORG was not more lenient for the applicant than the old ORG ; and ( viii ) DATE in the circumstances – the time available to the defence to inspect the case file had been adequate . As to the remainder of the applicant ’s arguments , ORG fully endorsed the reasons provided by ORG .

On DATE ORG declared inadmissible the applicant ’s complaint under LAW , in which he had raised in principle similar arguments to those raised in his appeal . Among a number of other legal provisions , he relied on LAW ( application of subsequent more lenient criminal legislation ) .

The Constitutional Court found that , in part , the applicant ’s arguments were to be examined in the framework of proceedings on an appeal on points of law ( dovolanie ) and that , as to the remainder , there was no constitutionally relevant arbitrariness in the impugned decisions of ORG and ORG .

On DATE ORG requested , and GPE súd ) issued , a warrant for the applicant ’s arrest on the charges mentioned above .

On DATE respectively the applicant was arrested in GPE and remanded ( by ORG ) in custody pending extradition to GPE .

On DATE the applicant was handed over to the NORP authorities to be prosecuted in GPE . He was subsequently detained in GPE pending trial there . The details are described below .

On DATE a single judge of ORG remanded the applicant in custody pending trial to prevent him from absconding ( LAW § CARDINAL ( a ) of the old ORG ) or interfering with the course of justice ( LAW ( b ) of the old ORG ) .

The lawfulness of the applicant ’s detention was subsequently examined numerous times in the context of his requests for release ( see paragraphs CARDINAL to CARDINAL below ) and requests by the prosecution service for extension of his detention ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the applicant made a submission in which he argued , inter alia , that his continued detention after DATE had been unlawful , since on DATE the DATE period for pre - trial detention ( from the date of his arrest in GPE on DATE ) had expired and no extension of his detention had been authorised . He accordingly sought to be released .

ORG subsequently sought a judicial ruling that the period of the applicant ’s detention in GPE be deducted from his detention time in GPE .

ORG granted the request of the prosecution service and dismissed the request of the applicant on CARDINAL and DATE , respectively .

Following the applicant ’s interlocutory appeals , the matter was finally resolved by ORG on DATE when it upheld ORG ruling to the effect that the applicant ’s detention time in GPE did not count as pre - trial detention for the purposes of the timelimits on its maximum duration in GPE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s further request for release , finding that , although it was no longer necessary to keep him detained to prevent him from interfering with the course of justice , there was a continuing need for his detention to prevent him from absconding .

The applicant ’s further requests for release were dismissed at first instance on DATE ( by ORG ) and DATE ( by ORG ) and , following interlocutory appeals by the applicant , on DATE and DATE ( by ORG ) , respectively .

The latter decision was made after a previous decision of ORG had been quashed by ORG on account of a technical error .

Extensions of the applicant ’s detention were authorised by decisions of DATE ( until DATE ) , DATE ( until DATE ) , DATE ( until DATE ) , DATE ( until DATE ) , DATE ( until DATE ) ( see below for details ) , on DATE ( until DATE ) ( see below for details ) and CARDINAL DATE ( until DATE ) .

The courts observed that the applicant stood accused of wideranging criminal activity and that an extensive amount of evidence had to be obtained and assessed , including statements from a very large number of witnesses . Some of the evidence was abroad and had to be obtained by means of international judicial assistance . The length of the applicant ’s detention was therefore justified .

As to the existence of a risk that the applicant would abscond , the courts held that it was of crucial importance that when leaving GPE the applicant had known that criminal proceedings concerning his activities might commence shortly . The applicant had not been staying at his habitual residence in GPE and his whereabouts in GPE had been unknown even to his family .

The courts observed that if convicted the applicant faced a heavy penalty , that he had CARDINAL passports , that his financial situation would allow him to settle in any country , and that there were indications that he would do so in a country out of the reach of ORG .

These reasons were endorsed by ORG in its decision of DATE to declared inadmissible as being manifestly illfounded the applicant ’s complaint under LAW , in which , represented by a lawyer , the applicant had sought to challenge the decision of ORG of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , arguing that his continued detention had been unjustified and as such contrary to LAW and CARDINAL of LAW and LAW CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( c ) of the LAW .

In the decision of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) concerning the extension of the applicant ’s pre - trial detention , ORG acceded to a request by the President of ORG trying the applicant and extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE .

At the same time , ORG expressed the opinion that the limitation on the maximum duration of pre - trial detention to DATE under the new ORG applied to the applicant ’s case by operation of the constitutional principle of equality before the law , although , pursuant to the transitional provisions of the new ORG , the applicant ’s trial and detention continued to be governed by the old ORG , which allowed detention pending trial to last at DATE . Therefore , as the applicant ’s pre - trial detention in GPE had commenced on DATE , a further extension after DATE would not be permissible .

On DATE Judge NORP of ORG requested that ORG authorise an extension of the applicant ’s detention until DATE .

In his observations in reply , the applicant , assisted by his lawyer , relied on the ORG decision of DATE , considered the matter to be res judicata and asked for the request to be dismissed .

Moreover , the applicant submitted that he had not been heard in person in any of the previous proceedings on extension of his pre - trial detention and argued that this was contrary to his right to adversarial proceedings and equality of arms .

The request fell to be determined by a different bench of ORG which , on DATE , summoned the applicant and his lawyer to a public session ( verené zasadnutie ) on the extension of the applicant ’s pre - trial detention , to be held on DATE .

On DATE , prior to the scheduled public session , ORG established that the summons had not been served on the applicant ’s lawyer within the procedural time - limit of DATE before the session . ORG held that in those circumstances the public session could not take place and the matter had to be decided in private session ( neverejné zasadnutie ) , that is to say behind closed doors .

Nevertheless , before opening the private session , ORG allowed , and the applicant used , the opportunity to address the court orally . The applicant was assisted by CARDINAL defence lawyers and CARDINAL substitute defence lawyer . He made various submissions , including that he had never had any intention of absconding .

Later on DATE , in private session , ORG extended the applicant ’s pre - trial detention until DATE . ORG explained in detail that the offences of which the applicant stood accused fell within the category of “ extremely serious offences ” ( obzvlášť závažný trestný čin ) within the meaning of the old ORG and the old ORG , that pre - trial detention on charges of such offences could last DATE under the old ORG and that the old ORG applied .

In that context , ORG referred to a decision of ORG of DATE in an unrelated but similar case , file no . III . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL in “ Relevant domestic law and practice ” below and GPE v. GPE ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL , DATE ) , in which ORG had upheld a previous decision of ORG of DATE interpreting and applying the relevant law in line with the decision taken in the applicant ’s case .

The applicant then requested that the Minister of ORG challenge the decision by way of an appeal on points of law and lodged a complaint with ORG under LAW . He argued that his detention beyond the DATE time - limit under the new ORG was unlawful and complained that there had been no public hearing .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request , having found no error of law or procedure . As to the maximum duration of detention pending trial in situations such as that of the applicant , ORG also referred to the above - mentioned decision of ORG in the case file no . II . ÚS DATE .

On DATE , sitting in private , ORG declared the applicant ’s constitutional complaint inadmissible . It observed that , although he had complained to ORG that there had been no oral hearing on the extension of his detention , the applicant had failed to make a formal request for a public hearing . The applicant had had ample opportunity to make written submissions and he had actually used it , both directly and through the intermediary of his lawyers . In addition , the applicant had addressed ORG orally before the private session on DATE . The principle of always applying the more lenient criminal legislation was only valid in substantive criminal law and not in respect of detention , which was a procedural measure . There was no doubt that under the relevant statutory provisions the old ORG continued to apply to the applicant ’s detention , including the limits on its maximum duration .

The decision was served on the applicant on DATE .

Article CARDINAL guarantees the right to liberty . Pursuant to its paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL , liberty of a person is guaranteed and no one is to be prosecuted or deprived of liberty except for reasons and in a manner provided for by an act of ORG .

Under LAW , pre - trial detention is permissible exclusively on grounds and for a period defined by an act of ORG and on the basis of a court ’s ruling .

