Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)

André Potocki;Ann Power-Forde;Dean Spielmann;Elisabet Fura;Ganna Yudkivska;Karel Jungwiert;Mark Villiger

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and is currently serving a sentence in FAC .

The applicant served his prison sentence in FAC in Sections C and D DATE .

DATE and DATE , he shared cell no . CARDINAL , of a total surface area of CARDINAL sq . m. , with CARDINAL other prisoners . The cell was rectangular in shape with bunk beds along both of the longer walls . Next to the entrance , which was at CARDINAL end of the cell , was a separate room with a toilet . At the opposite end of the cell were CARDINAL large windows , measuring QUANTITY m each . CARDINAL window and CARDINAL of the second one could be opened . ORG translucent pieces of fibreglass covered them from the outside at a distance of QUANTITY It was up to the detainees how and when the windows were opened . The cell was equipped with CARDINAL lockers , CARDINAL tables and CARDINAL chairs .

During the whole period of his detention in cell no . CARDINAL the applicant was employed in the prison laundry where he spent TIME every working day . He was allowed to spend TIME a day outside in the yard . He could also watch television or take part in other recreational activities outside his cell . The applicant could take a hot shower twice a week and wash after work . He was guaranteed CARDINAL warm meal per day and CARDINAL hot meals CARDINAL times a week . He had access to a range of cultural and sports activities , books , newspapers and magazines .

On DATE at TIME the applicant broke his ankle in his cell while climbing down from his bunk bed . According to him , he fell because he was dizzy due to the stuffy air in the cell . He did not call for medical assistance as he thought that his ankle was just sprained . He took some pills containing ORG as a painkiller . In TIME , he was unable to walk due to a severe pain in his ankle , so his cell mates took him to the prison infirmary .

The prison doctor visually examined the applicant and considered him to be heavily intoxicated with medicaments , although he did not conduct a medical test . The doctor did not send him for an x - ray , because the person operating the prison ’s x - ray machine was on holiday and due to the applicant ’s alleged intoxication , his transfer to a hospital was , in his view , impossible . The applicant , having been proclaimed intoxicated , was sent to solitary confinement .

On DATE , DATE , the applicant was x - rayed and it was found that his ankle was broken . He was transferred to a prison hospital in GPE . The record shows that the applicant fully cooperated with the medical staff and was operated on at the hospital on DATE . He then stayed in FAC , where he was treated until DATE . He was subsequently transferred to FAC , where he continued his treatment , including physiotherapy . The treatment lasted for DATE overall , but the applicant has continued to see a doctor afterwards as he has developed arthritis in his broken ankle .

NORP On DATE the applicant was found guilty of the disciplinary offence of self - intoxication . He was sentenced to DATE under the “ closed prison ” regime ( uzavřené oddělení ) . He did not appeal .

He was also dismissed from his prison job because it was considered that on DATE he had been absent from work due to his self - intoxication .

NORP In DATE the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the director of ORG alleging inadequate treatment of his injury .

On DATE the ORG Králové ORG informed him that his complaints were unjustified .

On DATE ORG expressed doubts about the conduct of the prison authorities towards the applicant and forwarded the complaints to ORG , ORG ( odbor generální inspekce , oddělení vězeňství ) to investigate the matter . The prosecutor noted with concern that even though a medical report had found that the applicant had no longer been intoxicated at TIME on DATE , he still had not been sent for an x - ray but had been kept in solitary confinement until DATE ; that the applicant had been dismissed from his prison job during the time of his injury ; that he had not been paid sickness benefit ; and that he had been subjected to disciplinary punishment for intoxication without any consideration to his claim that he had taken painkillers due to the injury he had suffered . The applicant did not inform the ORG about the outcome of this investigation .

On DATE , in reply to another complaint by the applicant alleging overcrowding in the prison , ORG informed him that it was aware of the fact that some sections in FAC were overcrowded and that the competent prosecutor had been taking steps to remedy the situation .

On DATE the applicant sent another complaint challenging his treatment on CARDINAL and DATE to ORG ( PERSON ředitelství PERSON služby ) which , on DATE , found it unsubstantiated .

The applicant instituted civil proceedings against the NORP Republic claiming compensation in respect of pecuniary damage arising from his injury , which had been caused by the unsatisfactory conditions of detention in cell no . CARDINAL in FAC and inadequate treatment of the injury by the prison doctor .

In a judgment of DATE ORG ( okresní soud ) rejected his action , finding that at the material time the applicant had been held together with CARDINAL other inmates in a cell measuring QUANTITY m. ( or QUANTITY ) including a toilet , which was in accordance with Order of the Minister of Justice no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL in force at the relevant time , which had required a minimum of QUANTITY per prisoner . The court based its findings on the testimony of the applicant , CARDINAL of his cellmates at the time of the injury , other witnesses and several documents . The information about the cell dimensions was based on a report by the prison authorities and the court did not consider it necessary to measure the cell itself , as requested by the applicant . It did not find any illegality in the prison doctor ’s conduct . It dismissed the applicant ’s request to admit additional evidence as unnecessary .

NORP The applicant appealed , arguing that the conditions of his detention had been unsatisfactory . He claimed that the court had rejected his request to admit in evidence a medical expert report to assess the conditions of his detention and his request that the court measure the cell itself and not rely on the prison report .

On DATE the Hradec Králové Regional Court ( krajský soud ) upheld the first - instance judgment endorsing ORG opinion .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) dismissed the applicant ’s appeal on points of law ( dovolání ) . It upheld the conclusions of the lower courts that the conditions of the applicant ’s detention , including the dimensions of his cell , complied with domestic law .

NORP The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal ( ústavní stížnost ) complaining about the conditions of his detention and violations of his right to a fair trial in the precedent proceedings .

The Constitutional Court ( Ústavní soud ) sent the appeal to the lower courts that had previously been involved in the case for comments .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s constitutional appeal as manifestly ill - founded , holding that the applicant had merely disagreed with the outcome of the proceedings . It added that the decisions of the ordinary courts had been logical and sufficiently reasoned without any appearance of arbitrariness . The court did not refer in its reasoning to the written observations submitted by the lower courts . It appears from the decision that ORG maintained , in a short submission , that its decision had not violated the applicant ’s constitutional rights and that ORG referred only to the text of its judgment . None of these observations were sent to the applicant , the court finding that they did not bring anything new to the case .

NORP In DATE the applicant instituted proceedings against the prison doctor who treated him on DATE , for the protection of his personality rights . On DATE the claim was dismissed on the ground that the doctor had been acting in his official capacity and therefore it was the ORG which should have been sued . At the same time , the prescription period for the claim had already expired .

