CASE OF RUIZ RIVERA v. SWITZERLAND [Extracts]

Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Procedural guarantees of review;Review of lawfulness of detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Procedural guarantees of review;Review of lawfulness of detention);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient

András Sajó;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Peer Lorenzen

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE ( GPE ) . At the material time he was living in GPE .

Criminal proceedings against the applicant following the premeditated murder of his wife

On DATE the applicant ’s wife was found dead . The applicant who , according to the toxicological examinations that he subsequently underwent , was under the influence of alcohol and cocaine , had stabbed his wife CARDINAL times . He had also cut off her head and thrown it out of the window of the flat where the incident had taken place .

At an unknown date the applicant was charged with his wife ’s murder .

On DATE the public prosecutor for the district of GPE asked the psychiatric clinic of ORG ( PERSON ) to carry out a psychiatric assessment of the applicant .

On DATE Doctor PERSON , a psychiatrist , issued his report . He found that the applicant had been suffering for DATE from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and had a drug addiction . He took the view that the offence had been directly related to his illness and drug abuse . He concluded that at the material time the applicant had not been criminally responsible for his actions . In view of the serious danger he represented for public safety , PERSON recommended his confinement .

NORP On DATE ORG found , having regard to the evidence before it , that the applicant had killed his wife and that he had been totally lacking in criminal responsibility for his actions at the material time . The court thus ordered his confinement within the meaning of LAW of LAW as then in force .

NORP The applicant ’s confinement and second psychiatric assessment

The applicant was placed in confinement from CARDINAL DATE onwards at FAC in GPE ( GPE of GPE ) .

His discharge was refused on DATE , DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE , at the request of the Probation and Sentence - enforcement Service of the GPE of GPE ( Bewährungs- und Vollzugsdienste des Kantons Zürich ) , the applicant ’s mental health was examined by a head doctor and an assistant doctor of ORG of Rheinau ( Kantonale PERSON ) , who drew up a second psychiatric report .

The expert psychiatrists observed that the applicant had not encountered any particular difficulties in the custodial facility where he had been held since DATE . In the prison he had successively worked as a bookbinder , in the dispensary , as a gardener and lastly as a cook . The experts took note of the fact that , according to a psychological report of CARDINAL DATE , the applicant had not displayed any awareness of his illness and no capacity for introspection . As regards his mental health , the experts concluded that he was suffering from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and that in the “ not very stimulating ” atmosphere of the prison , “ the positive symptoms of the illness had become less noticeable ” , even though he “ still display[ed ] a delirious interpretation of the details of his offence ” . His situation had thus changed little since his psychiatric assessment in DATE . In view of the lack of treatment , the experts took the view that “ no indication c[ould ] be given as regards alternative arrangements for the enforcement of the measure or the possibility of discharge on probation ” .

On DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE , ORG of GPE ( ORG ) refused the applicant ’s discharge on probation . The applicant challenged the decision of DATE before ORG of the Canton of GPE ( ORG ) , which dismissed his appeal on DATE .

On DATE the Psychiatry and Psychology Service of ORG issued an annual therapy report , signed by CARDINAL psychologists , CARDINAL of whom had treated the applicant . The report confirmed the findings of the psychiatric assessment carried out in DATE and indicated an unfavourable legal prognosis on account of the applicant ’s personality and the impossibility of treating his residual psychotic symptoms . The applicant continued , in particular , to deny that he was ill and refused to follow the medical treatment that had been prescribed for him . The psychologists concluded that the conditions for his discharge on probation were not satisfied . At the end of their report they indicated that they had discussed the report with the applicant and had given him a copy .

Refusal to discharge the applicant and the proceedings before the domestic courts

On DATE , after hearing the applicant in person in an interview of DATE , ORG of GPE refused his discharge on probation . It based its decision on a report of the ORG administration of DATE , on the DATE report of DATE , and on the psychiatric assessment of DATE .

Assisted by a lawyer , the applicant appealed to ORG and ORG of GPE , arguing that a fresh expert ’s assessment was necessary . He applied for legal aid . ORG and ORG dismissed his application in a decision of DATE . He was exempted from paying administrative costs , but was denied the free assistance of a lawyer , on the ground that his appeal was devoid of any prospect of success , as his discharge on probation had already been refused several times and there had been no change in the meantime .

