Alvina Gyulumyan;Ján Šikuta;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Luis López Guerra

The first applicant is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and is presently residing in GPE ( GPE ) . The application has been submitted on the first applicant ’s behalf by the first applicants’ father , the second applicant , who has parental responsibility for the first applicant as a matter of LANGUAGE law .

The second applicant is a NORP national . He was born in DATE and lives in FAC ( GPE ) .

NORP The President granted the applicants’ request for their identities not to be disclosed to the public ( Rule CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) .

The applicants were represented before the ORG by ORG in GPE . The Government of GPE ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON .

On DATE the Government of GPE were informed of the case and invited to exercise their right of intervention ( LAW ) , to which invitation they have not responded .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

In DATE , prior to the first applicant ’s birth , the second applicant married the first applicant ’s mother , a NORP national . The family lived in GPE .

On DATE the mother informed the second applicant that she and the first applicant would not be returning to GPE from holiday in GPE and that she intended to take the first applicant to GPE and to settle there permanently .

On DATE the mother and the first applicant , who was then DATE , travelled to GPE and have not returned to GPE since .

On DATE an LANGUAGE court granted the couple a divorce , which was finalised on DATE .

Meanwhile , on DATE , the second applicant had commenced proceedings in the NORP courts for the return of the first applicant to GPE and GPE under LAW ( “ LAW ) .

On DATE and DATE , respectively , the Bratislava II ORG ( Okresný súd ) and , following the mother ’s appeal ( odvolanie ) , ORG ( PERSON súd ) ordered the return of the first applicant to GPE and GPE as the country of the child ’s habitual residence . The courts emphasised that the order did not imply that the first applicant should reside with either parent , but merely required that the status quo ante be restored so that questions of residence and contact might be determined by the LANGUAGE courts , which had jurisdiction over them .

The return order became enforceable on DATE .

NORP On DATE ORG acceded to a petition by the mother and exercised his discretionary power to challenge the return order by way of an extraordinary appeal on points of law ( mimoriadne dovolanie ) . It was argued that the courts had failed properly to establish whether the first applicant had been wrongfully removed or retained and whether there were grounds for not ordering the first applicant ’s return under LAW .

At the same time , the Prosecutor General suspended the enforceability of the return order .

On DATE , in response to an enquiry made on the second applicant ’s behalf , the President of ORG provided the office of the President of GPE with an update on the state of the proceedings . She added the following comment :

“ It does not behove me to judge the actions of ORG . I am not privy to the reasons why an extraordinary appeal on points of law was lodged . I detect a problem in the system , which allows for such a procedure even in respect of decisions on the return of minor children abroad ( ‘ international child ORG ) . Irrespective of the outcome of the specific case , the possibility of lodging an appeal on points of law and an extraordinary appeal on points of law in cases of international child abduction protracts the proceedings and negates the object of the [ Hague Convention ] , which is as expeditious a restoration of the original state [ of affairs ] as possible , that is to say the return of the child to the country of the child ’s habitual residence within the shortest possible time . ”

On DATE ORG ( Najvyšší súd ) ruled on the extraordinary appeal by quashing the return order and remitting the matter to the first - instance court for re - examination .

On DATE ORG dismissed the second applicant ’s application for the return of the first applicant . Relying on LAW , it observed that the first applicant had been living in GPE for CARDINAL - and - a - half years and had developed a settled home life there . The return of the first applicant was thus “ not in the interests of the child and the child ’s healthy mental development ” .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision of CARDINAL DATE following the second applicant ’s appeal and remitted the case to the first - instance court , finding that the latter had failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision .

On DATE and , respectively , DATE , ORG and , following the mother ’s appeal , ORG again ordered the return of the first applicant to GPE and GPE . The courts found that the second applicant had shown that appropriate measures had been taken to secure the first applicant ’s rights and interests after his return and that the mother had failed to show that the return of the first applicant was contrary to LAW .

On DATE the mother lodged an appeal on points of law ( dovolanie ) and subsequently sought to have the enforcement of the return order suspended .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE , respectively , ORG summoned the mother and interviewed her and the second applicant with a view to having the return order complied with , to no avail .

Following the interview of CARDINAL DATE , on DATE , ORG dismissed the mother ’s motion for the enforcement proceedings to be suspended . Upon her appeal , that decision was quashed . Subsequently , the enforcement proceedings were terminated in view of ORG decision on the mother ’s appeal on points of law ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The second applicant appealed against that decision and the proceedings are still pending .

Meanwhile , on DATE , the Prosecutor General informed the mother , in response to a petition filed by her , that he had no intention of challenging the new return order by an extraordinary appeal on points of law .

NORP However , on DATE , following the mother ’s appeal on points of law , ORG quashed ORG decision of DATE to dismiss her appeal against the new return order and remitted the appeal to ORG for re - examination . It held that the latter had failed to provide adequate reasons for dismissing the mother ’s arguments under LAW .

Following ORG judgment of DATE , the case was remitted to the first - instance court . The proceedings are still pending .

Meanwhile , on DATE and DATE and DATE , ORG and GPE issued CARDINAL orders to the mother to return the first applicant to the jurisdiction of GPE and GPE . At the same time , it issued certificates pursuant to LAW ( ORG ) No . CARDINAL of DATE concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility ( “ Regulation No . CARDINAL ” ) providing the second applicant with contact rights in respect of the first applicant in GPE .

Since the first applicant was taken to GPE , the applicants have had intermittent contact .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE , respectively , ORG and , following the mother ’s appeal , ORG ordered the mother to facilitate contact between the applicants .

According to the ORG , the mother has not been hindering contact between the applicants . However , in the ORG submission , the mother has often obstructed the second applicant ’s visits from the first applicant and he continues to experience difficulties seeing the first applicant .

In their observations in reply to the present application , the ORG submitted a copy of an undated letter from the mother of the first applicant to the Government in which she declared that both she and the second applicant had equal parental rights and responsibilities in respect of the first applicant and that she therefore disagreed with the first applicant ’s introducing an application under LAW . She considered that such a course of action exclusively benefited the interests of the second applicant and was in fact contrary to the interests of the first applicant .

The relevant provisions of LAW , LAW on the Rights of the Child , LAW and the Regulation No . DATE have recently been summarised in the ORG ’s judgment in the case of PERSON v. GPE ( [ ORG ] , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , ECHR DATE ) .

Article CARDINAL was re - codified by Constitutional Law no . PERSON . , with effect from DATE . It reads as follows :

“ CARDINAL . ORG shall decide on complaints by natural or legal persons alleging a violation of their fundamental rights or freedoms ... unless the protection of such rights and freedoms falls within the jurisdiction of a different court .

If ORG finds a complaint to be justified , it shall deliver a decision stating that the person ’s rights or freedoms as set out in paragraph CARDINAL have been violated by a final decision , specific measure or other act and shall quash that decision , measure or act . If the violation that has been found is the result of a failure to act , ORG may order [ the authority ] which has violated the [ person ’s ] rights or freedoms to take the necessary action . At the same time it may remit the case to the authority concerned for further proceedings , order that authority to refrain from violating the [ person ’s ] fundamental rights and freedoms ... or , where appropriate , order those who have violated the rights or freedoms set out in paragraph CARDINAL to restore the situation to that existing prior to the violation .

In its decision on a complaint ORG may grant appropriate financial compensation to a person whose rights under paragraph CARDINAL have been violated .

The liability for damage or other loss of a person who has violated the rights or freedoms as referred to in paragraph CARDINAL shall not be affected by ORG decision . ”

LAW on the Rights of the Child entered into force in respect of GPE on DATE ( Notice of ORG no . PERSON . ) , while LAW did so on DATE ( Notice of ORG no . PERSON . ) .

The relevant provisions concerning appeals on points of law are summarised , for example , in the ORG ’s decision in GPE PERSON Springer GPE v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , LAW DATE , CARDINAL DATE , with further references ) . Appeals on points of law have no automatic suspensive effect , the power to suspend the enforceability of the impugned decision being entrusted to ORG ( Article CARDINAL ) .

Extraordinary appeals on points of law are regulated by the provisions of Articles CARDINALe et seq .

The Prosecutor General has the power to challenge a decision of a court by means of an extraordinary appeal . He or she may do so upon a petition of a party to the proceedings or another person concerned or injured by the decision , provided that ORG concludes that : the final and binding decision has violated the law ; the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of individuals , legal entities , or the ORG requires that such an appeal be brought ; such protection can not be achieved by other means ; and the matter at hand is not excluded from judicial review ( ORG CARDINALe § CARDINAL and CARDINALf § CARDINAL ) .

An extraordinary appeal may only be aimed at a ruling in a decision which has been contested by the party to the proceedings or the person concerned or injured by that decision ( LAW ) . Unless a statute provides otherwise , ORG is bound by the scope of the petition for an extraordinary appeal ( Article LAW and CARDINAL ) .

Further conditions of admissibility of an extraordinary appeal are listed in Article CARDINALf § CARDINAL . They comprise ( a ) major procedural flaws within the meaning of LAW ( in that respect see , for example , GPE PERSON Springer GPE , v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § CARDINAL , DATE ) , ( b ) other errors of procedure resulting in an erroneous decision on the merits , and ( c ) wrongful assessment of points of law .