This provision is to be read in conjunction with the provisions of the ORG providing that pre - trial detention may only last for a period that is inevitably necessary ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

The provisions of LAW and DATE are understood as comprising the rights under LAW not to be deprived of liberty for a period longer than is necessary and to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial ( see , for example , judgments of ORG in cases LAW III . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL , III . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL and III . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

Article CARDINAL § § CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the LAW provides :

“ CARDINAL . The Constitutional Court shall decide complaints by natural or legal persons alleging a violation of their fundamental rights or freedoms ... unless the protection of such rights and freedoms falls within the jurisdiction of a different court .

NORP If ORG finds a complaint justified , it shall deliver a decision stating that a person ’s rights or freedoms as set out in paragraph CARDINAL have been violated by a final decision , specific measure or other act and shall quash such decision , measure or act . If the violation that has been found is the result of a failure to act , ORG may order [ the authority ] which has violated the rights or freedoms to take the necessary action . At the same time it may remit the case to the authority concerned for further proceedings , order such authority to refrain from violating the fundamental rights and freedoms ... or , where appropriate , order those who have violated the rights or freedoms set out in paragraph CARDINAL to restore the situation to that existing prior to the violation .

NORP In its decision on a complaint ORG may grant appropriate financial compensation to the person whose rights under paragraph CARDINAL have been violated . ”

DATE . According to the explanatory report ( dôvodová správa ) on LAW ( Law . No CARDINAL/CARDINAL Coll . ) , the aim of the LAW was to create structures for the detection , investigation and prosecution of corruption and organised crime . ORG and other authorities established under LAW had national jurisdiction with a view to ensuring better specialisation and protection as well as to severing local ties .

Pursuant to Section VII.CARDINAL of the LAW , the Special Court had criminal jurisdiction over members of ORG , members of the ORG , heads of central administrative agencies , judges , prosecutors , the ORG , the Director of ORG ( ORG bezpečnostný úrad – “ the ORG ” ) , the Director of ORG and members of the board of ORG .

Irrespective of who was the perpetrator , ORG also had jurisdiction over certain forms of corruption , organised crime , terrorism , “ extremely serious offences ” ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , crimes of an economic nature that resulted in damage equal to or CARDINAL times the statutory minimum wage , and other offences .

A judge could only be assigned to ORG after passing security vetting by the ORG for access to top secret information ( Section VI.CARDINAL of the LAW ) and would be recalled if he or she ceased to meet the security vetting criteria ( Section VI.CARDINAL of the LAW ) . A decision to refuse security vetting clearance ( bezpečnostná previerka ) could be appealed against in a special parliamentary committee and ultimately , by way of an administrative - law action , in ORG .

Special Court judges were entitled to a salary as ORG judges ( Section VI.CARDINAL of the Act ) and to a special DATE allowance equal to double the average nominal wage in the NORP economy in DATE ( Section VI.CARDINAL of the Act ) . In DATE the amount of the allowance was increased to CARDINAL times the average nominal wage in the NORP economy in DATE ( Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL Coll . ) .

On DATE a group of CARDINAL members of ORG challenged in ORG the constitutionality of the statutory provisions establishing ORG .

On DATE ORG , sitting in plenary , gave a judgment , by majority of CARDINAL against CARDINAL , declaring the statutory provisions establishing ORG unconstitutional .

At the same time , ORG ruled that its judgment gave no ground for reopening proceedings which had ended by final but not yet executed judgments of ORG , which would otherwise be the case under section CARDINALb of LAW .

DATE . On the publication of the judgment in LAW DATE , the unconstitutional provisions ceased to have legal effect .

The majority of ORG relied on a comparative law analysis concerning specialised jurisdictions in various ORG member GPE . It observed that there was no specific legal basis in GPE allowing for an extraordinary jurisdiction whereas ORG had mixed features of a specialised court and an extraordinary court . However , the existence of the latter could only be justified by extraordinary circumstances and for the attainment of an extremely serious goal that could not be attained by other means .

Restricting the jurisdiction of the Special Court ratione personae was an anachronism . This and the requirement for ORG judges to have valid security vetting clearance from the ORG , which was an agency within the executive , was found to be incompatible with the principles of legal certainty and division of power . It was also noted that the role of the ORG in respect of appointment of judges to ORG unacceptably interfered with the role to the professional body of the judiciary in GPE , ORG Rada Slovenskej republiky ) .

In reaching the conclusion mentioned in the precedent paragraph , the majority took into account , inter alia , that existing remedies against decisions of the ORG were insufficient and limited in effect .

NORP Moreover , the remuneration arrangements for the ORG judges were discriminatory and disproportionate and as such unacceptable .

At the same time , it was pointed out in the reasoning of the judgment that the judgment would have no impact on decisions of ORG which had become final , because the reasons for the judgment concerned the institutional status of ORG within the judiciary and had no bearing on the legal basis of its decisions .

The dissenting judges were of the opinion that the majority had applied an incorrect test for the determination of the compatibility of ORG with the judicial system of GPE as a whole . The appropriate test was whether such a court offered sufficient guarantees of a fair trial before an independent tribunal .

The question of the social need for ORG , which the majority had examined , was predominantly political in nature , fell within the discretion of ORG and the courts should be most cautious in dealing with such questions .

The dissenting judges found no support for the conclusion that ORG had unacceptable features as an extraordinary court .

The requirement for a ORG judge to obtain security vetting clearance from the ORG was legitimate and constitutional . Any doubts as to the powers of the ORG to withdraw and refuse renewal of security vetting clearance could have been eliminated and did not constitute grounds for abolishing ORG .

In addition , the conclusion of the majority that the remedies existing against the security vetting decisions of the ORG were insufficient was not supported by convincing reasoning and it was contrary to ORG previous case - law .

Furthermore , the majority opinion as to the inadequacy and discriminatory nature of the remuneration of the ORG judges lacked relevant analysis , the remuneration being legitimate and justified .

Lastly , the ruling concerning inapplicability of section CARDINALb of LAW ( no ground for reopening ) was an intolerable act of judicial activism , by which ORG had assumed the role of an active lawmaker in excess of its jurisdiction in the given case and , consequently , in breach of the rule of law .

With effect from DATE ORG was established , which , unless provided for otherwise , provides for procedural continuity after the abolition of ORG .

The old ORG distinguished between “ offences ” ( trestný čin ) and “ extremely serious offences ” ( obzvlášť závažný trestný čin ) . The latter comprised “ offences ” for which the minimum penalty was equal to or DATE of imprisonment ( LAW ) and “ offences ” listed in LAW , such as , for example , treason , terrorism , sabotage , spying , currency counterfeiting , genocide , setting up a criminal enterprise , murder and aggravated forms of robbery , hostage - taking , extortion , rape , fraud and money - laundering .

The offence of fraud was defined in LAW . Pursuant to paragraph CARDINAL , in conjunction with LAW , if a fraud resulted in damage equal to or CARDINAL times the statutory minimum monthly salary , it was punishable by imprisonment in the range of DATE .

The new ORG distinguishes between “ transgressions ” ( prečin ) , “ crimes ” ( zločin ) and “ extremely serious crimes ” ( obzvlášť závažný zločin ) .

A “ crime ” that carries as the minimum penalty a term of imprisonment equal to or greater than DATE is considered “ extremely serious ” ( Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) .

The crime of fraud is defined in Article CARDINAL . Pursuant to paragraph CARDINAL , in conjunction with LAW , if a fraud results in damage equal to or greater than LAW , it is punishable by imprisonment in the range of DATE .

Pre - trial detention may only last for a period that is inevitably necessary ( Article CARDINAL of the old ORG and LAW ) .

Detailed rules of the old ORG and of the new ORG as well as the existing judicial practice in respect of the maximum duration of detention pending trial are stated in the ORG ’s decision in the case of GPE v. GPE ( cited above ) .

Part CARDINAL of the new ORG governs extraordinary remedies . These include an appeal on points of law , which is regulated by LAW .

