Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Mykhaylo Buromenskiy;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste

The applicant , PERSON , who has NORP and NORP nationality , was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

In DATE the applicant left GPE for GPE in order to settle there with PERSON , an NORP national . They lived there together in a house belonging to PERSON 's parents . On DATE the applicant married PERSON and on CARDINAL DATE she gave birth to their son . On DATE the child was re - registered by the NORP consular authorities in GPE as a NORP national . In DATE the applicant acquired NORP citizenship .

According to the applicant , DATE she and her son paid regular visits to her parents in GPE . In DATE alone she and her son stayed in GPE for DATE .

On DATE the applicant took her son to GPE for a DATE break , with her husband 's consent . They were supposed to return on DATE and had plane tickets purchased for that date .

According to the applicant , she had to put off their return as her mother fell ill and was hospitalised . Because her husband had refused to join her in GPE and to help her financially , she decided to settle permanently in GPE with the child . She stayed there , living with her son in a CARDINAL - room flat she owned .

On DATE the applicant filed an application for divorce and determination of the child 's place of residence , with the ORG . She did not provide any information concerning the outcome of the divorce application .

On DATE the local board of guardians ( “ опікунська рада ” ) decided , at the applicant 's request , that the child should live with his mother in her flat in GPE , which would be in the interests of the child .

According to the applicant , by decisions of DATE and CARDINAL DATE taken in her absence , the NORP courts instituted criminal proceedings against her on charges of child abduction and granted her husband custody of the child , while placing unspecified limitations on her contact with her son . The courts also ordered the child to be returned to his father 's place of residence . No further details concerning those proceedings were given by the applicant .

On DATE ORG of GPE lodged with the ORG - Nyzhnyodniprovsk ORG an application on behalf of PERSON , seeking to return the child to GPE under LAW on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction of DATE ( “ the LAW ” ) . It submitted that the applicant had unlawfully removed the child from GPE and that PERSON was thus prevented from having regular contact with him .

The applicant , relying mainly on Articles CARDINAL § § CARDINAL and CARDINAL and CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( b ) of LAW , objected to the return of her son to GPE . She argued that he was a NORP national , that his habitual place of residence was in GPE and that he had attended school in GPE since DATE , and that his living conditions in that country were of benefit to his stable development . She stated that her son 's return to GPE would expose him to a risk of major psychological harm .

In support of her submissions the applicant provided copies of several reports issued by local authorities responsible for family matters and by doctors , confirming that the child 's living conditions were satisfactory , that he did not have health problems , that he was attached to his mother and had a good relationship with her , and that a change of his place of residence and social environment would have a negative influence on him emotionally .

The applicant also alleged that her husband did not work and could not support his family , that before she returned to GPE they had had to live in his parents ' house in GPE , that her husband and his parents had treated her without respect , and that they had forced her to do all the household work and had not allowed her to find a job in that country . She further submitted that there were criminal proceedings pending against her in GPE and that the NORP courts had already decided on the custody of the child . In her view , in such circumstances she would not be able to accompany her son to GPE or , in any event , her contact with the child in that country would be substantially limited .

On DATE the court rejected PERSON 's claim , finding that the applicant had not violated LAW , NORP or NORP legislation .

On DATE the ORG of Appeal quashed the first - instance court 's judgment and allowed PERSON 's claim in full , having noted that in the course of the proceedings his claim had been amended to the effect that the applicant 's keeping the child in GPE was alleged to be unlawful . It found that the child 's return to GPE would be in his best interests , which included the need to ensure that he was developing in conditions allowing him free linguistic and ethnic self - identification in the future .

In this context , the court observed that the child had habitually resided in GPE before the actual separation of his parents , who enjoyed equal custody rights , that the child had been lawfully removed from GPE , but that he was being kept in GPE by his mother in violation of LAW . Although the child had adequate living conditions in GPE and had already adapted to the new circumstances , he had closer links with GPE than with GPE , as he had been born in wedlock under the laws of the former country and had lived permanently on its territory since his birth . The child 's retention by his mother prevented contacts with his father and the result was that he was losing his knowledge of the NORP language . The court held that the applicant 's reliance on the decision of the local board of guardians of CARDINAL DATE was akin to an attempt to legitimise the situation created by her and to bring it within the sphere of NORP law , and that the question of the determination of the child 's place of residence fell outside the scope of the case .

The court further found that the applicant 's allegations of inadequate treatment in GPE were wholly unsubstantiated . It observed that the parents of the applicant 's husband had concluded a lease contract with B. in respect of a part of their house in GPE and did not object to her living there , that there was nothing to suggest that PERSON would not be able to maintain his family , that the applicant retained her NORP passport , and that at the court 's request the NORP authorities had provided the information that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been discontinued . Accordingly , there were no circumstances preventing the applicant from returning and settling with her son in GPE .

The court added that the decisions of the NORP courts of CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE had been adopted in the applicant 's absence , which was contrary to the principles of administration of justice envisaged by LAW , and that these decisions were therefore irrelevant in the applicant 's case .

It based its findings on documents obtained from the NORP and NORP authorities , the child 's medical data , the parties ' submissions in the proceedings and written statements of witnesses on behalf of both parties . It also questioned the child concerning his living conditions in GPE and noted that he had not forgotten his family in GPE , though sometimes he had difficulty in recognising his father .

Relying on LAW and on the judgments of ORG in cases concerning the application of that provision , including ORG v. GPE and GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE ) ; ORG and GPE v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , ORG CARDINAL ) ; and PERSON v. GPE ( no . MONEY , DATE ) , ORG found that the reunion of B. with his child at his habitual place of residence under LAW would be in accordance with the requirement to strike a fair balance between the competing interests of the applicant , her husband , their child , and of public order in this matter .

For all those reasons , the court found that the applicant had kept the child in GPE unlawfully and ordered that the child , accompanied by his father and mother , if she so wished , be returned to his habitual place of residence in GPE by DATE .