An extraordinary appeal is to be lodged with ORG within DATE of the contested judicial decision ’s becoming final and binding ( Article CARDINAL g ) .

If ORG concludes , upon a petition of a party to the proceedings or another person concerned or injured by the impugned decision , that there is the risk of considerable economic loss or other serious irreparable consequences , the extraordinary appeal may be filed without reasons for appeal being stated . The reasons then must be stated within DATE of the lodging of the extraordinary appeal with ORG , failing which the proceedings are to be discontinued ( LAW and CARDINAL ) .

If the extraordinary appeal on points of law is accompanied by a request that that the enforceability of the contested decision be suspended , its enforceability is to be suspended upon the extraordinary appeal being lodged with ORG ( Article CARDINAL ha § CARDINAL ) .

The duration of such a suspension is regulated by Article CARDINAL ha § CARDINAL , pursuant to which that suspension ceases ( a ) when the request is dismissed or ( b ) with the decision on the extraordinary appeal , unless extended by ORG DATE from the lodging of the extraordinary appeal with it .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review by a court)

Carlo Ranzoni;Ganna Yudkivska;Iulia Motoc;Marko Bošnjak;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in LOC .

On DATE the applicant was arrested and detained on suspicion of having committed war crimes against the civilian population and against prisoners of war during the DATE - CARDINAL war .

On DATE ORG of GPE ( “ the ORG ” ) reviewed and extended his detention based on the risk of his obstructing the course of justice by exerting pressure on witnesses and co - accused or by destroying evidence . On DATE that decision was upheld by ORG .

On DATE ORG further extended the applicant ’s detention on the same grounds as before . On DATE that decision was upheld by ORG .

On DATE ORG issued an indictment against the applicant and CARDINAL other co - suspects , which was confirmed by ORG on DATE .

Thereafter , the applicant ’s detention was regularly examined and extended DATE by ORG . In addition to those automatic reviews , the applicant repeatedly challenged his detention before ORG of ORG .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal , relying on LAW ) of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and LAW . He alleged , in particular , that his detention had been arbitrary and excessive , and that it had not been based on relevant and sufficient reasons .

On DATE the Constitutional Court of GPE ( “ the LAW ” ) , in a formation of CARDINAL judges , rejected the applicant ’s appeal since it could not reach a majority on any of the proposals . The court ’s reasoning included all the views expressed at the session on the issues raised in the case . Pursuant to LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) that decision was final .

On DATE ORG held that the grounds for the applicant ’s continued detention had ceased to apply and released the applicant . By the same decision , the court imposed preventive measures on the applicant which included the following : a prohibition on leaving his place of residence without the prior approval of ORG save for the purpose of appearing before that court ; the duty to report once DATE to the LOC police ; a prohibition on associating with other co - accused and on associating or having contact with the witnesses . Furthermore , the applicant ’s passport was seized .

The preventive measures were reviewed and extended DATE . On DATE they were revoked .

At the date of the latest information available to ORG ( DATE ) , the criminal proceedings against the applicant were still ongoing .


CASE OF NAKONECHNYY AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE

Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review)

André Potocki;Mārtiņš Mits;Síofra O’Leary

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the excessive length of their pre - trial detention . Some applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)

Branko Lubarda;Ján Šikuta;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE , the applicant was driving to PERSON accompanied by FAC in a car registered in GPE . At TIME they visited a mutual friend , PERSON Shortly thereafter , all CARDINAL of them returned to his car , which was parked near GPE ’s home . They found it surrounded by CARDINAL police cars , approximately QUANTITY police officers and CARDINAL of curious civilians .

NORP The applicant overheard CARDINAL of the police officers informing his colleagues that they had found out the car registered in GPE had been involved in that accident in which some pedestrians had been injured . He informed the police officers that he was the owner of the car and denied that he had been involved in an accident .

NORP The police officers immediately proceeded to detain the applicant aggressively , without checking his identity papers . Police officer PERSON twisted the applicant ’s arm behind his back and hit him in the legs . The blow was so powerful that the applicant had to grab one of the police car ’s wing mirrors and window in order to avoid falling down . At the same time he was hit on the head and his mouth was covered because he was shouting for , amongst other things , his identity documents , which were in his car . Police officer ORG also punched the applicant repeatedly .

Once he was in the police car , the applicant was handcuffed with his hands behind his back and QUANTITY police officers , who remained unidentified , continued to hit him . He lost his dentures and eventually fainted . Police officer GPE travelled in a separate car and police officer PERSON drove the police car in which the applicant was detained . Consequently , the applicant concluded that those CARDINAL officers could not have hit him .

At the police station police officer PERSON removed the handcuffs from the applicant .

On DATE , the applicant was caught speeding and refused to stop his car at a police officer ’s request . When the police eventually found his car parked in an area surrounded by blocks of flats , the applicant and his friends became very agitated and the applicant refused to show his identity papers to the police officers . He claimed that he was immune to prosecution because he was an NORP citizen .

NORP The police officers lawfully took the applicant to the police station in order to establish his identity and to fine him for speeding . According to eyewitness statements , the police officers handcuffed the applicant in a stern , but not abusive manner . They confirmed that the applicant and his friends had been verbally abusive towards the police officers .

On DATE , following a request by the applicant , ORG produced an expert report concluding that the applicant had suffered traumatic lesions which could have been sustained on DATE . It also concluded that he had suffered an injury to the lower lip and damage to the dental prosthesis next to his upper - right canine as a result of his being struck with a solid object , possibly on the chin . In addition , the skin on the bridge of his nose and the left side of his neck had been scratched by a hard and sharp nail - like object . The bruises located on his left shoulder and below his left clavicle had resulted from being struck with a solid object . The bruise on the inside of his right arm had resulted from finger compression . Also his left forearm and the back of his left hand had been scratched with or by solid sharp objects . The report concluded that the contusion of his thorax together with the bruise below his left clavicle would require , in the absence of any complications , DATE of medical care in order to heal . The rest of the lesions would require DATE of medical care to heal and he might have to have the prosthesis next to his upper - right canine repaired .

The forensic report stated that on DATE the emergency unit of ORG had diagnosed the applicant with cranio - cerebral and thorax trauma , as well as a severe thorax contusion . The thorax X - ray that had been produced on DATE did not show any broken ribs or post - traumatic lung damage . Also the dental emergency unit attached to the same hospital had diagnosed the applicant with a contusion in the chin area as a result of a blow which had damaged the dental work on his upper - right canine . It stated that the repairs to his upper - right canine could require the destruction of his fixed maxillary prosthesis .

On DATE the applicant underwent an encephalography at ORG . He was advised to rest for DATE on account of anxiety .

At the applicant ’s request , on DATE ORG produced a forensic expert report . The report stated that according to a dental specialist , the dental - alveolar lesions suffered by the applicant as a result of the assault of DATE would require twentyeight to DATE of medical care to heal and repair .

The forensic report further stated that according to the medical documents presented by the applicant , he had been prescribed treatment with pain killers for DATE for his dental - alveolar lesions . In addition , his fixed maxillary prosthesis needed to be repaired as a result of the damage caused to his upper - right canine ; the report estimated that the repairs would take DATE .

On DATE the applicant brought criminal proceedings against the police officers who had been involved in the incident of DATE for violent behaviour . In addition , he requested that those responsible for the impugned events be brought to justice . He claimed that on DATE he had been ill - treated by police officers and had suffered physical injuries , including damage to his dental prosthesis .

On DATE GPE and GPE , friends of the applicant and GPE , submitted CARDINAL statements before ORG . PERSON stated that when the applicant had returned to his car , police officers had already been waiting for him , claiming that the car had been involved in an accident , even though there had been no visible damage to the car . Although the applicant had attempted to present his identity papers to the police , they had abusively and violently grabbed him and handcuffed him . Subsequently , the applicant had been thrown into a police car and hit until he fainted . When ORG had attempted to find out what police station the applicant was being taken to , CARDINAL of the officers had elbowed him in the chest .

A.C. stated that on arrival at the police station she had noticed a smell of alcohol on the breath of CARDINAL of the prosecution witnesses . The witness had been collected by the police officers from the terrace of a restaurant located near the scene of the incident . He had been insulting the applicant on account of his NORP citizenship . He had admitted that he had been drinking and when he had started becoming aggressive , one of the officers had asked him to leave the room .

On DATE the investigating authorities heard GPE as a witness . He stated that he had seen the applicant park his car at the scene of the incident and run together with FAC through the blocks of flats . The police had arrived shortly afterwards and waited for the applicant to return . When the applicant had returned the officers had asked him politely to identify himself . The applicant had refused vehemently to identify himself and claimed that the police officers could not touch him because he was an NORP citizen . As the police officers had been unable to reason with him , they had been forced to immobilise him in order to place him in the police car , which the applicant had almost wrecked . At the same time the applicant had continued to verbally offend the officers and him . He had seen the applicant being placed in the police car ; the applicant had not been beaten by the police officers . Moreover , the applicant had not been abused , either physically or verbally , by the police officers at the police station .

