ORG Mr PERSON and his wife , PERSON , née PERSON , chose to give their daughter , born on DATE , the forenames " PERSON , PERSON , PERSON " . After consulting ORG at PERSON , the registrar of births , deaths and marriages for ORG , to whom the child 's birth had been declared , refused to register the first of these names on the ground that it did not appear in any calendar of saints DATE . The birth certificate drawn up at the time mentions only " Armine , Angèle " .

ORG In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE the PERSON tribunal de grande instance dismissed the applicants ' main application for an order that the forename " PERSON " be added as their daughter 's first forename , but granted their application made in the alternative for the addition of " PERSON " . It held as follows :

" ORG objected to the application on the grounds that whereas ' PERSON ' and ' PERSON ' are , when taken separately , acceptable first forenames under NORP law , that is not the case with ' PERSON . The applicants submit that ' PERSON is composed of CARDINAL forenames recognised by NORP law , which when linked by the preposition ' de ' form the name of the heroine of LOC PERSON , a work which is world - famous . However , although a forename may be composed of CARDINAL names already in use , it can not , as in the present case , consist of a combination of CARDINAL names linked by a preposition since it would cease to be a mere reuse of a traditional boy 's or girl 's name and become an image invented at the whim of individuals , for all that they might possess as lively an imagination as LOC . In any event , this was not the intention of the legislature when it regulated the choice of forenames . Consequently , the main claim in the application must be dismissed but there is no reason not to grant the claim made in the alternative relating to the forename ' PERSON . For these reasons , ... Dismisses the applicants ' application for an order that the forename ' PERSON be added as the first forename of the child born on DATE and already called PERSON . Declares , on the other hand , that the forename ' PERSON is acceptable under NORP law and orders that it be added as the first forename of the above - mentioned child . Orders that the operative provision of this judgment ordering the addition of the first forename be entered in the margin of the child 's birth certificate . Orders that no certified copy of the certificate shall be delivered without the said addition .

Mr and PERSON appealed to ORG , which on DATE upheld the judgment of the court below in the following terms :

Although in spite of the mandatory requirements of the LAW Germinal Year XI , which provides that forenames must be chosen from the various calendars in use , case - law is tending towards a more liberal approach in order to take account of changes in social mores , local customs and family traditions , it is necessary to prevent parents from choosing forenames which are excessively whimsical and so eccentric that the child is likely to be the first victim . This is the case with the forename ' PERSON , notwithstanding that it was the name of the heroine of a famous literary work . On the other hand , there is no reason not to allow the claim made in the alternative that the forename should consist of the CARDINAL forenames ' PERSON ' and ' PERSON ' juxtaposed .

ORG Relying in particular on LAW , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Convention ( article CARDINAL , article CARDINAL , article CARDINAL ) , the applicants appealed on points of law to ORG ( ORG ) , which dismissed their appeal on DATE on the following grounds :

the provisions of LAW are not contrary to ... Articles [ CARDINAL , CARDINAL and DATE ] ( article CARDINAL , article CARDINAL , article CARDINAL ) of ORG , which merely establish general principles relating to respect for private and family life , freedom of conscience and the prohibition of discrimination between individuals ; ... ... ORG , which was not obliged to go into the finer detail of the parties ' reasoning , held , in the exercise of its unfettered discretion , that the chosen forename , because it was eccentric and excessively whimsical , and notwithstanding that it was the name of the heroine of a famous literary work , was likely to harm the interests of the child ; in so doing , ORG justified its decision in law

ORG LAW provided :

" The birth certificate shall state the date , time and place of birth , the sex of the child and the forenames to be given it , the forenames , surnames , ages , occupations and addresses of the father and mother and , if applicable , those of the person registering the birth ... The forenames which appear on a child 's birth certificate may , where there is a good and lawful reason , be amended by an order of the tribunal de grande instance made on an application by the child or , during the child 's minority , by the child 's legal representative . The order shall be made and published in accordance with the conditions set out in Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of this Code . The addition of forenames may likewise be ordered . "

The Law of CARDINAL Germinal Year ORG and its application

ORG LAW of CARDINAL Germinal Year XI provided :

only names in use in the various calendars , and those of known figures of ancient history may be entered as forenames in birth registers ; registrars shall not enter any other names in their registers . "

The ministerial circular of DATE amending the general circular on civil status ( ORG of DATE ) laid down in particular :

CHOICE OF ORG

General principles

Practical application

( a ) It should , however , be observed that the impact of custom in this field has considerably reduced the restrictions which were initially placed on the acceptance of forenames by the provisions of the LAW Germinal Year ORG taken literally . It is true that these provisions are of practical value in that they provide registrars of births , deaths and marriages with a bulwark against innovations which appear to them to be such as might later harm children 's interests and which would therefore be unacceptable . In practice , registrars of births , deaths and marriages , who have to take the immediate decision whether a forename is acceptable , can hardly be expected to compile a list of the exact resources of the calendars and of ancient history in order to determine whether a given forename is included in this heritage or not . In practice they are required to use common sense when exercising their discretion , so as to ensure that the law is applied with a measure of realism and liberality , in other words in such a way that the changes in social mores which have hallowed certain usages are not ignored and that surviving local characteristics and even family traditions which can be shown to exist are respected . Registrars must not lose sight of the fact that it is for parents to choose forenames and that , to the fullest extent possible , any wishes they may have expressed should be taken into account . ...

( b ) In addition to the forenames normally allowed within the strict limits of LAW , the following may therefore possibly be accepted , having regard to the foregoing considerations and , where applicable , subject to appropriate evidence being produced :

certain forenames of mythological origin ( such as ORG , etc . ) ;

certain forenames peculiar to local languages of the national territory ( NORP , GPE , NORP , etc . ) ;

certain foreign forenames ( such as PERSON , PERSON , PERSON , PERSON , etc . ) ;

certain forenames which correspond to words that have a specific meaning ( such as ORG , PERSON , etc . ) or even old surnames ( such as GPE , PERSON , PERSON , PERSON , etc . ) ;

compound forenames , provided that they do not include CARDINAL simple names ( such as PERSON or PERSON - GPE but not , for example , PERSON , which would be a combination of CARDINAL forenames ) .

( c ) Exceptionally , registrars of births , deaths and marriages may also accept , but with some caution :

certain diminutives ( such as ' ORG PERSON , ' PERSON ' for PERSON , or even ' Line ' , which is derived from feminine forenames containing that ending ) ;

certain shortened forms of double names ( such as ' PERSON ' for PERSON , ' PERSON ' or ' PERSON ' for PERSON , ' PERSON ' for PERSON , ' PERSON ' for PERSON , etc . ) ;

certain variations in spelling ( for example PERSON or PERSON , PERSON or PERSON , Ghislaine or PERSON , PERSON or ORG , etc . ) .

( d ) Ultimately , it would appear that registrars of births , deaths and marriages should only refuse to enter names chosen by parents which have not been demonstrably established as forenames in GPE by sufficiently widespread use . Thus , in particular , registrars should systematically refuse to enter forenames which are purely whimsical or names which , by reason of their nature , meaning or form can not normally constitute forenames ( surnames , names of objects , animals or qualities , words used as stage names or forenames or as pseudonyms , names that are onomatopoeic or recall political events ) .

In a judgment of DATE ORG stated that " parents can in particular choose as forenames , subject to the general reservation that , in the child 's interest , they are not found to be ridiculous , names in use in the various calendars ; and while no official list of permitted forenames exists , there is no ground for requiring that the calendar relied on emanate from an official authority " ( ORG , DATE , PERSON DATE , p. CARDINAL ) .

The Law of CARDINAL Fructidor Year II provided - and still provides :

" No citizen may bear a surname or forename other than those stated on his birth certificate ; those who have abandoned their original names shall resume them . "

" Neither may any nickname be added to the original name , unless it has hitherto been used to distinguish members of the same family and does not evoke feudal or nobiliary attributes . "

" All public servants are expressly prohibited from referring to citizens in documents otherwise than by their surnames , the forenames shown on the birth certificate or the nicknames permissible under LAW and from recording any other names in the certified copies or short - form certificates which they issue subsequently . "

Law no . CARDINAL of DATE on civil status , the family and children 's rights , which created the office of family - affairs judge , repealed the PERSON of CARDINAL Germinal Year XI and replaced the last CARDINAL paragraphs of LAW by the following provisions :

" A child 's forenames shall be chosen by its father and mother

The registrar of births , deaths and marriages shall immediately enter the chosen forenames on the birth certificate . Any forename recorded on the birth certificate may be chosen as the usual forename . Where the said forenames or any CARDINAL of them , either taken alone or linked to the other forenames or to the surname , appear to the registrar to be contrary to the child 's interests or to the right of third parties to protect their surname , the registrar of births , deaths and marriages shall immediately so inform ORG , who may then refer the matter to the family - affairs judge . If the judge considers that the forename is contrary to the child 's interests or infringes the right of third parties to protect their surnames , he shall order the name to be deleted from the registers of births , deaths and marriages . If the parents fail to choose an alternative name compatible with the aforementioned interests , he shall give the child another forename of his own choosing . The decision shall be noted in the margin of all documents relating to the child 's civil status . "

On the other hand , the PERSON of DATE did not repeal PERSON


The applicant , ORG , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She is represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in ORG .

