Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Impartial tribunal;Independent tribunal)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić

The applicant was born in DATE .

At the time of the events the applicant was serving in ORG as a lieutenant - colonel .

On DATE , CARDINAL May and CARDINAL DATE , the applicant was interrogated by the military prosecutor within the context of a criminal investigation initiated against him for embezzlement .

On DATE an arrest warrant was issued in respect of the applicant on suspicion of embezzlement .

DATE the applicant applied to ORG . He was placed in detention on remand on DATE by ORG .

On DATE , the applicant gave a power of attorney to a lawyer .

On DATE the applicant ’s brother PERSON , who was a lawyer , was also placed in detention on remand . On DATE the applicant ’s brother was released .

On DATE the General Staff Military Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with ORG charging the applicant with embezzlement under LAW , involving in trade activities as a soldier under LAW and breaching LAW . CARDINAL ( Law on Disclosure of Assets and Fight Against Bribery and Corruption ) . The siblings of the applicant , PERSON and PERSON were also charged with the same bill of indictment with embezzlement and breaching LAW . CARDINAL .

On DATE the General Staff Military Prosecutor filed an additional bill of indictment and charged the accused with additional acts related to the crimes already stated in the first bill of indictment .

On DATE , the applicant submitted a petition with the prison authorities , complaining that he had not been able to see his brother PERSON ORG , who was also detained in remand . The applicant stated that he regretted that his brother was also in prison because of him , and requested to see him .

On DATE the applicant was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for embezzlement and being involved in trade activities as a soldier by ORG , composed of a military officer with no legal background and CARDINAL military judges .

On DATE the applicant appealed against the decision of ORG .

On DATE ORG quashed the judgment of DATE on procedural grounds and on the merits .

On DATE the ORG found the applicant guilty for embezzlement and being involved in trade activities as a soldier , but reduced his prison sentence . The applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the applicant requested from ORG to reopen the criminal proceedings alleging that a witness who had not been heard , was ready to give statements before the court . The applicant submitted that ORG written statements to ORG as well .

On DATE rejected the applicant ’s request for reopening of the criminal proceedings , on the grounds that the ORG statements did not have any evidential value , which could warrant a lesser sentence or the acquittal of the applicant .


András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON . He was represented before the ORG by Mr T. Gaudi - Nagy , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by Mr PERSON , Agent , ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant appeared at the main entrance of ORG in PERSON , for the purpose of demonstrating against Prime Minister PERSON and his government . He held a CARDINALxCARDINAL cm placard saying “ PERSON to resign ! Voluntary contribution pay - desk ; minimum MONEY ” , and he distributed flyers to the passers - by . The applicant had his CARDINAL children , respectively DATE , with him .

Upon a citizen ’s notice the police appeared to check the applicant ’s identity . He explained that he had been demonstrating on his own and that was the reason why he had failed to notify the authorities about the demonstration in advance . However , the police officers said he had been committing an infringement and obliged him to terminate the demonstration . The applicant obeyed , put all his belongings into his car and drove to Sopron Municipal Police Department , escorted by CARDINAL police cars on his way . He did so at the police’

On DATE , shortly after his release , the applicant filed a complaint with ORG , complaining about the offensive style of communication of the police officers dealing with the incident , and about not taking TIME and not giving him the chance to indicate his objections . The chief officer of ORG dismissed the applicant ’s complaint on DATE . Upon the applicant ’s appeal , PERSON Police Department upheld the decision . The applicant challenged the decision before FAC but his claim was dismissed .

On DATE the Sopron Municipal Police Department , acting as administrative authority , imposed a fine of MONEY ( MONEY ) on the applicant for the offence of misusing the right to assembly .

Upon the appeal of the applicant – in which he argued that he had not exercised his right to assembly as he was on his own – the Sopron ORG terminated the regulatory offence proceedings against the applicant on DATE . The court emphasised that the applicant had been exercising his right to freedom of expression but , as he was demonstrating on his own , he could not possibly commit the offence of misuse of the right to assembly .

In DATE the applicant lodged an action in damages against the Győr - Moson - Sopron County Police Department , stating that the police had violated his rights to freedom of expression , to liberty and to human dignity , and claiming non - pecuniary damages in the amount of MONEY ( MONEY ) . The applicant argued that by escorting him to ORG and retaining him for TIME , the police officers had violated his right to liberty . Moreover , by their offensive style of communication , they had violated his right to dignity . He also asserted that the officers – by virtue of their intervention as such – had infringed his right to freedom of expression . Moreover , the police officers had acted wrongfully when not taking TIME or allowing the applicant to make objections .

On DATE the Győr - Moson - Sopron County Court found that the applicant ’s act was to be considered as expression of political opinion . PERSON Police Department had violated his right to freedom of expression by seizing the objects used for the purposes of the demonstration . Apart from this , the court dismissed the applicant ’s claims . Although , as a finding of fact , it was established that the applicant had been called upon to follow the officers to ORG , the court found that he had been neither forced to go to ORG nor arrested . There had not been any evidence proving that the police officers’ action was a coercive measure . The court was satisfied that the applicant had voluntarily driven to ORG , that DATE while inside – he had stayed in a public waiting room and his cell phone had not been seized . The court also noted that the applicant could not prove that his personal documents had been withheld during the time he spent at ORG . It had not been proved either that the applicant ’s right to dignity had been violated . Moreover , his right to a remedy was not infringed by not providing him with a pen and paper on site , as he was able to file a complaint later on . The court dismissed the applicant ’s claim for non - pecuniary damages since the violation of right to freedom of expression – even if the claim was well - founded – did not , in the court ’s view , justify the awarding of non - pecuniary damages in the case .

The applicant appealed against the judgment . ORG upheld the first - instance court ’s judgment in essence .

The applicant challenged this judgment before ORG . In his petition for review he reiterated that the police officers had violated his right to liberty since he had driven to ORG because of the express instruction given by the officers and he had not been able to leave the police GPE until his ORG cards had been restored to him .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment finding that there had not been any evidence proving that the police officers had pursued any coercive measure against the applicant . On the contrary , the police officers had escorted him to ORG because he had requested more information about the legal qualification of his act and that information could only have been provided there . The applicant had driven to ORG voluntarily and had not been deprived of his liberty . Neither could the applicant prove a violation of his right to dignity . Finally , ORG agreed with the first and second instance courts on the consideration that a violation of the right to freedom of expression – even if the claim was well - founded – did not justify the awarding of damages in the applicant ’s case .


Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Paul Lemmens;Georges Ravarani;Ksenija Turković

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE .

On DATE the ORG mother died after being admitted for respiratory problems to ORG ( Klinički bolnički centar Jordanovac ; hereinafter : the “ Hospital ” ) , a public health care institution .

An autopsy performed on DATE by ORG of ORG ( GPE za opću patologiju i patološku anatomiju PERSON fakulteta GPE ) indicated that the cause of death was a respiratory insufficiency leading to cardiac complications .

The applicants were informed of the results of the autopsy and the measures which had been taken in the treatment of their mother were explained to them .

According to the applicants , based on a mutual agreement , it was decided that the first applicant would pursue legal remedies concerning the death of their mother .

In DATE the first applicant met CARDINAL health inspectors at ORG ( ORG zdravstva ; hereinafter : the “ Ministry ” ) to whom she complained of their inability to obtain their mother ’s medical records and about the circumstances in which she had died . The inspectors , however , took no further action concerning these complaints .

On DATE the first applicant complained to ORG ( GPE liječnička komora ; hereinafter : the “ ORG ” ) that her mother had died in unclear circumstances which had severely affected her family . She also expressed her dissatisfaction with the functioning of the medical system and complained in particular of her own medical treatment .

Upon receiving the first applicant ’s complaint , ORG of ORG ( GPE za stručni nadzor Hrvatskw liječničke komore ; hereinafter : the “ Commission ” ) invited the first applicant to specify in respect of which doctor and medical institution she made her complaints .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE ORG informed the first applicant that it considered her complaints to be withdrawn as she had failed to specify them as requested .

On DATE the first applicant replied to the letter of the Commission maintaining that there must have been some misunderstanding with the correspondence she had received from them . She indicated that her complaint concerned ORG , its director doctor , ORG , and the head of the intensive care unit doctor , ORG The first applicant in particular submitted that her family had never received any relevant documents concerning their relative ’s death . A copy of this reply was sent to ORG .

After receiving the first applicant ’s complaint , ORG requested ORG to provide a report concerning her mother ’s death .

On DATE the ORG submitted a report to the Ministry concerning the medical treatment of the applicants’ mother and the circumstances of her death .

On DATE the ORG forwarded all available documents to the ORG and requested a report on the actions taken with regard to the first applicant ’s complaint .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE the Commission informed the first applicant that it had not found any malpractice in the medical treatment of her mother .