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings for damages against the ORG before the GPE CARDINAL ORG ( obvodní soud ) under LAW for inhuman conditions of detention for the whole period of his sentence . Those proceedings are pending .

Under LAW , natural persons have the right to protection of their personality rights ( personal integrity ) , in particular their life and health , civil and human dignity , privacy , name and personal characteristics . Under LAW , natural persons have the right to request that any unjustified infringement of their personality rights be ended and that the consequences of such infringement be eliminated . They also have the right to appropriate just satisfaction . LAW provides that , in cases where the satisfaction obtained under paragraph CARDINAL is insufficient , in particular because the injured party ’s dignity or social standing has been considerably diminished , the injured party is also entitled to financial compensation for non - pecuniary damage . Under LAW if pecuniary damage was caused by unjustified interference with personality rights the liability of the perpetrator is governed by the provisions of LAW on liability for damage .

Articles CARDINAL et seq . regulate civil liability for causing damage . Everybody is liable for damage caused by his or her unlawful conduct . Only pecuniary damage can be claimed under those provisions

Section CARDINAL provided that the ORG is liable for damage caused by an irregularity in the conduct of proceedings , including non - compliance with the obligation to perform an act or give a decision within the statutory time - limit . A person who has suffered loss on account of such an irregularity was entitled to damages under LAW .

Section PERSON ) provides that each prisoner must have a bed and a place to store his personal belongings . Under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) a prisoner has the right to medical care in accordance with a special law , subject to the limitations associated with the aim of the punishment . Section CARDINAL ) provides that a prisoner has a right to file complaints and requests to the competent authorities in order to enforce those rights and interests protected by law . Such complaints and requests must be made without delay .

Section CARDINAL regulated the accommodation of prisoners , but did not specify cell dimensions . Under section CARDINAL cells had to have a toilet and a sink , separated from the rest of the room by a non - transparent curtain .

The amendment provides that there must be CARDINAL sq . m of cell surface per each inmate . Placing a person in a multiple occupancy cell that will result in CARDINAL QUANTITY m for an inmate is permitted only when the total nationwide number of prisoners exceeds the capacity of that type of prison , rendering it impossible to satisfy the minimum surface requirement . Under section CARDINAL ) bunk beds can be used only if the distance between the CARDINAL storeys is QUANTITY and the cell has QUANTITY of space per prisoner .

Section CARDINAL regulated the accommodation of prisoners . It stipulated the minimum cell space per prisoner as QUANTITY and the minimum height of the cell as QUANTITY beds were allowed if the distance between the CARDINAL storeys was QUANTITY .

The ORG stated , inter alia , as follows :

“ CARDINAL . Recent legislative changes concerning remand imprisonment have resulted in a substantial decrease of prisoners in NORP prisons . However , the delegation ’s findings during DATE visit indicated that there was still a lack of sufficient living space for many prisoners in NORP prisons .

In this connection , the ORG was concerned to learn that the already modest standard of CARDINAL m² per person , which had been criticized by ORG ( cf . paragraph CARDINAL of the report on the DATE visit ) , had recently been formally abolished . The ORG recommends that an official standard be re - established in the NORP prison system , guaranteeing CARDINAL m² per prisoner in multiple occupancy cells .

[ T]he ORG invites the NORP authorities to continue to pursue their efforts to bring about a permanent end to overcrowding ; success in this area will require inter alia that full use be made of existing possibilities for non - custodial sanctions .

... PERSON is located on the premises of a DATE monastery , which was converted into a prison DATE . Its official capacity had been more than halved since DATE ( from CARDINAL to CARDINAL prisoners ) ; at the time of the visit , the prison was accommodating CARDINAL male inmates ( an occupancy rate of PERCENT ) . ”

“ CARDINAL . The ORG was pleased to note that the amendments to LAW and to LAW in DATE introduced the norm of a minimum of CARDINAL m² per prisoner in multi - occupancy cells . However , an exemption to this rule was introduced and , as the NORP authorities noted in their follow - up response of DATE ( cf . ORG ( DATE ) CARDINAL ) , ‘ based on a minimum accommodation area of CARDINAL m² per prisoner , most prisons are significantly overcrowded’ .

PERSON , described in paragraph CARDINAL of the DATE ORG visit report ( cf . ORG ( DATE ) CARDINAL ) , has a capacity of CARDINAL and held CARDINAL sentenced prisoners , of whom CARDINAL were under the high security regime ( Category D ) . ”

The ORG observed , inter alia , as follows :

“ CARDINAL . ORG is concerned about overcrowding in prisons ( article CARDINAL ) . ORG party should take measures to overcome overcrowding in prisons and to ensure compliance with the requirements of article CARDINAL . Information should be provided on prison capacity and the actual prison population so as to permit the ORG to assess the level of overcrowding . ”


The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr PERSON of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

In DATE the applicant was a victim of an accident which occurred at his workplace in the “ Wieczorek ” mine . Subsequently , the applicant received a pension in connection with the work accident .

On DATE the applicant lodged a civil action for compensation and a pension against his former employer .

On DATE ORG ( Sąd Rejonowy ) partly granted his action and awarded the applicant a pension . The defendant appealed .

On DATE ORG PERSON ) quashed the impugned judgment and remitted the case .

On DATE ORG again partly granted the applicant ’s action and awarded him a pension . The defendant appealed .

On DATE ORG partly quashed the judgment and remitted the remainder of the case to ORG .

On DATE the GPE ORG gave a judgment . The court dismissed the action . The applicant appealed against the judgment .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal .

On DATE ORG dismissed his cassation appeal . The applicant was notified about this decision on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a civil action for damages on account of the unreasonable length of the proceedings without specifying the legal grounds of his claim .

On DATE he was invited by ORG to specify the legal basis of his claim .

On DATE the applicant submitted to ORG a statement in which he clarified that his motion should be understood as a complaint about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time under LAW and a request for payment of PLN CARDINAL,CARDINAL . The applicant further added that in the future he might seek compensation in tort from ORG in a separate set of civil proceedings .

On DATE the court rejected the applicant ’s complaint . The court established that LAW had not been applicable as the proceedings complained of had ended before its entry into force . The transitional provision of section CARDINAL of LAW could not be relied on either , as the applicant had lodged his complaint with the ORG after the termination of the domestic proceedings .

The relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the excessive length of judicial proceedings are stated in the ORG ’s decisions in the cases of ORG v. GPE no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( dec . ) , § § CARDINAL , ORG CARDINAL-V and NORP v. GPE no . CARDINAL ( dec . ) , ORG CARDINALVIII and the judgment in the case of ORG v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , ECHR CARDINAL-V.