On DATE , at TIME , PERSON , the applicant 's husband , was taking his animals out to graze on pastures that were CARDINAL to QUANTITY outside of the village of GPE , when he saw an unidentified object . He bent down and picked it up but when he realised that it could contain explosives he threw it away . At that moment there was a large explosion and Mr Evcil was wounded by shrapnel . His CARDINAL sheep died on the spot .

PERSON , a shepherd , who was accompanying him , ran towards the village for help . Road workers , who were working on a construction site at QUANTITY away from the scene of the incident , also heard the explosion . Mr PERSON , the construction site manager , immediately informed the security forces , who were stationed QUANTITY away .

At TIME , the applicant and her children arrived in a minibus , from Pertek which was QUANTITY away from the scene of the incident . They first took Mr Evcil to ORG . Following an initial medical treatment in ORG , he died during his transfer to ORG .

On DATE ORG initiated an investigation into the incident . Upon the public prosecutor 's request an autopsy was carried out on PERSON in ORG . The autopsy report contained a brief summary of the incident . There it was noted that the incident took place TIME Moreover according to this report , it was established that Mr ORG had died as a result of a haemorrhage , between CARDINAL am and CARDINAL am . The applicant 's son identified the body in the morgue .

Meanwhile the gendarmes drafted an incident report and made a sketch map of the scene of the incident . According to this report the incident occurred at TIME They also took statements from CARDINAL eyewitnesses .

In his statement taken by the gendarmes Mr PERSON submitted that his colleagues had informed him of the explosion while he was working on the construction site . He reported the incident to the security forces who told him that they had not opened fire . Moreover they told him that a “ special team ” would arrive shortly . Subsequently , Mr PERSON went to the scene of the incident with the security forces and talked with the applicant 's husband about what had happened . After Mr ORG had been taken to ORG , Mr PERSON called ORG in order to inform them of the incident .

In his statement PERSON , a road worker , said that at TIME he had heard a large explosion and saw smoke . He had also heard someone shouting in NORP for help . He stated that he had immediately informed Mr PERSON .

On DATE ORG gave a decision of non - jurisdiction ratione loci and transferred the case file to ORG .

On DATE ORG took the applicant 's statements . She stated that the incident occurred TIME She expressed the view that the security forces were responsible for the death of her husband because they had not provided him with any help despite having the means of doing so . The applicant claimed that if her husband had been taken to a hospital earlier , his life could have been saved . She believed that the explosive material that caused her husband 's death had not been left by terrorists , but by the security forces .

On DATE ORG of the Police in GPE carried out a ballistic examination of the shrapnel collected at the scene of the incident . According to ORG report dated DATE , the pieces gathered from the scene of the incident contained nitro - glycerine and nitrite , both explosive materials .

On DATE ORG sent the pieces of shrapnel collected from the scene of the incident to ORG for further examination .

On DATE ORG submitted the results of the ballistic examination to ORG . In the ballistic report it was stated that the CARDINAL pieces of shrapnel sent for examination bore resemblance to the outer layer of a tracer bullet which could be fired from a QUANTITY diameter M-CARDINAL ACARDINAL/ACARDINAL type of LAVA missile launcher . It was further stated that ORG ( ORG ve Kimya Enstitüsü – hereinafter “ ORG ” ) produced these tracer bullets for military purposes and that their commercial sale was prohibited .

In a letter dated DATE and addressed to ORG , ORG inquired whether the security forces at ORG had been using the type of tracer bullet mentioned in the ballistic report .

On DATE ORG replied that they had not been using the type of tracer bullet which was referred to in the ballistic report , however it was probable that other security forces in the district had been using this type of bullet .

In a letter dated DATE and addressed to the CARDINAL . ORG in GPE , ORG inquired whether the security forces in the entire district of Pertek had been using this type of tracer bullet .

On DATE the CARDINAL . ORG in GPE informed ORG that it was highly probable that the tracer bullet recovered from the scene of the incident had been left by terrorists . They submitted that it was a well - known fact that terrorists illegally obtain and use the weapons and the bullets produced by ORG . Furthermore , they maintained that , as the incident had taken place outside the area where the security forces practice shooting , there could be no responsibility attributable to the security forces in relation to the death of the applicant 's husband .

On DATE the ORG gave a decision of non - prosecution , as no crime could be attributable to the security forces and those responsible for the incident could not be identified .

In DATE ORG reinitiated the investigation . On DATE ORG issued a permanent search warrant valid for DATE from the date of the incident . According to this warrant the security forces have to carry out a rigorous investigation into the identification of the perpetrator(s ) until the search warrant expires .

In a letter dated DATE ORG requested information from ORG in order to establish if the military forces in the area had used the type of tracer bullet in question at any time and if the residents of the area had been warned about the explosive materials that could be found in the vicinity . Furthermore he asked to be kept informed of any development in the investigation into the death of the applicant 's husband until the statutory time limit expired .

On DATE ORG took statements from the village headman of LOC village at the time of the incident ; the present village headman ; the shepherd who was grazing his sheep with Mr ORG and the driver of the minibus who took PERSON ORG to the hospital . They all confirmed the facts of the incident , without mentioning the exact time of the incident .

On DATE ORG informed ORG that the NORP military forces had not used the type of tracer bullet responsible for the death of Mr Evcil since DATE , because it was expensive . However these bullets were still being produced by some ORG allies and it was observed that terrorists had been using them . Moreover they submitted that the villagers had been warned through the local press that any ammunition found in the area could be explosive and therefore they should immediately inform the security forces without handling them personally .

On DATE ORG informed ORG that the inquiries in relation to the identification of those responsible for the incident conducted so far had remained unsuccessful and that they were still actively being searched for . On DATE ORG issued a report similar to the previous one and submitted it to ORG . The last report of similar kind was issued on DATE .

A description of the relevant domestic law can be found in GPE v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , CARDINAL DATE .


CASE OF POPOVSKI v. "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA"

Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE an article was published in the DATE newspaper PERSON entitled “ The uncle was stealing , PERSON was standing guard ” ( PERSON крадел , Јован чувал стража ) . A reference to the article appeared on the front page of the newspaper . The text of the article read , in so far as relevant , as follows :

“ PERSON , uncle of dismissed bishop PERSON and owner of the company ORG from GPE , together with CARDINAL boys , entered the courtyard of GPE church in PERSON and continued towards the church garage . The uncle started the engine of the tractor [ inside ] and drove it out of the courtyard , while his helpers warned the church housekeeper , who was upset , to step aside . During the violent disturbance , the dismissed bishop PERSON drove around waiting for the outcome ...

... On the basis of an anonymous tip - off concerning the break - in , police stopped the tractor from leaving PERSON . The owner of ORG , [ the applicant ] , produced documents [ showing ] that ORG owned the tractor ! Only dismissed bishop PERSON knew how the tractor , which was a donation by GPE to PERSON ’s church co - operative , happened to belong to a private company from GPE ... ( GPE ) ”

The applicant submitted a letter to the newspaper DATE , in which he requested that it publish a retraction given the false allegations that he had stolen the tractor . In this connection he submitted a copy of a certificate issued by ORG confirming that the tractor had been returned to him . He alleged that in the absence of a retraction , he would be perceived as a criminal in GPE , a small town where people knew each other . The newspaper did not publish anything in this regard .

On DATE and after several verbal requests , the applicant submitted a letter to the newspaper seeking information about the identity of the journalist ( GPE ) , whose initials appeared at the end of the article .

On DATE ( as alleged by the applicant ) or DATE ( according to the Government ) the applicant brought private criminal charges for defamation under sections CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ) of LAW , which was an offence punishable under LAW ) of LAW ( see paragraphs CARDINAL , DATE and CARDINAL below ) . The complaint was made against ORG , editor - in - chief of the newspaper and GPE , the journalist responsible . The applicant claimed that the article had disgraced him and his family and said that he was seeking compensation for non - pecuniary loss , the amount of which was to be specified , as stated in the complaint , at the hearing .

On DATE and DATE respectively ORG ( “ the trial court ” ) requested that the applicant complete the complaint by providing information about the identity of GPE , describing the actions imputable to the accused and submitting an original of the article . In reply , the applicant specified his complaint and informed the trial court that all his attempts to get the newspaper to reveal the identity of the journalist responsible had been to no avail .

During the proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer practicing in GPE . The applicant alleged ( without providing any evidence in support ) that the first hearing had been scheduled for DATE ; however , the parties agreed that between DATE and DATE , the trial court had fixed CARDINAL hearings , of which CARDINAL were adjourned owing to the absence of either ORG , his representative or the journalist responsible . The trial court made several unsuccessful attempts to secure ORG ’s attendance with the assistance of the police . The applicant or his representative attended all the hearings scheduled .

