No violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Helena Jäderblom;Josep Casadevall;Síofra O’Leary;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

The applicant is the former head of the NORP separatist organisation Iparretarrak . After his detention in DATE , he was convicted several times : on DATE he was sentenced to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment for criminal association with a view to preparing a terrorist offence ; on DATE he was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder in the framework of terrorist activity , killing CARDINAL members of the ORG security police force ( “ ORG ” ) ; on DATE he was sentenced to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment for armed robbery ; on DATE he was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder in the framework of terrorist activity , killing a gendarme ; and on DATE he was sentenced to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to murder , complicity in murder and armed robbery .

By judgment of CARDINAL DATE the Sentence enforcement division of ORG released him on licence from DATE to DATE , ordering to follow a DATE programme of assistance and supervision . The Government pointed out that the applicant was the first person sentenced to life imprisonment for offences linked to terrorism ever to have been released on licence .

The Sentence enforcement division reiterated in its judgment that the applicant ’s release on licence would be accompanied by the following general obligations ( Article CARDINAL - CARDINAL of LAW ) : complying with the instructions of the sentence enforcement judge or of the social worker from FAC and probation service ; receiving visits from the latter and providing him or her with information or documents facilitating supervision of his livelihood and compliance with his obligations ; informing the social worker of any job changes and , if such changes are liable to hamper compliance with his obligations , obtaining prior authorisation from the sentence enforcement judge ; informing the social worker of any changes of address and of any travel lasting for DATE , reporting back to the latter on his return ; and obtaining the authorisation of the sentence enforcement judge for any foreign travel and for any change of job or of address liable to impede compliance with his obligations . The division added the following special obligations ( Article CARDINAL - CARDINAL [ CARDINAL ] , [ CARDINAL ] , [ CARDINAL ] and [ CARDINAL ] of LAW ) : exercising an occupation or following vocational education or training ; residing in LAW ; continuing , in accordance with his means , to pay into ORG for the compensation of victims of terrorism ; and refraining from possessing or carrying a weapon .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal on points of law lodged by ORG with ORG .

On DATE the applicant took part in a peaceful demonstration outside ORG in support of NORP detainees being held there . The media reported on that demonstration .

Consequently , ORG delivered a judgment on DATE imposing additional special obligations on the applicant : refraining from attending , in the vicinity of a prison or other detention facility , any demonstration in support of persons detained for terrorist offences or of any association or movement which is committing or has committed terrorist acts ( Article CARDINAL - CARDINAL [ CARDINAL ] of LAW ) ; refraining from distributing any document or audiovisual material produced or co - produced by himself concerning , in whole or in part , an offence committed by himself , and refraining from discussing that offence in public ( LAW [ CARDINAL ] of LAW ) .

NORP That judgment was upheld by judgment of ORG on DATE . However , the latter judgment was quashed by judgment of ORG on DATE , on the grounds that the sentence enforcement court did not have jurisdiction to modify the obligations for release on licence , for which matter the sentence enforcement judge held jurisdiction .

On DATE ORG requested that the sentence enforcement judge of ORG of GPE add both the aforementioned obligations to the applicant ’s list of obligations for release on licence , as well as a prohibition on “ contacting any person actively engaged in promoting NORP separatism or supporting detainees convicted of or charged with terrorist acts pursuant to ORG CARDINAL - CARDINAL to CARDINAL - CARDINAL of LAW , particularly with a view to expressing support for such detainees ( Article CARDINAL [ CARDINAL ] of LAW ) ” .

By judgment of DATE the sentence enforcement judge decided to impose on the applicant the obligation set out in LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW : “ refraining from distributing any document or audiovisual material produced or co - produced by himself concerning , in whole or in part , the offence committed , and refraining from discussing that offence in public , whereby [ these ] provisions [ are ] applicable only in cases of convictions for serious offences of intentional homicide , sexual assault or sexual abuse ” . He noted that in its judgment of DATE ORG had described the applicant “ as a calm , respectful person who spent most of his time writing his memoirs ” . The judge inferred that “ although it is unclear what the word ‘ memoirs’ entails , it is quite possible that Mr Bidart might be tempted to publish his memoirs and make statements on the offences of which he was convicted ” . Nor did the judgment go into further detail on that point . It explained , however , that “ during the adversarial proceedings Mr PERSON was reminded that the prosecution had requested the prohibition only of writings or statements connected with the offences of which he had been convicted ” .

That judgment was upheld by judgment of ORG on DATE , stating that the obligation in question “ merely prohibited commenting on or condoning the offences committed ” and “ that the obligation was not a disproportionate measure in the light of the need to protect public order , nor does it prevent PERSON from expressing his political convictions ” .

By judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant , on the grounds that in its judgment ORG had properly applied Article CARDINAL - CARDINAL [ CARDINAL ] of LAW , in compliance with the legal texts and conventions relevant to the applicant ’s appeal ( including LAW ) .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing;Equality of arms)

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

In DATE the applicant was employed as an inspector for ORG ( Grad GPE ) . On DATE ORG ( GPE vijeće ) of ORG removed the applicant from her position and on DATE she was made available for redeployment ( stavljena na raspolaganje ) and subsequently redeployed to ORG , Transport and Infrastructure ( PERSON sekretarijat za prostorno uređenje , komunalne poslove , promet i veze – “ the ORG ” ) until DATE , without being given a permanent role there .

On DATE the ORG determined that the applicant could not be found a permanent position within the organisation and terminated her employment upon the expiry of her notice period on DATE . The applicant did not , at the time , receive any severance pay following her dismissal .

On DATE the applicant requested payment of severance pay from ORG ( PERSON ured za prostorno uređenje , zaštitu okoliša , izgradnju grada , graditeljstvo , komunalne poslove i promet – “ the Municipal Office ” ) .

On DATE ORG found that the request for payment should have been submitted within DATE of the applicant ’s dismissal and rejected it as lodged out of time . The relevant part of the decision reads as follows :

The request of PERSON is inadmissible , as the conditions for initiating proceedings have not been met ...

By the ORG ’s decision ... the applicant ’s employment was terminated on DATE in accordance with section CARDINAL of LAW .

On DATE the applicant requested the severance pay , relying on section CARDINAL(a ) of LAW .

This ORG finds that in the present case the conditions for initiating proceedings following the request of PERSON have not been met .

Section CARDINAL of LAW ... sets the statute of limitations for claims arising from employment at DATE .

Section CARDINAL subsection CARDINAL of LAW ... provides that the right to claim fulfilment of an obligation ceases when the statutory limitation period expires ...

In the present case , the statute of limitations ran from DATE . It follows that the applicant lodged her request for severance pay out of time ... ”

The applicant appealed against this decision to the Chief of ORG and on DATE he dismissed the appeal as without merit and upheld the first - instance decision . The relevant part of the decision reads as follows :

The appeal is without merit .

After an examination of the appeal and the entire case file , it was found that the first - instance body had fully and correctly established the factual background and had rendered a correct decision . There had been no breaches of procedural rules or errors in the application of the law to the detriment of the appellant ...

As regards the appellant ’s allegations that , instead of provisions of LAW and LAW , the provisions of LAW should have been applied to her case , [ this authority finds them to be ] unfounded ...

Section CARDINAL of LAW provided that claims became time - barred after DATE , if no other statutory limitation period was prescribed by law .

Section CARDINAL of the Labour Act provides that the statute of limitations for claims arising from employment , including severance pay , is DATE .

In the light of the above , it is apparent at the outset that under both LAW , relevant for determining the statute of limitations at the time the appellant ’s employment was terminated , and under LAW , relevant for determining the statute of limitations at the time of lodging the request , the appellant ’s claim is time - barred .

The validity of the decision of the first - instance authority is therefore clear ... ”

On DATE the applicant brought an administrative action against the appeal decision in ORG ( Upravni sud PERSON ) . Subsequently , ORG forwarded the case for comment to ORG .

On DATE ORG submitted its observations to ORG . In those observations ORG raised the issue of the applicant ’s entitlement to severance pay for the first time and reiterated that the request for payment had been lodged out of time . These observations were not forwarded to the applicant . The relevant part of the observations reads as follows :

II . It is further noted that even if the claimant had requested severance pay within the statutory time - limit , she would not have been entitled to it , as her employment was not terminated on the basis of section CARDINAL(a ) of LAW , on which the claimant relied , but on the basis of section CARDINAL of that Act ....

Section CARDINAL of LAW , on the basis of which the claimant ’s employment was terminated , envisages the restructuring of units or individual posts as grounds for being made available for redeployment or termination of employment , and as such does not envisage severance pay ...

On the contrary , section CARDINAL(a ) envisages the needs of the civil service as grounds for being made available for redeployment or termination of employment .

