The applicant is a NORP citizen born in DATE and residing in ORG .

On DATE ORG issued a warrant of arrest against the applicant and on DATE remanded him in custody on suspicion of attempted manslaughter by assaulting the victims in their apartment with a knife and an axe .

. On DATE ORG ( Sąd Wojewódzki ) granted the Prosecutor ’s request for prolongation of the applicant ’s detention until DATE in view of the need to obtain further expert opinions . On DATE the ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request for release .

On DATE the ORG ( Sąd Apelacyjny ) complied with the applicant ’s request to amend the decision of DATE and shortened the period for which the applicant ’s detention was authorised to CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the applicant requested his release . ORG and , upon appeal , ORG , dismissed his request .

On DATE the applicant again requested to be released . On DATE he underwent a psychiatric examination .

On DATE the ORG , acting upon the motion of ORG , prolonged the applicant ’s detention from DATE until DATE . The ORG considered that the reasons for which the detention had been ordered had not ceased to exist . There was sufficient suspicion that the applicant had committed the criminal offence at issue , supported by the evidence gathered in the course of the investigations . The applicant had to undergo a further time - consuming psychiatric examination . Further investigatory measures had to be taken and evidence had to be obtained .

On DATE an additional psychiatric opinion was submitted .

On DATE the ORG upheld the decision of DATE . The ORG considered that the applicant ’s continued detention was necessary in order to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings in view of the fact that the applicant ’s psychiatric examination had not been completed .

On DATE the applicant requested to be released . His requests were subsequently dismissed by ORG .

On DATE the applicant was informed that the charges against him had been in part modified and he was allowed access to the case - file .

On DATE the applicant was served with a bill of indictment . On DATE ORG submitted the indictment to ORG .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request for release of DATE . The ORG considered that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed a dangerous offence , supported by the evidence given , inter alia , by the CARDINAL victims . The reasons for which the detention had been ordered continued to exist . The applicant had failed to indicate in his request any new circumstances which could justify his release .

On DATE the applicant ’s father appealed against the decision . He submitted that the period of detention had expired on DATE , whereas the applicant had not received any decision further prolonging his detention .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer appealed against the same decision . He submitted that the ORG ’s conclusions as to the reasonableness of the suspicion were based on insufficient evidence as only the evidence given by the victims supported the suspicion that the applicant was guilty . The applicant ’s detention since DATE lacked any legal basis , as the detention period had expired on DATE . No further decision relating to the prolongation of the detention had been issued .

On DATE the ORG upheld the decision of DATE . The court first considered that the applicant ’s arguments as to whether the suspicion against him was reasonable were ill - founded . The court further considered that the applicant ’s suggestion that his detention since DATE lacked any legal basis was entirely erroneous . The court stated that the applicant ’s lawyer must apparently have overlooked the fact that the bill of indictment had been submitted to the court on DATE . Therefore the time - limits for detention on remand provided for by LAW had ceased to apply , given that this provision applied only to the pre - trial stage of criminal proceedings

On an unspecified later date the applicant challenged all the judges of ORG , alleging that they were biased against him . On DATE the ORG decided that judge PERSON should step down , considering that he had declared , in reply to the applicant ’s challenge , that he had known the victims of the offence for DATE and that this could make it difficult for him to remain impartial . The court dismissed the applicant ’s challenge of the remaining judges , finding that the statutory requirements for them to step down were not satisfied .

The court fixed the date of the first hearing to be held in the case for DATE . On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer requested that the hearing be adjourned as he was ill . He further requested the court to obtain a medical expert opinion in order to establish whether in the light of the injuries sustained by the victims the course of the material events could possibly correspond to events as presented in the bill of indictment . He further requested the court to order a reconstruction of the crime , which would allow it to make findings of facts relevant to the determination of the applicant ’s criminal responsibility .

Subsequently , on CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL and DATE and on DATE the applicant requested to be released , but to no avail as ORG dismissed all his requests .

In DATE the applicant complained to the prison medical services that , following pains which he had had in his right eye , he had begun to lose his eyesight .

On DATE the ORG convicted the applicant of attempted manslaughter and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment .

On DATE the court informed the applicant that the written grounds of the judgment would be prepared by DATE .

In DATE ORG , supervising the enforcement of sentences ordered that the applicant should be examined by an ophthalmologist . Apparently , this specialist had not found any pathology as regards the applicant ’s eyesight , but indicated that a neurological examination was called for . In DATE the applicant was examined by a neurologist who recommended that he should undergo a comprehensive neurological examination in a specialised hospital .

Subsequently the applicant was transferred to NORP Opolskie prison . At DATE he was transferred to PERSON prison .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE the ORG informed the applicant , in reply to his earlier complaints about the allegedly inadequate medical care which he had received in prison , that his allegations had been investigated and that they had proved unfounded . The ORG referred to the fact that upon his admission to the FAC prison the applicant had only stated that he was short sighted . On DATE , after the applicant complained that he had had a short loss of consciousness , he had been examined by a neurologist and had undergone a tomography of brain which had not shown any pathological changes . On DATE he had been examined by an ophthalmologist , who had stated that his eyesight had not deteriorated since his admission to the prison . It was further stated in the letter that since DATE the applicant had not reported any health problems to the prison health services , either after his transfer to the NORP Opolskie or after his subsequent transfer to the PERSON prison . On DATE he had only complained of headache .

On an unspecified date in DATE the applicant was transferred to another ward of PERSON prison , to a cell for CARDINAL inmates . On DATE the applicant , following his complaints about his asthma , back pains and problems with his eyesight , was admitted to a hospital in PERSON prison .

On DATE the applicant was served with the written grounds of the judgment of CARDINAL DATE .

Subsequently the applicant ’s lawyers lodged CARDINAL appeals against this judgment , submitting that ORG had committed errors of law in that it had erroneously applied substantive law and wrongly qualified the offence concerned as attempted manslaughter , whereas it should have been qualified as assault . It was further argued that the court had erroneously assessed the evidence , had disregarded the discrepancies between the testimony of various witnesses and , as a result , had made wrongful findings of fact . The court should have questioned PERSON who , as not having any family links with either the applicant or the victims , would be an impartial and credible witness . His testimony would in particular confirm that the applicant had not acted with an intention to kill .

On DATE the applicant requested ORG to expedite the appellate proceedings in his case .

On an unspecified date in DATE the doctors of the PERSON prison hospital found that the applicant suffered from certain degenerative ailment of spine .

On DATE ORG informed the applicant that the case - file had not been submitted to that court .

On an unspecified date at DATE the applicant underwent a medical consultation in a public hospital in PERSON .

On DATE the ORG partly amended the judgment in that , in the determination of the applicant ’s sentence , it relied on different provisions of LAW as applicable at the material time , and upheld it in its remainder . The court observed that whereas it was true that there had been certain discrepancies between the testimony of the CARDINAL members of the PERSON family , the victims of the crime , on the other hand they had been quite concordant in respect of the essential elements of the material circumstances . These discrepancies could be explained by the lapse of time between their first questioning , made in the investigations , and the subsequent ones , made before the trial court . On the whole , the discrepancies were not of such a nature as to diminish the credibility of these witnesses , in particular as regards the weapons used by the applicant and the fact that he had used both of them , i.e. a knife and a kitchen axe . The court further noted that the lower court had summoned witness PERSON for the hearing on DATE , but as he had failed to attend the hearing , the court had read out his testimony deposed during the investigations , having first requested the parties to state whether they had insisted that this witness be questioned . At this stage the applicant ’s lawyers had agreed that this testimony be read out in the court . Thus , the applicant had accepted that it had not been necessary for the court to hear this witness . The court further considered that , in any event , this testimony was in part concordant with the testimony of the other CARDINAL witnesses , GPE and NORP There were no grounds on which to accept that the testimony in question would have entirely exonerated the applicant .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer lodged a cassation appeal against this judgment with ORG . It was argued that the courts had committed a serious error of law in that the applicant ’s offence had erroneously been qualified as attempted manslaughter whereas it should have been qualified as assault . It was further submitted that in the assessment of the evidence the principle in dubio pro reo had not been respected . ORG had committed a procedural error in that it had failed to question witness PERSON and had limited itself to reading out during the trial his testimony submitted during the investigations . It was finally argued that the court had failed to establish certain circumstances relevant for the assessment of the applicant criminal responsibility , in particular as it had failed to order a reconstruction of the circumstances of the crime which would show that the course of the material events could not possibly have been such as established by the court .

On DATE the applicant was examined by a medical panel , with a view to establishing whether he was fit for further detention .

On DATE ORG stayed the enforcement of the applicant ’s sentence , having regard to his bad health . The court had regard to a medical certificate of DATE and considered that his further staying in prison would be detrimental to his health .

On DATE the applicant was discharged from ORG of the PERSON prison hospital . A medical certificate issued at his discharge stated that he had been diagnosed as suffering from hernia of the nucleus pulposus . He had been examined by an orthopaedist , a neurologist , and a specialist in neurosurgery . A tomography of the spine had been effected and he had been receiving various medicines to ease his back pain . It was further stated that the applicant ’s further serving the sentence could entail a serious danger to his health and that he should be operated on in connection with his spine problems . On an unspecified later date the applicant was released .

From DATE the applicant underwent medical treatment in ORG of ORG in ORG . A medical certificate of DATE stated that he suffered from discopathy and painful pressure on spinal cord . A surgical intervention was indispensable , but it could not be envisaged in the applicant ’s depressive state and was , accordingly , postponed . However , the postponing of the surgery would ultimately entail very serious risks to the applicant ’s health and even life . He was referred to a psychiatric department for further treatment . The date of his next admission to the hospital for neurological treatment was set for DATE .