At a hearing on DATE , the trial court requested that the newspaper reveal the identity of GPE , the presumed author of the article . In the absence of any reply from the newspaper , the trial court made the same request on DATE and DATE , as well as on DATE , but they were never answered .

At a hearing on DATE , ORG admitted that he had allowed the article to be published and requested additional time to identify the journalist who had written it . In a statement given on DATE , the applicant avowed that the article in question had contained defamatory allegations portraying him as a thief , which had had a significant negative impact on his personal and family life . In this connection he argued that his wife had closed her private medical practice since her office had been covered with writings describing them as “ thieves ” ( арамии ) . He also alleged that his children had encountered difficulties in school due to the defamatory article .

At a hearing on DATE , ORG stated that according to the newspaper ’s records , the author of the text had been a certain ORG , who had confirmed as much in a telephone conversation with him . The court ordered that PERSON be summoned to the next hearing . His home address was to be obtained with the assistance of the police .

K.J. did not attend any of the CARDINAL hearings scheduled DATE and DATE , despite the fact that the court had summoned him to do so . At the DATE hearing , the trial court stayed ( запира ) the proceedings because the prosecution had become time - barred . It also ordered each party to bear its own costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings . On DATE ORG upheld the judgment , which was served on the applicant on DATE .

During the proceedings , the applicant addressed the trial judge and the president of the trial court on QUANTITY occasions , complaining about the way in which the trial had been conducted and alerting them to the possibility that the prosecution might become time - barred .

The relevant parts of the above ORG read as follows :

“ CARDINAL . Anti - defamation laws pursue the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation and rights of others . The ORG nonetheless urges member states to apply these laws with the utmost restraint since they can seriously infringe freedom of expression ...

ORG the fact that in a number of member states prosecution for defamation is misused in what could be seen as attempts by the authorities to silence media criticism ...

The ORG consequently takes the view that prison sentences for defamation should be abolished without further delay . In particular it exhorts states whose laws still provide for prison sentences DATE although prison sentences are not actually imposed DATE to abolish them without delay so as not to give any excuse , however unjustified , to those countries which continue to impose them , thus provoking a corrosion of fundamental freedoms ...

The ORG accordingly calls on the member states to :

abolish prison sentences for defamation without delay ;

guarantee that there is no misuse of criminal prosecutions for defamation and safeguard the independence of prosecutors in these cases ;

define the concept of defamation more precisely in their legislation so as to avoid an arbitrary application of the law and to ensure that civil law provides effective protection of the dignity of persons affected by defamation ... ”

Section CARDINAL of LAW provides for the right to claim civil compensation .

Section CARDINAL provides that an employer is responsible for damage caused by an employee in the performance of his or her duties or in relation to them . A victim can claim compensation directly from the employee if the damage was caused intentionally . The employer can seek reimbursement of the compensation awarded to the victim from the employee if he or she caused the damage intentionally or negligently .

Section CARDINAL provides for the right to claim compensation in cases regarding damage to reputation or the dissemination of false allegations .

NORP Under sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL , the court can order the publication of a judgment in which a human rights violation has been found , a retraction or any other form of redress . The court can also award just satisfaction irrespective of whether an award for pecuniary damage has been made .

Under LAW , a compensation claim becomes time - barred DATE after the victim becomes aware of the damage and the person responsible . The absolute limitation period for compensation is DATE after the occurrence of the damage .

The running of the limitation period is suspended if a claimant brings an action before a court or competent authority with a view to determining or securing his or her claim ( section CARDINAL ) .

NORP Under section CARDINAL , if a court rejects an action for lack of competence or on another ground unrelated to the merits of the claim , and if the claimant resubmits that claim within DATE of the decision becoming final , the limitation period is considered to have been suspended by the first action . This applies if a court or competent authority advised the person concerned to pursue his or her claim by means of a separate civil action .

After the limitation period has been suspended , it starts running again and the time elapsed before the suspension is deemed to fall within the statutory limitation period . If the limitation period was suspended by a claim brought in the course of other proceedings , it starts running after settlement of the dispute ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) ) .

Under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of LAW , an editor - in - chief of a newspaper or other periodical publication could be held criminally liable for offences committed through that or other types of media if the identity of the author remained unknown until DATE trial .

Under section CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW , any person who disseminated false defamatory allegations about another person could be subjected to a fine or CARDINAL months’ imprisonment . Acts of defamation committed in public or through the use of media were punishable by a fine and by DATE imprisonment .

Under section CARDINAL ) , defamation as stipulated in section CARDINAL was subject to private prosecution .

NORP Since DATE , sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ( see paragraphs CARDINAL above ) have no longer been in force ( Official Gazette no . CARDINAL ) .

Under LAW of LAW , in force at the material time , proceedings were supervised by a judge , who was responsible for conducting them without delay .

Under section DATE ) and ( CARDINAL ) of the LAW , criminal proceedings were instituted at the request of an authorised prosecutor . In respect of criminal offences subject to public prosecution , the authorised prosecutor was the public prosecutor whereas in respect of criminal offences to be prosecuted privately , the qualified prosecutor was a private prosecutor .

Section CARDINAL provided that a civil - party claim ( имотноправно барање ) relating to a criminal offence was to be decided in criminal proceedings , unless it significantly delayed them . The civil - party claim could concern monetary compensation , the restitution of property or the annulment of a legal act .

Under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) , a civil - party claim could be brought in the course of the criminal proceedings before they were concluded at first instance . Such a claim had to be specified and supported with evidence .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) provided that the victim could withdraw ( откажe ) the civil - party claim until DATE trial and pursue it by means of a separate civil action . Such a claim could not be repeated in the course of the criminal proceedings , unless otherwise provided by law .

Under section CARDINAL , the court could question the accused and examine the circumstances relevant for the civil - party claim , and had to collect evidence and consider everything that was relevant to decide it . If a decision on the civil - party claim would significantly delay the proceedings , the court would restrict itself to gathering evidence which would be impossible or significantly difficult to gather at a later stage .

Section CARDINAL provided that the court was responsible for deciding a civil - party claim . If the court found the accused guilty as charged , the victim could be awarded full or partial compensation . In the latter case , the court could advise him or her to seek the remainder by way of civil proceedings . The same applied if evidence taken in the criminal proceedings was insufficient for the court to award any damages ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ) .

In case of an acquittal or dismissal of the prosecution , if the proceedings were discontinued or the indictment was rejected , the court was to advise the victim to pursue his or her civil - party claim by way of civil proceedings ( section ORG ) ) .

Under section ORG ) , criminal proceedings had to be instituted on the basis of either a charge brought by the public prosecutor or a private criminal complaint .

Sections CARDINAL of LAW DATE , which enter into force on DATE , provide for the same rules on civil - party claims as those specified in the CARDINAL Criminal Proceedings Act ( see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL above ) .

NORP Under section ORG , civil courts are bound by judgments given by criminal courts finding an accused guilty , in respect of the commission of the offence and the convict ’s criminal liability .

LAW lists grounds under which civil proceedings are stayed by operation of the law . Under section ORG ) , the civil court may stay proceedings if the decision depended on whether n offence subject to ORG prosecution had been committed , who the perpetrator was , and if he or she was found guilty .

The Law concerns civil liability for violation of the honour and reputation of physical and legal persons through insult or defamation . The law provides for freedom of expression and states that any restrictions thereon shall be in conformity with LAW and the ORG ’s case - law . Under the PERSON , the potential victim can seek publication of a retraction , a public apology or rectification . It further regulates the procedure regarding claims for compensation for pecuniary and non - pecuniary loss sustained as a result of the insult or defamation , as well injunctions the court can order if parties so request .

The Government submitted a copy of a final judgment of CARDINAL DATE , in which the courts accepted a compensation claim concerning defamatory statements the defendant ( a journalist ) had made in a DATE newspaper . The compensation claim was brought after criminal proceedings instituted by the claimant against the defendant had been stayed because of the absolute limitation period . In the judgment , the courts found that the termination of the criminal proceedings had not been binding on the civil courts in respect of the claimant ’s action for damages ( ПCARDINAL.бр.CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

They further provided a copy of a judgment in which ORG dismissed a legality review request ( барање за заштита на законитоста ) lodged against final judgments rendered in civil proceedings . It concerned a dismissal by the lower courts of an action for damages brought DATE after an alleged crime had been committed and after the criminal courts had acquitted the alleged offender . ORG found that the statutory limitation period for compensation claims relating to an alleged crime started to run from the moment the victim had lodged a civil - party claim in the criminal proceedings . Since the victim had not made such a claim , the fact that he had instituted the criminal proceedings had not suspended the running of the statutory limitation period concerning the compensation claim ( ORG of CARDINAL and DATE ) .


The applicant [ PERSON ] is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He is a lawyer .

In connection with criminal proceedings for misappropriation of assets , brought against the applicant by GPE investigating judge no . CARDINAL , the applicant was awarded legal aid and a lawyer was assigned by the court to assist him .