NORP The applicant lodged an appeal with ORG the Canton of GPE . Once again , he submitted that the verification of the need for his confinement had to be based on a fresh psychiatric assessment by a neutral doctor . He also sought free legal assistance and requested a hearing , submitting as follows :

“ It is is essential that the person concerned should have access to a court and the opportunity to be heard either in person or , where necessary , through some form of representation , failing which he [ can not be ] ‘ afforded the fundamental guarantees of procedure applied in matters of deprivation of PERSON ( ECtHR judgment PERSON v. the GPE , DATE , Series A , no . CARDINAL , § CARDINAL ) .

While the requirements of LAW ORG [ can be distinguished ] from those laid down in DATE , which applies to civil and criminal proceedings , this provision dictates , according to legal science , that sufficient safeguards be afforded in order to guarantee effective judicial supervision .

Should a fresh expert ’s opinion not be ordered , it would at least be justified for the author of the report to give evidence at a hearing of the court and for [ the applicant ] to put questions to him .

As already stated , NORP legal science guarantees in such cases an adversarial hearing and the examination of witnesses . It entails that a fresh expert ’s opinion may prove necessary in order to uphold the rights of the person confined . ”

ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal by a decision of DATE . It found that in view of the circumstances , the expert ’s report of DATE was still valid . The doubts expressed by the applicant concerning that report had already given rise to a final judgment of ORG DATE . Moreover , it was unnecessary for the expert to give evidence as he had already expressed his opinion clearly and comprehensively in his report . No new pertinent information could thus be expected of such a hearing . In addition , the applicant had not shown how his right of access to a court had actually been impaired . He had failed to indicate the reasons which led him to believe that ORG was not able to comply with the basic rules of procedure or to exercise sufficient supervision . Lastly , he had been denied legal assistance on the ground that his appeal appeared devoid of any prospect of success , CARDINAL appeals in the same case already having been dismissed without any change in the meantime .

The applicant lodged an administrative - law appeal with ORG . He reiterated the complaints he had submitted to ORG : the last expert ’s report was now DATE , and the therapy report was not a neutral assessment and was insufficient . In addition , given that various findings of the expert ’s report were based on misinterpretations it was necessary for a fresh expert ’s report to be drawn up or for the expert to give evidence with the possibility of cross - examination . The applicant was , moreover , entitled to the holding of a public and adversarial hearing . Lastly , the denial of legal assistance by the court below had impaired his right of access to a court . As the applicant was entitled to regular scrutiny of the lawfulness of his detention , the fact that he was appealing again against a refusal could not constitute a ground for refusing legal aid . The applicant also sought free legal assistance in the proceedings before ORG .

NORP In a judgment of DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . It declared inadmissible the complaint concerning the lack of a public hearing , on the ground that no formal application to that effect had been lodged with the cantonal authorities . As regards the need for a fresh assessment by a neutral expert , it first noted that LAW did not require one , even though case - law had found it necessary in particular circumstances . In the present case , ORG found that a fresh psychiatric assessment was not necessary , because the initial diagnosis had been confirmed in subsequent therapy reports and “ no change c[ould ] be identified ” . It concluded that no other measure of sentence enforcement could be considered , with the result that the maintaining of the applicant ’s confinement was to be regarded as proportionate . As regards , lastly , the complaint about the refusal to grant the applicant legal aid , ORG first observed that he had been able to use the remedies available to him . It then noted that LAW required scrutiny of the lawfulness of detention only at reasonable intervals , and that such intervals were longer with regard to persons of unsound mind , where circumstances only changed in the medium term . The last decision to have been taken by a court in the present case dated from DATE . At the time of the DATE assessment by the prison administration in DATE , it had been found that the circumstances had clearly not changed since that decision . The appeal thus appeared to be devoid of any prospects of success . In ORG view , that constituted a legitimate ground on which to deny legal aid . In view of the foregoing , legal aid was also denied in respect of the proceedings before ORG itself .