It is further noted that section CARDINAL(a ) of LAW , relied upon by the claimant , came into force on DATE , at the time when the decision setting the claimant ’s notice period , on basis of section CARDINAL of LAW , had been already rendered . Upon the expiry of that period , the claimant ’s employment was terminated .

On DATE the applicant requested that the proceedings before ORG be expedited . On DATE the applicant again requested that the proceedings be expedited and an oral hearing held in her case . On CARDINAL May and DATE the applicant requested that ORG expedite the proceedings and decide her case with or without holding an oral hearing .

On DATE the applicant asked ORG and the President of ORG ( PERSON ) to exclude the assigned judge and the President of ORG from her case . She expressed concerns that her case had been deliberately delayed .

On DATE the President of ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request for exclusion of the President of ORG as groundless .

On DATE the President of ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request for exclusion of the assigned judge as unsubstantiated .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s action . The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows :

The complaint is without merit .

It transpires from the above - mentioned statutory provisions that the claimant ’s employment was terminated on the basis of section CARDINAL , and not section CARDINAL(a ) of LAW , and that the claimant ’s claim is unfounded because her employment was terminated due to the restructuring of units or individual posts , and not due to redeployment for the needs of the civil service , as prescribed by section CARDINAL(a ) of the LAW . In the light of the above , the claimant has no grounds for severance pay .

However , the defendant authority did not entertain the claimant ’s severance pay entitlement . Instead , it declared her request inadmissible as time - barred ...

Given that the claimant lodged her request after the expiry of the statutory time - limit , the defendant authority correctly dismissed the claimant ’s appeal against its decision ... ”

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) complaining , inter alia , of a lack of adversarial proceedings before ORG . On DATE ORG declared the applicant ’s complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill - founded . The relevant part of the decision reads as follows :

“ The constitutional complaint is declared inadmissible .

NORP The constitutional complaint was lodged against the decision of ORG ... of CARDINAL DATE whereby [ that court ] dismissed the complainant ’s administrative complaint and upheld the decision of ORG ... of DATE .

By that decision the complainant ’s appeal against the first - instance decision whereby her request for severance pay had been declared inadmissible was dismissed .

The complainant considers that her rights guaranteed by ORG CARDINAL § CARDINAL , CARDINAL § CARDINAL , CARDINAL § CARDINAL and QUANTITY were violated by the contested decisions . She also cites Articles CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ...

The conditions for examining the merits of the case have not been met .

... LAW of LAW provides :

“ The Constitutional Court shall declare inadmissible any request or complaint in respect of which it has no jurisdiction ; which is lodged out of time ; and in other situations where the conditions for examining the merits of the case are not met .

By “ examining the merits of the case ” , section CARDINAL of LAW refers to scrutinising the constitutional law aspects of the case .

NORP In accordance with the LAW and LAW , ORG does not form part of the regular judicial system , does not conduct court proceedings and does not decide on the merits of judicial matters . ORG is a separate body established under LAW for the protection of individual human rights and fundamental freedoms ( constitutional rights ) in proceedings instituted by a constitutional complaint .

A constitutional complaint is not a regular or extraordinary remedy within the system of domestic legal remedies . It is a special , constitutional remedy for the protection of constitutional rights in individual cases . It is therefore not sufficient to base a constitutional complaint on breaches resulting from alleged unlawful acts committed by a competent body or a court . The legal protection against such unlawfulness is provided by general and specialised courts in proceedings taking place before several levels of jurisdiction . They can exceptionally be examined before ORG , but only in so far as they can [ be argued to have ] violated human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by LAW .

It is also not sufficient to repeat the submissions from the appeal or cassation proceedings or to merely enumerate constitutional rights that have allegedly been violated . The constitutional complaint must contain specific and reasoned claims of a breach of a constitutional right .

In the present case , ORG accepted the findings of the administrative bodies that the complainant ’s claim had been time - barred , as her employment had been terminated on DATE and she had submitted her request for severance pay on DATE .

The Constitutional Court finds the claims in the constitutional complaint to be a repetition of the claims in the administrative complaint .

In her constitutional complaint , the complainant was unable to show that ORG had acted contrary to the constitutional provisions concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms or had arbitrarily interpreted the relevant statutory provisions . ORG therefore finds that the present case does not raise an issue of the complainant ’s constitutional rights . Thus , there is no constitutional law issue in the case for ORG to decide on .

Meanwhile , on DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG ( PERSON ) about the length of the administrative proceedings .

On DATE her complaint was dismissed . ORG found that the proceedings had lasted for DATE , DATE and DATE at CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction , which was not deemed to be excessive .

NORP The applicant appealed against this decision and on DATE a panel of judges of ORG dismissed her appeal .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before ORG against the decisions of ORG .

On DATE ORG declared the applicant ’s constitutional complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the contested decisions were not susceptible to constitutional review .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court)

Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant worked for LOC until DATE , when he was made redundant .

On DATE the applicant brought a civil action against GPE in ORG ( PERSON ORG ) , seeking reinstatement and salary arrears .

By a partial judgment ( djelomična presuda ) of DATE , ORG annulled the decision on the applicant ’s dismissal as unlawful and ordered his reinstatement within DATE of the judgment becoming final . At the same time , the court decided to wait until the partial judgment became final before examining the applicant ’s claim for salary arrears . The relevant part of the partial judgment in question reads as follows :

“ The decision of the defendant , LOC , ... of DATE on the termination of the plaintiff ’s [ the applicant ’s ] employment is hereby annulled ,

... the defendant , LOC , is ordered to reinstate the plaintiff in his post ... and to acknowledge his employment - related rights ... , and to do so within DATE of this judgment becoming final ...

On the remaining part of the claim and the [ claim for ] costs and expenses [ the court ] shall decide by a definitive [ i.e. later ] judgment . ”

The judgment was served on the applicant ’s representative on DATE , and on the defendant on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the defendant , represented by the GPE State Attorney ’s Office , appealed against the partial judgment . The applicant received a copy of that appeal on DATE .

In the meantime , after having submitted several written requests for reinstatement to LOC without success , on DATE the applicant wrote to the President of ORG ( Županijski sud u Vukovaru ) seeking help in that regard . In particular , he submitted that on CARDINAL DATE and DATE he had requested ORG to certify that its partial judgment had become final ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) by adding a stamped endorsement to that effect ( klauzula pravomoćnosti – “ certificate of finality ” ) . He alleged that his requests had been refused orally with the explanation that the defendant ’s appeal of DATE had prevented the judgment from becoming final .

On DATE the applicant lodged a response to the defendant ’s appeal , arguing , inter alia , that ORG should declare the appeal inadmissible as it had been lodged out of time .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG declared the defendant ’s appeal inadmissible as having been lodged outside the statutory time - limit , finding that the last day for lodging the appeal had been DATE . The defendant appealed against that decision .

On DATE the applicant took early retirement on grounds of disability .

By a decision of DATE ORG dismissed the defendant ’s appeal against ORG decision of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE ORG stamped the applicant ’s copy of its partial judgment of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) to indicate that it had become final . The stamp indicated that the partial judgment had become final on DATE .

In the resumed proceedings concerning the salary arrears ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , by a judgment of DATE ORG found for the applicant and ordered the defendant to pay him salary arrears for the period DATE and DATE , that is , CARDINAL NORP kunas ( HRK ) in total , together with the accrued statutory default interest .

NORP However , following an appeal by the defendant , on DATE ORG reversed the first - instance judgment , dismissing the applicant ’s action in its entirety . That court noted , inter alia , that under LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) an employee could apply for the enforcement of a judgment ordering his reinstatement within DATE of its becoming final . The partial judgment ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) had become final on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above and paragraph CARDINAL below ) but the applicant had never applied for its enforcement , and he should have done so by DATE . ORG therefore held that the applicant had not only lost the right to seek reinstatement but consequently also the right to receive salary arrears .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law ( revizija ) against the second - instance judgment . He argued that he could not possibly have applied for enforcement of the partial judgment ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) by DATE because at that time the defendant ’s appeal of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) against the partial judgment had still been pending and he had consequently been unaware that the partial judgment had become final . That the partial judgment had actually become final on DATE had become apparent to him only on CARDINAL DATE , when it had been confirmed by the stamped endorsement of ORG . However , since he had retired on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , he had not been able to apply for enforcement of the partial judgment and seek reinstatement .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) quashed the second - instance judgment in part and upheld it in part . In particular , it quashed the second - instance judgment in the part dismissing the applicant ’s claim for salary arrears for the period DATE and DATE ( that is , for HRK CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL , together with the accrued statutory default interest ) and in that part remitted the case to the first - instance court . However , it upheld the second - instance judgment in the part dismissing the applicant ’s claim for salary arrears for the period DATE and DATE ( that is , for HRK ORG , together with the accrued statutory default interest ) . The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows :

“ In dismissing the plaintiff ’s claim for payment of salary arrears for the period DATE and DATE [ ORG ] misapplied the substantive law .

