The applicants are GPE nationals , who were born in DATE , DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE , GPE . The first applicant is the mother of the second and third applicants .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the applicants , may be summarised as follows .

The first applicant suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease , which is a terminal illness affecting the heart and lungs . Her doctor advised her to rest and that she was in no state to do anything else . Her oldest son , the second applicant , suffers from asthma .

The first applicant is divorced from her husband , who is in ORG and apparently no longer lives in GPE . The applicants continued to live in the matrimonial home which was in his name . It was a large house , with a garden and therapeutic pool for use of her son .

The applicant ’s former husband was made bankrupt and his interest in the property was vested in the trustee in bankruptcy .

ORG took proceedings for possession of the matrimonial home , claiming considerable arrears in mortgage payments . An order for possession was made by ORG on DATE . The first applicant made various applications to suspend possession which resulted in short extensions .

On DATE , ORG heard an application for ancillary relief in the divorce proceedings . LOC made no order for the transfer of the matrimonial home but awarded the applicant a lump sum . Because of the costs attached to the home , it was considered that she would not have received any benefit from such a transfer .

The first applicant applied to extend the time for appealing against the ancillary relief order and for permission to appeal against the order refusing to suspend the warrant of possession . These requests were refused by ORG on DATE . The applicant ’s appeal was refused by ORG on DATE .

The date for execution of the order was set for DATE . This was adjourned pending the applicants’ application for a cancellation of the eviction . The eviction of the applicants from their house was then set for CARDINAL DATE . This date was also vacated when the first applicant made a further application to the court to stay the eviction . She raised arguments , inter alia , that due to her medical condition it was not reasonable for the bank to evict her , that she had made offers to pay the arrears in the past which the bank had refused and that she could now pay the arrears .

On DATE , ORG judge refused the first applicant ’s applications . He noted that there were substantial arrears in payments ( in excess of MONEY ( GBP ) ) and that DATE instalments now stood at GBP MONEY , with CARDINAL payable as interest on the arrears . In her previous letters to the bank , she had made it clear that it was her former husband who was to pay the arrears but the bank however had found that there was no adequate agreement as to how the arrears were to be dealt with . Though the first applicant claimed that she could pay out of her income , her income was noted as being ORG DATE , whereas the current mortgage instalments were GBP CARDINAL . She had no capital or savings with which to pay off the arrears . As regards her medical condition , the court had not been provided with a medical report but seen a note from which it appeared that the first applicant suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease . The judge concluded :

“ There is no realistic chance that the mortgage will be paid within a reasonable time ... I have no alternative but to dismiss the application . I am concerned by the practical consequences . What in practical terms will happen ? ... where are [ the applicants ] to go ? [ The first applicant ] has not been in touch with social services since DATE last year and therefore does not know if she can pack up in a day or CARDINAL .

I ’ve come to the conclusion , bearing in mind the practical realities of eviction , to ... remove the eviction from DATE . Beyond that seems unfair on the claimant , now that there is a possibility of a negative equity ... I also intend to direct the court office immediately to phone ORG and the local housing authority of ORG to explain to them this order and to seek their assistance in finding alternative accommodation . It is incumbent on [ the first applicant ] to contact the housing department and make sure they are appraised . ”

On DATE , the applicants were informed that they should vacate the house by CARDINAL DATE , at TIME

The first applicant made a further application to the court against the enforcement . On or DATE , ORG judge refused her application . He noted that he had directed the court office to notify the social services and that the first applicant had been in touch with them and the housing authority . She had a meeting arranged with the latter . He found no new matters arising and stated that her medical problems did not give him any right to suspend the warrant for possession .

On DATE , the applicants were required to leave their home by the bailiffs enforcing the possession order . They went to live with the first applicant ’s father , who lives in a CARDINAL - bedroom property . The first applicant made an application to this Court on DATE .

The local housing authority meanwhile offered the applicants accommodation in a CARDINAL - bedroom bungalow . The first applicant refused it , alleging that it was unsuitable for her and her children , as , inter alia , there were steps leading to the front door and it was too small to house all their possessions . On DATE , the housing authority informed her that they had no other accommodation that they could offer and that if she declined this property they would have to regard her decision as a discharge of their duty towards her and she would have to find her own property . By letter of CARDINAL DATE , the housing authority stated that modifications could be made to the house on the recommendation of an occupational therapist ( e.g. concerning the applicants’ claimed health requirements ) and urged her to accept the property . The first applicant declined .

On DATE , the bank obtained an order to remove the applicants’ personal possessions from the house unless the applicants took them within DATE . The first applicant claimed that she was unable to arrange for storage due to the costs involved . The bank informed her on DATE that she should inform them of where her possessions should be delivered or they would be obliged to dispose of them to defray their costs of storage .

In a letter dated DATE , the Government submitted that the social services had offered the first applicant advice and assistance which she had declined . ORG had meanwhile given the family a holiday grant . The housing authority records indicated that the first applicant had refused the CARDINAL bedroom bungalow as it was too small and did not have a therapeutic pool . They had a long waiting list for the type of property which the first applicant would have liked and while willing to place her on the waiting list , could not justify housing her in such a property before persons who had been on the waiting list for DATE .

In a letter of DATE , the first applicant informed the ORG that she had found a house suitable to her needs and was in the process of moving in .


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property;Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial

Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Egbert Myjer;Elisabet Fura;Josep Casadevall;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

On DATE the applicant brought an action against the Bîra agricultural cooperative for the recovery of possession of QUANTITY . m of land .

On DATE ORG of First Instance authorised the applicant to recover possession of a QUANTITY . m plot of land situated in GPE at a place called “ LOC ” ( “ the cemetery ” ) . The land had boundaries with the cemetery ( to the north ) , a road ( to the south ) , pastureland ( to the east ) and land belonging to ORG , CARDINAL party ( to the west ) . The court ordered the agricultural cooperative to enable the applicant to take possession of the land . That judgment became final .

On DATE the bailiff certified in an official record that the applicant had been able to take possession of the land and that some constructions built by the former agricultural cooperative , including a stable and part of a shed , were situated on it .