DATE the applicant was treated in ORG of the same hospital . It was established that he suffered from depression .

In DATE the applicant apparently started anew to serve his sentence .

On DATE ORG refused to grant the applicant ’s request for a conditional release .

On an unspecified date before DATE the applicant ’s request to have the execution of his sentence stayed was granted in order for him to undergo the operation of the spine .


András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Kristina Pardalos;Nona Tsotsoria

The applicants are NORP nationals . Their names , dates of birth and places of residence appear in the table below .

In all CARDINAL applications , the applicants were issued minor fines by ORG and ORG under section CARDINAL of the Code of Civil Procedure ( Hukuk Usulü Muhakemeleri Kanunu ) following the rejection of requests for rectification they had brought before those courts .

All of the applicants complained under LAW that their right of access to court was violated by the imposition of fines for having used a legal remedy , which was made available to them by law .

The other complaints that were raised by the applicants and specific facts relevant to these complaints are indicated in the table below .

Section CARDINAL

“ Rectification of a Court of Cassation decision may be requested for the following reasons , within DATE after the notification of the impugned decision :

If in the appeal proceedings , ORG failed to respond to the parties’ appeal requests ;

If ORG decision contains contradictory paragraphs ;

If it is established that some of the documents examined during the appeal proceedings were fraudulent or false ;

If ORG decision is against domestic procedure or domestic law . ”

“ If the request for rectification is not based on CARDINAL of the conditions ( set forth by LAW ) , it shall be rejected and a fine shall be imposed on the applicant . ”

“ Sections CARDINAL - CARDINAL of LAW shall be abolished as of DATE . ”

“ Sections CARDINAL - CARDINAL of LAW shall be applied , without taking into account the changes made by PERSON no . PERSON , as regards judgments which had been appealed against prior to the date ORG take office . ”


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Effective investigation);Violation of Article 38 - Examination of the case-{general} (Article 38 - Obligation to furnish all necessary facilities);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Khanlar Hajiyev

The applicants are :

Mr PERSON born in DATE ,

Mr PERSON born in DATE ,

Mr PERSON born in DATE ,

Mr PERSON born in DATE ,

PERSON born in DATE ,

Mr PERSON born in DATE , and

PERSON born in DATE .

At the material time all the applicants were serving a prison sentence in correctional colony no . CARDINAL in the village of PERSON of the NORP district of LOC ( also known as facility no . IK-CARDINAL , hereinafter “ the colony ” ) .

NORP In DATE a group of CARDINAL officers of a special - purpose unit , GPE , of ORG DATE now renumbered as ORG , отдел специального назначения « Варяг PERSON лесных исправительных учреждений АМ-CARDINAL/ВК-CARDINAL ) , under the command of Mr B. , arrived at the colony for the purpose of “ rendering practical assistance in maintaining the detention regime ” .

Upon their arrival Mr B. and PERSON , the deputy colony director for security and operational activities , devised a plan which included the following measures : searches of the living premises , including the premises of the strict - security department ( отряд со строгими условиями содержания ) , the punishment ward ( штрафной изолятор ) and cell - like LOC ( помещения камерного типа ) ; body searches of detainees , including on their return from work ; and supervision of the detainees’ compliance with the regime regulations . The officers of the unit wore balaclava masks and carried rubber truncheons during the implementation of the plan .

The applicants alleged that the unit officers had beaten detainees with truncheons and kicked and punched them . Specific allegations concerning each applicant are outlined in chronological order below .

On coming back from work to the colony living premises Mr ORG learnt from other detainees that the unit officers were performing a search . The officers wore camouflage and balaclava masks . During the search they hit Mr Dedovskiy on his back CARDINAL times with a truncheon without any apparent reason and verbally assaulted him . On leaving the search LOC he received more truncheon blows .

Later in the day , when going to dinner , Mr ORG , among other detainees , was told to squat down and waddle “ duck - style ” to the canteen .

On coming back from work to the colony Mr PERSON was told to submit to a strip - search . PERSON , the deputy colony director , divided all the detainees into groups of CARDINAL and told them to run into the search room . Inside the room Mr PERSON was ordered to look at the floor and comply with all instructions . Any delay in fulfilling an order was met with punches to the stomach and head . Once the strip - search was completed , Mr PERSON was thrown CARDINAL - naked out into the courtyard .

On coming back from work to the colony , the unit officers hit Mr Vidin on his head , neck and spine with a truncheon during their search . As a result , he could not work for an extended period of time owing to pain in his head and spine . He attempted to seek medical assistance but the medical department was closed .

Later in DATE , when going to dinner , PERSON , among others , was told to squat down and waddle to the canteen . On entering the canteen and while eating the unit officers hit him in the small of his back .

At the roll - call Mr GPE was beaten for having answered a unit officer ’s question too softly .

Mr Gorokhov was held in cell no . CARDINAL of the strict - security department . At TIME the unit officers arrived at the department and told the detainees to go out into the corridor and to remain spread - eagled against the wall . While they were standing there , the officers punched them ; Mr Gorokhov received several blows to his liver and spine .

The unit officers hit Mr ORG , among other detainees , during the wake - up and on their way to the canteen and back . He was also hit while eating . The officers allegedly hit him with a truncheon , holding it by the light end in order to increase the pain .

At their work - place detainees , including PERSON , were told to form a line . The unit officers and PERSON , the security head , verbally assaulted them .

NORP The unit officers allegedly told PERSON , when going to dinner , to carry another detainee on his back . Then they told all the detainees to go to the canteen in couples holding hands . PERSON was beaten for refusing to comply with these demands . After that a unit officer jumped on his back and told him to carry him to the canteen . Mr PERSON ’s refusal provoked a new round of beatings .

On DATE Mr GPE , among other detainees , arrived at the colony to serve his sentence . The unit officers verbally and physically assaulted them on their way from the car to the punishment ward , where the newly arrived detainees were held . Mr PERSON and Mr T. of the colony administration were present . Later , PERSON PERSON was taken out of the cell and beaten in the corridor with truncheons . Mr T. was again present .

The unit officers , accompanied by PERSON , came to the strict - security department where ORG was being held . The officers shouted at detainees as they were running out of the cells and punched them . Mr Gorokhov was hit and fell to the floor . Thereafter PERSON and his cellmates were told to stand up , strip naked and lean spread - eagled against the wall . The officers punched and kicked them and also hit them with truncheons . Mr Gorokhov collapsed several times , but when he rose to his feet the beating resumed . The officers did not make any demands or claims of the detainees . As a consequence of that treatment , PERSON had many bruises and abrasions , a headache and sharp pain in his liver .

Mr PERSON was held in cell no . CARDINAL of the strict - security department ( the same cell as the sixth applicant , PERSON ) . At TIME on DATE the unit officers opened the door of their cell and put a bench in front of it . The detainees were rudely told to jump over the bench into the corridor . Mr PERSON stumbled over the bench and fell . The officers started to punch and kick him and to hit him with truncheons . In the corridor all the detainees were stripped naked and placed spread - eagled against the wall . Then the officers beat them . When Mr PERSON fell , he was made to stand up again and the beating continued . The beatings lasted for TIME .

Once the unit officers had left , a doctor and a nurse entered the cell and asked whether there were any “ bedridden patients ” ( that is , who could no longer walk by themselves ) . Mr PERSON complained about sharp pains , but received no assistance .

NORP The report on the use of a rubber truncheon of DATE indicated that “ during a search ... at TIME the convict PERSON refused to go out of the living premises into the common corridor , stating that he would be present during the search , although it was the convict PERSON who had been assigned to be present during the search . PERSON was warned that in case of further disobedience , a truncheon would be used on him , but he continued to disobey ” . The report was signed by CARDINAL colony officials and PERSON

On coming back from work at TIME , among other detainees , was subjected to a strip - search . During the search the officers punched him and hit him with truncheons .

The report on the use of a rubber truncheon of DATE indicated that “ on returning from the work facility PERSON , the convict PERSON repeatedly disobeyed the lawful request of the colony administration ... because he flatly refused to spread his arms and legs wide apart for a body search . He did not react to the repeated requests . Thereafter , a rubber truncheon ... was used on him ” . The report was signed by CARDINAL colony officials and PERSON

Mr Matrosov , among other detainees , was beaten during the strip - search upon their return from work .

On coming to the canteen , detainees , including PERSON , were ordered to form CARDINAL lines and run into the canteen CARDINAL at a time . The unit officers stood at the doors and hit detainees with truncheons . While eating , the detainees were told not to raise their eyes and PERSON , among others , received a truncheon blow to his neck . On leaving the canteen he received more blows to his back .

At the roll - call Mr GPE was told to step out of the line and say “ ah ” . He was beaten for saying it too softly . As a result of the beatings , Mr GPE had broken ribs . He applied to the medical department , where a doctor treated the area around the broken ribs with iodine .

The unit officers took Mr GPE , among other detainees , out of the cell and into the corridor , where he was spread - eagled against the wall and beaten .

Mr GPE , among other detainees , was taken out of the cell into the corridor , where the unit officers punched and kicked them and also hit them with truncheons . Mr F. and PERSON , were also present , in an inebriated state .

At TIME the unit officers , together with Mr F. and Mr T. , arrived at the strict - security department where Mr GPE had been transferred from the punishment ward on TIME . All the detainees , including the fifth applicant , were told to run out of the cells into the corridor . The unit officers punched and kicked Mr GPE and beat him with truncheons . He collapsed several times and finally fainted after a particularly strong blow to his head .

