Violation of Art. 5-3;Violation of Art. 5-4;Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award

On DATE the ORG ( Prokurator Rejonowy ) , on the basis of evidence obtained by ORG ( Komenda PERSON ) from ORG in GPE , opened an investigation against persons unknown into the circumstances of an attempt to obtain a loan of MONEY ( ORG ) by false pretences . On DATE the prosecutor laid charges against CARDINAL persons of having attempted to forge bank guarantees and fraudulently to seize public property .

DATE , on DATE , the ORG charged the applicant with forgery and attempting to obtain a loan of CARDINAL by false pretences , committed together with CARDINAL other persons , and detained him on remand on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences with which he had been charged .

Subsequently , on DATE , ORG ( Prokurator Wojewódzki ) took over the investigation from the ORG .

On DATE respectively , both the applicant and his defence counsel appealed against the detention order of CARDINAL DATE . The other suspects lodged similar appeals at about the same time . On DATE the ORG ( PERSON ) upheld all the detention orders .

On CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE the investigating prosecutor ordered that evidence be obtained from an expert in graphology , an expert in financial and banking matters , as well as from a psychiatrist and a psychologist . On DATE the prosecutor issued a letter of request to the NORP authorities , asking them to hear evidence from certain witnesses residing in GPE .

On DATE , at the applicant ’s request , ORG presented , in writing , detailed reasons for the charges laid against him . The prosecutor maintained , in particular , that those charges were based on abundant evidence , in particular in the form of bank documents and testimonies of the applicant ’s co - suspects . In consequence and in the light of the material collected at this stage , the prosecution considered that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant and his co - suspects had forged CARDINAL provisional bank guarantees and CARDINAL final bank guarantees in order to obtain a loan of USD MONEY .

On DATE the ORG ordered that the charges laid against the applicant in other criminal proceedings instituted against him by ORG be joined in the same criminal proceedings and , accordingly , referred the latter case to the investigating prosecutor .

On DATE , on an application by ORG , the ORG prolonged the applicant ’s and his co - suspects’ detention until DATE . On DATE , ruling on the applicant ’s appeal , ORG ( Sąd Apelacyjny ) upheld the first - instance decision .

In the meantime , on DATE , the applicant had asked ORG to release him or to vary the measure imposed on him by replacing detention by bail or police supervision . That application was rejected on DATE .

On DATE the applicant asked the ORG to release him on bail . He asserted that his detention was putting a severe strain on his family . In particular , his minor daughter had recently been examined by psychiatrists and it had been found that the separation from her father had seriously affected her mental state . He also submitted that his daughter was suffering from dyslexia and that her mental state had been rapidly worsening during DATE . The relevant facts were confirmed by a report made by a psychologist on DATE . Furthermore , the applicant stressed that there was no risk of his absconding and that the proper conduct of the proceedings could be secured by bail . On CARDINAL DATE the application was dismissed .

On DATE , ruling on an application made by ORG , the ORG prolonged the applicant ’s detention until DATE . The applicant and his defence counsel appealed against this decision on CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE respectively . ORG dismissed their appeals on an unknown date .

On DATE the applicant lodged a further application for release with the Poznań Regional Prosecutor . It was dismissed on CARDINAL DATE . The relevant decision was upheld on appeal on DATE .

On DATE the applicant ’s defence counsel applied to ORG to have the applicant released in view of the fact that his wife was ill and was to be admitted to hospital . He submitted a medical certificate . On DATE the prosecutor ordered that evidence be obtained from a medical expert in order to define the nature of the wife ’s illness and to confirm whether her state of health required treatment in hospital .

Later , on DATE and DATE , the applicant again asked the prosecutor to release him on bail . He maintained that on account of his long - lasting separation from his family both his daughter and wife were suffering from serious neurosis and depression .

Meanwhile , on DATE , ruling on an application made by ORG on an unknown date in DATE , ORG had prolonged the applicant ’s detention until DATE . On DATE the ORG , on the applicant ’s appeal , upheld that decision in view of the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question and of their serious nature .

On DATE the ORG had completed the investigation . On DATE he lodged a bill of indictment with the ORG . The applicant ’s applications for release of CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE and of DATE were referred to that court together with the case - file .

On DATE a medical expert submitted a report stating that the applicant ’s wife was suffering from neurasthenia resulting from her family situation . On DATE the ORG , after considering that report , dismissed all the CARDINAL above - mentioned applications , holding that the applicant ’s detention should continue . The court based its decision on the fact that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences with which he had been charged and the serious nature of those offences . It also found that the applicant ’s family situation did not militate against his continuing detention and that there were no grounds on which to release the applicant , as defined in LAW of LAW .

The applicant appealed on DATE , submitting , among other things , that the mere suspicion that he had committed the offences with which he had been charged could no longer suffice to justify his excessively long detention and that such reasoning showed that the court had breached the principle of the presumption of innocence . He stressed that CARDINAL of his co - defendants had already been released .

On DATE the ORG dismissed his appeal , holding that the lower court ’s findings had not concerned the question of the applicant ’s guilt but the likelihood that he had committed the offences in question . It rejected the applicant ’s argument that the CARDINAL of his co - defendants had been released and stressed that that could not be a factor militating in favour of releasing him . Furthermore , ORG considered that the applicant ’s detention should continue because of the serious nature of the charges laid against him and the fact that he had acted in an organised group .

On DATE the applicant made yet another application for release on bail , submitting that his family situation was critical , especially as the mental state of his wife and daughter had markedly worsened . On DATE the court dismissed his application , finding that even though the applicant ’s detention was indeed putting a severe strain on his family , the serious nature of the charges laid against him justified his detention .

In the meantime , on DATE , the applicant attempted to commit suicide by swallowing CARDINAL tablets of the sedative “ Relanium”[diazepam ] . On DATE a psychiatrist examined him in prison and found that he was suffering from depression that resulted from his being held in detention and from his prolonged separation from his family .

Subsequently , on an unspecified date , the ORG scheduled the trial for DATE and DATE . However , on CARDINAL DATE both hearings were cancelled because the presiding judge was ill .

On DATE and DATE the applicant and his defence counsel lodged further applications for release , still relying on the difficult situation of the applicant ’s family and , in particular , on the fact that the applicant ’s minor daughter was in need of treatment in hospital . On DATE the ORG ordered that evidence from medical experts from ORG be obtained to determine the child ’s condition . The experts submitted their report on DATE . The court dismissed the application on DATE . The applicant appealed . ORG upheld the first - instance decision on DATE .

On DATE the ORG held a hearing but decided not to examine the case on the merits and remitted it to ORG . It ordered that a further investigation be carried out . On DATE , on the parties’ appeals , ORG quashed that decision and ordered the lower court to deal with the merits of the case .

During the hearing of CARDINAL DATE the applicant unsuccessfully asked the court to release him on bail . The relevant decision was upheld on appeal on DATE . Subsequently , on CARDINAL and DATE and on a further unknown date , the applicant made similar applications . They all were dismissed on CARDINAL DATE at first instance and , on appeal , on DATE .

On DATE the applicant again asked the ORG to release him on bail in view of his family situation . He also submitted that the criminal proceedings against him were not progressing with the requisite expedience . On DATE the court dismissed the application on the ground that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question acting in an organised group . It attached considerable importance to the fact that the applicant had attempted to obtain a very substantial loan by false pretences . The court acknowledged , however , that his detention , which at the material time had exceeded DATE , had lasted for a long time . Yet in the court ’s opinion , that fact did not in itself change the reasons given to justify his being held in custody . The applicant appealed against that decision . The appeal was dismissed on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the ORG dismissed another application for release made by the applicant on DATE . That decision was upheld on appeal on DATE .

On DATE the court held a hearing . The court did not deal with the merits of the case and adjourned the trial to DATE .

During that hearing the applicant and one of his co - defendants asked for release . The court released the applicant and his co - defendant with a condition that they submit to police supervision and ordered the applicant to surrender his passport . The court further observed that at the material time the length of their detention was DATE and that it was not desirable to hold them in custody , especially as the proceedings had to be adjourned for DATE . The court found that there was no risk of collusion and that police supervision would be sufficient to secure the proper conduct of the trial . On DATE , on the Poznań Regional Prosecutor ’s appeal , ORG upheld the first - instance decision and the reasons given for it .

Later , the court listed CARDINAL hearings for DATE and DATE . Those hearings were cancelled ; the first as one of the defence lawyers had failed to appear , the second because another defence lawyer asked the court to give him extra time to study documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution .

On DATE the trial court held the first hearing on the merits . On CARDINAL and DATE the trial continued . The court heard evidence from several witnesses called by the prosecution .

