The applicants , PERSON PERSON , Mr PERSON and Mr PERSON are GPE nationals , who were born in DATE and DATE respectively . The first applicant lives in GPE . The second and third applicants live in GPE . The applicants are represented before the ORG by PERSON , Solicitors , GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the applicants , may be summarised as follows .

In its judgment ( Merits ) of DATE in the case of ORG , GMR and ORG v. GPE ( nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL and ORG ) , the ORG found that the respondent Government had breached the applicants’ right to a fair hearing since a significant part of the prosecution case against them consisted of the transcripts of the interviews they gave to ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) under statutory compulsion . These interviews were conducted during an investigation into the applicants’ alleged dishonest conduct in the context of a share support operation in the course of a take - over bid in DATE . The statutory basis for requiring the applicants to reply to the Inspectors’ questions was contained in section CARDINAL of LAW DATE .

The ORG noted in its judgment that the transcripts of the applicants’ interviews were read out to the jury by the prosecution over a DATE period and were used in a manner intended to incriminate the applicants . The ORG concluded that , in the circumstances , there had been an infringement of the right not to incriminate oneself and thus a breach of LAW ( see § § DATE and CARDINAL of the judgment and point CARDINAL of the operative provisions ) .

The ORG rejected the ORG claim for pecuniary loss on the ground that it could not speculate as to the question whether the outcome of their trial would have been any different had use not been made of the transcripts ( § CARDINAL and point CARDINAL of the operative provisions ) .

On DATE an amendment was made to section CARDINAL of LAW DATE via the enactment of ORG and Criminal Evidence Act DATE . The amended provisions came into force pursuant to SI No . CARDINAL . As a result of that amendment , the prosecution can no longer use in evidence as part of its case or in cross - examination answers obtained under compulsory powers .

Following the ORG ’s judgment the applicants succeeded in having their cases referred back to ORG by ORG ( “ CCRC ” ) under section CARDINAL of LAW DATE . The PERSON reasoned its reference decision as follows :

“ If [ the applicants’ ] replies to the compulsory interviews had been excluded from evidence , the jury would have been presented with a substantially different case to consider . The use of those interviews by the ORG had been identified by ORG as having given rise to unfairness in the trial . The developments which have taken place since [ the applicants’ ] previous appeal suggest to the Commission that there is a real possibility that the ORG might now regard the unfairness identified by the ORG as a shortcoming of such gravity that doubt is cast on the safety of the conviction . ”

In the proceedings before ORG the applicants contended that retrospective effect should be given to LAW DATE ( “ HRA ” ) so as to allow them to base a challenge to the fairness of their trial on Convention grounds , notwithstanding that their trial took place DATE before its coming into force ( DATE ) . ORG considered that the ORG argument was excluded in the light of ORG decision in PERSON ( [ DATE ] CARDINAL WLR CARDINAL ) . In that decision , which was later criticised but confirmed by ORG in the case of NORP v. GPE ( [ DATE ] CARDINAL AC CARDINAL ) , ORG ruled that the ORG did not enable an applicant to rely , during the course of a hearing held after the date on which the LAW came into force , on a breach of a LAW right which had occurred during a trial that had concluded before that date .

The applicants also contended that ORG was required to recognise and give effect to the judgment of DATE as a consequence of GPE obligations under LAW to abide by that judgment and to afford restitutio in integrum for the breach identified by ORG . In concrete terms , that meant conducting a reconsideration of the safety of the ORG conviction without reliance on the evidence which ORG found to have been admitted in breach of LAW . The applicants relied on , among other materials , Recommendation No . DATE of ORG on the re - examination or re - opening of certain cases at domestic level following judgments of ORG .

In giving the judgment of the ORG , the Vice - President , Lord Justice Rose , observed that during the course of argument , the court had indicated that :

“ ... we concluded that the compelled answers should not have been admitted in evidence , or if we concluded that we were bound to give effect to ORG decision that the trial was unfair by examining anew the safety of the convictions , we would not uphold the convictions on the basis that they are unsafe in any event . ”

Lord Justice Rose further stated :