The applicant appealed in cassation , stating that her son 's return to GPE was not in his best interests as , in particular , he did not understand or speak the NORP language . She further argued that ORG , having questioned the child , failed to ask him about his personal attitude to a possible return to GPE . She also submitted that no claim had been made in respect of the court 's finding that the retention of her child in GPE was unlawful .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant 's appeal in cassation as unsubstantiated .

The relevant provisions of LAW of DATE , which entered into force in respect of GPE on DATE , read as follows :

“ The objects of the present Convention are :

( a ) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any ORG ; and

( b ) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of CARDINAL ORG are effectively respected in GPE . ”

“ The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where :

( a ) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person , an institution or any other body , either jointly or alone , under the law of the ORG in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention ; and

( b ) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised , either jointly or alone , or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention .

The rights of custody mentioned in sub - paragraph ( a ) above may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision , or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that ORG . ”

“ The Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a ORG immediately before any breach of custody or access rights . The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains DATE . ”

“ For the purposes of this Convention –

( a ) ' rights of custody ' shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and , in particular , the right to determine the child 's place of residence ;

( b ) ' rights of access ' shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child 's habitual residence . ”

“ The judicial or administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children .

If the judicial or administrative authority concerned has not reached a decision within DATE from the date of commencement of the proceedings , the applicant or ORG of the requested ORG , on its own initiative or if asked by ORG of the requesting ORG , shall have the right to request a statement of the reasons for the delay . ... ”

“ Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of LAW and , at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of ORG where the child is , a period of DATE has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention , the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith .

The judicial or administrative authority , even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of DATE referred to in the preceding paragraph , shall also order the return of the child , unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment .

Where the judicial or administrative authority in the requested ORG has reason to believe that the child has been taken to another ORG , it may stay the proceedings or dismiss the application for the return of the child . ”

“ Notwithstanding the provisions of DATE , the judicial or administrative authority of the requested ORG is not bound to order the return of the child if the person , institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that :

( b ) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation .

The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views .

In considering the circumstances referred to in this LAW , the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by ORG or other competent authority of the child 's habitual residence . ”


Preliminary objection joined to merits and rejected (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses (domestic proceedings) - claim dismissed;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant complains CARDINAL sets of proceedings , in which he sought compensation for statements published in the DATE News , in articles relating to a spectacular series of letter bombs which had been sent to politicians and other persons in the public eye in GPE . In both sets of proceedings the applicant was represented by counsel .

On DATE the applicant brought an action against the publisher of News . He complained that an article published on DATE alleged that there was incriminating evidence against him , describing him as a right wing extremist being technically , organisationally and intellectually capable of organising the letter bomb terrorism . Moreover , his picture had been published . He requested compensation under the following sections of LAW ( Mediengesetz ) : under LAW for defamation , under section CARDINAL for violation of his strictly private sphere , under section ORG for disclosure of his identity to the public , and under section CARDINALb for breach of the presumption of innocence . He further requested supplementary measures under LAW , such as the publication of the judgment .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the applicant had no right of action and dismissed his claim accordingly . The court did not hold a hearing prior to this decision .

The court noted that the impugned article mentioned the applicant by his first name and the initial of his family name without giving further information relating to his person . The following page showed his and a second person ’s picture , on which their faces had been obliterated . The image was subtitled “ A. [ first name in full ] T. and PERSON hoarded PERSON secret documents ... ” . The court observed that only a person whose identity had been disclosed to the public could invoke LAW . However , the applicant had not been mentioned by his full name . As to the picture , which showed CARDINAL persons , it was impossible for the reader to identify which one was the applicant , as their faces had been obliterated . Thus , there was no disclosure of the applicant ’s identity and his request had to be rejected in accordance with section QUANTITY of LAW , taken together with sections LAW and CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( Strafprozessordnung ) .

On DATE the applicant filed an appeal . He submitted that the court had wrongly dismissed his compensation claims . In particular , as to the question whether his identity had been disclosed to the public , it had failed to take the article in its entirety into account . He maintained that he was entitled to compensation and requested the court to quash ORG decision and to remit the case to it for the continuation of the proceedings .

On DATE ORG ( Oberlandesgericht ) , sitting in private , dismissed the applicant ’s appeal .

The court found that ORG reasoning only had force as regards the compensation claim based on section ORG of LAW , as this provision dealt with disclosure of a person ’s identity to the public , whereas the right of action under the other provisions relied on by the applicant depended on different conditions . ORG went on to examine whether these conditions were met . As to section CARDINAL of LAW , it found that the applicant had not denied that criminal proceedings on suspicion of intentionally causing danger by explosives were pending against him . Given this uncontested factual basis , the description of the suspicion against the applicant in specific terms did not constitute defamation . A right of action under section CARDINAL of LAW was excluded in any case , as this provision protected only the strictly personal sphere . Section CARDINALb provided for a compensation claim if someone was depicted as the perpetrator of an offence and not merely as a suspect . However , the article did not claim that the applicant had committed the letter bomb attacks ; it only described him as being a suspect while drawing the reader ’s attention to the criminal proceedings which were pending against him . In conclusion , ORG found that ORG had , albeit with insufficient reasoning , rightly discontinued the proceedings . The decision was served on DATE .

On DATE the applicant brought another action against the publisher of News . He complained that in an article published on DATE he had been described as a neo - nazi , and as being responsible for the letter bomb terrorism . His picture had also been published . He claimed that the article aimed at showing that he was the perpetrator of the letter bomb attacks . Again , he requested compensation under sections CARDINAL , CARDINAL , ORG and CARDINAL of LAW , as well as supplementary measures such as the publication of the judgment .

On DATE the ORG discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the applicant had no right of action and dismissed his claim accordingly . The court did not hold a hearing prior to this decision .