An appeal on points of law can be lodged against judicial decisions resolving a matter with final effect ( Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) . An appeal on points of law has no suppressive effect ( Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) .

A convicted person is entitled to lodge an appeal on points of law against rulings that directly concern him or her ( LAW ( b ) ) within DATE of the date the decision is served ( LAW ) on grounds recognised by LAW . These include ( i ) lack of territorial , material or personal competence of the court , ( ii ) errors in the composition of the bench , ( iii ) fundamental breach of the rights of defence , ( iv ) the matter has been decided upon by a judge who should have been excluded from the proceedings , ( v ) the decision is based on evidence which has not been lawfully examined , and ( vi ) the penalty imposed is outside the lawful penalty scale .

The merits of an appeal on points of law are determined by ORG ( Article CARDINAL ) in public session ( Articles CARDINAL et seq . ) and legal representation is mandatory ( Article CARDINAL ) .

Should ORG find an appeal on points of law well founded , it makes a finding of a breach of the law ( LAW ) and quashes the decisions concerned ( LAW ) .

NORP Should a new determination of the matter be required , ORG makes an order to that effect ( LAW ) . Legal opinions and instructions expressed by ORG are binding upon the bodies making a new determination of the matter ( Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) .

The relevant statutory provisions and the existing judicial practice in respect of State liability for damage are summarised in the ORG ’s judgments in the cases of GPE and GPE ( nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) ; PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE with further references , CARDINAL DATE ) ; GPE v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) ; GPE v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , CARDINAL DATE ) ; and GPE v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL with further references , CARDINAL DATE ) .


The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON , the GPE region . She is a former employee of the ORG - controlled ORG “ NORP ” ( “ the ORG , ” ORG “ Південелектромаш ” ) .

The background facts of the case are described in the case of ORG v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL - CARDINAL , DATE ) .

On DATE ORG Новокаховський міський суд PERSON області ) gave CARDINAL judgments ordering the Company to pay the applicant ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL and ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL in salary arrears due to her and her deceased husband , respectively . The judgments became final and the enforcement writs were transferred to ORG ( “ the Bailiffs , ” PERSON виконавчої служби Новокаховського міського управління юстиції ) for enforcement .

Both judgments remain unenforced to the present day .

The relevant domestic law is summarised in the judgments of ORG v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) and ORG v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) .


No violation of Art. 6;Violation of P7-2;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings

Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;David Thór Björgvinsson;Egbert Myjer;Ineta Ziemele;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre

The applicant , who is not employed , is president of the nongovernmental organisation ORG , ( “ Defender ” ) which is based in PERSON and the aim of which , according to its articles of association , is to protect the rights of retired , disabled and less well - off persons and other vulnerable categories .

On DATE PERSON , whom the applicant considers as one of his clients , went to ORG in order to obtain a copy of the record of the hearing held DATE previously in her civil case . At ORG request the applicant accompanied her to the office of Judge PERSON , who had heard the case in question . However , the judge refused to provide them with the document requested and ordered them to leave her office .

As soon as the applicant had left the office , Judge PERSON drew up a regulatory offence report ( administratīvā pārkāpuma protokols ) . This document , which was written entirely by hand , read as follows :

“ PERSON , DATE

TIME Regulatory offence report prepared by Judge [ PERSON ] of ORG concerning ORG ... , of ... , PERSON . Mr PERSON burst into my office without permission , disturbing me at my work , and rudely demanded information to which he was not entitled , thus acting in flagrant breach of the rules [ of conduct ] within the precincts of a court and displaying a lack of respect .

PERSON thereby infringed Article CARDINAL - CARDINAL of LAW .

The offending party is unable to offer an explanation , having left the LOC . ... ”

DATE , Judge PERSON sent an explanatory note to Judge PERSON , acting president of the court . The note read as follows :

“ On DATE , at TIME , I was working in my office ... , preparing a judgment in another case . The door of the office opened suddenly and PERSON and [ FAC ] burst in without permission .

In flagrant breach of the secrecy of deliberations , ORG demanded , rudely and in a loud voice , that I provide him with a copy of the record in the case of [ FAC ] . I explained calmly that it was not our practice to provide copies of records . PERSON began shouting more loudly , demanding that [ LOC 's ] supposed rights be respected . He waved his mobile phone around and threatened to call the public prosecutor 's office . As the CARDINAL [ visitors ] refused to leave the office , I stood up and went towards the registry office in order to summon a security officer .

ORG ' conduct demonstrated a gross lack of respect for the court , in flagrant breach of the rules [ of conduct ] applicable within the precincts of a court : he not only addressed me in an impolite tone , but also issued threats , entered a judge 's office without permission and breached the secrecy of deliberations . ... ”

Shortly afterwards , a similar account was given in writing by a member of the court 's registry who had witnessed the incident .

On DATE , DATE , Judge PERSON ordered the registry to summon the applicant to appear on DATE in order to determine whether he had been guilty of contempt of court . When the applicant failed to appear at the appointed time , the judge ordered the police to find him and bring him before the court by force . DATE , DATE , the police officer concerned informed ORG that the applicant had not been at home and could not be traced .

NORP On DATE the applicant himself went to ORG in order to represent another person who had been declared a victim in criminal proceedings . After the hearing the court 's registrar issued him with a summons ( tiesas pavēste ) requesting him to appear before the same court on DATE in connection with the regulatory offence . According to the applicant , it was only then that he learned of the charges against him . He immediately went to see Judge PERSON and requested leave to consult and make copies of the documents in his file to help him prepare his defence . His request was refused , and the applicant immediately made note of the fact on the summons which he handed back to the registrar .

In a letter sent DATE , CARDINAL DATE , the applicant addressed a complaint to the public prosecutor 's office at ORG and the Minister of Justice concerning the refusal by Judge PERSON to allow him to consult the file . He received no reply .

On DATE Judge PERSON gave the applicant leave to consult the documents in his file and to make photocopies free of charge . According to the explanations furnished by the Government , which were not disputed by the applicant , the file comprised a total of CARDINAL - page documents , as follows : the regulatory offence report , the depositions of the registry official who had witnessed the incident , the depositions of Judge PERSON , the order issued by Judge PERSON to the police to find the applicant and bring him before the court by force , the report of the police officer concerned and CARDINAL summonses to the applicant .

On DATE Judge PERSON , also of ORG , examined the merits of the charge against the applicant . At the hearing , the applicant pleaded not guilty to the regulatory offence . In particular , he contested the account of the facts presented by Judge PERSON The relevant part of the record of the hearing reads as follows :

“ ... When asked whether he had any specific requests in relation to the case , PERSON [ replied to the court ] : ' I would ask you to note that I consulted the CARDINAL documents in the file . '

When asked whether he had read the regulatory offence report , PERSON [ replied to the court ] : ' I have read the documents , including the regulatory offence report , but do not understand why LAW ] O[ffences ] C[ode ] was applied . ... I would ask that the lawfulness of applying that provision be reviewed by means of administrative proceedings . ... The report by [ Judge PERSON ] is dated DATE , but I did not see it until DATE . '

When asked whether he had further questions , PERSON requested that Judge [ PERSON ] be summoned to the hearing on account of her allegedly unlawful refusal to provide him with copies of the record [ in the case of GPE ] . The court explained again why the administrative proceedings had been brought , and stated that Judge [ PERSON ] would not be given notice to appear as the present proceedings did not concern any failure [ on PERSON 's part ] to provide the record in question , but related to contempt of court .

PERSON [ stated ] : ' I wish to challenge the bench . ' The court explained that the R[egulatory ] O[ffences ] C[ode ] made no provision for challenging the judge in this category of cases ... ”

In a final order issued at the end of the hearing on DATE , Judge PERSON sentenced the applicant to DATE “ administrative detention ” ( administratīvais arests ) for contempt of court ( necieņa pret tiesu ) , an offence punishable under LAW of LAW . The judge took the view that the applicant 's guilt had been sufficiently proven by the written explanations of PERSON and the member of the registry staff who had witnessed the incident . ORG ( NORP policija ) was instructed to execute the order , which became effective as soon as it was issued .