At the public hearing of the case the applicant ’s officially assigned lawyer raised an objection , as a preliminary issue , on the ground that the applicant had informed her that he no longer had confidence in her ability to represent him because she was specialised in labour law and not criminal law . She requested the judge to suspend the hearing In a judgment of DATE GPE criminal - court judge no . CARDINAL dismissed that objection on the ground that criminal law , as such , did not constitute a specialisation . He added that the applicant , who had not appointed a lawyer of his choice , had not expressed any intention to defend himself either . He also referred to the lawyer ’s professional experience . On the merits , the court found the applicant guilty of the offence of misappropriation , sentenced him to CARDINAL months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay damages to the victim of the offence .

The applicant appealed against that judgment to ORG . He disputed the judge ’s legal classification of the offence with which he had been charged . A new lawyer – this time one matching his requirements – was appointed by that court to assist him . In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , delivered after proceedings deemed to be inter partes , ORG dismissed the appeal and upheld the lower court ’s judgment . That judgment was served on the applicant ’s officially assigned lawyer on DATE . According to the applicant , the officially assigned lawyer did not send him a copy of the judgment upholding his conviction . The applicant therefore personally contacted ORG asking it to serve the judgment of DATE on him directly , which was done on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged an amparo appeal with ORG . He relied on LAW ( right to a fair trial ) . In his grounds in support of his amparo appeal , the applicant ’s representative stated that the judgment of ORG had been served personally on his client on DATE .

In a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG held the amparo appeal to be inadmissible on the ground that it had been lodged out of time . The court gave the following reasons for its decision :

“ As this court has stated on many occasions ( see , among others , the decisions of ORG , DATE , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE and CARDINAL ) , service of documents on the representative of a party to a trial shall produce the same effects as service on the represented party where section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ( ORG ) does not require personal service for the purpose of calculating the relevant time - period . That is so irrespective of the fact that the rules of ordinary law can impose an additional requirement of serving judgments personally . Consequently , if account is taken of the fact , as can be seen from the file , that the appellate court ’s judgment was served on the applicant ’s lawyer on DATE , the amparo appeal of DATE was lodged out of time because it was lodged long after the DATE time - limit provided for by section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the ORG for lodging a constitutional appeal . ”

LAW

“ The time - limit for lodging an amparo appeal shall be DATE from service of the decision delivered in the judicial proceedings . ”

Code of Criminal Procedure

“ Final judgments shall be delivered and served on the parties and their lawyers ... ”


The first applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . In DATE the first applicant ’s sons , M r PERSON , born in DATE , and Mr PERSON , born in DATE ( the second and the third applicants , both NORP nationals ) , joined the proceedings before the ORG .

The applicants were represented before the ORG by PERSON , a legal adviser practising in GPE . The respondent Government were represented by their agent PERSON , of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

In DATE , by decision of a ORG authority the first applicant and her husband were granted the right to use CARDINAL rooms and the kitchen in an apartment in GPE . In DATE , after the birth the second applicant , the competent authority allocated an additional room to the family . At that time the apartment , which covered QUANTITY , belonged to a private joint - stock company .

In DATE the property of the company was expropriated without compensation . In DATE the apartment at issue was allocated to ORG at ORG . In DATE the fund issued a tenancy order to the first applicant ’s husband .

In DATE , at a time when he was Deputy Minister of Defence , the first applicant ’s husband purchased the whole apartment from ORG . In accordance with the applicable rules of family law , the first applicant acquired CARDINAL of the property .

In DATE the heirs of the pre - nationalisation owners of the apartment brought an action against the first applicant ’s husband under section CARDINAL of LAW . The applicants were not parties to the proceedings .

On DATE ORG granted the claim . It found , inter alia , that the apartment had been purchased in breach of the relevant housing regulations as in force in DATE since it had been significantly larger than permitted for a CARDINAL - member family , as the applicants’ . The court also found that certain procedural rules had not been complied with and that , in all likelihood , the first applicant ’s husband had abused his position of Deputy Minister of Defence .

On appeal , on DATE the ORG quashed ORG judgment and dismissed the claim of the pre - nationalisation ORG heirs . The court found that all relevant regulations as in force DATE had been complied with and that the allegation that the first applicant ’s husband had abused his position was groundless .

The heirs of the pre - nationalisation owners submitted a petition for review ( cassation ) .

On DATE ORG quashed ORG judgment and upheld ORG judgment .

ORG agreed that the allegation of abuse of office had not been proven . However , the apartment had largely exceeded the needs of the applicants’ family under the rules applicable at the relevant time . As a result , the title of the first applicant ’s husband to the apartment at issue was null and void .

The judgment of CARDINAL DATE was final and enforceable .

On an unspecified date shortly after DATE the first applicant , who had not been a party to the proceedings until then , submitted a request for reopening , stating that in accordance with LAW she should have been cited as a party since she was the owner of CARDINAL of the apartment at issue .

The first applicant ’s husband died in DATE . The first applicant and her CARDINAL sons ( the second and the third applicants ) were his heirs .

By judgments of DATE and DATE , ORG quashed the judgments of DATE and CARDINAL DATE and reopened the case . The court found that , in violation of the relevant provisions of LAW , the first applicant had not been summoned as a party to the DATE proceedings .

All CARDINAL applicants became parties to the reopened proceedings .

On DATE the ORG decided to refer the case for renewed examination by ORG . That decision was quashed by ORG on DATE , as the reopened case fell to be examined by ORG .

On DATE the ORG found that the DATE transaction was null and void , having regard to the fact that the apartment at issue had largely exceeded the applicants’ family ’s needs as determined by the relevant housing regulations . The court thus upheld ORG judgment of DATE .

The applicants appealed . The proceedings are currently pending before ORG which listed a hearing for DATE .

In the meantime , DATE , there were separate rei vindicatio proceedings between the same parties regarding the same apartment . The proceedings ended in DATE by judgment rejecting the pre - nationalisation ORG claim , apparently on the basis that the proceedings under section CARDINAL of LAW were still pending .

The applicants continue to possess the apartment at issue .

These are summarised in the case of ORG and Others v. GPE , nos . CARDINAL , ORG , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , GPE , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , ORG , and CARDINAL , DATE .


CASE OF EZEH AND CONNORS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Violation of Art. 6-3-c;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings

The first applicant lived in GPE until he was DATE and then in GPE until he was DATE , after which he returned to GPE .

In DATE he was convicted of rape , possessing an imitation firearm and attempted murder . He was sentenced to CARDINAL concurrent terms of imprisonment , the longest term being DATE .

On DATE the first applicant attended a meeting in the “ C wing Interview Room ” with his probation officer for the preparation of his parole assessment report . The probation officer alleged that the first applicant threatened to kill her if she did not write down what he said . The first applicant was charged with an offence contrary to Rule CARDINAL ) of the Prison Rules DATE ( “ the Prison Rules ” ) .

He was “ put on report ” and an adjudication hearing before the Governor was convened for DATE . The first applicant requested legal representation in a form submitted to the Governor dated DATE and also during the hearing on DATE before the Governor . His reasons for such a request were not considered sufficient by the Governor , but the hearing was adjourned to allow him to obtain legal advice . The first applicant ’s representative before the ORG has submitted a statement , the contents of which were not disputed by the ORG , to the effect that , inter alia , he advised the first applicant at that stage about the nature and format of the adjudication proceedings and about the questions which the first applicant should raise .

In his detailed reply to the complaint lodged against him and written after the hearing on DATE , the first applicant stated that he required legal representation to put his points clearly to the authorities .

The hearing resumed on DATE . The record of the hearing indicated that the first applicant was asked whether he had had time to speak to his solicitor and whether he was ready to proceed . The relevant part of the record was ticked to indicate that he had . The hearing went ahead . The first applicant disputed that he had used threatening words against the probation officer . He submitted that the probation officer had misunderstood the actual words he had used , either because of his accent or language , and that the impugned remarks were about his life in GPE . Evidence was heard from the first applicant and the probation officer , to whom questions were put by the Governor and the first applicant .

The first applicant was found guilty and awarded CARDINAL additional days’ custody ( pursuant to section CARDINAL of LAW DATE “ the DATE LAW ) together with CARDINAL days’ cellular confinement , CARDINAL days’ exclusion from associated work and CARDINAL days’ forfeiture of privileges . This was the applicant ’s CARDINAL offence against discipline and his seventh offence of threatening to kill or injure a member of the prison staff .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the applicant unsuccessfully petitioned the Secretary of ORG about the conduct of his adjudication proceedings . In a letter dated DATE , it was confirmed that the Secretary of ORG had reviewed the adjudication procedure as a whole and found it to have been satisfactory .

In DATE the second applicant was convicted on CARDINAL counts of rape and of robbery and was sentenced to CARDINAL concurrent terms of imprisonment , the longest being DATE .