The first applicant objected to these findings on DATE . She stressed that her family had never received any concrete document indicating the cause of death of their relative and that the letter which she had received from the ORG lacked the relevant reasoning .

On DATE the first applicant submitted further observations on her objection and on DATE she urged the ORG to adopt a decision on the matter .

On DATE ORG ( GPE odbor PERSON liječničke komore ) , as a second - instance body of the ORG , dismissed the first applicant ’s objection as ill - founded , upholding the decision of the Commission . It also informed the first applicant that she could challenge its decision by lodging an administrative action in ORG ( ORG ) .

After receiving the decision of ORG , the first applicant requested the ORG for an explanation concerning the procedure before it . On DATE she received a reply from the ORG indicating that she had been accordingly informed that she could lodge an administrative action in ORG and that there was no need for the ORG to communicate further with her concerning the matter .

On DATE the first applicant lodged an administrative action in the ORG challenging the decision of ORG . She argued that the bodies of the ORG had not replied to her submissions and had failed to properly assess the circumstances of her mother ’s death .

On DATE the first applicant urged ORG to examine her case . She received a reply from ORG on DATE indicating that due to a backlog at that court her case had still not been examined .

The applicant then complained to ORG ( ORG pravosuđa PERSON ) about the manner in which her case was processed by ORG and on DATE ORG requested ORG for a report on the matter . ORG replied on DATE , reiterating its previous explanation as to the reason why the case had not been examined .

On DATE , upon another complaint by the first applicant , ORG requested ORG for a report concerning the progress of the case .

On DATE ORG ) , based on the first applicant ’s complaint , urged ORG to speed up the proceedings in her case .

On DATE ORG declared the first applicant ’s administrative action inadmissible on the ground that the decision of ORG was not an administrative decision concerning any of her rights or obligations or legal interests .

On DATE the first applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) , complaining of the ineffectiveness of the proceedings before the lower bodies and her family ’s inability to obtain any concrete information about the circumstances of their relative ’s death .

On DATE the first applicant urged ORG to examine her case . Meanwhile she supplemented her constitutional complaint with further arguments and complaints , complaining in particular about the inordinate length of the proceedings in her case .

On DATE , the first applicant also asked ORG to allow her to inspect the case file .

In the meantime , the first applicant complained to various domestic authorities , including ORG , ORG of GPE ( PERSON ) and a Deputy in the ORG about the ineffectiveness of the domestic authorities’ response to her complaints concerning her mother ’s death .

On DATE the Ministry , replying to a question of the Deputy , stressed that it had never taken any action within its competence concerning the applicants’ case , although it had taken note of the proceedings before the competent bodies of the ORG and informed the first applicant of its findings with regard to the decisions of the ORG .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s constitutional complaint of DATE as ill - founded ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , upholding the decision of ORG . It also declared the applicant ’s additional complaints inadmissible as being lodged out of time and for non - exhaustion of the length of proceedings remedies . The decision of ORG was served on the first applicant on DATE .

On DATE the first applicant lodged a criminal complaint with ORG Attorney ’s Office ( Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u GPE ) alleging medical negligence by unknown Hospital staff . In particular , the first applicant submitted that upon the admission of her mother to the ORG she had been given a drug to which she was allergic , which had caused an allergic reaction and further medical complications leading up to her death .

After lodging the criminal complaint , the first applicant inquired several times with FAC about the progress of the investigation .

On DATE the first applicant submitted a written request to ORG Attorney ’s Office urging it to examine her criminal complaint .

As she received no reply from the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney ’s ORG , the first applicant complained to ORG about the inactivity in processing her complaint .

Based on the first applicant ’s complaint , on DATE ORG requested a report from the State Attorney ’s ORG ( ORG odvjetništvo PERSON ) concerning the case .

NORP Since it received no reply , on DATE ORG again urged ORG to produce a report concerning the proceedings at issue .

On DATE the ORG Attorney ’s ORG informed ORG and the first applicant that FAC had requested an investigating judge of ORG ( Županijski sud u GPE ) to commission an expert report concerning the circumstances of the applicants’ mother ’s death . It also stressed that this fact should be known to the first applicant as she had been duly informed about the status of the proceedings when she had made an inquiry in FAC Attorney ’s Office .

After receiving this information , the first applicant made several inquiries in the GPE County Court concerning the status of the case . On DATE she was informed by that court that the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney ’s Office had never requested any investigative actions concerning her criminal complaint .

Meanwhile , on DATE the ORG Attorney ’s ORG found that the first applicant ’s case file had been lost and ordered that it should be reconstructed .

The Zagreb Municipal State Attorney ’s ORG also ordered the police to conduct an investigation into the circumstances of the first applicant ’s complaint . In addition , it requested ORG to provide the autopsy report , and it commissioned an expert report concerning the circumstances of the applicants’ mother ’s death .

On DATE the police produced a report on the interviews with the ORG mother ’s general practitioner and doctor ORG The latter denied any medical malpractice and administration of the drug to which the applicants’ mother was allergic . His statement was confirmed by the ORG director , doctor ORG The police also obtained the relevant medical records concerning the medical treatment and death of the applicants’ mother .

On DATE an expert , doctor GPE , produced a report indicating that the cause of death of the applicants’ mother was a respiratory insufficiency leading to cardiac complications . The report did not indicate any medical malpractice on the part of the Hospital doctors .

On DATE the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney ’s ORG rejected the first applicant ’s criminal complaint on the ground that there was no reasonable suspicion that a criminal offence had been committed in the medical treatment of the ORG mother . The first applicant was instructed that she could take over the prosecution as a subsidiary prosecutor .

On DATE the first applicant asked ORG Attorney ’s Office to provide her with a copy of the entire domestic case file .

DATE . On DATE , after she had received the relevant documents from the GPE Municipal State Attorney ’s ORG , the first applicant instituted criminal proceedings in ORG ( PERSON kazneni sud u GPE ) against doctor GPE on charges of medical negligence .

In the meantime , the first applicant complained to various domestic authorities about the ineffectiveness of proceedings before FAC Attorney ’s Office and on DATE she received a reply from the State Attorney ’s Office of GPE expressing its regrets for the protracted length of the proceedings dealing with her criminal complaint .

On DATE ORG requested ORG Attorney ’s Office to forward the relevant documents concerning the first applicant ’s case .

The documents were provided on DATE .

On DATE ORG invited the first applicant to amend her request to prosecute ( optužni prijedlog ) as required under the relevant domestic law concerning the factual and legal basis of the charges against doctor GPE

On DATE the first applicant submitted an indictment ( optužnica ) against doctor GPE on charges of medical negligence .

As there was no progress in the proceedings , on CARDINAL DATE the applicant urged ORG to examine her case .

On DATE ORG commissioned an expert report concerning the medical treatment and death of the applicants’ mother . It requested an investigating judge of ORG to coordinate that procedural action .

An expert report of CARDINAL DATE , drafted by doctors ORG and GPE , indicated that there had been no irregularity in the medical treatment of the applicants’ mother . It further found that the drug , to which the applicant ’s mother was allergic , had neither been used nor indicated for use during her treatment on DATE . The experts also excluded the possibility that the ORG mother had died as a result of an allergic reaction .

The first applicant received the expert report on DATE .

On DATE the first applicant challenged the findings of the expert report , arguing that it had failed to examine all aspects of the medical treatment and death of her mother . The first applicant thus requested that the experts be ordered to re - examine and accordingly supplement their findings .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG returned the indictment to the first applicant , ordering her to institute an investigation before an investigating judge of ORG .

The first applicant complied with that order and on DATE requested that an investigation be opened before an investigating judge of ORG .

On DATE an investigating judge of ORG questioned doctor ORG , who denied any medical malpractice maintaining that the drug to which the applicants’ mother was allergic had neither been used nor indicated in her treatment .

On DATE the investigating judge expressed his disagreement with the first applicant ’s request for opening of an investigation and forwarded the case file to a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed the first applicant ’s request for an investigation on the ground of lack of evidence of medical malpractice . The first applicant challenged this decision by lodging an appeal before ORG ( PERSON ) .

Meanwhile , the first applicant complained to ORG about the length of the criminal proceedings and on DATE ORG found a violation of her right to a trial within a reasonable time and awarded her CARDINAL NORP kunas ( HRK ) in non - pecuniary damage ( approximately EUR CARDINAL ) .

On DATE ORG dismissed the first applicant ’s appeal and upheld the decision of ORG of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The decision of ORG was served on the first applicant on DATE .

The first applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with ORG , complaining of the ineffectiveness of the proceedings before the lower courts and their failure to elucidate the circumstances of her mother ’s death .

DATE . On DATE ORG declared the constitutional complaint inadmissible on the ground that the decisions of the lower courts did not concern any of her rights or obligations or any criminal charge against her . The decision of ORG was served on the first applicant on DATE .

On DATE the first applicant lodged a request for the reopening of the proceedings before ORG , alleging procedural flaws in the processing of her case .