The next hearing was listed for DATE but subsequently cancelled since certain lay and expert witnesses had failed to appear . During the hearing of DATE the court heard evidence from CARDINAL witness . On DATE the court heard evidence from CARDINAL witnesses called by the defence and adjourned the trial because several other witnesses had failed to appear . The court fined those witnesses , considering that they had not supplied any satisfactory explanation to justify their absence . The next hearing was listed for DATE ; during that hearing the court heard evidence from CARDINAL witness and ordered that evidence from experts be heard at the next hearing , scheduled for DATE .

On DATE the court did not hear evidence from experts because CARDINAL of them had in the meantime died . For that reason , the trial was adjourned sine die . At that hearing , the court lifted the order to surrender the applicant ’s passport . It considered that it could not be said that in the course of the trial the applicant had obstructed its conduct and held that at the current stage of the proceedings there was no danger of his absconding or attempting to tamper with the process of obtaining evidence .

On DATE the applicant , maintaining that no hearing on the merits had been held in his case since DATE , complained to the ORG ( PERSON ) about the length of the proceedings and asked him to intervene on his behalf .

NORP The applicant ’s trial was to restart on DATE but was postponed to DATE because the presiding judge was ill . On the latter date the court adjourned the trial since CARDINAL of the co - defendants had failed to appear . During the hearing of CARDINAL DATE the court heard evidence from an expert and CARDINAL witness but adjourned the trial to DATE . On DATE the court once again adjourned the trial because a witness had been absent .

On DATE the court held a hearing and heard evidence from CARDINAL witness . It then postponed the trial to DATE . On the latter date it adjourned the trial sine die , considering that evidence from an expert in international banking transactions needed to be obtained . The trial court did , however , encounter certain difficulties in finding a suitable expert . Eventually , in DATE , the presiding judge appointed PERSON , who assured the court that he would prepare the relevant report by DATE . Yet as that report was in effect submitted to the court ’s registry on DATE and the expert could not appear before the court at a hearing listed for CARDINAL DATE , the court postponed the trial to DATE .

On the above - mentioned date the trial was adjourned to CARDINAL DATE because PERSON , CARDINAL of the applicant ’s co - defendants , had not appeared before the court . The police informed the court that PERSON had apparently left GPE together with his family .

On DATE ORG asked the court to severe the charges against PERSON and to proceed with the trial . The court made an order to that effect and , at the same hearing , heard evidence from an expert .

The next hearing was listed for DATE . At that hearing , the applicant produced certain documents from DATE and asked the court to obtain evidence from an expert in graphology . The court granted his application and appointed the expert on DATE , instructing him to prepare the report by DATE .

The report was submitted to the court ’s registry on DATE .

After obtaining the report and serving its copies on the parties , ORG ( PERSON ) set the date for the parties’ final submissions for DATE . On DATE it gave judgment . The applicant was sentenced to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment . All parties to the proceedings except for CARDINAL of the applicant ’s co - defendants appealed .

The Poznań Court of Appeal heard appeals on CARDINAL DATE . It quashed the first - instance judgment and remitted the case . ORG listed the retrial for DATE but the hearing was subsequently cancelled . The proceedings are still pending in the ORG .

In a letter of DATE , the applicant informed the ORG that since DATE the trial court had held hearings at DATE intervals and had so far heard evidence from CARDINAL witnesses .

At the material time the rules governing detention on remand were contained in LAW of the Law of DATE – Code of Criminal Procedure ( Kodeks postępowania karnego ) ( “ the Code ” ) – entitled “ Preventive measures ” ( NORP zapobiegawcze ) . The LAW is no longer in force . It was repealed and replaced by LAW DATE ( commonly referred to as the “ GPE Procedure ” ) , which entered into force on DATE .

The Code listed as “ preventive measures ” , inter alia , detention on remand , bail and police supervision .

Article CARDINAL set out the general grounds justifying imposition of the preventive measures . This provision read :

“ Preventive measures may be imposed in order to secure the proper course of proceedings if the evidence against the accused sufficiently justifies the opinion that he has committed a criminal offence . ”

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL defined grounds for detention on remand . The relevant part of this provision stated :

“ Detention on remand may be imposed if :

NORP there is a reasonable risk that an accused will abscond or go into hiding , in particular when he has no fixed residence [ in GPE ] or his identity can not be established ; or

NORP there is a reasonable risk that an accused will attempt to induce witnesses to give false testimony or to obstruct the proper course of proceedings by any other unlawful means , or

an accused has been charged with a serious offence [ for the commission of which an accused could be liable to a sentence of a minimum of CARDINAL years’ imprisonment ] or has relapsed into crime in the manner defined in LAW ; or

an accused has been charged with an offence which creates a serious danger to society . ”

The Code set out the margin of discretion in maintaining a specific preventive measure . Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Code were based on the principle that detention on remand was the most extreme preventive measure and that it should not be imposed if more lenient measures were adequate .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL provided :

“ A preventive measure ( including detention on remand ) shall be immediately lifted or varied if the basis for it has ceased to exist or new circumstances have arisen which justify lifting a given measure or replacing it with a more or less severe one . ”

Article CARDINAL stated :

“ Detention on remand shall be imposed only when it is mandatory ; this measure shall not be imposed if bail or police supervision , or both of those measures , are considered adequate . ”

Finally , Article CARDINAL stipulated :

“ If there are no special reasons to the contrary , detention on remand should be lifted , in particular when :

( CARDINAL ) it may seriously jeopardise the life or health of the accused ; or

( CARDINAL ) it would entail excessively burdensome effects for the accused or his family . "

At the relevant time the LAW set out CARDINAL different legal avenues whereby a detainee could challenge the lawfulness of his detention : an appeal to a court against a detention order made by a prosecutor ; proceedings in which courts examined applications for prolongation of detention made by a prosecutor during an investigation ; and proceedings relating to the detainee ’s applications for release .

As regards the last of these , LAW provided the following :

“ An accused may at any time apply to have a preventive measure lifted or varied .

Such an application shall be decided by the prosecutor or , after the bill of indictment has been lodged , by the court competent to deal with the case , within a period not exceeding DATE . ”


Violation of Art. 6-1;Remainder inadmissible;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - domestic proceedings;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant brought an action before the Pest Central District Court seeking the termination of the common ownership of real estate belonging to him and his divorced wife .

At the subsequent hearings on DATE , DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE , the applicant extended his claims to include the allocation of other items of the matrimonial property . He was repeatedly invited to give better particulars of his claims .

At the hearing on CARDINAL DATE ORG suspended the proceedings pending the outcome of expropriation proceedings concerning one of the real properties at issue .

On the applicant ’s procedural appeal , on DATE ORG ordered that the proceedings be resumed . Subsequently , hearings were held on CARDINAL September CARDINAL , DATE and DATE . On DATE ORG appointed a valuation expert . The expert filed his report on DATE .

Further hearings took place on DATE , DATE and DATE . On DATE another valuation expert was appointed .

The court held additional hearings on DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE . On the latter date it again invited the applicant to give better particulars of his claims .

The proceedings are still pending .

On DATE the GPE and ORG issued a payment order against the applicant concerning unpaid social - security contributions . Subsequently the applicant brought an action in LOC challenging the lawfulness of the administrative decision .

On DATE the court observed that , due to a change of legislation , the respondent was replaced by ORG . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s procedural appeal . He filed a petition for review with ORG which he withdrew on DATE .

The court held hearings on DATE and DATE . On DATE an expert accountant was appointed . The expert presented his opinion on CARDINAL DATE .

Further hearings took place on DATE and DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s action , holding that the payment order had been issued lawfully .

On DATE the applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s petition for review .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property

András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Nona Tsotsoria;Vladimiro Zagrebelsky

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG in GPE ( “ ORG ” ) ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the respondent “ socially - owned ” company ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , “ FAC ” ( “ the debtor ” ) , to pay him :

i. salary arrears in the amount of MONEY ( “ ORG ” , CARDINAL , “ ORG ” ) plus statutory interest as of DATE ;

ii . CARDINAL ORG ( PERCENT ORG ) in already accrued statutory interest , and

iii . CARDINAL ORG ( approximately CARDINAL ORG ) for his legal costs .

By DATE this judgment became final .

On DATE the applicant filed a request for the enforcement of the judgment , proposing that it be carried out through the auctioning of the debtor ’s movable assets .

On DATE ORG accepted the applicant ’s request and issued an enforcement order ( PERSON . PERSON ) .

NORP This order subsequently became final .

ORG thereafter attempted several auctions but to no avail .

On DATE ORG reduced the sum awarded to the applicant in the above judgment by CARDINAL ORG ( CARDINAL ORG ) , which amount the applicant owed the debtor based on a prior transaction within a separate set of enforcement proceedings .

On DATE the applicant filed another request for the enforcement of the above judgment , this time proposing that it be carried out by means of a bank transfer and that the total sum awarded therein be reduced by CARDINAL ORG .

On DATE ORG accepted the applicant ’s request and issued an enforcement order ( PERSON . CARDINAL ) .

By DATE this order became final .