On DATE the county commission in GPE for the application of PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( “ the county commission ” ) authorised the applicant to recover possession of QUANTITY . m of land .

On DATE the applicant contested the administrative decision before the court on the ground that he was also entitled to recover possession of a further QUANTITY m approximately of land .

On DATE ORG allowed the applicant ’s action , taking the view that he was entitled to recover possession of a total surface area of CARDINAL sq . m of land , and ordered the administrative authorities to issue him with a document of title for that land , situated in GPE . That judgment became final .

On DATE the local commission in PERSON for the application of PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( “ the local commission ” ) certified in an official record that the applicant had been able to take possession of a QUANTITY . m plot of land at GPE . The applicant signed the official record .

On DATE the applicant brought an administrative action against the local commission seeking to have it perform the procedure for enabling him to take possession of the land and to prepare the documentation pertaining to the issuance of a document of title for the CARDINAL sq . m of land .

On DATE ORG upheld the applicant ’s action and ordered the local commission to implement the procedure for enabling him to take possession of the QUANTITY . m of land situated in GPE , to issue the official record and to provide him with a title document , in accordance with the judgment of DATE . That judgment became final .

On DATE the applicant brought an administrative action against the local commission seeking a DATE pecuniary penalty for the refusal to enable him to take possession of the entire surface area of CARDINAL sq . m of land in GPE , and to prepare the documentation pertaining to the acquisition of title , as ordered by the judgment of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE ORG , by an enforceable decision , upheld the applicant ’s action and ordered the local commission to pay a DATE pecuniary penalty of MONEY ( ROL ) . The court noted that the applicant had taken possession of QUANTITY m of land and that the local commission had refused to enable him to take possession of the plot of QUANTITY . m of land situated at GPE , thus preventing the preparation of the necessary documentation for the acquisition of title . The court also noted that the plot of QUANTITY . m of land had been leased by PERSON town council to a private company .

The expert report produced during the proceedings mentioned the plot of QUANTITY . m of land at GPE , which was expressly referred to in the judgment of DATE , as part of the total of CARDINAL sq . m of land for which the authorities were supposed to prepare the documentation pertaining to the acquisition of title . It also mentioned that on DATE the applicant had been able to take possession of the land in question at ORG , in a location situated in the yard of the former agricultural cooperative , but that subsequently the local commission had allocated to him a QUANTITY . m plot of land next to the yard .

On DATE the town council invited the applicant to take possession of a plot of QUANTITY . m of land as provided for by the judgment of DATE , in CARDINAL of CARDINAL locations proposed by the authorities , none of them at LOC .

On DATE the local commission certified in an official record that the applicant had been able to take possession of a QUANTITY . m plot of land in a place called “ PERSON , which was not CARDINAL of the CARDINAL abovementioned locations . The applicant refused to sign the official record , as it did not relate to the original location .

On DATE and DATE the town council invited the applicant to sign the official record and the forms for the issuance of the document of title . The applicant refused , claiming the land in the original location .

On DATE the ORG prefecture , in a written note following an interview with the applicant , acknowledged that the latter ’s right of ownership over the plot of QUANTITY . m had been certified by the judgment of DATE and that the bailiff had enabled him to take possession in DATE . The prefecture further admitted that the applicant could not enjoy possession , as the local authorities had refused several times to take that judgment into account . Hence , the buildings on the land had been systematically leased out , without the question of ownership of the land being examined , and were currently leased to CARDINAL party , with the town council receiving a lease tax for the land . Finally , the note mentioned that the prefecture had informed the mayor that according to the law it was the applicant who should have entered into the lease contract as the owner of the land and of the buildings on it . Therefore , the applicant was directed to lodge either an application for determination of ownership or an application concerning the obligation to take action .

On DATE the bailiff , at the applicant ’s request , directed the local commission to execute the judgment of DATE and to pay the DATE pecuniary penalty with effect from DATE .

On DATE the local commission lodged an objection to execution , alleging that the failure to enable the applicant to take possession of QUANTITY . m of land and to issue him with a document of title was due to his own refusal .

On DATE ORG Instance dismissed the objection as groundless , stating that the acts performed by the local commission were not in conformity with the judgments given in the applicant ’s favour and that his claim to take possession of the QUANTITY . m plot of land in the original location at LOC was justified .

On DATE ORG , by a final decision , upheld an appeal by the local commission and annulled the bailiff ’s injunction . The court noted that the establishment of the location of plots of land fell within the exclusive competence of the local commission and that the authorities had made several proposals to the applicant with a view to providing him with equivalent land in compensation . It also considered that the evidence proved that the applicant was already in possession of a CARDINAL sq . m plot of land at GPE , in accordance with the judgment of DATE .

On DATE the applicant brought proceedings against the local authorities seeking to obtain a document of title for the QUANTITY . m plot of land at LOC as granted by the judgment of DATE , with the following boundaries : the road ( to the north and south ) , pastureland ( to the east ) and buildings belonging to the town council ( to the west ) . He submitted that he was the owner of that land according to the judgment of DATE and that he had been granted possession by the bailiff on CARDINAL DATE , but that the authorities were planning to prepare documentation for the acquisition of title for land in other locations .

On DATE ORG , taking into consideration an expert report produced in the proceedings and refusing a request by the applicant for a new expert report , dismissed the action on the ground that the land claimed by the applicant within those boundaries included the stables of the former agricultural cooperative and had no connection with the plot of land awarded by the judgment of DATE , being adjoining to it . The court acknowledged the applicant ’s interest in claiming that land , as it had the stables of the former agricultural cooperative on it .

On DATE ORG , by a final decision , dismissed as groundless an appeal by the applicant in which he had contested the location on which the expert report produced before the first - instance court was based and the dismissal of his request for a new expert report .

On DATE the town council informed the Agent of the Government that the applicant was in possession of a plot of land at GPE , certified by the official record of DATE and , according to an expert report of CARDINAL DATE , with a surface area of QUANTITY m. That land was the land mentioned by the judgment of DATE .

So far the applicant has not received a document of title .

The relevant domestic law is summarised in the judgments in PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL , DATE ) and ORG v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § CARDINAL , DATE ) .


Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - award

David Thór Björgvinsson;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Mihai Poalelungi;Nicolas Bratza;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

On DATE ORG declared the company “ Wojewódzkie Przedsiębiorstwo Przemysłu Mięsnego ” insolvent and appointed the applicant ( a practising lawyer ) as an insolvency trustee . Judge ORG was appointed as an insolvency judge .

On DATE , the court discharged PERSON from his position and appointed PERSON as the new insolvency judge .

On DATE the applicant asked the insolvency judge to determine the amount of his remuneration .

At the hearing held on DATE the question of payment of the applicant 's expenses was examined . The hearing was adjourned since the court decided to wait for an opinion from an expert accountant .

On DATE the applicant asked to be granted an advance payment on his remuneration . The insolvency judge – M.S. – submitted that the applicant had already been granted an advance payment of MONEY ( ORG ) and he had already obtained ORG MONEY . In addition , he had obtained , for his alleged expenses , a total of ORG .

At the hearing held on DATE the ORG sitting as a panel composed of CARDINAL judges , including judge PERSON , granted the applicant an advance payment of LAW .

On DATE the applicant applied to ORG in GPE and requested the sum of ORG MONEY as payment for his DATE of trustee duties .

GPE , the insolvency judge , in her submissions to the court ( przedstawienie ) , asked it to grant the applicant remuneration in a lower amount , namely PLN CARDINAL,CARDINAL . She submitted that the applicant had been responsible for a lengthy and expensive liquidation proceedings . She also requested the offsetting of the sum of PLN CARDINAL,CARDINAL that had already been paid to the applicant in the form of advance payments .

At the hearing held on DATE the court heard evidence from the applicant . On DATE ORG at a session held in camera granted the applicant 's request in part , and awarded him CARDINAL . The sum of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL already paid to the applicant was offset from the amount . The bench that gave this decision was composed of CARDINAL professional judges including both PERSON and GPE

On DATE the applicant appealed against this decision . He disagreed with the court 's decision in general terms . He further argued that the proceedings had been invalid since the insolvency judge , PERSON , had acted both as a claimant and as a member of the court , which called into question the court 's impartiality .

On DATE ORG at a session held in camera dismissed the applicant 's appeal . The court considered that the first - instance court had correctly calculated the trustee 's remuneration , in particular because the applicant was responsible for delays in the proceedings . It referred to the fact that the applicant was heard at the hearing held on DATE and he was able to present his arguments . In the court 's opinion , judge PERSON was entitled to sit on the bench of the commercial court deciding on the applicant 's remuneration , given that LAW did not provide for any limitations in this respect .

The applicant filed a cassation appeal with ORG .

On DATE ORG rejected his cassation appeal as inadmissible in law .

On DATE the applicant appealed against this decision . On DATE ORG dismissed his appeal confirming that a second - instance court 's decision on trustee 's remuneration could not be the subject of an appeal .

Meanwhile , on DATE the applicant asked to be paid further partial remuneration in the amount of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL for the period DATE and DATE .

On DATE ORG held a hearing in that case . The panel of judges was composed of CARDINAL professional judges , including judge PERSON The applicant challenged judge PERSON In reply , on DATE ORG ordered judge PERSON to withdraw from the panel . The court noted that the insolvency judge , who had already made her submission regarding the applicant 's remuneration , would have pre - conceived notions about the issues in the case .

On DATE the ORG granted the applicant partial remuneration in the amount of PLN CARDINAL .

On DATE ORG declared the liquidation procedure to be terminated .

The Ordinance of the President of GPE of DATE , LAW , as applicable at the material time , set out the rules governing insolvency proceedings .

Under section CARDINAL of LAW , proceedings relating to an insolvency petition were to be instituted before ORG , sitting as a bench of CARDINAL professional judges , in whose jurisdiction the insolvent debtor had its registered office .

Under section CARDINAL § CARDINAL the insolvency judge was not to be on the bench of the court that heard a complaint against a decision given by that judge .


Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE . He is currently confined in a psychiatric hospital in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in Neuwied . The respondent Government were represented by their Agent , PERSON , PERSON , of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of sexual abuse of a DATE girl . He confessed and was released DATE .

On DATE the applicant voluntarily admitted himself to a psychiatric clinic at GPE .

In the course of the applicant ’s trial at ORG it was established that DATE the applicant had committed QUANTITY offences of sexual abuse of children . At the time of the first offence the applicant was DATE . The applicant had manipulated the genitals of his victims , girls between DATE and ten , with his hands , whereupon he had spontaneous ejaculations or masturbated . He ceased the sexual manipulations as soon as his victims resisted him . The first sixteen offences of sexual abuse had been committed DATE . The victims were schoolmates of the applicant at a special boarding school for visually impaired persons which the applicant , who suffers from a serious congenital visual impairment himself , attended from DATE to DATE , first as a pupil and later as an apprentice . The other victims were children of relatives or of other acquaintances .

On DATE ORG , following a confession by the applicant and after consulting a medical expert at the GPE psychiatric hospital , who diagnosed the applicant as suffering from a personality disorder characterised by very low self - esteem and difficulties with social integration as well as from a serious sexual deviation in the form of heterosexual paedophilia , acquitted the applicant . ORG considered that the applicant had committed his offences without criminal responsibility and ordered him to be placed in a forensic psychiatric clinic , since there was a high risk that he would commit further serious sexual offences ( Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW , see Relevant domestic law below ) . Since then the applicant has been confined in psychiatric hospitals for CARDINAL .

The applicant was initially detained in the forensic psychiatric hospital at GPE , then from DATE in GPE , where it was established that the applicant ’s sexual deviation was the consequence of a compulsive neurotic development and that - among other factors - the applicant ’s congenital visual impairment and problematic family background had led to his social marginalisation and prevented him from learning how to deal adequately with his sexuality .

Following a failed therapy attempt the applicant was retransferred to the GPE psychiatric hospital in DATE , where he stayed until DATE . An authorisation to work in an external sheltered workshop for disabled persons was revoked in DATE when the applicant extended his journeys to work without permission on several occasions .