On DATE he was jogging around a track in the prison exercise yard when he collided with a prison officer . The officer alleged that the second applicant had run into him deliberately and he was charged with the offence of assault , contrary to Rule CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of FAC .

The adjudication hearing commenced on DATE when the second applicant requested legal representation ( or , alternatively , representation by his probation officer ) at the hearing . This was refused but the hearing was adjourned to allow him to obtain legal advice , which he did on DATE . The statement submitted by the second applicant ’s representative before the ORG pointed out that he had advised the second applicant about the nature and format of the adjudication proceedings and about the questions which the second applicant should raise . The second applicant was advised to request legal representation again for the adjudication hearing , which he did on DATE .

The adjudication hearing was reconvened on DATE . The Governor rejected the application for legal representation . He heard evidence from the relevant prison officer and another prison officer , from the second applicant and from CARDINAL prisoners called by the second applicant . The second applicant ’s case was that the collision had been accidental .

The second applicant was found guilty of assault and awarded CARDINAL additional days’ custody ( pursuant to section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act ) . CARDINAL days’ cellular confinement was also awarded and he was fined MONEY ( GBP ) . It was his CARDINAL offence against discipline .

On DATE and DATE , respectively , the applicants requested leave to apply for judicial review of the Governor ’s refusal of legal representation . Mr Ezeh also applied for an extension of time in which to do so . They argued that the various statutory and regulatory changes since the case of ORG and PERSON v. ORG ( [ DATE ] CARDINAL AC CARDINAL ) had made adjudication of prison disciplinary matters virtually indistinguishable from matters of summary jurisdiction and , therefore , legal representation ought to have been allowed as of right . On DATE a single judge of ORG refused leave to both applicants . He observed that there was no right to legal representation in adjudication hearings and that the Governor ’s exercise of his discretion not to allow such representation was not irrational or perverse given the facts of the cases . In Mr Ezeh ’s case he added that there was therefore no good reason for extending time .

On DATE the ORG counsel advised that a renewed leave application had no realistic prospect of success , given the views expressed by the single judge of ORG .

Control over , and responsibility for , prisons and prisoners in GPE and GPE is vested by LAW in the Home Secretary . He is empowered by CARDINAL ) of that Act to make rules “ for the regulation and management of prisons ... and for the classification , treatment , employment , discipline and control of persons required to be detained therein ” . Such rules are contained in statutory instruments laid before ORG and made in accordance with the negative resolution procedure , that is , they come into operation unless ORG otherwise resolves .

The rules made by the Home Secretary and currently in force are the Prison Rules DATE as amended ( “ the Prison Rules ” ) .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of ORG provides that a prisoner is guilty of an offence against discipline if he uses threatening , abusive or insulting words or behaviour .

ORG ( section CARDINAL ) provides as follows :

“ It is important that it is shown how the action was threatening , abusive or insulting , but it may not always be necessary to establish at whom the action was aimed and it is not necessary to name an individual in every charge .

Section CARDINAL further provides that the impugned matter can be a specific act or word or a general pattern of behaviour ; that “ threatening , abusive or insulting ” words should be given their ordinary meaning and that it is only necessary to find that a reasonable person at the scene would consider the words or behaviour threatening , abusive or insulting ; and that the accused intended to be , or was reckless as to whether he was , threatening , abusive or insulting .

Section CARDINAL of LAW CARDINAL ( “ the DATE LAW ) is entitled “ Fear or provocation of violence ” and provides :

“ ( CARDINAL ) A person is guilty of an offence if he –

( a ) uses towards another person threatening , abusive or insulting words or behaviour ; or

( b ) ORG distributes or displays to another person any writing , sign or other visible representation which is threatening , abusive or insulting ,

with intent to cause that person to believe that immediate unlawful violence will be used against him or another by any person , or to provoke the immediate use of unlawful violence by that person or another , or whereby that person is likely to believe that such violence will be used or it is likely that such violence will be provoked .

( CARDINAL ) An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place , except that no offence is committed where the words or behaviour are used , or the writing , sign or other visible representation is distributed or displayed , by a person inside a dwelling and the other person is also inside that or another dwelling . ...

( CARDINAL ) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable ... to imprisonment for a term not exceeding DATE or a fine ... or both . ”

Section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act is entitled “ Harassment , alarm or distress ” and section CARDINAL ) provides :

“ A person is guilty of an offence if he –

( a ) uses threatening , abusive or insulting words or behaviour , or disorderly behaviour ; or

( b ) displays any writing , sign or other visible representation which is threatening , abusive or insulting ,

within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment , alarm or distress thereby . ”

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) provides that it is a defence for the accused to prove that there was no person within hearing or sight likely to be caused such harassment , alarm or distress , or that he was inside a dwelling and had no reason to believe that the words of behaviour used , or the writing , sign or other visible representation displayed , would be heard or seen by a person outside that or any other dwelling , or that his conduct was reasonable .

Dwelling is defined for the purposes of sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act , as being any structure or part of a structure occupied as a person ’s home or as other living accommodation ( whether the occupation is separate or shared with others ) but does not include any part not so occupied , and for this purpose “ structure ” includes a tent , caravan , vehicle , vessel or other temporary moveable structure .

A prisoner is guilty of an offence against discipline if he commits an assault ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of ORG ) . Both section CARDINAL of the Offences Against LAW DATE and section CARDINAL of LAW DATE make provision for the criminal offence of common assault .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of ORG provides that a charge of an offence against discipline shall be laid , save in exceptional circumstances , within TIME of the offence and , in general , inquired into by the Governor DATE after it is laid .

Prior to DATE disciplinary offences were adjudicated upon by Governors who could award a maximum of CARDINAL days’ “ loss of remission ” ( together with CARDINAL days’ solitary confinement ) . Grave or especially grave offences were adjudicated upon by ORG which could order forfeiture of a maximum of CARDINAL days’ remission for a grave offence ( together with CARDINAL days’ solitary confinement ) or an unlimited forfeiture of remission for an especially grave offence .

Loss of remission was initially considered in domestic law to amount to nothing more than a loss of a privilege ( see , for example , PERSON v. DATE ] CARDINAL KB CARDINAL ) . By DATE , however , the NORP courts had rejected that idea : whether or not it could be said , under the prevailing statutory framework , that remission was a privilege or a right , prisoners were told their earliest release date on arrival in prison and could expect , subject to forfeiture being ordered , release on that date . Forfeiture of remission had the effect of causing the detention to continue beyond the period corresponding to that legitimate expectation ( NORP v. Hull ORG , ex parte PERSON and Others [ DATE ] CARDINAL All England Law Reports CARDINAL and “ Prison Law ( second edition , DATE ) , PERSON and PERSON ) .

In DATE the power of ORG to award unlimited remission was removed .

The Prior Report on ORG ( DATE ) recommended that there should be an effective appeal process where issues of personal liberty were at stake and that there should be a right of appeal to a manifestly independent tribunal where there was any significant forfeiture of remission .

In DATE the distinction between offences , grave offences and especially grave offences was removed and the maximum loss of remission was reduced to DATE for any CARDINAL offence .

Lord PERSON ’s report on ORG ( DATE ) recommended that prison Governors ( as opposed to on ORG ) should continue to adjudicate disciplinary offences and that criminal offences should be referred to the criminal courts . The report recommended that the Governor ’s order be limited to a maximum of CARDINAL days’ loss of remission and that there should be more recourse to alternative punishments such as the loss of facilities and privileges . It was suggested that the initial decision should be taken by a Governor with a right of review by an area manager , with an appeal thereafter to a ORG .

LAW DATE ( “ the DATE LAW ) took away the disciplinary jurisdiction of ORG , allocating it to prison Governors . It also introduced a new framework for determining the period of a sentence which would be served in custody . The concept of remission , which would result in early release of prisoners prior to the expiry of their sentence , was abolished . In its place , a new regime was created which distinguished between those prisoners sentenced to less or more than four years’ imprisonment ( short and long - term prisoners , respectively ) .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the DATE LAW provides that , as soon as a long - term prisoner has served CARDINAL of his sentence , it shall be the duty of the Secretary of ORG to release him on licence . Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) put the same obligation of release on the Secretary of ORG as regards short - term prisoners who had served CARDINAL of their sentences : release of the latter category of prison was unconditional if the original sentence was for a term of DATE and was on licence if the original sentence was for DATE imprisonment .

In addition , section CARDINAL of the DATE Act provided as follows for the award of “ additional days ” to a prisoner found guilty by the prison Governor of disciplinary offences :

“ ( CARDINAL ) Prison rules , that is to say , rules made under LAW , may include provision for the award of additional days -

( a ) to short - term or long - term prisoners ; or

( b ) conditionally on their subsequently becoming such prisoners , to persons on remand .

who ( in either case ) are guilty of disciplinary offences .