On DATE ORG provided ORG ( ORG banka ORG ) with the enforcement order , as well as the debtor ’s bank account details .

On DATE ORG provided ORG with additional specifications concerning the enforcement ordered .

On DATE the applicant urged ORG and ORG to ensure effective implementation of ORG enforcement order dated DATE ( PERSON . CARDINAL ) .

On DATE the applicant requested ORG to provide him with a complete list of the debtor ’s assets .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON za privatizaciju ) published a public announcement inviting all of the debtor ’s creditors to report their claims , noting , however , that the private creditors were not legally obliged to do so .

On DATE the same agency accepted a privatisation programme for the debtor .

On DATE the applicant wrote to ORG . He stated that the debtor ’s bank account had apparently not been blocked despite the fact that there was a binding court decision so ordering .

On DATE the applicant complained to ORG , referring to his application filed with ORG .

On DATE the applicant received a letter form ORG , informing him that on DATE the above enforcement had been stayed at the initiative of ORG .

On DATE ORG itself sent a letter to the applicant , explaining that the decision to privatise the debtor , by means of a public auction , had been adopted on DATE . It then , inter alia , referred to LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and concluded that the enforcement proceedings at issue had to be stayed , ex lege , for a period of DATE beginning on DATE .

On DATE an unrelated final judgment , rendered in favour of a third party , was enforced against the debtor by means of a bank transfer .

On DATE CARDINAL PERCENT of the debtor ’s socially - owned capital was privatised .

On DATE ORG withdrew the instruction issued to ORG .

On DATE ORG resumed the enforcement ordered by ORG .

On CARDINAL DATE the President of ORG ( PERSON ) confirmed that judicial enforcement proceedings could not be stayed in respect of a company undergoing privatisation without restructuring . She also noted that , in any event , it was within the sole competence of the enforcement court to rule in this regard .

On DATE the Deputy President of ORG ( PERSON trgovinski sud ) confirmed that , in the absence of restructuring , no stay of enforcement was possible .

On DATE the ORG confirmed that the debtor had not been restructured as part of its privatisation process .

On DATE ORG carried out the enforcement ordered by ORG .

On DATE the applicant filed a new claim with ORG , seeking that the debtor be ordered to pay additional statutory interest in respect of the ORG CARDINAL already awarded in his favour ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . These proceedings are still pending .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL provided that all enforcement proceedings were to be conducted urgently .

Under LAW only the court in charge of these proceedings had the right to stay them .

Articles DATE and CARDINAL - CARDINAL regulated enforcement by means of a bank transfer , as well as enforcement through the auctioning of the debtor ’s movable assets .

LAW ( “ the CARDINAL Act ” ) entered into force on DATE , thereby repealing LAW CARDINAL ( “ the CARDINAL Act ” ) .

Article CARDINAL of LAW , however , provides that all enforcement proceedings instituted prior to DATE are to be concluded in accordance with LAW .

Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL provide , inter alia , that judicial review proceedings may only be brought against an administrative decision issued by a competent ORG body .

Under Articles CARDINAL , DATE and DATE , inter alia , the NORP ORG shall comply with a final judicial execution order providing for enforcement by means of a bank transfer and shall , in so doing , instruct the “ debtor ’s bank ” to transfer the amount in question .

Articles DATE set out the details as regards the restructuring of companies about to be privatised . This restructuring , however , is optional and a company may be sold without having been restructured if ORG so decides .

DATE provides that a company whose restructuring commenced prior to DATE , as part of an ongoing privatisation , can not be “ subjected to an enforcement procedure ” within DATE of that date . If the decision to restructure a company , however , was not adopted prior to DATE , the relevant time limit shall be DATE as of the subsequent adoption of a decision to this effect . Any ongoing enforcement proceedings shall be stayed while new enforcement proceedings shall not be instituted until the expiry of the above time - limits .

The relevant provisions of this legislation are set out in the NORP GPE and Others v. GPE judgment ( ORG . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , DATE , DATE , CARDINAL and CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) .

Other relevant provisions are set out in the Cvetković v. GPE judgment ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE , not yet final ) .


Preliminary objection rejected (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Art. 6-1 (length of the proceedings);Not necessary to examine Art. 6-1 (access to court);No violation of Art. 8;Violation of Art. 13+6;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The first applicant is the mother of the second applicant . The applicants were born in GPE in DATE and DATE , respectively , and now live outside GPE . They both have NORP nationality and the nationality of the country of their permanent residence .

In DATE the Bratislava CARDINAL ORG ( then ORG , at present ORG súd ) pronounced the first applicant ’s divorce from Mr P. , the biological father of the second applicant . The second applicant was entrusted to the care and custody of the first applicant .

In DATE the first applicant married Mr DATE abroad and the applicants set up their permanent residence with him there .

On DATE PERSON , the mother of the first applicant , filed an action with the ORG claiming that she should be granted the right to educate the second applicant , her granddaughter . At that time the second applicant was DATE and both applicants were in GPE on a temporary stay . PERSON joined the proceedings on the side of PERSON

On DATE ORG appointed ORG úrad ) to look after the second applicant ’s interests in the proceedings .

On DATE the first applicant made several submissions to ORG . She asserted that she and the second applicant were permanently residing outside GPE and that , in addition to NORP nationality , they also had the nationality of the country of their permanent residence . As they were staying in GPE only temporarily , the NORP courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the question of the education and care of the second applicant . The first applicant further expressed critical views as to the character of PERSON and PERSON Finally , she lodged an appeal against the decision of DATE arguing that officials of ORG had previously failed to represent the second applicant ’s interests adequately and that they could not be expected to do so properly in the future .

NORP In DATE and DATE the first applicant sought to disqualify the judge dealing with the case as well as all other judges of ORG on grounds of bias . The hearing scheduled for CARDINAL DATE had therefore to be adjourned and the casefile was submitted to ORG ( PERSON súd ) for a decision on the challenge .

On DATE the first applicant filed a petition with ORG claiming that PERSON should be deprived of his parental rights over the second applicant . According to the applicants , no decision has ever been taken in respect of this request .

On DATE ORG issued an interim measure ordering that the second applicant be temporarily placed in the care of PERSON The applicants claim that this measure was illegal and that it has never been served officially on them . The first applicant subsequently returned with the second applicant to their home abroad .

On DATE ORG sent the casefile back to ORG instructing it to invite the first applicant to indicate which judges of ORG she was challenging and why . Subsequently the police informed ORG that the applicants had left GPE in DATE .

On DATE PERSON requested that the ORG issue an interim measure granting her the custody of the second applicant pending the outcome of the proceedings . The applicants have never been made officially aware of this request .

The casefile was again sent to ORG in DATE . ORG decided that ORG judges were not biased and , on DATE , returned the casefile to the latter .

ORG held a hearing on DATE .

Following their arrival for another temporary stay in GPE , ORG heard the first applicant and PERSON on DATE and the second applicant on DATE .

On DATE the case was adjourned and on DATE ORG dismissed PERSON request of CARDINAL DATE for an interim measure . ORG did so observing that the applicants were living in GPE at that time and that , when questioned on DATE , the second applicant had expressed the wish to stay with the first applicant . The applicants maintain that at that time they were staying in GPE only temporarily .

On DATE the first applicant filed a petition with ORG in which she again claimed that PERSON should be deprived of his parental rights over the second applicant .

On DATE ORG heard witnesses and on DATE it appointed an expert in psychology to draw up a report on the second applicant . The latter filed an appeal against this decision .

On DATE ORG appointed ORG to look after the second applicant ’s interests in the proceedings . The applicants maintain that they have never been notified of the appointment .

On DATE the expert informed ORG that she was not in a position to produce the report because of a heavy workload .

The hearing called for DATE had to be adjourned as the first applicant and PERSON failed to appear . ORG ordered that ORG look into the upbringing environment of the second applicant and the personal and material situation of the first applicant and PERSON

PERSON requested that an interim measure be issued to prevent the second applicant from travelling abroad without his consent . On DATE ORG dismissed the request .

At a hearing held on DATE ORG heard the parties and a representative of ORG . The first applicant was fined for disturbing the orderly conduct of the hearing by , as the applicants claim , objecting to the truthfulness of the testimony given by PERSON case was then adjourned and PERSON was invited to submit documentary evidence .

On DATE the first applicant filed an appeal “ against all decisions ” delivered by ORG judge dealing with the case .

On DATE PERSON appealed against the decision of DATE . He also claimed that his right to meet the second applicant be determined by the court .

On DATE the first applicant requested that further documentary evidence be taken .

On DATE Mr O.A.M. lodged a request for adoption of the second applicant . It was his third request to this effect after he had withdrawn CARDINAL similar requests made previously on DATE and DATE .