On DATE the investigating authorities heard GPE and GPE as witnesses . They both stated that they had seen police officers speak to the applicant and attempt politely to identify him . The applicant had refused to give his identity by shouting that he was an NORP citizen . The police officers had made several more attempts to politely reason with the applicant and once that had failed they had proceeded to immobilise him and to place him in a police car . Once inside the police car , the applicant had started shouting again , at which point several other bystanders , including PERSON , had started to remonstrate with him . Consequently , FAC had started insulting them . The witnesses further stated that they had not seen the police officers hit the applicant .

On an unspecified date ORG stated before the investigating authorities that on DATE when the applicant had been driving to PERSON , she had noticed a police car on the road and had seen a police officer make a signal . However , it had not been the correct signal for a motorist to stop . The applicant had not stopped the car but had continued to drive . When they had arrived in PERSON she had seen another police car , but the police had not signaled the applicant to stop .

On DATE the prosecutor ’s office attached to ORG discontinued the criminal proceedings brought by the applicant against the police officers , on the grounds that the police officers had not committed the offences of which they had been accused or that the alleged offences were not provided for by criminal law . It held , on the basis of the police ORG statements corroborated by the statements of GPE , GPE and GPE that the applicant had repeatedly refused to show the police officers his identity papers , despite warnings that he would be taken to a police station if he failed to provide proof of his identity . The police officers had attempted to take the applicant to the police station , but he had resisted . Consequently , the officers had immobilised him . When they had attempted to place him in the police car , he had continued to resist , physically struggling and being verbally aggressive towards them . The prosecutor ’s office further held that the time required for medical care could not be confused with the time required for full recovery . In this connection , it noted that in the applicant ’s case the reconstruction work that was needed on his upper teeth would take DATE . Consequently , DATE referred to by the forensic expert report of DATE could not be understood to mean DATE of medical care within the meaning of the law . Lastly , the use of force by the police officers had not been disproportionate and had been aimed solely at immobilising him .

The applicant challenged the decision before the superior prosecutor attached to ORG . He argued that the witnesses who had been heard had committed perjury , probably because they had been influenced by the police .

By a final decision of CARDINAL DATE the superior prosecutor dismissed the applicant ’s challenge . He held , amongst other things , based on the eyewitness statements , that the police ORG actions had been in response to the applicant ’s aggressive and offensive behaviour . Consequently , the police officers had not overstepped their bounds . Also , DATE of medical care required by the applicant , according to the forensic expert report produced on DATE , concerned the period required for the reconstruction of his upper dental prosthesis and not the time it would take for the dental - alveolar lesions to heal .

The applicant appealed against the decision before the domestic courts . He argued that the authorities had failed to investigate how the injuries attested by the forensic expert reports had been caused .

By a judgment of DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal and upheld the decision of DATE . It noted , amongst other things , that according to the forensic expert report of DATE , the applicant had suffered injuries which required , depending on their severity , DATE of medical care . In addition , according to the criminal investigation carried out in respect of the case , the police officers who had been involved in the events of DATE were GPE , ORG , ORG , PERSON , PERSON and ORG as well as two ORG students , GPE and PERSON According to the statements of ORG , the applicant had been caught speeding . He had ignored ORG ’s signals to stop and had continued to drive . Consequently , ORG had asked their colleagues to locate and stop the applicant ’s car . GPE had made a second attempt to stop the applicant , but he had ignored the police sirens and the signals to stop . The police officers had searched for the applicant ’s car and had eventually found it parked near GPE ’s home . According to the statements of GPE , GPE , ORG and PERSON , when the applicant returned to his car he refused the police ORG request to show his identity papers on the grounds that he was an NORP citizen and was not subject to NORP law . Even though he was informed that he had broken the law , he continued to refuse to show his identity papers to the police or to accompany them to the police station .

The court also noted that GPE and PERSON stated that PERSON and ORG had had to handcuff the applicant and force him into the police car , because he had refused to climb into the car and had resisted by grabbing the car door and wing mirror . PERSON and ORG stated that after the applicant had been immobilised and forced into the police vehicle , during the drive to the police station he had continued to bang his head against the windows of the police car . At the police station PERSON had fined the applicant for the offence and prepared a police report , which had eventually been signed by the applicant . PERSON stated that from the time the applicant had arrived at the police station , he had had no further contact with the other police officers and had shown no signs of violence .

The court further noted that according to ORG ’s statement , she had seen the applicant being handcuffed and how several police officers had tried to place him in the police car , even though he had wanted to prove to them that he was an NORP citizen . She had not been allowed to travel with the applicant to the police station and when she had arrived there his clothes had been dirty and he had blood stains on his face . According to ORG , the applicant had been handcuffed prior to being placed in the police car and had not been asked to identify himself or told why was he being taken to a police station . ORG had seen the applicant resisting getting into the police car , but the police officers had used force . He also contradicted the applicant ’s statement that after leaving the police station they had gone to ORG .

The court also noted that ORG had seen the whole incident and had stated that the applicant had refused to identify himself because he was an NORP citizen and together with GPE he had insulted the police officers and the other witnesses . Also the applicant had been forcefully placed in the police car because he had been behaving aggressively and had been grabbing the car door and wing mirror . ORG statement concerning the applicant ’s behaviour had also been confirmed by witnesses ORG and GPE

The court held that according to the available evidence , in particular the witness statements of GPE , PERSON and ORG , the applicant had had to be handcuffed because he had been behaving aggressively both prior to and after being placed in the police car as well as during the drive to the police station . The court noted that the applicant had claimed that the injuries he had suffered at the hands of the police had amounted to ill - treatment in breach of the guarantees set out in LAW . However , ORG had been reluctant to sanction the behaviour of ORG agents if they had used force in order to counteract the aggressive behaviour of an arrested person . The applicant ’s refusal to show the police officers his identity papers and his aggressive conduct on account of his foreign nationality had not been justified given that he had been informed that he had committed an offence and had a duty to observe the laws of the ORG . Consequently , the force used by the ORG agents did not appear excessive .

The applicant appealed on points of law ( recurs ) against the judgment . He argued that the prosecutor ’s office attached to ORG had not been competent ratione materiae to carry out the criminal investigation in his case . The investigation had been superficial because not all the police officers involved in the events had been identified and because the police officers who had informed their colleagues that the applicant ’s car had been involved in a car accident had not been heard . The authorities had refused to allow him to identify the individuals against whom the criminal proceedings had been brought , and witnesses PERSON and PERSON had committed perjury . At the time of the incident he had been denied the right to contact ORG or a lawyer . The statements of witnesses GPE and GPE had been incomplete , and the first - instance court had ignored the fact that the authorities had failed to investigate how the injuries attested by the forensic expert reports had been caused .

By a final judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal on points of law . It held that the prosecutor ’s office attached to ORG had been competent ratione materiae to carry out the criminal investigation in the case . Also the investigation had not been superficial and the authorities had identified and heard the QUANTITY police officers who had handcuffed the applicant and had driven him to the police station . Other police officers had been heard , including the CARDINAL ORG students as well as relevant eyewitnesses who were not police officers .

The court also held that the investigation had focused on all the applicant ’s allegations and the authorities had heard the defence witnesses requested by him , namely GPE and GPE The fact that the authorities had not adduced all the data considered relevant by the applicant was not unlawful , considering that a preliminary investigation could be limited in respect of both quality and quantity by its lawful purpose . Moreover , the applicant ’s allegation that some of the witnesses had committed perjury had been refuted by the corroboration of their statements by other evidence . The prosecutor ’s office solution remained valid given that most of the witnesses had confirmed that the applicant had refused to go to the police station and had behaved aggressively , both verbally and physically , and that none of the witnesses had confirmed that he had been hit before being placed in the police car . Consequently , the measures taken against him had not been excessive or unjustified and had met the requirements of LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL on the organisation and operation of the NORP police force .

The court further held that the fact that the statements of the applicant ’s friends had contradicted those of the remaining witnesses was a consequence of their friendly relations with the applicant .

The court considered that the authorities had correctly interpreted the available medical documents . The scratches on the left side of the applicant ’s neck , on his left forearm and the back of his left hand , as well as the bruises on his left shoulder , below his left clavicle and on the inside of his right arm had been inflicted by the police officers when they had handcuffed him and placed him in the police car . Their actions had been proportionate given his strong opposition . It was clear that handcuffing and the operation of placing a person in a police vehicle , if that person physically resisted the measure , would cause injuries . The superficial nature of the injuries and the areas of the body where the bruises and scratches had been sustained merely confirmed the proportional nature of the police ORG actions . It was clear that the applicant had exaggerated the nature of his injuries in his complaint against the officers , given that there was no evidence in the file suggesting that he had been repeatedly kicked . It appeared that the internal lip injury and the dental damage suffered by the applicant had been caused by an impact to the chin , possibly when he had been resisting his handcuffing and placement in the car . The police officers could not be considered guilty as long as the applicant had continued to behave violently in the police vehicle . He had not suffered any external lesions in the chin area which could have been caused by an impact with a solid object .

On DATE the applicant was fined for speeding and for failure to stop when signaled to do so by a police officer .

By a final judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed on the merits the applicant ’s action seeking the annulment of the speeding fine imposed on DATE and of the suspension of his driving licence .


Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The first applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE ) . The second applicant , who was born in DATE , is the son of the first applicant . He lives in GPE .

The first applicant entered GPE in DATE , where he applied for asylum in DATE . At that time , the second applicant remained in GPE , where he was cared for by his mother . The first applicant ’s asylum application was rejected by the competent authorities .

