Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Pavlina Panova;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

In DATE ORG adopted LAW ( “ the ORG ” , see for more detail paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) which provided for the restitution of collectivised agricultural land .

On DATE the applicant requested from the GPE agricultural land commission ( “ the land commission ” or “ the commission ” ) restitution of CARDINAL plots of agricultural land which he had previously owned in the area around the village of PERSON , totalling QUANTITY ( request no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) .

By a decision of DATE ( no . CARDINAL ) the commission recognised and restored “ in actual boundaries ” the property rights of the applicant in respect of CARDINAL of the plots , in particular those under nos . CARDINAL - CARDINAL , DATE and DATE in his request of CARDINAL DATE , which totalled QUANTITY . The applicant was informed of the decision by a letter of DATE . The decision was subject to appeal within DATE of receipt . As no appeal was lodged against it the decision entered into force .

Despite the aforesaid decision , the land commission issued a second decision dealing with the same subject matter , which the applicant received by a letter of DATE . The decision ’s number was identical with that of the first decision issued by the land commission ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

By this decision , however , the commission recognised and restored the property rights of the applicant in respect of CARDINAL of the plots he had requested , namely those under nos . CARDINAL - CARDINAL in his request of CARDINAL DATE . The commission refused to recognise the property rights of the applicant in respect of plots nos . CARDINAL and DATE , with respective areas of QUANTITY . The grounds for the refusal were the following :

“ [ These properties were ] claimed [ by means of ] a certified declaration despite the existence of a [ conflicting ] property deed of DATE . ”

NORP The applicant appealed against this decision .

By amendment of DATE to LAW ( section QUANTITY and CARDINAL ) agricultural land commissions were provided with the power to amend , in certain circumstances , their decisions which had entered into force ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG declared null and void the land commission ’s second decision communicated to the applicant by letter of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The domestic court found , inter alia , that :

“ the [ land commission ] violated the law by adopting decision no . MONEY in its version [ communicated by ] letter no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL , [ as it ] did not have the power to do so . The possibility for the [ commission ] to amend [ its ] decisions which have entered into force ... [ was introduced ] with the [ latest ] amendment to the [ ORG ] . ... [ The ] first administrative act [ communicated by letter of DATE had ] entered into force and had [ already ] determined the ownership of the properties of ... the applicant , which were [ recognised and ] restored in their entirety . ”

No appeal was lodged against the decision , so it entered into force on DATE .

Despite the aforesaid decision of ORG , the land commission adopted another decision dealing with the same subject matter .

By a decision of DATE ( no . CARDINAL ) it readopted the text of its second decision , which had been declared null and void . It expanded its reasoning for refusing to recognise the applicant ’s property rights in respect of plots nos . CARDINAL and DATE as follows :

“ In connection with the possibility under section QUANTITY and CARDINAL of the [ ORG ] and the decision of ORG [ of CARDINAL DATE ] , the [ commission ] confirms its refusal : [ These properties were ] claimed [ by means of ] a certified declaration despite the existence of a [ conflicting ] property deed of DATE . ”

On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against this decision .

In a final judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG declared it null and void . The domestic court found that the commission had failed to justify the grounds for amending its previous decision regarding the same properties , as there had existed no new facts or documents

On DATE the applicant deposited a copy of the aforementioned judgment with the land commission and insisted that it comply with its first decision of DATE , which was still in force .

NORP Before the appeal against the commission ’s third decision was heard , the latter issued another decision dealing with the same subject matter .

By a decision of DATE ( no . CARDINAL ) it apparently reiterated its refusal to recognise the applicant ’s property rights in respect of plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL and CARDINAL . The applicant appealed against this decision .

On an unspecified date in DATE , ORG heard the applicant ’s appeal and declared null and void the decision of DATE . No appeal was lodged against this judgment so it entered into force on an unspecified date .

On DATE the applicant deposited a copy of the aforementioned judgment with the land commission . He demanded compliance with it and recognition of his property rights in accordance with the first decision of DATE .

Before the appeal against the fourth decision of the land commission was heard , the latter issued another decision dealing with the same subject matter .

By a decision of DATE ( no . CARDINALACARDINAL/CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) it readopted the text of its third decision of DATE , which had been declared null and void by ORG on DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) . It expanded its reasoning for refusing to recognise the applicant ’s property rights in respect of plots nos . DATE and DATE by stating , in addition to the previously used reasoning , the following :

“ [ This decision ] rescinds decision no . CARDINAL ... in compliance with order no . RD-CARDINAL - CARDINAL of CARDINAL of the Minister of [ Agriculture ] for a complete revision of the land redistribution plan for the PERSON area .

In compliance with [ the decision of CARDINAL DATE ] of ORG . ”

The applicant appealed against this decision on DATE .

Instead of forwarding the appeal to ORG the land commission issued another decision dealing with the same subject matter .

By decision of CARDINAL DATE ( no . CARDINALBCARDINAL/CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) it readopted the text of its above - mentioned fifth decision ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . It only expanded its reasoning for refusing to recognise the applicant ’s property rights in respect of plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL and CARDINAL by stating , in addition to the previously used reasoning , the following :

“ [ This decision ] rescinds [ the ] decision [ of DATE ] of the [ land commission ] in connection with appeal no . CARDINAL lodged on the basis of § CARDINAL of the [ ORG ] . The [ commission ] confirms the basis for its refusal . No new facts or documents have been presented . ”

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE the applicant complained to the land commission about the numerous decisions it was issuing in respect of the same properties , of its continual disregard for the judgments in his favour and the constant need for him to appeal against each of the decisions .

By a judgment of DATE ORG declared null and void the fifth and sixth decisions of the land commission , dated DATE and DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) . The court found that by adopting these CARDINAL decisions the commission was , in substance , amending its first decision of DATE which had entered into force and which it did not have the power to amend .

No appeal was lodged against the judgment , so it entered into force on DATE .

Despite the aforementioned judgments of ORG the land commission issued a seventh decision dealing partly with the same subject matter .

By a decision of DATE ( no . CARDINAL ) it recognised and restored the applicant ’s property rights in respect of plots nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL in his request of CARDINAL DATE . It also recognised his property rights in respect of plots nos . CARDINAL and DATE , but refused to restore them because of the following :

“ The judgment [ of DATE of ORG ] , which recognised the [ applicant ’s ] property rights , entered into force after the land redistribution plan had been published in ORG .

[ This decision ] rescinds decision no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL .

[ Subject to ] compensation under section CARDINALb § CARDINAL of the [ ORG ] . ”

It is unclear whether the applicant appealed against this decision .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( the former land commission ) allotted to the applicant another plot in compensation for plot no . CARDINAL and also awarded him compensation bonds . He appears to be satisfied with the compensation received .

At the time of the parties’ latest communications of DATE he had not received any compensation for plot no . CARDINAL .

On DATE ( request no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) the applicant requested from the land commission the restitution of CARDINAL plots of agricultural land which had previously been owned by his father in the area around the village of PERSON , totalling QUANTITY . The parties have not specified who the heirs of the applicant ’s father were ; it transpires from the documents that the applicant has CARDINAL siblings .

NORP By decision of DATE ( no . CARDINAL ) the commission recognised and restored the property rights of the heirs of the applicant ’s father in respect of CARDINAL of the plots , in particular , those under CARDINAL . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , DATE and DATE , in his request of CARDINAL DATE , which totalled QUANTITY . The commission refused to recognise the property rights of the heirs of the applicant ’s father in respect of plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL and DATE , which totalled QUANTITY . The grounds for the refusal were :

“ [ Refusal to ] recognise the property deeds [ presented by ] DATE [ the documents ] are without notary certification for the transfer of the land . ”

On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against this decision .

In a final judgment of DATE the ORG quashed the land commission ’s decision in so far as it concerned plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL and DATE . It recognised the property rights of the heirs of the applicant ’s father over those CARDINAL plots and held that those properties were to be restored through a land redistribution plan . ORG found , in particular , that the applicant ’s father had acquired the said properties by adverse possession , so it was immaterial whether the property deeds had been certified by a notary or not .

Before ORG had heard the applicant ’s appeal against the first decision of the land commission , the latter adopted a second decision dealing with the same subject matter .

By decision of CARDINAL DATE ( no . CARDINAL\CARDINAL/CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) it rescinded its first decision , but then recognised and restored the property rights of the heirs of the applicant ’s father only in respect of plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL and CARDINAL in his request of CARDINAL DATE , which totalled QUANTITY . It refused to recognise the property rights of the heirs of the applicant ’s father in respect of plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL . The grounds for the refusal were the following :

“ [ This decision ] rescinds decision no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL due to the discovery of a technical error . Properties nos . [ CARDINAL and CARDINAL ] – [ Refusal to ] recognise the property deeds [ presented by ] the inheritor – [ the documents ] are without a notary certification for the transfer of the land . Properties nos . [ CARDINAL and CARDINAL ] – [ These properties were ] claimed [ by means of ] a certified declaration despite the existence of [ conflicting ] property deeds . ”

The applicant was informed of the decision by letter of DATE . He apparently appealed against it on an unspecified date . It is unclear whether the appeal was examined by the courts .