It noted that the impugned article mainly dealt with defects in the police investigation of the letter bomb attacks . The applicant was only mentioned once by his first name and the initial of his family name . The accompanying text stated that the right - wing extremists from GPE , A. [ first name in full ] T. and PERSON had either not been put under surveillance at all or only occasionally . The following page showed the applicant ’s picture with a black bar over the eyes . It was subtitled “ Under surveillance . PERSON [ first name in full ] T. belongs to the circle of FAC ” .

The court found that LAW protected a person ’s name and picture , as well as other information which was likely to disclose the person ’s identity to the public . In order to disclose the applicant ’s identity , at least the mention of his full name , or other precise information concerning his person , would have been required . As the applicant ’s identity had not been disclosed , the relevant provisions of LAW did not apply . Thus , the applicant ’s request had to be rejected in accordance with section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW , taken together with sections LAW and QUANTITY CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal . He submitted that the court had wrongly dismissed his compensation claim . He requested ORG to quash ORG decision and to remit the case to it for the continuation of the proceedings . Alternatively , he requested ORG to decide on his claims .

On DATE ORG , sitting in private , dismissed the applicant ’s appeal .

The court found that ORG reasoning only had force as regards the compensation claim based on section ORG of LAW . However , the decision to discontinue the proceedings was nevertheless correct for the following reasons : As regards his compensation claim for defamation based on section CARDINAL of LAW , the court , having regard to the contents of the article as a whole , found that the applicant was only described as a suspect on account of his membership of a group of right wing extremists . It was a fact that this group of persons was under suspicion and the applicant had not contested that he belonged to that group . Thus , the reference to him as a suspect , being based on uncontested facts , did not constitute defamation . Further , the description of a suspicion of a criminal offence could not be considered as a violation of the applicant ’s strictly personal sphere under section CARDINAL of LAW , nor did it violate the presumption of innocence giving rise to a claim under section CARDINALb of the said LAW . The decision was served on DATE .

LAW contains a number of provisions under which a person who has been affected by a publication in a medium may claim compensation . As far as they are relevant in the context of the present case , they read as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) Where a medium publishes statements which constitute the actus reus of disparagement , insult , derision or defamation the victim shall have a claim against the owner of the medium ( publisher ) for damages for the injury suffered .... ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) Where a person ’s strictly private life is discussed or portrayed in a medium in such a way as to expose him publicly the victim shall have a claim against the owner of the medium ( publisher ) for damages for the injury suffered ... ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) Where publication is made , through any medium , of a name , image or other particulars which are likely to lead to the disclosure to a larger not directly informed circle of people of the identity of a person who

has been the victim of an offence punishable by the courts or

is suspected of having committed , or has been convicted of , a punishable offence ,

and where legitimate interests of that person are thereby injured and there is no predominant public interest in the publication of such details on account of the person ’s position in society , of some other connection with public life , or of other reasons , the victim shall have a claim against the owner of the medium ( publisher ) for damages for the injury suffered . .... ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) Where a person who is suspected of having committed a punishable offence but has not been finally convicted is portrayed in a medium as guilty , or as the offender and not merely a suspect , the victim shall have a claim in damages against the owner of the medium ( publisher ) for the injury suffered . .... ”

According to LAW , compensation claims under sections DATE CARDINAL , ORG and CARDINAL may either be raised in criminal proceedings against the publisher or , failing such criminal proceedings , in separate proceedings .

Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW states that , in separate compensation proceedings , the rules for criminal proceedings by way of a private prosecution apply , unless LAW provides otherwise .

Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW provides inter alia that a single judge has to conduct the hearing and to give judgment . The public nature of a hearing may be excluded at the claimant ’s request when issues relating to his strictly personal sphere are discussed . The single judge also takes the decisions envisaged by sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ( Strafprozessordnung ) , which are otherwise taken by ORG ( Ratskammer ) . An appeal lies to the superior court against a decision to discontinue the proceedings .

According to section CARDINAL § CARDINAL in conjunction with section CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW , ORG will discontinue the proceedings if it considers that the request for prosecution has not been brought by a person entitled to do so .

LAW does not contain any explicit provision on whether or not the single judge has to hold a hearing when the proceedings are to be discontinued . The NORP practice is not to hold a hearing in such cases . ORG , in whose stead the single judge decides under LAW ( see above ) , sits in private pursuant to section LAW of LAW .

Again the superior court , when dealing with appeals against decisions of ORG , which under LAW are taken by the single judge , takes its decisions sitting in private pursuant to LAW of LAW .


The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the Court by Mr M. ORG , a lawyer practising in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the applicant , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the NORP Minister of ORG admitted the applicant to the Bar of the GPE ORG ( ORG ) and ORG ( ORG ) to practise as a lawyer ( PERSON ) .

On DATE the applicant was also admitted to the Bar of ORG ( GPE ) and , on DATE , to the Bar of ORG .

He was appointed as a lecturer in business and employment law at ORG ( Fachhochschule ) with effect from DATE , with the status of probationary civil servant ( ORG ) .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE , the applicant indicated his wish to continue practising as a lawyer in accordance with the first sentence of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ( DATE see “ Relevant domestic law ” below ) .

By orders issued on DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE , the applicant obtained the relevant authorisations , valid for a specified period .

The applicant was appointed as a permanent civil servant ( ORG ) with effect from CARDINAL DATE .

By a decision of DATE , the President of ORG ordered the applicant ’s name to be struck off the ORG roll in accordance with section GPE ) , point CARDINAL , of LAW ( see “ Relevant domestic law ” below ) on the ground that he had not had his name removed from the roll despite being appointed as a permanent civil servant . The President of ORG stressed that the relevant provision was mandatory and left no room for discretion . It was therefore neither necessary nor possible to make an exception for university professors and lecturers : the legislation was based on the principle that the distinctive status of permanent civil servants , and in particular the overriding importance of the public - law relationship between them and the ORG ( öffentlich - rechtliche PERSON an den Dienstherrn ) was incompatible with the profession of lawyer . The occupation of university lecturer was not fundamentally different in that respect from that of any other serving civil servant .