In DATE the first applicant married a NORP national and obtained a residence permit . In DATE a daughter was born to the couple .

In DATE the second applicant visited his father in GPE for DATE based on a tourist visa valid for that period .

NORP In DATE the second applicant re - entered GPE for purposes of family reunification with his father .

In DATE the first applicant was granted a permanent residence permit . In DATE he obtained NORP nationality and has since held nationality of both GPE and GPE .

After encountering difficulties in school and with his step - mother , the second applicant returned to GPE in DATE , where he was cared for by his mother and his paternal grandmother .

In DATE the first applicant separated from his spouse . The latter continued to live in GPE with the couple ’s daughter .

On DATE the first applicant lodged a request for family reunification with the second applicant , who was DATE at the time and for whom he had custody according to NORP law .

On DATE ORG of the GPE of LOC refused that request .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision with ORG of the GPE of LOC .

On DATE that authority dismissed the appeal .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision with ORG in ORG PERSON ( NORP i m GPE ) of the GPE of LOC .

On DATE that court granted the applicant ’s appeal . In a very detailed decision it noted that the requirements for family reunification under LAW third sentence of the LAW on the Residence of Foreign Nationals ( Bundesgesetz über PERSON , ANAG ) were not met ( see relevant domestic law and practice paragraphs CARDINAL below ) . Largely basing its reasoning on LAW , it considered , however , that the applicants’ interests in respect for their family life prevailed over those of the public . It ordered ORG to arrange for a residence permit for the second applicant .

Subsequently , ORG of the GPE of LOC declared that it would grant a permanent residence permit to the second applicant for purposes of family reunification and , on DATE , transferred the file to ORG to seek the required consent . On DATE the latter refused to give its consent , finding that the requirements for family reunification were not met and that the decision of the court of the GPE of LOC was in contradiction to the case - law of ORG .

On DATE the first applicant lodged an appeal against that decision with ORG , both in his own name and in that of his son .

On DATE the applicants informed the authorities that the situation of the second applicant had changed . His mother had moved to GPE with her new spouse and he was now cared for exclusively by his paternal grandmother .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal . It noted , first , that the requirements for family reunification under LAW third sentence of the LAW on the Residence of Foreign Nationals were not met ( see relevant domestic law and practice paragraphs CARDINAL below ) . It found , second , that the applicants could not rely on LAW , as the second applicant had reached the age of adulthood and was not dependant on the first applicant ( see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the applicants lodged an appeal against that decision with ORG .

On DATE ORG dismissed that appeal . It considered , in particular , that the relationship between the CARDINAL applicants was not paramount ( “ vorrangig ” ) , even though the first applicant had the right of custody for the second applicant according to NORP law . It noted that the first applicant had not applied for family reunification immediately after his arrival in GPE , that the second applicant was cared for by his mother and his grandmother in GPE until he turned DATE , that the second applicant had lived almost all of his life in GPE and had more important social and personal ties to his country of origin , which would be negatively affected if he moved to GPE , and that he had returned to GPE after having stayed with his father in GPE for DATE . It observed that the first applicant had , thus , at that time , preferred that the second applicant lived with his mother and that the second applicant would face even more severe challenges to integration now than he had during his first stay in GPE , given his age . While noting that the first applicant had a close relationship to his daughter in GPE and that he could , thus , not be expected to relocate to GPE to live there with the second applicant , the court noted that the applicants had not submitted sufficient reasons to justify the second applicant ’s reunion with his father in GPE .

NORP Moreover , ORG considered that the circumstances of the present case differed from those of ORG and Others v. the GPE , no . CARDINAL , DATE . The latter concerned a situation where CARDINAL parent , the child ’s mother , was still alive . The mother had tried to bring her child to the GPE as soon as possible after her arrival . Moreover , the child ’s grandmother who cared for her in GPE had taken the child out of school against the mother ’s will and planned a forced marriage .

On DATE the ORG refused to apply Rule CARDINAL of the Rules of the ORG .


André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Erik Møse;Síofra O’Leary;Yonko Grozev;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is an NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He is represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Ambassador PERSON , Head of ORG at ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant and his former wife , GPE , are the parents of PERSON , who was born in DATE in wedlock . From DATE the parents lived in separate households and PERSON lived together with her mother . The parents , however , continued to share custody . On DATE GPE applied for sole custody of PERSON On DATE the applicant and GPE concluded an agreement before ORG under which sole custody of PERSON was awarded to GPE

On DATE the applicant and GPE divorced .

On DATE the applicant and GPE concluded a court settlement concerning the contact rights of the applicant in respect of PERSON

On DATE the applicant applied for joint custody over PERSON and requested GPE to agree to this application . However , GPE disapproved of the applicant ’s application for joint custody as there were ongoing disputes between the parents . The applicant , on the other hand , stated that he wished to be involved in PERSON ’s life and to be included in decisions concerning her education , medical issues and other matters .

On DATE ORG heard the applicant , GPE and PERSON ; at the end of the hearing the applicant and GPE confirmed that they would continue to adhere to the settlement of DATE concerning the contact rights of the applicant .

On DATE ORG , having held a further hearing in the course of which the applicant , GPE and PERSON were examined again , dismissed the applicant ’s application for joint custody . It based this decision on Article CARDINALa of LAW , under which joint custody is only possible in the event of both parents consenting . The applicant requested the court to apply to ORG for review of the constitutionality of this provision , but ORG held that a court of first instance did not have the authority to lodge such an application .

The applicant appealed , arguing that Article CARDINALa of the Civil Code was unconstitutional and in violation of his Convention rights ; he also asked ORG to request ORG for review of the constitutionality of this provision .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s request for an application to ORG for judicial review in respect of Articles CARDINAL and CARDINALa of LAW , as ORG had no concerns regarding the constitutionality of these provisions . Referring explicitly to the ORG ’s judgment in the case of ORG v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , DATE ) , ORG found that the present case must be distinguished from ORG . Under Articles CARDINAL and CARDINALa of LAW , which applied in the present case , parents had joint custody of their child . If after divorce CARDINAL parent were to ask for sole custody then the court , taking into account the well - being of the child , had to transfer custody to CARDINAL of the parents . By contrast , Article CARDINAL of LAW , which was at issue in ORG , provided that custody of a child born out of wedlock was from the very beginning to be granted only to the mother of that child . Given that in the event of the termination of joint custody after divorce or following an agreement between the parents , the law did not grant either of the parents a privileged position as regards the award of sole custody , there was no indication that this was discriminatory . If CARDINAL were to follow the reasoning of the applicant that it should be possible to simply request the re - establishment of joint custody at any moment following a final court decision lifting joint custody or an agreement of the parents to that effect , the binding force of decisions whereby joint custody had been lifted would be rendered meaningless , which was in contradiction to the principle of legal certainty ( Rechtskraft ) .

ORG observed furthermore that the first - instance court had not made any findings as to the ability of the parents to find compromise ( GPE ) indispensable for the meaningful exercise of joint custody . From the content of the case file and in particular the expert reports submitted , it could , however , be deduced that at the time of the termination of joint custody , the parents lacked this ability , and there was no indication in the file that the situation had improved in the meantime . In such a situation it was not in the interest of the well - being of a child that once joint custody had been granted , every single issue on which parents did not agree – such as which school a child should attend – had to be determined by decision of ORG .

On DATE the applicant lodged an ordinary appeal ( ordentlicher Revisionsrekurs ) against ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE and asked ORG to apply to ORG for review of the constitutionality of ORG CARDINAL and CARDINALa of LAW .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal as inadmissible . The ruling was served on the applicant ’s counsel on DATE . ORG found that if custody of a child had been granted to CARDINAL parent , either by a court decision or by agreement between the parents , then in the interest of consistency of education ( ORG ) a change of the person having custody could only be granted if there existed a risk to the well - being of the child . It was not decisive whether the circumstances of CARDINAL parent were better than those of the other . ORG noted that in his application for joint custody the applicant had not even made the argument that circumstances had changed since the decision on custody of ORG of DATE had become final , and he had not given any other reasons ( as required by LAW ) to justify a different ruling . The mere presupposition that joint custody exercised by both parents might be better for the well - being of the child was not a sufficient justification for interfering with a binding decision . Furthermore , the ability and intention of both parents to share their responsibility is an indispensable precondition for joint custody . It could be clearly seen from the case file that there was no agreement between the parents regarding the issue of joint custody and that no coordinated action when exercising joint custody could therefore be expected from them .

Following the DATE amendment to LAW ( see para . CARDINAL below ) , on DATE the applicant lodged an application for joint custody of PERSON However , on DATE , he withdrew this application .

Articles CARDINAL and CARDINALa of LAW , as in force at the material time read as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) If the marriage of the parents of a minor legitimate child is dissolved or annulled , the custodial rights of both parents remain intact . However , they may present an agreement to the court DATE even modifying an existing agreement – regarding custodial responsibility . In this connection it may be agreed that CARDINAL parent alone or both parents shall have custody . Where both parents have custodial powers , those of CARDINAL parent may be limited to specific matters .

( CARDINAL ) Where both parents have custody , they must submit an agreement to the court regarding the parent with whom the child is to stay primarily . This parent must always be put in charge of all custodial matters .