Mr GPE alleges that he had brain concussion . In DATE he was diagnosed with traumatic psychopathy in prison hospital GPE MOB , which he believes to be a consequence of the beating on DATE .

NORP The report on the use of a rubber truncheon of DATE indicated that “ the rubber truncheon was used because at the rouse at CARDINAL a.m. the convict GPE , along with other convicts , did not fulfil the get - up command . He flatly refused to proceed to the administrative premises to give a written explanation , and refused to give his name or to explain the reasons for his conduct ” . The report was signed by CARDINAL colony officials and PERSON

The unit officers , this time accompanied by PERSON , came to the strict - security department , where Mr Gorokhov was being held . PERSON and his cellmates were taken out into the corridor where the officers punched and kicked them and also hit them with truncheons . Thereafter he was allegedly refused medical assistance in the medical department of the colony .

The report on the use of a rubber truncheon of DATE indicated that “ the rubber truncheon was used because at the rouse ... the convict PERSON did not get up . When ordered to get up and dress , he reacted reluctantly and failed to dress in accordance with the established form of dress . When told to change his clothes and assume the normal look , he did not react , but behaved rudely and tactlessly towards the officers ” . The report was signed by CARDINAL colony officials and PERSON

Mr GPE , among other detainees , was taken out of the cell into the corridor , where the unit officers punched and kicked them and also hit them with truncheons . Mr F. and PERSON were also present , in an inebriated state .

On DATE ORG handed CARDINAL complaints of ill - treatment written by the colony detainees to ORG ( ORG по правам человека в Пермской области , hereinafter “ the ORG ” ) . The ORG provided the Perm Regional prosecutor with copies of the complaints and requested factual information from the colony administration . On DATE the ORG town prosecutor in charge of supervision of compliance with laws in penitentiary institutions opened a criminal investigation into an offence under LAW of LAW ( excess of power involving the use of weapons or special means ) .

On DATE the ORG decided to form a public commission for the investigation of the causes and circumstances of the events in colony AM CARDINAL/CARDINAL - CARDINAL . The commission included the ORG , the director of ORG and a representative of ORG .

On DATE the ORG visited the colony and talked to the detainees who had lodged the complaints . The majority of them confirmed their statements .

On DATE the director of facility no . ORG replied to the ORG ’s request for information as follows :

“ The measures ... with the involvement of the special - purpose unit officers ... were carried out from DATE ] on the basis of LAW and they were not extraordinary ... RP-CARDINAL [ rubber truncheons ] were used on detainees who refused to comply ... The mass lodging of complaints about allegedly unlawful actions of the unit officers has been arranged by a criminal leader ... ”

On DATE the director and other employees of ORG visited the colony . They were allowed to take photos and talked to CARDINAL detainees in private . The findings were reported to the Ombudsman in the following manner :

“ Conclusion : there is no reason not to trust the allegations of the detainees . For DATE detainees were severely beaten while returning from work , in the canteen ... in the punishment ward , in the cell - like premises ... detainees were made to squat and waddle and then jump up again ... they were stripped naked before the search ... It is conceivable that the special - purpose unit was called upon to intimidate [ detainees ] in the wake of a conflict between the colony administration and the criminal leader . However , no matter how subversive the ringleader ’s influence on other detainees might have been , this can not in any way justify the unit ’s actions ... especially taking into account that a majority of detainees in the colony are ... unconnected to organised crime . It appears that the detainees were , as usual , ‘ collateral damage’ of an extremely complicated and entangled relationship between the management of the correctional institution and criminal leaders . ”

On DATE the ORG paid another visit to the colony and talked to CARDINAL detainees . Of those , CARDINAL detainees confirmed their initial allegations and indicated that they had given the same statements to investigators from the prosecutor ’s office . The ORG found a number of violations of the colony regime , such as belated provision of medical assistance in the punishment ward and cell - like LOC , lack of water and lack of remedies against disciplinary sanctions imposed by the colony administration .

In DATE and DATE Mr PERSON , the head of the department for supervision of compliance with laws in penitentiary institutions , which is a department of ORG , arrived in PERSON for a special inquiry . The ORG refused to produce a copy of his report requested by ORG ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) . According to the applicants , he found that ( i ) the unit officers had used rubber truncheons unlawfully ; ( ii ) when performing their duties , the unit officers should not have worn balaclava masks ; ( iii ) the quality of the pre - trial investigation had been unsatisfactory ; and ( iv ) a few detainees had been unlawfully placed in the punishment ward . The ORG town prosecutor was disciplined and the materials of the investigation were transferred to the NORP Regional prosecutor .

On DATE Mr B. , the head of the special - purpose unit , was charged with an offence under LAW of LAW . On DATE he was additionally charged under LAW ( undue performance of professional duties entailing a substantial impairment of ORG rights and interests ) .

On DATE a prosecutor discontinued criminal proceedings against PERSON subordinates , officers of the special - purpose unit , finding as follows :

“ In the period from DATE ] the employees of the special - purpose unit AM-CARDINAL stayed at the colony , executing the deputy head ’s request to carry out the planned preventive and regime measures on detainees of the colony IK-CARDINAL . When carrying out these measures , officers of the unit used rubber truncheons on the detainees .

The investigation has taken all measures to determine the part of each unit officer in the events ; however , the victims and witnesses were not able to identify the unit officers who had beaten them because they had worn identical camouflage and balaclava masks . Thus , the investigation has not obtained any objective information which would permit charges to be brought against any unit officers . ”

On DATE the same prosecutor discontinued the criminal proceedings in respect of the complaints lodged by the second , third and fourth applicants and CARDINAL other detainees , finding that “ the investigation had not obtained any objective information confirming these detainees’ allegations of the use of rubber truncheons by the special - purpose unit ” .

DATE . On DATE the same prosecutor discontinued criminal proceedings against PERSON on the charge of excess of power . The prosecutor noted that PERSON had not used a rubber truncheon himself and had not given orders to use one . The remaining charge of professional misconduct was referred for trial .

On DATE the public commission was disbanded because the case had gone to trial .

DATE the ORG of GPE held public hearings in the criminal case against PERSON , accused of professional misconduct under LAW . In total , QUANTITY detainees were granted victim status in the criminal proceedings ; of these , QUANTITY persons took part in the hearings and written depositions by the others were read out before the court . The court took witness statements from CARDINAL other detainees who had not been victims themselves .

The trial concerned CARDINAL counts . In counts CARDINAL to CARDINAL twelve detainees were beaten during searches on CARDINAL and DATE . In count CARDINAL detainees , including the seventh applicant , were hit with rubber truncheons . CARDINAL detainees were hit with truncheons at the roll - call on DATE ( count CARDINAL ) . On DATE Mr B. ’s subordinates beat CARDINAL detainees , including the first applicant , who were returning from work ( count CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL other detainees during a search in the punishment ward ( count CARDINAL) . In count CARDINAL the fifth and sixth applicants , as well as CARDINAL other detainees , were beaten with truncheons during the wake - up . Finally , another detainee received a truncheon blow on DATE ( count CARDINAL ) .

Before the court the applicants maintained their claims . The court decided , however , that their allegations were contradicted by the reports on the use of rubber truncheons ( cited above ) and witness statements by representatives of the colony administration .

The employees of the colony , including PERSON and PERSON , as well as PERSON subordinates , denied any unjustified use of rubber truncheons on detainees . The colony doctor confirmed that a few detainees had applied for medical assistance after they had been hit with truncheons ; however , no one had had broken ribs or been in a serious condition . Nor had medical assistance been refused to anyone . The CARDINAL detainees heard by the court corroborated the statements by the other victims .

On DATE the trial court delivered judgment . It acquitted Mr B. of the charges , finding as follows :

“ Under LAW and LAW , employees of penitentiary institutions may use special means , including rubber truncheons , in cases of persistent disobedience to the lawful demands of the colony staff ... The court has established that ... all demands ... were lawful . In all cases the use of [ rubber truncheons ] was justified because they were used after ... a warning of the intention to use a [ truncheon ] and because they were used when the victims refused to execute lawful demands of the staff , that is , disobedience to the colony staff ... Each use of the [ truncheon ] was reported to B. if he was absent during its application ... There are therefore no grounds to consider that [ B. ] did not exercise appropriate control over the lawfulness of the actions of his subordinates and in that way unduly performed his duties .

Nor did the court establish violations of rights and lawful interests of citizens who are the victims in the present case ... [ T]he court considers that damage to their health was caused on lawful grounds ...

[ T]he court also takes into account that criminal proceedings against the unit officers were discontinued for lack of evidence of a criminal offence ... That decision has not been quashed . It does not , in itself , confirm the lawfulness of the unit ORG actions ... but it prevents [ the court ] from establishing the facts of unlawful actions . ”

NORP The prosecution and CARDINAL victims appealed against the acquittal . The prosecution submitted , in particular , that the trial court had based its judgments on the statements by the defendant , his subordinates and the colony administration and disregarded submissions by the detainees . It pointed out factual discrepancies : thus , according to the statements by PERSON ’s subordinates , they had used truncheons CARDINAL times , but PERSON had signed CARDINAL reports on the use of special means . Moreover , it noted that the infliction of physical pain and bodily injuries had clearly violated the GPE right and lawful interests and that the trial court had failed to identify lawful grounds for the use of physical force and special means .