“ In our judgment , the ORG ’s obligation under LAW to abide by the judgments of the ECtHR does not confer any right on these appellants . In any event , we doubt whether LAW requires the re - opening of convictions . This is not expressly or implicitly required by LAW and there is nothing in the GPE jurisprudence to suggest that there is any such obligation . It is to be noted that the ECtHR made a declaration of violation in relation to each of these appellants . That declaration can be , and is regarded by the ECtHR as amounting to , sufficient just satisfaction . That court could have awarded damages but did not do so . It made an award of costs which GPE has paid in fulfilment of the judgment of the court . There is no suggestion in the ECtHR ’s judgments that that court regarded the remedy of declaration and costs as insufficient , irrespective of what might or might not occur domestically . This is so even though the LANGUAGE courts ( whatever may have been the position in other countries ) have not , before the ORG , re - opened convictions solely because of a GPE finding of unfairness . Assuming , at the highest from the NORP point of view , that the GPE findings entitle them to have their convictions re - opened by this court , that would simply mean , in view of the other evidence against them , that their convictions would be quashed and a retrial ordered . This is not a case in which , in relation to any appellant , the prosecution case was dependent solely on the compelled answers : there was and is substantial other evidence against each of them . It may be , given the lapse of time in this case and other considerations , that a retrial would not , as a matter of discretion , be ordered – indeed we so indicated during the hearing . That does not detract from the point that in principle in a case such as the present where what is complained of is the use of compelled evidence but there exists other evidence on the basis of which a jury might equally have convicted , restitutio in integrum would be achieved by the ordering of a retrial . Merely to quash a conviction would in such a situation put an appellant , at any rate so far as concerns jeopardy of a conviction , in a superior position to that in which he had been before his trial . Perhaps what this discussion demonstrates is that , in relation to convictions properly secured DATE , the concept of restoring as far as possible the situation existing before the breach is somewhat elusive , the more so when the challenge is to the use of some but not all of the material deployed at trial .

However , and determinatively , even if the failure to re - open the appellants’ convictions might give rise to violation of LAW , domestic law precludes reliance on any such violation in the circumstances of this case . The fact of violation could not have led to the exclusion of the answers at the trial , applying the approach available under domestic law at the time , because this would have amounted to partial repeal of legislation enacted by ORG which authorised the use of the evidence ( ... ) . The same conclusion results from sCARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the ORG which preserves the lawfulness of the conduct of the prosecution and trial judge in relation to the admission of the ORG answers . Put another way , the will of ORG as expressed in sCARDINAL trumps any international obligation . ”

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicants’ appeals . The applicants sought leave to appeal .

On DATE ORG certified that the applicants’ appeal raised a point of law of general importance , namely :

" Where ORG ) is called upon to determine the safety of a criminal conviction following a finding by ORG that the use made at trial before DATE of evidence obtained under powers of statutory compulsion in section CARDINAL of LAW DATE rendered the appellant ’s trial unfair and in breach of LAW

( a ) is the ORG entitled to rely after DATE upon the evidence the use of which was held to have rendered the trial unfair in order to support the safety of the conviction ; and

( b ) is the ORG entitled to hold the conviction safe in reliance on such evidence ;

notwithstanding GPE obligation under LAW to abide by the judgment of ORG , and the principle of judicial comity governing the recognition and enforcement of a judgment of an international tribunal which is final and binding as between the parties to the appeal ? "

On DATE , ORG granted leave to appeal .

In addition to the arguments deployed before ORG , the applicants also relied on the relevant principles of international law in the matter of reparation for internationally wrongful acts .

The ORG appeal was dismissed on DATE .

ORG held that ORG was entitled to hold the applicants’ convictions as safe since ORG was obliged to examine the question of safety according to the law as it stood at the time of the ORG trial , and at that time section CARDINAL of LAW DATE permitted the admission in evidence of statements which the applicants were obliged to give to the ORG . ORG had since amended that LAW to bring it into line with ORG judgment . However that amendment did not apply with retrospective effect . Accordingly , ORG considered itself bound by the principle of parliamentary sovereignty to respect the legislative intention of ORG as it stood at the date of the ORG trial . The applicants had not had an unfair trial and there was no lack of safety in their conviction .

As to the effect of LAW , and the obligation of GPE to make reparation for the breach of LAW in the form of restitutio in integrum , Lord PERSON stated :

In the circumstances , I think it neither necessary nor desirable , despite the wealth of interesting material to which we were referred , to consider what full reparation or just satisfaction might require in a case such as the present in which ( if the compelled evidence were excluded ) the existing convictions could not be upheld as safe , in which there is material ( irrespective of the compelled evidence ) to support a case against the appellants , but in which ORG has indicated ( no doubt rightly , in view of the lapse of time , the serving or partial serving of prison sentences and the age and health of some of the appellants ) that the interests of justice would not appear to require a retrial even if the appeals were allowed ( see section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW DATE ) . These are no doubt questions which ORG or ORG , or both , may be called upon to address and I forbear to comment .