On DATE ORG submitted the casefile to ORG for a decision on the appeals filed by the parties . On DATE ORG returned the casefile to ORG instructing it to ensure that the first applicant eliminated formal shortcomings in her appeal of DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the second applicant ’s appeal against the decision of DATE concerning the appointment of an expert and quashed the above ORG decision of DATE .

On DATE and DATE ORG inquired of the first applicant ’s father about the applicants’ whereabouts . On DATE and DATE he replied that the applicants were currently staying abroad where they had left on DATE . According to the applicants , they had left GPE on DATE and were not present there until DATE .

From DATE the court attempted several times to establish the address of the applicants in the country of their residence . The police notified the address to ORG on DATE .

On DATE , while both applicants were abroad , ORG issued an interim measure prohibiting them inter alia from leaving GPE . On DATE appealed against this decision . The first applicant , PERSON and PERSON also appealed .

On DATE the casefile was submitted to the President of ORG who returned the file on DATE .

On DATE , after having taken several procedural steps , ORG resubmitted the casefile to ORG for a determination of the appeals against the decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the ORG quashed ORG decision to the extent that it prohibited the applicants from travelling abroad and dismissed the request of PERSON for an interim measure to this effect . The casefile was returned to ORG on DATE . On DATE and on DATE ORG judge arranged for service of ORG decision on the parties .

In the meantime , on DATE , the first applicant had requested that further evidence be taken .

ORG judge dealing with the case was ill for a considerable period DATE and also DATE and DATE .

On DATE , on the complaint of PERSON , ORG found that her constitutional right to a hearing without unjustified delay had been violated in the above proceedings . In its decision ORG admitted that , to a certain extent , the length of the proceedings was due to the behaviour of the parties . However , the case was not particularly complex and what was at stake in the proceedings called for particular diligence . ORG further noted that ORG had caused undue delays in the proceedings by failing to decide in a timely manner on the request for an interim measure restricting the applicants’ travel abroad , thus bringing about the need for the assistance of foreign authorities . Furthermore , by the time of ORG decision ORG judge had not yet prepared the request for assistance that was to be sent to these authorities .

The Constitutional Court further observed that ORG had not proceeded with the case effectively in that it had failed to take evidence , including an expert opinion , required for a decision on the case . Delays in the proceedings had also arisen as a result of the ordinary courts’ failure to decide on the requests for interim measures within the statutory timelimit . Finally , ORG noted that ORG had failed to take any effective action in the case since DATE .

The applicants were not informed of the above proceedings before ORG , did not take part in them and only learned of their outcome once the proceedings were completed .

On DATE ORG judge prepared a request for assistance which was to be submitted through ORG to the competent authorities in the country of the applicants’ residence . In particular , ORG sought that information be obtained from the first applicant and PERSON as regards the care and education of the second applicant , PERSON parental and visiting rights in respect of the second applicant and the second applicant ’s adoption . ORG also sought an inquiry into the general upbringing environment of the second applicant and the personal , social and material situation of the first applicant and Mr O.A.M.

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE ORG invited ORG to complete the request for assistance by submitting further information and copies of the relevant documents .

DATE . On DATE ORG took CARDINAL separate decisions to discontinue the proceedings concerning , respectively , the education and care of the second applicant , the deprivation of PERSON of his parental rights over her and her adoption by PERSON The decisions stated that the second applicant had reached the age of majority in DATE and that , therefore , the said matters could no longer be determined on the merits .


The applicant is a limited partnership company founded in DATE and based in GPE .

The applicant company , which was running a restaurant in GPE , rented the restaurant premises from an insurance company , GPE ( ORG ) . In DATE it was offered the opportunity to rent more LOC , which would be renovated to be suitable for restaurant use . When the renovation was finished , the applicant company found that there were excessive toilet facilities and that part of the planned restaurant facilities were missing , especially those planned to be built in the cellar . The applicant company paid MONEY ( MONEY ) for the renovation expenses and the DATE rent was raised considerably . The amended rent contract had been signed before the extension work commenced .

In DATE the applicant company instituted civil proceedings against ORG before a ORG the GPE ORG ( käräjäoikeus , tingsrätt ) known as “ the ORG ” ( asunto - oikeus , bostadsdomstolen ) . The applicant company claimed that there had been a breach of the rent contract , as the newly renovated facilities did not correspond to the original plan , on the basis of which the applicant company had signed the amended rent contract . ORG disagreed with the applicant company , arguing that even though there had originally been a plan to build restaurant facilities in the cellar , it had later proved to be impossible to build such an extension and that the applicant company had been aware of this before signing the contract ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE ORG found in favour of the insurance company , rejecting the applicant company 's action for compensation in accordance with LAW .

The applicant company appealed to ORG ( hovioikeus hovrätt ) , requesting that ORG decision be quashed . On DATE ORG of ORG upheld ORG decision without an oral hearing . CARDINAL of the members of ORG , GPE , was a member of the NORP parliament at the time . He had been an expert member of ORG since DATE . DATE he was also a member of parliament . For DATE of election was DATE .

NORP On DATE the applicant company applied to ORG ( korkein oikeus , högsta domstolen ) for leave to appeal , complaining , inter alia , about the lack of independence of Judge PERSON , who had both legislative functions as a member of parliament and judicial functions as a member of ORG . On CARDINAL DATE ORG refused the applicant company leave to appeal .

Under section CARDINAL of LAW ( valtiopäiväjärjestys , riksdagsordning CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , which was in force in DATE , only certain military positions and certain high positions in the judiciary , as well as the duties of officials supervising the lawfulness of government activities , were incompatible with the duties of a member of parliament , but there were no such restrictions as regards membership of a court of appeal . That provision read as follows :

“ The Chancellor of ORG , the Assistant Chancellor of ORG , a ORG of ORG or of ORG , ORG and ORG may not hold the office of a representative . If a representative is appointed to CARDINAL of the aforesaid offices or elected ORG or ORG , his parliamentary mandate shall expire . ”

This provision corresponds to the existing section CARDINAL of the LAW ( perustuslaki , grundlagen GPE ) .

According to section CARDINAL of ORG ( valtion virkamieslaki , statstjänstemannalagen CARDINAL ) , a public official must be absent from office for the period of time he or she performs the duties of a member of parliament .

NORP Under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ( CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) of ORG in Cases concerning ORG ( laki oikeudenkäynnistä huoneenvuokra - asioissa , lag om rättegång i hyresmål CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , as in force at the relevant time , the court of appeal was required to consider appeals concerning rent contracts as a bench of CARDINAL judges and CARDINAL expert members , CARDINAL of whom represented the views of landlords and the other the views of tenants . The expert members of the court of appeal were appointed by the President of GPE DATE . Members must be DATE , and have full legal capacity ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ) . Expert members were required to take an oath ( section CARDINAL ) .

The Act on Court Proceedings in Cases concerning ORG was repealed by Act no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , which came into force on DATE . Expert members no longer take part in the proceedings before the district courts or courts of appeal . Instead , the Code of Judicial Procedure ( oikeudenkäymiskaari , rättegångsbalken ) applies to the proceedings .

The provisions concerning the disqualification of judges are contained in LAW , section CARDINAL , of LAW . At the relevant time the said provision was worded as follows :

“ If the plaintiff or the defendant wishes to challenge a judge , he shall do so in a proper manner , and that judge shall decide whether or not to stand down . The following shall be the legal grounds for disqualification : where the judge is related by blood or marriage to CARDINAL of the parties to a degree which would constitute a bar to marriage under LAW of the ( DATE ) Marriage Code , including cousinship by blood although not by marriage ; where the judge is the opposing party or a publicly known “ enemy ” of a party ; where the judge or a listed relative has an interest in the case , where they stand to obtain particular benefit or suffer particular loss in it ; where the judge has served as a judge in the case in another court ; where the judge has served as an advocate or witness in the case ; where the judge has previously , on the orders of a court , decided a part of the case ; or where the judge has a similar case pending before another court . If the judge knows that such grounds exist in his regard , even though the parties are not aware of the same , the judge shall stand down of his own accord . ”

The provisions of LAW of LAW concerning the impartiality of judges were amended by an LAW ) which came into force on DATE . The government bill ( HE CARDINAL ) contains an extensive account of the existing legislative provisions , the case - law of ORG and precedents of ORG concerning the disqualification of judges . The amendment has not changed the ORG 's assessment of the present case .

The Act on Commercial Leases ( laki liikehuoneiston vuokrauksesta , lag om hyra av affärslokal CARDINAL ) was presented as a government bill on DATE . It was adopted on CARDINAL DATE and came into force on CARDINAL DATE .


The applicant , a NORP citizen born in DATE , is retired and resides in GPE .

The facts of the case as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as follows :

In DATE the Veterans and ORG ( GPE do PERSON i PERSON ) informed the applicant that the ORG had instituted ex officio proceedings pursuant to the DATE Act on NORP and ORG ( “ the DATE LAW ) during the post - war period in order to verify whether under this legislation the applicant was entitled to retain his veteran status . The applicant was requested to furnish information relating to the grounds on which he had acquired this status in accordance with the provisions of the DATE LAW ( “ the DATE LAW ) .