In the proceedings it was established that the defendant ’s decision on the termination of the plaintiff ’s employment ... had been annulled by the final partial judgment of ORG of DATE , [ whereby ] the defendant had [ also ] been ordered to reinstate the plaintiff ...

It was [ further ] established that the [ partial ] judgment in question had become final on DATE , and that the plaintiff had not instituted enforcement proceedings for reinstatement within the DATE time - limit laid down in section QUANTITY of LAW .

Given that the [ partial ] judgment in question is final , the plaintiff is entitled to the rights he would have acquired had the annulled decision never been rendered . Therefore , the defendant has to pay the plaintiff the salary arrears ... as if the unlawful decision on dismissal had never existed .

Since the lower courts erred in law , the factual background was not properly established . The appeal on points of law is therefore allowed [ in part ] and the impugned judgment quashed in the part whereby the plaintiff ’s claim for salary arrears for the period DATE and DATE was dismissed . In that part the case is remitted to the first - instance court .

As regards the [ part of the contested ] judgment whereby the plaintiff ’s claim for salary arrears for the period after DATE was dismissed , it is to be noted that the lower courts correctly applied the substantive law in dismissing the plaintiff ’s claim as unfounded . In particular , the plaintiff failed to institute enforcement proceedings for reinstatement within the strict DATE time - limit set forth in section CARDINAL of LAW ... It follows that the plaintiff did not work from DATE owing to his own omission . He is therefore not entitled to salary arrears for that period .

For these reasons the appeal on points of law has to be dismissed ... in so far as it contests that part of the impugned judgment ... ”

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against ORG judgment , alleging a violation of his constitutional right to a fair hearing . In so doing he repeated the argument raised in his appeal on points of law .

On DATE ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) dismissed the applicant ’s constitutional complaint , serving its decision on the applicant ’s representative on DATE . The relevant part of that decision reads as follows :

The constitutional complaint is unfounded .

As regards the complainant ’s argument that he could not have obtained a certificate of finality and thus observed [ the statutory time - limit laid down in ] section CARDINAL of LAW , the Constitutional Court finds ...

... that this [ argument ] can not be raised for the first time in a constitutional complaint . Rather , it should have been raised in proceedings before the ordinary courts .

Moreover , the complainant ’s submissions suggest that he never instituted enforcement proceedings for reinstatement , but only unsuccessfully contacted the defendant on several occasions requesting to be returned to work . The complainant therefore lost the right to salary arrears from DATE onwards owing to his own failure to undertake the procedural steps required by LAW ... ”

Meanwhile , in the resumed proceedings following the part of ORG decision of DATE remitting the case ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , by a judgment of DATE ORG ordered GPE to pay the applicant salary arrears for the period DATE and DATE .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed an appeal by the defendant and upheld the first - instance judgment .


András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Iulia Motoc;Marko Bošnjak;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicants , PERSON and Mr PERSON , are NORP nationals who were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in PERSON , GPE and Vicar , GPE . They are represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-2 - Information on reasons for arrest);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-5 - Compensation);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment)

The applicant was born in DATE and resides in ORG .

The applicant is a NORP citizen of NORP origin . He left his country in DATE and arrived in GPE , where he was granted a residence permit . He claimed that in view of the ongoing armed conflict in his country of origin , he would face extrajudicial killing , imprisonment or death by torture if he were to be deported or extradited there .

On DATE , following an order issued by the PERSON public prosecutor , the police arrested the applicant at GPE FAC on suspicion of illegal entry into GPE with a false passport .

At TIME on CARDINAL DATE the applicant was questioned by the police at the airport . He was subsequently detained at the airport police facility for DATE without any judicial order to that effect . He submitted that he had been kept in an overcrowded room .

On DATE the police took the applicant to the Kumkapı Removal Centre for Foreigners ( “ the Kumkapı Removal Centre ” ) pending his deportation .

The applicant alleged that he had been detained in unhygienic , unhealthy and overcrowded conditions at the Kumkapı Removal Centre .

NORP On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer lodged a complaint with the GPE public prosecutor ’s office against police officers from the ORG department of the GPE police headquarters alleging that he had been unlawfully detained by ORG officials . He also complained about the conditions of detention at ORG , particularly overcrowding , insufficient ventilation and poor hygiene .

On DATE and DATE the applicant ’s lawyer filed petitions with ORG and the GPE governor ’s office requesting the applicant ’s immediate release , claiming that his detention was unlawful .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer also applied to ORG for the applicant ’s release , challenging the lawfulness of his detention .

On DATE the police released the applicant from the Kumkapı Removal Centre on condition that he applied for the renewal of his residence permit .

On DATE the GPE governor ’s office decided not to examine the applicant ’s complaint regarding his detention .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer appealed against that decision . He pointed out , inter alia , that on DATE he had requested to be provided with the content of the applicant ’s file and that on DATE he had been given only a limited number of documents . He submitted that some documents had not been provided as they had been classified as “ confidential ” and that such practice by the police was not prescribed by law .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision , holding that the governor ’s office had to decide on whether authorisation should be granted for the prosecution of police officers at the Kumkapı Removal Centre .

On an unspecified date the GPE governor ’s office decided not to authorise the prosecution of the police officers . Subsequently , on CARDINAL DATE the GPE public prosecutor decided to terminate the investigation opened at the applicant ’s request . In his decision the public prosecutor noted that the applicant had been banned from entering GPE and that he had been apprehended with a false passport . He further noted that the applicant had not been imprisoned but remanded in custody pending his deportation .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

George Nicolaou;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE . The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , can be summarised as follows .

The applicant was arrested in the GPE on DATE . On DATE , following transfer to GPE , he was charged with the attempted importation of QUANTITY ( compressed weight ) of cocaine with a potential street value of ORG .

Prior to trial , in order to seize and preserve the applicant ’s assets for future confiscation in the event of a conviction , the prosecution applied for and obtained a restraint order and the appointment of a receiver under section CARDINAL of LAW DATE ( “ the DATE LAW ) . The receiver sought to sell the applicant ’s horses immediately and this was successfully challenged by the applicant . In its judgment dated DATE ORG confirmed that the purpose of the DATE Act was to preserve the value of assets for the purpose of future confiscation proceedings .

Also prior to trial , the applicant sought to challenge the admissibility of telephone interception evidence obtained in the GPE . He ultimately pursued an appeal to ORG , which delivered its judgment against the applicant on DATE .

The trial subsequently commenced in ORG in DATE . However , after the jury had already retired to consider their verdict a prejudicial document was discovered within the jury bundle . The fault for this lay with the prosecution , a matter admitted at the time . Consequently , on DATE the jury were discharged .

A retrial commenced on DATE . At the start of the retrial the applicant ’s counsel pursued an unsuccessful application to stay the proceedings on grounds of hardship suffered as a result of the prosecution ’s negligence in causing the first trial to be abandoned .

On DATE the applicant was found guilty of the offences charged . On DATE he was sentenced to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment . He lodged an appeal against sentence , which was unsuccessful . In DATE he lodged an out - of - time appeal against conviction . He was released from prison in DATE and , on DATE , he abandoned his appeal ( see further paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

The DATE LAW provides for the making of a confiscation order in the event of a conviction for drug trafficking offences . Accordingly , prior to the sentencing hearing , the prosecution served notice under LAW of its intention to seek a confiscation order and a statement under section CARDINAL of the LAW containing the prosecution ’s assessment of whether the applicant had benefited from drug trafficking and the value of his proceeds of drug trafficking .

At the sentencing hearing on DATE , the judge ordered the defence to serve a written response to the prosecution ’s statement within DATE . The defence failed to serve its response within the DATE period . At the prosecution ’s request , a further procedural hearing took place on DATE . At this hearing , the judge was informed that the delay in serving the defence response had been caused by the applicant moving prisons and wishing to instruct new solicitors . The prosecution drew the judge ’s attention to section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act , which provided a DATE deadline in respect of the confiscation proceedings . Prosecution counsel indicated that an extension of the deadline might be required . Defence counsel confirmed that the applicant wished to apply for a transfer to new solicitors and agreed that an extension would probably be required as it was unlikely that a fresh legal team would be ready by DATE when the current deadline was due to expire . The judge granted a short adjournment of DATE to resolve the matter of transferring representation .

On DATE the court granted a defence application for the transfer of legal aid . The new defence representative sought an adjournment of DATE to allow new counsel to receive the papers and take instructions from the applicant . The prosecution did not oppose the application but reminded the judge that under LAW , the judge needed to find “ exceptional circumstances ” before the timetable could be extended beyond the DATE deadline . Defence counsel was unable to address the judge on the point of “ exceptional circumstances ” owing to his lack of familiarity with the case . Accordingly , the matter was adjourned to DATE to review progress .