Recommendation No . R ( DATE ) CARDINAL

on the re - examination or reopening of certain cases at domestic level

following judgments of ORG

( Adopted by ORG

on DATE

at the PERSON meeting of ORG )

ORG , under the terms of ORG ,

Considering that the aim of ORG is to bring about a closer union between its members ;

Having regard to the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ( hereinafter " the Convention " ) ;

Noting that under LAW ( “ the LAW ) the Contracting Parties have accepted the obligation to abide by the final judgment of ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) in any case to which they are parties and that ORG shall supervise its execution ;

Bearing in mind that in certain circumstances the above - mentioned obligation may entail the adoption of measures , other than just satisfaction awarded by ORG in accordance with LAW and/or general measures , which ensure that the injured party is put , as far as possible , in the same situation as he or she enjoyed prior to the violation of the Convention ( restitutio in integrum ) ;

Noting that it is for the competent authorities of the respondent ORG to decide what measures are most appropriate to achieve restitutio in integrum , taking into account the means available under the national legal system ;

Bearing in mind , however , that the practice of ORG in supervising the execution of the ORG ’s judgments shows that in exceptional circumstances the re - examination of a case or a reopening of proceedings has proved the most efficient , if not the only , means of achieving restitutio in integrum ;

ORG , in the light of these considerations the Contracting Parties to ensure that there exist at national level adequate possibilities to achieve , as far as possible , restitutio in integrum ;

II . Encourages the Contracting Parties , in particular , to examine their national legal systems with a view to ensuring that there exist adequate possibilities of re - examination of the case , including reopening of proceedings , in instances where the ORG has found a violation of the LAW , especially where :

( i ) the injured party continues to suffer very serious negative consequences because of the outcome of the domestic decision at issue , which are not adequately remedied by the just satisfaction and can not be rectified except by re - examination or reopening , and

( ii ) the judgment of the ORG leads to the conclusion that

( a ) the impugned domestic decision is on the merits contrary to the LAW , or

( b ) the violation found is based on procedural errors or shortcomings of such gravity that a serious doubt is cast on the outcome of the domestic proceedings complained of .


A.

On DATE the applicant claimed , pursuant to LAW ( see " Relevant domestic law " below ) , restitution of real property . He alleged that he had been forced , in DATE , to sell the property to the ORG under conditions that had been imposed on him .

On DATE ORG Okresný súd - " FAC " ) granted the applicant 's claim . It noted that the applicant had been threatened with expropriation should he refuse to sell the property in question . ORG found that the purchase price had been determined by an expert of the company which had been in charge of carrying out the purchase on behalf of the ORG . It was not clear from the expert 's opinion whether he had considered all the relevant facts when determining the price . ORG therefore considered that the applicant was entitled to restitution of the property pursuant to LAW para . CARDINAL ( g ) of LAW .

On DATE the ORG branch office of ORG ( PERSON súd GPE - pobočka v Nitre - " ORG " ) granted the appeal lodged by the defendant authority and dismissed the applicant 's claim . ORG noted that the DATE sale contract had been drafted and signed in accordance with the law , and that the applicant had been paid the purchase price as determined by an expert .

ORG further established that the ORG had purchased the applicant 's real property in order to use it as a building site in the context of construction , on adjacent plots , of a heat pipe - line . After the construction had been completed , the land originally owned by the applicant was used as a parking place .

Finally , ORG noted that beside the price for his property the applicant had also been granted , in DATE , a flat in GPE which had been put at the disposal of his son , and that in the relevant documents the applicant had not mentioned that he had disagreed with the sale of his property . In ORG view , the applicant had not shown that the requirements laid down in Section CARDINAL para . CARDINAL ( g ) of LAW were met in his case .

On DATE the applicant complained to the president of ORG that at the hearing held on DATE he had not been allowed to submit orally all facts concerning his case , that the chamber president had put irrelevant questions to him and his wife , and that there had been delays in the service of ORG judgment .

On DATE the president of ORG informed the applicant that there was nothing to show that the chamber president dealing with his case had lacked impartiality or had otherwise infringed the applicant 's right to a fair hearing . The president of ORG further stated that the written version of the judgment of DATE had been submitted for distribution on DATE , and admitted that there had been a delay of DATE in its drafting .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law ( dovolanie ) against ORG judgment of DATE . He alleged that he had been obliged to sell the property under threat of expropriation , possibly without any compensation . The applicant had also been warned that criminal proceedings could be brought against him should he incite other owners not to sell their property .