On DATE ORG examined the points of appeal and upheld the judgment of DATE . It noted that Mr B. had played a “ merely nominal ” part in the events and that he had not been able , or obliged , to control the conduct of each unit officer in his absence . He had not given orders to use truncheons and he had not used them himself . The appellate court held that in these circumstances the acquittal on the charge of undue performance of professional duties had been lawful and justified . It further noted that the investigative bodies had discontinued the proceedings against PERSON on the charge of excess of power and against his subordinates for the lack of evidence of a criminal offence and it was not therefore required to rule on those issues .

Further to the ORG ’s request , the ORG submitted handwritten and typed copies of the applicants’ medical records .

The medical records of the applicants Mr Dedovskiy , PERSON , PERSON , PERSON and PERSON do not contain any entries relating to the time of the events described above . The entry of DATE in Mr PERSON ’s medical record indicates that he was beaten by unidentified persons and underwent in - patient treatment in DATE for affected kidneys .

The medical record of the applicant PERSON indicates that on DATE he was referred to the prison hospital for treatment for inguinal hernia . In DATE he applied to the medical department in connection with recrudescence of otitis media , first diagnosed in DATE .

According to his medical record , on DATE Mr PERSON asked to be examined by a psychiatrist , complaining of headache . There are no other entries for DATE . In DATE , DATE and DATE Mr GPE received treatment for craniocerebral injury of an unspecified origin . According to the Government , that injury was the result of head traumas in DATE .

Detainees and the premises where they live may be searched ( Article CARDINAL § § CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) .

Physical force , special means or weapons may be used against detainees if they offer resistance to the officers , persistently disobey lawful demands of the officers , engage in riotous conduct , take part in mass disorders , take hostages , attack individuals or commit other publicly dangerous acts , escape from the penitentiary institution or attempt to harm themselves or others ( Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) . The procedure for application of these security measures is determined in the NORP legislation ( Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) .

When using physical force , special means or weapons , the penitentiary officers must :

( CARDINAL ) NORP state their intention to use them and afford the detainee(s ) sufficient time to comply with their demands unless a delay would imperil life or limb of the officers or detainees ;

( CARDINAL ) NORP ensure the least possible harm to detainees and provide medical assistance ;

( CARDINAL ) report every incident involving the use of physical force , special means or weapons to their immediate superiors ( section CARDINAL ) .

Rubber truncheons may be used for

( CARDINAL ) putting an end to assaults on officers , detainees or civilians ;

( CARDINAL ) NORP repressing mass disorders or group violations of public order by detainees , as well as for apprehension ( задержание ) of offenders who persistently disobey or resist the officers ( section CARDINAL ) .

If criminal proceedings are discontinued at the stage of the investigation , a victim or a civil party may lodge a separate civil claim unless the proceedings were discontinued on the ground that ( a ) the alleged offence had not been committed ( otsutstvie sobytiya prestupleniya ) or ( b ) the suspect had not been involved in its commission ( LAW and LAW ( CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ) .

If the defendant is acquitted by the trial court on the ground that ( a ) the alleged offence was not committed or ( b ) the defendant was not involved in its commission , the trial court will dismiss the civil claim . If the defendant is acquitted on the ground that CARDINAL or more constituent elements of a criminal offence are missing ( LAW ( CARDINAL ) ) , the trial court will disallow the civil claim but it may be lodged again in separate civil proceedings ( LAW ) .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy

Javier Borrego Borrego;Karel Jungwiert;Margarita Tsatsa-Nikolovska;Mark Villiger;Peer Lorenzen;Renate Jaeger;Volodymyr Butkevych

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in the village of GPE , GPE , GPE .

The applicant is a former employee of ORG ( ДОАО шахта ім. GPE , hereafter “ the Mine ” ) . He is suffering from an occupational disease .

In DATE a medical commission established that due to his occupational disease the applicant had permanently lost PERCENT of his ability to work .

As during his employment with the Mine the applicant had served in several different capacities , on DATE he brought proceedings against his former employer , seeking to have identified the work which had caused his occupational disease . He also sought recovery of his occupational disability allowance arrears .

On DATE the judge of ORG ( Ровеньківський міський суд , hereafter “ the ORG ” ) , dealing with the applicant 's case , ordered an additional medical examination to determine the degree of his disability .

On DATE ORG of ORG ( ORG обласне бюро судово-медичних експертиз ) confirmed the applicant 's previous diagnosis and the fact that he had lost PERCENT of his ability to work .

On DATE ORG terminated the proceedings as the parties had reached a friendly settlement under which the Mine was to pay the applicant CARDINAL NORP hryvnas ( ORG ) in compensation .

On an unspecified date in DATE the applicant requested a supervisory ( наглядове ) review of the above decision , stating that he had agreed to the friendly settlement under unlawful pressure from the trial judge .

On DATE the ORG of ORG ( ORG обласний суд , hereafter “ the ORG ” ) , acting upon an extraordinary appeal ( протест в порядку нагляду ) of the Deputy President of this court , quashed the decision of DATE and remitted the case for a fresh consideration . It was found that the first - instance court had not examined the possible consequences of this decision for the parties .

Of CARDINAL hearings scheduled for the period DATE one was adjourned at the applicant 's request and CARDINAL were cancelled on account of the applicant 's and his lawyer 's absence from the courtroom . This delayed the proceedings for a total of DATE .

On CARDINAL occasions during this period the Mine 's representative failed to appear . During this period the applicant filed CARDINAL successful and CARDINAL unsuccessful challenges to the impartiality of the presiding judge .

On DATE ORG , having heard the parties and examined the case file , allowed the applicant 's claims in part . The applicant appealed , considering that the sum of the disability allowance arrears which had been awarded to him was insufficient .

On DATE ORG quashed this decision on the ground that the first - instance court had failed to give due consideration to all the applicant 's claims and that the amount of his allowance had been calculated wrongly . The case was remitted for a fresh hearing .

Of CARDINAL hearings fixed for the period from DATE CARDINAL were quashed due to the failure of the Mine 's representative to appear .

On DATE ORG ( ORG ) , in response to the applicant 's complaint about the length of the proceedings , urged ORG ( PERSON суд ORG області , ORG as renamed on DATE , hereafter “ the ORG ” ) to take the necessary measures to ensure the prompt determination of the applicant 's claims .

On DATE ORG found for the applicant in part . The court identified the work which had caused the applicant 's occupational disease . However , his compensation claims were rejected in their entirety . The applicant appealed against the latter part of the judgment .

On DATE ORG quashed the appealed part of the judgment and remitted the question of disability allowance arrears for a fresh consideration . ORG indicated that the first instance court had failed to examine thoroughly the applicant 's statements as to the wrong calculation of the amount of his allowance .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant 's compensation claims as unsubstantiated . The applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG quashed this judgment and remitted the case for a fresh consideration , relying on the same grounds as those stated in its decision of DATE .

On DATE ORG , based on the case file and the parties ' oral submissions , rejected the applicant 's claims for recovery of disability allowance arrears as unsubstantiated . The applicant lodged an appeal against this judgment .

On DATE ORG changed this decision and ordered the Mine to pay the applicant a lump sum of UAH MONEY . Considering this sum insufficient the applicant appealed in cassation .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's appeal in cassation .

This decision was served on the applicant on DATE .


The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before ORG , Solicitors , GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant was in receipt of child benefit until DATE or DATE . His wife died on DATE and he remarried in DATE .

His formal claim for widows’ benefits was made in DATE and was rejected on DATE on the ground that he was not entitled to widows’ benefits because he was not a woman . The applicant requested ORG to reconsider this decision . On DATE the original decision was confirmed .

The domestic law relevant to this application is set out in PERSON v. the GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , ORG CARDINAL-IV .


The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in Ramenskoye in LOC . He was represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON and PERSON . PERSON , lawyers practising in PERSON in LOC . The respondent Government were represented by PERSON , the representative of GPE at ORG .

On DATE ORG found the applicant guilty of murder and affray and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment .

On DATE , upon the applicant 's appeal , ORG of GPE acquitted him of affray and reclassified the charge of murder to CARDINAL of manslaughter . The applicant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to DATE imprisonment . The court further applied an amnesty law and released the applicant from serving his sentence .

On an unspecified date the Deputy Prosecutor General lodged with the Presidium of ORG of GPE an application for supervisory review of the case , requesting it to quash the decisions of CARDINAL DATE and DATE .

On DATE the ORG of ORG granted the application , quashed the decisions and remitted the case to ORG for a fresh examination . The Presidium of ORG found , inter alia , that the courts in the previous proceedings had wrongly assessed the evidence , incorrectly applied the law and denied the procedural right of the victims to participate in the hearing before ORG on DATE . Neither the applicant nor his counsel was aware of the examination of the case by way of supervisory review on DATE .

On DATE ORG held a hearing in the presence of the applicant and his counsel . The court found the applicant guilty of murder and affray and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment .

On DATE , on the applicant 's appeal , ORG of the Russian Federation reduced the sentence to DATE imprisonment .

Under LAW in force at the material time applications for supervisory review of decisions of ORG of GPE were to be considered by the ORG of ORG of GPE . No appeal was allowed against a decision of the Presidium of ORG of the Russian Federation taken on the supervisory review .

A review of the domestic law concerning supervisory review proceedings is set out in Nikitin v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE .


David Thór Björgvinsson;George Nicolaou;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Päivi Hirvelä;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

NORP The applicant , ORG , née GPE , is an NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She was represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their then Agent , PERSON of ORG .

NORP The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP On DATE ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) recognised the existence of the applicant ’s father ’s property rights over a plot of land measuring QUANTITY . m situated in the city of GPE ( vendim vërtetim fakti ) . On an unspecified date , a CARDINAL - storey building was constructed on that plot of land , including the bar - restaurant “ DATE ” , located on the ground floor .