By a decision of DATE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL/CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) the land commission rescinded its second decision ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) and recognised and restored the property rights of the heirs of the applicant ’s father in respect of plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL and CARDINAL in his request of CARDINAL DATE . The commission recognised their property rights in respect of plots nos . CARDINAL and DATE , totalling QUANTITY , refused to restore those properties “ in actual boundaries ” and held that they were to be restored through a land redistribution plan . Furthermore , it refused again to recognise the property rights of the heirs of the applicant ’s father in respect of plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL and CARDINAL .

The grounds for the commission ’s decision were the following :

“ CARDINAL . Recognises in compliance with the judgment [ of DATE of ORG ] .

NORP [ This decision ] rescinds decision [ of the PALC ] no . CARDINAL\CARDINAL of CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL . ”

The applicant appealed against this decision on an unspecified date . It is unclear whether the appeal was examined by the courts .

Apparently , at a later stage the applicant obtained a satisfactory outcome in respect of plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL and DATE and does not raise complaints in respect of them .

Plots nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL were partially restored to him in DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) .

On an unspecified date in DATE the applicant initiated an action for a declaratory judgment against the land commission , pursuant to LAW ORG . He petitioned the courts to recognise that , as an heir of his parents , he had the right to have his property rights restored in respect of another CARDINAL properties .

By a declaratory judgment of DATE ORG found partly in favour of the applicant and recognised that the heirs of his parents had the right to have their property rights restored in respect of CARDINAL of the claimed properties , namely , CARDINAL plots of land of CARDINAL , QUANTITY respectively .

No appeal was lodged against this judgment so it entered into force on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the applicant deposited a copy of the aforementioned judgment with the land commission and demanded compliance with it .

NORP In response to the aforementioned judgment , the land commission issued another decision .

By a decision of DATE ( no . CARDINAL ) it rescinded its decision of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , readopted the text of said decision and , despite the favourable judgment ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , refused to recognise and restore the property rights of the heirs of the applicant ’s parents in respect of the CARDINAL new plots of agricultural land of QUANTITY , now numbered CARDINAL and CARDINAL respectively . The grounds for the refusal were the following :

“ [ This decision ] rescinds decision [ of the commission ] no . CARDINAL of DATE on the basis of judgment [ of DATE of ORG ] under section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the [ ORG ] in respect of the properties under nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL in the request . The property was restored to [ those claimants with ] documents dated most [ recently ] DATE declarations for entry into the [ collective farm ] of [ the village of ] PERSON in DATE [ presented ] by the successors ”

On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against this decision .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE the ORG quashed the land commission ’s fourth decision of DATE in respect of the refusal to recognise and restore the property rights of the heirs of the applicant ’s parents in respect of plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL and DATE . It found that the property rights of the heirs of the applicant ’s parents in respect of these CARDINAL properties had already been recognised by virtue of the judgment of DATE of ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) and that the properties at issue were to be restored through a land redistribution plan .

No appeal was lodged against this judgment , so it entered into force on DATE .

On DATE the applicant deposited a copy of the aforementioned judgment with the land commission . Apparently taking into account that the revised land redistribution plan of PERSON had already been published ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , the applicant requested compensation for these CARDINAL properties ( nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL) in the form of comparable ORG or municipal land .

It is not clear whether the applicant obtained restitution of the plot of QUANTITY , also mentioned in the judgment of ORG of DATE . He does not raise complaints in respect of this property .

On an unspecified date in DATE the applicant initiated another action for a declaratory judgment under LAW of the ORG . He petitioned to the courts to recognise that , as an heir of his father , he had the right to have the property rights restored in respect of one more property , a plot of QUANTITY .

In a declaratory judgment of DATE the ORG recognised that the heirs of the applicant ’s father had the right to have their property rights restored .

No appeal was lodged against the judgment so it entered into force on DATE .

On DATE the applicant deposited a copy of the aforementioned judgment with the land commission .

In an attempt to comply with the judgments of ORG of DATE and DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) , the land commission adopted another decision dealing with the CARDINAL properties in question ( those under nos . CARDINAL and DATE , plus the plot of QUANTITY in the judgment of DATE , thereinafter referred to under no . CARDINAL ) .

By a decision of DATE ( no . CARDINALBCARDINAL ) the commission recognised the property rights of the heirs of the applicant ’s parents in respect of the aforementioned properties , but refused to restore them “ in actual boundaries ” .

DATE . The commission based its refusal to restore plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL and CARDINAL on the judgment of DATE of ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . It reasoned as follows :

“ The judgment [ of DATE of ORG ] which recognised the property rights [ in question ] entered into force after the land redistribution plan had been published in ORG . ”

In respect of its refusal to restore plot no . CARDINAL , the commission used similar reasoning . It indicated as follows :

“ The judgment [ of DATE of ORG ] under section CARDINAL § CARDINAL [ of the ORG ] which recognised the property rights [ in question ] entered into force after the land redistribution plan had been published in ORG . ”

The applicant was informed of the decision on DATE . It is unclear whether he appealed against it .

In respect of plots CARDINAL . CARDINAL and DATE , the heirs of the applicant ’s parents received municipally - owned land on DATE . The applicant appears to be satisfied with the location and the size of this land .

In respect of the plot numbered under no . CARDINAL , on DATE the land commission assigned to the heirs of the applicant ’s father compensation in the form of compensation bonds with a face value of CARDINAL NORP levs ( ORG ) . The applicant does not specify whether he appealed against this decision .

The first land redistribution plan for PERSON was published on an unspecified date . It is unclear what properties were allocated to the applicant under it . For undisclosed reasons , on DATE the Minister of Agriculture ordered the complete revision of the plan .

The revised land redistribution plan for PERSON was published in ORG on DATE .

On DATE the applicant appealed against the revised land redistribution plan . He complained of the size of the property that the heirs of his father had been allocated under the said plan for plots nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL in his request no . DATE of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . He submitted a proposal for the amendment of the plan , according to which the heirs of his father were to receive a plot measuring QUANTITY .

DATE . In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE the ORG found in favour of the applicant and amended the revised land redistribution plan in accordance with the aforementioned proposal . The applicant took possession of the new plot thus allotted to his father ’s heirs on DATE . At the time of the parties’ latest communications of DATE , he had not yet received any compensation for the remaining land to be restored , totalling QUANTITY .

The applicant did not appeal against the judgment of ORG , although he was entitled to .

On an unspecified date the applicant requested from the land commission the restitution of several plots of agricultural land previously owned by his mother in the area around the village of Hadzhievo .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ( no . DATE ) the commission refused to recognise the property rights of his mother ’s heirs in respect of CARDINAL plots of agricultural land .

On an appeal by the applicant , in a final judgment of CARDINAL DATE the ORG quashed the aforementioned decision of the land commission and , instead , restored the property rights of the heirs of the applicant ’s mother in respect of the CARDINAL plots , totalling QUANTITY .

On DATE the applicant deposited a copy of the aforementioned judgment with the land commission and demanded compliance with it .

On DATE the land commission adopted a decision ( no . CARDINALВCARDINAL/CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) whereby it allocated to the heirs of the applicant ’s mother other land in compensation for the aforementioned property . The applicant , who appears to be satisfied with the size and quality of this land , took possession of it on DATE .

LAW of DATE ( “ the ORG ” , ORG за собствеността и ползването на земеделските земи ) provides , inter alia , that persons , or their heirs , whose land has been collectivised , may request restoration of their ownership rights under certain conditions ( section CARDINAL of the ORG ) . On the basis of certain statutory criteria , such as whether or not the plot of land once owned by the claimant or his or her ancestors had remained unaffected by urban construction , restitution may be “ in actual boundaries ” or through a redistribution plan .

CARDINAL possible ways of obtaining restitution are provided for : ( a ) administrative proceedings , initiated within DATE following the entry into force of ORG , through a request to the local agricultural land commission ( section CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) whose decision is subject to appeal before the courts ( section CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) , or , ( b ) after the expiry of that time - limit , through a civil claim to the competent court , directed against the respective land commission ( section CARDINAL § QUANTITY of the ORG ) .

When seized with a request for restitution under LAW § CARDINAL of the ORG , it was the land commission ’s task to establish whether the relevant statutory conditions were met and if so , to issue a decision restoring ownership . It could not revoke its decisions . Favourable decisions were not subject to appeal and were final . Following an amendment to the ORG of DATE , land commissions could modify their decisions within certain time limits in case where ( CARDINAL ) they contained factual mistakes , or ( CARDINAL ) with certain limitations , new facts or documents had been discovered ( section QUANTITY and CARDINAL ) . Some courts have stated that the decisions of the land commissions have characteristics similar to those of certifications in ex parte notary proceedings ( opred . DATE ; opred . CARDINAL - CARDINAL-VAS ) . It has also been stated that land ORG decisions are administrative decisions ( DATE ) .