The applicant served his sentence from TIME CARDINAL DATE until TIME CARDINAL DATE in the temporary segregation unit ( īslaicīgās aizturēšanas izolators ) of the local police station . On DATE the deputy head of the police station issued the applicant with a written certificate attesting to his stay in the segregation unit .

DATE the applicant wrote several letters to ORG criticising the proceedings leading to his conviction . He received no reply .

Prior to DATE , most offences falling within the jurisdiction of the courts were governed by the DATE LAW ( ORG likums ) . During the NORP era , however , the least serious offences were removed from the criminallaw sphere , reclassified as “ regulatory offences ” ( administratīvie pārkāpumi ) and incorporated in a separate code . The new DATE LAW ( ORG ) is based on the same approach , dealing with only the most serious offences ( kriminālpārkāpumi ) . Other offences are governed by LAW ( Administratīvo pārkāpumu kodekss ) , which was adopted in DATE and has undergone numerous amendments .

The ne bis in idem rule applies across both categories of offences . Hence , administrative liability can arise only if the facts in question do not fall within the sphere of criminal law ( LAW ) . No administrative proceedings may be brought against a person who is already the subject of criminal proceedings concerning the same facts ( LAW , point CARDINAL) . However , if the criminal case has been discontinued without a decision being given , an administrative penalty may in principle be imposed ( LAW . In a judgment of DATE ( case no . LOC ) , the ORG of ORG held that , once it had been enforced , an administrative penalty could not be quashed in favour of a criminal prosecution in relation to the same facts ( point CARDINAL of the judgment ) .

The first paragraph of LAW reads as follows :

“ Administrative detention may be ordered and enforced only in exceptional cases relating to specific categories of regulatory offences and for a period of DATE . It shall be ordered by a judge of the court [ of first instance ] . ”

Under the terms of the above - mentioned judgment of DATE , “ administrative detention ... by its nature , can be ... equated to a criminal penalty ” ( ibid . ) .

At the time of the facts dealt with in the present application , the other relevant provisions of LAW read as follows :

“ Contempt of court in the form of refusal on the part of a witness , victim or civil party or [ their ] representatives , a legal representative , expert , specialist , interpreter or participant in a civil case , or any other person , to comply with the orders of the presiding judge by failing to observe the rules during the hearing or by any conduct displaying flagrant disregard for the rules governing the hearing or the court , shall be punishable by a fine of CARDINAL latis or a period of administrative detention of DATE . ”

“ Any person against whom administrative liability [ for an offence ] is asserted shall have the right to consult all the documents in the case file either in person or through a lawyer , to furnish explanations and to make requests and applications .

Any person against whom administrative liability [ for an offence ] is asserted shall have the right to attend the hearings in the case , be assisted by a lawyer , submit additional evidence , lodge requests and appeal against the decision taken in the case . ”

“ Any order given by a judge of the court [ of first instance ] ... imposing a penalty for a regulatory offence shall be final and shall not be amenable to appeal ... , except where the law so provides . ”

“ Any order given by a judge in a case ... under LAW ... may be set aside or amended either by the same judge on a third - party application by the prosecutor or , irrespective of any third - party application ... , by the president of the higher court . ”

“ Where ... a third - party application has been lodged to set aside a decision imposing a penalty for a regulatory offence , the penalty must be enforced if ... the application ... is rejected . ”

In a judgment of DATE in case no . DATE , ORG ( PERSON tiesa ) found the second paragraph of LAW to be contrary to the relevant provisions of LAW , LAW , and declared it null and void ex nunc . The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows :

“ ... CARDINAL . ...

In GPE , as in most post - socialist GPE , administrative procedure – unlike civil and criminal procedure – is generally characterised by the fact that the court 's ( judge 's ) decision in a case concerning a regulatory offence is final and is not amenable to appeal before a higher court . ...

Cases concerning regulatory offences can ... be divided into [ CARDINAL categories ] : ( CARDINAL ) those which can be equated to criminal cases , ( CARDINAL ) those which can be equated to civil cases and ( CARDINAL ) those which do not possess any characteristics enabling them to be equated to another category of cases . Whether or not , in a given case ... , the right to appeal to a higher court is guaranteed by ... the LAW depends on the category to which the case belongs .

... A study of cases concerning regulatory offences governed by the R[egulatory ] O[ffences ] C[ode ] reveals that some offences are punishable by a fine or [ a short period of ] detention . Both the fine and the detention are of a punitive nature characteristic of the criminal - law sphere ; accordingly , these penalties are criminal in nature . The purpose of the Convention requires that such significant penalties be protected [ sic ] by LAW .

Similarly , the national legal system places some regulatory offences – for example , drunk driving ... , and most offences against the environment DATE in both the administrative and the criminal - law categories ; if an offence of this kind ... is committed twice during DATE , [ the person responsible ] incurs criminal liability . Accordingly , in these cases also , the rights of persons punished for a regulatory offence are protected by LAW .

This leads to the conclusion that ... the LAW guarantees the right to appeal in cases concerning regulatory offences which possess the characteristics of a criminal case on the basis of CARDINAL of the criteria referred to above or another criterion .

... [ C]ases with a public dimension , in which priority is given to the interests of society , may not be classified as civil cases for the purposes of the Convention . Examples include decisions relating to tax , immigration and emigration , the issuing of visas or electoral rights . Similarly , offences against the legal system ... which do not possess characteristics bringing them within the criminal sphere , are not covered either by LAW . Consequently , national law may define categories of cases concerning regulatory offences which are not amenable to appeal .

NORP The relevant paragraphs of the explanatory report to LAW CARDINAL are worded as follows :

“ CARDINAL . This article recognises the right of everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal to have his conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal . It does not require that in every case he should be entitled to have both his conviction and sentence so reviewed . Thus , for example , if the person convicted has pleaded guilty to the offence charged , the right may be restricted to a review of his sentence . As compared with the wording of the corresponding provisions of LAW ( Article CARDINAL , paragraph CARDINAL ) , the word ' tribunal ' has been added to show clearly that this provision does not concern offences which have been tried by bodies which are not tribunals within the meaning of LAW .

Paragraph CARDINAL of the article permits exceptions to this right of review by a higher tribunal :

- for offences of a minor character , as prescribed by law ;

- in cases in which the person concerned has been tried in the first instance by the highest tribunal , for example by virtue of his status as a minister , judge or other holder of high office , or because of the nature of the offence ;

- where the person concerned was convicted following an appeal against acquittal .

When deciding whether an offence is of a minor character , an important criterion is the question of whether the offence is punishable by imprisonment or not . ”


Violation of P1-1;Just satisfaction reserved

The applicants , ORG , PERSON , PERSON and ORG , were born in DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE .

After surveys had been conducted by ORG DATE , a plot of land on the coast in the locality of GPE ( village of GPE , district of GPE , parcel no . CARDINAL ) was entered in the land register in the name of PERSON

Following PERSON 's death , the applicants inherited the land and paid the appropriate taxes and duties on it .

On DATE the applicants obtained a tourist investment certificate from ORG with a view to building a hotel on the land .

On DATE ORG awarded the applicants an investment incentive certificate , again for the purpose of building a hotel . Paragraph X of the certificate stated that the applicants had to obtain a tourism licence once the investment had been made .

On DATE , after the applicants had started building the hotel , the ORG instituted proceedings in ORG , seeking an order for the cancellation of the entry of the property in the land register and for the demolition of the hotel .

An expert report of DATE stated that parcel no . CARDINAL was part of the coastline and could not be the subject of an acquisition .

On DATE ORG made an interim order for the suspension of building work on the hotel .

An expert report of CARDINAL DATE pointed out that parcel no . CARDINAL was part of the coastline and , as such , could not be owned by a private individual .