On DATE defence counsel indicated to the judge that , owing to the complexities of the case , he would not have a defence response prepared before DATE . He also indicated that a contested hearing , which the parties now appeared to consider necessary , would require a DATE time estimate . The judge was again referred to section CARDINAL of the DATE Act and it was decided with the agreement of all parties to postpone the confiscation timetable to DATE pursuant to the court ’s powers under that section . The judge suggested DATE of DATE for the substantive confiscation hearing .

At a hearing on DATE , the defence gave notice that it wished to challenge the validity of the postponement of the confiscation hearing on the basis that ORG had no jurisdiction because procedural requirements had not been properly followed by the judge at the hearing on DATE . The judge set a timetable for the service of skeleton arguments on the jurisdiction point and fixed DATE for legal argument on the matter .

NORP In DATE , as a result of informal discussions between junior counsel for both sides regarding a case pending before ORG on the jurisdiction point , DATE was vacated . In the event , the pending appeal case was subsequently conceded by the prosecution so no oral argument took place in that case . A review hearing in the applicant ’s case was scheduled for DATE .

Prior to the hearing on DATE it became apparent that the parties had misunderstood each other in agreeing to vacate DATE . Counsel for the defence had understood that if the appeal in the other case was decided in the appellant ’s favour , the prosecution in the applicant ’s case would terminate the confiscation proceedings against him . Counsel for the prosecution denied that such an undertaking was ever made . Counsel for the defence indicated his intention to argue abuse of process on the basis that an undertaking had been given and was then reneged upon .

On DATE , the prosecution indicated its intention to proceed with the confiscation hearing on DATE , as planned . The defence requested that legal argument on jurisdiction and abuse of process be postponed to suit the diary of leading counsel . The judge noted that it was “ a supreme irony frankly ... that this case was adjourned solely for Mr ORG benefit and he now has the temerity to say that there is no jurisdiction to try him . ” He also commented that since the prosecution had produced its statement under LAW of LAW before the sentencing hearing on DATE , Mr PERSON had done absolutely nothing . The judge indicated his preference for retention of the DATE for the substantive hearing with any legal argument to take place beforehand , suggesting that alternative leading counsel could be found . Defence counsel proposed instead that the DATE be set down for legal argument and after that , unless the confiscation proceedings had fallen away , the defence would serve their response by DATE The judge reluctantly put back the substantive confiscation proceedings until DATE , noting that he was “ very loath to have further slippage than is absolutely necessary ” .

On DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE CARDINAL defence applications submitted by newly instructed leading counsel were heard . The first was to stay the confiscation proceedings on grounds of abuse of process ; the second was for an order declaring that there was no jurisdiction to continue the confiscation proceedings on account of the judge having failed to observe the proper procedural requirements when he postponed the confiscation hearing on DATE .

NORP In his ruling of CARDINAL DATE the judge found , in relation to the jurisdiction point that the original adjournment was to afford the defence more time , that no defence response had been forthcoming to the prosecution statement and that further delay had been caused by the applicant wishing to instruct new solicitors . He indicated that he had listed the case on DATE , DATE before the DATE time - limit expired , and that on that date he had postponed the listing to CARDINAL DATE in compliance with section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act . He further found that no prejudice had been caused to the applicant as a result of the postponement . Accordingly , he concluded that the court had jurisdiction to deal with the confiscation proceedings . On the issue of abuse of process , the judge ruled that there had been a misunderstanding between counsel as to whether any undertaking had been given and that no abuse therefore arose . Following the ruling , the confiscation proceedings were adjourned and fixed for DATE to allow the defence to prepare their case .

Further argument then took place in relation to the jurisdiction point following a ORG judgment on DATE in which a confiscation order was quashed following a finding that a ORG judge had not complied with the requirements of section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Act . The applicant asked the judge to reconsider his ruling of CARDINAL DATE . The judge considered the applicant ’s case to be distinguishable on the facts . However , on the request of the defence and following advice from both parties that an interlocutory appeal could be completed quickly and that the DATE confiscation hearing would not need to be vacated , he certified the point as fit for appeal to ORG .

The applicant duly lodged an appeal on the jurisdiction point . For unknown reasons , matters proceeded more slowly than the parties had expected and the DATE confiscation hearing did not go ahead . A further judgment in a similar appeal was handed down by ORG on DATE ( NORP v ORG ( PERSON ) and others [ DATE ] PERSON ) . An appeal against that judgment was lodged with ORG .

The applicant ’s case was adjourned further in DATE and DATE on application by him under section CARDINAL of LAW , the “ exceptional circumstances ” being the pending ORG appeals . The parties were requested to keep the court updated . The applicant was subsequently informed by letter from ORG dated DATE that a question had been certified for ORG in the case of ORG and others and that all similar appeals , including his own , would be held in abeyance until that appeal had been decided by ORG .

As a result of this , and disclosure issues in relation to the receiver , the matter was further postponed in DATE until DATE by which time ORG had not issued a judgment in ORG and others . The judge allowed a DATE adjournment to obtain an update from the judicial office of ORG . He was reminded by the applicant that he would again need to formally postpone the confiscation hearing . The judge proposed a further DATE postponement , on the proviso that he be provided with more up to date information in a DATE ’s time and that if the proceedings could be listed and dealt with before the DATE period had expired , the parties should arrange this . Both counsel agreed .

Further hearings took place in DATE and DATE . However , ORG had still not issued a judgment . Further postponements were ordered .

On DATE the judge was informed that the applicant had lodged an out - of - time appeal with ORG against his conviction . Accordingly , there was little point in fixing a date for a substantive hearing in the confiscation proceedings . The applicant suggested a postponement to DATE . The judge agreed to the postponement on condition that the parties kept him informed of any progress in the meantime .

On DATE ORG handed down their judgments in CARDINAL jurisdiction appeals ( R v ORG and others [ DATE ] ORG CARDINAL ; and R v ORG and another [ DATE ] ORG CARDINAL ) . It upheld the confiscation orders , stating that any prejudice caused to the defendants by delay was outweighed by the public interest in not allowing convicted offenders to escape confiscation for bona fide errors in the judicial process .

On DATE a procedural hearing was held in ORG in the applicant ’s case . The applicant ’s counsel acknowledged that ORG judgment effectively ruled out the prospect of a successful appeal on jurisdiction . The applicant requested a further adjournment to allow the parties to discuss matters further and agree amongst themselves a convenient date in DATE for the next hearing . The judge agreed to an adjournment . It is unclear whether a hearing took place in DATE or whether further adjournments were agreed in light of the applicant ’s pending appeal against conviction .

In the meantime , from DATE , separate hearings were held in ORG relating to the applicant ’s appeal against conviction . On DATE , the applicant was released from prison , having served CARDINAL of his sentence . On DATE , apparently following adverse outcomes on various issues relating to his appeal , the applicant abandoned his appeal against conviction .

On DATE at a review hearing in the confiscation proceedings , the applicant informed the court that he had a large number of witnesses and a great deal of work was yet to be done . The applicant ’s counsel gave notice of a potential abuse argument arising from the deaths of CARDINAL of his witnesses . The judge fixed a timetable for further proceedings , including the lodging of an amended “ section CARDINAL statement ” by the prosecution and reply by the applicant . The matter was listed for a hearing in DATE . The prosecution served the amended statement in DATE . At the hearing on DATE it was agreed to seek suitable dates in DATE .

At a directions hearing on DATE the applicant ’s counsel again raised issues relating to the volume of work and requested until DATE to respond to the prosecution ’s “ section CARDINAL statement ” . The judge extended the deadline to DATE and ordered that the prosecution serve any further response within DATE . A procedural hearing was agreed for DATE . The judge further extended the deadline for the confiscation hearing on the grounds of “ exceptional circumstances ” , stating that this was “ a wholly exceptional case ” .

At the procedural hearing on DATE the applicant proposed DATE for the substantive confiscation hearing and assured the judge that the hearing would not last longer than DATE . The judge was scheduled to start a complex trial on DATE to last until DATE . He therefore listed the applicant ’s case for DATE . On DATE the parties appeared before the judge . The applicant ’s counsel informed the judge that , contrary to previous advice to the court , DATE would be insufficient for the substantive hearing as he now wished to call more witnesses than had originally been indicated . The judge ’s other commitments precluded a rescheduled hearing taking place before DATE and counsel could not agree on dates after DATE . The judge decided to keep the hearing fixed for DATE to clarify the situation as to dates . The matter was further adjourned at hearings that took place in DATE and DATE . The substantive hearing was listed for DATE , with a time estimate of DATE , but in fact lasted DATE from DATE .