In DATE the applicant was transferred to a forensic psychiatric clinic in GPE , where he entered into a homosexual relationship with a fellow patient . In DATE he was transferred back to a ward of the GPE clinic in GPE , where he has remained .

Expert opinions established at regular intervals by the respective clinics in the period from DATE ( for instance on CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE ) while acknowledging that the applicant had adapted to life in the institution and had made some progress in his therapy , highlighted that he had a tendency to trivialise the offences he had committed and was not ready to deal with his personality disorder , and that it could not be ruled out that he would commit similar offences if released . An external expert opinion commissioned by ORG at the request of the applicant and rendered on DATE suggested that further therapeutic measures be pursued with the applicant , that accompanied exits from the hospital be allowed , and that his criminal prognosis be reviewed after DATE . Subsequent accompanied exits of the applicant from the clinic and further relaxations of his detention did not give cause for complaint .

In DATE the applicant entered into a further homosexual relationship with a fellow patient , which was qualified by the attending therapists as relatively stable and estimated as the beginning of development towards a mature form of sexuality . Pursuant to an expert report rendered by the clinic on DATE the applicant showed progress in dealing with the offences he had committed but there was still a risk that he would commit related sexual offences .

In an expert opinion dated DATE the same external expert who had rendered the opinion of DATE came to the conclusion that the applicant was not suffering from paedophilia and that the offences committed were to be qualified as compensatory acts of an inhibited and severely visually impaired person , who had considered his victims little adults . In view of the progress made by the applicant , as confirmed by the attending therapist , the expert found that the criminal prognosis for the applicant was rather positive and recommended that following a DATE probationary period a conditional release of the applicant and his placement in supervised accommodation ( Betreutes PERSON ) could be considered .

The expert further pointed out that he had hardly ever come across a case where a person detained in a psychiatric hospital had been exposed to so many different treatments and transferred so often from CARDINAL clinic to another , resulting in alternating positive and negative prognoses . For instance , a course of therapy at the ORG psychiatric clinic showing positive results was interrupted in DATE when the applicant was retransferred to the clinic in GPE .

The applicant ’s detention in a psychiatric hospital has been reviewed at regular intervals ( compare Article PERSON and Article CARDINAL of LAW , see Relevant domestic law below ) by the relevant courts , and his requests for probationary suspension of his detention have repeatedly been refused by the courts .

For instance , by a decision dated DATE ORG , while refusing a further request by the applicant for a probationary suspension of his detention , held that after DATE of detention its further continuation might no longer be proportionate and that therefore the hospital was under an obligation to expedite rehabilitation measures , in particular in view of the applicant’Regional ORG reduced the statutory DATE period for the subsequent review of the applicant ’s detention to DATE .

An appeal by the applicant against a subsequent refusal of a similar request by ORG was dismissed by ORG by a decision of DATE .

On DATE ORG , in a decision confirmed on appeal , again rejected the request of the applicant for a probationary suspension of his detention .

On DATE ORG rejected a further request for conditional discharge and ordered a review of his detention after DATE instead of the statutory DATE period .

On DATE ORG , after hearing the applicant , dismissed his request to have his detention in a psychiatric hospital terminated or suspended on probation ( see Article CARDINALd and LAW of LAW ) . Having heard the applicant on DATE in the presence of his counsel as well as the ward physician and another doctor and relying in particular on an expert report by the GPE psychiatric clinic dated DATE , ORG found that since the last review of the applicant ’s detention on DATE the applicant , who had for a while been displaying aggressive behaviour , was now participating regularly in therapy groups again but had only agreed to do so after being informed that a refusal to undergo treatment would have a negative impact on his legal and medical prognosis . While taking into account the length of the applicant ’s detention , ORG emphasised the fact that the latter was still at the beginning of a new therapy attempt , that he was trivialising the committed offences on the ground that he had never used force against his victims , that he did not show any empathy with them and was incapable of speaking about his emotions . The ORG held that for these reasons there persisted a high risk that the applicant would commit similar sexual offences if released .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . ORG was convinced that the applicant was still suffering from paedophilia and stressed that this diagnosis had repeatedly been confirmed by attending doctors . ORG further emphasised that it was not persuaded by the findings to the contrary of the external expert in DATE . It pointed out that in DATE the applicant had abused his unsupervised journeys to work in a sheltered workshop in order to visit locations frequented by children and juveniles , that pictures depicting child pornography had been discovered in his room and that he had subscribed to magazines for children and young people . ORG held that a probationary suspension of the applicant ’s detention would only be possible in the event that his therapy could be regarded as having reached such an advanced stage that the remaining threat to pre - adolescent girls would be low . These conditions had not been met in the instant case and it had to be assumed with certainty that the applicant would sexually abuse little girls if released .

ORG referring also to its previous decision of DATE further considered that in view of this risk the applicant ’s continued detention for DATE was still proportionate . Having regard to the nature of the offences at stake and the obligation of the ORG to protect the rights of individuals and of the general public it was unjustifiable to release the applicant . Even lifelong detention in a psychiatric hospital could be proportionate and constitutional if justified by protection of the rights of third parties .

On DATE ORG declined to consider the applicant ’s constitutional complaint ( file no . CARDINAL BvR CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) on the ground that it had no prospect of success . It held that the courts dealing with the execution of the applicant ’s detention were under an obligation to independently assess statements made or opinions rendered by experts and to reach a decision on the resulting prognosis . ORG was not bound by the conclusions of the external expert but was free to make its own assessment as to whether the conditions of Articles DATE of LAW had been met in the instant case . ORG conclusion had been in line with the findings of other experts , who had obviously assumed for DATE that the applicant was a paedophile . It had had sufficient regard to the external expert ’s findings and evaluations and had not come to any arbitrary conclusions . A negative legal prognosis for the applicant had been justified in view of the fact that he did not show any empathy with his victims and had a tendency to trivialise the committed offences . When assessing the proportionality of the continuing detention ORG had struck a fair balance between the applicant ’s request to be released after DATE of detention in a psychiatric hospital and the threat he posed to society .