( CARDINAL ) The court must approve the agreement of the parents if it serves the interests of the child . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) If an agreement under LAW on the main domicile of the child or on custodial powers is not reached within a reasonable period after a marriage is dissolved or annulled , or if [ such an agreement ] is incompatible with the interests of the child , the court must decide which parent shall henceforth have sole custody , if all attempts to reach an amicable solution fail .

( CARDINAL ) NORP If both parents have custody under LAW after their marriage has been dissolved or annulled , and if one parent applies for the withdrawal of that custody , the court must decide which parent shall have sole custody , if all attempts to reach an amicable solution fail . ”

It is noted , however , that on DATE the relevant provisions of ORG were amended significantly . The relevant sections read as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) If the marriage or the common household of the parents is dissolved , joint custody is maintained . They can , however , conclude an agreement before a court under which CARDINAL parent is entrusted with sole custody , or the custody of CARDINAL parent is limited to certain matters .

( CARDINAL ) In the case that both parents have joint custody after the dissolution of their marriage or the common household , [ the parents ] have to conclude an agreement before a court regarding in whose household the child will predominantly be cared for . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) Provided that it is in the best interests of the child , the court has to decide on the provisional regulation of parental responsibility ( “ the phase of provisional parental responsibility ” ) , if

after the dissolution of the marriage or the common household the parents can not concur on an agreement , pursuant to section CARDINAL , within a reasonable time limit , or

CARDINAL parent applies for sole custody or his / her participation in custodial rights .

( CARDINAL ) After [ the phase of provisional responsibility , which lasts DATE ] , the court has to take a final decision on custody ( on the basis of what transpired during the phase of provisional parental responsibility ) – including payment of statutory maintenance – [ which is in the best interests of the child . ] ... If the court awards joint custody , it also has to decide in whose household the child will predominantly be cared for . ”


Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life);Violation of Article 13+8 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life)

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant came to GPE in DATE . In DATE he started a relationship with PERSON , also a NORP national . In DATE the CARDINAL of them had a son . In DATE the applicant was granted permanent resident status .

On DATE the head of ORG issued an order withdrawing the applicant ’s residence permit , ordering his expulsion and imposing a DATE ban on his re - entering GPE , on the ground that his presence in the country represented a “ serious threat to national security ” . Factual grounds justifying the order were not indicated ; it was merely noted that it was based on “ proposal no . BCARDINAL ” .

NORP That proposal , drawn up by ORG and also dated DATE , was submitted to ORG . It stated that the applicant had allegedly been involved in acts of extortion , smuggling , arms deals and money laundering , that he operated with large amounts of illegally obtained money , that he had established contacts with NORP officials , including police officers , who had been providing him with illegal services , and that he had been in contact with presumed terrorists . While enumerating the applicant ’s presumed illegal activities , the proposal referred to specific dates and names , but to no evidence to support the allegations . Lastly , it was stated that the applicant had left GPE on DATE .

Unaware of the ministerial order of DATE , on DATE the applicant attempted to re - enter the NORP territory but was stopped at the border and not permitted entry . Since then he has been living in GPE , while PERSON and his son remained in GPE .

Through his lawyer , the applicant submitted an appeal to the NORP Minister of the ORG against the order of DATE . The appeal was dismissed on DATE , the Minister pointing out , in particular , that he considered irrelevant the applicant ’s argument that he had settled in GPE with his family .

After that the applicant applied for judicial review of the order of DATE . In particular , he pointed out in his application that his family resided in GPE and that their separation had been unjustified .

NORP In the course of the judicial proceedings the applicant ’s lawyer was shown proposal no . BCARDINAL .

In a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG held that it was competent to examine the application , with reference to the ORG ’s judgment in the case of PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , DATE ) and LAW , even though , at the time the impugned order had been issued , judicial review had not been available under the legislation then applicable ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

NORP The judicial proceedings ended on DATE with a final judgment of ORG , which upheld the order of DATE . After enumerating the applicant ’s alleged unlawful activities described in proposal no . BCARDINAL , it stated merely that the impugned order did not breach the law . Furthermore , it dismissed the applicant ’s arguments relating to his family and private life , stating :

“ any restriction of the rights under the ORG is justified [ when based ] on national security considerations , in cases where foreign ORG behaviour threatens the national security and the public order of the State where they reside . ”


CASE OF CENTRE FOR LEGAL RESOURCES ON BEHALF OF VALENTIN CÂMPEANU v. ROMANIA

Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 34 - Locus standi);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Positive obligations;Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 13+2 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 2 - Right to life);Respondent State to take measures of a general character (Article 46-2 - Measures of a general character)

Alvina Gyulumyan;Angelika Nußberger;Dean Spielmann;Guido Raimondi;Ineta Ziemele;Ján Šikuta;Johannes Silvis;Kristina Pardalos;Ledi Bianku;Luis López Guerra;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano

PERSON , a man of GPE ethnicity , was born on DATE . His father was unknown , and his mother , Florica Câmpeanu , who died in DATE , abandoned him at birth . Mr Câmpeanu was therefore placed in an orphanage , ORG , where he grew up .

In DATE Mr Câmpeanu was diagnosed as HIV - positive . He was later diagnosed with “ profound intellectual disability , an IQ of CARDINAL and HIV ” and was accordingly classified as belonging to the “ severe ” disability group . In time , he also developed associated symptoms such as pulmonary tuberculosis , pneumonia and chronic hepatitis .

In DATE he was transferred to ORG and at DATE to the GPE no . CARDINAL ORG ( “ the LOC ” ) .

On DATE ORG ( “ the Panel ” ) ordered that Mr Câmpeanu should no longer be cared for by the ORG . The decision was justified on the grounds that Mr Câmpeanu had recently turned DATE and was not enrolled in any form of education at the time .

Although the social worker dealing with Mr Câmpeanu had recommended transferring him to the local Neuropsychological Recovery and Rehabilitation Centre , the ORG ordered that a competent social worker should take all measures necessary for Mr Câmpeanu to be transferred to ORG ( “ the NORP ” ) . According to the relevant law , the decision could be challenged before ORG .

Mr Câmpeanu was not present in person and was not represented at the hearing held by the ORG .

On DATE Mr Câmpeanu ’s health was reassessed by ORG . The assessment resulted solely in a finding of HIV infection , corresponding to the “ average ” disability group . It was also mentioned that the patient was “ socially integrated ” .

Subsequently , on an unspecified date in DATE or DATE , a medical and welfare assessment of Mr Câmpeanu was carried out by a social worker and a doctor from ORG as a prerequisite for his admission to a medical and social care centre . Under the heading “ Legal representative ” they indicated “ abandoned at birth ” , while the space next to “ Person to contact in case of emergency ” was left blank . The diagnosis indicated was “ severe intellectual disability , HIV - positive ” , without any reference to the previous diagnosis ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The following information was included in the assessment report : “ requires supervision and intermittent assistance with personal care ” , and the report concluded that Mr Câmpeanu was able to take care of himself , but at the same time required considerable support .

By a letter dated DATE , the ORG informed the ORG that it could not admit Mr Câmpeanu , who had been diagnosed with HIV and mental disability , as the hospital lacked the facilities necessary to treat individuals with such a diagnosis .

NORP Following this refusal , DATE and DATE the ORG and ORG for ORG ( “ ORG ” ) contacted a series of institutions , asking for assistance in identifying a social care or psychiatric establishment willing to admit Mr Câmpeanu . While stating that the ORG had refused to admit the patient because he had HIV , ORG asked for the cooperation of the institutions concerned , mentioning that Mr Câmpeanu ’s condition “ did not necessitate hospitalisation , but rather continuous supervision in a specialist institution ” .

The ORG eventually identified the ORG and ORG ( “ the CMSC ” ) as an appropriate establishment where PERSON could be placed . In its request to the ORG , the ORG mentioned only that Mr Câmpeanu was HIV - positive , corresponding to the average disability group , without referring to his learning difficulties .

On DATE Mr Câmpeanu was admitted to the ORG . According to a report issued by the ORG and sent to the ORG on DATE detailing his condition upon admission , Mr Câmpeanu was in an advanced state of “ psychiatric and physical degradation ” , was dressed in a tattered tracksuit , with no underwear or shoes , and did not have any antiretroviral medication or information concerning his medical condition . It was noted that the patient “ refused to cooperate ” .

In her statement to the prosecutor on DATE in the context of the domestic proceedings ( described in section B below ) , PERSON , the doctor who had treated Mr Câmpeanu at FAC , justified the failure to provide appropriate medication or information on the basis that she did not know whether , depending on the results of the most recent investigation ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , it would be necessary to modify his treatment .

A medical examination carried out upon Mr Câmpeanu ’s admission to the ORG concluded that he suffered from “ severe intellectual disability , HIV infection and malnutrition ” . At that time , he was QUANTITY tall and weighed QUANTITY . It was mentioned that “ he could not orient himself in time and space and he could not eat or care for his personal hygiene by himself ” .

During TIME DATE Mr Câmpeanu became agitated . According to the above - mentioned report by the ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , on TIME CARDINAL DATE he “ became violent , assaulted other patients , broke a window and tore up a mattress and his clothes and sheets ” . He was given phenobarbital and then diazepam to calm him down .