( CARDINAL ) Where DATE are awarded to a short - term or long - term prisoner , or to a person on remand who subsequently becomes such a prisoner , and are not remitted in accordance with prison rules -

( a ) any period which he must serve before becoming entitled to or eligible for release under this Part ; and

( b ) any period for which a licence granted to him under this Part remains in force ,

shall be extended by the aggregate of DATE . ”

NORP The maximum DATE which could be awarded by the Governor was DATE , the same maximum period recommended by Lord PERSON ’s report in DATE .

However , given the growth in prisoner offending and the view that the system put in place in DATE had not acted as an adequate deterrent or inducement to good behaviour , FAC DATE ( statutory instrument No . CARDINAL/CARDINAL – in force on DATE ) increased the maximum award of DATE to CARDINAL for each offence ; the maximum cellular confinement was increased to DATE and the maximum forfeiture of privileges was increased to DATE ( Rule CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of FAC ) . However , the award of DATE could never extend beyond the length of the original sentence imposed by the trial court .

The case of NORP v. Governor of ORG , ex parte PERSON ( No . CARDINAL ) ( [ DATE ] CARDINAL WLR CARDINAL ) concerned a short - term prisoner ’s detention beyond the statutory release date because of an erroneous calculation of the release date . ORG found detention beyond that statutory release date to be unlawful and awarded damages for false imprisonment . Lord Justice PERSON noted that , pursuant to section DATE of the CARDINAL Act , DATE could be added onto the core period foreseen by section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) so that the date therein envisaged was not absolute , but was DATE that could be affected by decisions made by the prison Governor under section CARDINAL . Lord Justice Judge pointed out that :

“ The discretionary aspects of earlier arrangements for remission and parole were altered by the [ CARDINAL Act ] . As a “ short - term ” prisoner within Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the [ CARDINAL Act ] , subject to an award of DATE in custody for disciplinary offences , the appellant was entitled to be released on licence as soon as she had served CARDINAL of the sentence imposed by the court . Therefore authorities such as ORG and Winter [ DATE ] CARDINAL KB CARDINAL , based on the principle that there was no entitlement to remission , cease to be relevant ...

The order of the court justifies the detention . Nevertheless , the prisoner is entitled to be released immediately the sentence has been completed . The method of calculating the date of release depends on statutory provisions which must be applied correctly , that is , correctly in law . ”

ORG ( [ DATE ] CARDINAL WLR CARDINAL ) later rejected the appeal and confirmed the finding of false imprisonment and the award of damages .

In the case of NORP v. the Secretary of ORG for ORG ex parte PERSON , PERSON and GPE ( judgment of ORG of DATE ) , the appellants argued that LAW should apply to prison disciplinary proceedings referring , inter alia , to the changes brought about by LAW . The judgment , delivered by Lord PERSON , provided , in so far as relevant , as follows :

“ Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the DATE Act provided a power to make prison rules which included provision for the award of DATE but section ORG ) makes it clear that where DATE are awarded to a prisoner DATE are aggregated with the period which would otherwise have to be served before the prisoner is released on licence . ...

The new statutory framework properly understood is not fatal to the cases advanced by the appellants . Section CARDINAL merely gives their case its proper perspective . The awards of DATE to be served by each of the appellants did not have the effect of adding to their sentence . It was not a fresh sentence of imprisonment . Their effect was to postpone the appellant ’s release on licence . The awards clearly had a practical effect so far as the appellants were concerned and that practical effect was to postpone their release . But there was no question of their sentence being increased as a matter of law . DATE could not be imposed so that they extended the actual sentence , which the appellants were serving , and the sentence passed by the court was the justification for the appellant ’s detention for the purposes of Article CARDINAL ) ORG . ”

The judgment went on to apply “ the PERSON criteria ” ( PERSON and Others v. the GPE judgment of DATE , Series A no . CARDINAL ) . It noted that the domestic categorisation of the relevant offences was not criminal but disciplinary . It was held , inter alia , that LAW did not apply to proceedings concerning a penalty of DATE for a charge of administering a controlled drug to himself or failing to prevent the administration of a controlled drug by another person contrary to LAW ) of the Prison Rules DATE . It was found that the offence of which the prisoner was found guilty did not precisely replicate any offence contrary to the criminal law and that “ the power of punishment ” was not disproportionate for a disciplinary offence although it was considered close to the borderline .

This document entitled “ ORG and ORG on the use of Additional Days ” provided guidance on the implications of LAW DATE for the conduct of adjudications and the imposition of punishments , particularly the punishment of DATE . Insofar as relevant , it provided as follows :

“ CARDINAL . Disciplinary proceedings in prisons require swift hearings and a speedy process to maintain discipline and order . They are not adversarial and the nature of the decision is an administrative public law decision rather than CARDINAL which resolves a dispute between CARDINAL parties . Domestic LANGUAGE law has distinguished prison disciplinary proceedings from criminal proceedings when deciding the procedural standards necessary for fairness . PERSON case law confirms this view .

NORP However , the fact that the ORG will not in general apply to disciplinary proceedings does not mean that there is not , in theory , a risk it could apply in certain circumstances . ...

The imposition of DATE is generally the heaviest of the range of punishments available to adjudicators and should be used accordingly , in targeted fashion . It is not possible to give an exhaustive list of the types of offence where DATE might be appropriate ; much will depend upon the circumstances of the individual case . The following , however , are examples where DATE may be particularly appropriate following a finding of guilt at adjudication .

( a ) Cases which would have been referred to the police but for the wishes of the victim .

( b ) Serious assaults and assaults on staff .

( c ) Escapes , attempted escapes and absconds .

( d ) ORG offences , particularly involving Class A drugs .

( e ) Concerted or persistent acts of indiscipline .

Where DATE are imposed , the number of DATE imposed must be proportionate to the aim of securing good order and discipline in the prison . In making this decision , the Governor will consider the same factors as those set out in paragraph CARDINAL .

Adjudicators should be particularly careful before imposing a large number of DATE . Overall , it should be extremely rare for punishments of DATE to be made . As a guide , in DATE , PERCENT of punishments of DATE were for DATE .

For more serious cases , adjudicators must ensure that they have fully considered the alternative of referring the matter to police ( see section CARDINAL of ORG ) . Only if this is not possible in the circumstances or there are very good reasons where a disciplinary punishment is more appropriate ( for example if the victim objects to the involvement of the police ) should adjudicators use the disciplinary procedure instead . ”

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the Prison Act DATE provides :

“ Rules made under this section shall make provision for ensuring that a person who is charged with any offence under the rules shall be given a proper opportunity of presenting his case . ”

The above provision is implemented through Rule CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the Prison Rules :

“ At an inquiry into a charge against a prisoner , he shall be given a full opportunity of hearing what is alleged against him and of presenting his own case . ”

The courts have interpreted Rule CARDINAL ) as conferring a power on the Governor to grant , or not , to a prisoner legal representation at an adjudication hearing . In R v. the Home Secretary ex parte GPE and Others ( [ DATE ] CARDINAL QB CARDINAL ) , ORG pointed out that there is no right to legal representation for prison adjudications and that its grant in a particular case should be determined by reference to certain factors . Those factors were stated to include the seriousness of the charge and of the potential penalty ; whether any points of law are likely to arise ; the capacity of the particular prisoner to present his own case ; procedural difficulties ; the need of the prison authorities for reasonable speed in making their adjudications ; and the need for fairness as between prisoners and as between prisoners and prison officers .

ORG endorsed the factors outlined in the aforementioned GPE judgment in the above - cited case of ORG and PERSON v. ORG . FAC found it difficult to imagine that “ the rules of natural justice would ever require legal representation before the Governor ” . Lord PERSON considered that :

“ ... it is easy to envisage circumstances in which the rules of natural justice do not call for representation , even though the disciplinary charge relates to a matter which constitutes in law a crime , as may well happen in the case of a simple assault where no question of law arises , and where the prisoner charged is capable of presenting his own case . To hold otherwise would result in wholly unnecessary delays in many cases , to the detriment of all concerned including the prisoner charged , and to a wholly unnecessary waste of time and money , contrary to public interest . Indeed to hold otherwise would not only cause injustice to prisoners : it would also lead to an adventitious distinction being drawn between disciplinary offences which happen also to be crimes and those which happen not to be so , for the punishments liable to be imposed do not depend on any such distinction . ”

In its letter dated DATE , ORG set out the numbers of adjudications which took place DATE , those in which the charges were considered proven and those where DATE were awarded . The approximate figures are set out below :

That letter also pointed out that DATE there were CARDINAL requests for legal or other representation , of which CARDINAL were granted .

The above - cited R v. PERSON , PERSON and PERSON judgment noted that CARDINAL adjudications had taken place in DATE , during which the charges were proven in CARDINAL cases and a total of DATE were awarded .


Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE .

A. Facts prior to CARDINAL DATE

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder , grievous bodily harm , and insulting and assaulting policemen .

On DATE the ORG ( Prokurator Rejonowy ) brought criminal charges against him .

On DATE prosecution authorities lodged with ORG ( Sąd Wojewódzki ) a bill of indictment against him .

NORP From DATE to DATE no hearing was held .