CASE OF HIRST v. THE UNITED KINGDOM (No. 2)

Violation of P1-3;No separate issue under Art. 14;No separate issue under Art. 10;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses (domestic proceedings) - claim dismissed;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

Luzius Wildhaber;Nicolas Bratza;Simon Brown

The applicant was born in DATE .

On DATE the applicant pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility . His guilty plea was accepted on the basis of medical evidence that he was a man with a severe personality disorder to such a degree that he was amoral . He was sentenced to a term of discretionary life imprisonment .

The applicant ’s tariff ( that part of the sentence relating to retribution and deterrence ) expired on DATE . His continued detention was based on considerations of risk and dangerousness , ORG considering that he continued to present a risk of serious harm to the public .

The applicant , who is barred by section CARDINAL of the Representation of the People Act DATE from voting in parliamentary or local elections , issued proceedings in ORG under section CARDINAL of LAW DATE , seeking a declaration that this provision was incompatible with LAW .

The applicant ’s application was heard by ORG on CARDINAL and DATE , together with an application for judicial review by CARDINAL other prisoners , PERSON and Mr PERSON , who had applied for registration as electors and been refused by the Registration Officer and who also sought a declaration of incompatibility .

In the ORG judgment dated DATE , Lord Justice PERSON noted that section CARDINAL had a long history and cited the Secretary of ORG ’s reasons , given in the proceedings , for maintaining the current policy :

“ By committing offences which by themselves or taken with any aggravating circumstances including the offender ’s character and previous criminal record require a custodial sentence , such prisoners have forfeited the right to have a say in the way the country is governed for that period . There is CARDINAL element to punishment than forcible detention . Removal from society means removal from the privileges of society , amongst which is the right to vote for one ’s representative . ”

Examining the state of practice in other jurisdictions , he observed that in LOC CARDINAL countries , including GPE , did not give convicted prisoners a vote , while twenty did not disenfranchise prisoners and CARDINAL imposed a more restricted disenfranchisement . Reference was made to ORG which had rejected a challenge to LAW disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners ( see PERSON v. PERSON [ DATE ] GPE : ORG Reports DATE ) . Some considerable attention was given to NORP precedents , which were relied on by both parties , in particular that of ORG which , in PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL ) ( [ DATE ] CARDINAL ORG Reports CARDINAL ) , struck down the disenfranchisement of all prisoners as too widely drawn and infringing the minimum impairment rule , and that of ORG which , in PERSON ( no . CARDINAL ) ( [ DATE ] CARDINAL ORG Reports CARDINAL ) , upheld the subsequent legislative provision restricting the ban to prisoners serving a sentence of DATE or more in a correctional institution . While it was noted that the NORP courts were applying a differently phrased provision in LAW , ORG commented that the judgment of ORG in the second case in ORG contained helpful observations , in particular as regards the danger of the courts usurping the role of ORG . The cases before ORG and this ORG were also reviewed , ORG noting that the ORG had been consistent in its approach in accepting restrictions on persons convicted and detained .

Lord Justice PERSON concluded :

“ ... I return to what was said by ORG in paragraph CARDINAL of its judgment in PERSON . Of course as far as an individual prisoner is concerned disenfranchisement does impair the very essence of his right to vote , but that is too simplistic an approach , because what LAW is really concerned with is the wider question of universal franchise , and ‘ the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature’ . If an individual is to be disenfranchised that must be in the pursuit of a legitimate aim . In the case of a convicted prisoner serving his sentence the aim may not be easy to articulate . Clearly there is an element of punishment , and also an element of electoral law . As the Home Secretary said , ORG has taken the view that for the period during which they are in custody convicted prisoners have forfeited their right to have a say in the way the country is governed . ORG said that such prisoners had lost the moral authority to vote . Perhaps the best course is that suggested by ORG , namely to leave to philosophers the true nature of this disenfranchisement whilst recognising that the legislation does different things .

ORG also requires that the means employed to restrict the implied Convention rights to vote are not disproportionate , and that is the point at which , as it seems to me , it is appropriate for this ORG to defer to the legislature . It is easy to be critical of a law which operates against a wide spectrum ( e.g. in relation to its effect on post - tariff discretionary life prisoners , and those detained under some provision of LAW DATE ) , but , as is clear from the authorities , those GPE which disenfranchise following conviction do not all limit the period of disenfranchisement to the period in custody . ORG in this country could have provided differently in order to meet the objectives which it discerned , and like PERSON in GPE , I would accept that the tailoring process seldom admits of perfection , so the courts must afford some leeway to the legislator . As [ counsel for the Secretary of ORG ] submits , there is a broad spectrum of approaches among democratic societies , and GPE falls into the middle of the spectrum . In course of time this position may move , either by way of further fine tuning , as was recently done in relation to remand prisoners and others , or more radically , but its position in the spectrum is plainly a matter for ORG not for the courts . That applies even to the ‘ hard NORP of post - tariff discretionary life sentence prisoners ... They have all been convicted and if , for example , ORG were to have said that all those sentenced to life imprisonment lose the franchise for life the apparent anomaly of their position would disappear . ...

If section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the DATE Act can meet the challenge of LAW [ of LAW ] then LAW has nothing to offer , any more than LAW . ”

The applicant ’s claims were accordingly dismissed as were those of the other prisoners .

On DATE an application for permission to appeal was filed on behalf of PERSON and PERSON , together with a CARDINAL - page skeleton argument . On CARDINAL DATE Lord Justice PERSON considered the application on the papers and refused permission on the ground that the appeal had no real prospect of success .

On DATE the applicant filed an application for permission to appeal . On DATE , his application was considered on the papers by Lord Justice PERSON who refused permission for the same reasons as Lord Justice PERSON in relation to the earlier applications . The applicant ’s renewed application , together with the renewed applications of PERSON and PERSON , were refused on DATE , after oral argument , by Lord Justice PERSON .

On DATE the applicant was released from prison on licence .

Section CARDINAL of the Representation of the People Act DATE ( “ the DATE LAW ) provides :

“ ( CARDINAL ) A convicted person during the time that he is detained in a penal institution in pursuance of his sentence ... is legally incapable of voting at any parliamentary or local election . ”

This section re - enacted without debate the provisions of section CARDINAL of the Representation of the People Act DATE , the substance of which dated back to LAW of DATE , which in turn reflected earlier rules of law relating to the forfeiture of certain rights by a convicted “ felon ” ( the so - called “ civic death ” of the times of King Edward III ) .

The disqualification does not apply to persons imprisoned for contempt of court ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) or to those imprisoned only for default in , for example , paying a fine ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(c ) ) .