On DATE Mr Câmpeanu was taken to the ORG for examination , diagnosis and treatment , as it was the nearest psychiatric establishment . He was again diagnosed with “ severe intellectual disability ” . However , his condition was described as “ not a psychiatric emergency ” , as “ he was not agitated ” . PERSON diagnosed him with “ medium intellectual disability ” and prescribed sedative medicines ( carbamazepine and diazepam ) .

According to the medical records kept at the ORG , no information regarding Mr Câmpeanu ’s medical history could be obtained upon his admission to the hospital , as he “ would not cooperate ” . In the statement she gave to the investigative authorities on DATE , PERSON from the ORG stated that “ the patient was different in that it was not possible to communicate with him and he had mental disabilities ” .

Mr Câmpeanu was returned to the CMSC on DATE , by which time his health had worsened considerably . At that time , the ORG had received a supply of antiretroviral medication and thus his treatment was resumed . Despite these measures , his condition did not improve , and his medical records noted that he continued to be “ agitated ” and “ violent ” .

The ORG decided that because it lacked the facilities needed to treat Mr Câmpeanu ’s condition , it was impossible to keep him there any longer . The hospital sent a request to ORG asking it to refer him to a different establishment . However , ORG refused the request on the ground that he was already “ outside its jurisdiction ” .

On DATE FAC , the Director of the ORG , allegedly called ORG and asked it to come up with a solution that would allow Mr Câmpeanu to be transferred to a facility which was more suitable for the treatment of his health problems . It appears that she was advised to transfer him to the ORG for a period of DATE for psychiatric treatment .

On DATE Mr Câmpeanu was transferred from the CMSC to the ORG , on the understanding that his stay at the ORG would last for DATE with the purpose of attempting to provide treatment for his hyperaggressive behaviour . He was placed in ORG V.

On DATE Mr Câmpeanu was placed under the care of Dr L.G. Given the fact that Mr Câmpeanu was HIV - positive , the doctor decided to transfer him to ORG . She continued to be in charge of his psychiatric treatment , as that department had CARDINAL general , non - specialist doctors and no psychiatrists on its staff .

On DATE Mr Câmpeanu stopped eating and refused to take his medication . He was therefore prescribed an intravenous treatment which included glucose and vitamins . Upon examination by the doctor , he was found to be “ generally unwell ” .

On DATE a team of monitors from the ORG visited the ORG and noticed Mr Câmpeanu ’s condition . According to the information included in a report by ORG staff on that visit , Mr Câmpeanu was alone in an isolated , unheated and locked room , which contained only a bed without any bedding . He was dressed only in a pyjama top . At the time he could not eat or use the toilet without assistance . However , the staff at the ORG refused to help him , allegedly for fear that they would contract HIV . Consequently , the only nutrition provided to Mr Câmpeanu was glucose , through a drip . The report concluded that the hospital had failed to provide him with the most basic treatment and care services .

The ORG representatives stated that they had asked for him to be transferred immediately to ORG in GPE , where he could receive appropriate treatment . However , the hospital manager had decided against that request , believing that the patient was not an “ emergency case , but a social case ” , and that in any event he would not be able to withstand the trip .

PERSON died on TIME DATE . According to his death certificate , issued on DATE , the immediate cause of death was cardiorespiratory insufficiency . The certificate also noted that his HIV infection was the “ original morbid condition ” and designated “ intellectual disability ” as “ another important morbid condition ” .

In spite of the legal provisions that made it compulsory to carry out an autopsy when a death occurred in a psychiatric hospital ( Joint Order no . CARDINAL of the Minister of ORG and the Minister of Health ) , the ORG did not carry out an autopsy on the body , stating that “ it was not believed to be a suspicious death , taking into consideration the CARDINAL serious conditions displayed by the patient ” ( namely intellectual disability and HIV infection ) .

Unaware of Mr Câmpeanu ’s death , on DATE the ORG had drafted several urgent letters and then sent them to a number of local and central officials , including the Minister of Health , the prefect of GPE , the mayor of PERSON and the director of ORG , highlighting PERSON extremely critical condition and the fact that he had been transferred to an institution that was unable to provide him with appropriate care , in view of his HIV infection ; the ORG further criticised the inadequate treatment he was receiving and asked for emergency measures to be taken to address the situation . It further stated that PERSON admission to the ORG and subsequent transfer to the ORG had been in breach of his human rights , and urged that an appropriate investigation of the matter be launched .

On DATE the ORG issued a press release highlighting the conditions and the treatment received by patients at the ORG , making particular reference to the case of Mr Câmpeanu and calling for urgent action .

In a letter of DATE to ORG , the ORG requested an update on the state of proceedings following the criminal complaint it had lodged with that institution on DATE in relation to the circumstances leading up to PERSON death ; in the complaint it had emphasised that Mr Câmpeanu had not been placed in an appropriate medical institution , as required by his medical and mental condition .

On DATE , the ORG lodged CARDINAL further criminal complaints , CARDINAL with the prosecutor ’s office attached to ORG and the other with the prosecutor ’s office attached to ORG . The ORG repeated its request for a criminal investigation to be opened in relation to the circumstances leading up to and surrounding Mr Câmpeanu ’s death , alleging that the following offences had been committed :

( i ) negligence , by employees of ORG and of ORG ( LAW ) ;

( ii ) malfeasance and nonfeasance against a person ’s interests and endangering a person unable to care for himself or herself , by employees of the CMSC ( Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ) ; and

( iii ) homicide by negligence or endangering a person unable to care for himself or herself , by employees of the ORG ( LAW and LAW ) .

The ORG further argued that ORG had wrongly classified Mr Câmpeanu as being in the medium disability group , contrary to previous and subsequent diagnoses ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . In turn , ORG had failed to institute proceedings for the appointment of a guardian when Mr Câmpeanu had reached the age of majority , in breach of existing legislation .

Moreover , ORG had failed to supply the required antiretroviral medication to ORG staff when Mr Câmpeanu had been transferred there on DATE , which might have caused his death DATE .

The ORG also claimed that the transfer from the ORG to the ORG had been unnecessary , improper and contrary to existing legislation , the measure having been taken without the patient ’s or his representative ’s consent , as required by LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL ) .

Lastly , the ORG argued that Mr Câmpeanu had not received adequate care , treatment or nutrition at the ORG .

On DATE ORG informed the ORG that the case had been sent to the prosecutor ’s office attached to ORG for investigation .

On DATE the prosecutor ’s office attached to ORG informed the ORG that a criminal file had been opened in response to its complaint , and that the investigation had been allocated to ORG of ORG ( “ the Police Department ” ) .

On DATE , at the request of the prosecutor ’s office , a forensic report was issued by ORG . Based on the medical records submitted , the report concluded as follows :

“ Medical treatment was prescribed for [ the patient ’s ] HIV and his psychiatric condition , the treatment [ being ] correct and appropriate as to the dosage , in connection with the patient ’s clinical and immunological condition .

It can not be ascertained whether the patient had indeed taken his prescribed medication , having regard to his advanced state of psychosomatic degradation . ”

On DATE PERSON body was exhumed and an autopsy carried out . A forensic report was subsequently issued on DATE , recording that the body showed advanced signs of cachexia and concluding as follows :

“ ... the death was not violent . It was due to cardiorespiratory insufficiency caused by pneumonia , a complication suffered during the progression of the HIV infection . Upon exhumation , no traces of violence were noticed . ”

On DATE the prosecutor ’s office attached to ORG issued a decision not to prosecute , holding , inter alia , that , according to the evidence produced , the medical treatment provided to the patient had been appropriate , and that the death had not been violent , but rather had been caused by a complication which had occurred during the progression of PERSON HIV infection .

On DATE the ORG lodged a complaint against that decision with ORG of the prosecutor ’s office attached to ORG , claiming , inter alia , that some of the submissions it had made concerning the medical treatment given to the patient , the alleged discontinuation of the antiretroviral treatment and the living conditions in the hospitals had not been examined .

On DATE ORG allowed the complaint , set aside the decision of DATE and ordered the reopening of the investigation so that all aspects of the case could be examined . Specific instructions were given as to certain medical documents that needed to be examined , once they had been obtained from ORG in GPE , ORG , the ORG and the ORG . The doctors who had treated Mr Câmpeanu were to be questioned . The circumstances in which the antiretroviral treatment had or had not been provided to the patient while he was in the ORG and in the ORG were to be clarified , especially as the medical records at the ORG did not mention anything on that account .

On DATE the prosecutor ’s office attached to ORG decided that , pursuant to new procedural rules in force , it lacked jurisdiction to carry out the investigation , and referred the case file to the prosecutor ’s office attached to ORG .

On DATE ORG asked ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) to provide it with an opinion on “ whether the therapeutic approach [ adopted ] was correct in view of the diagnosis [ established in the autopsy report ] or whether it contains indications of medical malpractice ” .

On DATE , ORG of ORG ruled that there were no grounds for taking disciplinary action against staff at the ORG :

“ ... the psychotropic treatment , as noted in the general clinical observation notes from the ORG , was appropriate ... [ and therefore ] ... the information received suggests that the LOC decisions were correct , without any suspicion of medical malpractice [ arising from ] an opportunistic infection associated with HIV [ being ] incorrectly treated . ”

That decision was challenged by ORG , but on DATE the challenge was rejected as out of time .