B. Facts after DATE

A hearing listed for DATE was adjourned until DATE . A further hearing , listed for DATE , was adjourned because the judge rapporteur was ill . The next hearing , scheduled for DATE , was cancelled because the judge rapporteur was hospitalised .

On DATE the case was assigned to another panel of judges as the presiding judge rapporteur resigned from his function .

On DATE the hearing was re - opened .

The subsequent hearings were held on DATE , CARDINAL May , CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE and on DATE .

On DATE the ORG pronounced its judgment . It convicted the applicant as indicted , except for the count of murder , of which he was acquitted . The court sentenced him to DATE imprisonment . On DATE the prosecutor lodged an appeal against that judgment , contesting its part relating to the acquittal .

On DATE the ORG ( Sąd Apelacyjny ) quashed the contested part of the first - instance court 's judgment and remitted the case for re - examination .

The court held hearings on DATE and DATE . A hearing scheduled for DATE was adjourned until DATE . A further hearing , listed for DATE , was cancelled because the judge rapporteur was ill . The subsequent hearing was held on DATE .

On DATE the ORG convicted the applicant of murder with an oblique intent ( w zamiarze ewentualnym ) and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment . The applicant lodged an appeal against that judgment .

On DATE ORG modified the judgment in that it convicted the applicant of grievous bodily harm with deadly effect and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment .

In the letter of DATE the applicant 's legal aid lawyer informed him that he refused to lodge a cassation appeal against that judgment , arguing that there was no indication of any breach of substantive or procedural law . He explained that lodging that appeal would only delay the proceedings concerning a cumulative penalty ( kara łączna ) and , afterwards , proceedings concerning the applicant 's conditional release .

On DATE the ORG delivered a judgment in which it sentenced the applicant to DATE imprisonment as the cumulative penalty for the convictions included in the judgments of CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE ( delivered in the course of other criminal proceedings ) .


The applicant is a NORP citizen , born in DATE and living in GPE .

A.

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against a decision of ORG by which the latter had refused to grant him retirement pension for persons working in difficult conditions . On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision with ORG , which transmitted it to ORG .

On DATE ORG , following an order of ORG , requested the applicant to supplement his appeal by indicating what errors of fact and law had allegedly been committed by the court during the examination of the case . This order was served on the applicant on DATE and he was informed that he should comply with it within DATE from its service .

On DATE the applicant submitted pleadings to the court explaining the grounds of his appeal . The date of submitting the pleadings to the court is clearly certified by a stamp of the court ’s registry on a copy of the document .

By a decision of DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal , finding that he had failed to comply with its order of DATE .

In DATE the applicant requested assistance from his local MP , complaining that ORG had rejected his appeal , having failed to take into consideration his pleadings of DATE . In reply to the ORG ’s enquiry as to circumstances in which the applicant ’s appeal had been rejected , ORG informed him by a letter of DATE that the judgment of CARDINAL DATE had became final since the applicant had failed to complement his appeal within the time - limit fixed by the court for that purpose .

In reply , by a letter to the President of ORG DATE , the MP referred to information he had received on DATE in a telephone conversation with ORG registry , according to which the applicant had failed to pick up the court ’s decision of DATE at the post office . The MP reiterated his request that the applicant ’s complaint be thoroughly investigated .

By a letter of DATE the President of ORG of ORG informed the MP that on DATE the applicant had complemented his appeal , but , since his appeal so complemented still did not comply with the requirements that the law attached to an appeal against a first - instance judicial decision , the court rejected it on DATE . This decision was later duly served on the applicant , in a manner compatible with the requirements of LAW .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of DATE . He submitted that the court , when rejecting his appeal on DATE , must have been unaware that he had complied with its order to complement it by detailed arguments . Thus , his appeal had been rejected erroneously .

He further submitted that this decision had been served on him only in DATE . He also stated that he did not pick up the decision of DATE at the post office , as in DATE he had been on DATE for DATE . It had only been in DATE that he had enquired about the further course of the proceedings . He had received a copy of the decision from which it transpired that it had been taken on the erroneous ground of his alleged failure to comply with the court ’s order to supplement his appeal .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal . The court found that the decision of DATE had been sent to the applicant by registered letter . It could not be served on him because of his absence . On DATE , the decision was deposited at the post office . As the applicant did not pick it up at the post office within the CARDINAL - days’ time - limit provided for by law , it was not delivered to him . On DATE the decision was returned to the court and deposited in the case - file . Pursuant to LAW , it should therefore be regarded as having been duly served . Thus , the applicant ’s appeal had to be rejected , having been lodged out of time .

B. Relevant domestic law

LAW , insofar as relevant , provides that if a party to proceedings fails to comply with the prescribed time - limit without its fault , the court shall , on that party ’s request , grant leave to appeal out of time .

Article CARDINAL of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the parties to proceedings are under an obligation to inform the court about any changes in their addresses . Under § CARDINAL of this provision , if they fail to do so , a decision to be served on the party shall be filed in the case - file and shall be regarded as having been duly served , unless the court knows the new address of that party .


No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial

András Sajó;Antonella Mularoni;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Nona Tsotsoria

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

CARDINAL

On DATE Başbağlar village in NORP was raided by terrorists . They burned numerous houses and killed CARDINAL villagers . The applicant , who was living in the neighbouring village , was suspected of having participated in the so - called “ FAC ” .

The applicant and CARDINAL other individuals were charged under LAW of LAW .

On DATE the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody . On DATE ORG ordered his release pending trial .

On DATE the applicant was acquitted .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint under PERSON no . CARDINAL with ORG against the ORG , requesting MONEY ( GPE ) in respect of pecuniary damage and TRL CARDINAL for non - pecuniary damage by way of compensation for unjustified detention DATE and DATE .

The Bakırköy Assize Court appointed CARDINAL of its members as judge rapporteur ( naip hakim ) to investigate the case and draft a report . The applicant was heard by the judge rapporteur on DATE and DATE . He stated that he did not have a regular job at the time but was unofficially working for a dairy merchant DATE , collecting cheese from local farmers , and in return was paid GPE CARDINAL per month .

On DATE the ORG found that the applicant ’s unjustified detention on remand for DATE qualified for compensation . In its judgment , the court took note of all the complaints set out by the applicant ’s lawyer , as well as the content of the judge rapporteur ’s report and the written submissions of the public prosecutor . The court further referred to the minimum wage at the time and the expert report which had estimated the applicant ’s income loss to be TRL CARDINAL . The court concluded in line with the expert report and awarded the applicant GPE CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL for pecuniary damage . Considering the applicant ’s economic and social position , the seriousness of the charges brought against him and the time that he had spent in detention as well as the intensity of his emotional suffering , the court additionally awarded the applicant ORG for non - pecuniary damage .

The applicant ’s lawyer appealed and claimed that the amount of compensation for non - pecuniary damage was insufficient reparation for the wrongful detention of the applicant and the subsequent suffering that he had endured . He further maintained that , considering the length of the proceedings , the compensation for pecuniary damage awarded by the court was not sufficient either . He also complained about the lack of interest on the compensation .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision on the ground that the defendant had not been notified of the applicant ’s claim and had not been invited to submit replies .

The case was resumed before ORG . On DATE the judge rapporteur heard the applicant who repeated his previous statements and was paid GPE CARDINAL per month . A new expert report estimated the applicant ’s income loss , on the basis of the net minimum wages in force at the time , to be FAC .

On DATE the ORG awarded the applicant ORG for pecuniary damage and GPE CARDINAL for non - pecuniary damage . The court refused the applicant ’s claim for interest which was not covered by Law no . CARDINAL .

On DATE the applicant appealed .

The written opinion of ORG was submitted to ORG and notified to the applicant .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of ORG , with a minor amendment regarding the costs and expenses .

On DATE the applicant was paid TRL CARDINAL plus TRL CARDINAL in statutory interest , applied with effect from DATE .


Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Art. 6-1

Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen;Rait Maruste;Renate Jaeger;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

Following a petition from her former husband , on DATE the ORG dissolved their marriage . It gave the applicant custody of the couple ’s only child , and also gave her the use of the former matrimonial home . It found that this home was a flat acquired jointly by the former spouses during their marriage , situated in the “ LOC neighbourhood of GPE , and intended by them to fulfil the family ’s housing needs ( the applicant had moved into that flat in DATE although it had not been fully finished ) . The fact that the applicant ’s former husband had never lived there was of no relevance , as this had been the result of his disregarding his duty to cohabit with his spouse . As the applicant had been given custody of their only child , the court held that she was entitled to use the flat .

The applicant ’s former husband appealed against the court order relating to the former matrimonial home . He averred that this home was in fact another flat DATE situated in the “ GPE ” neighbourhood of GPE and coowned by him and his mother and sister – where the spouses had lived before their de facto separation in DATE .