The judge delivered his ruling on the confiscation on DATE . He identified the total amount of the applicant ’s benefit from criminal conduct as ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL . He found the principal realisable asset to be a farm , which was valued at GBP MONEY . A confiscation order was made , with a DATE term of imprisonment to be served consecutive to the main sentence in default of payment . In his judgment , the judge also addressed the question of delay , noting that the delay incurred resulted partly from the applicant ’s desire to challenge the jurisdiction of the court , partly from his appeal to ORG and partly from his decision to change his legal representatives .

On DATE the applicant requested the judge to vary the confiscation order and reopen his findings on the delay issue on the basis of the judgment of this Court in GPE and PERSON v. GPE , no . PERSON , DATE . The judge declined , noting that it was now for the applicant to seek other remedies .

The applicant applied , out of time , to ORG for leave to appeal the confiscation order . He argued , first , that the judge had erred in including the current value of the farm within the benefit figure of the proceeds of drug trafficking ; and , secondly , that the delay in the disposal of the confiscation proceedings had breached his right to a fair trial and to a trial within a reasonable time under LAW .

An oral hearing took place before the full court to decide upon both leave to appeal and the merits on DATE . ORG granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal itself , upholding the confiscation order and finding no violation of LAW . As regards the delay complaint , the court considered the whole period from the applicant ’s arrest in DATE to the making of the confiscation order in DATE . It indicated that the delay :

“ CARDINAL . ... raises a prima facie case of a significant breach of LAW . Unless there is a satisfactory explanation for it , it is a chronology which is way , way below the standards which are expected and achieved in the courts of this country . ...

... We start with the proposition that the passage of such a length of time as we have described calls for the most careful investigation and detailed justification . It is simply on the face of it well beyond acceptable . ”

The court found that the period from the applicant ’s arrest in DATE to the conclusion of his first trial on DATE was wholly unexceptional and reasonable . As to the period between the discharge of the jury in the first trial to the conclusion of the second trial in DATE , a period of DATE , the court accepted that the abandonment of the first trial was the fault of the prosecution , noting :

“ CARDINAL . ... The trial had to start all over again . It was not concluded by conviction at DATE second trial until DATE . There is thus a period of DATE from DATE until CARDINALth DATE which was an unnecessary delay attributable to the error , although in good faith , made on behalf of the prosecution by some junior clerk . That period is therefore potentially available to be considered as the responsibility of the ORG . ”

The court then examined the delay from DATE second trial in DATE until DATE , when the ORG of Lords’ judgment in the jurisdiction appeals was handed down . It observed that at the outset of this period , the confiscation proceedings were moving in good time . The court considered that there would have been a hearing of the confiscation question in about DATE or DATE , if that probable timetable had not been overtaken by the applicant ’s challenge to the court ’s jurisdiction , of which the court noted;.

“ CARDINAL . ... He was entitled to do so . The issue was raised before the trial judge in the early part of DATE ... The controversy as to the correct construction of the confiscation legislation was not resolved until the decision of ORG in R v PERSON and GPE ... In fact the question raised and decided went further than simply the confiscation legislation . It bore on a broader question of when technical failure to abide exactly by prescribed procedure has the effect of nullifying the subsequent actions of courts which is , of course , a very large general question . ”

ORG considered that it was in the applicant ’s interests to await the eventual authoritative ruling of ORG . It therefore concluded that the delay that arose in this respect could not be criticised .

In the period from DATE until the applicant abandoned his appeal against conviction in DATE , the court considered that the delay was the result of the appeal lodged “ long out of time ” , noting :

“ CARDINAL . ... Whilst an appeal against conviction was outstanding there could not of course sensibly be a confiscation hearing because if the defendant ’s conviction disappeared so would any prospect of confiscation . ”

The court observed that the applicant had engaged a third counsel for the appeal , and pursued it on grounds that had never been supported by those who had conducted his trial . It further noted that the various grounds advanced by the applicant fell away CARDINAL by CARDINAL over that period , but CARDINAL of them remained and was not finally laid to rest until DATE . The court concluded :

“ CARDINAL . ... The simple fact is that the appeal on this ground , as on the others , had always been without any proper basis or merit . It is this additional period to which we referred prospectively earlier on as an example of the defendant taking the course that he is quite entitled to do – leaving no legal stone unturned – but adding to the passage of time as a result . We are satisfied that nothing in that period can be called unreasonable delay attributable to the act or omission of the ORG . ”

As regards the period DATE , when the confiscation order was eventually made , ORG noted that the parties had returned promptly to ORG for the resumption of the confiscation issue within TIME of the abandonment of the appeal against conviction . It was apparent at the hearing of DATE that the prosecution was pressing for a short timetable . The applicant ’s representatives , on the other hand , wanted a longer timetable and were seeking additional time on the grounds that they had an enormous volume of work and would be calling a large number of witnesses , and might even be mounting an abuse argument on the grounds that some potential witnesses had died . Hearings were adjourned owing to the applicant ’s applications . Although ORG did not blame the applicant for his conduct , the court made it clear that any additional passage of time as a result of that conduct was not attributable to any act of the ORG . It observed in particular that :

“ CARDINAL . ... At CARDINAL such hearing , in DATE , the defendant through his lawyers indicated that there would be CARDINAL witnesses necessary to be examined at the confiscation hearing ... [ that ] was eventually set down for DATE , taking into account the potentially large number of witnesses and time that would be needed . At that stage the estimate , which according to LANGUAGE practice will have been an estimate contributed to by both parties , was DATE . That is a very long time for a confiscation hearing but if the time has to be found it has to be found . However , that date had to be broken on the application of the defendant because they assured the judge that they had so many witnesses to call that in fact DATE would be needed , that is DATE , to hear the confiscation question . In the end , the defendant called CARDINAL ( not DATE ) witnesses and CARDINAL of those was himself . ”

The court commented on the time taken by ORG judge to deliver his ruling ( CARDINAL after the conclusion of the confiscation hearing ) as follows :

“ CARDINAL . ... We do not doubt that that will be attributable to the demands made on the judges at ORG , but it is too long and that period , or at least part of it , is no doubt the responsibility of the State . Judgments of this kind ought to be delivered within , at the very least , DATE . ”

Looking at the passage of time as a whole , the court concluded that there had not been in the applicant ’s case unreasonable delay attributable to the acts of the ORG . The court also considered the impact of the passage of time upon the applicant , and acknowledged that he and his wife lived throughout this time with the uncertainty of whether they would lose his family home . However , given that his assets remained the same throughout the whole period and that he continued to enjoy his home which might have otherwise been taken from him earlier , the court had very little doubt about where the balance of advantage lay . It concluded :

“ CARDINAL . The reality of this case is that this was a defendant of resourceful approach who deployed every possible legal stratagem to delay the confiscation process . He can not now be heard to say that as a result of his having succeeded in delaying it , it has become unfair for the confiscation order to proceed . If there had been unreasonable delay attributable to the ORG , in the absence of any possible damage to the defendant beyond the very limited uncertainty that we have mentioned we are quite satisfied that this could not possibly have been a case in which the appropriate remedy would have been a stay of the confiscation process for abuse of process . There would simply have been nothing remotely unfair about the defendant eventually having to disgorge the confiscation which was the consequence of his offending . The appropriate remedy would , hypothetically , as it seems to us , have been a declaration . But that does not in the end arise . It follows that the substantive ground ... in relation to LAW . ”

Since the lodging of his application to this ORG , a further judgment has been handed down by ORG on DATE , substantially reducing the amount of assets payable under the confiscation order ( ORG v ORG [ DATE ] EWHC CARDINAL ( Admin ) ) .


Aleš Pejchal;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Pauliine Koskelo;Ksenija Turković

NORP The applicant , Mladost PERSON a.d . ( hereafter “ the applicant company ” ) , is a commercial ( joint stock ) company incorporated under NORP law , with its seat in GPE . It was represented before the ORG by PERSON , an advocate practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON . ORG , having been informed of their right to intervene ( Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( a ) of ORG ) , did not avail themselves of this right .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP The legal system of the former GPE ( SFRY ) distinguished CARDINAL types of ownership : private ownership ( privatno vlasništvo ) and social ownership ( društveno vlasništvo ) . While owners of property in private ownership were private individuals ( natural persons ) and some private legal entities called “ civil legal entities ” ( građanske pravne osobe ) such as foundations , associations and religious communities , the owner of property in social ownership was not defined . Nevertheless , the federal ORG , the constituent Republics , municipalities being local government units and other various legal entities called “ social legal entities ” ( društvene pravne osobe ) , among which the most important ones were companies , known at the time as “ organisations of associated labour ” ( organizacije udruženog rada ) and later on as “ socially owned companies ” ( društvena poduzeća ) , were during the socialist period given certain quasi - ownership rights over property in social ownership , such as the right to use it ( pravo DATE ) , the right to administer it ( pravo upravljanja ) or the right to dispose of it ( pravo raspolaganja ) .