On DATE the prosecutor ’s office attached to ORG issued a fresh decision not to prosecute . The prosecutor relied in his reasoning on the evidence adduced in the file , as well as on the decision issued by ORG .

The ORG lodged a complaint against that decision , submitting that the majority of the instructions given in the Chief Prosecutor ’s decision of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) had been ignored . The complaint was dismissed by ORG of the prosecutor ’s office attached to ORG on DATE . The brief statement of reasons in the decision referred to the conclusions of the forensic report of DATE and ORG decision of DATE .

On DATE the ORG challenged that decision before ORG .

On DATE the ORG allowed the complaint , set aside the decisions of CARDINAL DATE and DATE and ordered the reopening of the investigation , holding that several aspects of Mr Câmpeanu ’s death had not been examined and that more evidence needed to be produced .

Among the shortcomings highlighted by the court were the following : most of the documents which were supposed to have been obtained from ORG in GPE and ORG had not actually been added to the investigation file ( the forensic documents on the basis of which Mr Câmpeanu had been admitted to the ORG and transferred to the ORG ; the clinical and paraclinical tests undertaken ; the records of questioning of the doctors and nurses who had been responsible for Mr Câmpeanu ’s care ; and the HIV testing guidelines ) . Contradictions in the statements of those involved in Mr Câmpeanu ’s admission to the ORG had not been clarified , and neither had the circumstances relating to the interruption of his antiretroviral treatment after being transferred to the ORG . In addition , the contradictory claims of medical personnel from the ORG and the NORP regarding PERSON alleged “ state of agitation ” had not been clarified .

The investigators had also failed to ascertain whether the medical staff at the ORG had carried out the necessary tests after Mr Câmpeanu had been admitted there and whether he had received antiretrovirals or any other appropriate medication . The investigators had failed to establish the origin of the oedema noted on PERSON face and lower limbs and whether the therapeutic approach adopted at the ORG had been correct . Given these failures , the request for an opinion from ORG had been premature and should be resubmitted once the investigation file had been completed .

The prosecutor ’s office attached to ORG appealed against that judgment . On DATE ORG allowed the appeal , quashed the judgment delivered by ORG and dismissed the ORG ’s complaint concerning the decision of DATE not to prosecute .

The court mainly relied on the conclusions of the forensic report and the autopsy report , and also on the decision of ORG , all of which had stated that there had been no causal link between the medical treatment given to Mr Câmpeanu and his death .

NORP In response to the complaints lodged by the ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , on DATE the prefect of GPE established a commission with the task of carrying out an investigation into the circumstances surrounding PERSON death . The commission was made up of representatives of ORG , ORG , ORG of ORG and the prefect ’s office . The commission was given DATE to complete the investigation and submit a report on its findings .

The commission ’s report concluded that all procedures relating to Mr Câmpeanu ’s treatment after his discharge from ORG had been lawful and justified in view of his diagnosis . The commission found CARDINAL irregularity , in that an autopsy had not been carried out immediately after Mr Câmpeanu ’s death , in breach of existing legislation ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the ORG filed a complaint with ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) , criticising several deficiencies concerning mainly the failure to appoint a guardian for Mr Câmpeanu and to place him in an appropriate medical institution . The ORG reiterated its complaint on DATE , submitting that the wrongful transfer of Mr Câmpeanu to the ORG could raise issues under LAW ( e ) of the LAW .

In response to those allegations , ORG issued a report on DATE on the circumstances surrounding Mr Câmpeanu ’s death . ORG acknowledged that the ORG had acted ultra vires when ordering Mr Câmpeanu ’s admission to the ORG . However , it stated that in any event , the order had been of no consequence , given that the institution had initially refused to accept Mr Câmpeanu ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

ORG concluded that ORG had acted in line with the principles of professional ethics and best practice when it had transferred Mr Câmpeanu to the ORG . At the same time , ORG stated that it was not authorised to pass judgment on Mr Câmpeanu ’s subsequent transfer to the ORG .

Similarly , ORG declined to express an opinion on the allegedly wrongful categorisation of Mr Câmpeanu as belonging to the medium disability group , or on the events which had occurred after his admission to the ORG .

On DATE ORG informed the ORG that a commission made up of various county - level officials had concluded that “ no human rights were breached ” in connection with Mr Câmpeanu ’s death , as his successive admissions to hospital had been justified by LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL on measures for the prevention of the spread of HIV infection and the protection of persons infected with HIV or suffering from AIDS .

On DATE , following a criminal investigation concerning the death of CARDINAL patients at the ORG , ORG sent a letter to ORG , requiring it to take certain administrative measures to address the situation at the hospital . While noting that no criminal wrongdoing was detectable in connection with the deaths in question , the letter highlighted “ administrative deficiencies ” observed at the hospital and called for appropriate measures to be taken as regards the following problems :

“ [ L]ack of heating in the ORG rooms ; hypocaloric food ; insufficient staff , poorly trained in providing care to mentally disabled patients ; lack of effective medication ; extremely limited opportunities to carry out paraclinical investigations ... , all these factors having encouraged the onset of infectious diseases , as well as their fatal progression ... ”

In a decision of DATE concerning a criminal complaint lodged by the ORG on behalf of another patient , GPE , who had died at the ORG , ORG and ORG dismissed an objection by the public prosecutor that the ORG did not have locus standi . It found that the ORG did indeed have locus standi to pursue proceedings of this nature with a view to elucidating the circumstances in which CARDINAL patients had died at the ORG in DATE and DATE , in view of its field of activity and stated aims as a foundation for the protection of human rights . The court held as follows :

“ ORG considers that the ORG may be regarded as ‘ any other person whose legitimate interests are harmed’ within the meaning of LAW . The legitimacy of its interest lies in the ORG ’s request that the circumstances which led to the death of CARDINAL patients at the ORG in DATE and DATE be determined and elucidated ; its aim was thus to safeguard the right to life and the prohibition of torture and ill - treatment ... by initiating an official criminal investigation that would be effective and exhaustive so as to identify those responsible for breaches of the above - mentioned rights , in accordance with the requirements of ORG CARDINAL of LAW . [ It also aimed ] to raise the awareness of society as to the need to protect fundamental human rights and freedoms and to ensure access to justice , which corresponds to the NGO ’s stated goals .

Its legitimate interest has been demonstrated by the initiation of investigations , which are currently pending .

At the same time , the possibility for the ORG to lodge a complaint in accordance with LAW represents a judicial remedy of which the complainant availed itself , also in compliance with the provisions of LAW ... ”

The ORG submitted an expert opinion , dated DATE and issued by Dr PERSON , a member of ORG and director of ORG ( ORG ) , assisted by PERSON , ORG at the ORG . The opinion was based on copies of the evidence which the ORG also submitted to the ORG , including the medical records from the ORG and the ORG .

The expert opinion referred to the “ very poor , substandard , often absent or missing ” medical records at the ORG and the ORG , in which the description of PERSON clinical situation was “ scant ” . It noted that while at the ORG the patient had never been consulted by an infectiousdisease specialist . Also , contrary to NORP law , no autopsy had taken place immediately after the patient ’s death .

Concerning the antiretroviral treatment , the documents available did not provide reliable information as to whether it had been received on a continuous basis . Therefore , as a result of inappropriate treatment , Mr Câmpeanu might have suffered from a relapse of HIV , and also from opportunistic infections such as pneumocystis pneumonia ( pneumonia appeared in the autopsy report as the cause of death ) . The opinion noted that pneumonia had not been diagnosed or treated while the patient was at the ORG or the ORG , even though it was a very common disease in HIV patients . Common laboratory tests to monitor the patient ’s HIV status had never been carried out .

The expert opinion stated that certain behavioural signs interpreted as psychiatric disorders might have been caused by septicaemia .

Therefore , the risks of discontinued antiretroviral treatment , the possibility of opportunistic infections and the patient ’s history of tuberculosis should have led to Mr Câmpeanu being admitted to an infectious - disease department of a general hospital , and not to a psychiatric institution .

The report concluded that Mr Câmpeanu ’s death at the ORG had been the result of “ gross medical negligence ” . The management of HIV and opportunistic infections had failed to comply with international standards and medical ethics , as had the counselling and treatment provided to the patient for his severe intellectual disability . Moreover , the disciplinary proceedings before ORG had been substandard and negligent , in the absence of important medical documentation .

The ORG is located in GPE in southern GPE , QUANTITY from GPE , on a former army base occupying QUANTITY hectares of land . The ORG has the capacity to admit CARDINAL patients , both on a voluntary and an involuntary basis , in the latter case as a result of either civil or criminal proceedings . Until DATE , the hospital also included a ward for patients suffering from tuberculosis . The ward was relocated to a nearby town as a result of pressure from a number of national and international agencies , including ORG for ORG Treatment or Punishment ( ORG ) .

At the time of the relevant events , namely in DATE , there were CARDINAL patients at the ORG . The medical staff included CARDINAL psychiatrists , CARDINAL psychiatry residents and CARDINAL general practitioners .

According to the ORG ’s report of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , during DATE , CARDINAL patients died in suspicious circumstances at the PMH DATE and twentyeight in DATE . The ORG had visited the ORG CARDINAL times , in DATE , DATE and DATE ; its last visit was specifically aimed at investigating the alarming increase in the death rate . After each visit , the ORG issued very critical reports , highlighting the “ inhuman and degrading living conditions ” at the ORG .