A claimant whose request for restitution has been refused by the competent land commission may appeal to the respective ORG ( section CARDINAL of the ORG ) . ORG has jurisdiction to examine the matter on the merits and determine whether or not the claimant has the right to restitution under the ORG . If it finds that the relevant statutory criteria for restitution are met , the court shall set aside the land commission ’s refusal and order restitution ( section QUANTITY of the ORG ) . ORG judgment is amenable to review ( cassation ) .

Land commissions , which existed until DATE , were state bodies whose members were appointed by the Minister of Agriculture ( section CARDINAL of the ORG ) . In DATE they were replaced by ORG , after DATE named ORG , whose members are appointed by ORG .

By section CARDINAL of the Regulations for the Implementation of the Agricultural Land Act , a restitution request concerning the property of a deceased person lodged by CARDINAL of the heirs benefits all of them .

Persons claiming restitution of agricultural land who have missed the DATE time - limit under LAW § CARDINAL , may bring an action for a declaratory judgment against the local land commission . In these proceedings the courts determine whether or not the claimant has the right to restitution . Where the courts decide in favour of the claimant , the land commission must comply and issue the necessary restitution decision , restoring the claimant ’s rights “ in actual boundaries ” or through a land redistribution plan .

In the absence of an express provision , the legal theory accepts that , similarly to the procedure under LAW ORG , an action brought by one of the heirs of a deceased person benefits all of them .

By section CARDINALb of the ORG , former owners whose property can not be restored “ in actual boundaries ” are to receive land by means of a land redistribution plan , on the basis of which the respective land commission adopts a decision to restore the property ( section CARDINAL of the ORG ) .

Where the land in a certain area is not sufficient to satisfy fully all former owners , the land to be provided to each of them is reduced . For the difference , they are to be compensated with municipal land or with compensation bonds , which can be used in privatisation tenders or for the purchase of ORG - owned land ( sections CARDINAL § § CARDINAL and DATE of the ORG ) .

In preparing a land redistribution plan , the land commission takes into consideration former ORG claims which have been presented to it prior to the publication in ORG of a notification that a draft plan has been prepared . It can not take into account claims presented to it later ; in that case , former owners are to receive compensation through municipal land or bonds ( section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the ORG ) .

Appeals against land redistribution plans were , at the relevant time , to be addressed to the respective ORG . They had to be accompanied by a proposal for a specific amendment to the plan ( section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Regulations for the Implementation of the Agricultural Land Act ) . The judgments of the regional courts were subject to cassation .

Pursuant to section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the ORG , the Minister of Agriculture is authorised to order the revision of a land redistribution plan where it has been established that the original one contained an obvious factual error .

Section CARDINAL of ORG of DATE ( “ the ORG ” ) provides that the ORG is liable for damage suffered by private persons as a result of unlawful acts or omissions by ORG bodies or civil servants , committed in the course of or in connection with the performance of their duties . LAW provides that compensation is due for all damage which is the direct and proximate result of the unlawful act or omission .

In some cases the domestic courts have allowed claims under section CARDINAL of the ORG on the basis of the LOC unlawful acts or omissions in restitution proceedings . In a judgment of DATE ORG awarded damages to the claimant , finding that the respective land commission had unnecessary delayed taking a decision on his request for restitution and had eventually unlawfully refused restitution ( judgment no . CARDINAL of DATE , case no . DATE ) . In another judgment of DATE , ORG allowed a claim against the respective land commission , finding that the claimant had suffered damages as a result of the commission ’s refusal to recognise and restore his rights to a certain property , and of its renewed failure to recognise and restore his rights after the initial refusal had been declared null and void by the courts ( judgment no . CARDINAL of DATE , case no . CARDINAL ) .

However , in a judgment of CARDINAL DATE the ORG dismissed a claim for damages against the respective land commission . It found that the rescission of a decision of the commission , which had entered into force and whereby the commission had recognised the claimant ’s rights over certain properties , was null and void . Nevertheless , it concluded that the claimant had not suffered damages as the initial decision had not sufficed to make her the owner of the property at issue ( judgment CARDINAL of DATE , case no . CARDINAL ) .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG allowed a claim against the relevant municipality , finding that the claimants had suffered damage as a result of the municipality ’s failure to duly correct their property ’s borders in the cadastral maps ( judgment no . CARDINAL of DATE , case no . CARDINAL ) .


Violation of Art. 8;Not necessary to examine P1-1;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award

Ján Šikuta;Josep Casadevall;Kristaq Traja;Matti Pellonpää;Nicolas Bratza;Stanislav Pavlovschi

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant and her husband entered into a contract for the purchase of a family house and a plot of land from Mr and PERSON

Mr NORP , who was registered as permanently resident ( trvalý pobyt ) at the house ’s address , undertook in the contract to secure his deregistration by CARDINAL DATE .

The applicant and her husband then became the owners of the property and moved into the house . However , Mr NORP failed to deregister himself from the relevant register , which was kept by the municipal office ( Obecný úrad ) of Nové PERSON .

In a letter of DATE in reply to the applicant ’s enquiry , the ORG GPE district prosecutor ( ORG prokurátor ) informed her that registration of permanent places of residence was governed by the Registration of ORG Place of Residence Act ( Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , see “ Relevant domestic law and practice ” below ) in conjunction with ORG of the Registration of Citizens’ Place of Residence Act ( Regulation no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . Individuals were obliged to report the taking - up of a new permanent place of residence to the municipal office of the municipality in which that residence was located within DATE . Registration of a new permanent place of residence entailed an automatic cancellation of the registration at the previous one . A registration of a permanent place of residence could only be cancelled without registering a new one if the person concerned had lawfully emigrated from GPE or if it was discovered that the registration had been based on invalid or forged documents . As Mr D. had not applied for registration of a new permanent place of residence , the ORG Zámky municipal office had no legal authority under the existing legislation to cancel his previous registration at the applicant ’s home address .

On DATE the applicant and Mr D. made a joint written declaration to the effect that Mr NORP was not resident at the house in question , that he had no right of use in respect of it and that he was not contributing to the costs of its use . Mr NORP further declared that he had applied to be deregistered as permanently resident at the house , that his application had been dismissed and that he was homeless and staying in different locations .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE , in reply to her enquiry , the head office of ORG informed the applicant that section CARDINAL ) of a new Registration of Citizens’ Place of Residence Act ( Law no . DATE see “ Relevant domestic law and practice ” below ) , which was to come into force on DATE , could offer a solution to her problem . This legal provision enabled a person to be registered as a permanent resident in a municipality where he or she was born or was habitually resident ( kde sa zdržuje ) , without actually having any specific address there . The letter further stated that the registration of a permanent place of residence at a certain address did not confer a legal right to live there and was merely evidentiary in nature .

On an unspecified date the applicant applied for a social contribution towards her dwelling costs ( príspevok na bývanie ) . The number of persons registered as permanently resident at a dwelling was a relevant factor in considering eligibility for such contributions and in calculating the amount to be paid . On DATE the ORG municipal office issued a certificate to the effect that CARDINAL persons were registered as permanently resident at the applicant ’s address , namely the applicant , her husband and Mr NORP The municipal office issued a similar certificate on DATE . Once the applicant had explained the situation to the municipal office employees , the problem was resolved .

NORP In a letter of DATE , in response to the applicant ’s enquiry , the ORG municipal office informed her that , in the circumstances , it would not be possible to cancel Mr D. ’s registration as permanently resident at her house , even when the DATE Registration of Citizens’ Place of LAW came into force .

By a payment order of DATE , the ORG municipality charged the applicant ’s husband a fee for the removal of household waste from their house . The amount of such fees depended on the number of persons registered as permanently or temporarily resident at a given dwelling . In the applicant ’s case the fee was calculated on the basis of CARDINAL persons being registered at her address . Once the applicant had explained the situation to the municipality employees , the problem was resolved .

The applicant submitted that official mail and other documents , including , in DATE , a letter from the ORG municipal office , were being sent to Mr D. at her address , and that the police had come to her house searching for Mr NORP on suspicion of having failed to make child maintenance payments .

The applicant further submitted that her marriage had been dissolved and that , in order to settle their property affairs , she and her former husband had put the house on the market . A prospective buyer withdrew his offer on learning that a third person was registered as permanently resident at the house and that there was no way of having that registration cancelled . The applicant continues to live in the house with her former husband .

Article CARDINAL provides :

“ CARDINAL . Everyone has the right to the preservation of his human dignity and personal honour , and the protection of his good name .

Everyone has the right to protection against unwarranted interference in his private and family life ... ”

Article CARDINAL , as in force since DATE , provides :

“ CARDINAL . The Constitutional Court shall decide complaints by natural or juristic persons alleging a violation of their fundamental rights or freedoms or of human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in international treaties ratified by GPE ... unless the protection of such rights and freedoms falls within the jurisdiction of a different court .