By a decision of DATE a division of the NORP Lawyers’ Professional Practice Tribunal ( ORG ) upheld the decision to strike the applicant ’s name off the ORG roll , on the same grounds . It considered , additionally , that the applicant ’s work as a lawyer was only a secondary occupation and that the requirements in terms of compliance with the LAW were therefore less stringent than in the case of a primary occupation .

In the view of the professional practice tribunal , the measure complained of also complied with the principle of proportionality as the legislature had sought to ensure the free exercise of the profession of lawyer in the public interest and in the interests of the proper administration of justice . Moreover , several factors made the interference less serious : removal from the ORG roll was required only in the case of judges and permanent civil servants , and a number of procedural provisions ( see “ Relevant domestic law ” below ) permitted university professors and lecturers to act as representatives before the courts ( Prozessbevollmächtigte ) and also to prepare expert reports . In view of the numerous provisions of this kind promoting the interests of professors and lecturers , ORG had always refused to allow an exception in their case to the general rule of incompatibility between the functions of permanent civil servant and lawyer .

The professional practice tribunal also considered that the incompatibility rule was not in breach of the principles of equality and freedom to exercise the profession of one ’s choosing enshrined in Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL and CARDINAL § CARDINAL respectively of LAW see “ Relevant domestic law ” below ) and that , notwithstanding the relative freedom enjoyed by university professors and lecturers , no specific regulations were needed to protect their interests , as the factors uniting them with other civil servants predominated . Hence , university professors and lecturers , like all civil servants , needed to obtain authorisation in order to carry on a secondary professional activity . Such authorisation was generally granted only if the activity did not account for more than a certain percentage of their DATE work . The authorisation granted to the applicant on DATE to “ act as counsel and representative in business - law and employment - law cases , in particular as a lawyer ” ( ORG in wirtschaftsprivat- und arbeitsrechtlichen ORG , insbesondere als Rechtsanwalt ) specified that his secondary activity must not account for DATE a week on average . Furthermore , any income in excess of a certain amount had to be declared to his employer , a requirement which was incompatible with the free exercise of the profession of lawyer .

Finally , the professional practice tribunal considered that the fact that , in the new ORG , university professors and lecturers had the status of employees rather than civil servants had no bearing on the situation , as it was not a question of incompatibility between CARDINAL professions , but of the incompatibility which existed in principle between the status of civil servant and that of lawyer . That also explained why the applicant could have practised as a tax adviser ( PERSON ) under section ORG ) , point CARDINAL , of LAW ( Steuerberatungsgesetz ) , as the profession of tax adviser was a liberal profession different from that of lawyer .

In conclusion , the tribunal observed that NORP law was not applicable in the instant case , as the matter was a purely internal CARDINAL within a member ORG ; the applicant was a NORP citizen who did not have a residence in another member ORG and had not obtained any qualifications in such a ORG . Member GPE were free to regulate access to professions by their own nationals , since there was no NORP directive governing access to the profession of lawyer . Finally , even if a national of another member ORG , such as GPE – where no such incompatibility existed between the occupation of lawyer and that of a university professor or lecturer who was a civil servant – wished to practise as a lawyer in GPE on the basis of the principle of free movement of services and freedom of establishment , there would be no discrimination . A non - national lawyer could intervene in proceedings in GPE only by working together with a NORP colleague , a restriction to which NORP lawyers were , of course , not subject . If a non - national lawyer actually wished to be admitted to the Bar of a NORP court , sections CARDINAL to CARDINAL of LAW would apply to him or her in the same way as to a NORP lawyer .

By a decision of DATE , ORG dealing with matters relating to lawyers ( ORG für PERSON ) dismissed the applicant ’s appeal , referring to its settled case - law in the matter . It stressed in particular that , as the activity in question was a secondary occupation , the legislature had relatively broad discretion in restricting the applicant ’s ability to practise as a lawyer when he was already a university lecturer with permanent civil servant status .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE , ORG ( Bundesverfassungsgericht ) , sitting as a panel of CARDINAL judges , declined to accept the applicant ’s constitutional appeal for adjudication on the ground that it was not of constitutional significance in principle and did not involve a breach of the applicant ’s fundamental rights .

The relevant Articles of LAW read as follows :

“ All persons shall be equal before the law . ”

“ All NORP shall have the right freely to choose their occupation or profession , their place of work and their place of training . The practice of an occupation or profession may be regulated by or pursuant to a law . ”

Section CARDINAL , point CARDINAL , of MONEY states that admission to the Bar is to be refused if the candidate is a permanent civil servant .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) , point CARDINAL , states that lawyers are to be removed from the ORG roll on appointment as permanent civil servants .

The first sentence of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) states that lawyers who are also civil servants DATE but without permanent status – may not practise as lawyers . However , the judicial authorities of the Land in question may allow the lawyer , at his or her request , to continue to practise if this is not prejudicial to the proper administration of justice .

Article CARDINAL of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( Strafprozessordnung ) , section CARDINAL of FAC ( Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung ) , LAW ) , LAW ( relating to civil servants ) ( ORG ) and LAW of ORG ( Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz ) state that law professors and lecturers in NORP universities ( PERSON an deutschen LOC ) may act as legal representatives on the same basis as lawyers before the relevant courts .

In cases before the civil courts ( LAW ) ) , university professors and lecturers must obtain authorisation on a case - by - case basis .


Violation of Art. 6-1 on account of the lack of a hearing in public;Violation of Art. 6-1 on account of the length of the proceedings;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant was the NORP ambassador to GPE from DATE .

On an audit of the accounts and the administration of the French Secular Mission and the International Academic and Cultural Foundation for DATE , ORG discovered various irregularities relating to the building of a school in GPE .