In a judgment of DATE ORG ordered the cancellation of the entry in the land register and the demolition of the partially built hotel . It made the following observations :

“ [ Having regard to ] the expert report [ and ] ruling on the merits [ of the case ] , ... having regard to the available evidence and , in particular , the photographs and all the other items in the file , the ORG considers that the property in issue is part of the seashore [ LOC kıyısı ] . Although coastlines remain outside the boundary delimited and fixed in decisions by certain commissions , they can not constitute property that is subject to private ownership ... the registration of the property in the claimants ' name does not confer any rights on them . ”

On DATE ORG dismissed an appeal by the applicants against the interim order of DATE .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG quashed the judgment of DATE and remitted the case to the first - instance court .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , disregarding ORG judgment , ORG reaffirmed its initial ruling . It held :

“ ... the disputed site is the responsibility and property of the ORG . In that respect there is no discrepancy with [ the judgment ] delivered by ORG . Even the ORG , when placing restrictions on the enjoyment of possessions in accordance with property law ... , can not accept the existence of private property at such a site ... Although the property in issue in the present case was formerly situated within the coastal boundary , it was placed outside that boundary by [ a decision of ] the commission formed at DATE . The site was quite clearly located on a sandy beach , as , indeed , is apparent from previous judicial decisions that have become final , and from expert reports and photographs ... ”

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld the judgment given by the lower court , finding it to have interpreted and applied the law correctly .

In a judgment given on an unspecified date ORG confirmed its initial judgment .

NORP In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld the judgment given at first instance .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE it dismissed an application for rectification of the judgment .

On DATE the applicants brought an action for damages in the GPE ORG on account of their loss of ownership and the demolition of the partially built hotel .

In a judgment of DATE ORG dismissed the applicants ' action on the ground that the ORG was not liable for the damage resulting from the cancellation of the registration of the property in issue . In its reasoning it stated that the applicants had asserted , on the basis of the entries in the land register , that they had made investments in relation to the land in question and that , as a result of the proceedings brought by the ORG for the cancellation of the registration , they had sustained a loss . ORG explained its decision by pointing out that the applicants and their heirs would have been aware that the site was on sandy ground , and that it was impossible for them to maintain that the ORG had deceived them and for the principle of strict liability to be applied in their case . It concluded that no loss had resulted from the contents of the land register , that the entry had been unlawful from the outset and that the applicants were accordingly not entitled to take proceedings against the ORG to seek compensation for the loss sustained .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed an application for rectification of the judgment .

Article CARDINAL of the LAW provides :

“ The coasts are the property of the ORG and fall within its jurisdiction .

The public interest shall prevail in the use of seashores , lake shores and riverbanks and of the coastal strips situated by seas and lakes .

The law shall determine the width of coastal strips according to their use , together with the possibilities and conditions for such use by individuals . ”


Violation of Art. 6-1 with regard to the length of the proceedings;Inadmissible under Art. 6-1 with regard to the other complaints;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses (Convention proceedings) - claim dismissed

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE ) . He is a practising lawyer by profession .

On DATE a colleague , PERSON , laid a disciplinary information against the applicant alleging that he had infringed the profession ’s honour and reputation in the context of administrative criminal proceedings relating to traffic offences . He was suspected of having misbehaved towards intervening police officers during a traffic control by threatening them with job - related troubles in case they charged him with traffic offences . Subsequently , on DATE ORG of ORG ( NORP der PERSON ) , upon request of ORG ( PERSON ) , appointed an Investigating Commissioner ( PERSON ) .

On DATE the Investigating Commissioner informed the applicant that disciplinary proceedings against him were opened and requested him to file observations as regards the charges against him .

On DATE the applicant complied with this request .

On DATE the Investigating Commissioner submitted a report to ORG .

On DATE ORG discontinued the proceedings against the applicant . ORG Prosecutor filed an appeal against this decision .

On DATE the applicant submitted his observations on the appeal .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON Berufungs- und ORG ) allowed ORG Prosecutor ’s appeal and remitted the case to ORG .

NORP In DATE , after the case had been taken over by another Investigating Commissioner , the latter agreed with ORG ) to question the police officers involved in the traffic control at issue by way of letters rogatory . On DATE he filed letters rogatory with ORG ( Bezirksgericht ) which were subsequently transferred to ORG .

On DATE the CARDINAL police officers were questioned by ORG .

On DATE the Investigating Commissioner submitted his report to ORG .

On DATE ORG , upon the Investigating Commissioner ’s report , decided to open the main proceedings . This decision was served on the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the applicant filed his observations .

On DATE ORG fixed a hearing for DATE and summoned the applicant , his spouse and the QUANTITY police officers . As the applicant ’s spouse and one police officers submitted that they could not appear at that date , the hearing was cancelled .

On DATE ORG , in proceedings unrelated to the present one ’s , issued a decision concerning the composition of ORG . On DATE , after an internal discussion of the consequences of ORG decision for the proceedings at issue , Mr F was appointed as new chairman of ORG .

On DATE ORG fixed a hearing for DATE . The applicant ’s spouse and the QUANTITY police officers submitted that they could not appear at that date .

On DATE the applicant filed observations and challenged the chairman and another member of ORG for bias .

On DATE a new chairman was appointed .

On DATE ORG held a hearing . The applicant requested to summon his spouse for the next hearing . ORG adjourned the case and decided to obtain the file concerning the administrative criminal proceedings against the applicant .

On DATE ORG requested ORG to submit the file concerning the administrative criminal proceedings against the applicant .

On DATE , since the file at issue had meanwhile been transmitted to an other administrative authority , ORG filed a new request to submit the file .

On DATE ORG fixed a hearing for DATE . The applicant again challenged a member of ORG for bias .

On DATE ORG held a hearing . The only witness heard was one of the QUANTITY police officers , the other witnesses and the applicant submitted that they were not able to appear .

On DATE ORG fixed another hearing for DATE . The applicant again challenged CARDINAL members of ORG for bias and submitted that he was prevented from appearing .

On DATE ORG held a hearing and convicted the applicant under section CARDINAL LAW . It found that he had misbehaved towards intervening police officers during a traffic control by threatening them with job - related troubles in case they charged him with traffic offences . The applicant had thereby infringed the profession ’s honour and reputation . ORG ordered him to pay an additional fine of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL as he had already been ordered to pay ORG CARDINAL in CARDINAL other sets of disciplinary proceedings .

On DATE the applicant filed an appeal against this decision and on DATE ORG Prosecutor submitted his observations in reply .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG ) . He complained , inter alia , about the length of the proceedings and claimed that the disciplinary authorities had failed to take the excessive length of the proceedings into account as a mitigating circumstance .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s complaint . This decision was served on the applicant on DATE .

Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW ( Rechtsanwaltsordung ) provides that a practising lawyer is obliged to preserve the honour and reputation of the profession by his honest and sincere conduct .

Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW ( GPE ) , in the version applicable at the material time , provided for the following disciplinary penalties : a written reprimand , a fine of up to ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL , a prohibition on practising as a lawyer for a period not exceeding one year and being struck off the bar roll .


Violation of Art. 6-1 (access);Not necessary to examine Art. 6-1 (publicly);Preliminary objection rejected (reservation);Preliminary objection rejected (ratione temporis);Violation of P7-4;Costs and expenses partial award - domestic proceedings;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

Mr Gradinger is an NORP citizen who lives at PERSON ( ORG ) .

ORG On DATE at TIME , while driving his car , he caused an accident which led to the death of a cyclist .

At the hospital where he was taken for treatment a specimen of his blood was taken . This showed that he then had a blood alcohol level of QUANTITY .

ORG On CARDINAL DATE the St ORG ( PERSON ) convicted him of causing death by negligence ( fahrlässige PERSON ) and sentenced him to CARDINAL day - fines of CARDINAL NORP schillings ( ORG ) with DATE imprisonment in default of payment ( LAW ) - see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

According to the applicant , an expert , PERSON , had stated at his trial that in view of the shortness of the interval between the last drink the applicant had had and the collision , he could not have absorbed an amount of alcohol exceeding the prescribed limit .