By a letter of DATE the applicant informed the ORG that during the Second World War he had participated in the activities of the NORP underground ORG PERSON ) , that during his service in ORG ( NORP GPE ) in GPE in DATE he had been carrying out normal police duties such as maintaining public order , and that he had participated in combating the Werwolf , the post - war NORP underground paramilitary organisation .

By a decision of DATE the Director of the NORP and ORG divested the applicant of his veteran status . It was established that the applicant had served from DATE to DATE in the former ORG . In his application for admission to ORG , which the applicant had submitted in DATE , he had stated that during his service he had actively participated in the armed struggle by the reactionary underground resistance . In his curriculum vitae which had been attached to this application , the applicant had stated that “ immediately after the liberation of GPE ... I had started my service in LAW of ORG in GPE from where I had been sent to participate in the armed struggle with bands and with the reactionary underground resistance ( “ natychmiast po wyzwoleniu Sosnowca ... rozpocząłem pracę w III PERSON w GPE , skąd byłem włączony do walk z bandami i reakcyjnym podziemiem ” ) . The applicant had subsequently acquired his veteran status by virtue of a decision of ORG DATE , made on the basis of a certificate issued by ORG of ORG . This certificate had confirmed that he had been serving therein from DATE and that throughout this period he had participated in the armed struggle by the reactionary underground resistance forces . The Director considered that the applicant fell within the scope of LAW read together with LAW of the DATE Act which provided , inter alia , that persons who had served in the former internal security services were to be divested of their veteran status . As the applicant belonged to the category of persons who , under the applicable legal provisions , were to be deprived of veteran status , the decision was justified and in accordance with the law .

The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision . He argued that the decision was unlawful . He emphasised that he had been serving in ORG for DATE and that his participation in fighting armed NORP groups during the war could not be regarded as a struggle to consolidate people ’s power .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision under appeal . The ORG considered that the administrative authority had failed to establish all facts relevant for the legal assessment of the applicant ’s case in that it had entirely disregarded the contents of the applicant ’s letter of DATE in which he had stated that he had been involved in the clandestine fight of ORG against the NORP troops occupying GPE and that his service in ORG had consisted of fighting the NORP and of ordinary police functions such as maintaining public order . The ORG observed that , under LAW , combating the Werwolf was to be regarded as giving rise to veteran status . Thus , the administrative authority had to establish what armed forces had been active near GPE during the applicant ’s service and what had been the armed formations in which the applicant had fought .

On DATE the Director of the Veterans and ORG divested the applicant of his veteran status .

The administrative authority took into consideration a reply of ORG to its request of DATE for detailed information concerning the applicant ’s service in ORG . It had been stated in this reply of CARDINAL DATE that it had not transpired from the applicant ’s personal file that during his service he had participated in the armed combat of any organisation ’s fight for the independence of GPE . Therefore , as the applicant ’s veteran status had been awarded to him on the basis of his participation in the struggle to consolidate people ’s power ( “ utrwalanie władzy ludowej ” ) , he had to be divested of this status pursuant to LAW .

On DATE , CARDINAL DATE , the Director of ORG refused to grant the applicant veteran status on the basis of his service in ORG ( PERSON ) during the Second World War , considering that the documents submitted in support of his claim were wholly inadequate to establish the relevant facts and , consequently , to grant such status ( “ nie dają absolutnie podstaw do przyznania uprawnień kombatanckich ” ) .

The applicant again appealed to ORG against both decisions . He submitted that both decisions were unlawful . He argued that he could not reasonably be expected to submit any new evidence relating to his service in ORG , and in particular any testimony of living witnesses , given the lapse of time since the relevant events .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against the withdrawal of his veteran status on the basis of his service in ORG .

ORG had regard to the fact that the administrative authority , following the ORG ’s judgment of DATE , had held an enquiry as to the nature of the applicant ’s activities during his service in the ORG in DATE . In the light of the letter of ORG of CARDINAL DATE , it could not be established that the applicant had in fact participated in “ consolidating the people ’s power ” . Therefore , the original decision of DATE bestowing veteran status on the applicant had lacked any sound factual basis . Consequently , the ORG concluded that the contested decision divesting the applicant of this status was in conformity with the law .

ORG further set aside the decision concerning the refusal to grant veteran status to the applicant in respect of his service in ORG and remitted the case for reconsideration by the first - instance authority . The ORG considered that the administrative authority , when considering that the evidence submitted by the applicant was “ wholly inadequate ” for a finding that he had in fact served therein , had significantly overstepped the margin of appreciation applicable in the assessment of evidence , as set out in the relevant provisions of LAW . These proceedings are apparently still pending .

Relevant domestic law

Veteran status

The Law of DATE on NORP and Other Victims of War and Post - War Repression repealed the PERSON of CARDINAL DATE on the Special Status of Veterans . Under LAW , participation in the armed struggle against the reactionary underground resistance ( “ walka o utrwalenie władzy ludowej ” ) gave rise to the entitlement to veteran status .

The CARDINAL Act enacted new criteria on which veteran status can be granted . Pursuant to LAW , the following persons , inter alia , are entitled to acquire veteran status :

a ) those having served in ORG ( ORG ) and in the NORP military formations organised during the Second World War within the ORG armies ;

b ) those having served in the NORP underground resistance organisations , including military formations organised in the framework of these organisations DATE ;

c ) those having served in the ORG armies and in the underground resistance organisations operating in the territories of the Allies in DATE , with the exception of the GPE and other special organisations acting to the detriment of the NORP nation ;

d ) those having served in the NORP underground military formations and organisations fighting for the independence of GPE within the borders of GPE DATE and within the NORP post - war borders , in the period from the arrival of ORG ( GPE ) on NORP territory until DATE ;

e ) those having served in the armed struggle against the formations of ORG ( ORG ) and against the Werwolf .

The DATE Act took away the entitlement to veteran status accorded by virtue of LAW from certain categories of persons who had served in DATE in various organisations and ORG organs whose purpose was to combat the political opponents of the

communist regime . In particular , LAW provides , inter alia , that a person who had served in ORG ( " aparat bezpieczeństwa publicznego " ) was not entitled to acquire veteran status , and those persons who had acquired it , were to be divested of it .

ORG is defined as being the State organs , partly comprising special armed forces and political police , modelled on the ORG and the ORG , established on DATE with a view to combating , suppressing and eliminating groups of political opposition , including the post - war underground resistance against Communism . These organs were also competent to conduct criminal investigations under the rules of criminal procedure . They were , depending on political circumstances , called variously : ORG ( Resort Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego ) ( DATE ) , ORG ( PERSON ) ( DATE ) , ORG ( PERSON do PERSON ) ( DATE ) and ORG ( PERSON ) , i.e. a special department of ORG ( DATE ) .

Under LAW , which was subsequently replaced by LAW , veteran status gives rise to various special employment and social insurance entitlements . The periods of veteran service are taken into account in calculating the periods giving rise to seniority . The same periods are multiplied by CARDINAL in calculating periods giving rise to a retirement pension . Veterans who remain in employment are entitled to DATE additional paid leave per year . They are entitled to retire earlier than other employees : women at DATE , and men at DATE , if they have satisfied another requirement for the acquisition of a retirement pension , i.e. if they have worked for periods set out in LAW . The retired veterans are further entitled to the special veterans ' benefit , paid together with their retirement pension as a certain fixed sum .

DATE CARDINAL LAW provides that persons who have lost their veteran status which was granted to them on the basis of LAW , retain the social insurance benefits to which they are entitled pursuant to the generally applicable social insurance laws , in particular the laws governing retirement pensions . Pursuant to LAW , if a decision is appealed to ORG , the rights stemming from the veteran status are suspended until a final judgment is given .

The appeal procedure against administrative decisions

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW , as applicable at the material time , provided that an appeal could be lodged against an administrative decision with ORG on the ground that it was not in conformity with the law . LAW stated that the ORG could set the decision aside wholly or in part if it established that the decision had been in breach of substantive law , that the proceedings leading to the decision had been flawed with such procedural errors that the decision should be null and void , or if such procedural shortcomings had occurred which would justify a reopening of the proceedings .