On the occasion of a subsequent review of the applicant ’s detention ORG , by a decision of DATE after hearing the applicant , and relying on an opinion by the attending doctors of CARDINAL DATE , again ordered that the applicant remain in a psychiatric hospital . The attending doctors had confirmed the diagnosis of paedophilia and given a negative criminal prognosis for the applicant , in particular in view of insufficient progress made in the course of his therapy and the resulting risk of recidivism . As regards the assessment as to whether the duration of the detention was still proportionate , ORG referred to ORG reasoning in its aforementioned decision of DATE . The applicant ’s related appeal was dismissed by ORG as manifestly ill - founded by a decision of DATE .

On DATE ORG obtained an external expert opinion in view of a further review of the applicant ’s detention . The expert found that the applicant was suffering from heterosexual paedophilia and that the homosexual relationships he had established with other prisoners had to be qualified as compensatory acts . The expert was of the opinion that the applicant continued to show paedophilic tendencies and that there persisted a risk that the applicant would commit similar sexual offences if released . In view of the external expert ’s conclusion and after hearing the applicant , ORG confirmed his continued detention by a decision dated DATE .

On DATE ORG , after hearing the applicant and on the basis of a statement of the attending doctors of CARDINAL DATE , again found that a probationary suspension of the applicant ’s detention could not yet be envisaged , since the risk persisted that he would reoffend . The applicant ’s paedophilia and personality disorder remained unchanged and his capacity and willingness to cooperate in therapy was severely limited due to his lack of acknowledgement of his illness and need for treatment . He was still trivialising the offences committed and was incapable of showing sufficient emotional concern and empathy . The ORG , while taking into consideration the considerable length of the applicant ’s detention , pointed out that there was no doubt that his placement in a psychiatric hospital was still proportionate . The crimes which had been at the origin of the applicant ’s placement in the psychiatric hospital were serious and there persisted a high risk of recidivism . According to the statements of the attending doctors there were no other measures capable of responding to such a risk , in particular since the applicant ’s attitude towards his sexuality and paedophilic tendencies was completely unclear . Thus , at present the interest of the safety of the general public could only be protected by means of the applicant ’s continued detention and still took priority over the applicant ’s interest to be released .

On DATE ORG dismissed a related appeal by the applicant .

The German Criminal Code distinguishes between penalties ( PERSON ) and socalled correction and prevention measures ( Maßregeln der Besserung und GPE ) to deal with unlawful acts . Penalties ( see Articles CARDINAL et seq . of LAW ) consist mainly of prison sentences and fines . The penalty is fixed according to the defendant ’s guilt ( LAW ) . Measures of correction and prevention ( see Articles CARDINAL et seq . of LAW ) consist mainly of placement in a psychiatric hospital ( LAW ) or a detoxification facility ( LAW ) or in preventive detention ( LAW ) . The purpose of these measures is to rehabilitate dangerous offenders or to protect the public from them . Placement in a psychiatric hospital may be ordered against offenders who have acted without , or with diminished , criminal responsibility . The measure must , however , be proportionate to the gravity of the offences committed by , or to be expected from , the defendants concerned , as well as to the danger they present ( LAW ) .

Pursuant to LAW , a person who upon commission of a criminal offence is incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of the act or of acting in accordance with such appreciation due to a pathological emotional disorder , profound personality disorder , mental defect or any other serious emotional abnormality , acts without guilt .

Article CARDINAL of the Criminal Code provides that if someone commits an unlawful act without criminal responsibility pursuant to Article CARDINAL , the court orders their placement without a maximum duration in a psychiatric hospital if a comprehensive evaluation of the defendant and his act reveals that as a result of his condition he can be expected to commit serious unlawful acts and that he is therefore dangerous to the general public .

Article PERSON of the Criminal Code governs the duration of detention . If the court considers following the commencement of detention in a psychiatric hospital that the conditions for the measure are no longer met or that further execution of the measure would be disproportionate , it declares the measure terminated ( Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) .

Article CARDINAL of LAW provides for review of a person ’s detention , inter alia , in a psychiatric hospital . The court may review at any time whether further execution of the detention order should be suspended on probation . It is obliged to do so within fixed time - limits ( § CARDINAL of Article CARDINALe ) . For persons detained in a psychiatric hospital , this time - limit is DATE ( § CARDINAL of Article CARDINAL ) .


GOUDSWAARD-VAN DER LANS v. THE NETHERLANDS

The applicant , PERSON , is a GPE national who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON . She is represented before the Court by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . The respondent Government are represented by Mr R.A.A. PERSON , of ORG .

In the interest of the proper administration of justice , the President has granted leave to the following persons to submit written comments : PERSON , PERSON , PERSON , PERSON , PERSON , PERSON , PERSON PERSON , PERSON , PERSON and Mr PERSON ( Article CARDINAL of LAW CARDINAL § CARDINAL of ORG ) . These persons , referred to hereafter as “ third parties ” , are represented by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

The applicant ’s husband died on DATE . The applicant was left with CARDINAL children born in DATE and DATE respectively . She was granted a pension under the General Widows and Orphans Act ( Algemene Weduwen- en PERSON ; “ AWW ” ) .

She entered into a relationship with a Mr H. , by whom she had a child in DATE , and set up home with him some time before DATE .

At the time of the events complained of , the applicant ’s AWW pension amounted to MONEY ( NLG ) DATE .

The AWW was repealed on DATE and replaced by LAW ( PERSON ; “ ANW ” ) .

By a decision of DATE the competent executive authority , ORG ( ORG ) , reduced the applicant ’s pension to NLG MONEY DATE , with effect from DATE . The reason for this reduction was the fact that the applicant had been living with PERSON on DATE , the date on which the ORG entered into force , and was expected to continue to do so beyond DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged an objection against this decision with ORG . It was dismissed on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal with ORG ( arrondissementsrechtbank ) .

On DATE , owing to the entry into force of new transitional legislation ( the Act of DATE see below ) , ORG raised the applicant ’s pension to ORG DATE , with effect from DATE .

On DATE the applicant ’s representative wrote to ORG informing it that the applicant ’s appeal was CARDINAL of several that had been selected as pilot cases intended to allow the courts to establish case - law . On DATE ORG also wrote to confirm this .