ORG rejected the request as unfounded on DATE and this was upheld by ORG on DATE .

The first applicants also lodged a criminal complaint against the medical experts FAC and GPE on DATE alleging that they had provided false evidence . On DATE she received a reply from the GPE Municipal State Attorney ’s ORG indicating that it considered her criminal complaint unfounded in any respect .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression;Freedom to impart information);Violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression;Freedom to impart information);Non-pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Aleš Pejchal;André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Ganna Yudkivska;Helena Jäderblom;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in ORG .

On DATE the applicant , who campaigns against abortion , distributed leaflets in the immediate vicinity of the medical practices of anesthetists Dr M. and PERSON , who run a DATE clinic . Furthermore , the applicant deposited leaflets in all letterboxes in the vicinity of the DATE clinic .

The front page of the leaflets contained the following text in bold letters :

“ In DATE clinic Dr M./Dr R. [ full names and address ] unlawful abortions are performed ” ( “ In PERSON . M./Dr . NORP [ ... ] werden rechtswidrige Abtreibungen durchgeführt ” )

Followed by an explanation set in smaller letters :

“ which are , however , allowed by the NORP legislator and are not subject to criminal liability . The attestation of counselling protects the “ doctor ” and the mother from criminal responsibility , but not from their responsibility before God . ” ( “ die aber der deutsche ORG erlaubt und nicht unter Strafe stellt . PERSON schützt PERSON “ und ORG , aber nicht vor der ORG . “ )

A box below contained the following text :

“ According to international criminal law : murder is the intentional “ bringing - to - death ” of an innocent human being ! ” ( “ PERSON den internationalen GPE : PERSON ” eines unschuldigen GPE ! ” )

On the back of the folded leaflet , the applicant quoted ORG leading judgment with regard to abortion ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) as well as a statement by PERSON , the personal physician of PERSON and PERSON , dealing with the role of doctors in relation to voluntary euthanasia and abortion . He also cited section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Law on Conflicts in Pregnancy ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and asked readers to make use of their influence on those performing and assisting in abortions .

Furthermore , the following text appeared on the back of the folded leaflet :

“ The murder of human beings in FAC was unlawful , but the morally degraded ORG allowed the murder of innocent people and did not make it subject to criminal liability . ” ( “ PERSON in GPE war rechtswidrig , aber der moralisch verkommene NS - Staat hatte den GPE an den unschuldigen GPE erlaubt und nicht unter Strafe gestellt . ” )

Below this sentence the leaflet referred to the website “ www.babycaust.de ” . This website , which was operated by the applicant , contained , inter alia , an address list of so - called “ abortion doctors ” , in which the DATE clinic and the full names of PERSON and PERSON were mentioned . This list was accessible on the website under the link “ death or life”/“request for prayers for GPE ” ( PERSON für GPE ) .

Dr M. and PERSON filed a request for a civil injunction against the applicant . They submitted that only legal abortions were performed at DATE clinic . The applicant ’s leaflet created the erroneous impression that the abortions performed were contrary to the relevant legal provisions .

On DATE ORG granted the requested injunction and ordered the applicant to desist from further disseminating in the immediate vicinity of the DATE clinic leaflets containing the GPE names and the assertion that unlawful abortions were performed in the plaintiffs’ medical practice . ORG further ordered the applicant to desist from mentioning the plaintiffs’ names and address in the list of “ abortion doctors ” on the website “ www.babycaust.de ” .

ORG considered that the statements in the applicant ’s leaflet made the incorrect allegation that abortions were performed outside the legal conditions . This was not called into question by the further explanation that the abortions were not subject to criminal liability , as the whole layout of the leaflet was intended to draw the reader ’s attention to the first sentence set in bold letters , while the further additions were set in smaller letters with the intent of dissimulating their content . ORG further considered that by singling out the plaintiffs , who had not given him any reasons to do so , the applicant had created a socalled “ pillory effect ” . The allegations raised by the applicant seriously interfered with the plaintiffs’ personality rights . It followed that the applicant ’s right to freedom of expression had to cede .

ORG considered that the same principles applied to the mentioning of the plaintiffs’ names on the website entitled “ babycaust.de ” . This implied a connection between the plaintiffs and crimes which were , according to the applicant , comparable to the crimes committed by the NORP during the Holocaust , and was not covered by the applicant ’s freedom of expression and had thus not to be tolerated by the plaintiffs .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal . It did not find it necessary to examine whether the text of the leaflets had to be qualified as a statement of facts or as an expression of opinion as , in any event , the applicant ’s freedom of opinion had to cede . ORG confirmed ORG assessment that the text in the leaflet implied that the plaintiffs performed unlawful actions . This was not called into question by the further explanations , as the average reader could not be expected to draw the distinction between the act of abortion which was justified under LAW and the act of abortion which was merely exempt from prosecution under LAW CARDINALa § CARDINAL of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Seen from a layman ’s point of view , the text of the leaflet created the impression that the act of abortion , as permitted by the NORP legislator , amounted to unlawful homicide , or even to murder . The statement was at the very least ambiguous and had not to be tolerated by the plaintiffs .

Even if CARDINAL were to assume that the leaflet did not contain a wrong statement of facts , the applicant ’s freedom of expression had to cede . ORG reiterated that freedom of expression conveyed the right to express an opinion even in an offending , shocking or disturbing way . If the expression of opinion was part of a debate on matters of public interest , there was an assumption militating in favour of freedom of expression . However , in the instant case the applicant had created a massive “ pillory effect ” by singling out the plaintiffs , who had not given the applicant any reason to do so . The performance of abortions was criticised with harsh and rigid words . This was further aggravated by the Holocaust reference . ORG further noted that the applicant was not under any specific pressure to express his general criticism of the facilitation of abortions with such a massive violation of the plaintiffs’ personality rights .

The Court of Appeal further considered that it had not been necessary for the plaintiffs to submit the exact content of the website , as this website was generally accessible and its content was thus known . It then went on to state :

“ The content of the webpage is likewise characterised by the fact that the defendant labels individuals , including the plaintiffs , “ abortion doctors ” and puts their actions on a level with the national - socialist Holocaust and with mass murder . Therefore , the plaintiffs’ claim to compel the defendant to refrain from performing the impugned action must be granted . In that connection , the court refers to its above reasoning . Furthermore , the defendant himself admitted that he had , on the webpage , labelled the plaintiffs “ abortion doctors ” who are directly or indirectly involved in the performance of abortions . ”

ORG did not grant leave to appeal on points of law .

On DATE ORG refused the applicant ’s request for legal aid , on the ground that the applicant ’s intended appeal on points of law lacked sufficient prospect of success .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the judgments of ORG , of ORG and against the decision of ORG . He complained , in particular , that the impugned decisions violated his right to freedom of expression .

On DATE ORG , sitting as a ORG of CARDINAL judges , refused to admit the applicant ’s complaint for adjudication for being inadmissible , without providing reasons ( no . CARDINAL BvR CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . This decision was served on the applicant ’s counsel on DATE .

On DATE ORG , sitting as a ORG of CARDINAL judges , granted a further constitutional complaint of the applicant dealing with another set of proceedings before ORG and ORG ( no . DATE ) . In this set of proceedings the courts had granted a civil injunction against the applicant , as ORG and ORG had done in the present case . They had ordered him , inter alia , to desist from disseminating leaflets similar to the ones now in dispute in the immediate vicinity of another gynaecological practice and to desist from publishing on his webpage the information that the doctor in question had performed or assisted in “ unlawful ” abortions .

ORG held that the civil injunction had violated the applicant ’s right to freedom of expression as provided in LAW ) because the civil courts had not sufficiently taken into account that the doctor , who had himself publicly announced on the Internet that he performed abortions in his gynaecological practice , had not been confronted with an extensive loss of social reputation as a result of the applicant ’s activities . Furthermore , it underlined that the applicant had only blamed the doctor for having carried out allegedly immoral acts , but had not reproached him for having committed acts which were subject to criminal liability or forbidden by law in a wider sense . ORG moreover insisted on the fact that the applicant had contributed to a highly controversial debate of public interest and pointed out that , against the factual background of that case , the courts had not sufficiently clarified why and to what extent the special relationship between the doctor and women searching for counselling and medical treatment in the practice might have been jeopardised .


Violation of Article 13+6-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

André Potocki;Mārtiņš Mits;Síofra O’Leary

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the excessive length of civil proceedings and of the lack of any effective remedy in domestic law .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13+6-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

The applicants complained of the excessive length of criminal proceedings and of the lack of any effective remedy in domestic law . Some applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .


Alvina Gyulumyan;Ján Šikuta;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra

NORP The applicant , Mr NORP Chadidovich Chentiev , is a NORP national of NORP ethnic origin . He was born in DATE and is detained in PERSON prison .

The Government of GPE ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON .

NORP The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP The applicant arrived illegally in GPE from GPE in DATE . He unsuccessfully applied for asylum . The NORP authorities found that his extradition to GPE for the purpose of his criminal prosecution there was admissible .

On DATE the Court declared inadmissible application no . CARDINAL in which the applicant complained that his extradition to GPE would amount to a breach of his rights under Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the LAW and under LAW No . CARDINAL .

On DATE the applicant lodged a new application with the same subject - matter as application no . CARDINAL while relying on additional facts . In parallel the applicant filed a fresh asylum request with reference to those facts .

On DATE the President of the Fourth Section to which the case had been allocated decided to indicate to the respondent Government , under Rule CARDINAL of ORG , that the applicant should not been extradited to GPE . On DATE ORG ) decided to prolong under further notice that interim measure .

On DATE the ORG decided to give notice of the application to the Government of GPE and to invite the Government to submit written observations on the complaints that the applicant ’s extradition to GPE would amount to a breach of his rights under LAW and CARDINAL of the Convention . The ORG declared the remainder of the application inadmissible .

As regards the domestic proceedings on his fresh asylum request , ORG , in a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , dismissed the applicant ’s action against the decision given by ORG .

The applicant filed an appeal through his legal representative .

In CARDINAL letters of DATE the applicant informed ORG that he had terminated the authority of his representative and withdrawn his action for review of the administrative decisions on his asylum request .

On DATE ORG discontinued the proceedings on that ground without addressing the merits of the case .

NORP In the meantime , on DATE , the applicant informed the ORG that he no longer wished to pursue the application and that he had petitioned for the domestic proceedings to be discontinued . The respondent Government confirmed that information .

On DATE the ORG reconsidered the application in the light of the information submitted by the parties and decided to lift the interim measure under Rule CARDINAL of ORG previously indicated in respect of the applicant .

In a letter which was delivered on DATE the applicant informed the ORG that he and his family were threatened by NORP authorities in order to make him return to GPE voluntarily . The applicant maintained that he wished to pursue the application .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment)

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention . Some applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

Alena Poláčková;Helen Keller;Johannes Silvis

The applicants were all targeted in undercover operations carried out by the police in the form of test purchases of drugs under sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Operational - Search Activities Act of CARDINAL DATE ( no . CARDINAL-FZ ) . Those operations led to their criminal convictions for drug dealing .

The applicants disagreed with their convictions and argued that the police had incited them to commit drug - related offences . They also complained that they had not been able to examine the witnesses who had testified against them .


André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Erik Møse;Síofra O’Leary;Yonko Grozev;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is an NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON an PERSON . He was represented before the ORG by PERSON , a partnership of lawyers with its office in GPE .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-5 - Compensation)

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant was arrested by police officers from ORG on suspicion of being involved in the activities of a terrorist organisation .

On DATE the applicant ’s statement was taken by the public prosecutor . The same day the investigating judge at ORG ordered that the applicant be detained on remand taking into account the strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence he was charged with and risk of tampering with evidence .

On DATE the GPE public prosecutor filed an indictment with ORG . He charged the applicant with membership of an armed terrorist organisation , making the propaganda of an armed terrorist organisation , contravening LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL ) , and causing damage to public property .

On DATE at the end of the preparatory hearing , ORG decided that the applicant ’s detention should be continued taking into account the nature of the offence , the state of evidence and the fact that his statements had not yet been taken .

On DATE the applicant ’s trial resumed . At the first hearing , in the presence of the applicant , the court ordered that the applicant ’s detention on remand be continued on the same grounds .

At hearings held on DATE and DATE , respectively , the applicant ’s requests to be released from detention on remand were rejected by the trial court . The applicant filed objections against these decisions . On DATE and DATE , ORG dismissed the objections . The court decided on the basis of the case file , without holding a public hearing . In delivering its decisions , the court also took into consideration the written opinion of the public prosecutors , which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative .

On DATE ORG released the applicant from detention on remand taking into account the period he had remained in detention .

On DATE the case was transferred to ORG .

According to the information in the case file , the case is still pending before ORG .


Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-3 - Ratione personae);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;George Nicolaou;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Johannes Silvis;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He is self - employed and runs a business .

On DATE the NORP commercial television channel ORG broadcast an episode of a television show entitled “ Insider ” , in which it was claimed that “ shady transactions and shady characters ” were revealed . The show was broadcast live with a few recorded features . In the show , the applicant , who was unknown to the broader public , appeared in pictures and was mentioned by name . He was singled out as the central figure of organised crime within media and advertising and as being guilty of several counts of fraud and other economic offences . The programme was rebroadcast on DATE and DATE . At this time , no criminal investigation had been initiated against the applicant .

The television programme was produced in GPE by the NORP company ORG . It was sent by satellite link from GPE to the GPE - based company ORG and from there sent unaltered to a satellite which transmitted the programme to the NORP audience . The encoded programme was viewable via a satellite receiver or a cable connection in GPE a fraction of a second after it had been sent by satellite link . Even if it was viewable in GPE , which is doubtful , it would have been watched there by a small audience . It was presented in the NORP language for a LANGUAGE - speaking audience , and was sponsored by companies competing in the NORP market . The anchorman of the show , X , a NORP national , was a celebrity and a well - known television personality in GPE ; he was also the Chief Executive Officer of ORG . The show had a long run and was watched by many viewers .

NORP In DATE the applicant brought a private prosecution against X for gross defamation , claiming damages in the amount of MONEY ( SEK ; MONEY ) . He maintained that he had been unreservedly pointed out as the central figure of organised crime within media and advertising and as being directly or indirectly responsible for a large number of serious crimes . He further alleged that X was responsible for the content of the programme since he had failed in his duty to appoint a legally responsible editor ( ansvarig utgivare ) for the programme and because he had been its anchor .

The applicant relied on DATE of LAW ( PERSON , ORG ; hereafter “ the LAW ” ) , regarding freedom of expression offences and liability rules , and LAW ( ORG ) , dealing with defamation , as well as ORG CARDINAL § CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Convention . In the latter respect , he argued that his appearance in the show breached his right to privacy as well as his right to be presumed innocent and that a decision to dismiss his claims would constitute a violation of his right to an effective remedy . The applicant submitted a legal opinion stating that it would be impossible , or at least not useful , to bring an action in GPE in the present case since the damage flowing from the television programme at issue had not occurred in GPE .

X disputed the claim on the grounds , inter alia , that he was not the responsible editor of the show and that he enjoyed the freedom to communicate information as provided for under LAW , section CARDINAL of LAW and as clarified by ORG ( ORG domstolen ) in the case ORG DATE p. CARDINAL ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) .

In a preliminary ruling on DATE ORG ( PERSON tingsrätt ) dismissed the claim in so far as it was based on LAW . It referred to ORG judgment in an almost identical case , ORG DATE p. CARDINAL ( see paragraphs DATE below ) , and held that LAW of LAW were not applicable to the television programme since it could not be regarded as emanating from GPE . This was because the programme had first been sent by satellite link to ORG , the NORP company responsible for the programme content , and thereafter uplinked to a satellite , which had in turn transmitted the programme to viewers in GPE . As LAW of LAW were not applicable , X could not be held responsible for the programme content under LAW . ORG further held that the applicant ’s claims under LAW were to be determined following the main hearing in the case . The court finally drew the parties’ attention to ORG case ORG DATE p. CARDINAL .

NORP The applicant appealed , repeating what he had stated in his earlier submissions . He further argued that all companies involved in the case were NORP , including the receiving company in GPE , allegedly named ORG , with its seat in GPE . Although ORG had acquired the right to transmit the show from the NORP company ORG , it had had no impact on or responsibility for the programme selection . Having regard to the above , the offence committed against the applicant through the programme could not be examined by GPE courts . The applicant also submitted that NORP courts were competent to examine the case under ORG ( see further paragraph CARDINAL below ) . X contested the arguments and submitted that it was the company ORG , whose seat was in GPE , which was responsible for the programme service and decided on the final content of the programmes .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON hovrätt ) upheld ORG decision . It held that the issue for it to determine was whether the general provisions in LAW were applicable to the programme in question , that is , whether or not the broadcasting of the programme could be considered to have originated from GPE within the meaning of LAW , section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of that law . It further stated that the burden of proof concerning the applicability of LAW rested on the applicant and that he had not , in response to X ’s refutation , established that the decisions concerning the programme content were taken in GPE . Consequently , LAW were not applicable in the case . The court further held that the material before it indicated that it was possible for the applicant to bring claims before a NORP court .