During the passage through ORG of the Representation of the People Act CARDINAL ( “ the LAW ” ) , which allowed remand prisoners and unconvicted mental patients to vote , Mr PERSON , speaking for the government , maintained the view that “ it should be part of a convicted prisoner ’s punishment that he loses rights and CARDINAL of them is the right to vote ” . The LAW was accompanied by a statement of compatibility under section CARDINAL of LAW DATE , namely , indicating that , in introducing the measure in ORG , the Secretary of ORG considered its provisions to be compatible with the Convention .

Section CARDINAL of LAW DATE provides :

“ ( CARDINAL ) Subsection ( CARDINAL ) applies in any proceedings in which a court determines whether a provision of primary legislation is compatible with a Convention right .

( CARDINAL ) NORP If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right , it may make a declaration of that incompatibility .

The relevant provisions of LAW provide :

“ Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity , without any of the distinctions mentioned in LAW [ race , colour , sex , language , religion , political or other opinion , national or social origin , property , birth or other status ] and without unreasonable restrictions :

( a ) to take part in the conduct of public affairs , directly or through freely chosen representatives ;

( b ) to vote ... ”

All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person .

NORP The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation . ... ”

In General Comment no . CARDINAL ) adopted by ORG under LAW of LAW on DATE , the ORG stated , inter alia , concerning the right guaranteed under LAW :

“ CARDINAL . In their reports , ORG parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which would deprive citizens of their right to vote . The grounds for such deprivation should be objective and reasonable . If conviction for an offence is a basis for suspending the right to vote , the period of suspension should be proportionate to the offence and the sentence . Persons who are deprived of liberty but who have not been convicted should not be excluded from exercising the right to vote . ”

These rules set out the minimum standards to be applied to conditions of imprisonment , including the following principle :

“ CARDINAL . Imprisonment is by the deprivation of liberty a punishment in itself . The conditions of imprisonment and the prison regimes shall not , therefore , except as incidental to justifiable segregation or the maintenance of discipline , aggravate the suffering inherent in this . ”

This recommendation , adopted on DATE , noted the increase in life sentences and aimed to give guidance to member GPE on the management of long - term prisoners .

The aims of the management of such prisoners should be :

“ CARDINAL . ...

– to ensure that prisons are safe and secure places for these prisoners ... ;

– to counteract the damaging effects of life and long - term imprisonment ;

– to increase and improve the possibilities of these prisoners to be successfully resettled and to lead a law - abiding life following their release . ”

General principles included the following :

“ CARDINAL . Consideration should be given to the diversity of personal characteristics to be found among life sentence and long - term prisoners and account taken of them to make individual plans for the implementation of the sentence ( individualisation principle ) .

Prison life should be arranged so as to approximate as closely as possible to the realities of life in the community ( normalisation principle ) .

Prisoners should be given opportunities to exercise personal responsibility in DATE prison life ( responsibility principle ) . ”

This document adopted by ORG ) at its CARDINALst Plenary Session ( DATE ) and submitted to ORG of ORG on DATE includes the ORG ’s guidelines as to the circumstances in which there may be a deprivation of the right to vote or to be elected :

“ d. ...

i. provision may be made for depriving individuals of their right to vote and to be elected , but only subject to the following cumulative conditions :

ii . it must be provided for by law ;

iii . the proportionality principle must be observed ; conditions for depriving individuals of the right to stand for election may be less strict than for disenfranchising them ;

iv . the deprivation must be based on mental incapacity or a criminal conviction for a serious offence ;

v. PERSON furthermore , the withdrawal of political rights or finding of mental incapacity may only be imposed by express decision of a court of law . ”

According to the ORG ’s survey based on information obtained from its diplomatic representation , CARDINAL countries allowed prisoners to vote without restriction ( GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , “ the former GPE ” , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , the GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE and GPE ) , in CARDINAL countries all prisoners were barred from voting or unable to vote ( GPE , GPE

, GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE and GPE ) , while in CARDINAL countries prisoners’ right to vote could be limited in some other way ( GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE and GPE ) .

Other material before the ORG indicates that in GPE prisoners may be debarred from voting if the principal sentence exceeds DATE , while in GPE prisoners serving a sentence in penitentiaries are not entitled to vote ; nor are prisoners in GPE .

In DATE the NORP ORG unanimously struck down a legislative provision barring all prisoners from voting ( see PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL ) , cited above ) . Amendments were introduced limiting the ban to prisoners serving a sentence of DATE or more . ORG upheld the provision . However , following the decision of ORG in the present case , ORG on DATE in Sauvé v. the Attorney General of GPE ( no . CARDINAL ) held by CARDINAL votes to CARDINAL that section CARDINAL(e ) of LAW DATE , which denied the right to vote to every person imprisoned in a correctional institution serving a sentence of DATE or more , was unconstitutional as it infringed Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW , which provides :

“ CARDINAL . LAW guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society . ”

“ CARDINAL . Every citizen of GPE has the right to vote in an election of members of ORG or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein . ”

The majority opinion given by PERSON considered that the right to vote was fundamental to their democracy and the rule of law and could not be lightly set aside . Limits on this right required not deference , but careful examination . The majority found that the Government had failed to identify the particular problems that required denying the right to vote and that the measure did not satisfy the proportionality test , in particular as the Government had failed to establish a rational connection between the denial of the right to vote and its stated objectives .

As regards the objective of promoting civic responsibility and respect for the law , denying penitentiary inmates the right to vote was more likely to send messages that undermined respect for the law and democracy than messages that enhanced those values . The legitimacy of the law and the obligation to obey the law flowed directly from the right of every citizen to vote . To deny prisoners the right to vote was to lose an important means of teaching them democratic values and social responsibility and ran counter to democratic principles of inclusiveness , equality , and citizen participation and was inconsistent with the respect for the dignity of every person that lay at the heart of NORP democracy and the LAW .

With regard to the second objective of imposing appropriate punishment , it was considered that the Government had offered no credible theory about why it should be allowed to deny a fundamental democratic right as a form of ORG punishment . Nor could it be regarded as a legitimate form of punishment as it was arbitrary – it was not tailored to the acts and circumstances of the individual offender and bore little relation to the offender ’s particular crime – and did not serve a valid criminal - law purpose , as neither the record nor common sense supported the claim that disenfranchisement deterred crime or rehabilitated criminals .