ORG gave a decision on DATE declaring the appeal well - founded on grounds not relevant to the case before the ORG . It quashed the decisions of DATE and DATE but left the effects of the latter decision unaffected .

On DATE the applicant lodged a further appeal with ORG ( ORG ) , the highest tribunal with jurisdiction in social - security matters . ORG also lodged an appeal , directed against aspects of ORG decision with which it disagreed .

ORG dismissed the applicant ’s further appeal in a decision delivered in open court on DATE and notified to the applicant on DATE . It accepted that there had been a “ partial deprivation of possessions ” within the meaning of LAW No . CARDINAL to the Convention . Its reasoning included the following :

“ In this legal provision [ i.e. section CARDINAL of the ANW – see below ] CARDINAL of the basic assumptions of the ORG , namely that statutory insurance for surviving dependants should be based on actual need ( dat aan een wettelijke nabestaandenverzekering het behoefteprincipe QUANTITY grondslag moet liggen ) , has been elaborated in respect of former recipients of AWW pensions . As compared to the ordinary ORG regime DATE under which , in short , the pension is reduced by the entire amount of work - related benefits [ i.e. unemployment and disability benefits ] and by income from work excluding a sum equal to PERCENT of the statutory minimum wage before tax , plus CARDINAL of any income in excess thereof – the deduction applicable to former AWW beneficiaries under LAW of DATE – see below ] is more advantageous : PERCENT of the statutory minimum wage before tax , in respect of both forms of income , together with CARDINAL of any income from work in excess thereof , is disregarded for the purposes of the reduction . It can also be said in such cases that , regardless of the level of income , an amount of benefit equal to PERCENT of the statutory minimum wage before tax remains unaffected .

As regards the transitional regime under LAW ANW it is also relevant that , in the case of persons maintaining a common household who are treated under the ORG as married persons ( with the exception of first - degree relatives ) , the former AWW beneficiary who is regarded as married on this ground retains , from DATE , an ORG pension equal to PERCENT of the statutory minimum wage , that percentage in the case of persons maintaining a common household in order to take care of an invalid rising to PERCENT ( of the statutory minimum wage after tax ) , PERCENT of which is means - tested .

ORG held that this result was consistent with the criteria embodied in LAW No . CARDINAL , which provides :

ORG agrees that the transitional arrangements under the ORG fulfil those criteria , and in particular that the legislature , in determining what can and must be considered necessary in the general interest , has not overstepped its margin of appreciation . In addition to ORG findings on this point , ORG considers the following important : according to current opinion the statutory insurance regime for surviving dependants acts as a basic provision ( bodemvoorziening ) in terms of supplementary arrangements for surviving dependants and as an income provision ( inkomensvoorziening ) at the level of the social minimum . This does not sit well with the idea of leaving the ( basic ) benefit intact where circumstances indicate that the surviving dependant concerned is , or has been , able to meet his or her own needs . The fact that there was no provision of this nature in the AWW may plausibly be attributed to the then insignificant proportion of married women in employment , as a consequence of which the concurrence of an AWW pension and a salary , or social benefit in lieu of salary ( loondervingsuitkeringen ) , was relatively rare . From the perspective of the aims of the new system , the social changes in this area required an arrangement that dealt with the concurrence of benefits for surviving dependants and other income . In addition , the legislature found it appropriate to extend the equal treatment of married couples and unmarried cohabitants ( in a general sense ) , as for other social arrangements , to the statutory insurance for surviving dependants .

The fact that the adaptations in question also extend to existing cases ( persons in receipt of AWW pensions ) is considered acceptable by ORG within the scope of its present review , from the equality point of view , and also in the light of the potentially considerable duration of the benefit ; and what is also acceptable within the same scope of review is the position of the legislature that , in terms of legal security , a temporary and/or partial ( in the present case : an initially complete and subsequently partial ) respect for existing rights is required .

The position that only ‘ full compensation’ would be consistent with LAW No . CARDINAL , as has been argued by the persons concerned by the cases dealt with in the present proceedings , is based on an incorrect understanding of that provision , which does not go so far as to make it utterly impossible for a ORG to make changes to existing ( social security ) rights . ”

The AWW , which entered into force on DATE , insured against the risk of the death of the family breadwinner . Under the AWW scheme , all persons residing in the GPE and non - residents gainfully employed in the GPE were compulsorily insured . Contributions to this scheme were paid by all persons gainfully employed in the GPE .

Entitlement to AWW benefit was not dependent on the level of contributions paid as , unlike a social - security scheme based on employment ( werknemersverzekering ) , it was a nationwide social - security scheme ( volksverzekering ) . The level of benefit was linked to the statutory minimum wage .

The AWW conferred entitlement to a widow ’s pension on the widow of an insured person , provided she was under DATE and was caring for an unmarried child born or conceived no later than the date of her spouse ’s death . A widow without children was also entitled to claim benefit subject to certain conditions , for example if she was incapacitated for work or was aged DATE or over at the time of her husband ’s death . “ Widow ” meant the woman to whom the insured person was married on the date of his death .

At the time when the AWW was replaced by the ORG , the amount of the pension was equal to the statutory minimum wage after tax in the case of a widow with dependent children below the age of DATE , and PERCENT of that wage in other cases . This amount was the same for all widows , regardless of any income which they might have been receiving from other sources .

Entitlement to an AWW pension was lost upon remarriage .

DATE , widowers enjoyed the same entitlement to benefit after the death of their wives pursuant to the case - law of the domestic tribunals under LAW .

By DATE the Government of the day felt that the AWW , based as it was on the traditional division of labour between men and women , had become obsolete . It gave surviving dependants an entitlement to benefit even if they were not in need of it : increasingly , beneficiaries included widows and widowers in paid employment .

For this reason the Government decided to introduce new legislation granting an entitlement to a pension only to certain categories of surviving dependants who could not be expected either to provide entirely for themselves or to take out private insurance .

A first bill was introduced in DATE . It was rejected by ORG of ORG , which disapproved of , among other things , the proposed transitional provisions .

A revised bill was introduced during ORG ’s DATE - CARDINAL session .