NORP The applicant company was established in DATE in GPE as an “ organisation of associated labour ” . On DATE it transformed itself under NORP law into a commercial ( joint stock ) company whose shareholders were all private individuals .

The applicant company claimed that during the socialist period it had held a quasi - ownership right over CARDINAL plots of land in social ownership ( društveno vlasništvo ) located in GPE ) , namely the right of use ( pravo korištenja ) of that land . At the time , the plots in question had formed the “ GPE ” Children and ORG operated by the applicant company .

On DATE GPE declared independence and severed all ties with ORG ( hereafter “ the SFRY ” ) .

By a number of decrees adopted in the period DATE and CARDINAL DATE the Government of GPE prohibited companies or other legal entities with their seat in other GPE of the former SFRY from undertaking any transactions involving assets ( including immovable property ) located in GPE .

By Government of GPE decree of DATE , which entered into force on DATE , all such assets of legal entities with their seats in GPE or GPE were transferred to the State ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

Relying on subsequent legislation that entered into force on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , ORG ( PERSON ) on DATE recorded in the land register the ORG as the owner of the plots of land at issue .

With the entry into force on DATE of LAW , holders of existing quasi - ownership rights over socially - owned property ( the rights to administer , use and dispose of it ) ex lege became its owners ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . This did not apply to such rights which had been extinguished before that date , primarily by virtue of earlier legislative acts whereby social ownership of certain types of property ( such as flats , agricultural land and sports facilities ) was transformed into private ownership .

By a gift contract of DATE the ORG transferred ownership of the land in question to the GPE elementary school ( hereafter “ the elementary school ” ) . On the basis of that contract , on DATE the ORG registered the school as the owner of the land .

On DATE the Agreement on Succession Issues between the successor GPE to the SFRY ( hereafter “ the LAW ” ) entered into force ( see paragraph CARDINAL below , and , for further details , PERSON and Others v. GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE and the former GPE [ ORG ] , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , ECHR DATE ) . PERSON to the ORG deals with private property and acquired rights . LAW provides that successor GPE will recognise , protect and restore the rights to immovable property located on their territory to which citizens or other legal entities of the SFRY were entitled on DATE , and that anyone who is unable to enjoy such rights will be entitled to compensation . It also provides that any purported transfer of rights to immovable property made after DATE will be deemed null and void ( see paragraph DATE below ) .

Following an application by the relevant land - survey ( geodetic ) authorities of CARDINAL DATE , ORG , by a decision of CARDINAL DATE , joined the CARDINAL plots of land in question to form a single cadastral plot and recorded the change in the land register .

NORP In DATE the applicant company brought a civil action against the ORG and the elementary school ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) in ORG , seeking restitution of the land in question . In particular , since all existing rights of use had been abolished and transformed into rights of ownership ( see paragraph CARDINAL above and paragraph CARDINAL below ) , the applicant company sought to be declared the owner of the land . In the alternative , the company sought MONEY ( ORG ) in compensation . It relied on LAW to LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL above and paragraphs CARDINAL below ) .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant company ’s action . It found that during the socialist period the applicant company had held the right of use only in respect of CARDINAL of the CARDINAL plots of land which at the time had formed the “ GPE ” Children and FAC ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . During the socialist period the right of use in respect of the remaining plots had belonged to GPE ( CARDINAL plots ) and to ORG ( CARDINAL plot ) . When the company had instituted civil proceedings in DATE , that plot had no longer existed as it had been joined to the remaining CARDINAL plots to form a single cadastral plot ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . This meant that the applicant company ’s action had to be dismissed because it had been brought in respect of an inexistent item of property .

The applicant company appealed , arguing that during the socialist period GPE and ORG had transferred to it the right of use in respect of the CARDINAL plots of land . It provided some documentary evidence to that effect . In any event , it was evident that the applicant company had operated and used the resort in DATE for DATE and thereby , under the legislation in force at the time , had acquired the right of use in respect of those CARDINAL plots by the operation of law . As regards the remaining plot in respect of which ORG had acknowledged that it had had the right of use , the applicant company argued that its civil action should not have been dismissed just because that plot had been joined with the remaining CARDINAL to form a single plot of land .

On DATE the ORG ( Županijski sud u PERSON ) dismissed the applicant company ’s appeal and upheld the firstinstance judgment . It held that the applicant company had not provided sufficient evidence to overturn ORG finding that the company had not held the right of use in respect of the CARDINAL plots of land . ORG , however , agreed with the applicant company ’s argument that its civil action regarding the remaining plot of land should not have been dismissed on the grounds stated by ORG . Nonetheless , the applicant company ’s action had to be dismissed because the ORG had lawfully become the owner of that plot on the basis of the decree of CARDINAL DATE and the legislation of DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL above and CARDINAL below ) . The applicant company ’s right of use had thereby been extinguished and thus could not have been transformed into a right of ownership on the basis of the transitional provisions of the DATE LAW , which had entered into force on DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL above and CARDINAL below ) . Lastly , the applicant company could not have relied on Annex G of LAW either , because that agreement was not directly applicable .

By a judgment of DATE ORG ( PERSON ) dismissed a subsequent appeal on points of law ( revizija ) lodged by the applicant company . The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows :

“ Pursuant to section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW the owner of a socially - owned immovable property is the [ legal entity ] recorded in the land register as the holder of the right to administer , use or dispose of that immovable property .

However , this statutory presumption does not operate in favour of the plaintiff .

The plaintiff ’s right of use ... could not have been transformed into a right of ownership with the entry into force of LAW ( DATE ) because the plaintiff had already lost the right of use before that , on the basis of section CARDINAL ) of the [ Government ] Decree [ of CARDINAL DATE ] .

In the light of the foregoing , the right of use ... was extinguished and was transformed into a right of ownership of the first defendant [ i.e. the ORG ] before the entry into force of LAW .

Lastly , as regards the application of ORG to LAW , on which the plaintiff relies , its provisions do not entitle the plaintiff to seek from the [ first ] defendant recognition of its [ i.e the plaintiff ’s ] right of ownership , ... deletion of the [ second ] defendant ’s right of ownership or [ to make ] further claims under the law of obligations [ i.e. to seek compensation ] .

The plaintiff did not acquire the right of ownership on the basis of LAW itself because that right still needs to be recognised . This clearly follows from the last sentence of LAW subparagraph ( a ) of ORG which reads : ‘ Persons unable to realise such rights shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with civil and international legal norms.’

Therefore , the plaintiff ’s right of ownership still has to be recognised , whereupon the competent authority should decide either to return the property or to recognise the right to compensation .

In this connection it should be mentioned that under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW , its implementation is within the jurisdiction of the ORG authorities citied therein and not of the courts . ”

NORP The applicant company then lodged a constitutional complaint against ORG judgment . It relied on Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and on LAW No . CARDINAL to the Convention .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) declared inadmissible the applicant company ’s constitutional complaint . It held that the case did not raise any constitutional issues .

The relevant Articles of the LAW of GPE ( ORG , ORG no . CARDINAL , with subsequent amendments ) read :

“ The right of ownership shall be guaranteed .

Ownership entails obligations . Owners and users of property shall contribute to the general welfare . ”

“ CARDINAL . Ownership may be restricted or taken in accordance with the law and in the interests of GPE , subject to the payment of compensation equal to the market value .

Entrepreneurial freedom and ownership rights may , on an exceptional basis , be restricted by law for the protection of the interests and security of GPE , nature , the environment or public health . ”

“ International agreements in force which have been concluded and ratified in accordance with the LAW and made public shall be part of the internal legal order of GPE and shall have precedence over the [ domestic ] statutes . ... ”

The relevant provision of LAW of DATE prohibiting transactions with , and taking over assets of , certain legal entities on the territory of GPE ( ORG o zabrani raspolaganja i preuzimanja sredstava određenih pravnih osoba na teritoriju PERSON , ORG no . CARDINAL with subsequent amendments ) , reads as follows :

“ The assets of business units and other organisational forms of legal entities with their seat in the territory of GPE or GPE and the autonomous provinces of GPE and GPE ... are [ hereby ] transferred to GPE . ”

On DATE ORG passed legislation with the same name ( Zakon o zabrani raspolaganja i preuzimanju sredstava određenih pravnih osoba na teritoriju PERSON , ORG no . CARDINAL ) . The relevant provision of that LAW reads as follows :

“ The courts shall of their own motion record [ in the land register ] the immovable property of which GPE became the owner on the basis of section CARDINAL ) of the [ Government ] Decree [ of CARDINAL DATE ] . ”

The relevant transitional provisions of the Ownership and Other Rights in GPE ( Zakon o vlasništvu i drugim stvarnim pravima , ORG no . CARDINAL with subsequent amendments – “ the DATE LAW ” ) , in force since DATE , are set out in the case of GPE v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § CARDINAL , DATE .