On an unspecified date the President of the then ORG made a request for supervisory review in respect of the decision of DATE . On DATE ORG decided to quash that decision on the ground that a thorough investigation had not been conducted by the lower court , and remitted the case for fresh examination . On CARDINAL DATE , following a request for interpretation , the then ORG ruled that its decision of CARDINAL DATE had not had any effect on the outcome of the proceedings decided by way of the ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

It would appear that the rehearing proceedings were dismissed by ORG on an unspecified date , following the applicant ’s loss of interest in the case .

On DATE ORG on ORG and Compensation of Properties ( GPE i GPE dhe PERSON Pronave – “ the Commission ” ) recognised the Ks’ ( third parties ) inherited property title to a plot of land measuring CARDINAL sq . m ( “ Commission decision no . CARDINAL ” ) , including the right to first refusal on the premises of the bar - restaurant “ DATE ” .

On an unspecified date the PERSON requested ORG to recognise their property title to the plot of land on which the “ DATE ” had been built . On DATE ORG , relying on its decision of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , dismissed their claim . It annulled Commission decision no . CARDINAL and recognised the applicant ’s and her GPE property rights over the plot of QUANTITY m. On an unspecified date the GPE appealed .

On DATE ORG upheld ORG decision recognising the applicant ’s and her ORG title to the plot of QUANTITY m. However , it quashed the part of ORG decision that had annulled Commission decision no . CARDINAL , in so far as the Commission had not been invited as a party to the proceedings . On an unspecified date the GPE appealed to ORG .

On DATE ORG quashed both lower courts’ decisions . Deciding on the facts , it dismissed the Ks’ complaints in the light of their withdrawal from the case . The Commission decision of CARDINAL DATE thus became enforceable .

Interpreting ORG decision of DATE as having recognised the applicant and her ORG property title to the plot of land , on DATE the ORG recognised the applicant ’s and her ORG inherited property title to QUANTITY . m ( “ Commission decision no . CARDINAL ” ) , including the right to first refusal in respect of the premises of the “ DATE ” . On DATE the applicant ’s siblings , by means of a contract of donation , donated their equal shares in the land to the applicant .

On DATE a contract of sale was concluded between a ORG - owned company , ORG , ORG , ( “ the ORG ” ) , and the applicant , whereby the latter acquired the premises of the “ DATE ” for CARDINAL NORP leks ( ALL ) .

NORP The applicant was also issued with a certificate of registration of property ( no . CARDINAL ) by ORG , dated DATE .

On DATE the GPE lodged a complaint with ORG requesting the annulment of Commission decision no . CARDINAL . It appears from the file that the applicant was not a party to these proceedings .

On DATE ORG decision no . CARDINAL . Relying on ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , it found that Commission decision no . CARDINAL had been issued in breach of the law as the applicant ’s property rights had been quashed . ORG further noted that since the applicant had failed to pursue the application following the remittal of her case by virtue of ORG decision of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , it had dismissed the proceedings .

This decision became final , no appeal having been filed against it .

In the light of the invalidity of Commission decision no . CARDINAL , on DATE the ORG and the PERSON filed a complaint with ORG against the contract of sale , alleging that it was null and void .

On DATE ORG annulled the contract of sale , relying on the same reasoning as in the decision of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . It decided that the amount paid , indexed to take account of inflation , should be returned to the applicant . On DATE the applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG quashed ORG decision and remitted the case for re - examination by a different formation of that court , holding as follows :

“ In re - examining the case ORG should take into account any overlapping of the plots of land allocated by the Commission ’s decisions ... ORG should correctly identify the parties , summon the Commission and conduct a topographic study to look into and clarify the foregoing . ”

On DATE ORG declared Commission decision no . CARDINAL null and void . It also declared void the contract of sale and ordered the ORG to reimburse the sum paid by the applicant , indexed to take account of inflation . On an unspecified date the applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG ( “ the Court of Appeal ” ) quashed the ORG decision . It found that Commission decision no . CARDINAL was still in force as it had not been challenged before the domestic courts . No reference was made to the ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph DATE above ) . The proceedings initiated by the GPE were dismissed . On an unspecified date the GPE lodged an appeal with ORG .

On DATE ORG quashed ORG decision and remitted the case for re - examination . It found that ORG had failed to rule on all of the Ks’ complaints .

On DATE ORG upheld ORG decision of DATE . It found , inter alia , as follows :

“ ORG by a decision ... in DATE ... made an interpretation of the decision ... dated DATE . According to its interpretation , the plaintiffs’ [ the Ks’ ] withdrawal resulted from the fact that they had become the owners of the plot of land as a result of the Commission decision of DATE [ Commission decision No . CARDINAL ] .

ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE did not recognise the right of property of the defendant [ i.e. the applicant ] and , as such , it could not serve as a property title on the basis of which the ORG could act .

The defendant argued that her property title was based on the ORG decision of DATE . However , this decision was quashed by ORG decision of DATE . ”

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal with ORG .

On DATE ORG , by a majority , upheld the decision . It confirmed that the applicant ’s right to property had not been recognised , finding that the Commission had not only committed procedural violations in awarding the property to the applicant , but had also misinterpreted the merits of the applicant ’s case . ORG ordered that the sum paid by the applicant should be reimbursed in accordance with the terms of the decision of ORG of CARDINAL DATE . On DATE the applicant filed a constitutional complaint with ORG .

On DATE ORG declared the applicant ’s complaint inadmissible , finding that it did not raise any breaches of the right to a fair hearing .

On DATE the ORG ordered that the amount of ALL CARDINAL be returned to the applicant pursuant to the DATE ORG judgment .

On DATE the applicant informed the ORG in writing that the judgment had been enforced on an unspecified date . No supporting documents were submitted by the applicant , despite the ORG ’s request to do so in their letter of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the applicant filed an application with ORG for review of its decision of DATE in the light of new evidence and facts . She complained , inter alia , in the light of a letter from ORG and Tourism , that CARDINAL of the CARDINAL experts who had prepared the experts’ report had not been licensed by the authorities .

On DATE ORG rejected that application . It made reference to the previous court rulings , outlined the reasons for the applicant ’s request for review and concluded that the request did not comply with LAW ( see “ Relevant domestic law ” below ) . Judge PERSON , who had also been in the majority which had ruled against the applicant in ORG decision of decision of DATE , was a member of the bench .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal .

On an unspecified date the applicant renewed her request for review .

On DATE ORG rejected it as being substantially the same as the previous request .

On DATE ORG declared the applicant ’s complaint inadmissible , finding that the issues raised fell within the jurisdiction of the lower courts .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE the applicant informed ORG that she had brought proceedings against the ORG for reimbursement of expenses incurred in the maintenance and renovation of the bar - restaurant “ ORG ” .

On DATE and DATE ORG and ORG , respectively , ruled in favour of the applicant . The parties have not provided copies of the NORP decisions . However , an appeal before ORG appears to be currently pending .

The relevant parts of LAW read as follows :

“ Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL

In the protection of his constitutional and legal rights , freedoms and interests , or in defending a criminal charge , everyone has the right to a fair and public hearing , within a reasonable time , by an independent and impartial court established by law . ”

“ Article CARDINAL

The Constitutional Court shall determine : ... ( f ) complaints by individuals alleging a violation of their constitutional rights to a fair hearing , provided all legal remedies for the protection of those rights have been exhausted . ”

“ Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL

State bodies shall comply with judicial judgments . ”

Articles CARDINAL - CARDINAL of the ORG govern the review of court judgments . Article CARDINAL provides that the review of a final decision may occur , inter alia , when : ( a ) new circumstances or new written evidence which are important to the case , which could not have been known to the party during the proceedings , are discovered ; or ( b ) it is proved that ORG statements or experts’ opinions on which the decision is based were false .

Under LAW ORG a request for review is submitted within DATE of the date on which the requesting party had knowledge of the ground for review and , in any case , not DATE from the date on which the ground for review came into existence . LAW ORG states that an inadmissibility decision on the request for revision is taken by ORG without the parties being present .


Preliminary objection rejected (ratione materiae);Violation of Art. 14+8;Not necessary to examine Art. 8;Just satisfaction reserved

The first applicant , Mr PERSON , who was born in DATE , is the adopted son of the second applicant , PERSON . The second applicant was the first applicant ’s supervisor , as Mr PERSON is mentally handicapped . They both lived in GPE . She died when the proceedings were still pending before the ORG .

In DATE Mrs Carolina Pujol PERSON , the widow of ORG , died leaving CARDINAL children : ORG , GPE and PERSON . She had made a will before a notary in DATE . Under the seventh clause of her will , she settled her estate on her son , ORG , as tenant for life . Should he be unable to inherit , the estate was to pass to his sister , GPE , and if she was also unable to inherit , it was to pass to PERSON son , PERSON .

NORP The testatrix indicated that ORG , the beneficiary and life tenant under her will , was to transfer the estate to a son or grandson of a lawful and canonical marriage . To that effect she had inserted the following clause in her will : “ The future heir to the estate must leave it to a son or grandson of a lawful and canonical marriage ... ” ( “ El qui arribi a ésser hereu haurà forçosament de transmetre l’herència a un fill o net de legítim i canònic matrimoni ... ) ” .

Should those conditions not be met , the testatrix had stipulated that the children and grandchildren of the remaindermen under the settlement would be entitled to her estate .

The beneficiary under the will , ORG , contracted canonical marriage to the second applicant , PERSON . By deed drawn up on QUANTITY DATE before a notary in GPE ( GPE ) , they adopted a child , PERSON , in accordance with the procedure for full adoption . They subsequently adopted a second child .