In the judgment , as set out in the court record ( Protokolls- und GPE ) , it was held that the applicant had indeed been drinking before the accident but not to such an extent as to be caught by LAW para . CARDINAL of LAW , which prescribed a heavier penalty for causing death by negligence while under the influence of drink ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

ORG On DATE the GPE district authority ( ORG ) issued a " sentence order " ( PERSON ) imposing on PERSON a fine of ORG CARDINAL , with DATE imprisonment in default , for driving under the influence of drink . It made this order pursuant to sections QUANTITY ) and CARDINAL ) of LAW DATE ( Straßenverkehrsordnung - see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) and on the basis of a different medical report , of CARDINAL DATE , according to which , in view of the time that had elapsed between the collision and the taking of the blood specimen , PERSON blood alcohol level when the accident had occurred must have been QUANTITY .

ORG The applicant appealed to the GPE regional government ( Amt der Landesregierung ) , which dismissed his appeal on DATE on the basis of a further expert opinion , of DATE , to the effect that the blood alcohol level had been QUANTITY .

ORG On DATE ORG Verfassungsgerichtshof ) declined to accept for adjudication an appeal by the applicant , on the ground that it did not have sufficient prospects of success .

ORG A further appeal , to ORG , was dismissed as ill - founded on DATE . It was held that the regional authorities had not in any way misconstrued the law in finding that at the material time Mr Gradinger had been under the influence of drink for the purposes of section CARDINAL ) of LAW . That finding had been based on an expert opinion of DATE in which it had been assumed that all the alcohol consumed by the applicant had passed into his bloodstream by the time of the accident , a point which PERSON had not contested . He was therefore wrong in asserting that the expert report had not analysed the effects of the last drink he had had before the accident .

Furthermore , the authorities had acted in accordance with the law in appointing an official expert ( PERSON ) rather than a sworn court expert ( gerichtlich beeideter PERSON ) to report on Mr PERSON 's blood alcohol level . In the case under consideration there had been no special factor to justify their doing otherwise . Nor , contrary to the applicant 's assertions , had they appointed as expert the person already called upon at first instance by the district authority ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

As for LAW para . CARDINAL of LAW , embodying the " non bis in idem " principle , this was not directly applicable in the NORP legal system . Accordingly , the authorities had not misconstrued the law by punishing the applicant after a criminal court had acquitted him ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

ORG By LAW ) :

" It shall be an offence , punishable with DATE imprisonment , for any person to cause the death of another by negligence . "

Article CARDINAL para . CARDINAL of LAW provides :

ORG ...

ORG after allowing himself , even if only negligently , to become intoxicated ... through the consumption of alcohol , but not to an extent which excludes his responsibility , notwithstanding that he has foreseen or could have foreseen that he would shortly have to engage in an activity likely to pose ... a danger to the lives ... of others if performed in that state . "

Under an irrebuttable presumption applied by the criminal courts , a driver with a blood alcohol level of QUANTITY or higher is deemed to be " intoxicated " for the purposes of LAW para . CARDINAL of LAW ( Foregger / Serini , GPE , CARDINALth edition , DATE , p. CARDINAL ) .

ORG Under LAW DATE it is an offence for any person to drive a vehicle if the proportion of alcohol in his blood or breath is equal to or QUANTITY respectively . The same section also lays down the conditions for the use of breathalysers and blood tests .

ORG Since CARDINAL DATE section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) of the LAW has provided :

" It shall be an administrative offence ( PERSON ) , punishable with a fine of not CARDINAL and not QUANTITY or , in default of payment , with DATE imprisonment , for any person :

( a ) to drive ... a vehicle when under the influence of drink ... "

ORG In DATE , at the time when ORG ratified LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , section CARDINAL of LAW ( ORG ) provided : " Every driver shall be under a duty to pay reasonable heed to other road users and to display the care and diligence necessary to ensure the maintenance of order , safety and a proper flow of traffic . "

Article CARDINAL para . CARDINAL of LAW ( Bundes - Verfassungsgesetz ) provides :

" Hearings by trial courts in civil and criminal cases shall be oral and public . Exceptions may be prescribed by law . "

ORG By Article CARDINAL para . CARDINAL of LAW , when an application ( Beschwerde ) is made to it , has to determine whether an administrative decision ( Bescheid ) has infringed a right guaranteed by the LAW or has applied regulations ( Verordnung ) contrary to the law , a law contrary to LAW or an international treaty incompatible with NORP law .

Article CARDINAL para . CARDINAL provides :

" Up to the time of the hearing ORG may by means of a decision ( ORG ) decline to accept a case for adjudication if it does not have sufficient prospects of success or if it can not be expected that the judgment will clarify an issue of constitutional law . The court may not decline to accept for adjudication a case excluded from the jurisdiction of ORG by Article CARDINAL . "

ORG By LAW para . CARDINAL of LAW , ORG has jurisdiction to hear , inter alia , applications alleging that an administrative decision is unlawful .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ( Verwaltungsgerichtshofsgesetz ) provides :

" Applications from whose content it is apparent that the contravention of the law alleged by the applicant has not occurred shall be dismissed , at a private sitting , without further formality . "

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) provides , in particular , that at the end of the preliminary proceedings ( ORG ) ORG must hold a hearing where the applicant makes a request to that effect .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) reads as follows :

" Notwithstanding a party 's application under subsection ( CARDINAL ) , ORG may decide not to hold a hearing where

ORG the proceedings must be stayed ( section CARDINAL ) or the application dismissed ( section CARDINAL ) ;

ORG the impugned decision must be quashed as unlawful because the respondent authority lacked jurisdiction ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) ) ;

ORG the impugned decision must be quashed as unlawful on account of a breach of procedural rules ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) ) ;

ORG the impugned decision must be quashed because its content is unlawful according to the established case - law of ORG ;

ORG neither the respondent authority nor any other party before the court has filed pleadings in reply and the impugned decision is to be quashed ;

ORG it is apparent to the court from the pleadings of the parties to the proceedings before it and from the files relating to the earlier administrative proceedings that a hearing is not likely to clarify the case further . "

ORG - paragraphs CARDINAL of section CARDINAL ) were in force in DATE ; sub - paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL were inserted in DATE and sub - paragraph CARDINAL in DATE .

ORG LAW ) of LAW provides :

" In so far as ORG does not find any unlawfulness deriving from the respondent authority 's lack of jurisdiction or from breaches of procedural rules ( section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) ) ... , it must examine the impugned decision on the basis of the facts found by the respondent authority and with reference to the complaints put forward ... If it considers that reasons which have not yet been notified to CARDINAL of the parties might be decisive for ruling on [ CARDINAL of these complaints ] ... , it must hear the parties on this point and adjourn the proceedings if necessary . "

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the same LAW states that , save as otherwise provided , ORG must either dismiss an application as ill - founded or quash the impugned decision .

By section ORG ) ,

" The Administrative Court shall quash the impugned decision if it is unlawful

ORG by reason of its content , [ or ]

ORG because the respondent authority lacked jurisdiction , [ or ]

ORG on account of a breach of procedural rules , in that

( a ) the respondent authority has made findings of fact which are , in an important respect , contradicted by the case file , or

( b ) the facts require further investigation on an important point , or

( c ) procedural rules have been disregarded , compliance with which could have led to a different decision by the respondent authority . "

ORG If ORG quashes the impugned decision , " the administrative authorities [ are ] under a duty ... to take immediate steps , using the legal means available to them , to bring about in the specific case the legal situation which corresponds to ORG view of the law ( PERSON ) " ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ) .

ORG In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( G CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) ORG held :

" From the fact that it has been necessary to extend the reservation in respect of LAW to cover the procedural safeguards of LAW article CARDINAL ) of the LAW , because of the connection between those CARDINAL provisions ( article CARDINAL , article CARDINAL ) , it follows that , conversely , the limited review ( die ( bloß ) nachprüfende PERSON ) carried out by ORG or ORG is insufficient in respect of criminal penalties within the meaning of the Convention that are not covered by the reservation . "

ORG Pursuant to LAW , administrative courts called " independent administrative tribunals " ( ORG ) were set up in the Länder with effect from DATE . The functions of these tribunals include determining both the factual and the legal issues arising in cases concerning administrative offences ( ORG ) .