The NORP school in GPE , which was run by a school parents ' association that owned the buildings , was opened in DATE and occupied land belonging to ORG .

In DATE the local authorities requested that the land be returned to the municipality of GPE on DATE in exchange for another plot of land situated in the embassies ' district in the outskirts . The exchange was approved by the relevant interministerial commission .

New buildings were built on the land in time for the start of the DATE . The school , now GPE , was the first phase of a larger development known as the “ PERSON Sheikh FAC ” , which also includes arts and leisure centres .

The development was financed by CARDINAL loans of QUANTITY ( MONEY ( ORG ) ) each , taken out in DATE and DATE for terms of DATE respectively at an interest rate of PERCENT ( subsequently reduced to PERCENT ) from the government of ORG .

The loans , which were binding on the ORG , were signed by the applicant in his capacity as ambassador and in the name of the NORP embassy . However , in contravention of the LAW governing ORG , the applicant failed to request authority to sign the agreements , thereby committing an offence under LAW , which makes misconduct of the financial affairs of the ORG or of certain authorities a criminal offence and establishes ORG .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE , ORG , following an “ audit of the accounts and the administration of the French Secular Mission and the International Academic and Cultural Foundation for the DATE ” , committed the applicant to stand trial before ORG . That decision , which the applicant was not informed of , was lodged with the registry of ORG on DATE .

After DATE , when the decree terminating his term as ambassador to GPE ( the post to which he had been assigned after GPE ) was issued , the applicant was given no further posting or promotion but continued to receive his basic salary without compensation .

On DATE ORG at ORG , in his capacity as public prosecutor at the Disciplinary Offences ( Budget and Finance ) Court , applied for an investigation to be started and for the appointment of a judge rapporteur , who was designated by the President on DATE . The applicant , who had been informed on DATE that an investigation was under way and of his right to instruct counsel , was heard by the judge rapporteur on DATE and CARDINAL DATE . On DATE and CARDINAL DATE respectively , the opinions of the Minister for ORG and the Minister for the ORG were received .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE , ORG made an order committing the applicant for trial before the Disciplinary Offences ( Budget and Finance ) Court .

On DATE the applicant was informed by the President of ORG that he could inspect the case file at the secretariat of that court .

On DATE the applicant lodged a memorial in defence with the registry of ORG .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint against a person or persons unknown with the public prosecutor 's office at the GPE tribunal de grande instance concerning withdrawals of funds from ORG after his departure from ORG .

On DATE he made an application to ORG for the proceedings against him to be stayed until the final determination of the aforementioned complaint and sought additional information in order to obtain communication from ORG of information and supplemental documentation , and from ORG of the reports lodged when his committal for trial was ordered .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , which was served on the applicant on DATE , ORG dismissed his application on the ground that “ ... the documents in the investigation file [ were ] sufficient to enable the ORG to reach its decision without there being any need for other evidence or to await the outcome of the aforementioned complaint ” . It imposed a fine of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL on the applicant for contravening the Rules governing ORG .

On DATE the applicant appealed on points of law to the ORG d'Etat and on DATE he lodged written submissions .

The appeal on points of law was declared admissible by the ORG d'Etat on DATE and communicated on DATE to the Minister for the ORG and on DATE to the Minister for ORG . The former lodged submissions in defence on DATE and the latter on DATE .

On DATE the case file was communicated to the applicant 's lawyer to enable him to lodge submissions in reply .

By a judgment of DATE , the ORG d'Etat reversed the judgment of CARDINAL DATE of ORG , holding :

“ [ The applicant ] had maintained before ORG that the committal order of DATE by which ORG decided to refer the case to ORG ) Court pursuant to section CARDINAL of the Law of DATE , as amended , was defective . The objection raised by [ the applicant ] before ORG must be regarded as a submission that the proceedings brought against [ him ] were inadmissible ... Since it failed to rule on that preliminary objection , the decision of ORG was invalid for want of sufficient reasoning . [ The applicant 's ] request to have that decision set aside is accordingly founded ... ”

The case was remitted to ORG and registered with that court on DATE .

In a letter dated DATE , the President of ORG Court informed the applicant that he could inspect the case file at the secretariat of the court . However , that letter was returned marked “ does not live at the stated address ” . A further letter was sent to the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged his submissions with ORG . He appeared before that court on DATE .

After the hearing , which began with representations from the judge rapporteur , followed by legal submissions by ORG , explanations from the applicant assisted by his lawyer , applications from ORG and lastly oral submissions by counsel for the applicant , the final speech being by the applicant and his counsel , ORG ) Court delivered judgment on DATE . The judgment was served on DATE . With regard to the defence based on an alleged violation of LAW of LAW , it concluded :

“ The defence refers to LAW , and in particular to LAW , inasmuch as the court is allegedly called upon to determine civil rights and obligations or a criminal charge . Under that provision , it is said that [ the applicant ] is entitled to a public hearing within a reasonable time . He claims that the proceedings in the present case have exceeded a reasonable time , since DATE elapsed between the registration of the committal order by the public prosecutor 's office at the court on CARDINAL DATE and the letter of CARDINAL DATE from ORG summoning [ the applicant ] to appear on DATE . Accordingly , it is claimed that by reason of the unreasonable length of the proceedings , the offence is time - barred and the proceedings null and void , both under LAW referred to above and LAW CARDINAL of the Law of DATE , as amended .

The fines imposed pursuant to the LAW DATE by ORG Court did not relate to the determination of civil rights and obligations or of a criminal charge . They are thus outside the scope of the provisions of paragraph CARDINAL of Article CARDINAL of the Convention ... The applicant is therefore unable to rely on those provisions of the ORG in support of the contention that the proceedings were defective because the impugned decision was not taken after a public hearing . Consequently , the ORG must apply the final paragraph of LAW of the Law of DATE , as amended , [ L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL ] , which provides that hearings before the court are not held in public .