The applicant appealed and referred to his earlier submissions . In addition , he requested that a question concerning the interpretation of ORG be referred to ORG of ORG ( ECJ ) for a preliminary ruling . According to the applicant , the regulation entitled a person claiming non - contractual damages to bring actions where the harmful event occurred . In the present case , the harmful event had occurred in GPE and the applicant thus should have had the right to bring his action before the NORP courts . Consequently , the position hitherto taken by the NORP courts ran contrary to Community law .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s referral request and refused leave to appeal in the case . It held that , since ORG had found itself competent to examine the applicant ’s claims in so far as they were based on grounds other than LAW , there was no reason to request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ .

The applicant subsequently withdrew his remaining claims before ORG since there was no practical prospect of success in a continued procedure . On DATE ORG struck the case out of the list and ordered the applicant to pay X ’s legal costs and expenses .

Criminal proceedings were taken against the applicant in regard , inter alia , to the matters described in the television programme . He was convicted of aggravated fraud as well as tax and bookkeeping offences and sentenced to DATE imprisonment . The criminal proceedings were finalised by a ORG decision to refuse leave to appeal on CARDINAL October CARDINAL . These proceedings , in particular their compliance with Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the LAW , are the subject of an application lodged with ORG on DATE ( no . CARDINAL ) .


Violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Ledi Bianku;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano

The applicant was born in DATE and is detained in PERSON .

On DATE the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation , namely the NORP / ORG ( Workers’ ORG of ORG ) . It appears that at some point the applicant confessed to committing an armed attack on a prison vehicle in GPE and , as a result , on DATE at TIME was required to participate in a reconstruction of the events ( yer gösterme ) . According to the record drafted by police officers and signed by the applicant , the latter described in detail what steps he had taken before the attack on a prison vehicle in GPE and indicated how he had opened fire on that vehicle .

On DATE , he was taken to the GPE police station for questioning . The questioning took place TIME . The applicant ’s statements to the police were transcribed on pre - printed forms , the relevant part of which was filled in to indicate , inter alia , that the applicant was suspected of membership of an illegal organisation and of carrying out armed activities on behalf of that organisation . On the first page of the forms there was a pre - printed message stating , inter alia , that the person being questioned had the right to remain silent and the right to choose a lawyer . It appears from the form that the applicant had refused legal assistance since the first page of the record includes a pre - printed phrase stating “ No lawyer sought ” with the applicant ’s signature underneath . He was thus questioned in the absence of a lawyer .

In his statement , the applicant admitted that he was a member of the ORG / ORG and that he was active in the organisation . In particular , he gave detailed information about , inter alia , an armed attack on a prison vehicle in GPE . He also stated that his code name was “ GPE ” .

On DATE he was brought before the GPE public prosecutor , where he partly confirmed and partly denied the content of his statements to the police made in the absence of a lawyer . Prior to this he had been told his rights , including the right to benefit from the assistance of a lawyer . He further stated that he was a member of the ORG / ORG and had been involved in some of its activities in northern GPE but had not taken part in any political or armed activities in GPE .

On DATE , an investigating judge of ORG took statements from the applicant . Prior to the interview , the applicant was informed of his rights under LAW . He did not ask for a lawyer . During the interview , the applicant stated that his statements made to the police and the public prosecutor had been correct . He maintained , in particular , that his statements made to the police in respect of the armed attack in GPE had been entirely correct . The court ordered the applicant ’s pre - trial detention .

During the applicant ’s period in custody , specifically from CARDINAL to DATE , he was examined CARDINAL times by doctors . The medical examinations conducted before and at the end of his custody period revealed no signs of ill - treatment on his body .

Prior to the applicant ’s arrest , on DATE , a certain PERSON , who was a co - accused , had claimed during questioning that he had organised the armed attack , acting with someone whose code name was “ GPE ” . Later , at the first court hearing , he retracted his statements to the police , alleging that they had been extracted under duress .

On DATE the ORG public prosecutor lodged an indictment , charging the applicant with the offence of breaking up the unity of the ORG and seeking to remove part of the national territory from the ORG ’s control , under LAW .

On DATE , at the first hearing in the case , the applicant retracted his statements made to the police , the public prosecutor and the investigating judge , alleging that they had been obtained through coercion and death threats by the police . He admitted that he was a member of the NORP / ORG while denying involvement in the armed attack in GPE . When asked about the reports of the reconstruction of events , the applicant submitted that he had not accepted the evidence against him .

State Security Courts were abolished on DATE pursuant to Law no . CARDINAL . The case was therefore transferred to ORG .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer applied to the court to have a certain PERSON summoned as a witness and to hold a confrontation with the applicant , as GPE had stated in his witness statements dated DATE that he had seen the perpetrators of the attack . He also asked the court to enquire of the banks as to whether there had been any money transferred between the applicant ’s father and PERSON The court dismissed the application concerning the attendance of a witness , on the grounds that the witness would not remember the incidents given the long time which had elapsed and that he would not tell the truth owing to the nature of the incident . It further dismissed the other request concerning the transfer of money , considering it not to be essential for the purposes of the case .

On DATE the applicant sent a letter to the trial court in which he explained the threats and coercion he had been subjected to in detail and asked the court not to take his co - accused ’s statements into consideration .

On DATE the ORG convicted the applicant as charged .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer appealed against that judgment and alleged , inter alia , that the applicant ’s statements had been taken without notifying him of his rights and as a result of coercion and death threats by the police . The applicant ’s lawyer gave detailed accounts of such treatment and asked ORG not to rely on these statements which had been obtained by impairing the applicant ’s will .

On DATE ORG quashed the conviction for procedural shortcomings .

At a hearing on DATE , the applicant ’s lawyer once again maintained that the applicant ’s confessions had taken by coercion and that the applicant had been forced by the police to sign his statements . He asked the trial court not to rely on those statements . At the same hearing , the first - instance court again convicted the applicant under LAW then in force , and sentenced him to life imprisonment . It relied , inter alia , on the consistent confessions of the applicant and PERSON made during questioning , which were later repeated before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge , and the record of the reconstruction of events . It also took into account the weapons , bullets and explosives seized by the judicial authorities and the organisational documents as well as the incident report , hotel records , an autopsy and expert reports , photographs , witness statements and investigation reports . The trial court ’s reasoned judgment did not contain any pronouncements as regards the admissibility of the applicant ’s pre - trial statements .

On DATE , the applicant ’s lawyer appealed against that judgment and alleged , inter alia , that the applicant ’s statements had been taken without notifying him of his rights and as a result of coercion and death threats by the police . The applicant ’s lawyer gave detailed accounts of such treatment and asked ORG not to rely on these statements which had been obtained by impairing the applicant ’s will .

On DATE ORG upheld the conviction .

On DATE the judgment was pronounced in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer .


CASE OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF RAIL, MARITIME AND TRANSPORT WORKERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11-1 - Freedom of association)

George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney

The applicant is a trade union based in GPE with a membership of CARDINAL persons employed in different sectors of the transport industry in GPE .

Noting that in the domestic system industrial disputes are governed by very detailed legislative provisions , the applicant union raised CARDINAL specific limitations on the statutory protection of strike action that it submitted were inconsistent with LAW , each of the contested limitations being exposed by a separate set of facts .

The relevant set of facts relied on under this head involved the company ORG ( ORG ) , which was under contract to manage , operate and maintain the electrical power network used by GPE ’s underground transport system . The ORG was one of several trade unions recognised by the company for the purposes of collective bargaining . In all , the company employed CARDINAL staff at CARDINAL different sites , the biggest one being that at GPE with CARDINAL employees . According to the applicant union , there were CARDINAL RMT members there at the relevant time . The company would not have known which of its employees were members of a trade union , as it did not operate a system for deducting union subscriptions from staff wages .

DATE , the applicant union and the company held several rounds of negotiation on pay and conditions of service . Dissatisfied with the company ’s offer , it decided to embark on industrial action and on DATE gave the requisite ballot notice to the company ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The notice described the category of workers that would be voting on industrial action as “ Engineer / Technician ” and stated how many of such were based at each site . DATE the company wrote to the applicant union , stating that it did not recognise the term “ Technician ” ( it categorised its workers in a more precise way : fitters , jointers , test - room inspectors , day testers , shift testers , ORG fitters ) . It considered the ballot notice served on it was therefore not compliant with the relevant statutory provisions . The applicant union replied DATE , maintaining that the term it had used was sufficient to allow the company to know which employees were concerned , thereby meeting the purpose of the relevant provisions of law .

Following a further exchange of correspondence between the CARDINAL sides , the company applied to ORG for an injunction to restrain the applicant union from calling industrial action on the basis of the ballot . The injunction was granted by PERSON on DATE .