The relevant articles of ORG between the successor GPE to the SFRY read as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) A Standing Joint Committee of senior representatives of each successor ORG , who may be assisted by experts , is hereby established .

( CARDINAL ) This Committee shall have as its principal tasks the monitoring of the effective implementation of this LAW and serving as a forum in which issues arising in the course of its implementation may be discussed . The ORG may as necessary make appropriate recommendations to ORG .

“ ( CARDINAL ) Differences which may arise over the interpretation and application of this Agreement shall , in the first place , be resolved in discussion among the GPE concerned .

( CARDINAL ) If the differences can not be resolved in such discussions within DATE of the first communication in the discussion the GPE concerned shall either

( a ) refer the matter to an independent person of their choice , with a view to obtaining a speedy and authoritative determination of the matter which shall be respected and which may , as appropriate , indicate specific time - limits for actions to be taken ; or

( b ) refer the matter to ORG established by LAW for resolution .

( CARDINAL ) ORG which may arise in practice over the interpretation of the terms used in this Agreement or in any subsequent agreement called for in implementation of the LOC to this Agreement may , additionally , be referred at the initiative of any ORG concerned to binding expert solution , conducted by a single expert ( who shall not be a national of any party to this Agreement ) to be appointed by agreement between the parties in dispute or , in the absence of agreement , by the President of ORG within the LOC . The expert shall determine all questions of procedure , after consulting the parties seeking such expert solution if the expert considers it appropriate to do so , with the firm intention of securing a speedy and effective resolution of the difference .

( CARDINAL ) The procedure provided for in paragraph ( CARDINAL ) of this Article shall be strictly limited to the interpretation of terms used in the agreements in question and shall in no circumstances permit the expert to determine the practical application of any of those agreements . In particular the procedure referred to shall not apply to

( a ) The Appendix to this Agreement ;

( b ) ORG CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of Annex B ;

( c ) ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) of ORG ;

( d ) Article CARDINAL of Annex D.

( CARDINAL ) Nothing in the preceding paragraphs of this Article shall affect the rights or obligations of the Parties to the present Agreement under any provision in force binding them with regard to the settlement of disputes . ”

“ The PERSON to this LAW and the LAW and Annexes are an integral part of the LAW . ”

“ This Agreement , together with any subsequent agreements called for in implementation of the Annexes to this Agreement , finally settles the mutual rights and obligations of the successor States in respect of succession issues covered by this Agreement . The fact that it does not deal with certain other non - succession matters is without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the GPE parties to this LAW in relation to those other matters . ”

“ Each successor ORG , on the basis of reciprocity , shall take the necessary measures in accordance with its internal law to ensure that the provisions of this Agreement are recognised and effective in its courts , administrative tribunals and agencies , and that the other successor ORG and their nationals have access to those courts , tribunals and agencies to secure the implementation of this Agreement . ”

“ This Agreement shall be implemented by the successor ORG in good faith in conformity with the LAW of ORG and in accordance with international law . ”

The relevant Articles of Annex G to LAW read as follows :

“ Private property and acquired rights of citizens and other legal persons of the SFRY shall be protected by successor ORG in accordance with the provisions of this FAC . ”

( CARDINAL ) ( a ) The rights to movable and immovable property located in a successor ORG and to which citizens or other legal persons of the SFRY were entitled on DATE shall be recognised , and protected and restored by that ORG in accordance with established standards and norms of international law and irrespective of the nationality , citizenship , residence or domicile of those persons . This shall include persons who , after DATE , acquired the citizenship of or established domicile or residence in , a ORG other than a successor ORG . Persons unable to realize such rights shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with civil and international legal norms .

( b ) Any purported transfer of rights to movable or immovable property made after DATE and concluded under duress or contrary to sub - paragraph ( a ) of this Article shall be null and void .

“ The successor GPE shall take such action as may be required by general principles of law and otherwise appropriate to ensure the effective application of the principles set out in this ORG , such as concluding bilateral agreements and notifying their courts and other competent authorities . ”

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ( Zakon o potvrđivanju ORG o pitanjima sukcesije , ORG no . CARDINAL ) entrusts its implementation to ORG , ORG , ORG , ORG , ORG , ORG , ORG , ORG and other ORG authorities responsible for the issues covered by the Agreement .

At the meetings of ORG , established under LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) held on DATE and DATE , the committee adopted recommendations concerning , inter alia , ORG to the ORG . The committee noted that the application of the provisions of ORG was not efficient enough , and recommended that the interested successor ORG conclude bilateral agreements for the purpose of the efficient implementation of those provisions . It also advised them to refrain from passing any legislation or undertaking any steps contrary to the provisions of ORG , and to adopt , should they deem it necessary , measures intended to enable the effective application of Annex G standards .

NORP In decision no . U - I-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ORG held as follows :

“ ... ORG notes that the entry into force of the [ LAW did not remove the legal effects associated with taking over the assets of certain legal entities on the territory of GPE produced by the entry into force of the [ Government of GPE ] Decree [ of DATE ] ... nor did the Contracting Parties by that Agreement explicitly undertake to return those assets . They only established the principle of equal protection of the property of natural [ persons ] and legal [ entities ] with the nationality of , or their seat in , the territory of the other Contracting party [ thereby granting them the same level of protection ] as the one enjoyed by their nationals and legal entities .

The said Agreement merely constitutes a basis for the conclusion of further agreements between the Contracting Parties with a view to regulating the procedure for exercising the right to compensation for damaged , destroyed or lost property , but is not an instrument suitable for direct application in each particular case .

ORG ... reiterates that ORG stipulates only the fundamental principles underlying the succession issues related to private property and acquired rights of citizens and other legal entities . This undoubtedly stems from LAW , which stipulates that the successor ORG should take such measures as may be required by general principles of law and otherwise appropriate to ensure the effective application of the principles set out in that ORG , such as concluding bilateral agreements and notifying their courts and other competent authorities .

... [ these ] measures entail the adoption of appropriate legislation and subordinate legislation , concluding international agreements and the like . In so doing , all the successor ORG are obliged to implement the LAW in good faith , in accordance with the ORG Charter and international law . ”


Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Aleš Pejchal;András Sajó;Angelika Nußberger;Armen Harutyunyan;Dmitry Dedov;Egidijus Kūris;Erik Møse;Guido Raimondi;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Kristina Pardalos;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Luis López Guerra;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paul Mahoney;Pauliine Koskelo;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Yonko Grozev;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

In a judgment of ORG ( PERSON u PERSON ) of DATE , upheld by ORG ( PERSON ) on DATE , the applicant was sentenced to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment for armed robbery .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) sentenced him to DATE imprisonment for theft , which was confirmed by ORG on DATE .

Following a request by the applicant , on CARDINAL DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG took into account those CARDINAL convictions and sentenced him to a single term of DATE and QUANTITY months’ imprisonment .

On DATE the applicant was transferred from a semi - open regime in ORG ( FAC ( GPE u GPE ) to serve the prison sentence originally imposed by ORG on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The reason for the transfer , as indicated in a report of ORG , was the applicant ’s inappropriate behaviour and threats of escape .

The applicant remained in FAC until DATE , when he was transferred to ORG ( PERSON u ORG ) following a decision by ORG ( ORG pravosuđa , PERSON ) of DATE .

According to the applicant , during his stay in FAC he was placed in overcrowded cells . He alleged in particular that for DATE in total he disposed of QUANTITY ( sq . m ) of personal space , including for a period of DATE . There were also several non - consecutive periods in which he was allocated between CARDINAL and QUANTITY m of personal space in the cells ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

The applicant further submitted that the cells in which he had been held were badly maintained , humid , dirty and insufficiently equipped with lockers and chairs for all inmates . The sanitary facilities were in the same room as the living area , from which they were not fully separated . Those facilities were QUANTITY away from the dining table and there was a constant smell in the cell . Moreover , he had not been given any opportunity to engage in prison work and in general was not provided with sufficient access to recreational and educational activities . The prisoners were allowed to move freely outside the locked part of the prison DATE , and the out - of - cell facilities were inadequate and insufficient , particularly given that there was only an open recreation yard . The nutrition was poor and the hygiene conditions were inadequate , especially since the toilet was not separated from the living area . The inmates did not have sufficient access to hot water and were allowed to shower only once or sometimes CARDINAL times per week .

According to the Government , while in FAC the applicant had at his disposal an average of CARDINAL sq . m of personal space . He was held in CARDINAL different cells , the conditions of which are detailed in the table below .

The measurements of the cells indicate their overall size ( as provided by the Government ) and with the in - cell sanitary facility deducted ( based on the methodology enunciated in paragraph CARDINAL below ) . That calculation is based on an approximate measurement of the sanitary facility ( QUANTITY . m ) according to the floor plans FAC , which the Government provided to the ORG and which are not disputed by the applicant .