NORP If ORG finds a complaint justified , it shall deliver a decision stating that a person ’s rights or freedoms as set out in paragraph CARDINAL have been violated by a final decision , specific measure or other act and shall quash such decision , measure or act . If the violation that has been found is the result of a failure to act , ORG may order [ the authority ] which has violated the rights or freedoms to take the necessary action . At the same time it may remit the case to the authority concerned for further proceedings , order such authority to refrain from violating the fundamental rights and freedoms ... or , where appropriate , order those who have violated the rights or freedoms set out in paragraph CARDINAL to restore the situation to that existing prior to the violation .

NORP In its decision on a complaint ORG may grant appropriate financial compensation to the person whose rights under paragraph CARDINAL have been violated .

The liability for damage or other loss of a person who has violated another person ’s rights or freedoms within the meaning of paragraph CARDINAL shall not be affected by ORG decision . ”

Article CARDINAL ( c ) provides :

“ CARDINAL . International treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms ratified by GPE and promulgated in accordance with the statutory requirements existing prior to the entry into force of this constitutional law shall be part of the national legal order and take precedence over national laws provided that such international treaties guarantee more extensive constitutional rights and freedoms .

Other international treaties ratified by GPE and promulgated under statutory requirements existing prior to the entry into force of this constitutional law shall be part of the national legal order if so provided by statute . ”

In decision no . I. ÚS CARDINAL of DATE , ORG expressed the view that ordinary courts were obliged in civil proceedings to interpret and apply the relevant laws in accordance with the LAW and with international treaties . The ordinary courts therefore had primary responsibility for upholding the rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the LAW or international treaties .

NORP In case no . II . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL , a private individual sought to bring a complaint under LAW , challenging a generally binding municipal regulation as unconstitutional .

On DATE ORG declared the complaint inadmissible . In its decision it summarised the existing caselaw concerning the standing of private persons to bring proceedings for review of the constitutionality of legislation . ORG held that any of the various forms of constitutional proceedings before it could only be commenced in a distinct set of proceedings and only on the motion of persons or bodies which had standing to initiate them . No other type of constitutional proceedings could be carried out within separate proceedings of another type . An examination of an individual human rights complaint could not entail a review of the constitutionality of legislation . This approach was in line with ORG previous decision in case no . II . ÚS CARDINAL , and was followed in the later decision in case no . II . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL .

The protection of personal integrity is governed by the provisions of Articles CARDINAL et seq . In so far as relevant , these provide :

“ LAW

Every natural person shall have the right to protection of his or her personal integrity , in particular his or her ... civil honour and human dignity , as well as privacy , name ...

LAW

Every natural person shall have the right , inter alia , to request an order restraining any unjustified interference with his or her personal integrity , an order cancelling out the effects of such interference and an award of appropriate compensation .

NORP If the satisfaction afforded under paragraph CARDINAL of this LAW is insufficient , in particular because the injured party ’s dignity or social standing has been considerably diminished , the injured party shall also be entitled to financial compensation for non - pecuniary damage .

When determining the amount of compensation payable under paragraph CARDINAL of this LAW , the court shall take into account the seriousness of the harm suffered by the injured party and the circumstances in which the violation of his or her rights occurred . ”

The Act was enacted on CARDINAL DATE , came into force on DATE ( section CARDINAL ) and is still in force in GPE .

The purpose of the LAW is to regulate and secure the proper and timely reporting and registration of the place of residence of NORP citizens on the territory of ORG ( section CARDINAL ) .

Citizens are obliged to report the location and the start and end dates of their place of residence to the registration office ( ohlasovňa ) of the local national council ( miestny národný výbor ) ( section CARDINAL ) ) .

Under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) an individual can permanently reside for the purposes of that LAW only in LOC which have a registration number , issued in accordance with special regulations .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) provide that all citizens are to register their permanent place of residence . For that purpose they are to submit to the registration office their identity card and a certificate to the effect that they are authorised to use the flat or other residential LOC in question .

Pursuant to section CARDINAL ) on reporting the location and start date of their permanent place of residence , citizens are obliged to report also DATE of their previous permanent place of residence .

In accordance with section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(b ) , a registration office is to cancel the registration of a citizen ’s permanent place of residence where it has been shown that the registration was made erroneously on the basis of an invalid document .

The Act was enacted on DATE and was intended to come into force on DATE . Its entry into force was subsequently postponed CARDINAL times and is presently envisaged for DATE ( section CARDINAL ) .

The Act regulates the rights and duties of the citizens of GPE in respect of reporting their place of residence , and the rights and duties of the competent authorities in the area of registration of ORG place of residence ( section CARDINAL ) .

All citizens are obliged to report the location and start and end dates of their place of residence to the registration office of the municipality in which it is located ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ) .

A permanent place of residence may only be established in a building or a part of a building which has a registration number , issued in accordance with special regulations , and which is intended for residential use . The registration of a permanent place of residence confers no right in respect of the building or in relation to its owner and is merely of an evidentiary nature ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) ) .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(c ) and ( d ) provide that , for registration purposes , citizens are to submit to the registration office a document attesting to their ownership of the LOC or , as the case may be , the owner ’s written consent to the registration .

Pursuant to section CARDINAL , citizens who are not in a position to show that they are authorised to stay in a flat or other residential LOC are to report their stay to the registration office in the place where they are resident ( kde sa zdržiava ) . In such cases , the municipality in question is considered to be the permanent place of residence . The address of the municipal office is to be used as the address for official purposes , such as the service of official mail .

A registration office is to cancel the registration of ORG permanent place of residence , inter alia , when they move and register as residing elsewhere ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) in conjunction with section CARDINAL(d ) ) .

A registration office is also to cancel the registration at the request of the owner of the LOC if the citizen in question has no right of use in respect of them ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(f ) ) . In such cases the citizen whose registration has been cancelled is to be registered as residing in the municipality where the registration was cancelled ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ) .


The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She was represented before the ORG by Mr I. Gažík , a lawyer practising in GPE . The respondent Government were represented by their Agent , Mr. PERSON , succeeded by PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant gave birth to a boy . A blood test showed that the applicant ’s husband had not fathered the child . The child ’s father is unknown .

As the applicant had health problems at the time of delivery , the child was placed in a social institution , with the applicant ’s consent , on DATE . The applicant visited her son regularly and bought necessary items and presents for him .

On DATE the applicant claimed that she should be allowed to take care of the child .

On DATE the Bratislava III ORG dismissed the action . The decision stated that the applicant ’s situation did not allow her to take appropriate care of her son , and that she suffered from a lasting mental disease . It was served on the applicant on DATE . The applicant did not appeal .

DATE and DATE the applicant was treated as an in - patient in a psychiatric hospital .

The Government contend , with reference to a list of the visits , that the applicant ’s last visit of her son took place on DATE .

The applicant submits that DATE and DATE she attempted to visit her son but was told that he was in the theatre . After her in - patient treatment had ended in DATE , the applicant submits , without giving further details , to have again unsuccessfully attempted to visit the child .

On DATE the Bratislava III ORG delivered a judgment depriving the applicant of her legal capacity on the ground that she suffered from a mental illness . On CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld the first instance judgment and the decision became final on DATE .

The documents submitted by the Government indicate that ORG , on DATE , allowed the applicant ’s son to be adopted by a couple . The judgment became final on DATE . It stated , inter alia , that the applicant ’s last visit of her son took place on DATE . As she had failed to manifest any interest in the child thereafter , the boy had become free for adoption as from DATE . On DATE he had been placed in the pre - adoption care of the couple concerned . A guardian appointed to represent the interests of the child in the proceedings agreed to the adoption . It is apparent from the judgment that the applicant was not considered to be a party to the proceedings .

On DATE the Bratislava III ORG restored legal capacity to the applicant . Reference was made to an expert opinion submitted on CARDINAL DATE . In the opinion the expert summed up the applicant ’s situation , as described by the applicant during the examination . According to the opinion , the applicant stated that her child born in DATE had been placed in an institution . She could not visit him as she had been treated in a hospital . The boy had been adopted by other persons and the applicant had no information about him . She could only hope that the child was doing well . The applicant also stated that she had not been aware that it would have sufficed , as demonstrating her interest in the child , to send him a postcard .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer requested , on the applicant ’s behalf , that the applicant should be allowed to meet her son .

In a letter dated DATE and delivered on DATE the social institution where the child had been placed prior to his adoption replied that the boy had not been in its care as from DATE and that he had been adopted by a family . The adoption had been approved by a court and it was irrevocable . Reference was made to Section CARDINAL ) and , in substance , to Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW .

The letter further stated that the applicant had visited the boy for the last time on DATE and that his father was unknown . The boy had been adopted under Section CARDINAL ) of LAW without the applicant ’s consent as she had failed to show interest in him for DATE .

The following relevant provisions of LAW ( PERSON o rodine ) were in force at the relevant time .

Under Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) , following a person ’s adoption the same relations as those existing between parents and children come into being between the adopted person and the persons who adopted him or her .

Paragraph CARDINAL of LAW provides that a court decides on a person ’s adoption upon the proposal of those who wish to adopt that person .