The judge did not accept the applicant union ’s claim that the statutory requirements unduly restricted the exercise of its right to call industrial action , this same argument having been rejected by ORG in the case of ORG v. ORG ( [ DATE ] EWCA Civ CARDINAL ) . He also rejected the argument that since the procedure was still at an early stage it would be premature to put a stop to it . Instead he considered the risk of unlawful strike action to be sufficiently imminent to justify the injunction . Given the sector involved , the implications of a shutdown would be substantial , with widespread ramifications elsewhere . Addressing the question whether the applicant union had in fact given sufficient indication of the category of staff that would be balloted , the judge found that it had not , since the union ’s members at GPE included persons working at different trades . The applicant union was not under an absolute duty , but instead a duty to do its reasonable best to provide sufficient information to the company . The fact that it used its own system of job classification was relevant but not decisive . Similarly , the fact that a union might not record or possess such information could be a highly material consideration , but not necessarily a decisive one . The applicant union had accepted that it was practicable for a union to supply the necessary information in the context of a small place of employment – it was therefore neither onerous nor unreasonable to require it to do so . Finally , the judge observed that while there was as yet no stated intention on the part of the applicant union to call a strike ( the ballot not having taken place ) , there was a clear nexus between the failure to provide the requisite notice and the employer ’s ability to respond to the situation either by making preparations for a work stoppage or seeking to persuade employees not to vote for industrial action . The applicant union ’s failure to comply with the statutory requirements was therefore not a mere technical or immaterial breach .

Application for permission to appeal was refused on the papers on DATE . Renewed application for permission to appeal was refused on DATE , by which point the industrial dispute between the applicant union and ORG had already been resolved .

Following the granting of the injunction against the strike , the applicant union set about gathering the precise job descriptions of the workers concerned and included these in a fresh notice of a strike ballot , the result of which supported industrial action . This went ahead on dates in DATE and DATE . ORG made an improved offer on DATE which was accepted by the union ’s members and took effect as a collective agreement on DATE of DATE .

The set of facts relied on under this head involved some RMT members who were employed in railway maintenance by ORG , a company that formed part of a group of companies known as ORG plc . Another company in the group , ORG , was engaged in rail engineering work . At the time , PERSON and ORG ( “ PERSON ” ) employed CARDINAL persons in total , CARDINAL of whom were members of the ORG . In DATE , ORG transferred part of its undertaking , comprising CARDINAL employees , to another company known as ORG ( GPE ) Ltd ( “ ORG ” ) . These employees’ existing terms and conditions were preserved by ORG , as required by law ( ORG ) . According to the applicant union , the employees involved were nonetheless concerned for their situation , as ORG workers were paid significantly less . It also appeared that trade unions had less influence in that company .

In DATE ORG ’s management informed the ex - PERSON employees that because of difficult market conditions it intended to reduce the level of their terms and conditions to that of other ORG staff . This meant a reduction in salary of PERCENT , according to the applicant union . In DATE that followed , the applicant union made representations to ORG on behalf of the employees concerned but without achieving any agreement . When the company indicated that it intended to proceed with its plan , the applicant union organised a strike ballot of the workers concerned ( CARDINAL by that stage ) . They voted in favour of a strike , which took place DATE and DATE . During the strike , the participants organised pickets at a number of the sites where they normally carried out their work . This caused ORG to write to the applicant union to remind it that by law picketing could take place only at or near the employer ’s premises and to warn that the union was exposing itself to liability for any economic loss incurred by the company due to this unlawful action ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

A second strike was announced for DATE , but this was postponed when ORG indicated its willingness to resume discussions with the applicant union . This led to a revised offer which the union submitted to its ORG members , recommending that they accept it . The result of the vote was known on DATE . CARDINAL votes were cast , all of them rejecting the ORG offer . According to the applicant union , its position was extremely weak given the very small number of its members in the ORG workforce . These were far too few for their strike action to have any appreciable effect on the company , whose activities had not really been disrupted at all . The applicant union considered that it would have been in a position to defend its ORG interests much more effectively had it been able to mobilise its PERSON members as well . The simple threat of a strike on this scale , and a fortiori an actual stoppage , would have exerted significantly more pressure on ORG to maintain existing terms and conditions . The applicant union stated that PERSON employees would have been willing to strike in support of their colleagues at ORG . Instead , the ORG members had had to stand alone , and in the end had no option but to accept the new terms and conditions . They did so under protest .

According to the applicant union , neither PERSON nor ORG exist any longer , having been put into administration in DATE and DATE respectively . The ORG undertaking was purchased by another company , which in turn sold it on in DATE .

In relation to the ORG case , PERSON referred to the following provisions of ORG DATE ( “ the DATE LAW ) :

“ ( CARDINAL ) An act done by a trade union to induce a person to take part , or continue to take part , in industrial action

( a ) is not protected unless the industrial action has the support of a ballot , and

( b ) where section CARDINALA falls to be complied with in relation to the person ’s employer , is not protected as respects the employer unless the trade union has complied with section CARDINALA in relation to him . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) The trade union must take such steps as are reasonably necessary to ensure that—

( a ) not later than DATE before DATE of the ballot , the notice specified in subsection ( CARDINAL ) , ...

is received by every person who it is reasonable for the union to believe ( at the latest time when steps could be taken to comply with paragraph ( a ) ) will be the employer of persons who will be entitled to vote in the ballot .

( CARDINAL ) The notice referred to in paragraph ( a ) of subsection ( CARDINAL ) is a notice in writing—

( a ) stating that the union intends to hold the ballot ,

( b ) specifying the date which the union reasonably believes will be DATE of the ballot , and

( c ) NORP containing—

( i ) the lists mentioned in subsection ( CARDINAL ) and the figures mentioned in subsection ( CARDINAL ) , together with an explanation of how those figures were arrived at , or

( CARDINAL ) The lists are—

( a ) a list of the categories of employee to which the employees concerned belong , and

( b ) a list of the workplaces at which the employees concerned work .

( CARDINAL ) The figures are—

( a ) the total number of employees concerned ,

( b ) the number of the employees concerned in each of the categories in the list mentioned in subsection ( CARDINALA)(a ) , and

( c ) the number of the employees concerned who work at each workplace in the list mentioned in subsection ( CARDINALA)(b ) .

( CARDINAL ) The lists and figures supplied under this section , or the information mentioned in subsection ( CARDINAL ) that is so supplied , must be as accurate as is reasonably practicable in the light of the information in the possession of the union at the time when it complies with subsection ( CARDINAL)(a ) . ”

In relation to the ORG situation , the statutory protection against liability in tort regarding acts done “ in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute ” ( section CARDINAL of the DATE Act ) is confined , by section CARDINAL of the same Act , to “ a dispute between workers and their employer ” . Secondary action is expressly excluded from statutory protection by section CARDINAL of the LAW , which defines it as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) There is secondary action in relation to a trade dispute when , and only when , a person—

( a ) induces another to break a contract of employment or interferes or induces another to interfere with its performance , or

( b ) threatens that a contract of employment under which he or another is employed will be broken or its performance interfered with , or that he will induce another to break a contract of employment or to interfere with its performance ,

and the employer under the contract of employment is not the employer party to the dispute . ”

The provisions on peaceful picketing are contained in section QUANTITY of the LAW , which provides :

“ ( CARDINAL ) It is lawful for a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute to attend—

( a ) at or near his own place of work , or

( b ) if he is an official of a trade union , at or near the place of work of a member of the union whom he is accompanying and whom he represents ,

for the purpose only of peacefully obtaining or communicating information , or peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working .

( CARDINAL ) If a person works or normally works—

( a ) otherwise than at any CARDINAL place , or

( b ) at a place the location of which is such that attendance there for a purpose mentioned in subsection ( CARDINAL ) is impracticable ,

his place of work for the purposes of that subsection shall be any premises of his employer from which he works or from which his work is administered . ”

Both parties referred to the previous legislative regime , which included secondary action in the scope of the statutory protection . The ORG explained that secondary action was first outlawed by ORG DATE , adopted in the aftermath of the general strike of DATE . The situation changed with ORG , which lifted the ban .

NORP Further reforms occurred in DATE . ORG Labour Relations Act DATE afforded substantially broader protection to industrial action than is the case at present . It provided at section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ( as amended in DATE ) :

“ An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be actionable in tort on the ground only—

( a ) that it induces another person to break a contract or interferes or induces any other person to interfere with its performance ; or .

( b ) that it consists in his threatening that a contract ( whether one to which he is a party or not ) will be broken or its performance interfered with , or that he will induce another person to break a contract or to interfere with its performance . ”

This provision was considered by ORG in the case of ORG v. PERSON and another ( [ DATE ] ORG CARDINAL ) . The case involved secondary action in the newspaper industry , led by ORG . The majority of the ORG held that the test to be applied to determine whether an act enjoyed the protection of section MONEY ) was a subjective one , that is to say , it was sufficient that the person honestly believed that the act in question might further the cause of those taking part in the dispute . The genuineness of such belief could be tested by the courts , but the person calling the strike did not need to prove that it was reasonably capable of achieving the objective . Lord PERSON dissented on the nature of the test , but concurred with the finding that the injunction granted against the union should be discharged .