NORP In DATE ORG made a will in which he left MONEY ( ORG ) to his son , PERSON ( the first applicant ) , and EUR CARDINAL to his daughter . He named his wife , PERSON ( the second applicant ) , sole heir to the remainder of his estate . In a codicil of DATE , ORG left the assets he had inherited under his mother ’s will to his wife for life and to his adopted son , PERSON , as remainderman . The assets in question consisted of real estate . On DATE ORG died . The codicil was opened on DATE .

Accordingly , the only potential heirs to the estate under the will are the applicants , PERSON and his mother , and CARDINAL sisters , GPE and NORP PERSON , who are the great - grandchildren of the testatrix .

On DATE Carolina and NORP PERSON brought proceedings in ORG to have the codicil of DATE declared null and void and seeking an order requiring the applicants , as defendants in the proceedings , to return to the plaintiffs all the assets of the estate of ORG PERSON , their great - grandmother , and to pay them damages for unlawful possession of the assets .

In a judgment delivered on DATE , after hearing submissions from both sides , ORG of ORG dismissed the action for the following reasons :

III . Both parties agree that it is the contents of the will that determine the testatrix ’s intention at the time of making it , so that the will has to be interpreted in accordance with that intention , which is to be inferred from the words used in the will ( Digest CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL ) . Since DATE it has been apparent from the case - law of the PERSON courts ( judgment of the Judge of Appeals dated DATE ) that ‘ on both a partially intestate and a testate succession it is principally the testator ’s intention that must be taken into account , as can be inferred from many provisions of ORG and canon law ... ’

IV . In her will dated DATE , the testatrix stipulated that ... ‘ The future heir to the estate must leave it to a son or grandson of a lawful and canonical marriage ... ’ [ ‘ NORP qui arribi a ésser hereu haurà forçosament de transmetre l’herència a un fill o net de legítim i canònic matrimoni ... ’ ] .

In doing so , the will in question set up a family settlement si sine liberis decesserit . An analysis of this type of settlement shows that the purpose is to secure and preserve the estate by keeping it in the settlor ’s family .

PERSON In interpreting the contents of the will in question , account has to be taken , as has previously been stated , of the testatrix ’s intention in the light of the words used and the actual nature of the society in which she lived .

When the will was made , the LAW had not been enacted and there was no ordinary statute or other relevant analogous provisions . Consequently , for the purposes of interpreting the wording in the will reference has to be made to customary law , the ius commune , deriving from the influence of NORP law as amended by canon law , and to the relevant case - law of the LOC courts ... Foreign legislation , case - law and legal theory can not apply in the present case .

The Corpus Iuris provided for the institution of adoption and included in the word ‘ child’ , children born out of wedlock and adopted children ... by providing for CARDINAL forms of adoption : CARDINAL undertaken under the authority of a princep and the other before a judge . The procedure followed in the first case was to ask the adoptive parent if he sought to take the adopted child as his legitimate child and to ask the adopted child if he consented . It was also stipulated that ‘ a consanguineous relationship is not instituted by deed but by birth or solemn adoption’ ( NORP and PERSON , Codi DATE , DATE ) . Furthermore , ‘ the father - child bond is not created by mere declarations or false assertions , even if both parties consent , but only by lawful marriage or solemn adoption’ ( NORP and PERSON , Codi CARDINAL , DATE , DATE ) ...

Consequently , according to the NORP concept of adoption , the adopted child leaves his family of origin and terminates all legal connection with it . On doing so he becomes the son of the adoptive parent ’s family and , as such , takes the family name and above all acquires inheritance rights . This institution has essentially been used for inheritance purposes . Subsequently , CARDINAL forms of adoption became available : full adoption and simple adoption [ menys plena ] , the sole purpose of the latter being to safeguard the adopted child ’s rights over the adoptive parent ’s estate . Full adoption is based on the idea that adoption must replace or imitate biological filiation .

VI . ... If account is taken of the fact that adoption is a legal institution whose purpose is to enable childless couples to have children ... At that time adoption therefore already satisfied a need , with the adopted child being regarded as a legitimate child . That approach was subsequently confirmed by LAW and by statute .

It can not therefore be said that , by inserting that clause , the testatrix intended to prevent adopted or non - biological children from inheriting her estate . If that had been her intention , she would have made express provision for it .

Accordingly , the codicil made by the late heir , ORG , is compatible with the deceased ORG PERSON ’s will and can not be declared null ... ”

The PERSON sisters appealed to ORG of GPE . In a judgment delivered on DATE , after hearing submissions from both sides , ORG set the lower court ’s judgment aside . It allowed the appeal , set aside the codicil of DATE , declared that the appellants were the legitimate heirs to their great - grandmother ’s estate and ordered the applicants to return the property in question . The grounds for the court ’s judgment were as follows :

“ II . ... Accordingly , the fundamental question to be resolved in the instant case is whether a child who has been adopted in accordance with the procedure for full adoption can be regarded as a child of a lawful and canonical marriage , as required by the testatrix ...

III . This question has to be resolved in accordance with the legal rules on the relationship of adopted children to their adoptive parents that were in force in DATE and DATE , that is , between the time when PERSON i PERSON made her will and the date of her death . A will becomes a legal deed from the date on which it is made in accordance with the statutory formalities . Accordingly , in interpreting the testamentary dispositions , regard must be had in the instant case to the legal position of adopted children in the social and family conditions existing in DATE when the will was made and possibly in DATE when the testatrix died ...

Legal commentators with first - hand experience of Andorran life stress that adoption is practically unheard of in GPE ( PERSON : ‘ PERSON , p. CARDINAL ) . That assertion is borne out by all the LOC case - law reports , in which there is no reference to adoption . This silence on the subject is perfectly understandable , moreover , given that the provisions of NORP law on adoption could not easily be transposed to LOC families living in DATE for the following reasons : since DATE it could be regarded as an institution that had become obsolete and , to a certain extent , unnecessary given that the main purpose – to appoint a successor or heir – had been achieved in ORG through the institution of heretament ( agreement , specific to NORP law , on the succession of a living person ) , introduced by customary law . In that social and family context , it is difficult to sustain the proposition that , in setting up a family settlement in case her heir should die without leaving offspring of a lawful and canonical marriage , the testatrix was also referring to adopted children , given that , at the time , adoption was not an established institution in the Principality of Andorra .

The fact that in the instant case the adoptive parents were married to each other does not make their adopted child a legitimate child or a child born of the marriage . The distinction according to whether a child was born in or out of wedlock is relevant only to illegitimate children ... with regard to adopted children , the distinction according to whether a child was born in or out of wedlock does not apply . Accordingly , a child adopted by a couple is an adopted child and not a legitimate child or a child of the marriage .

Furthermore , the notarially recorded deed of adoption was drawn up in GPE in accordance with the NORP procedure for full adoption ... The Law of DATE , amending LAW , is applicable to the conditions and general effects of full adoption . Under that PERSON , the act of adopting a child gave him or her the status of the adoptive father / mother ’s child , but did not give the child family status with regard to the adoptive PERSON family . Under LAW , adoption created a filial tie between the adoptive parent , the adopted child and his or her legitimate descendants , but not with the adoptive parent ’s family . Moreover , the inheritance rights were also limited in the present case : the deed of adoption referred to the relevant DATE NORP legislation , that is , a compilation of DATE NORP civil law . Article CARDINAL provided that on an intestate succession adopted children were entitled to inherit only from their adoptive father or mother and not from the rest of their adoptive GPE family . That rule reflected the idea that adoption created only a filial status and not a family status .

IV . Accordingly , from a legal standpoint , the adopted children of persons on whom an estate was settled by their father or mother were unconnected with the family circle with regard to the beneficiary ’s ascendants . That approach can largely be explained by the minimal impact of adoption on the social and family consciousness in GPE , both at the time when the will was made and when the testatrix died . The testatrix ’s presumed intention has to be established in the light of the circumstances existing at the time of her death . The adopted children of her legitimate son or of the marriage were unconnected with the family circle both from a legal and a sociological point of view .

The purpose of a family settlement si sine liberis decesserit under NORP law is to keep the family estate in the legitimate or married family and NORP legal tradition has always favoured the exclusion of adopted children from such family settlements ... Thus , in order for adopted children to inherit under this type of settlement , there must be no doubt as to the testatrix ’s intention to depart from the usual nature of this institution . In the instant case , the expression ‘ offspring of a lawful and canonical GPE , which appears in DATE will , does not suffice to infer that the testatrix intended to depart from the usual meaning given to family settlements si sine liberis decesserit under the NORP and PERSON law of succession .

PERSON It is apparent from the foregoing that , although the law in force when the child was actually adopted allowed adopted children to inherit from their adoptive parents on an intestate succession ( code CARDINAL , DATE , DATE ) , those rights can not extend to a testate succession , where the main factor is the testator ’s intention . Accordingly , any doubt as to the scope of the expression ‘ offspring of a lawful and canonical GPE falls away when the testatrix ’s intention is analysed in the light of the social , family and legal conditions in which she lived . In the present case , nothing militates in favour of including the life tenant ’s adopted children , given the minimal impact of adoption on PERSON family and inheritance law , the adopted child ’s status as the adoptive GPE child ( son ) but not as a member of the GPE family , the purpose traditionally ascribed to family settlements under NORP law , and NORP and PERSON legal tradition . ”

The applicants lodged an application with ORG to have the proceedings set aside . They submitted that the latter had breached the principle of equality before the law enshrined in LAW and that they had breached LAW ( right to judicial protection and to a fair trial ) of LAW . In a decision of DATE , ORG dismissed their application as ill - founded .