Section CARDINAL ) , as in force until DATE , provided that , in cases where the legal representatives of a child to be adopted were his or her parents , their consent to the child ’s adoption was not required when they had failed to demonstrate , for DATE , real interest in the child which they normally should show as parents . With effect from DATE this provision was extended in that it enumerated the following reasons as examples of the GPE failure to show real interest in the child : failure to visit the child regularly , failure to comply regularly and voluntarily with the obligation to provide for the child ’s maintenance , failure to show willingness to adjust , as far as possible , their family and social situation in a manner permitting them to take personal care of the child unless they were prevented from doing so for a serious reason .

Pursuant to paragraph CARDINAL of Section CARDINAL , in such cases it is required that a guardian appointed to represent the interests of the child in the context of the adoption proceedings should give his or her consent to the child ’s adoption .

Under LAW ) , prior to a judicial decision on his or her adoption , the child concerned has to be in care of the person wishing to adopt him or her for DATE .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) provides that , following a person ’s adoption , mutual rights and obligations existing between that person and his or her original family cease to exist . The rights and obligations of a guardian appointed , as the case may be , to exercise such parental rights also cease to exist following the adoption of the person concerned .

Article CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) provides that parties to proceedings concerning the adoption of a minor are the child to be adopted , his or her parents , the person adopting the child and his or her spouse .

Under paragraph CARDINAL of Article CARDINAL , the parents of the child to be adopted are not parties to proceedings when they are deprived of parental rights or of their legal capacity as well as in cases where their agreement is not required for adoption of their child notwithstanding that they are his or her legal representatives .


The applicant , Mr ORG , is a NORP citizen of NORP origin , who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON . GPE . He is represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practicing in GPE , GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the applicant , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant owned a house where he lived with his family and adjacent stable and wooden house in the village GPE , GPE . On DATE the applicant , due to a military action by ORG , left GPE and went to live in GPE .

The applicant alleges that after his departure his property in GPE was devastated sometime between CARDINAL DATE and DATE by the members of ORG .

The applicant alleges further that the NORP authorities impeded his return to GPE . He was able to obtain NORP identity documents only in DATE and to enter GPE only in DATE .

In the meantime ORG introduced CARDINAL changes to the law governing compensation for damage caused by terrorist acts and the war - related damage .

Firstly , on DATE the NORP parliament introduced a change of LAW which provided that all proceedings concerning actions for damages resulting from terrorist acts were to be stayed pending the enactment of new legislation on the subject and that before the enactment of such new legislation damages for terrorist acts may not be sought . So far the NORP authorities have not enacted any new legislation regulating the matter .

Secondly , on DATE ORG introduced a change of LAW which provided that all proceedings concerning actions for damages resulting from acts of members of the NORP army or police when acting in their official capacity during the war in GPE were to be stayed .

The relevant part of LAW ( Zakon o obveznim odnosima ) reads as follows :

“ Responsibility for damages caused by death , bodily injury or by abstraction or destruction of another person ’s property , when it results from violent acts or terror or from public demonstrations or manifestations , lies with the authority whose officials were , according to the laws in effect , under a duty to prevent such damages . ”

The relevant parts of the LAW on Changes of LAW read ( Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama PERSON o obveznim odnosima - Official Gazette no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) as follows :

“ Section CARDINAL of LAW ( the Official Gazette nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL and DATE ) is to be repealed . ”

“ Proceedings for damages instituted pursuant to LAW are to be stayed .

Proceedings referred to in LAW of this section will be continued after enactment of a special legislation that will regulate responsibility for damages resulting from the terrorist acts . ”

Section CARDINAL ( a ) of the Act on Changes of LAW ( Zakon o dopunama GPE o obveznim odnosima , ORG no . CARDINAL ) provides that all proceedings instituted against GPE for damages caused by members of the NORP army or police when acting in their official capacity during the Homeland War in GPE from DATE to DATE are to be stayed .


The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the Court by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

On DATE , ORG issued an arrest warrant in respect of the applicant , who had been employed with ORG in GPE , on the ground that he was strongly suspected of being member of a terrorist group called the PERSON and that he had participated in various terrorist attacks during the period DATE . PERSON , which dissolved itself in DATE , was responsible for CARDINAL terrorist attacks . Its regional branch in GPE , ORG , was responsible for CARDINAL terrorist attacks , inter alia for attempts to explode ORG for Asylum Seekers and the victory column in GPE as well as for attempted assassinations of the chief of ORG and a presiding judge of ORG .

On DATE , the applicant was put on detention on remand . On DATE , ORG filed the bill of indictment against the applicant and CARDINAL other indicted persons for membership of a terrorist organisation and the causing of an explosion in CARDINAL instances . The bill of indictment was based on various items of evidence , among them the testimony of a privileged prosecution witness ( GPE ) , the results of the preliminary investigations , the preliminary investigation against the above witness for the prosecution and subsequent measures under LAW as well as further seized evidence . The main proceedings regarding the above charges commenced on DATE , but were subsequently adjourned until CARDINAL DATE in order to join them to the proceedings against a further person .

On DATE , ORG dismissed the applicant ’s motion to quash or set aside the arrest warrant of CARDINAL DATE . It found that there existed a strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the crimes of which he was accused and that he was likely to abscond if released , given the sentence which he risked incurring if found guilty as charged . ORG noted that the applicant had stable social ties as he had been married since DATE , he was frequently in touch with his daughter who lived in GPE , and the dismissal from his job at ORG in GPE had not yet become final . However , ORG took the view that there was concern that the applicant could vanish abroad as he owned with his wife an estate in GPE where he could travel uncontrolled . His various skills could earn him a living there , and his extradition to GPE could not be taken for granted given the practice of the NORP authorities . Moreover , the current length of the detention on remand was not disproportionate to the expected prison sentence .

On DATE , ORG dismissed the applicant ’s motion against the decision of ORG of DATE . It found that neither the manner in which the proceedings had so far been conducted nor the adjournment until DATE had been in violation of the obligation to proceed speedily ( Beschleunigungsgrundsatz ) . The reasons given by ORG for the adjournment were plausible , and the delay of the proceedings was still proportionate to the length of the applicant ’s detention on remand .

On DATE , ORG ordered the continuation of the applicant ’s detention on remand because both the strong suspicion and the reasons for detention persisted .

On DATE , ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against the decision of ORG of DATE . It considered that there persisted strong suspicion which had not been dissipated by the evidence gathered during the main proceedings . The period of DATE and DATE which the applicant had so far spent in detention on remand had not eliminated the danger of the applicant ’s absconding , nor had it made that detention disproportionate . Despite the considerable period since the crimes the applicant was charged with had been committed , the applicant ’s probable sentence in view of their gravity and the fact that he had played a leading role in the terrorist organisation could justify the assumption that there was significant incentive to escape and that the continuation of the detention on remand was proportionate .

On DATE , ORG dismissed the applicant ’s motion to quash , or alternatively to set aside , the arrest warrant . ORG took the view that there persisted a strong suspicion that the applicant and CARDINAL other persons had committed the terrorist attacks , which was supported by evidence collected in the main proceedings . It further held that there was still the danger of him absconding and that it was proportionate to continue the detention on remand given the gravity of the charges and the likely prison sentence .

On DATE , ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against the decision of ORG of CARDINAL DATE . It referred to its earlier decision of DATE and found that the applicant ’s continued detention on remand was justified as the circumstances had not significantly changed since then . ORG noted that it was not objectionable that ORG had found that there persisted a strong suspicion of the applicant ’s responsibility for the crimes . ORG also held that the main proceedings had so far been conducted speedily which was appropriate in view of the applicant ’s detention on remand . The complexity of the proceedings against several accused persons combined with the difficulty in establishing events planned with conspirative means by a terrorist group in the period DATE had so far prevented the judgment from being delivered . The assessment of the reason for arrest and the proportionality of the detention on remand had not considerably changed since ORG decision of DATE . The likely sentence of the applicant still exceeded the period of his detention on remand ; hence there remained the danger of his absconding . Therefore , the continuation of the detention on remand was proportionate .

On DATE , ORG suspended the arrest warrant of CARDINAL DATE and ordered the applicant instead to participate in the main proceedings , to submit his passport and not to leave the territory of GPE without prior consent by the court . ORG found that , in view of a serious accident of the applicant ’s son - in - law who needed intensive care , the danger of the applicant absconding was reduced to such a degree that the less far - reaching measures which had been ordered instead would satisfy the purpose of the detention on remand . The applicant was released on DATE .

On DATE , ORG refused to admit the applicant ’s constitutional complaint against the decisions of ORG of DATE and the decision of ORG of DATE . The applicant ’s lawyer received the decision on DATE .

On DATE , ORG convicted the applicant of ringleadership of a terrorist organisation and of causing an explosion on CARDINAL occasions and sentenced him to DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment . In determining the sentence , ORG took into account the length of the detention on remand and the length of the criminal proceedings as mitigating facts . The judgment has since become final .