Following a visit to several of the medical institutions indicated as problematic in the ORG ’s reports , among them the ORG , ORG issued a report on DATE . It concluded that at the ORG the medication provided to patients was inadequate , either because there was no link between the psychiatric diagnosis and the treatment provided , or because the medical examinations were very limited . Several deficiencies were found concerning management efficiency and the insufficient number of medical staff in relation to the number of patients .

It appears from the information received from the ORG that the ORG was a small centre for medical and social care , with a capacity of CARDINAL beds at DATE ; at the time , there were CARDINAL patients at the ORG . Before DATE when it was designated as a medical and social care centre – the ORG was a psychiatric hospital .

According to its accreditation certificate for DATE to DATE , the ORG was authorised to provide services for adults experiencing difficult family situations , with an emphasis on the social component of medical and social care .


Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Deprivation of property;Peaceful enjoyment of possessions;Possessions);No violation of Article 14+P1-1 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property;Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

András Sajó;André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Branko Lubarda;Carlo Ranzoni;Guido Raimondi;Kristina Pardalos;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Luis López Guerra;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Nona Tsotsoria;Pauliine Koskelo;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Síofra O’Leary;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Yonko Grozev;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

He had been employed as a police officer when , having reached an age when he was entitled to do so , he took early retirement and started receiving a “ service pension ” ( szolgálati nyugdíj ) from DATE , when he was DATE . The applicant , however , continued to work : he was employed in the private sector DATE and from DATE until DATE he worked , as a civil servant , as the head of ORG of the GPE . The applicant paid the statutory contributions to the ORG old - age pension scheme from DATE of his employment ( DATE ) until DATE .

On DATE Parliament enacted Act no . ORG , which entered into force on DATE . According to section CARDINAL ) of that law , service pensions like that of the applicant were converted into a “ service allowance ” ( szolgálati járandóság ) , provided that the person concerned was born in or after DATE . Pursuant to section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(b ) of the same LAW , for recipients of a service pension who , like the applicant , were born in or before DATE , the service pension was to be converted into an old - age pension .

On DATE an amendment to Act no . LXXXI of DATE on ORG ( hereafter “ the DATE LAW ” ) entered into force , according to which the disbursement of those old - age pensions whose beneficiaries were simultaneously employed in certain categories within the civil service would be suspended from DATE for the duration of their employment ( see also paragraphs CARDINAL below ) . No such restriction was put in place in respect of those who were in receipt of an old - age pension while being employed within the private sector .

On DATE ORG ( Országos Nyugdíjbiztosítási Főigazgatóság ) sent a letter to the applicant in his capacity as the recipient of an old - age pension , informing him of the amended legislation and instructing him to make a declaration as to whether he was employed in the civil service , in CARDINAL of the categories concerned by the amendment of DATE . By a letter of CARDINAL DATE the applicant notified ORG of his employment situation . Subsequently , on DATE , ORG informed the applicant that the disbursement of his pension had been suspended as of DATE . At that time his pension amounted to MONEY ( ORG ; at that time MONEY ( ORG ) ) per month .

On DATE the applicant lodged an administrative appeal with ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) against the suspension of his pension payments in which he argued that his pension constituted an acquired right and that he was being discriminated against since pensioners working in the private sector continued to receive their pensions .

ORG sought further information from the applicant on DATE . The applicant elaborated on his appeal on CARDINAL DATE , referring , inter alia , to an application filed by the ORG with ORG in DATE ( AJB-CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . In that application the ORG set out the complaints which had been made to his ORG about the amendment of LAW and raised the issue of a difference in treatment between pensioners employed in the civil service and those employed in the private sector . As far as the ORG is aware , this case is currently still pending before ORG .

On DATE ORG discontinued the proceedings concerning the applicant ’s appeal , holding that the applicant had failed to provide the information sought from him on DATE .

The applicant ’s employment with the GPE came to an end on DATE . On DATE the competent authority decided that the disbursement of his pension would be resumed . His pension was increased to ORG MONEY ( at that time approximately EUR CARDINAL ) .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention;Reasonableness of pre-trial detention);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Dmitry Dedov;Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of a flagrant breach of public peace and order , committed in concert by an organised group . The events in question took place in DATE .

On DATE the ORG of GPE remanded the applicant in custody during the investigation . In particular , the court noted as follows :

“ When deciding whether a preventive measure should be imposed , the court takes into consideration whether [ the applicant ] has been charged with a serious offence which entails a custodial sentence of DATE imprisonment . [ The offence in question ] was committed against public peace and public order .

Further , the court takes into consideration the fact that , at the time of the arrest , [ the applicant ] did not reside in GPE , did not reside at his registered address and , according to him , was staying at his friend ’s place in LOC ; and that he had applied for DATE leave of absence from his studies at university . During that period he did not have a permanent place of residence and did not reside at his registered address . [ The applicant ] is not employed . The source of his income or means of subsistence for his family are not known . Earlier [ the applicant ] was found liable for administrative offences against public order and public safety .

The court also takes into consideration the motive for and the specific circumstances of the offence with which [ the applicant ] has been charged . The perpetrators used improvised weapons and acted in an organised group during TIME .

Regard being had to the circumstances described above , the court concludes that , if at large , [ the applicant ] may abscond or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice by , inter alia , putting pressure on [ witnesses ] . ”

On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of DATE . He argued that ORG had failed to justify its decision to remand him in custody and had not considered the possibility of using a less restrictive preventive measure in his case . He further noted that there was no evidence that he had ever tried to put pressure on witnesses , to interfere with the administration of justice or to abscond . Lastly , he pointed out that he was residing at the address known to the authorities together with his wife , who was pregnant .

On DATE the ORG found the decision of DATE justified and upheld it on appeal .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s pre - trial detention until DATE . The court reasoned as follows :

“ As can be seen from the materials submitted to the court , [ the applicant ] is charged with a serious offence which carries a custodial sentence of DATE . The crime was committed in concert with other persons . Some of them have not been identified by the investigating authorities to date . The others have been arrested . [ The applicant ] was not residing at his registered address . He does not have a registered address in LOC . He is unemployed .

Under LAW of LAW , a preventive measure can be imposed if there is evidence that a defendant might abscond or interfere with the administration of justice in his case . Neither [ the applicant ] nor his lawyer presented evidence to show that the existence of such a risk could not be justified . Furthermore , it can be seen from the documents submitted to the court that there is a risk that [ the applicant ] might engage in unlawful acts as defined in the above - mentioned provision of the law , regard being had to the nature and seriousness of the offence with which he is charged , to and to his character

Accordingly , the court concludes that the circumstances justifying the [ applicant ’s ] remand in custody have not changed . There is no reason to change or lift the preventive measure imposed earlier . The statements of guarantee submitted by the [ applicant ’s ] lawyer can not be taken into consideration by the court because they were not submitted to the investigator or presented by the signatories in person . ... Some of the statements are not duly authorised and the court has doubts as to their authenticity . ”

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of CARDINAL DATE on appeal .

On DATE the ORG of GPE scheduled the trial for DATE . The applicant argued against the extension of his pre - trial detention . He submitted that he was a student , that he was married and that his wife was pregnant . He further pointed out that the investigation in the case had already been completed and that he could not interfere with the administration of justice or put pressure on witnesses . He had no intention of doing so or of absconding . The court ruled that the applicant should remain in custody pending trial . In particular , the court stated as follows :

“ Having examined the prosecutor ’s request to detain [ the applicant and CARDINAL other defendants ] pending trial , the court grants it . It discerns no grounds on which to change the preventive measure imposed on the defendants , regard being had to the seriousness of the charges , the factual circumstances and the defendants’ character . In particular , PERSON and [ the applicant ] do not have a registered address in GPE or LOC . They were not living at their registered address . They are unemployed . The circumstances underlying their remand in custody have not ceased to exist or changed . The fact that the investigation in the criminal case has been completed has no effect to the contrary .

Regard being had to the foregoing , the court discerns no grounds on which to change the preventive measure imposed earlier on the defendants and apply a less restrictive measure , including the [ applicant ’s ] release upon a statement of guarantee signed by a surety . ”

On DATE the applicant asked ORG for release . He submitted that on DATE his wife had given birth to their child . He also relied on the statements of guarantee submitted by his sureties . The court dismissed the applicant ’s request noting as follows :

“ ... the court considers that the request can not be granted . The court discerns no circumstances that would allow it to change the preventive measure imposed on [ the applicant ] , regard being had to the seriousness of the charges , the factual circumstances and his character . In particular , [ the applicant ] does not have a registered address in GPE or LOC . He is unemployed . Nor was [ he ] residing at his registered address . The reasons justifying the [ applicant ’s ] remand in custody have not ceased to exist or changed . ... the birth of his child has no effect to the contrary and can not justify the decision to replace [ pre - trial detention ] with a less restrictive measure , including the [ applicant ’s ] release upon a statement of guarantee signed by a surety . ”

On DATE ORG found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment .

On DATE ORG upheld , in substance , the applicant ’s conviction on appeal .


Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Helena Jäderblom

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention . They also argued that they did not have an effective domestic remedy to complain about the poor detention conditions .