Violation of Art. 8;Not necessary to examine Art. 6;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses award - domestic proceedings

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant was born out of wedlock . Her biological mother abandoned her outside the house of a woman who gave her to PERSON . The latter brought her up . Although estranged from her biological mother , the applicant did not lose all contact with her . In DATE , when the applicant was DATE , her biological mother , just before dying , told her the name of her biological father in the presence of the applicant 's son . Her mother died in DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged an application with ORG requesting judicial recognition of paternity on the basis of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of ORG Law CARDINAL ( hereinafter “ LAW ) . The respondent , whom the applicant claimed was her father , objected to the application and denied paternity . Without going into the merits of the paternity claim , he maintained that the applicant 's claim was time - barred under section GPE ) of the above - mentioned PERSON . The applicant claimed , in reply , that the aforementioned section and , in addition , section GPE ) of the same PERSON setting in motion the period of limitation on the date of entry into force of the PERSON rather than on the date when she acquired knowledge of her father 's identity , were unconstitutional . In particular , she argued that they were contrary to Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( the right to respect for private and family life ) , CARDINAL ( the principle of equality and non discrimination ) and QUANTITY ( the right of access to a court ) of the LAW . The applicant contended that she had been prevented from having recourse to court and from determining through judicial proceedings whether or not she was the respondent 's daughter . She had also been placed in a disadvantageous position with regard to other litigants who happened to acquire information concerning their father within the statutory time - limit .

On DATE the respondent applied to the court for trial of the preliminary matter of whether the applicant 's claim was statute - barred . On DATE the applicant lodged an application requesting the court to refer the question to ORG .

On DATE ORG , following the agreement of the parties , decided to refer the issue of constitutionality of section GPE ) to ORG under LAW .

NORP In its judgment of DATE ORG , by a majority ( Judges PERSON , PERSON , PERSON , PERSON , PERSON and PERSON ) , held that sections GPE ) and GPE ) of LAW complied with the relevant provisions of LAW and the Convention . In particular , ORG noted the following :

“ The applicant 's lawyer suggests that the violation of ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the LAW is caused by the fact that the applicant learnt the identity of her natural father in DATE . It was , consequently , objectively impossible to lodge the application for her recognition within the DATE period from the date the PERSON came into force . Therefore , as he concludes , LAW is also violated because the applicant is deprived of access to court to assert her statutory right , a right which originates directly from LAW , which protects private and family life . A further suggestion of the applicant 's lawyer , concerning unfavourable discrimination caused by the different time - limits for the exercise of other rights that are provided for by the PERSON , we will not deal with because it was not pursued .

The matters raised are extremely serious because they touch on the institution and the function of the family : the most important nucleus of society , the members of which are bound by the deepest and purest feelings of love and solidarity . The ORG considers self - evident the value of the institution of the family , which it also protects in its most powerful statute , LAW . This also regulates the whole range of family relationships – also on the basis of the criterion of their lawful functioning in society as a whole – in legislative rules which constitute the basis of the body of law known as LAW .

The basis of our discussion is Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the LAW , corresponding to LAW , which was ratified by ORG by Law No . CARDINAL . Accordingly , the decisions of ORG on the matters with which we are concerned illustrate the approach to be taken , as does our jurisprudence .

In the recent decision of ORG of ORG in PERSON v. ORG ( DATE ) TIME , we dealt with the provisions of section DATE ) of the same PERSON , according to which the husband of the mother is barred from contesting paternity after DATE has elapsed from the time he is informed of the birth and the circumstances from which the conception of the child resulted . ORG had also addressed the same questions with reference again to Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL and QUANTITY .

We refer to our above decision , the reasoning of which we believe holds in the present case as well without being distinguished on any ground whatsoever . The legal principles , as discussed and adopted , are applicable here too .

The general principle which emerges from the decisions of ORG is that the right of access to court is subject to legitimate restrictions , precisely so that it can function rationally for all interested parties in the judicial process . The ORG considers that time - limits on the exercise of a right serve fundamental purposes inseparably interwoven with certainty about the rights of individuals and are intended to ensure the finality of the dispute .

ORG is distinguishable , as the applicant 's lawyer submits , in a situation where the child seeking recognition by its natural father learns his identity after its right has lapsed under the PERSON . In such a case , the lawyer asserts , the right is time - barred , as has happened in the case of the applicant .

We do not agree with this submission . In the statute of limitations on civil rights the starting point of the time - limit is not the litigant 's knowledge of the particulars on the basis of which he will pursue his right , but the event which created the cause of action . And this is determined , in case of disagreement , by the court according to objective criteria . This principle was applied by ORG in the case of X. v. GPE . ”

ORG laid emphasis on the decision of ORG in the case of GPE v. GPE ( decision of CARDINAL DATE , no . CARDINAL , Decisions and Reports CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) , in particular the following extract :

“ In the opinion of the Commission it must generally be accepted in the interest of good administration of justice that there are time - limits within which prospective proceedings must be instituted . It must also be accepted that the time - limit is final and that there is no possibility to institute proceedings even when new facts have arisen after the expiry of the time - limit . This is also true for paternity proceedings . ORG is furthermore of the opinion that a time - limit of DATE from the child 's birth as in the present case , is not an unreasonable time - limit for instituting paternity proceedings . Accordingly , the Commission finds that the fact that the applicant was not permitted to institute paternity proceedings does not disclose any appearance of a violation of LAW taken alone . ”

ORG concluded that the provisions of sections GPE ) and GPE ) of LAW not only did not conflict with the provisions of LAW and CARDINAL of the LAW but , on the contrary , were in line with the jurisprudence and reasoning which the ORG has adopted in the operation and application of the corresponding ORG . In this regard , ORG held as follows :

“ We also note that the entirety of the provisions of ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL which have occupied our attention create not only rights but also obligations . DATE does not operate only on behalf of the person resorting to the court but also on behalf of those who are being sued . All the interested parties before the court have the right to a fair trial in accordance with paragraph QUANTITY of the LAW , and the right to present their case , adduce evidence and examine witnesses , as provided for in paragraph CARDINAL of the same LAW . The right of protection of private and family life is provided for in paragraph CARDINAL of LAW ; in accordance with paragraph CARDINAL , however , interference with that right in accordance with the law is permitted for the protection of the rights and freedoms which the LAW guarantees to any other person . The principle of proportionality and balance of the rights is also based on the spirit and letter of those provisions , as is discussed in the passages we have cited above .

In the particular question before us , it should not be overlooked that in the period which will have elapsed between the birth of the child born out of wedlock and the submitting of the application for paternal recognition , the putative father could have created his own family . The submitting of an application for paternal recognition and indeed when the putative father is advanced in age will without doubt cause upheaval in his family life . Therefore the recognition of the right to submit an application without time - limits may , on the one hand , have as a consequence the creation of a family for the child but , on the other , lead also to the break - up of another family , the family of the putative father . It is for this reason that the principle of proportionality must play the decisive role . Its correct and commensurate application dictates that the exercise of the relevant right be time - barred after a reasonable time has elapsed since the child 's birth . ”

Lastly , in view of the interesting and novel legal matter raised before it , ORG did not make an order for costs .

NORP However , a minority of ORG judges dissented ( Judges PERSON , PERSON , GPE , ORG ) . The minority found that section GPE ) of LAW was contrary to and incompatible with the provisions of LAW and CARDINAL § § CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the LAW since it extinguished the exercise of the family right to recognition of paternity . They therefore considered that the application could not be considered time - barred .

The minority , following ORG judgment in GPE v. ORG ( ( DATE ) TIME ) , considered that the setting of a time - limit for the exercise of the civil right to recognition of paternity was acceptable provided that it was not oppressive and left a reasonable margin for the exercise of the right . The creation of an institution for the incorporation into the family of a child born out of wedlock was an obligation of the ORG that was imposed by both LAW and LAW .

They further observed that it was indisputable that the right of recognition of paternity constituted an integral aspect of the family life of the individual which LAW safeguarded . It was equally certain in their view that the exercise of this right by the child might be subject to reasonable time - limits . The crucial question was whether a time - limit for the exercise of the right could be set irrespective of the knowledge of the facts that constituted the right or even the possibility , viewed objectively , of the holder of the right acquiring knowledge of that right .

The minority also examined LAW , PERSON . DATE , and in this context stated the following :

“ In civil law the setting of time - limits is related , as a rule , to the moment the cause of action arises . LAW , PERSON . DATE , provides for this . ...

This principle is subject to CARDINAL categories of exceptions , namely :

the impossibility of exercise of the right by persons affected by an impediment – minority ( under DATE ) , mental disturbance , prohibition from administering the individual 's affairs or absence from the country ; and

the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake .

In both cases the time - period for the exercise of the right is suspended for as long as the ignorance or impediment exists . The spirit by which LAW is inspired is that the ignorance of or the impossibility of defending rights suspends , within the framework we have explained , the time - limits .

The subject of paternity belongs to established civil rights which touch on the existence of the individual . The recognition of paternity takes effect against all and marks the framework of the family of the individual ( see PERSON v. PERSON ( ( DATE ) CARDINAL C.L.R. CARDINAL ) .