Section CARDINAL of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides , inter alia :

“ As long as the accused is in detention on remand , he may at any time apply for a court hearing to determine whether the arrest warrant is to be revoked or whether its execution is to be suspended in accordance with LAW . ”

LAW provides , inter alia :

“ No trial shall be held in respect of a person who is absent . ”


Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses (domestic proceedings) - claim dismissed;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE .

NORP In DATE the applicant married an NORP citizen . The marriage was concluded in GPE and the couple set up their common residence in GPE . On DATE , their daughter was born .

On DATE , after his wife had left GPE with their daughter without obtaining the applicant ’s consent and had set up her residence in GPE , he brought a petition for divorce in ORG ( GPE ) . He also introduced court proceedings in GPE requesting the return of his daughter under the DATE Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction .

On DATE the applicant ’s wife brought a petition for divorce in the ORG .

On DATE ORG confirmed a default decree of divorce issued in DATE , noting that PERSON had failed to comply with the requirements for setting aside the default . Further , it awarded the applicant sole custody over the couple ’s daughter and ordered that she should reside with him in case of her return .

On DATE the applicant filed a request for recognition of the divorce decree with ORG .

On DATE ORG refused to grant this request . Referring to LAW of the Fourth Implementing Regulation to LAW ( CARDINAL . PERSON ORG ) , it considered that a recognition of the divorce decree would be contrary to NORP ordre public as the applicant ’s wife , being the defendant in the proceedings before ORG , had not been heard as she was considered to be in default , despite the fact that the applicant ’s petition for divorce had not been duly served on her .

Thereupon , on DATE the applicant filed a complaint with ORG . The latter instituted preliminary proceedings on DATE .

On DATE ORG received the observations of ORG and , on DATE , it received the observations of PERSON as a third party .

On DATE ORG referred the case to ORG requesting it to review the constitutionality of LAW of the Fourth Implementing Regulation to LAW .

It argued that LAW which has constitutional rank in NORP law , applied to the proceedings concerning the recognition of foreign divorce decrees as their outcome had a direct effect on the civil law relationship of the persons concerned . However , it was incompatible with that LAW that ORG , an administrative authority , decided upon the request for recognition . The subsequent control by ORG was not sufficient where the subject matter , such as family law relations , fell within the very core of the notion of “ civil rights ” .

ORG received ORG request on DATE . ORG submitted CARDINAL further requests raising the same issue , which were received by ORG on DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE , respectively . The proceedings in these cases were joined to proceedings in the applicant ’s case .

On DATE ORG supplemented its request in the applicant ’s case .

On DATE it supplemented its requests in the CARDINAL other cases .

On DATE the ORG gave its judgment , finding that LAW of the Fourth Implementing Regulation to LAW was in conformity with the constitution .

ORG noted firstly that the proceedings at issue were concerned with the questions whether recognition was compatible with NORP ordre public . Thus , the recognition of foreign divorce decrees was closely linked to the question whether they could be enforced in GPE . Referring to a number of decisions , in which ORG had found that Article CARDINAL did not apply to enforcement proceedings , ORG expressed doubts as to the applicability of LAW .

Even assuming that LAW applied , referring to the ORG ’s PERSON v. GPE judgment ( of DATE , Series A no . CARDINAL-A ) , ORG held that ORG scope of review was sufficient , since proceedings concerning the recognition of foreign divorce decrees involved mainly questions of law . Where an assessment of facts was required , as for instance where the question arose whether an action had been duly served , ORG was empowered to review whether the administrative authority ’s assessment was correctly based on the contents of the file .

On DATE having resumed its proceedings , ORG dismissed the applicant ’s complaint . The decision was served on the applicant on DATE .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial

Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;Khanlar Hajiyev;Sverre Erik Jebens

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE , a town in LOC .

NORP In DATE the applicant brought a court action against a housing maintenance service . Throughout the proceedings she represented herself . She claimed compensation for damages sustained as a result of poor quality repairs carried out by the respondent in her flat and requested that the works be done again . She also claimed penalties for the delays in the reparation of her flat . In course of the proceedings the applicant amended her claims .

On DATE the NORP ORG of LOC ( “ the ORG ” ) dismissed her claim . On DATE ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) upheld that judgment .

On DATE the Presidium of ORG quashed the judgment of CARDINAL DATE and remitted the case for a fresh examination to the first - instance court .

In the meantime the administration of the Solnechnogorskiy District transferred the municipal housing into the authority of a municipal enterprise , ORG .

On DATE ORG granted the applicant ’s claim in part . On DATE ORG upheld that judgment .

On DATE the Presidium of ORG quashed the judgment of DATE and remitted the case for a new examination to ORG . It held in particular that the lower courts had failed to establish the proper defendant in the case . It also indicated that in order to decide on the penalties the first - instance court had to establish whether the parties had previously set any deadlines for the repairs .

On DATE ORG set the examination of the case for DATE . DATE CARDINAL hearings were scheduled , however they were adjourned mainly because the respondent and the third party failed to appear .

On DATE ORG established that the municipal enterprise ORG was the proper respondent in the case and ordered it to repair the applicant ’s flat . It awarded the applicant penalties for the delays in the repair of her flat and compensation for non - pecuniary damage . Furthermore , it held that the respondent had been in bad faith in opposing a correct and quick examination of the case and ordered it to pay the applicant compensation for the lost time .

On DATE ORG quashed the judgment of CARDINAL DATE and remitted the case to the first - instance court for a fresh examination . It found that ORG had not indicated in its decision which repairs had to be done in the applicant ’s flat , it had not followed the ORG ’s decision of CARDINAL DATE and it had not given reasons for its conclusions as regards the respondent ’s bad faith in delaying the proceedings .

On DATE ORG set the examination of the case for DATE . DATE TIME hearings were scheduled . CARDINAL of them did not take place because the respondent failed to appear , CARDINAL hearing was postponed because the applicant did not appear and QUANTITY hearings were adjourned either because the applicant asked for additional time to amend her claims or because the respondent asked for additional time to submit evidence . CARDINAL hearing was postponed in order to call an expert to trial .

On DATE ORG held that since the maintenance service no longer existed it was impossible for it to repair the applicant ’s flat . Therefore , it awarded the applicant the money necessary for such repairs and compensation for non - pecuniary damage . It also ordered the respondent to replace some equipment in the applicant ’s flat . It further established that the parties had not concluded any written contract in respect of the repairs in the flat and had not set any time - limits ; therefore there was no call to award the applicant any penalties in that respect . On DATE ORG decided to examine the applicant ’s claim for payment of penalties for the delayed replacement of sanitary equipment and for compensation for loss of time in separate proceedings .

On DATE ORG quashed the judgment of DATE and referred the case to the first - instance court for a new examination on the ground that the first - instance court had failed to follow its decision of DATE .

On DATE the case was adjourned until DATE because the parties failed to appear .

According to the Government , on DATE the proceedings were discontinued at the applicant ’s request , however on DATE the Presidium of ORG quashed that decision in supervisory review on the prosecutor ’s application . The Government did not provide the ORG with copies of those decisions .

On DATE ORG set the examination of the case for DATE . On that date the case was adjourned until DATE because the parties failed to appear .

On DATE ORG left the applicant ’s claim unexamined on the ground that she had failed to appear at CARDINAL hearings .

On DATE the applicant requested ORG to reinstate the time - limit for lodging an appeal against the decision of CARDINAL DATE . In her appeal she claimed that she had failed to appear at CARDINAL hearings because she had not been duly notified of them and that she had not received a copy of the decision of DATE . On DATE ORG granted her appeal , quashed the decision of DATE and scheduled the examination of the case for DATE . On that date the case was again adjourned because the parties failed to appear .

On DATE the case was adjourned until DATE because the judge was on sick leave . On that date the applicant amended her claims . She submitted that since the examination of the case was very lengthy , she had repaired her flat at her own expense and she requested the court to reimburse her those expenses . On the same date the case was adjourned until DATE . The next CARDINAL hearings were adjourned either because the respondent company did not appear or because it asked for additional time to submit evidence and comments on the applicant ’s claims .

On DATE ORG ordered the municipal enterprise ORG to reimburse the applicant for the repair expenses and pay her non - pecuniary damage sustained as a result of poor - quality repair works . Furthermore , it ordered the defendant to replace the sanitary installations in the applicant ’s flat . It dismissed the remainder of the applicant ’s claims .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of CARDINAL DATE .


CASE OF A.D. AND O.D. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Violation of Art. 8;Violation of Art. 13+8;No violation of Art. 13;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Giovanni Bonello;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Mihai Poalelungi;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza

The first applicant , DATE , is a female NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE . The second applicant , PERSON , is the first applicant 's son . He is a NORP national who was born in DATE and currently resides with the first applicant .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE PERSON was delivered by caesarian section at DATE because of his failure to grow in the womb . He weighed QUANTITY . He was not diagnosed with any particular condition . He was initially fed via feeding tube .