The applicants lodged an empara appeal with ORG against the decisions of ORG . They alleged a violation of LAW ( principle of children ’s equality before the law regardless of filiation ) and LAW ( right to judicial protection and a fair trial ) of LAW . In a decision of DATE , ORG declared their appeal inadmissible for the following reasons :

“ ... It seems clear that the judgment of ORG is limited to clarifying and determining , that is , interpreting , a specific point concerning the testatrix ’s intention , as expressed in her will in the form of a family settlement in favour of a child or grandson of a lawful and canonical marriage .

ORG does not at any point suggest that there is general discrimination against , or inequality between , children according to whether they are biological or adopted . Such an assertion would evidently amount to a flagrant breach of LAW and would also be contrary to the prevailing legal opinion according to which legal systems must always be interpreted , which is that all children are equal , irrespective of their origin . However , as submitted in substance by ORG , ‘ discrimination against adopted children as compared to biological children does not in the instant case derive from an act of the public authorities , that is , from the judgment of ORG of ORG , but from the intention of the testatrix or settlor regarding who should inherit under her ORG in accordance with the principle of freedom to make testamentary dispositions , which is a concrete manifestation of the general principle of civil liberty .

In its judgment , ORG confined itself to interpreting a testamentary disposition . It did so from the legal standpoint it considered adequate and in accordance with its unfettered discretion , seeing that the interpretation of legal instruments is a question of fact which , as such , falls under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts .

The applicants lodged an appeal ( recurso de súplica ) with ORG , which dismissed it on DATE .

Articles DATE , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW of DATE provide :

“ CARDINAL . Everyone is equal before the law . No one may be discriminated against on grounds of birth , race , sex , origin , religion , opinions or any other personal or social condition .

NORP The public authorities shall create the conditions necessary to give full effect to the principles of equality and freedom . ”

“ CARDINAL . The civil status of persons and forms of marriage shall be regulated by law . Canonical marriages are recognised as having civil effects .

Both spouses have the same rights and duties . All children are equal before the law , regardless of their filiation . ”

“ Everyone has the right to respect for their privacy , honour and image . Everyone is entitled to legal protection from unlawful interference with their private and family life . ”

Section CARDINAL of the Special Law ( qualificada ) of DATE on the adoption and protection of minors in distress provides :

“ ... Adopted children have the same rights and obligations within the adoptive family as legitimate children . ”


George Nicolaou;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON . He is represented before the Court by Ms A. Przedpełska , a lawyer practising in PERSON . The Polish Government ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

Since his early childhood , the applicant has been suffering from epilepsy marked by frequent seizures .

On DATE the applicant was remanded in custody in GPE in connection with criminal proceedings pending at that time against him . During his detention , he was treated at ORG .

On DATE the applicant was extradited to GPE .

On DATE he was convicted of a criminal offence by a competent NORP court and sentenced to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment .

The proceedings are currently pending on appeal .

On DATE the applicant was committed to FAC .

On DATE he was transferred to the hospital of FAC .

On DATE the applicant was discharged from the hospital and transported in a prison van to FAC ( a journey of QUANTITY ) . He was committed to FAC TIME . Subsequent short stopovers took place on DATE at PERSON and ORG .

On DATE at TIME the applicant arrived at FAC . He was detained there until DATE when he was released .

On DATE the applicant was committed to ORG to serve his prison sentence .

DATE , on DATE he was granted prison leave on health grounds .

The applicant submitted that in FAC he had been detained in overcrowded cells . The cells in question measured on average QUANTITY . m and were shared by CARDINAL detainees including the applicant ( QUANTITY . m per person ) . They were insufficiently lit . As a result , the applicant ’s eyesight deteriorated .

The applicant also claimed that the cells had been dirty and infested with insects . They were furnished with triple bunk beds , CARDINAL tables and stools . The toilet annex in each cell was not separated and there was always a stench inside .

The applicant also complained of being bullied and laughed at by the staff of ORG .

The Government acknowledged that from DATE until DATE , with the exception of DATE , ORG had been overcrowded . The degree by which the number of prisoners exceeded the maximum capacity for that detention facility ( calculated on the basis of the standard of QUANTITY m of cell space per prisoner provided for in NORP law ) ranged from PERCENT in DATE until DATE . It was PERCENT in DATE , PERCENT in DATE , PERCENT in DATE , PERCENT in DATE , and PERCENT in DATE .

Moreover , the detailed records provided by the Government reveal the following information concerning the applicant .

From DATE until DATE the applicant was assigned to cell no . CARDINAL which measured QUANTITY m. It was shared by CARDINAL detainees , including the applicant ( CARDINAL to QUANTITY m per person ) .

From DATE the applicant was committed to cell no . CARDINAL which measured QUANTITY m and was shared by CARDINAL detainees including the applicant ( QUANTITY per person ) .

From DATE until DATE he was again detained in cell no . CARDINAL , which was this time shared by CARDINAL persons ( CARDINAL to QUANTITY . m per person ) .

Lastly , from DATE to CARDINAL DATE and from CARDINAL to CARDINAL DATE the applicant was held in cells CARDINAL . CARDINAL and CARDINAL respectively , which measured over QUANTITY . m and were shared by CARDINAL detainees including the applicant ( CARDINAL to QUANTITY per person ) .

The Government also submitted that the applicant ’s cells had been clean , with the toilet annex separated by a concrete or plywood wall . The applicant had CARDINAL shower per week and an TIME ’s outdoor exercise per day .

The applicant submitted that in FAC he had not been under regular medical supervision and that his epilepsy had been treated with inadequate generic drugs administered in wrong dosages . As a result his epileptic seizures had increased and he had lived in constant fear for his life and in despair .

Ambulances were called to the remand centre for the applicant on CARDINAL occasions ( namely , CARDINAL times in DATE and CARDINAL times in DATE , CARDINAL times in DATE , CARDINAL in DATE and CARDINAL in DATE ) . He continued to have fits in FAC hospital , although , as he submitted , the medicine he received there had been more effective . The applicant also submitted that throughout his detention he had often been taken to the local hospitals in GPE for emergency treatment .

During the applicant ’s journey from ORG on CARDINAL and DATE , he did not receive adequate medical attention . His medicine was administered in the evening of DATE in FAC . TIME , however , despite his repeated requests , the applicant did not receive any drugs . On DATE at TIME he had a serious epileptic fit , after which he lost consciousness .

On DATE the applicant had a serious epileptic seizure during his outdoor exercise in FAC . He fell and hit his head on the concrete floor of the courtyard . He received some help from his fellow inmates . TIME into the seizure the applicant was surrounded by the remand centre ’s guards who were armed and wearing bullet proof vests . A remand centre doctor and a nurse only arrived TIME . The applicant was given an injection . Still unconscious , he was taken inside the building , where he was given another injection . He was then moved inside his cell , where he suffered from another seizure . Only then was an ambulance called and the applicant received some further medical treatment .

On DATE he was denied access to the remand centre ’s in - house doctor , even though he was not feeling well . His legs became momentarily paralysed and he was dragged into his cell by his fellow inmates . Since then , he has had difficulty walking .

The Government submitted that throughout his detention the applicant had been under constant medical treatment and care in conformity with the requirements of his medical condition and the recommendations of specialist doctors . In order to avoid any accidents or injuries the applicant was assigned a bottom bunk bed . He was also regularly administered medicines as prescribed by a neurologist and a psychiatrist .

The Government did not comment on the number of the applicant ’s epileptic seizures and medical emergencies . It was noted , however , that despite the efforts of the remand centre ’s medical staff , the applicant ’s epileptic fits had become more frequent and more serious .

In DATE the applicant had to be hospitalised in FAC . He was prescribed complex pharmacological treatment for patients with medicine - resistant epilepsy . The treatment gave good results and on DATE the applicant was transferred back to FAC in good condition with the recommendation to follow further treatment as an out - patient .

The Government did not comment on the applicant ’s transport from the hospital in ORG on DATE . They also did not refer to the alleged incidents of CARDINAL and DATE .

In the ORG ’s submission , until his release from the remand centre on DATE , the applicant ’s seizures were mild and less frequent than before his hospitalisation .

On the other hand , when the applicant returned to prison on DATE after DATE at liberty , his epilepsy was much worse than before his release . A medical examination of DATE confirmed that the applicant was at risk of suffering injuries during his epileptic fits in prison and that he was not fit for further detention . On these grounds the authorities of FAC applied to suspend the execution of the applicant ’s sentence ( zawieszenie wykonania kary ) . The suspension was granted on DATE .

On DATE ORG ( Sąd Apelacyjny ) examined the applicant ’s interlocutory appeal against a decision to extend his pre - trial detention . The applicant argued , among other things , that he had not been fit for further detention . The domestic court relied on an expert report which had been obtained by the first - instance court reviewing the applicant ’s preventive measure . It appears from another document in the ORG ’s possession that the expert report in question was ordered by ORG on DATE . As quoted by ORG , the expert had concluded that the applicant could receive adequate treatment in detention .

The hospital information chart ( karta informacyjna ) of DATE , which was signed by a neurology specialist , PERSON , contained the following relevant information : “ Recommendations for further treatment : Periodical neurological check - ups . Regular pharmacological treatment . Bottom bunk bed . Medicine : Tegretol PERSON CARDINAL x CARDINAL pill , Lamotrix CARDINAL x CARDINAL mg , PERSON x CARDINAL mg . ”

On DATE the applicant was certified as having a mild disability ( umiarkowany stopień niepełnosprawności ) . The relevant document stated that the applicant had had the disability DATE .