ORG The instrument of ratification of the Convention deposited by ORG on DATE contains , inter alia , a reservation worded as follows :

" The provisions of LAW shall be so applied that there shall be no interference with the measures for the deprivation of liberty prescribed in the laws on administrative procedure , BGBl [ ORG ] No . CARDINAL , subject to review by ORG or ORG as provided for in LAW . "

ORG The instrument of ratification of LAW CARDINAL ( PCARDINAL ) deposited by ORG on DATE contains , inter alia , the following declaration :

" Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL ( PCARDINAL - CARDINAL , PCARDINAL - CARDINAL ) exclusively relate to criminal proceedings in the sense of LAW . "


The applicant , Mr PERSON , is an NORP national who was born in DATE . At the time his application was lodged with the ORG he was serving a sentence in FAC . He currently lives in the city of GPE .

and the Government pursuant to Rule CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( a ) of ORG , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant was arrested and charged with murder and the possession of firearms .

On DATE the ORG found him guilty and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment .

From DATE to DATE the applicant served his sentence in FAC , during the course of which he was required to do forced labour in a mine .

DATE he was transferred to CARDINAL different prisons .

Under LAW of CARDINAL DATE the applicant was excused from serving DATE , DATE and DATE of imprisonment .

Under a pardon issued on DATE he was entitled to CARDINAL years’ remission of sentence .

In DATE the applicant argued that he had been excused from serving DATE and DATE of imprisonment under CARDINAL pardons .

On DATE he left prison , at a time when the ORG no longer had control over prisons when GPE was reduced to turmoil .

According to the applicant , an LAW of DATE entitled him to two years’ remission .

On DATE he gave himself up to the authorities in order to serve the rest of his sentence , which according to the applicant amounted to DATE .

On DATE and DATE , following the applicant ’s requests , ORG granted him a total of CARDINAL months’ remission for good behaviour .

In DATE the applicant lodged CARDINAL applications with the judge responsible for the execution of sentences for a reduction of sentence as follows : ( a ) DATE corresponding to CARDINAL GPE forced labour while in FAC ; ( b ) DATE , DATE under CARDINAL pardons issued in DATE ; ( c ) DATE being the period he had spent in pre - trial detention ; and ( d ) DATE under LAW of DATE . According to the applicant , his detention from DATE was unlawful .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE ORG decided to stay the proceedings in view of requests by the applicant for the cases to be struck out of the list . The applicant did not appeal against the above mentioned decisions .

Following a request for factual information under LAW CARDINAL ( a ) of ORG , the Government stated on DATE that the applicant had DATE and DATE of his sentence left to serve .

They submitted that the applicant had been entitled to remission of sentence for the following periods : ( a ) DATE under the pardon of CARDINAL DATE ; ( b ) DATE , DATE and DATE under LAW of DATE ; ( c ) DATE for his pre - trial detention ; ( d ) DATE granted by the domestic court for good behaviour ; ( e ) DATE and DATE corresponding to CARDINAL days’ forced labour .

With regard to the applicant ’s claim to a reduction in sentence on account of the forced labour , the ORG submitted that the applicant ’s prison file revealed that during DATE in FAC he had worked a total of DATE in a period DATE , entitling him to DATE and CARDINAL days’ remission .

As regards the remainder of the time the applicant spent in FAC there was nothing in his prison file to indicate whether he had been certified fit to work in the mine . The Government observed , however , that the applicant had failed to lodge a request for certification of facts with the domestic courts in order to have his prison file restored .

According to the Government , the applicant did not receive a pardon in DATE or qualify for remission under LAW of DATE .

On DATE the applicant was released from prison having served his sentence .

The relevant provisions of LAW read as follows :

“ When the creation , modification or cessation of a person ’s personal or property rights depends on a fact and the document which certifies the existence of such fact has disappeared or has been lost and can not be reissued or obtained in any other way , the interested party shall be entitled to request certification of such fact by a court decision . ”

( a ) Under a pardon issued on DATE the NORP President , exercising his right to grant convicted prisoners a pardon , decided that the applicant was entitled to CARDINAL years’ remission of sentence .

( b ) In DATE the NORP President granted CARDINAL pardons under his prerogative powers , but according to the Government , the applicant was not among the recipients .

Section CARDINAL of LAW of DATE provided that all convicted prisoners at the time the LAW entered into force were entitled to remission of CARDINAL of their sentence .


The applicant is a GPE citizen , born in DATE . At the time when he introduced his application , he was in custody in GPE pending his extradition to the GPE .

He is represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

On DATE the applicant was charged with conspiracy to import cocaine and attempting to import cocaine by ORG for LOC of GPE . The district attorney and the applicant signed an agreement to the effect that the applicant would plead guilty to the first charge , would be discharged on the second and would cooperate with the district attorney ’s office by acting as an undercover agent in groups of cocaine traffickers . He was then released on bail and ordered to appear before the court to be sentenced on DATE . However , he did not appear . On DATE a warrant for the applicant ’s arrest was issued by the Federal judge .

Further proceedings had also been brought against the applicant before ORG for GPE , GPE , on CARDINAL charges including armed robbery and kidnapping . On DATE the judge of this court issued a warrant for the applicant ’s arrest .

The applicant was arrested in GPE , GPE , on DATE pursuant to the international arrest warrant issued by ORG for LOC of GPE . The warrant requested the applicant ’s detention and extradition to the GPE to be tried for drug trafficking .

Following the applicant ’s arrest in GPE , ORG ( Juzgado Central de instrucción ) no . CARDINAL of the Audiencia Nacional , by a decision of DATE , ordered the applicant ’s detention pursuant to the relevant provisions of the law of CARDINAL DATE on extradition and LAW between GPE and the GPE . The court added that his detention would become invalid if a formal extradition request was not submitted within DATE from DATE of the notification to the GPE embassy , and that that period was to begin to run on DATE of the arrest .

On DATE , DATE , ORG notified the Spanish ORG of the applicant ’s detention . On DATE ORG notified ORG .

On DATE the NORP ORG received a note from the Governor of GPE , requesting that the applicant be detained and handed over to authorised agents so that he could be taken to GPE and punished according to the law .

ORG presented a Verbal Note dated DATE requesting the applicant ’s extradition . The mandatory extradition documents were received on DATE , including decisions from the GPE ORG for LOC of GPE and from ORG for GPE , GPE .

On DATE ORG of the Audiencia Nacional extended the applicant ’s detention for DATE .

On DATE ORG authorised the continuation of the extradition proceedings .

Appealing against the decision of DATE , the applicant requested the Audiencia Nacional to order his release as the mandatory extradition documents had not been received within the time laid down by law . The Audiencia Nacional , by a decision of DATE , rejected this request . The applicant lodged an appeal ( recurso de reforma ) that was also dismissed by the same court on DATE . The applicant appealed ( recurso de queja ) to the Audiencia Nacional , which rejected his appeal by a judgment of DATE . Finally , on DATE , the applicant lodged an appeal de amparo with ORG on the grounds of violation of LAW ( right to liberty ) and CARDINAL ( fair trial ) of the Spanish Constitution .

On DATE the applicant , relying on LAW on extradiction from GPE , had requested the Audiencia Nacional to obtain from the NORP authorities additional information relating to the agreement concluded between the district attorney and himself . On DATE the Audiencia Nacional had rejected this request as it considered the requested information to be irrelevant to the proceedings .

On DATE the applicant requested the Audiencia Nacional to declare the extradition request inadmissible on the grounds that the information provided by the NORP authorities was biased and said nothing of the agreement signed between the applicant and the district attorney , that the formalities had not been complied with , that there was no evidence of the applicant ’s participation in one of the offences and that there was a risk to his life on account of threats received from drug traffickers’ groups . The applicant also sought leave to submit certain evidence for the next hearing . On DATE , the Audiencia Nacional rejected this request for the same reasons as those given in its decision of DATE .