The first applicant was concerned about PERSON 's small size and his failure to pick up weight . On DATE she asked her general practitioner to refer him to a paediatrician . She was referred to PERSON , the paediatrician who had seen PERSON after his birth . Following a consultation in DATE the first applicant was told that the situation would be reviewed on DATE . As PERSON 's weight and length had fallen below the third centile chart , tests were carried out on DATE .

On DATE the consultant radiologist informed PERSON that X - rays revealed evidence of CARDINAL , possibly CARDINAL , healing fractures to the right ribs . The first applicant and her partner were informed DATE .

On DATE PERSON was admitted to hospital as a patient and a full skeletal survey was carried out , which confirmed CARDINAL fractures . The local authority were informed .

The first applicant took legal advice and also undertook some research , herself noting that PERSON had CARDINAL of the CARDINAL indicators for the condition of ORG ( brittle bone disease ) , including the genetic factor of her own joint laxity or double - jointedness . She states that she raised this possibility with PERSON who dismissed it without giving any reasons .

On DATE a report by PERSON concluded that the injuries were sustained “ non - accidentally ” in view of the nature of the fractures and the lack of any other explanation for them . He noted , however , that PERSON 's parents had appeared very caring and concerned for his welfare at their CARDINAL meetings .

On DATE the local authority held a case conference and placed FAC on the “ At Risk Register ” . At the meeting PERSON mentioned that she had looked at PERSON 's bones to see if they appeared thin but considered that they were normal .

PERSON , the social worker assigned to the case , conducted CARDINAL sessions with the family . When the first applicant raised the possibility of Osteogenesis Imperfecta with her , she was told that she was in denial over the injuries to her son . The first applicant and her partner were very distraught over PERSON 's feeding problems and injuries and by the accusations of child abuse .

The first applicant attended assessment meetings held at FAC , the purpose of which she was told was to assess the risk she and her partner posed to PERSON She and her partner fully co - operated and attended all meetings .

On DATE PERSON was admitted to hospital following further weight loss and a nasogastric tube was inserted .

On DATE the first applicant and her partner removed PERSON from the ward , against medical advice , as he had contracted a viral infection which caused vomiting and diarrhoea and was negating any advantages of feeding by tube . They took him to see a consultant paediatric gastroenterologist concerning his slow weight gain , but did not attend all appointments and cancelled a stomach biopsy as they felt he was well and gaining weight .

On DATE the local authority received a report from Professor C. , a professor of paediatric radiology , which confirmed the fractures to the ribs . She considered that the fractures had been inflicted on CARDINAL separate occasions . She also concurred with PERSON that “ the rib fractures have occurred from squeezing ” and that “ rib fractures in children are extraordinarily rare except in non - accidental injury ... ” . She found that PERSON 's bone texture was normal and there was nothing to indicate any underlying bone disease . She stated that there was no other medical test that would help to identify anything further about the rib fractures . Finally , she noted that the ultrasound of PERSON 's head revealed a bright area in the brain cortex . A small bleed could not be excluded , which caused her some concern as to shaking , but on balance she thought the results were normal .

On CARDINAL DATE the local authority applied to ORG for an interim care order . At the same time a guardian ad litem was appointed on behalf of PERSON , who was of the opinion that the family should stay together .

On DATE , at the statutory review meeting , it was noted that Dr S. had undertaken a test due to concerns about bone disease and that the result was used by Professor C. The local authority was informed that a police investigation was not considered appropriate as there was nothing to suggest that the injuries flowed from a criminal assault . It was hoped that the family would be placed in a protective unit where ORG could be monitored by professionals . The first applicant and her partner were present at this meeting . The applicants disputed , however , that Dr S. had in fact carried out a test for Osteogenesis Imperfecta .

On DATE ORG granted an interim care order . It was proposed in court that the family relocate to ORG in GPE , QUANTITY away . The first applicant claimed that neither she nor her partner had been consulted or even warned about this possibility . They had to go directly to FAC from the court room , leaving their own comfortable well - equipped home and their network of extended family and friends . The first applicant consented to the care order but submitted that she had no real choice , because if she had resisted the measure PERSON could have been placed in foster care straight away . She had been advised that if she did not oppose the assessment procedure , it would be less likely that they would be separated . While her solicitors had obtained an expert report by PERSON suggesting that PERSON suffered from ORG , she had been advised not to rely on it in the proceedings because PERSON had been discredited as a medical expert acceptable to the courts due to violations of professional ethics in the course of previous legal proceedings .

The first applicant stated that she was horrified by the conditions at the FAC , which was located in a crime - ridden , rough area of GPE . The family had to live in CARDINAL room with a small kitchenette and were not allowed to cook any meals after TIME The house was dirty and occupied by problem families ( crime , drugs and alcohol ) . Initially they were only allowed to leave FAC TIME per day . The latter restriction was lifted on DATE against the wishes of PERSON and the local authority . During their stay , the first applicant and her partner had to claim benefits which they had not done previously . The family was not permitted to leave FAC DATE to attend the wedding of the first applicant 's sister ; they were only allowed to attend the actual ceremony and not the reception . According to the Government , however , the first applicant 's evidence in the domestic care proceedings was at odds with this description : she stated on DATE that the physical surroundings were better than they had feared and that the other residents were friendly and helpful . There had also been no restriction on the first applicant leaving the centre alone ; the only requirement had been that if she left with FAC they had to be accompanied by a member of staff . From CARDINAL May she was allowed to take FAC out unaccompanied for TIME a day , and after DATE all restrictions were lifted . They also had overnight stays away from the hostel and a day long visit to GPE .

The family remained at ORG . The first applicant was under the impression , as had been stated in court , that the assessment to be made was of the risk posed to PERSON by her and her partner . The keyworker at the ORG understood that a parenting assessment was to be carried out . When the letter of instruction was at last sent to the ORG , it asked , somewhat ambiguously , for their opinion on the standard of care provided to FAC and the first applicant and her partner 's ability to care for him .

The ORG 's report compiled by Miss PERSON on DATE stated that its aims were to assess the future risk posed to PERSON by his parents , to assess their handling and interaction with the child and to assess their parenting skills . The report noted that the couple presented as being very capable of caring for PERSON and that both appeared to be committed , with a willingness to accept the advice of professionals , although their level of anxiety had been high . Concerns remained , however , about PERSON 's feeding difficulties and limited weight gain , as he remained substantially below the third centile weight for a child of his age . In a further report on DATE , Miss PERSON confirmed that until there was clarity about the cause of the injuries the risk remained high .

While in GPE O.D. had been seen by a consultant clinical geneticist who reported that Osteogenesis Imperfecta or some other collagen abnormality was no more than one possible explanation for PERSON 's medical history ; in particular as it was rare to have this degree of growth retardation in the absence of multiple long fractures , other causes for the failure to thrive should be sought . He also commented that continuing emotional stress in the family should be seriously considered as a possible aggravating factor . He noted that further investigation might include a skin biopsy to assess collagen profiles but that it would be inappropriate to pursue these in GPE . In any case , he indicated that the diagnostic value of the test had been previously shown to have a detection rate of PERCENT .

On return to GPE , after a DATE stay in GPE , the family had to live in a Family Assessment Centre for DATE while the local authority applied to renew the interim care order .

The first applicant 's solicitor instructed an expert radiologist , Dr L. , to report on FAC 's injuries , asking him specifically to comment on whether the injuries were more likely to have been caused by non - accidental means or a form of Osteogenesis Imperfecta . As an acknowledged expert in bone disease , PERSON stated in the report that there was no evidence of abnormal bone morphology or density to suggest bone fragility . In the absence of abnormal bone fragility , he considered that non - accidental injury was the likely cause of the fractures . He was sceptical about taking a skin biopsy , considering the test to be equivocal . He also confirmed that the previous suggestion of a brain injury on the initial scan was unfounded as the scan merely showed reflective echoes .

At a statutory review on DATE , the local authority concluded that PERSON could not safely be placed with his parents and proposed to place him with foster carers , with DATE parental contact , while a psychological assessment of the first applicant and her partner was undertaken and a risk assessment was carried out by ORG ( ORG ) . The question of placing LAW with a relative had been discussed with the maternal grandparents . PERSON and another social worker paid them a visit on DATE . The matter was not pursued as it was noted that the maternal grandparents considered that not enough consideration had been given to Osteogenesis Imperfecta and that decisions were being taken by persons who did not know the parents . In a statement of evidence submitted on DATE , the applicant 's partner listed family members who would either stay with the applicants or have the applicants stay with them ; he did not specify that any relative was prepared to look after PERSON by themselves .

The interim care proceedings began on DATE . At the hearing , PERSON , the consultant paediatrician who had overseen PERSON 's care at GPE stated her opposition to the care plan ; she considered that PERSON had a close relationship with his family and removal would cause emotional trauma equivalent to bereavement . The social worker supervisor also opposed the care plan , as O.D. had suffered no further injuries and she believed it to be highly likely to exacerbate his eating problems . While she gave evidence for the applicants , PERSON had nonetheless stated in her report of DATE that the rib fractures were unexplained and characteristic of non - accidental injury ; that there was no definitive test for ORG ; and that she felt it unlikely that PERSON had this condition , referring to the further opinion of an orthopaedic surgeon , PERSON , who had been unable to confirm a diagnosis of Osteogenesis Imperfecta .