The minority opinion given by PERSON found that the objectives of the measure were pressing and substantial and based upon a reasonable and rational social or political philosophy . The first objective , that of enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law , related to the promotion of good citizenship . The social rejection of serious crime reflected a moral line which safeguarded the social contract and the rule of law and bolstered the importance of the nexus between individuals and the community . The ‘ promotion of civic responsibility’ might be abstract or symbolic , but symbolic or abstract purposes could be valid of their own accord and should not be downplayed simply for being symbolic . As regards the second objective , that of enhancing the general purposes of the criminal sanction , the measure clearly had a punitive aspect with a retributive function . It was a valid objective for ORG to develop appropriate sanctions and punishments for serious crime . The disenfranchisement was a civil disability arising from the criminal conviction . It was also proportionate , as the measure was rationally connected to the objectives and carefully tailored to apply to perpetrators of serious crimes . The disenfranchisement of serious criminal offenders served to deliver a message to both the community and the offenders themselves that serious criminal activity would not be tolerated by the community . ORG , on this view , could choose to curtail temporarily the availability of the vote to serious criminals to insist that civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law , as goals worthy of pursuit , were prerequisites to democratic participation . The minority referred to the need to respect the limits imposed by ORG and to be sensitive to the fact that there may be many possible reasonable and rational balances .

On DATE , in DATE and ORG and Others ( CCTCARDINAL/CARDINAL : DATE ( CARDINAL ) SA CARDINAL ) , ORG considered the application of prisoners for a declaration and orders that ORG take measures enabling them and other prisoners to register and vote while in prison . It noted that , under LAW , the right of every adult citizen to vote in elections for legislative bodies was set out in unqualified terms and it underlined the importance of the right :

“ The universality of the franchise is important not only for nationhood and democracy . The vote of each and every citizen is a badge of dignity and personhood . Quite literally , it says that everybody counts . ”

The Constitutional Court found that the right to vote by its very nature imposed positive obligations upon the legislature and the executive and that LAW must be interpreted in a way that gave effect to constitutional declarations , guarantees and responsibilities . It noted that many democratic societies imposed voting disabilities on some categories of prisoners . Although there were no comparable provisions in LAW , it recognised that limitations might be imposed upon the exercise of fundamental rights , provided they were , inter alia , reasonable and justifiable . The question whether legislation barring prisoners would be justified under LAW was not raised in the proceedings and it emphasised that the judgment was not to be read as preventing ORG from disenfranchising certain categories of prisoners . In the absence of such legislation , prisoners had the constitutional right to vote and neither ORG nor ORG had the power to disenfranchise them . It concluded that the ORG was under the obligation to make reasonable arrangements for prisoners to vote .


Violation of Art. 5-4;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings

The applicant , born in DATE , had been placed in psychiatric detention on CARDINAL occasions since DATE . In DATE she was hospitalised in DATE , DATE and DATE .

On DATE Dr E. , a district medical officer ( PERSON ) in PERSON , decided in agreement with the applicant to send her to the PERSON cantonal psychiatric clinic ( “ the psychiatric clinic ” ) on account of chronic schizophrenia and of constituting a danger to herself .

On DATE the applicant applied for release from the psychiatric clinic . Her request was refused on DATE by PERSON , the chief medical officer of the psychiatric clinic , who referred , inter alia , to a psychotic outbreak ( Schub ) of recurring schizophrenia and to her inability to accept her illness ( mangelnde GPE ) .

On DATE the applicant , who was represented by counsel , filed an application with ORG Verwaltungsrekurskommission ) of the GPE of PERSON , requesting , with reference to LAW ( PERSON ) , her release from the psychiatric clinic . She also requested that the expert who was to examine her should not act as specialised judge ( PERSON ) .

ORG appointed CARDINAL of its members , ORG , a doctor specialising in psychiatry and psychotherapy , to act as judge rapporteur .

On DATE PERSON interviewed the applicant at the psychiatric clinic from TIME to TIME A court registrar ( NORP ) was also present . According to the verbatim record prepared by the latter , PERSON concluded the interview as follows :

“ PERSON explains the further procedure and that the hearing will take place on DATE .

W. : I shall propose to the court to dismiss the action .

N. : Pity . ”

NORP By letter of DATE ORG informed the applicant ’s counsel that the hearing had been fixed for DATE at the psychiatric clinic . The letter referred to ORG as being one of the specialised judges on the bench and rapporteur . It was further stated that at the hearing counsel would have the opportunity to comment on the expert opinion and on the case file .

On DATE ORG submitted his expert opinion . He diagnosed a schizophrenic mental illness and found that the applicant could not be released in view of the required high doses of medication . The report concluded : “ If the applicant ’s situation does not clearly improve before the date of the hearing , I recommend dismissal of the action . The applicant may consult this report . ”

The hearing took place on DATE at the psychiatric clinic . The bench of ORG consisted of the President , who was a professional judge , and CARDINAL other judges , namely a youth attorney ( PERSON ) and lawyer ; a district director and curator ( LOC ) of the social services ; an administrator of PERSON , a charitable association assisting the ill ; and PERSON , the rapporteur . ORG heard CARDINAL doctors from the psychiatric clinic and the applicant . The applicant ’s counsel , who was on holiday , remained absent , ORG having refused to grant his request to postpone the hearing until DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s action .

In its decision , ORG concluded with reference , inter alia , to ORG ’s expert opinion that the applicant suffered from severe mental disturbances warranting her detention in a psychiatric institution .

In so far as the applicant had requested to be examined by an expert who was not a member of ORG , it was found that the she had not substantiated her request . Reference was made to the case - law of ORG ( PERSON ) , in particular a decision published in DATE ( ORG ( FAC ) , vol . CARDINAL GPE , p. CARDINAL ) , where that court had not expressly ruled out the combination of expert and judicial functions .

NORP The applicant lodged a public - law appeal ( staatsrechtliche Beschwerde ) with ORG , complaining , inter alia , of the position of the expert PERSON , who should not have dealt with the case as he had already previously dealt with it by acting as an expert ( ORG ) .

On DATE ORG dismissed the public - law appeal . In respect of the position of the expert , the court found , with reference to its own case - law :

“ In the letter ... of DATE counsel for the applicant was informed of the identity of the expert , and also that he would act as specialised judge and rapporteur . Already in her application to ORG the applicant had provisionally requested that the expert should not act as specialised judge . However , she does not discuss the contrary opinion of ORG . In line with ORG Message to ORG concerning the part of LAW dealing with committal to a psychiatric institution , ... it has not been called in question that experts within the meaning of LAW will also act as members of the deciding body ... , to the extent that their position can at all be compared with that of a regular expert who is consulted in evidence proceedings ... It is true that ORG has recently described the combination of expert and judicial functions as being ‘ not entirely unobjectionable’ ... However , no change of case - law can be seen in that decision , and the applicant has not shown DATE in what respect such a change would be called for ... ”

Articles CARDINALa et seq . of the NORP Civil Code concern deprivation of liberty , inter alia , on account of mental illness . ORG and ORG list the conditions for such deprivation . Articles CARDINALd , ORG and PERSON provide as follows , in the version applicable at the relevant time :

D. Judicial review

NORP The person concerned or another close person may lodge in writing with the judge a complaint against the decision within DATE of its receipt .