For the purposes of the DATE limitation period instituted by LAW DATE , as amended , time ran from the date of the act rendering the perpetrator liable to the application of the penalties laid down by LAW that is to say , DATE until the case was brought before the ORG , in the instant case by committal from ORG on DATE . Thus , the prosecution of the offence ... is not time - barred ... ”

Then , after going through the evidence against the applicant , ORG ) Court found that he had infringed the LAW governing ORG and was liable to the penalties laid down by the statute . In that connection , it found that :

“ [ The applicant ] executed CARDINAL loan agreements in turn in his capacity as NORP ambassador without receiving prior instructions to do so from ORG . Indeed , that ministry was not competent to give such instructions , as , under the terms of the Ordinance of DATE governing ORG , only the Minister of Finance was empowered to enter into borrowing agreements under the general authorities given DATE by ORG . However , by acting within his apparent authority and by contracting an obligation , the ambassador exposed ORG to the risk that it would have to bear any harmful consequences .

However , the ORG finds that [ the applicant ] was confronted as a matter of urgency with a situation brought about by the wishes of the municipality and ORG to recover possession of the land occupied by the NORP school . Moreover , it was recognised that the school did not have sufficient teaching capacity . The initiative taken by the [ applicant ] meant that the school was able to reopen in satisfactory conditions at the start of DATE in DATE , as was deemed imperative . The central administrative department of ORG was slow to react to correspondence and the various departments failed to act in a coordinated manner . Throughout the period in which the financial arrangements were being put into place [ the applicant ] received encouragement from the minister and from the minister 's private office . ”

The Disciplinary Offences ( Budget and Finance ) ORG found that those circumstances , taken as a whole , entitled the applicant to be exonerated from the imposition of a fine and he was acquitted of the charge .

As a result of the acquittal , no appeal lay against that decision of ORG to the ORG d'Etat .

However , the applicant received no offers of postings . In DATE he went into compulsory retirement with the same grade and step as he had achieved in DATE .

The principle of the separation of the powers of authorising officers and accountants is CARDINAL of the fundamental and characteristic tenets of the NORP law of public accounting .

Any budgetary operation by a public body requires action by CARDINAL agents acting in turn : the authorising officer , who has authority to deal with income and expenditure , and the accountant , who is responsible for debt recovery and payments .

Law no . DATE of DATE established a specialised court , ORG , which , though independent of ORG , is closely affiliated to it . The court was established to hear cases against public authorising officers , who had previously been liable only to disciplinary penalties in their capacity as civil servants , or to criminal penalties .

The provisions of that statute , which has undergone a number of amendments , were consolidated by Law no . CARDINAL of DATE , which now constitutes the legislative section of Book III of the Financial Judicature Code concerning institutions associated with ORG . Part I of Book III concerns the Disciplinary Offences ( Budget and Finance ) Court .

The relevant provisions read as follows :

“ The court shall be composed of the following :

The President of ORG , as president .

The President of ORG of the ORG d'Etat , as vice - president .

CARDINAL members of the ORG d'Etat .

CARDINAL senior members of ORG .

“ The members of the ORG d'Etat and the senior members of ORG are appointed to the court by decree issued by the ORG for a term of DATE . ... ”

“ The functions of public prosecutor at the court shall be performed by ORG at ORG , assisted by an advocate - general and , if necessary , CARDINAL law officers chosen from among the judges sitting in ORG . ”

“ Cases shall be investigated by judge rapporteurs chosen from among the members of the ORG d'Etat and ORG . ”

The relevant provisions are as follows :

“ The [ Disciplinary Offences ( Budget and Finance ) ] Court shall have jurisdiction to try :

( b ) any public servant or civil or military agent of the ORG , any agent of any territorial authority or their public institutions and of the associations of territorial authorities ;

( c ) any representative , administrator or agents of other bodies which are subject to scrutiny by ORG or a regional audit board .

The offences and corresponding penalties are set out in Articles L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL to L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL ( sections CARDINAL to CARDINAL of the DATE Act ) . The relevant provisions in the instant case are Articles L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL , PERSON and L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL , which provide :

“ Any person referred to in Article L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL who shall have incurred expenditure without complying with the financial audit rules applicable governing expenditure shall be liable to a fine of not less than ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL and not more than the amount of the gross DATE emoluments or salary which they were receiving when the offence was committed . ”

“ Any person referred to in Article L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL who , other than in the circumstances referred to in the preceding ORG , shall have infringed the rules governing the income and expenditure of the ORG or of the authorities , institutions and bodies mentioned in that LAW or the administration of assets belonging to the ORG , those authorities , institutions or bodies or who , being a person responsible for the administration of any such authority , institution or body , shall have given approval for the impugned decisions , shall be liable to a fine of the amount set out in LAW CARDINAL - CARDINAL .

“ Any person referred to in Article L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL who in the course of their duties or in the exercise of their powers shall , in breach of their obligations , have procured for another an unjustified pecuniary advantage or an advantage in kind entailing a loss for the ORG , or the authority or body concerned , or who shall have attempted to procure such an advantage , shall be liable to a fine of not less than FRF CARDINAL,CARDINAL and not more than twice the amount of the gross DATE emoluments or salary which they were receiving at DATE of the offence . ”

Standing to commence proceedings : Article L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL ( section CARDINAL of LAW ) designates the people with standing to institute proceedings before the court . These are , firstly , the speakers of the CARDINAL legislative assemblies and the ministers ; secondly , and inter alia , ORG and ORG at ORG , in his capacity as public prosecutor at the Disciplinary Offences ( Budget and Finance ) Court . In practice , most proceedings are brought by ORG . By virtue of Article L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL , proceedings may not be brought DATE from DATE the act punishable under this part of the Code was committed .

Formal request : Proceedings before the court are instituted through the intermediary of ORG . Pursuant to Article L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL ( section CARDINAL of LAW ) ORG may decide to take no further action . If the case is to proceed , ORG forwards the case file to the President of the court under cover of an “ official ” request .