The interim care order was granted . In a judgment handed down on DATE , the judge considered that the consultant paediatrician and supervisor seemed to deal with a much more permanent separation than was envisaged . He stated that it was unfortunate that proper communications had not existed permitting the risk assessment to be carried out at GPE but that it still remained to be discovered how PERSON had sustained his injuries . With regard to the proposal to place FAC outside the family , the judge noted that there had been no proper assessment of any other family member but considered that the local authority could not be blamed for this : " Clearly there had been discussions , considerable discussions and disagreement about the care plan . ... as things stand at the moment I am not satisfied that any family member would accept the sort of risk that I think at present exists . "

He went on to say : “ So far as the capability of the parents is concerned , this will probably be of little comfort to them but nevertheless ... I have no doubt that they are very capable , that they are splendid parents in every possible way except with regard to these CARDINAL matters , this most important fact that the injury has still not been sorted out and there is also the possible problems with feeding . ”

He concluded that he had to make an order to provide FAC with the protection that he required .

PERSON was placed with local authority approved foster parents . The first applicant was allowed contact for DATE for DATE during DATE .

The first applicant was concerned as to the care which PERSON was receiving in the foster home . New clothes which she had given him were not being used ; she found a plastic pellet in his play pen ; on CARDINAL occasion he was crawling on the floor near to broken glass ; and when the first applicant noticed a bruise on FAC 's face , the foster mother showed no concern and it was the link worker who had to recommend that he saw a doctor . The Government stated that the foster parents , selected for expertise with feeding problems , reported to , and were visited by , the local authority regularly , who found their care to be satisfactory .

On DATE or DATE , PERSON was admitted to hospital due to feeding problems . The first applicant claimed that she was not informed and only found out on arrival for a contact session . She was not allowed to stay with him in hospital TIME . The Government stated that the first applicant had been aware in advance , due to a previous visit to a doctor , that LAW might be admitted to hospital and that she was informed when this happened as soon as was possible . Her normal contact continued with him during his DATE stay .

On DATE the ORG informed the local authority that PERSON should be returned without delay to his parents .

On DATE PERSON . , a consultant paediatrician instructed by the guardian ad litem , noted that the lack of further injury despite increased mobility was further evidence against Osteogenesis Imperfecta . He emphasised that the feeding and growth problem was not a child protection matter per se but that the impact of these problems on the parents needed to be taken into account .

On DATE , while still in foster care , PERSON fell and was taken to hospital . The radiologist diagnosed a possible fracture of the shinbone . The X - rays were analysed as showing the bones to be thin and osteopenic .

On DATE the ORG submitted their risk assessment . They recommended that PERSON be returned quickly to his parents ' care , with a short period of prior increased contact . The applicants submitted that the report was issued DATE than estimated ; the Government submitted that the judge had in fact indicated that only the initial report should be available at DATE .

On DATE the local authority , at a statutory review meeting , agreed that PERSON should return home DATE .

On DATE PERSON was examined by PERSON , a senior clinical research associate and honorary consultant paediatrician at ORG . He reported in his final report of CARDINAL DATE that there had been insufficient radiological evidence to substantiate the diagnosis of Osteogenesis Imperfecta or other bone disease in DATE but that the taking of additional X - ray views of particular bones might have provided further clarifications . Tests now indicated that PERSON had type PERSON , with a significant growth retardant component , a condition which had been active from the time of the tests . The force necessary to fracture his ribs might well have fallen within the range of normal handling . He recommended regular follow - up in a specialist paediatric clinic .

The X - rays and draft report of PERSON were submitted to Professor PERSON , who in her report of CARDINAL DATE found the special bone density tests inconclusive , although she noted that she was not an expert . She agreed that ORG now showed abnormalities but did not find this conclusive of Osteogenesis Imperfecta . She stated that in her experience if children with Osteogenesis Imperfecta had sustained rib fractures such as these from normal handling then they went on to sustain fractures in other areas ; she was therefore surprised that PERSON had not had further fractures other than the CARDINAL sustained in foster care if he in fact had had Osteogenesis Imperfecta .

PERSON , Professor C , PERSON and PERSON . held a meeting on DATE and issued a joint report , in which they concurred that there was no evidence at the time of the first fractures to indicate Osteogenesis Imperfecta or the desirability of any further investigations and that FAC had suffered from birth from Osteogenesis Imperfecta Type IV . They also agreed that in the absence of an account of trauma in a baby , rib fractures such as those observed would be highly suggestive of non - accidental injury inflicted by a forceful squeezing . However , while the latter CARDINAL doctors considered that the degree of force required to cause these fractures fell outwith the normal handling of a small baby although not within the category of abusive handling , PERSON took the view that it might not be completely outside the normal range of handling ( for example , catching a child who was slipping ) . The cause of the serious growth retardation was not known .

In light of that report , the local authority made an urgent application for an abridged procedure to withdraw care proceedings , which were scheduled for further hearing in DATE .

The interim care order was discharged in DATE .

The first applicant submitted that the care proceedings had a devastating effect on her relationship with her partner and they have since separated . PERSON , meanwhile , was suffering from sleeping and behavioural problems , was reluctant to leave the first applicant , would not play with other children and screamed and threw food at strangers .

In DATE the first applicant complained to the local authority which appointed an independent person , PERSON , to investigate the complaint . After interviewing the key people involved , she found various defects in the handling of the case . She held that the local authority had failed to consider fostering PERSON with family members as required by statute , noted the confusion in communication with the FAC concerning the risk assessment and stated that once it had been decided to accept the ORG recommendation the rehabilitation should have taken DATE , not DATE ; she also stated that there had been a steady deterioration in relations between the first applicant and the assigned social worker and that a more productive working relationship with the family might have been achieved by changing the caseworker as requested by the family . She did not uphold other specific complaints , finding , inter alia , that it had been necessary for the family to travel to FAC on DATE as the hearing , that the local authority was justified in imposing restrictive travel arrangements on the family while at FAC , that the stance of the judge and local authority when considering whether PERSON should be taken into care was understandable in light of the potential risks , that there was no reason to consider that the care received by PERSON from his foster carers was not entirely appropriate , that the parents were invited to review meetings and to give their views , and that the case involved the considered opinions of several eminent experts , who discounted bone disease and confirmed a diagnosis of non - accidental injury . She stated , inter alia , that with the weight of the medical evidence so firmly establishing non - accidental injury the local authority had no option but to apply for care proceedings . She made no recommendation for monetary compensation .

DATE . On DATE the local authority 's complaints officer wrote to the first applicant and recommended that she receive a full apology and that certain aspects of the local authority 's systems be reviewed and revised .

On DATE , in light of the above negative findings , ORG sent the first applicant a letter of apology in respect of the criticised practices .

The first applicant instituted proceedings against the local authority on behalf of herself and LAW , claiming damages for negligence and personal injury .

On DATE his Honour Judge PERSON held that the local authority owed no duty of care to a parent in the context of care proceedings based on allegations of abuse .

On DATE the judge rejected the claims of PERSON on the ground that he had not been shown to have suffered any recognisable psychiatric damage , or alternatively , that any injury was transient and not compensatable by damages .

Both applicants were granted permission to appeal but the proceedings were stayed pending the outcome of NORP v. ORG and others [ DATE ] AC CARDINAL ( see description of domestic proceedings in GPE and PERSON v. GPE , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , judgment of DATE , § § DATE ) . These cases concluded in ORG , which held that no duty was owed by medical or social work professionals to parents in the exercise of their duties , in the best interests of the children , when deciding whether there had been any abuse and what measures were necessary .

After the hearing of the applicants ' appeals on CARDINAL and DATE , ORG on DATE dismissed the first applicant 's appeal as at no stage was she owed a duty of care by the local authority . The court also rejected PERSON 's appeal on the ground that there was no evidence that he had suffered harm other than transient distress . In the alternative , the court held that any harm suffered by PERSON did not amount to a recognised psychiatric disorder and was therefore not of the kind giving rise to an action for damages ( “ non - justiciable harm ” ) . LAW DATE and LAW were irrelevant as the case concerned events prior to the LAW 's implementation .

Leave to appeal to ORG was refused .

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW DATE provides as follows :

“ Subject to any regulations made by the Secretary of ORG for the purposes of this subsection , any local authority looking after a child shall make arrangements to enable him to live with—

( a ) a person falling within subsection ( CARDINAL ) ; or

( b ) a relative , friend or other person connected with him ,

unless that would not be reasonably practicable or consistent with his welfare . ”

A person falling within subsection CARDINAL is a parent of the child ; a person who is not a parent of the child but who has parental responsibility for him ; or a person in whose favour a residence order was made .