NORP This right shall apply even if a request for release has been refused .

PERSON in the cantons

I. In general

The proceedings shall be determined by the cantonal law with the following exceptions :

NORP In each decision the person concerned shall be told the reasons of the decision and informed in writing of the possibility of lodging a complaint with a judge .

Every person who enters a clinic must immediately be informed in writing that a complaint can be lodged with a judge in case of detention or if a request for release is refused .

A request for judicial examination shall immediately be transferred to the competent judge .

The request for judicial examination can be granted suspensive effect by the authority ordering the hospitalisation or by the judge .

In the case of mentally ill persons a decision can only be taken after consultation of an expert ; if in judicial proceedings this has already happened , higher courts need not do so .

II . NORP Before the court

The judge shall decide in simple and speedy proceedings .

Where necessary he shall appoint a legal representative for the person .

The judge of first instance shall hear this person orally . ”

Upon enactment of these provisions ORG published in DATE in ORG ( Bundesblatt CARDINAL , vol . III , p. CARDINAL ) a message ( PERSON ) to ORG in which it was explained that cantons were free to appoint as experts for these release proceedings persons within or outside the judicial body deciding on the release .

ORG has developed extensive case - law on Article CARDINALe § DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . In a judgment published in DATE ( BGE , vol . CARDINAL II , p. CARDINAL ) it dealt with the issue whether the expert referred to in Article CARDINALe § DATE could act as a judge in the proceedings and stated :

“ This provision is complied with if experts belong as members to the deciding body ... The purpose of the statutory provision is that in the case of mentally ill persons no decision should be taken without the advice and the specialised knowledge of psychiatrically trained doctors . This will be the case in an optimal manner if such doctors participate as members of the judicial body . ”

In a judgment of DATE ( BGE , vol . CARDINAL II , p. CARDINAL ) the court stated :

“ It is one of the essential procedural guarantees that the expert mentioned in Article CARDINALe § CARDINAL of LAW , even if he is not a member of the deciding body , shall be both an established expert and impartial . This implies that the expert shall not already have expressed an opinion on the illness of the person concerned in the same procedure , i.e. in the administrative proceedings preceding the court procedure ... For it should not be overlooked that the judge who examines the grounds stated in LAW will substantially depend on the opinion of the expert . The position granted by the federal legislator to the expert within the framework of detention on grounds of protective care is exceptional : his position can not at all be compared with that of an expert who is consulted in proceedings in which evidence is taken . The expert must imperatively be heard before the contested decision whether or not to release a person from detention . ”

In judgments published in DATE ( BGE , vol . CARDINAL GPE , p CARDINAL , and vol . CARDINAL II , p. CARDINAL ) ORG referred to the “ not entirely unobjectionable combination of expert and judicial functions ” ( “ nicht ganz unbedenkliche Verquickung sachverständiger und richterlicher Funktionen ” ) and , in respect of the expert

mentioned in LAW , to “ the particular requirement of critical objectivity towards clinical doctors and psychiatrists ” ( “ die hier besonders geforderte kritische FAC gegenüber den GPE und den NORP ” ) .

In LOC ) is the competent body to decide on matters of deprivation of liberty if and when a person contests detention . The commission has CARDINAL full - time judge and CARDINAL to thirty specialised judges , including doctors ( often psychiatrists ) and social workers . The professional judges are appointed by the cantonal parliament ; the non - professional judges and the specialised judges are appointed , upon proposal of ORG the Canton of PERSON , by the cantonal government . A judge ’s term of office lasts DATE .

ORG sits with CARDINAL judges , including regular judges and specialised judges .

ORG has opted for the system whereby the expert required by LAW is appointed from the bench of judges .

According to section DATE ) of GPE ( PERSON über die PERSON ) of ORG , in the version in force at the relevant time , after an action has been filed with ORG the President will immediately order the questioning of the person concerned by a judge . The questioning is undertaken by the judge rapporteur who will then prepare an expert opinion ( Rule CARDINAL of the Rules of Procedure of ORG – Reglement über den Geschäftsgang der Verwaltungsrekurskommission ) .


Violation of Art. 6;Violation of Art. 13;Violation of P1-1

Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Sverre Erik Jebens

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE , LOC .

In DATE the applicant 's father died in a fire . The applicant alleged that the death had been caused by the firemen 's manifest failure to comply with the fire - fighting instructions . In DATE PERSON , an investigator of ORG of ORG , reported to a local prosecutor about the incident . In his official explanatory note issued in reply to the prosecutor 's inquiry PERSON stated that the applicant 's repeated unfounded complaints demonstrated that she must have been suffering from some mental disorder and that he strongly recommended subjecting her to a psychiatric examination .

The applicant sued PERSON and ORG of LOC for defamation .

On DATE the ORG found in the applicant 's favour . The court held , in particular , that PERSON had acted in his official capacity of an investigator when making the defamatory statements about the applicant . The court awarded her MONEY ( RUB ) in nonpecuniary damages against ORG of LOC and ordered PERSON to retract the false information about the applicant . On DATE ORG upheld the judgment in substance , and it entered into force . The judgment has not been executed to date .

On DATE pursuant to order no . CARDINAL of DATE issued by ORG of GPE , ORG of LOC was liquidated by way of removal from the ORG tax register . The functions of ORG have since been executed by the previously existing ORG of ORG of GPE .

On DATE CARDINAL writs of execution issued by ORG on DATE were received by the bailiff service of GPE , which initiated the enforcement proceedings on DATE . In the course of the proceedings the bailiff service established that the judgment could not be enforced due to the debtor 's liquidation . On DATE ORG of PERSON terminated the enforcement proceedings .

On DATE the ORG refused to replace the respondent authority by ORG of GPE on the ground that the latter was not a legal successor to the defunct ORG . The judgment was upheld by ORG on DATE .

The applicant further sued ORG for damages resulting from the firemen 's negligence . On DATE ORG in the final instance rejected her complaints as unfounded .

NORP Under section CARDINAL of LAW of DATE , a bailiff must enforce a judgment in DATE . Under section QUANTITY of LAW of DATE , ORG must enforce a judgment in DATE .


The applicant , Mr PERSON , is an NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant was arrested by NORP police , without a warrant , on NORP territory , on DATE . He alleges that he was pushed into the boot of a car and transported to GPE , where he was charged with robbery and smuggling . He also alleges that he was subjected to torture and degrading treatment during detention . He was detained on remand until DATE , when ORG acquitted him .