On DATE ORG upheld the order . It agreed with GPE that the former matrimonial home was the flat in “ PERSON , as it had been acquired , by means of a preliminary contract with the builder , during the marriage , for the family ’s housing needs , as at that time the spouses had not owned another home , and as the applicant and her child had been living there at the time when the marriage was dissolved . The flat in “ FAC was not the former matrimonial home , because it was co - owned by the applicant ’s former husband and third parties and both spouses had left it in DATE .

In a judgment of DATE ORG quashed the lower court ’s judgment and remitted the case . It held that the former matrimonial home was the flat in “ GPE ” , not the CARDINAL newly built in “ PERSON . According to its settled caselaw , the former matrimonial home was the one which had been used before the dissolution of the marriage and , in case of a de facto separation preceding the dissolution , the one used before the separation .

NORP On remittal , ORG , in a judgment of DATE , again upheld the order of GPE . It relied on interpretative decision no . CARDINAL of FAC of ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , according to whose point CARDINAL ( b ) , in the event of a de facto separation , the former matrimonial home is the CARDINAL acquired during the separation with funds accumulated during the marriage . On this basis , it found that the former matrimonial home was the flat in “ PERSON . Given the unambiguous rule set out in the interpretative decision , the fact that the spouses had not lived in that flat together was immaterial .

NORP The applicant ’s former husband appealed on points of law .

ORG held a hearing on DATE . The applicant was represented by counsel , who asked the court to dismiss the appeal and said that he had developed his arguments in a memorial which he filed during the hearing .

In the memorial , which ran to CARDINAL pages , the applicant ’s counsel argued that ORG had not erred by taking into account interpretative decision no . CARDINAL instead of the guidelines of ORG given in the judgment of DATE , since where there was conflict between the instructions given in a specific case and the solution envisaged by a binding interpretative decision the latter prevailed . He further presented a number of arguments why the flat in “ PERSON was the former matrimonial home and why its use should be given to the applicant . He asserted that this flat had been acquired by the spouses with a view to fulfilling the family ’s housing needs , that the applicant had contributed financially to its acquisition and that the only reason why she did not have title to it was her former husband ’s protracting the conclusion of the final contract for its acquisition from the builder . The applicant had brought a separate suit , seeking a court order declaring the preliminary contract with the builder final . However , that suit was still pending . The spouses had lived in the flat since DATE , but even assuming that the applicant ’s former husband had not done so throughout the entire period , this had been due to his dereliction of the duty to cohabit with his wife . The applicant and her child could not live in the flat in “ FAC , because this was not the former matrimonial home , and this would mean cohabiting with their former inlaws , with whom they did not have good relations .

On DATE ORG quashed GPE judgment . In the beginning of its twoandahalf page opinion it observed that the applicant had not made submissions in the proceedings before it . It found no indication that the spouses had obtained title and thus acquired the flat in “ Strelbishte ” during the marriage ; there was merely a preliminary contract in respect of it . The date of delivery of the flat was irrelevant . Therefore , point CARDINAL ( b ) of interpretative decision no . CARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) was not applicable . However , even if the spouses had acquired the flat during the marriage , it would not have become the matrimonial home , because it had not been acquired in order to fulfil the family ’s housing needs . Where a home had not been acquired for such purpose , point CARDINAL ( b ) was inapposite on account of the repeal in DATE of a DATE statute restricting the number of properties which an individual was allowed to own . Thereafter , the contribution of funds by both spouses could be of importance solely for the existence or otherwise of a joint title to a home acquired during the marriage , not for its designation as the matrimonial home . The former matrimonial home was the flat in “ GPE ” , as the spouses had lived there before their de facto separation in DATE . Since the couple ’s child was already an adult and since the applicant shared some of the responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage , the use of the former matrimonial home was to be given to her former husband .

On DATE the applicant ’s counsel asked ORG to rectify the statement in its judgment that he had not made any submissions in the cassation proceedings . He considered that statement to be an obvious mistake , because , as noted in TIME of the hearing , he had filed a memorial , which featured after page CARDINAL in the case file . On DATE the court refused , saying that only errors in the operative provisions of a judgment could be rectified .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the DATE LAW provides that when a court allows a divorce petition , it must give the use of the former matrimonial home to CARDINAL of the spouses if it can not be used separately by both of them . In reaching its decision , the court must have regard to the interests of the children , the fault for the breakdown of the marriage , the health of the spouses and all other relevant circumstances .

Interpretative decision no . CARDINAL of FAC of ORG ( постановление DATE от CARDINAL ноември DATE г. , GPE на ВС ) was adopted on DATE under the CARDINAL Family Code ( which was superseded by the DATE LAW ) . It deals with all issues relating to the use of the former matrimonial home . Point CARDINAL ( b ) of its operative provisions defines the former matrimonial home as the CARDINAL acquired while the spouses were separated de facto , but with funds accumulated during the marriage .


Anatoly Kovler;Erik Møse;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Peer Lorenzen

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE - GPE . He is represented before ORG by ORG , a lawyer practising in NORP .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) are represented by PERSON PERSON GPE , ORG at ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP The applicant and other claimants served in the law - enforcement agencies of ORG and were entitled to additional remuneration for service in the conditions of emergency and armed conflict . They brought proceedings against the regional office of ORG seeking recovery of the additional remuneration which included double salary , special rank salary , non - recurrent monetary allowance , and allowances for length of service , food and sanatorium treatment .

By a judgment of DATE ORG ( “ LOC ” ) granted the applicant ’s claim and awarded him MONEY ( RUB ) against ORG - GPE .

That judgment became final on DATE .

On DATE by ORG of GPE - GPE ( “ the LOC ” ) delivered a judgment on seemingly identical claims for additional remuneration for service in the conditions of emergency and armed conflict and including a non - recurrent monetary allowance , an allowance for sanatorium treatment , double salary , special rank salary , an allowance for length of service and an allowance for hardship of service . As transpires from the text of the judgment , the applicant and CARDINAL other claimants were represented by a certain Mr V.A. Em who attended the hearing . Mr Em requested the court to order that the debts be paid from the federal funds specifically allocated for compensation of damage inflicted by unlawful acts or omissions of the executive bodies and their officials , instead of the funds allocated to ORG .

Having taken into account the inflation losses , the court allowed the claims . In particular , it awarded the applicant RUB CARDINAL payable by ORG .

On DATE ORG examined the application of the claimants in the above proceedings for adjustment of the awards due to inflation losses and recovery of those amounts from the regional ORG . In those proceedings the applicant was represented by a certain Mr PERSON . The materials of the case contain a power of attorney signed by the applicant on DATE in the name of Mr ORG entitling him , inter alia , to bring claims and to receive money on his behalf .

The court stated , in particular , the following :

“ By a judgment of DATE in the case no . CARDINAL - CARDINAL the GPE court granted the claims of the servicemen of ORG - GPE and ORG represented by ORG concerning compensation of damages caused by the failure to pay them allowance for service in the conditions of emergency and armed conflict .

That judgment has been enforced .

As evidence of the time ( day ) of the transfer of the amounts due in accordance with the writs of enforcement , the applicants submitted certified excerpts from their bank accounts which demonstrate the following :

The bank account of PERSON ... was credited by way of bank orders dated CARDINAL and DATE with the amounts due to ... [the applicant ] . ”

The court granted the application for adjustment of the original amount and awarded the applicant RUB CARDINAL which on DATE was credited to the account of Mr ORG per procurationem .

NORP By letter of DATE the president of ORG addressed the head of the regional office of ORG with the following request :

“ [ Your department ] is in possession of the enforcement documents of the employees of the regional law - enforcement agencies issued pursuant to the judgments of ORG , concerning payment of compensation for participation in the clearing - up of the aftermath of the Ossetian - Ingush conflict , which were subsequently quashed on account of newly discovered circumstances .

New court judgments have been delivered and enforced in respect of the above individuals . Therefore , you are requested to return to us the enforcement documents according to the enclosed list , without enforcement . ”

On DATE the enforcement documents , including those concerning the applicant , were returned to ORG .

A letter of DATE addressed by the president of ORG - GPE to ORG at ORG stated the following :

“ ... The documents concerning enforcement ( non - enforcement ) of [ the judgment of DATE ] were destroyed together with the relevant case - file following expiration of the time - limit for their preservation ...

As the operative part of the judgment of DATE did not authorise recovery of the award from ORG Ossetia - GPE at the expense of ORG and following impossibility of enforcement of the judgment concerned , PERSON and others sued the ORG represented by ORG and [ its regional department ] , seeking recovery of the same payments ...

... [ B]y a judgment of ORG of GPE - GPE of DATE [ the above claims ] were granted . Having taken into account the amended claims and inflation losses , that judgment recovered in favour of MONEY .

That judgment was enforced . The documents proving the enforcement were destroyed together with the case - file following expiration of the time - limit for their preservation ...

It transpires from the correspondence of the president of ORG - GPE with the head of the [ regional office of ORG ] that the judgment of DATE was quashed on account of newly discovered circumstances following adoption of the judgment of DATE by ORG of GPE - GPE ... ”

The Government has not been able to provide any direct evidence or a date of the quashing of the judgment of DATE .