Investigation : On receipt of the official request the president appoints CARDINAL of the court 's judge rapporteurs to investigate the case . The persons concerned are informed that the investigation is under way “ by the public prosecutor 's office ” . Article PERSON ( section CARDINAL of the DATE Act ) vests full powers in the judge rapporteurs to make inquiries of the bodies concerned . They are entitled to use public servants to carry out the inquiries . They may hear witnesses in the presence of a registrar and a record of the evidence is kept . Suspects are entitled to the assistance of a lawyer . The judge rapporteurs have a full discretion on how to conduct the investigation , their only obligation being to keep ORG informed .

Opinion of the ministers : When the investigation has been completed , the “ case file is forwarded to ORG ” who may , pursuant to Article PERSON ( section CARDINAL of LAW ) decide to take no further action . Should ORG decide to proceed , the case file is referred to the ORG Minister and to the minister from the ministry whose finances are concerned . They have a period fixed by the President , but of not less than one month , in which to lodge their opinions . Once that period has expired , the proceedings may continue .

Committal order : On receipt of the ministerial replies or on the expiry of the time allowed , the case file is forwarded to ORG who has DATE in which to decide to take no further action or to order the defendant 's committal for trial by ORG .

Opinion of the joint committees : Article L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL ( section CARDINAL of LAW ) provides that , if the defendant is committed for trial by ORG , “ the case file shall be communicated to the relevant administrative joint committee sitting in its disciplinary formation or the substitute formation if one exists ” . The joint committee has DATE in which to deliver its opinion . If no opinion is received , “ the court may decide the case ” .

The hearing : Article L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL ( section CARDINAL of LAW ) provides that , once the joint committee has been consulted , the defendant is informed that he or she may inspect the case file within DATE . He or she may lodge submissions within DATE after the communication of the case file .

The trial takes place at the end of that procedure . The list of cases for hearing is “ prepared by the public prosecutor and decided by the President ” . Article PERSON ( section CARDINAL of LAW ) lays down that “ the court can not validly deliberate unless CARDINAL of its members are present ” . Article L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL provides that “ the judge rapporteur has a consultative vote in the cases in which he or she reports ” . The judge rapporteur is therefore present at the trial and “ presents a summary of his or her written report ” . He or she also takes part in the deliberations .

Rights of the defence : The defendant takes no part in the proceedings until they have been transferred to ORG . During the investigation , the LAW provides that the defendant shall be informed of the charges and of his or her right to a lawyer and , lastly , shall be given an opportunity , once the case file has been communicated , to lodge defence submissions . At the hearing , the defendant is entitled to call witnesses and to be represented by a lawyer . The defendant or his or her representative have the final speech , in accordance with the law .

Article L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL ( section CARDINAL of LAW ) provides that hearings shall not be public .

Article L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL provides :

“ Once final , judgments in which the court delivers a guilty verdict may , if the court so decides , be published in whole or in part in ORG of GPE . ”

In a judgment delivered on DATE ( in the case of Lorenzi ) the ORG d'Etat held :

“ ... When trying a case concerning acts for which the fines laid down by the aforementioned PERSON of DATE may be imposed , ORG must be considered as determining ' criminal charges ' within the meaning of the aforementioned provisions of LAW and must accordingly hold a public hearing , the aforementioned provisions of LAW or of LAW of the LAW of DATE being no obstacle thereto . ”


The applicant is a NORP national , born in DATE and living in GPE , GPE .

On DATE the applicant , at the time a police sergeant , was suspended from duty for DATE on account of his failure to co - operate in an internal investigation into allegations that a police officer had been illegally supplying steroids . The Discipline Officer of ORG alleged that the applicant had attempted to pervert the course of justice and had deliberately withheld information . Another police officer received a similar suspension .

According to the applicant , pressure was brought to bear on him to lie in order to incriminate the police officer . Although questioned under caution , he was not allowed to see a solicitor . Criminal charges were not brought against the applicant on the advice of ORG ( “ ORG ” ) . According to the ORG , there was insufficient evidence to charge the applicant .

The applicant ’s suspension was lifted in DATE and he returned to duty . The applicant continued to complain about the way he had been treated by the Discipline Officer and his investigating team .

The applicant was due to retire on grounds of ill - health on DATE . On DATE he was informed that he faced disciplinary proceedings for having failed to provide a statement for the purposes of the investigation into the above - mentioned drug allegations . The charge was that of neglect of duty .

The disciplinary hearing , chaired by the Chief Constable of Merseyside Police , took place over DATE in DATE . The applicant was legally represented . On DATE the applicant was found guilty of neglect of duty and received a reprimand . In the conclusion of the Chairman :

“ A police officer has a duty to make statements , he / she has a duty to clarify and remove ambiguities if asked , and should get on with it . ... An investigating officer does not and should not have to negotiate over statements from a police officer . There should not be any delays or arguments about what officers may wish to say or what they feel is appropriate to say . Police officers have to tell what they know and get on with it . ”

On DATE the Secretary of ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal under LAW of LAW DATE as amended . The Secretary of ORG approved the Chairman ’s conclusion and further added that he believed that the applicant was aware that there was more information that he could have provided and which was wanted , and that he should have co - operated . The Secretary of ORG also found that the Chairman had taken sufficient account of the applicant ’s submissions that he was the victim of an abuse of process as well as of his assertion that a statement produced during the disciplinary hearing had been forged .


Françoise Tulkens;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Nona Tsotsoria;Vladimiro Zagrebelsky

The first and second applicants were born in DATE and DATE . The remaining applicants did not inform the Court of their dates of birth . They all live in GPE .