By a decision of DATE , ORG no . CARDINAL of the Audiencia Nacional found , inter alia , that the conditions regarding documentation for the purposes of mandatory extradition under LAW between GPE and GPE had been met . It indicated that both arrest warrants were good and that the Federal court had even convicted the applicant . The ORG added :

“ ... there is no doubt about the existence of the agreement ( between the applicant and the district attorney ) ... the applicant broke it since he did not appear before the court to receive sentence ... therefore only if the agreement is still valid in accordance with the laws of the requesting ORG ) .... will its content apply . ORG

The applicant ’s reasoning that he acted as an undercover agent ... and that he had to leave his country because his life was in danger , can not be considered by the court , as they are facts irrelevant to the extradition proceedings .

The applicant alleged a formal defect ... as he was detained on DATE and the extradition request was received on DATE , and therefore after the DATE period prescribed by the treaty had expired ... DATE to start counting the period was not , as alleged by the applicant , DATE of arrest , but DATE of notification of the arrest to the embassy ...

The ORG then decided :

“ To declare the extradition ( of PERSON ) admissible in order to : A ) Be sentenced for the offences of which he was found guilty by ORG ... or , if the agreement between the district attorney and the person requested is not valid , to be tried for the facts of charge no.CARDINAL and for the facts corresponding to charge no . CARDINAL ( arrest warrant of CARDINAL ) ; B ) Be tried for the facts for which proceedings were brought against him before ORG of GPE ( arrest warrant of CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) . Extradition is declared admissible provided that , if the extradited person is sentenced to life imprisonment , imprisonment could not be indefinite or for the whole life ... ”

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal ( recurso de suplica ) against the Audiencia Nacional ’s decision of DATE . ORG of the Audiencia Nacional dismissed the appeal by a decision of DATE , stating , inter alia :

“ The reasons alleged by the applicant to justify his leaving the country can not be taken into account when deciding on the admissibility of the extradition request ... If the alleged risk is genuine , the applicant should seek protection from the authorities of the country concerned ...

The DATE period should start from DATE of the notification of the arrest ... to the embassy ... regardless of the fact that the ORG had been informed of the detention through ORG . Moreover , non - compliance with this DATE period could be relevant with regard to the decision of imprisonment , but not for declaring the extradition request inadmissible . ”

Replying to the applicant ’s argument about the illegality of the international arrest warrant , the ORG stated :

Although in the notification of the detention , ORG stated that the arrest warrant was dated DATE , in the communication from the NORP authorities it appears that this date corresponds to the day of the trial ... and the arrest warrant was issued on DATE . It is also reported that on DATE proceedings were brought against the applicant and on DATE the judge of the ORG for GPE issued a warrant for his arrest . ”

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal de amparo with the NORP ORG against the judgment of DATE , alleging violation of ORG CARDINAL ( right to life ) , CARDINAL ( right to liberty ) and CARDINAL ( fair trial ) of the Spanish Constitution .

On DATE the applicant applied to the Audiencia Nacional arguing that the requesting ORG ( the GPE ) should give formal , concrete and binding guarantees on the maximum duration of the sentence to be imposed on the applicant and that , if he was convicted , he should be imprisoned in a special prison for collaborators of the government . This application was rejected by ORG on DATE as it considered that the question raised had already been dealt with in its decision of DATE . On DATE the applicant lodged a second appeal ( recurso de súplica ) with the same arguments . The applicant submitted that the judgment of DATE was not sufficient as it only set generic conditions . Moreover , relying on LAW , on extradition from GPE , the applicant submitted that it was unlawful to declare extradition admissible as life imprisonment constituted inhuman and degrading treatment . The appeal was dismissed by a decision of DATE . The Criminal Chamber of the Audiencia Nacional concluded :

“ ... the decision declaring extradition admissible establishes as a condition that if the court of the requesting ORG ( the GPE ) orders life imprisonment , it should not be for whole life . As the GPE and GPE have signed an extradition treaty , signature is considered a sufficient guarantee that the GPE will comply with the commitment contained in that decision ... ”

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal de amparo with ORG , arguing that the refusal of FAC to request the GPE authorities to give concrete and formal guarantees in the extradition proceedings constituted a violation of LAW ( right to life ) , CARDINAL ( fair trial ) and CARDINAL ( imprisonment to be oriented towards re - education and social rehabilitation ) of the Spanish Constitution .

The appeals de amparo were rejected as being manifestly ill - founded by CARDINAL decisions delivered by ORG on DATE and DATE . Concerning the applicant ’s complaint about the risks he would run if extradited , ORG stated that the hypothetical threats deriving from his former relations with criminal organisations were irrelevant since he was to be delivered to ORG who would be responsible for his safety .

On DATE the applicant asked ORG to apply Rule CARDINAL of its Rules of Procedure and ask the NORP Government to stay the execution of the extradition order . By a decision of DATE the President of the ORG rejected the request .

On DATE the applicant was extradited to GPE , where he is imprisoned in the GPE ORG .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Deprivation of liberty;Article 5-1-c - Reasonably necessary to prevent fleeing)

András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Kristina Pardalos;Nona Tsotsoria

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in ORG .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on charges of drug abuse . On DATE ORG held a hearing and ordered his house arrest . On appeal , on DATE the ORG changed this decision and ordered the applicant 's pre - trial detention for fear of collusion and reoffending . However , on CARDINAL DATE he was released .

In another case , on DATE the applicant was arrested on charges of aggravated drug trafficking , essentially because substantial amounts of various drugs and packaging material had been found in a garage of which he had been the tenant . On DATE his pre - trial detention was ordered at a court hearing , for fear of collusion with members of the presumed drug network . His detention was subsequently prolonged at the statutory intervals in decisions which included rather stereotypical references to the risks of his absconding and collusion without any detailed reasoning in regard to his individual circumstances or the evidence obtained against him .

On DATE the applicant made a request for release on bail , pledging a substantial sum of money as a security . On DATE the request was rejected . His appeal was dismissed on DATE .

On DATE the investigation was terminated .

On DATE the ORG - ORG prolonged the applicant 's detention until DATE . The court rejected the arguments of the applicant 's lawyer to the effect that the results of the investigation did not support a reasonable suspicion against the applicant . It was satisfied that his continued detention was necessary for fear of his absconding and could not be substituted by home arrest as suggested . It held that there was a well - grounded suspicion that the applicant had participated in the storage and dispatch of drugs which constituted an offence punishable with very severe sanctions . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's appeal , holding that the potential sanctions justified the fear of the applicant 's absconding .

On DATE a bill of indictment was preferred concerning CARDINAL defendants , including the applicant . It combined the facts of the CARDINAL criminal proceedings outlined above . The applicant was charged with complicity in aggravated drug trafficking .

On DATE the Győr - Moson - Sopron County Regional Court prolonged the applicant 's pre - trial detention . The court held that the sanction which the applicant was potentially facing entailed the danger of his absconding .

The applicant 's lawyer appealed , arguing that no specific reasons , as required by the ORG 's case - law , had been given for the applicant 's continued detention . In particular , he maintained that nothing in the case file supported the applicant 's involvement in selling drugs . In the light of the jurisprudence of the courts , no such sanction was , in his view , to be envisaged as automatically justifying detention for fear of absconding . To refute this point , the lawyer submitted that the applicant 's personal circumstances were decent : he was being supported by his family with which he had good relations and he had been fulfilling his educational and professional duties diligently before his arrest . The lawyer proposed that the applicant 's detention be replaced by house arrest .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal , observing that part of the offences with which the applicant was charged was punishable with very severe sanctions including life imprisonment , which justified the fear of absconding .

On DATE the applicant again requested his release on bail . On DATE he was released on bail and his house arrest was ordered . This measure was lifted on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the applicant was found guilty of the charge relating to the offence for which he had been arrested on DATE , and acquitted in respect of the remainder of the charges .