The question in the present case is whether the right which the person concerned is ignorant of DATE and , objectively , could not have ascertained – can lapse before it comes to the knowledge of the person entitled to exercise it . The right under discussion is protected as a fundamental human right by LAW . The question arises whether the extinction of the right , independently of the knowledge or the possibility of acquiring knowledge of its existence , is compatible with the respect for the right to family life , which LAW safeguards and of the right of recourse to court , which LAW and CARDINAL of the LAW safeguard . Taking the question further : is elimination ever possible of a fundamental right , the existence of which the person concerned does not know and about which he does not have the means of being informed ? ”

NORP The minority considered that the decision of ORG v. GPE ( cited above ) did not touch directly on the matter before them , which revolved round respect for the right to family life . They did , however , find that it indirectly shed some light on the point in issue to the extent that it maintained that the separate regulation of the claim by the child for recognition of paternity was a right of a peculiar character which was connected to the particularities of the quest for paternity by the child itself . The ORG 's judgment in the case of ORG and Others v. The GPE ( judgment of DATE , Series A no CARDINALC , p. CARDINAL ) , in which it was held that the limitations imposed by NORP law on the recognition of paternity constituted a violation of the right to family life , was directly relevant to the facts of the applicant 's case .

NORP The minority finally underlined that :

“ The facts which relate to the paternity of a child relate to the time before its birth , in reality to the time which relates to its conception . Objectively , the child does not know , nor has it the means of discovering the facts surrounding its conception . The only persons who have authentic knowledge of these facts are the parents , each of them , primarily the mother . Chance knowledge , to the extent that the possibility of the paternity of a child is thought likely , may be acquired by third persons to the extent that the facts concerning the paternity of a child are rumoured , without it ever being certain that such possibility will come to the knowledge of the person affected . The setting of a time - limit for the exercise of the right to recognition of paternity , regardless and independent of the knowledge of facts that constitute it , reduces the right to the point of extinction . The core of the right to family life is violated and the right provided becomes only a right by law , and does not obtain respect . ”

Following ORG judgment , the applicant withdrew her application before ORG on DATE .

The applicant 's putative biological father died on an unspecified date in DATE .

DATE LAW provides :

“ CARDINAL . Every person has the right to respect for his private and family life .

There shall be no interference with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary only in the interests of the security of the LOC or the constitutional order or the public safety or the public order or the public health or the public morals or for the protection of the rights and liberties guaranteed by LAW to any person . ”

Article QUANTITY provide :

“ CARDINAL . All persons are equal before the law , the administration and justice and are entitled to equal protection thereof and treatment thereby .

Every person shall enjoy all the rights and liberties provided for in this LAW without any direct or indirect discrimination against any person on the ground of his community , race , religion , language , sex , political or other convictions , national or social descent , birth , colour , wealth , social class , or on any ground whatsoever , unless there is express provision to the contrary in LAW . ”

Article CARDINAL § § CARDINAL and CARDINAL provide :

“ CARDINAL . No person shall be denied access to the court assigned to him by or under LAW . The establishment of judicial committees or exceptional courts under any name whatsoever is prohibited .

In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him , every person is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent , impartial and competent court established by law ... . ”

Article CARDINAL reads as follows :

“ CARDINAL . A party to any judicial proceedings , including proceedings on appeal , may , at any stage thereof , raise the question of the unconstitutionality of any law or decision or any provision thereof material for the determination of any matter at issue in such proceedings and thereupon the ORG before which such question is raised shall reserve the question for the decision of ORG and stay further proceedings until such question is determined by ORG .

ORG , on a question so reserved , shall , after hearing the parties , consider and determine the question so reserved and transmit its decision to the court by which such question has been reserved .

Any decision of ORG under paragraph CARDINAL of this Article shall be binding on the court by which the question has been reserved and on the parties to the proceedings and shall , in case such decision is to the effect that the law or decision or any provision thereof is unconstitutional , operate as to make such law or decision inapplicable to such proceedings only . ”

“ Challenging paternity is excluded :

( a ) for the husband of the mother , when DATE has passed since the date he was informed of the child 's birth and the circumstances from which it emerges that the mother did not conceive by him , and , in every case DATE after the birth ... . ”

( CARDINAL ) “ A child that is born out of wedlock acquires retrospectively after its birth the legal status and the rights of a child born in wedlock as against its parents and their relatives if the parents subsequently marry and the child had been recognised or after the marriage the child is recognised voluntarily or by judicial decision as the child of the husband .

( CARDINAL ) The voluntary recognition as provided in paragraph ( CARDINAL ) may be challenged on the grounds that the husband of the mother is not the father in accordance with the provisions of section CARDINAL . ”

“ The paternal recognition of a child who is born out of wedlock is effected by

( a ) voluntary recognition or

( b ) recognition by judicial decision . ”

( CARDINAL ) “ The father can recognise a child born out of wedlock as his own provided that the mother consents to this .

( CARDINAL ) If the mother has died or does not have the capacity to enter legal relations , the recognition is effected by the sole declaration of the father .

( CARDINAL ) If the father has died or does not have the capacity to enter into legal relations , the recognition may be given by the paternal grandfather or grandmother .

( CARDINAL ) If the child has died the recognition takes effect for the benefit of its descendants . ”

“ If the consent of the mother is given in accordance with the provisions of this section , the recognition is considered to have been carried out and the appropriate changes are made in the official registers . ”

( CARDINAL ) “ The mother has the right to apply to the court for recognition of the paternity of her child that was born out of wedlock with its father ” .

( CARDINAL ) The child also has the right referred to in paragraph ( CARDINAL ) above .

( CARDINAL ) If the mother refuses her consent as provided for by paragraph ( CARDINAL ) of LAW , the father also has the right to apply for recognition by judicial decision and in the case of paragraph ( CARDINAL ) of LAW that right vests in the paternal grandfather and grandmother . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) The application of the mother for recognition by judicial decision is brought against the father or his heirs .

( CARDINAL ) The application of the child for recognition by judicial decision is brought against the parent who has not proceeded with the necessary declaration for voluntary recognition or his heirs .

( CARDINAL ) The application of the father or of his parents for recognition by judicial decision is brought against the mother or her heirs . ”

Section CARDINAL sets maximum time - limits after which it is not legally permissible for the mother , child or father , as the case may be , to seek judicial recognition of paternity . Unless exercised within the periods of limitation specified in the section , the legal right to seek judicial recognition lapses .

“ ( CARDINAL ) The right of the mother to seek recognition by judicial decision of the paternity of her child shall lapse DATE after the child 's birth .

( CARDINAL ) If the mother was married at the crucial period of the child 's conception , her right to ask for recognition by judicial decision of the paternity of her child by the biological father shall lapse DATE after DATE when the decision upholding the challenge to paternity in accordance with the provisions of section CARDINAL becomes final .

( CARDINAL ) The right of the child to seek its recognition by judicial decision shall lapse DATE after it has attained its majority .

( CARDINAL ) The right of the father or of his parents to seek recognition by judicial decision shall lapse DATE after the mother has refused to give her consent to voluntary recognition .

( CARDINAL ) In the case of LAW the right to recognition by judicial decision shall not lapse . ”

“ In the case of voluntary recognition or recognition by judicial decision the child acquires from its birth the legal status and the rights of a child born in wedlock as against both its parents and their relatives . ”

By virtue of section GPE ) , in the case of applications for judicial recognition of paternity where majority has been attained before the PERSON entered into force , the DATE limitation period is set in motion on the date of entry into force of the PERSON , that is , DATE , and not on DATE of attaining majority as referred to in section GPE ) :

“ In cases where reference is made in this PERSON to time - limits within which a person may exercise his rights or take the measures provided for in this PERSON , these time - limits shall begin to run from the date when this PERSON came into effect . ”

Therefore , the limitation period provided for in section GPE ) is not retroactively applied .

The relevant provisions of LAW on parent - child relations provide :

“ ( a ) The care of a child who is a minor ( “ parental care ” ) is the duty and right of the parents , who shall exercise it jointly .

( b ) Parental care includes the determination of a name , the supervision of the person , the administration of the property and the representation of the child in each matter or legal transaction which relate to its person or property . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) The parents have the obligation to maintain jointly their child who is a minor , each according to his capabilities .

( CARDINAL ) By a decision and relevant arrangement by the court , the obligation of the parents by virtue of paragraph ( CARDINAL ) may continue after the child attains its majority in cases where special circumstances demand this , such as in cases of incapacity or disability of the child or service in ORG or study at an educational institution or professional training school . ”

In the case of ORG v. ORG ( cited above ) ORG , sitting as a full bench , examined the constitutionality of the DATE limitation period set by section DATE ) of LAW in respect of applications contesting paternity . Under this provision , the limitation period starts to run from the time the mother 's husband is informed of the birth and the circumstances from which the conception of the child resulted . The question whether this time bar was in line with Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the LAW was referred to ORG by ORG .