The applicant brought an action against ORG seeking payment of compensation for non - pecuniary damage arising from the unlawful investigation and his detention on remand for DATE .

On DATE the ORG ruled in favour of the applicant and awarded him CARDINAL NORP lei ( MDL ) ( the equivalent of MONEY ( ORG ) at the time ) . ORG appealed .

On DATE ORG dismissed the ORG ’s appeal and the latter lodged an appeal in cassation with ORG .

By a final judgment of DATE ORG upheld the appeal in cassation and reduced the amount of compensation to MDL CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) .

On DATE the Deputy Prosecutor General lodged with ORG a request for annulment of the above - mentioned judgments and for a reduction in the amount of damages .

On DATE ORG upheld the Deputy Prosecutor General ’s request for annulment and quashed the above - mentioned judgments . ORG adopted a new judgment and awarded the applicant MDL CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL.CARDINAL at the time ) in compensation for unlawful detention .

On DATE the Government informed the ORG that , following the re - opening of the proceedings , on DATE , ORG ruled in favour of the applicant and awarded him MDL CARDINAL ( ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL at the time ) in compensation for non - pecuniary damage as a result of his unlawful detention . It also found that there had been a breach of the applicant ’s rights under LAW and LAW No . CARDINAL to the Convention as a result of the quashing of the judgment of ORG of DATE . ORG awarded him MDL CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL at the time ) in compensation for pecuniary damage suffered as a result of his unlawful detention , MDL CARDINAL ( ORG CARDINAL at the time ) for non - pecuniary damage suffered as a result of the violation of the applicant ’s rights under the Convention and MDL CARDINAL ( ORG CARDINAL.CARDINAL at the time ) for costs and expenses , including the applicant ’s representative ’s fees incurred before the ORG .

The relevant domestic law was set out in PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § CARDINAL , DATE .


András Sajó;Françoise Tulkens;Ireneu Cabral Barreto;Vladimiro Zagrebelsky

The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE . He is represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the applicant , may be summarised as follows .

After GPE regained independence in DATE , ORG , concerning the restitution of property rights to property nationalised by the NORP authorities , was enacted . The applicant , an NORP citizen at that time , requested the authorities to restore to him the property rights to a building owned by the applicant ’s late relatives prior to nationalisation .

By letters of DATE and DATE , ORG informed the applicant that his request could not be granted because he did not meet the criteria set out in ORG , namely , he did not have NORP citizenship and did not reside in the country . On DATE the ORG ’s office also informed the applicant about the citizenship and residence requirements .

On DATE the applicant started an exceptional Presidential procedure to obtain NORP citizenship . On DATE the applicant gained NORP citizenship by a decree of the ORG ’s President . In DATE the applicant requested the domestic courts to extend the statutory time - limit for his application for restitution , which had lapsed on DATE . The applicant submitted that he could not have applied for the restitution of his claimed property rights within the statutory time - limit because he had not had NORP citizenship earlier . He also noted that he did not know the NORP language and did not reside in GPE , which made it difficult for him to claim his rights within the time - limit . Before the courts the applicant was represented by counsel , who was present at all the hearings .

On DATE ORG granted the request . The court held that the applicant had actively sought to have his property rights restored and noted that his requests for restitution had been admitted and examined . Furthermore , the applicant had sought NORP citizenship in order to fulfil all the requirements of ORG . The court observed that in DATE the law was amended to include a possibility to extend the time - limit for applications for restitution and found no reason to deprive the applicant of that possibilty .

On DATE ORG overturned the decision and dismissed the request by the applicant . The court stated that the applicant , not being a NORP citizen before DATE , did not meet the criteria set out in the law and thus could not claim restitution of property rights . The applicant had only become a NORP citizen on DATE , after the time - limit for restitution applications had already expired . The examination of the provisions regulating the matter allowed the conclusion that the time - limit for submitting a restitution request could only be extended in respect of those persons who had acquired the right within the prescribed time - limit , but who had not been able to make use of it properly within the deadline for good reasons . The submission of the request for restitution , its time - limit and the extension of that deadline were interconnected . The applicant did not have the right to the restitution of property within the statutory time - limit until DATE because he had not been a NORP citizen . Thus , the legal provision regarding the extension of the time - limit was not applicable to his situation . Furthermore , the court observed that the applicant had only applied for citizenship under the exceptional Presidential procedure in DATE , whereas there had been nothing to stop him taking action earlier .

ORG Nuosavybės teisių ... atkūrimo įstatymas ) ( amended on numerous occasions ) provides that the right to property nationalised by the NORP authorities can only be restored to persons who are citizens of GPE . Under LAW , applications for the restitution of property rights could be submitted up until DATE . The time - limit of DATE was set for the production of any additional supporting documents which could not have been submitted earlier in respect of applications made before DATE . LAW , as amended on DATE , provides that the time - limit for both an application for the restitution of property rights and the submission of supporting documents could be extended if substantial reasons for missing the deadline existed . Whether those reasons are sufficiently important is to be established by the courts on a case - by - case basis .


The applicant company is incorporated under NORP law , has its head office in GPE and is currently under liquidation . It is represented before the Court by Mrs PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

In DATE ORG ( NORP Επικουρικής Ασφαλίσεως FAC Εμπορικών DATE hereinafter TEAYEK ) , a public body under the supervision of ORG , leased to the applicant company a hotel in GPE .

On DATE TEAYEK granted the applicant company the right to convert the hotel into a courthouse and sublease it to the ORG for a period of DATE . On DATE the applicant company entered into an agreement with the ORG and TEAYEK for the sublease of the building to the ORG . The rent would be paid by ORG ( GPE Χρηματοδοτήσεως GPE Κτιρίων – hereinafter TAXDIK ) , a public body , and ORG to ORG and the applicant company .

On DATE the sublease came up for re - negotiation . The applicant company requested a PERCENT increase , which ORG accepted . The ORG refused . However , it did not evacuate the LOC , which it continues using until DATE to house ORG of GPE . ORG , considering that the sublease had been terminated , asked the ORG and ORG to pay it the entire rent . ORG TAXDIK , not knowing to whom to pay the part of the rent that used to be collected by the applicant company , started deposing that part with ORG και NORP ) .

On DATE the applicant company sued the ORG and ORG for its part of the rent from DATE to CARDINAL DATE before the single - member first instance civil court of GPE ( first action ) . On DATE the court accepted the applicant company ’s action ( decision no . DATE concerning the first action ) . On DATE the defendants appealed . On DATE TEAYEK intervened in the proceedings in favour of the appellants .