The applicant further challenged the sale contract and the expert opinion , mainly because the expert determining the purchase price had not taken into consideration a part of the property which originally had been used as a bakery . He alleged that he had only obtained the contract and the expert opinion in DATE and in DATE respectively .

On DATE ORG ( Najvyšší súd ) quashed ORG judgment of DATE . It found that ORG had failed to specify correctly the defendant authority and to establish the relevant facts with sufficient certainty .

On DATE ORG quashed ORG judgment of DATE .

On DATE the applicant complained to ORG that ORG judgment on his appeal on points of law had not yet been served on him .

On DATE ORG granted the applicant 's claim again . It established that the applicant could not check whether the purchase price was correct as he had been provided , prior to the sale of his house , neither with the relevant expert opinion nor with the sale contract . ORG further found that the applicant had been informed by representatives of the competent authority that , should he not be willing to sell the property , it could be expropriated , with or without compensation .

ORG found that prior to the sale the applicant had invested into the property . In its view , it was therefore unlikely that the applicant had been genuinely willing to sell the property . ORG held that the conditions of the sale were obviously disadvantageous for the applicant since the expert had failed to take into account , when establishing the value of the property , the premises of a former bakery which had formed a part of the property , and also the fact that a part of the property had been re - built in DATE and in DATE respectively . ORG

On DATE ORG granted the defendant 's appeal and dismissed the applicant 's claim . It found , after having taken further evidence , that the applicant had not concluded the contract under duress on strikingly unfavourable conditions within the meaning of Section CARDINAL para . CARDINAL ( g ) of LAW .

ORG held , in particular , that immediately after the sale the applicant had moved to a new house which he had built . Furthermore , the applicant had arranged for an apartment , which had been granted to him in connection with the sale of the property in question , to be put at the disposal of his son in exchange for a smaller apartment used by the latter .

ORG further recalled that the possibility of expropriation of the property had been provided for by the law and considered that its mentioning , by the representatives of the competent authority , could not be regarded as a threat . ORG admitted that , as a result of the failure to provide him with the sale contract in advance , the applicant had been placed at a disadvantage . ORG recalled , however , that the applicant had signed the contract and found no evidence showing that he had done so under duress .

As to the applicant 's allegations concerning the conditions of the sale , ORG noted that the applicant had received CARDINAL NORP crowns for the property notwithstanding that the expert had evaluated it at CARDINAL crowns . It held , however , that only a price considerably below the value determined by an expert could be considered as imposing strikingly unfavourable conditions .

ORG further examined in detail the way in which the expert had determined the value of the applicant 's property . It found , with reference to the relevant price regulations , that even if the bakery invoked by the applicant had actually formed a part of the property , the latter would have fallen under a different category for which a lower compensation had been foreseen . ORG therefore found that the expert 's omission to mention the bakery in his opinion was to the applicant 's advantage .

ORG also recalled that the sale of the property had permitted the applicant to improve the living conditions of his son and concluded that the sale in question had not been carried out under conditions that were strikingly unfavourable for the applicant .

Finally , ORG referred to Section CARDINAL para . CARDINAL of LAW and held that , in any event , the property claimed by the applicant could not be restored since a heat pipe - line had been built on it .

The judge who , in the applicant 's view , had lacked impartiality in the proceedings leading to ORG judgment of DATE was not involved in the delivery of the aforesaid court 's judgment of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law . He claimed that there was no need for him to prove that he had acted under duress as it was generally known that under the communist regime the representatives of public authorities had commonly used threats and had acted arbitrarily , and that the prices for real property foreseen by the relevant regulations had been disproportionately low .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's appeal on points of law . It held that the obligation to restore the property could not be deduced generally from the then existing law or economic conditions , and that it was for the applicant to show that the requirements laid down in Section CARDINAL para . CARDINAL ( g ) of LAW were met in his particular case .

ORG found that the Regional had established all relevant facts of the case and had correctly assessed the evidence before it . In particular , ORG held that ORG had given detailed and correct reasons for its judgment and noted that in his appeal on points of law the applicant had not challenged , as such , ORG reasoning as regards the particular circumstances under which the contract had been concluded .

ORG judgment was served on the applicant in DATE .

B. Relevant domestic law

LAW ( Zákon o mimosúdnych rehabilitáciách ) of DATE , as amended , has for its aim to redress certain infringements of property and social rights which occurred DATE .

Section CARDINAL para . CARDINAL ( g ) of the LAW provides for restitution of objects which were transferred to the ORG on the basis of a sale contract concluded under duress on strikingly unfavourable conditions .

Section CARDINAL para . CARDINAL of LAW provides that plots which were built up after their transfer to the State are not liable to restitution .