Although the applicant union maintained that the PERSON judgment was not a significant development in the law , in that it merely confirmed the interpretation of clear statutory language , the case was referred to during the parliamentary debates leading to the passage of LAW as CARDINAL of the reasons for introducing restrictions on secondary action ( in section CARDINAL of that Act ) . LAW retained immunity for secondary action provided that CARDINAL conditions were satisfied : ( i ) that it was taken against first suppliers or customers of the employer in dispute or against associated employers of the employer which were substituting for it during the dispute ; ( ii ) that its principal purpose was to directly prevent or disrupt the supply of goods or services between the employer in dispute and his supplier or customer during the dispute ; and ( iii ) that it was likely to achieve that purpose .

NORP The current rule was originally introduced by LAW , and then re - enacted in LAW in the terms set out above .

The parties provided statistical information on DATE lost to industrial action in GPE , going back to DATE . The Government pointed out that in DATE , the average number of DATE lost DATE was CARDINAL . This decreased in DATE to an average of DATE . From DATE to DATE , the figure is much lower , standing at DATE lost per year on average . They attributed part of this decline at least to the ban on secondary action . The applicant union disputed that interpretation . It noted that the available statistics did not distinguish between primary and secondary strikes . It was therefore impossible to identify the true extent of secondary action before DATE and , consequently , impossible to ascertain the impact of the restrictions introduced in DATE and DATE . In the applicant union ’s view , secondary action had been relatively rare , the overwhelming majority of strikes at that time had been primary strikes . It referred to official figures ( contained in a Government publication , the “ Employment Gazette ” ) indicating that , since DATE , GPE was consistently close to the NORP average for DATE lost to industrial action . According to this source , the country had been middle - ranking since DATE . The only exception was for DATE , on account of the long and widespread strike in the mining industry that year . The Government submitted that the comparative statistics needed to be interpreted with caution , given the profound transformation of LOC over DATE . The fact that GPE remained close to the NORP average in this regard indicated that , contrary to the applicant union ’s point of view , the rules on industrial action were not so restrictive as to make it excessively difficult to organise strikes .

NORP In support of its application , the applicant union included references to other international legal instruments , and the interpretation given to them by the competent organs . The most relevant and detailed of these materials are referred to below .

While there is no provision in the ORG adopted by ORG ( ORG ) expressly conferring a right to strike , both ORG and ORG on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations ( “ ORG ) have progressively developed a number of principles on the right to strike , based on Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of ORG of the Right to Organise Convention , DATE ( No . DATE ) ( summarised in “ Giving globalization a human face ” , ORG , DATE , § CARDINAL ) . This Convention was ratified by GPE on DATE .

ORG has commented several times upon the notice requirements for industrial action in GPE . The applicant union referred to the following statement , adopted in DATE :

“ In its previous comments , ORG had taken note of comments made by the ORG to the effect that the notice requirements for an industrial action to be protected by immunity were unjustifiably burdensome . The ORG notes that according to the Government , a number of measures have already been taken to simplify sections CARDINAL - CARDINAL of the ORG and CARDINAL of the DATE Order ; moreover , as part of a plan published in DATE to simplify aspects of employment law , the Government explicitly invited trade unions to come forward with their ideas to simplify trade union law further . Since then , the Government has held discussions with the ORG to examine their ideas to simplify aspects of the law on industrial action ballots and notices . These discussions are ongoing . The ORG notes that in its latest comments , the ORG notes that there has been no progress in this reform . The ORG requests the Government to indicate in its next report progress made in this regard . ”

More recently , in a direct request to the Government of GPE , ORG stated :

“ In its previous comments , ORG had taken note of comments made by ORG ( ORG ) to the effect that the notice requirements for an industrial action to be protected by immunity were unjustifiably burdensome . ORG requested the Government to continue to provide information on any developments , as well as any relevant statistics or reports on the practical application and effect of these requirements . The ORG notes the Government ’s indication that the ORG of Appeal decision in ORG v. Serco and in ORG v. GPE ( DATE ) EWCA CARDINAL , overturned injunctions which had been obtained by ORG and ORG against the CARDINAL main national transport unions , the ORG and ORG . In both cases , the injunctions had been obtained on the basis of the ORG breaches of statutory balloting and notification procedures . This case was the latest in a series of cases assessing the extent of ORG technical obligations to ensure that a fair balloting process had taken place . In the ORG v. Serco decision , ORG issued some key clarification so that in future it is likely to be more difficult for employers to obtain injunctions to prevent strike action as a result of breaches of the balloting and notice requirements . A ORG decision is binding on all lower courts . Subsequent to this case , in ORG ( DATE ) EWHC CARDINAL ( QB ) , the ORG found against ORG , taking account of the Serco case and the need to strike a balance between striving for democratic legitimacy and imposing unrealistic burdens on unions and their officers . The ORG notes the ORG ’s observation that , while it greatly welcomes both decisions , it considers that they do not fully address the problems arising under the legislation that it has identified and that the legislation continues to impose intolerable demands on trade unions . The ORG notes these developments with interest and requests the Government to provide its comments on the concerns raised by the ORG . ”

ORG has taken the following view ( see “ Giving globalization a human face ” , § CARDINAL ) :

“ With regard to so - called ‘ ORG strikes , the ORG considers that a general prohibition of this form of strike action could lead to abuse , particularly in the context of globalization characterized by increasing interdependence and the internationalization of production , and that workers should be able to take such action , provided that the initial strike they are supporting is itself lawful . ”

ORG also considers this form of industrial action to be protected by international labour law ( see “ ORG ” , Digest of the decisions and principles of ORG of the ORG , Fifth ( revised ) edition , ORG , DATE ) :

“ CARDINAL . A general prohibition of sympathy strikes could lead to abuse and workers should be able to take such action provided the initial strike they are supporting is itself lawful .

A ban on strike action not linked to a collective dispute to which the employee or union is a party is contrary to the principles of freedom of association . ”

In its consideration of GPE observance of Convention No . DATE , ORG has repeatedly criticised the fact that secondary strikes are illegal . The initial criticism was included in its DATE observation concerning GPE :

“ The ORG notes that the common law renders virtually all forms of strikes or other industrial action unlawful as a matter of civil law . This means that workers and unions who engage in such action are liable to be sued for damages by employers ( or other parties ) who suffer loss as a consequence , and ( more importantly in practical terms ) may be restrained from committing unlawful acts by means of injunctions ( issued on both an interlocutory and a permanent basis ) . It appears to the ORG that unrestricted access to such remedies would deny workers the right to take strikes or other industrial action in order to protect and to promote their economic and social interests .

It is most important , therefore , that workers and unions should have some measure of protection against civil liability . There has been legislative recognition of this imperative since DATE in the form of a series of ‘ immunities’ ( or , more accurately , ‘ ORG ) against tort action for trade unions and their members and officials . The current version of the ‘ immunities’ is to be found in ORG DATE .

The scope of these protections has been narrowed in a number of respects since DATE . ORG notes , for example , that section CARDINAL of LAW has been amended so as to limit the right to picket to a worker ’s own place of work or , in the case of a trade union official , the place of work of the relevant membership , whilst section CARDINAL of the DATE Act removes protection from ‘ secondary GPE in the sense of action directed against an employer who is not directly a party to a given trade dispute . In addition , the definition of ‘ trade ORG in LAW of LAW has been narrowed so as to encompass only disputes between workers and their own employer , rather than disputes between ‘ employers and workers’ or ‘ workers and workers’ as was formerly the case .

Taken together , these changes appear to make it virtually impossible for workers and unions lawfully to engage in any form of boycott activity , or ‘ sympathetic’ action against parties not directly involved in a given dispute . ORG has never expressed any decided view on the use of boycotts as an exercise of the right to strike . However , it appears to ORG that where a boycott relates directly to the social and economic interests of the workers involved in either or both of the original dispute and the secondary action , and where the original dispute and the secondary action are not unlawful in themselves , then that boycott should be regarded as a legitimate exercise of the right to strike . This is clearly consistent with the approach the ORG has adopted in relation to ‘ sympathy strikes’ :

It would appear that more frequent recourse is being had to this form of action ( i.e. sympathy strikes ) because of the structure or the concentration of industries or the distribution of work centres in different regions of the world . The ORG considers that a general prohibition of sympathy strikes could lead to abuse and that workers should be able to take such action provided the initial strike they are supporting is itself lawful . ”

It appears that ORG did not take a definitive position on the ban until its DATE observation concerning GPE , when it observed as follows :

“ The ORG draws the Government ’s attention to paragraph CARDINAL of its DATE General Survey on ORG where it indicates that a general prohibition on sympathy strikes could lead to abuse and that workers should be able to take such action , provided the initial strike they are supporting is itself lawful . The lifting of immunity opens such industrial action to be actionable in tort and therefore would constitute a serious impediment to the workers’ right to carry out sympathy strikes . ”