According to figures quoted by the Government in support of their proposals , in DATE , the percentages of working women among widows and female divorcees in the age groups DATE and CARDINAL were PERCENT and PERCENT respectively ( see the Explanatory Memorandum – Memorie van Toelichting – , ORG of ORG , no . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , DATE session , no . CARDINAL ) .

The ANW ( Act of DATE , ORG ) DATE , no . CARDINAL , as amended ( with retroactive effect from DATE ) by LAW DATE , ORG , no . CARDINAL ) entered into force on DATE .

Under LAW of the ORG , the persons insured under LAW are those who are either GPE residents or , if not GPE residents , are liable for wage tax ( loonbelasting ) in respect of work carried out in the GPE under a contract of employment .

Section CARDINAL of the ORG provides that the surviving dependants of an insured person shall be entitled to a pension if they have an unmarried child under DATE who does not form part of any other person ’s household , or if they are unfit for work , or if they were born before DATE .

Section CARDINAL provides for the termination of the entitlement to an ANW pension in the event that the surviving dependant no longer meets the requirements of section DATE ( unless he or she was born before DATE ) or reaches DATE ( at which age , in the GPE , one normally becomes entitled ipso facto to an old - age pension under different legislation ) .

The ANW pension is equal , after tax , to PERCENT of the statutory minimum wage after tax ( section CARDINAL ) . The pension is reduced by an amount equal to the surviving dependant ’s other income , if any ; however , a proportion of income from paid employment ( inkomen uit arbeid ) equal to PERCENT of the statutory minimum wage before tax plus , if the surviving dependant ’s income from work exceeds that sum , CARDINAL of the remainder , is disregarded for the purposes of the deduction ( section CARDINAL ) .

Section CARDINAL laid down a transitional regime for persons who , before the entry into force of the ORG , had been entitled to benefit under the AWW .

In accordance with CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) , persons , like the applicant who maintained a common household with another person on DATE on which the ORG entered into force ( i.e. DATE ) , and were still maintaining that common household on DATE , lost their entitlement to an ANW pension entirely with effect from DATE unless they were born before DATE , in which case they were entitled to an ANW pension amounting to PERCENT of the statutory minimum wage ( after tax ) .

As originally enacted in DATE , the ORG provided that persons previously entitled to an AWW pension who maintained a common household with another person on DATE on which the ORG entered into force lost their entitlement to an ANW pension entirely with effect from DATE unless they were born before DATE , in which case they were entitled to an ANW pension amounting to PERCENT of the statutory minimum wage ( after tax ) .

The Act of DATE amending the transitional regime and introducing certain technical adaptations ( PERSON tot wijziging PERSON nabestaandenwet ( wijziging overgangsrecht alsmede QUANTITY technische aanpassingen ) ) amended this arrangement , limiting it to those who were still maintaining a common household with someone else on DATE ( CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of the ANW – see above ) .

As early as CARDINAL DATE the Deputy Minister for ORG and Employment ( Staatssecretaris van Sociale Zaken en GPE ) decided on a “ Temporary ORG of the ANW ” ( PERSON regeling reparaties overgangswet ANW ; Official Bulletin ( Staatscourant ) DATE , no . CARDINAL , page CARDINAL ) . Its stated intention was to remove some of the effects of CARDINAL of the ORG , which were widely felt to be excessively harsh in that they frequently led to the complete termination of entitlement to an ANW pension .

The solution chosen , as relevant to the present case , was to reduce the ANW pension of surviving dependants who had previously enjoyed an AWW pension and were cohabiting in a common household to PERCENT of the statutory minimum wage ( after tax ) regardless of their date of birth .

This temporary arrangement was withdrawn with effect from DATE ( Official Bulletin CARDINAL , no . CARDINAL , page CARDINAL) , having been made redundant by the LAW of DATE ( see below ) .

The LAW of DATE amending the ORG in view of apparent unfairness ( PERSON DATE tot wijziging PERSON nabestaandenwet in verband met gebleken onbillijkheden ; Official Gazette DATE , no . CARDINAL ) , amended section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of the ORG to provide , in so far as relevant to the case before the ORG , that for persons previously entitled to an AWW pension who maintained a common household with someone else on DATE , for reasons other than taking care of an invalid , and who were still maintaining that household on DATE , the ORG pension would be reduced to PERCENT of the statutory minimum wage ( before tax ) with effect from DATE .


Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Mykhaylo Buromenskiy;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste

On DATE ORG of GPE informed the applicant company that it could no longer remain a shareholder of the applicant company because the transfer of the building from NORP to the applicant company , as consideration for its shares , had been invalidated by the judgment of ORG of DATE ( see the principal judgment , § CARDINAL ) .

Subsequently , several other shareholders , including ORG , also informed the applicant company that they would no longer be shareholders .

On DATE the general assembly of the applicant company decided to remove ORG , ORG and CARDINAL other companies from its list of shareholders . It was also decided to cancel the shares of the former shareholders and to reduce the share capital from CARDINAL to CARDINAL NORP hryvnias ( ORG ) .

According to the applicant company , the substantial drop in its share capital and its inability to use the building had inhibited its activities , which it had had to discontinue from DATE .

On DATE experts hired by the applicant company estimated the market value of the building on that date at ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL .

On DATE CARDINAL other experts hired by the applicant company to evaluate the market value of the building examined it from the outside , having been refused entry into the building . On DATE they drew up an extensive report , finding that the building was worth ORG CARDINAL given its actual state , location , existing possibilities of deriving profit from using the building , and the market values of similar types of property . They also mentioned that the building had not been in use since DATE at least and therefore needed complete renovation .

NORP On DATE ORG ( the ORG real - estate register ) produced , at the applicant company 's request , an expert report which estimated the market value of the building on DATE at ORG CARDINAL , pointing out that the building had not been repaired or renovated since DATE .

On DATE the applicant company 's accounts were examined by an expert who noted , inter alia , that the book ( inventory ) value of the building on DATE had been ORG , that from CARDINAL DATE to CARDINAL DATE the applicant company had spent ORG CARDINAL on repair work to the building , and that its expenses for renting an office between CARDINAL February and DATE had come to ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL . The expert also calculated the inflation adjustment of the market value of the building , as mentioned in the valuation of DATE . Thus , the value of the building adjusted on DATE amounted to ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL .

The relevant provisions of ORG of DATE ( as worded at the material time ) read as follows :

“ A shareholder shall pay the full price of the shares ... at the latest within DATE from the date of the company 's registration .

Failing to make a payment in time ... a shareholder shall be liable to pay PERCENT DATE interest ...

If no payment is made within DATE [ after the expiry of the time - limit ] ... the company may sell the shares in accordance with the procedure established by [ its ] statute . ”


Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Khanlar Hajiyev

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

In DATE the applicant , a salesman by occupation , decided to go to GPE to purchase merchandise .

On DATE the applicant arrived at FAC . The customs found on him MONEY ( ORG ) and CARDINAL NORP yuan ( ORG ) in cash which he had not reported in his customs declaration . The applicant was charged with attempted smuggling of foreign currency , a criminal offence under LAW and CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW . The money was appended to the criminal case as physical evidence ( вещественные доказательства ) .

On DATE ORG found the applicant guilty as charged and imposed a suspended sentence of CARDINAL years’ imprisonment conditional on DATE probation . As regards the money , the court held that :

“ Physical evidence – USD CARDINAL,CARDINAL and CNY CARDINAL taken from Mr PERSON – shall be confiscated by the ORG ... ”

NORP In his statement of appeal , counsel for the applicant argued that the confiscation measure had no basis in domestic law because the offence of smuggling did not carry such a penalty . She asked that the money be returned to the applicant as the lawful owner .

On DATE ORG upheld the conviction on appeal . As regards the money , ORG held as follows :

“ Pursuant to LAW , criminally acquired money and other valuables shall be confiscated by the ORG after conviction .

It appears from the case materials that Mr PERSON did not report ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL and CNY CARDINAL in his customs declaration when crossing the customs border of GPE . Since that moment , the above - mentioned valuables have become criminally acquired by Mr PERSON and , pursuant to LAW , should be confiscated by the ORG after conviction . ”

On DATE the first deputy prosecutor of LOC lodged an application for supervisory review of the applicant ’s conviction . He submitted as follows :

“ It was established during the trial that the money which Mr PERSON omitted to declare ... CARDINAL were his personal property , whereas the remainder was the money destined to pay for the merchandise he had intended to buy in GPE . Thus , the court did not adduce any evidence showing that the seized foreign currency had been criminally acquired . In these circumstances , the physical evidence – USD CARDINAL,CARDINAL and CNY CARDINAL – must be returned to the lawful owner , Mr PERSON . Moreover , the first - instance and appeal judgments contradict the requirements of LAW No . CARDINAL ... ”

On DATE the Presidium of ORG rejected the prosecutor ’s application . In a succinct decision it held , without further details , that “ the convict ’s acts had been correctly characterised ” and that “ the penalty had been determined in accordance with the requirements of the law ” . It did not address in substance the issue raised in the prosecutor ’s application . Finally , noting that LAW did not provide for confiscation , ORG considered it necessary to amend the first - instance and appeal judgments to read “ reverted to the profit [ of the ORG ] ” instead of “ confiscated [ by the ORG ] ” .

LAW of the Russian Federation provides that smuggling , that is movement of large amounts of goods or other objects across the customs border of GPE , committed by concealing such goods from the customs or combined with non - declaration or inaccurate declaration of such goods , carries a penal sanction of up to DATE imprisonment ( LAW ) .

The RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure of GPE ( “ CCrP ” , in force at the material time ) provided as follows :

“ The judgment , interim decision or decision on discontinuation of proceedings must deal with the destiny of physical evidence in the following manner :

( CARDINAL ) instruments of the crime belonging to the accused are liable to confiscation , transfer to competent authorities or destruction ;

( CARDINAL ) objects banned from circulation must be transferred to competent authorities or destroyed ;

( CARDINAL ) unusable objects of no value must be destroyed ... ;

( CARDINAL ) NORP criminally acquired money and other valuables must revert to the ORG by a judicial decision ; any other objects must be returned to their lawful owners or , if the identity of the owner can not be established , transferred to the ORG ...

( CARDINAL ) documents must be kept with the case file ... ”

The Resolution of the Plenary Supreme Court of the GPE “ On judicial practice regarding the offence of smuggling ” ( no . CARDINAL of DATE ) provided as follows :

“ CARDINAL . In accordance with the current legislation , the objects of smuggling are liable to confiscation to the ORG as physical evidence . Vehicles and other means of transport are also liable to confiscation as instruments of the crime provided that they were equipped with special hiding places for concealing goods or other valuables ... ”

The Resolution of the Plenary Supreme Court of the GPE “ On confiscation of the instruments of the offence that were recognised as physical evidence in the case ” ( no . CARDINAL of DATE ) provided as follows :

“ Having regard to the questions relating to the possibility of applying LAW ... in cases of negligent criminal offences , ORG resolves -

- to clarify that the objects belonging to the convict and declared to be physical evidence may be confiscated on the basis of LAW ... only if the convict or his accomplices deliberately used them as the instruments of the crime with a view to achieving a criminal result . ”

The Presidium of ORG of GPE in the case of Prosecutor General v. PERSON ( decision no . CARDINAL of DATE ) granted the prosecution ’s appeal against the judgment , by which PERSON had been found guilty of smuggling foreign currency but the money had been returned to him on the ground that LAW did not provide for confiscation as a penal sanction . The ORG held as follows :

“ Confiscation of property as a penal sanction must be distinguished from confiscation of smuggled objects which were recognised as physical evidence . These issues must be addressed separately in the judgment ...

In the meaning of [ LAW ] and also LAW of the ORG , an instrument of the offence is any object which has been used for accomplishing publicly dangerous actions , irrespective of the main purpose of the object . Accordingly , the notion of an instrument of the offence comprises the object of the offence .

A mandatory element of a criminal offence under LAW is an object of smuggling that is being illegally transported across the customs border ... The court found Mr PERSON guilty of [ attempted smuggling ] , noting that MONEY were the object of the offence . Accordingly , it was required to decide on the destiny of physical evidence in accordance with LAW that is , according to the rules on the instruments of the offence – but failed to do so . ”