Since his release the applicant has been receiving constant medical treatment but his epilepsy is very severe . He suffers from frequent seizures , dizziness and anxiety . He claimed that he had to be accompanied by another person in his DATE routine .

CARDINAL DATE the applicant was admitted to ORG ( PERSON ) because he had broken his elbow during one of his epileptic fits .

The applicant submitted that his current state of health had been caused by the inadequate treatment provided to him in prison .

The applicant lodged numerous complaints with ORG FAC , the Director of ORG and with other prison authorities . He claimed that he had not received adequate medical care in FAC . He also alleged to have been denied access to his medical records .

Moreover , the applicant submitted many habeas corpus requests , asking to be released on health grounds .

Lastly , the applicant submitted that he could not afford to bring a civil lawsuit .

The provisions pertaining to medical care in detention facilities and general conditions of detention , and the relevant domestic law and practice are set out in the ORG ’s judgments in the cases of PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ; PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE ... ( extracts ) ; and PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE . More recent developments are described in the ORG ’s decision in the case of PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) .

In particular , the following civil - law provisions regulate ORG liability in tort .

LAW contains a non - exhaustive list of “ personal rights ” ( prawa osobiste ) . This provision states :

“ The personal rights of an individual , such as , in particular , health , liberty , honour , freedom of conscience , name or pseudonym , image , secrecy of correspondence , inviolability of the home , scientific or artistic work , [ as well as ] inventions and improvements , shall be protected by the civil law regardless of the protection laid down in other legal provisions . ”

LAW provides :

“ A person whose personal rights are at risk [ of infringement ] by a third party may seek an injunction , unless the activity [ complained of ] is not unlawful . In the event of infringement [ the person concerned ] may also require the party who caused the infringement to take the necessary steps to remove the consequences of the infringement ... In compliance with the principles of this LAW [ the person concerned ] may also seek pecuniary compensation or may ask the court to award an adequate sum for the benefit of a specific public interest . ”

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Civil Code provides :

“ ORG , or [ as the case may be ] a self - government entity or other legal person responsible for exercising public authority , shall be liable for any damage ( szkoda ) caused by an unlawful act or omission [ committed ] in connection with the exercise of public authority . ”

Moreover , LAW , applicable in the event that a person suffers a bodily injury or health disorder as a result of an unlawful act or omission of a ORG agent , reads as follows :

“ ... [ T]he court may award to the injured person an adequate sum in pecuniary compensation for the damage suffered . ”

Lastly , under LAW , a person whose personal rights have been infringed may seek compensation . That provision , in its relevant part , reads as follows :

“ The court may grant an adequate sum as pecuniary compensation for non - material damage ( krzywda ) suffered to anyone whose personal rights have been infringed . Alternatively , the person concerned , regardless of seeking any other relief that may be necessary for removing the consequences of the infringement sustained , may ask the court to award an adequate sum for the benefit of a specific public interest ... ”

Article DATE of the Civil Code sets out the limitation periods for civil claims based on tort . This provision , in the version applicable as from DATE , reads , in so far as relevant , as follows :

“ CARDINAL . A claim for compensation for damage caused by a tort shall not be brought after the expiration of DATE from the date on which the claimant learned of the damage and of the person liable for it . However , this time - limit may not be longer than DATE following the date on which the event causing the damage occurred . ”


CASE OF LAWYER PARTNERS, A.S., v. SLOVAKIA

Preliminary objection dismissed (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Art. 6-1;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Giovanni Bonello;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicant is a private limited company with its registered office in GPE . The applications on its behalf were lodged by Mr PERSON and Mr PERSON , the Chairman and Vice - Chairman of its managing board .

On DATE the applicant company concluded a contract with ORG , a public - law institution . Under that contract , taken together with CARDINAL additional ones concluded on DATE and DATE , the applicant company acquired the right , in exchange for compensation paid to ORG , to recover unpaid broadcast receiver licences in CARDINAL cases , plus additional sums for default in those payments .

On DATE the GPE I ORG confirmed the validity of the above contracts . The decision became final on DATE .

The applicant company was obliged to sue those persons who had refused to pay the debt which it had acquired the right to recover . The applicant company prepared individual actions with a request for payment orders to be issued against the debtors . Given the number of persons concerned , the actions were generated by means of computer software and recorded on DVDs . The DVDs were sent to the district courts concerned , accompanied by an explanatory letter .

Thus the applicant company , on DATE and DATE , lodged actions , in electronic form , with several district courts . On DATE , after officials of ORG had stated that courts were in a position to register such actions , the applicant company resubmitted the first group of actions to the courts concerned on DVDs . The courts refused to register the actions , indicating that they lacked the equipment to receive and process submissions made and signed electronically . Further relevant details of the applications under examination are set out in Appendix I.

In CARDINAL case the applicant company submitted , on DATE , with the agreement of ORG , a printed version of the CARDINAL actions it had lodged on a DVD on DATE . The documents in support of the claims remained available on the DVD exclusively . The file numbers indicate that the ORG registered those actions as having been lodged in DATE .

On DATE the applicant company informed the ORG that its claims relating to the actions which the district courts had refused to register had become statute - barred .

In DATE , following the district courts’ refusal to register the actions it had submitted on DVDs , the applicant company lodged a complaint with ORG in respect of each individual refusal . Referring to LAW and its constitutional equivalent , it alleged a violation of its right of access to a court .

ORG rejected the complaints in the cases under consideration as having been lodged outside the statutory time - limit of DATE . The decisions stated that the applicant company had earlier learned , in the context of its previous attempts to lodge actions electronically , that district courts lacked the necessary equipment for processing such actions and had failed to lodge a complaint with ORG at that time . ORG considered it irrelevant that the above - mentioned time - limit had been complied with in respect of the district ORG refusal to register actions in those cases which underlay the constitutional complaints under consideration ( further details of the individual proceedings are set out in Appendix I ) .

On DATE several courts asked ORG for instructions as to how they should process the applicant company ’s submissions lodged in electronic form . ORG advised the courts to wait until the position had been analysed .

In a letter of DATE , the ORG stated that as ordinary courts did not have an electronic registration facility , the conditions for receiving submissions in electronic form as laid down in PERSON no . PERSON . were not met .

At meetings with presidents of district and regional courts held on DATE and from CARDINAL to CARDINAL DATE ORG concluded that ordinary courts were duly equipped for receiving submissions bearing a secured electronic signature .

A press release issued by ORG on DATE indicates that ORG had published on its website the electronic addresses of individual courts and information about the filing of submissions signed electronically .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Code of Civil Procedure , as amended with effect from DATE , reads :

“ Submissions to a court can be made in written form , by an oral statement which is recorded and transcribed , by means of electronic devices subject to the submission bearing a secured electronic signature in accordance with the applicable legislation , by telegraph or by fax . ”

Regulation no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL governs , inter alia , the organisation of work within district courts and regional courts , including their registries . The relevant provisions read :

“ Submissions received by the registry which contain a petition for proceedings to be brought shall be registered by means of technical and software devices approved by ORG and designed for processing the agenda of the courts . ”

“ Receipt of submissions made by electronic means and bearing a secured electronic signature

Submissions received by means of electronic devices and having a secured electronic signature shall be dealt with in accordance with the applicable legislation . Such submissions are to be transmitted to the central office of the court to be processed in accordance with section CARDINAL . ”

The Act on Electronic Signature CARDINAL governs the establishment and use of electronic signature , the rights and obligations of persons in that context and the protection of documents signed electronically ( section CARDINAL ) .

At the relevant time , Regulation no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL governed the use of electronic signature in , inter alia , administrative relations . It was issued by ORG and entered into force on DATE . Sections CARDINAL to CARDINAL set out details on the establishment and functioning of an electronic registry within public authorities which use secured electronic signature , the filing , processing and handling of electronic documents , as well as their format and transfer between the dispatcher and the addressee .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW DATE provides that a complaint to ORG can be lodged within DATE from the date on which the decision in question has become final and binding or on which a measure has been notified or on which notice of other interference has been given . As regards measures and other interferences , this period commences when the plaintiff could have become aware of them .

In the majority of the cases examined in the course of DATE ORG took the same approach as indicated in paragraph CARDINAL above , namely that the period of DATE under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW DATE had started running not later than in DATE , when the applicant company had learned for the first time that ordinary courts were not in a position to register submissions in electronic form .

NORP In a different decision delivered on DATE , ORG declared admissible a complaint in respect of the refusal , by ORG , to register actions lodged electronically on DATE ( proceedings no . III . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . In its judgment on the merits of DATE , ORG found a violation of LAW . It held that the relevant law entitled parties to file submissions to courts in electronic form . Public authorities were obliged to establish facilities for receiving and processing such submissions . In the above case ORG ordered ORG to proceed with the actions lodged on DVDs by the applicant company on DATE . Prior to that , the applicant company had informed ORG earlier refusal to accept a different set of actions which had been lodged on DVDs on DATE .

Since DATE all chambers of ORG have systematically approached cases of this type in the manner described in the preceding paragraph . Thus , in CARDINAL other cases concerning similar complaints lodged in DATE ORG counted DATE from the moment when the applicant company had been informed about the refusal to register each specific submission filed electronically . This approach has been applied even in cases which concerned a second refusal to register an identical submission .

In those cases ORG found a violation of the applicant company ’s right of access to a court under LAW , holding that the relevant law obliged courts to accept actions submitted by electronic means and that there existed no justification for their refusal to do so . It ordered the district courts concerned to accept those actions as having been lodged on the date when they had initially received them and to process any submissions signed electronically .