It has maintained this view since , stating in its most recent review of the situation ( DATE observation , see Report of ORG to ORG , CARDINALnd Session , DATE , ILC.CARDINAL/III(CARDINALA ) , pp . CARDINAL ) . ) :

“ Immunities in respect of civil liability for strikes and other industrial action ( sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the TULRA ) . In its previous comments , ORG had noted that according to the ORG , due to the decentralized nature of the industrial relations system , it was essential for workers to be able to take action against employers who are easily able to undermine union action by complex corporate structures , transferring work , or hiving off companies . ORG generally raised the need to protect the right of workers to take industrial action in relation to matters which affect them even though , in certain cases , the direct employer may not be party to the dispute , and to participate in sympathy strikes provided the initial strike they are supporting is itself lawful . ORG takes note of the Government indication that : ( CARDINAL ) its position remains as set out in its report for DATE , that the rationale has not changed and that it therefore has no plans to change the law in this area ; and ( CARDINAL ) this issue forms part of a matter brought before the ORG by ORG ) and that the ORG has yet to consider the case . The ORG recalls the previous concern it raised that the globalization of the economy and the delocalization of work centres may have a severe impact on the right of workers’ organizations to organize their activities in a manner so as to defend effectively their ORG interests should lawful industrial action be too restrictively defined . In these circumstances , the ORG once again requests the Government to review sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the ORG , in full consultation with the social partners , and to provide further information in its next report on the outcome of these consultations . ”

The right to strike is protected by LAW , paragraph CARDINAL , of LAW , which GPE ratified on DATE . It provides as follows :

“ With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively , the Contracting Parties undertake :

[ to ] recognise :

the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of interest , including the right to strike , subject to obligations that might arise out of collective agreements previously entered into . ”

ORG ) has examined the NORP rules on strike ballots and deemed them incompatible with the proper exercise of the right to strike . In its most recent assessment of the matter ( Conclusions PERSON , DATE ) it stated :

“ The ORG considered in its previous conclusions ... that the requirement to give notice to an employer of a ballot on industrial action , in addition to the strike notice that must be issued before taking action , is excessive ( even the simplified requirements introduced by LAW ) . As there have been no changes to the situation , the ORG reiterates its finding that the situation is not in conformity with LAW in this respect . ”

Like ORG , the ORG has consistently criticised the situation in GPE . In its first consideration of the matter ( Conclusions XIII-CARDINAL , DATE ) it stated :

“ Referring to the report , ORG noted the ORG ’s observations concerning the limitations on the right to strike , imposed by LAW in respect of GPE . In particular , it noted that while the Government emphasised the importance of protecting the right of employers to dismiss those engaged in a strike , it also emphasised that the legislation continues to :

( i ) allow special protection for peaceful pickets at their own place of work ;

( ii ) provide statutory immunity to peaceful and lawful pickets ;

( iii ) provide statutory immunity for lawful trade disputes .

ORG also noted the recent observations of ORG recommending that the legislation be amended to conform with the principle of freedom of association in accordance with ORG . CARDINAL ( ORG the Right to Organise , DATE ) .

Having regard to this information and having noted that there is no immunity afforded individuals in respect of :

– secondary industrial action other than inducement in the course of peaceful picketing ;

– industrial action organised in support of employees dismissed while taking part in unofficial action ;

the ORG reiterated its previous negative conclusion for the reasons cited in the twelfth cycle of supervision . ” ( Conclusions XIII - I , reference period DATE ) . ”

In the ORG ’s most recent pronouncement on the matter ( Conclusions PERSON , DATE ) it said :

“ In its previous conclusions ... the ORG found that lawful collective action was limited to disputes between workers and their employer , thus preventing a union from taking action against the de facto employer if this was not the immediate employer . It furthermore noted that NORP courts excluded collective action concerning a future employer and future terms and conditions of employment in the context of a transfer of part of a business ( ORG v. ORG ) . ORG therefore considered that the scope for workers to defend their interests through lawful collective action was excessively circumscribed in GPE . Given that there have been no changes to the situation , the ORG reiterates its finding that the situation is not in conformity with LAW in this respect . ”

The relevant provisions are the following :

“ CARDINAL . Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all levels , in particular in political , trade union and civic matters , which implies the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests .

“ Workers and employers , or their respective organisations , have , in accordance with Community law and national laws and practices , the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and , in cases of conflicts of interest , to take collective action to defend their interests , including strike action . ”

Article CARDINAL appears in Title IV of the LAW . As regards GPE , reference must be made to LAW ( No CARDINAL ) to LAW . It provides , in so far as relevant :

NORP In particular , and for the avoidance of doubt , nothing in LAW creates justiciable rights applicable to GPE or the GPE except in so far as GPE or GPE has provided for such rights in its national law . ”

The parties provided some elements of comparative law in relation to secondary strikes . Both referred to a comparative study on the regulation of industrial action in LOC ( Strike rules in the ORG and beyond : A comparative overview , PERSON , ORG , ORG and ORG ( ETUI - REHS ) , DATE ) . According to this source , secondary action is protected or permitted , subject to varying restrictions and conditions , in the great majority of the member ORG . The GPE that , like GPE , do not permit secondary action were identified as GPE , GPE and the GPE .

In their initial submissions , the ORG sought to draw support for the situation in GPE by reference to the situation in the following GPE : GPE , the GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE and GPE . They contended that these illustrated a broad tendency in LOC to subject secondary action to much more restrictive conditions than primary industrial action . In reply to this the applicant union provided to the ORG statements from labour - law experts in a number of NORP countries contradicting the ORG ’s remarks . The applicant union concluded that GPE is the most restrictive among the Contracting Parties to the LAW in this respect . The Government concluded that the material demonstrated that , notwithstanding the great variety of industrial - relations systems and traditions in LOC , most GPE distinguished between primary and secondary action , with greater restriction on the latter . The broad right claimed by the applicant union was not supported by any real NORP consensus .

The ORG notes that comparative information is available from the monitoring mechanism of LAW . As indicated above , this body has repeatedly criticised the situation in GPE , which appears to be the only ORG subject to criticism on this specific ground . The ORG has also commented in DATE on the lawfulness of secondary action ( sometimes using the term “ sympathy ” or “ solidarity ” action ) in the following GPE : GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE and GPE . With reference to the three other GPE identified in the PERSON study as not permitting secondary action , the ORG notes that the ORG has not criticised the situation in the GPE on this ground . Nor has it made any comment at all in relation to the situation in GPE or GPE , neither ORG having accepted LAW , paragraph CARDINAL , of FAC .

Some further comparative information is available from the publications and legal databases of the ORG . For example , ORG referred to the removal from LAW of the prohibition on solidarity strikes ( “ Giving globalization a human face ” , § CARDINAL ) . It has also referred , in its review of ORG implementation of Convention No . DATE , to the lawfulness of sympathy strikes in GPE , GPE and GPE . ORG has referred to solidarity strike action in GPE ( complaint no . CARDINAL ) , and noted that NORP law does not expressly provide for , or for that matter prohibit , such action ( complaint no . CARDINAL ) .

Additionally , the ORG notes that in NORP law strikes are permitted if they “ relate to employment relations ” ( LAW ) . According to CARDINAL constitutional commentary , a strike must actually be about working conditions , and not pursue corporatist or political objectives outside of the enterprise or branch ( ORG constitutionnel GPE , vol . II , PERSON , PERSON and PERSON , p. CARDINAL ) .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant claimed a sum of money from a bank .

On DATE the applicant lodged an application before the ORG challenging the length of these proceedings . On DATE the ORG decided to strike that case ( application no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) out of its list of cases on the ground that a friendly settlement had been reached between the parties .

In the proceedings complained of ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE to dismiss the applicant ’s appeal , examined as an appeal on points of law , became final on DATE .

On DATE the above decision was quashed by ORG and the case was remitted to ORG for reexamination .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s complaint challenging the length of the proceedings .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against the first - instance judgment . Upon the applicant ’s appeal on points of law the cassation chamber of ORG quashed that decision on DATE .

On DATE ORG again dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against the first - instance judgment . The applicant indicated that he intended to lodge an appeal on points of law after the service of ORG decision .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Deprivation of liberty)

Branko Lubarda;Georgios A. Serghides;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE in GPE .

On DATE the applicant was arrested in connection with a drug - related offence and placed in custody .

On DATE ORG found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment .

On DATE ORG of GPE quashed the conviction and ordered a retrial .

On DATE ORG again convicted the applicant and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment . The court stated that the “ preventive measure [ should ] remain unchanged until the conviction [ had become ] final ” .

On DATE counsel for the applicant asked the director of the remand prison to release the applicant since he had already served the DATE sentence . On DATE a judge of ORG faxed a letter to the director , informing him that the applicant should not be released until ORG had examined the matter on appeal since ORG ordered the preventive measure to remain unchanged .

On DATE ORG upheld the conviction and the applicant was released .