On DATE ORG enacted a law ( no . DATE ) entitled “ social cover of uninsured groups , improvement of the social security and other provisions ” . Section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of that law provides for the termination of leases of real property owned by social security funds under the supervision of ORG and Security , if the property is used as commercial premises by a person other than the leaseholder . In that case the lease continues between the owner and the subtenant . It was indicated in the explanatory report that the subleases in question were continuously renewed and were “ unfavourable and unprofitable ” to the funds because it was the leaseholder who made capital of the bigger part of the rent . Thus , the purpose of the provision was to “ stop the exploitation of the social security funds and their pensioners ” .

On DATE ORG of GPE rejected both the appeal of the ORG and ORG and the intervention of TEAYEK ( decision no . DATE concerning the first action ) .

TAXDIK and the ORG appealed in cassation . TEAYEK did not . On DATE ORG rejected the appeal . It held that the sublease was tacitly renewed and that the ORG , which continued to use the building , had to pay the applicant company its part of the rent . ORG made no reference to Law no . DATE ( decision no . DATE concerning the first action ) . Subsequently , the applicant company was paid the amounts fixed .

On DATE the applicant company sued the ORG and ORG for its part of the rent from DATE to CARDINAL DATE before the single - member first instance civil court of GPE ( second action ) . The defendants relied on section QUANTITY no . DATE . The applicant company argued that the provision in question violated the constitutional provisions on equality and separation of powers . ORG intervened in the proceedings claiming the rent for itself . On DATE the court allowed ORG ’s intervention and dismissed the action ( decision no . MONEY concerning the second action ) . The applicant company appealed .

On DATE the applicant company sued the ORG and ORG for its part of the rent from DATE to CARDINAL DATE ( third action ) . On DATE the applicant company sued the ORG and ORG for its part of the rent DATE and DATE ( fourth action ) . ORG intervened in both actions claiming the rent for itself .

On DATE ORG upheld the applicant company ’s appeal against the first instance court ’s decision of DATE on the ground that section QUANTITY no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL did not apply to the case under consideration , which did not concern the lease of “ commercial ” LOC ( decision no . DATE concerning the second action ) . The ORG , ORG and TEAYEK appealed in cassation . The applicant company also appealed arguing that the courts should declare section QUANTITY no . DATE unconstitutional because it violated the right to equal treatment , the right to property and the principle of separation of powers .

On DATE the first instance court allowed the applicant company ’s actions of CARDINAL DATE and DATE on the ground that section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL did not apply ( decision no . CARDINAL concerning the third action and decision no . DATE concerning the fourth action ) . The ORG , ORG and TEAYEK appealed . The applicant company also appealed asking the court to declare section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of Law no . DATE unconstitutional .

On DATE the applicant company sued the ORG and ORG for its part of the rent from DATE to CARDINAL DATE ( fifth action ) . PERSON intervened . On DATE the first instance court allowed the action on the ground that section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL did not apply ( decision no . CARDINAL concerning the fifth action ) . The ORG , ORG and TEAYEK appealed . So did the applicant company relying on the alleged unconstitutionality of the above provision .

On DATE the applicant company sued the ORG and ORG for its part of the rent from DATE and DATE ( sixth action ) and on DATE it sued them for its part of the rent from CARDINAL DATE and DATE ( seventh action ) . ORG intervened .

On DATE the first instance court allowed the action of DATE on the ground that section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL did not apply ( decision no . CARDINAL concerning the sixth action ) . The ORG , ORG and TEAYEK appealed . The appeal is still pending .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeals of the ORG , ORG and TEAYEK against the first instance decisions of CARDINAL DATE , finding section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of Law no . DATE inapplicable ( decision no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL concerning the third action and decision no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL concerning the fourth action ) .

On DATE the applicant company sued the ORG and ORG for its part of the rent from DATE to CARDINAL DATE ( eighth action ) . The proceedings are still pending .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal of the ORG , ORG and TEAYEK against the first instance decision of CARDINAL DATE ( decision no . MONEY concerning the fifth action ) . The ORG , ORG and ORG did not appeal in cassation .

On DATE the first instance court allowed the action of DATE on the ground that section QUANTITY no . DATE was inapplicable ( decision no . DATE concerning the seventh action ) . The ORG , ORG and TEAYEK appealed . The appeal is still pending .

On DATE the applicant company sued for its part of the rent from CARDINAL DATE to DATE ( ninth action ) . The proceedings are still pending .

On DATE the applicant company sued for its part of the rent from DATE to DATE ( tenth action ) . The proceedings are still pending .

On DATE the applicant company sued for its part of the rent from DATE to DATE ( eleventh action ) . The proceedings are still pending .

On DATE ORG allowed the ORG ’s , ORG and ORG ’s appeal in cassation against ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE considering that , according to section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , TEAYEK was entitled to the whole rent ( decision no . PERSON concerning the second action ) . However , on the same date it dismissed their appeals in cassation against ORG decisions of CARDINAL DATE ; it considered that ORG had correctly decided the third and fourth actions because at the time it was bound by the res judicata effect of its own decision of CARDINAL DATE ( decision no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL concerning the third action and decision no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL concerning the fourth action ) . The applicant company notified these decisions to the ORG and TAXDIK on DATE . Under LAW , the time - limit for introducing remedies against these decisions is of DATE . However , according to a special law , the ORG and ORG could challenge these decisions within a time - limit of DATE .

On DATE the ORG and ORG asked ORG to revise its CARDINAL judgments of CARDINAL DATE and then its judgment of DATE . On DATE ORG granted their first request ( which concerned the CARDINAL judgments of CARDINAL DATE ) , found section QUANTITY no . DATE applicable and not unconstitutional and reversed the first instance judgments ( decision no . CARDINAL concerning the third action and decision no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL concerning the fourth action ) .

On DATE ORG also revised its judgment of DATE ( decision no . CARDINAL concerning the fifth action ) .

The applicant company appealed in cassation against decisions ORG . CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL/CARDINAL . It claimed that the applications for revision were lodged out of time . It also invoked a violation of ORG CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Convention and CARDINAL of Protocol No . CARDINAL .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal in cassation as being ill - founded . In the first place , the court considered that the applications for revision were lodged within the time - limit of DATE which applies to recourses filed by the ORG . Moreover , it considered that the applicant company had not sufficiently substantiated its complaints under LAW and CARDINAL of Protocol No . CARDINAL ( decision no . CARDINAL concerning the fourth action and decision no . MONEY concerning the fifth action ) . The above decisions were finalised ( καθαρογραφή ) on DATE and filed ( αρχειοθέτηση ) on DATE . ORG does not serve its judgments . The applicant company became aware of them on DATE .