The Government further explained that each cell in which the applicant had been accommodated had had windows allowing in natural light and fresh air . Artificial light was also secured and all cells were heated by a central heating system and equipped with a communication system enabling the inmates to contact prison staff immediately in case of need . All cells had a toilet fully separated from the living area and equipped with its own ventilation system . All cells had direct access to drinking water . The cells were constantly maintained and some necessary reconstruction work and improvements to the facilities had been carried out in DATE , DATE and DATE , as well as in DATE , DATE and DATE . Furthermore , the inmates were provided with all necessary hygiene and sanitary facilities . This included a shower CARDINAL times per week and after sports activities . Every inmate was also regularly provided with the necessary toiletries and cleaning supplies for keeping the cells clean . The inmates were provided with clean bedding and bedspreads DATE , or more often if necessary . In addition , the inmates were provided with the necessary clothing although they were allowed to use their own clothes . Nutrition was based on an assessment by experts and the quality of the food was constantly monitored by the competent ORG authorities . The inmates were provided with CARDINAL meals per day meeting the necessary nutrition requirements , as supervised by the prison doctor . Meals could be taken to cells or eaten in a common room .

The Government also explained that the inmates were allowed to move freely outside their cells in TIME , and to use the indoor and outdoor facilities of FAC . This in particular included TIME of outdoor exercise and in addition free out - of - cell movement inside the prison DATE Specifically , in the ordinary DATE regime , the inmates would wake up at TIME and at TIME on DATE and public holidays . They would then wash , tidy their beds , and have breakfast , followed by TIME cleaning of the cell . Leisure time was scheduled afterwards , until TIME , when they had an opportunity to take part in a number of activities . Leisure time was followed by lunch served CARDINAL The period after lunch was usually set aside for various group activities and meetings with lawyers and prison staff . CARDINAL all cell doors were opened again , enabling the inmates to move about within the prison and to use its facilities as they saw fit . Dinner was served from TIME , followed by TIME tidying and cleaning of the cells and other rooms in the prison .

The Government submitted that FAC was equipped with a recreation area located in the courtyard , which , in addition to the asphalted parts , included a lawn . The surface area of the courtyard was QUANTITY m. There was also direct access to drinking water and artificial light as well as protection from inclement weather available in the recreation area . The gym was open TIME and between CARDINAL and TIME , and the basketball court was open on DATE between TIME and at the weekends in both the morning and the afternoon . The recreation area was also equipped with a badminton court and ping - pong tables . The inmates were able to borrow books and use other services of the ORG library , which were regularly available in the prison . The prison administration also organised religious ceremonies and contacts with cultural and religious associations . Each cell was equipped with cable television , which could be watched TIME during DATE , and TIME and on DATE . There were also radio receivers in the cells and the possibility of borrowing and watching films from a collection available in FAC . In addition , the inmates were allowed to socialise by playing board games . There was also a room for spousal visits and the inmates were allowed to obtain various goods from outside the prison . FAC also offered a possibility of education in prison but the applicant had decided not to avail himself of that opportunity . Remunerated work in prison was available in accordance with the economic possibilities , which were at the time limited due to the general economic crisis . A possibility of work outside the prison existed but the applicant ’s previous threats to escape and his inadequate behaviour in detention had not made him eligible for this possibility . During his stay in FAC , the applicant had regularly received medical treatment . He had seen his family CARDINAL times while standing trial for another offence in Čakovec and had been allowed to speak to them by telephone TIME , with TIME on public holidays .

The Government substantiated their arguments with photographs taken in DATE , DATE and DATE in the context of the renovation of the prison and visits by various officials to the prison , floor plans and other relevant documentation related to the available facilities in FAC and the applicant ’s health care and nutrition .

On DATE the applicant lodged a request with the ORG administration through a lawyer , asking to be transferred to FAC for personal and family reasons .

On DATE he complained to ORG in general terms about the conduct of FAC administration , alleging that they had never offered him the opportunity to have a meeting with the relevant officials , that his request for a transfer had been ignored and that the prison food had been inadequate .

NORP The applicant again reiterated his request for a transfer to FAC on DATE , citing personal and family reasons , particularly his family ’s lack of financial means , which made it difficult for them to visit him .

On DATE ORG replied to the applicant ’s complaints , finding them ill - founded in all respects . It pointed out that he had been given sufficient opportunity to have contact with his family by telephone and while attending the court hearings in DATE , DATE and DATE in the criminal proceedings against him , that he had not been engaged in any work because there had been an insufficient number of work posts in FAC , that he had had CARDINAL meetings with the prison governor and CARDINAL meetings with various other ORG officials , and that food had been prepared in consultation with experts , the prison diet having been continuously supervised by the prison doctor .

On DATE the applicant complained about the conditions of his detention to a sentence - execution judge of ORG ( PERSON u GPE ) . He pointed out that central to his complaints was his wish to be transferred to another prison closer to his family . He also complained , in particular , that his request to engage in prison work had not been answered . He was being detained with CARDINAL other inmates in cell no . CARDINAL , which measured CARDINAL sq . m in total and was inadequately equipped and maintained . Hygiene conditions were poor , given that he had been allowed to take a shower CARDINAL times per week .

Following the applicant ’s complaint , the sentence - execution judge requested a detailed report from FAC concerning the conditions of his detention .

After obtaining the relevant report and hearing the applicant in person , on DATE the sentence - execution judge dismissed his complaints as ill - founded . She found , in particular , that the applicant had sufficient personal space at his disposal , given that CARDINAL other persons were at the time placed with him in the same cell . The sentence - execution judge also found that the applicant was provided with sufficient hygiene and sanitary facilities , and that he was not engaged in prison work since such opportunities did not exist for all prisoners in FAC .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against the sentence - execution judge ’s decision with a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG , alleging that she had erred in her factual findings , as cell no . CARDINAL had been occupied by CARDINAL inmates .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal as ill - founded , endorsing the reasoning of the sentence - execution judge . It also explained that the required standard for personal space under LAW , namely QUANTITY , was the recommended minimum standard that should in principle be respected , but that there could be no automatic violation of a prisoner ’s rights if such a standard was temporarily not complied with . In view of the fact that a reduction in the applicant ’s personal space in cell no . CARDINAL had only been temporary , the CARDINAL - judge panel considered that there had been no violation of his rights .

On DATE the applicant complained to ORG about the decision of its CARDINAL - judge panel . He argued that for DATE following his arrival at FAC , he had been detained in cell no . CARDINAL , measuring QUANTITY m , where CARDINAL inmates in total had been detained . He had then spent DATE in cell no . CARDINAL on the first floor with CARDINAL inmates , which had measured QUANTITY m. He had then been placed in another cell , also marked “ cell no . CARDINAL ” , which again measured QUANTITY . m , where he had spent DATE with CARDINAL inmates . At the time of his complaint he was being held in cell no . CARDINAL with CARDINAL inmates .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) , relying on LAW ( equality before the law ) , LAW before the ORG authorities ) and LAW ( right to a fair trial ) of the LAW , complaining in general terms of a lack of personal space and work opportunities in FAC . He also relied on section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of FAC , guaranteeing adequate personal space to detainees , and alleged that this provision had not been complied with in his case .

On DATE the applicant complained to the PERSON ( NORP pravobranitelj ) that he had not been granted a transfer to a prison closer to his family , and alleged in general terms that the conditions of his detention had been inadequate .

Meanwhile , in DATE the applicant joined a group of inmates who complained to the sentence - execution judge about inadequate general conditions in FAC .

By a letter of DATE the PERSON invited the applicant to further substantiate his complaints .

The applicant replied to that request on DATE , indicating that the sentence - execution judge and the CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG had never examined his complaints properly , and that he had not been granted QUANTITY m of personal space in detention as required under LAW .

In DATE the applicant saw a psychiatrist , who found that the applicant was frustrated with his internment and the impossibility of seeing his family .

On DATE the PERSON replied to the applicant ’s letter that , according to the information available , his accommodation in FAC had fallen short of the requirements of adequate personal space under FAC . The PERSON also pointed out that the cell where the applicant was being detained had been renovated in DATE , and complied with all hygiene and health standards . The ORG also noted that , just like CARDINAL other inmates , the applicant had not been engaged in prison work , as there had been an insufficient number of work posts for all prisoners .

On DATE ORG declared the applicant ’s constitutional complaint ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) inadmissible as manifestly ill - founded . The relevant part of the decision reads :

“ In his constitutional complaint , the complainant was unable to show that ORG had acted contrary to the constitutional provisions concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms or had arbitrarily interpreted the relevant statutory provisions . ORG therefore finds that the present case does not raise an issue of the complainant ’s constitutional rights . Thus , there is no constitutional law issue in the case for ORG to decide upon ... ”

The Constitutional Court ’s decision was served on the applicant ’s representative on DATE .