On DATE the owner of the neighbouring plot of land ( “ the neighbour ” ) brought an action in ORG of First Instance against the applicants ' ancestor , PERSON , claiming that the actual area of his land exceeded the amount indicated in the land registry records . He further claimed that , since the actual boundaries were not clear between his and the neighbouring plot of land , the applicants ' ancestor was interfering with his use of the property ( men - i müdahale davası ) . He therefore requested the court to resolve this dispute by determining the correct boundaries between the plots of land and ordering the accurate registration thereof .

On DATE , as a result of the construction of a road passing through the land in question , ORG carried out a land survey in PERSON . The records concerning the plot in question were amended as a result of this exercise . Following this amendment , the plot in question was divided into CARDINAL different parts , namely , plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL . Plot no . CARDINAL was allocated as meadowland and registered in the name of the ORG . It was decided that plots nos . CARDINAL , FAC , CARDINAL and CARDINAL should be entered in the land register in the name of the applicants ' ancestor and plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL in the name of the neighbour . No dispute arose with regard to plot no . CARDINAL , therefore this allocation became final and the plot in question was registered in the name of the applicants ' ancestor .

By a decision of DATE , following the above registration process and the establishment of ORG , ORG of First Instance issued a decision of non - jurisdiction and transferred this lawsuit to ORG . This decision was upheld by ORG on DATE .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE , the ORG designated PERSON and PERSON as the heirs ( “ the heirs ” ) of PERSON following his death .

On DATE ORG decided that plots nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL should be registered in the names of the heirs , plots nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL in the name of the ORG , and plots nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL in the name of the neighbour . On DATE ORG quashed this judgment and remitted the case to ORG .

In DATE the ORG , GPE and the heirs of CARDINAL other persons intervened in the proceedings . Relying on the NORP land registry records ( temessük kayıtları ) , they claimed ownership rights over the plots in question .

On DATE the second applicant , PERSON , also intervened in the proceedings before ORG as a testamentary heir .

On CARDINAL DATE the ORG decided that plots nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL should be registered in the names of the applicants ( as heirs of PERSON ) and plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL and CARDINAL in the names of GPE and the ORG respectively . The court also held that plots nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL should be registered in the names of the heirs of the neighbour . The court further allowed the request to intervene by the heirs of PERSON who stated that their ancestor had partially maintained the last - mentioned plots in his possession before the proceedings had begun . The total number of parties to the proceedings increased to DATE .

On DATE ORG quashed the judgment of CARDINAL DATE for non - compliance with the procedure for the announcement of the judgment . It further considered that the examination conducted by the first - instance court was insufficient and that the court should have considered the de facto possession of these plots of land .

On DATE , having conducted a land survey and with reference to an expert report , ORG set aside its decision concerning the registration of plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL and CARDINAL in the names of the applicants . Following its examination of the NORP land registry records ( temessük kayıtları ) , the court ruled that the aforementioned plots should be registered in the names of the heirs of PERSON , son of PERSON , and that plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL and CARDINAL should be registered in the names of GPE and the ORG respectively . The court also held that plots nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL should be registered in the names of the heirs of the neighbour .

It is to be noted that this judgment was not served on the first applicant , PERSON , but on his legal representative , who had died in DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) .

In a decision dated DATE ORG upheld the above judgment in part and quashed the remainder . It reasoned that the examination conducted by ORG had been insufficient because it had given judgment despite contradictory expert reports and witness statements . It further reasoned that the court had also failed to verify whether some of the documentary evidence was genuine . ORG held in particular that ORG had erred in its finding concerning the registration of plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL and CARDINAL . However , it upheld the judgment of DATE with regard to plots nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL . It further dismissed a rectification request by the parties on DATE . Thus , while the judgment became final in respect of the aforementioned plots , the dispute continued as regards plots nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL .

On DATE the ORG , relying on the NORP land registry records , decided that PERCENT of plots nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL should be registered in the names of the heirs of PERSON and PERCENT in the name of ORG , who had purchased part of the plots from ORG . The court further noted that the heirs of PERSON ( the applicants ' ancestor ) had failed to prove their possession of the plots for DATE .

It is to be noted that the first applicant , PERSON , was not a party to the above proceedings , although the remaining CARDINAL applicants , as heirs of PERSON , were noted as litigants in the court 's above - mentioned judgment .

On DATE ORG dismissed an appeal lodged by the heirs of the neighbour , GPE and the ORG against the above decision . It also rejected a rectification request by the appellants on DATE . The judgment of CARDINAL DATE thus became final .

On DATE the applicants brought an action in ORG asking for the proceedings to be reopened ( iade - i muhakeme ) on the basis of newly discovered documentary evidence . They claimed that plots nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL should be registered in their names .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicants ' request to reopen the proceedings . ORG upheld this judgment on DATE .

On DATE the first applicant applied to ORG claiming that the judgment of DATE had been served on his legal representative who had died in DATE and that he had not been able to learn of it in time to appeal within the statutory time - limit . He therefore asked the court to serve the said judgment on him and to grant him leave to appeal .

On DATE the court dismissed the first applicant 's requests on the grounds that the judgment in question had been communicated to the parties and had already been enforced . The first applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG quashed ORG judgment of DATE on the ground that the case file did not contain any information or document indicating that the judgment in question had been duly served on the first applicant . It therefore granted the first applicant leave to appeal but , after re - examining the case , dismissed his appeal .

On DATE ORG dismissed the first applicant 's request for rectification of its decision of CARDINAL DATE .

According to the information given by the ORG , on DATE the applicants brought a new action in ORG asking for the proceedings to be reopened . The applicants ' action was communicated to the parties ( CARDINAL persons ) and the proceedings are still pending .

Meanwhile , on an unspecified date , the applicants filed another action with ORG claiming compensation from ORG ( tapu sicil müdürlüğü ) . The applicants alleged that they had sustained damage on account of the negligence and mistakes made by the defendant in keeping the land registry records . These proceedings were suspended pending the outcome of the proceedings before ORG .

It is to be noted that the applicants did not provide any information or raise any complaints about the proceedings pending before ORG and ORG .