ORG held that the protection of family life , which was safeguarded as a fundamental right by LAW and , in parallel , by LAW , also extended to the procedural means which were provided for the constitution of the family and the relations between its members . Rights interwoven with family life were “ civil rights ” within the meaning of LAW CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Convention . Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the LAW secured access to court for the exercise of civil rights . The setting of a time - limit for the exercise of civil rights was acceptable provided that the restriction which was set was not oppressive and left a reasonable margin for the exercise of the right . Furthermore , the time - limit had to correlate with the purpose which it aimed to serve . An objective purpose of time - limits was the securing of certainty as regards the rights of the individual . The repudiation of paternity was by nature a civil right , the exercise of which could be subject to time - limits . The creation of an institution for the incorporation into the family of a child born out of wedlock was an obligation imposed by LAW .

ORG noted that since the father had had knowledge of the material facts concerning the presumption of paternity from DATE of the child 's birth , the time - limit of DATE was sufficiently long for the purposes of seeking judicial determination of his rights .

Accordingly , ORG held that the time - limit was in conformity with LAW .


Violation of Art. 6-1 with regard to the length of the proceedings;Inadmissible under Art. 6-1 with regard to the fairness of the proceedings;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE ORG instituted preliminary investigations on the suspicion of murder against the applicant and remanded him in custody . On DATE a ORG ( Geschworenengericht ) at ORG ( PERSON ) convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment . On DATE ORG ( Oberster Gerichtshof ) dismissed the applicant 's plea of nullity and appeal against sentence .

On DATE the applicant requested the re - opening of the criminal proceedings against him . On an unspecified date ORG dismissed this request . On DATE ORG ( Oberlandesgericht ) granted the applicant 's appeal and reopened the criminal proceedings against him . On DATE the applicant was released . New preliminary investigations were instituted against him .

On DATE the applicant instituted official liability proceedings ( Amtshaftung ) against GPE . He claimed compensation for damages caused by his conviction , which had been annulled , and his detention which lasted DATE . He further filed a request for legal aid .

On DATE the case was transferred to the ORG . GPE subsequently filed an appeal against the decision ordering the delegation . On DATE GPE withdrew their appeal .

On DATE GPE filed a statement of defence .

On DATE the Presiding Judge ( Vorsitzender ) of ORG dismissed the applicant 's request for legal aid .

Upon the applicant 's appeal , ORG quashed this decision .

On DATE the ORG granted the applicant 's request for legal aid .

In the meantime , on DATE , ORG had rejected submissions filed by the applicant . The applicant 's appeal was to no avail .

A hearing scheduled for DATE had to be cancelled due to illness of the Presiding Judge .

On DATE the ORG held a hearing and suspended the official liability proceedings , as the criminal proceedings against the applicant were still pending . The applicant appealed against this decision . On DATE ORG dismissed this appeal .

On DATE ORG acquitted the applicant of the charge of murder , but dismissed his application for compensation for detention ( PERSON ) under LAW ( Strafrechtliches Entschädigungsgesetz ) .

On DATE ORG allowed the applicant 's appeal and stated that the applicant was entitled to a compensation under LAW § CARDINAL(b ) and CARDINAL(c ) of LAW .

On DATE the ORG decided to continue the official liability proceedings .

In the meantime , on DATE the applicant instituted further official liability proceedings . On DATE ORG transferred the case to ORG . On DATE ORG dismissed GPE appeal .

On DATE the ORG decided to join the official liability proceedings .

On DATE the ORG found that the competent presiding judge was biased and allocated the case to another judge .

On DATE , DATE and DATE the ORG held hearings . At the hearing of DATE the applicant submitted that his claim was also based on LAW .

On DATE the applicant extended his claim .

On DATE the ORG partly allowed the applicant 's claim and granted him compensation of ORG CARDINAL . The applicant and GPE appealed against this decision .

On DATE ORG delegated the case to ORG .

On DATE ORG allowed the applicant 's appeal for procedural deficiencies and remitted the case to the court of first instance .

On DATE the applicant requested ORG to transfer the case back to the Steyr Regional Court . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's request .

On DATE ORG held a hearing and decided to appoint an expert in order to assess the applicant 's loss of earnings . It further ordered the applicant to submit the relevant documents concerning his loss of earnings . The applicant submitted the documents on DATE .

On DATE ORG appointed an expert to assess the applicant 's loss of earnings and ordered her to submit the expert opinion within DATE .

On DATE the expert requested ORG for an extension of the time - limit . ORG granted the request on DATE .

On DATE the applicant filed a request under LAW of LAW ( PERSON ) for a time - limit to be fixed for the delivery of the expert opinion and a hearing to be held .

On DATE the expert submitted her opinion .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's request under LAW of LAW .

On DATE ORG held a hearing . Upon the applicant 's request it ordered the expert to supplement the expert opinion within DATE .

On DATE the applicant filed again a request under LAW of LAW for a time - limit to be fixed for the delivery of the expert opinion .

On DATE and on DATE ORG requested the expert to submit her opinion . On DATE the expert filed her opinion .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant 's application under LAW of LAW .

Upon the applicant 's request ORG , on DATE , appointed another expert to assess the applicant 's loss of earnings within DATE . On DATE the new expert submitted her opinion .

On DATE ORG held a hearing .

On DATE ORG gave a partial decision ( ORG ) and granted the applicant compensation in the amount of CARDINAL CARDINAL € as well as a DATE annuity . On an unspecified date it decided upon the applicant 's further claims .

Appeal proceedings before ORG are still pending .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial

David Thór Björgvinsson;Ján Šikuta;Lech Garlicki;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in ORG .

In DATE the applicant 's parents agreed to the expropriation of their property in ORG for the purpose of building a pedestrian access and a driveway to a clinic .

On DATE the applicant and her parents lodged an application for restitution of the expropriated land with LOC ( PERSON ) under LAW of the LAW of DATE on ORG ( Ustawa o gospodarce gruntami i wywłaszczaniu nieruchomości ) . This section stipulated that the former owner of the expropriated property ( or his legal successor ) could lodge an application for restitution provided that the property no longer served the purpose specified in the expropriation decision . According to the applicant , their application was left unanswered .

Subsequently , the applicant 's parents transferred their claim to the property to the applicant .

On DATE the applicant and her parents made another application for restitution of the property .

On DATE the head of ORG ( ORG ) refused the application .

The applicant appealed .

On DATE the ORG Governor ( Wojewoda ) upheld the firstinstance decision .

The applicant appealed to ORG ( PERSON ) .

On DATE ORG quashed both decisions .

On DATE the applicant complained of inactivity on the part of the administrative authorities .

On DATE the ORG Governor explained that the case was particularly complex and acknowledged that the proceedings had indeed been lengthy . He also ordered the head of ORG to give a decision by CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the head of the ORG gave a decision and ordered the restitution of the property . He also ordered the applicant to pay LOC the indexed sum of CARDINAL Polish zlotys ( ORG ) in return for the compensation awarded to her parents in DATE .

The applicant appealed , arguing that the indexed sum had been wrongly calculated and did not reflect the real value of the property .

On DATE the applicant complained to ORG about the inactivity of the administrative authority .

On DATE the ORG Governor quashed the challenged decision and ordered that the property be returned to the applicant for a payment of ORG MONEY .

NORP The applicant and LOC lodged appeals with ORG .

On DATE ORG declared the challenged decision null and void .

On DATE ORG examined the applicant 's complaint of DATE about the inactivity of the administrative authorities and discontinued the proceedings , finding that a decision had already been given by the relevant authority .

On DATE the ORG Governor quashed the decision of the head of ORG of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the head of the ORG gave a decision and ordered that part of the property , which had not been developed , be returned to the applicant .

Both parties lodged appeals : the applicant on DATE and LOC on DATE .

On DATE the ORG Governor upheld the challenged decision .

On DATE the applicant again appealed to ORG .

On DATE ORG quashed the firstand second - instance decisions .

On DATE the Mayor of LOC ( Starosta Powiatu ) gave a decision and ordered the restitution of the property .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal , contending that the Mayor 's decision had been based on an incorrect measuring of the buildings constructed on the property in question .

On DATE the GPE ( PERSON ) also appealed against that decision , maintaining that the restitution of the property together with the buildings on it was impossible . It requested that the decision be quashed .

On DATE the Świętokrzyski Governor , who took over the competences of the ORG Governor , amended the first - instance decision in the part which concerned the indexed sum to be paid by the applicant .

On DATE the LOC lodged a complaint with ORG .

Subsequently , owing to the reform of the administrative courts which took effect on DATE , the case was transmitted to ORG PERSON ) .

On DATE the applicant 's father died .

On DATE the GPE applied to ORG for the proceedings to be stayed .

On DATE the proceedings were stayed .

On DATE ORG resumed the proceedings .

On DATE ORG gave judgment and dismissed the appeal .

On DATE the Sandomierz Municipality lodged a cassation appeal with ORG .

On DATE ORG dismissed the cassation appeal .

The relevant domestic law concerning inactivity on the part of administrative authorities is set out in the ORG 's judgment in the case of PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL , DATE .