Egidijus Kūris;Ganna Yudkivska;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix . They are all NORP nationals , represented by PERSON and PERSON PERSON , lawyers practising in GPE and GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr PERSON , of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The Soviet LAW of DATE ( “ the Act of DATE ” ) provided that NORP nationals who had suffered various forms of political persecution on the territory of the former GPE DATE and DATE , as well as their first - generation heirs , could claim compensation for non - pecuniary damage . In particular , LAW read as follows :

“ A person who has been recognised as a victim of political repression on account of having been subjected to deprivation of liberty , resettlement , exile , forceful placement in a special place of residence or a psychiatric hospital , or who died as a result of such repression , or this victim ’s first - generation heir , shall receive monetary compensation , the amount and procedures for payment of which shall be established by law . ”

Despite the general undertaking contained in section CARDINAL in fine of the LAW DATE , ORG did not enact legislation defining the amount and procedures for payment of the relevant compensation .

In its judgment of DATE in the case of PERSON and PERSON , the ORG found a violation of LAW No . CARDINAL on account of the respondent ORG ’s failure to undertake the necessary measures to ensure the effective exercise of the applicants’ right to receive monetary compensation for non - pecuniary damage under section CARDINAL of the Act of DATE ( see PERSON and PERSON v. GPE , no . MONEY , § § DATE and CARDINAL , DATE ) .

Applying LAW , the ORG stated that , since the finding of a violation under LAW No . CARDINAL concerned a large number of people and reflected a structural problem , it was urgent to undertake the necessary legislative , administrative and budgetary measures at the domestic level in order that victims of NORP political repression , who were targeted by LAW , could effectively benefit from the right to receive compensation under that section ( see PERSON and PERSON , cited above , § § DATE ) . Applying Article CARDINAL of the Convention , the ORG also held that if the necessary measures ( legislative and other ) were still lacking DATE after the date on which the judgment became final , the respondent ORG would have to pay each of the CARDINAL applicants , in accordance with LAW , MONEY ( ORG ) in respect of non - pecuniary damage ( ibid . , § CARDINAL ) .

As the necessary general measures were not implemented by the respondent ORG within the above - mentioned time - limit of DATE , each of the CARDINAL applicants in that case duly received ORG CARDINAL from the respondent ORG , as indicated by the ORG .

For the purposes of implementing the general measures indicated by ORG under LAW in its judgment of DATE , in DATE the ORG of GPE introduced draft amendments to LAW DATE and LAW .

On DATE the Government submitted the above - mentioned draft amendments to ORG see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the amendments were adopted , with certain modifications , by ORG . They entered into force on DATE ( hereinafter “ the LAW of DATE ” ) .

Thus , under the new LAW § DATE of LAW , victims of NORP political repression or their first - generation heirs had until DATE to lodge applications with ORG for monetary compensation under LAW DATE . The new provisions of the LAW also provided for various additional procedures for the lodging of such applications , their examination by ORG and subsequent appellate proceedings before ORG , the latter acting as the final level of jurisdiction in such matters .

As to the amount(s ) of compensation payable under LAW of DATE , they were not fixed by any of the abovementioned legislative amendments . Instead , a new subsection ( CARDINAL ) was added to section CARDINAL of the Act , stating that the relevant domestic court had the competence to determine an appropriate amount of compensation in each case , having regard to the particular factual circumstances :

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL )

“ The amount of compensation shall be determined by the court on the basis of the gravity of the form of coercion in question ... [ deprivation of liberty , resettlement , exile , forceful placement in a special place of residence or a psychiatric hospital or death ] , as well as the age and health of the repressed person or his / her first - generation heir , and other objective factors . ”

As confirmed by the official statistics issued by ORG on DATE , within DATE of the entry into force of the above - mentioned legislative amendments , CARDINAL applications for monetary compensation under LAW DATE were lodged with ORG , out of which CARDINAL cases were decided . The compensation awards in the cases examined varied from CARDINAL to CARDINAL NORP Laris ( ( GEL ) – EUR DATE and LAW respectively ) , the maximum amount having been awarded only to the first - generation heirs of victims of repression who had been executed by GPE .

All CARDINAL applicants ( see the appendix below ) are first - generation heirs of victims of NORP political repression . In DATE , after the entry into force of the LAW of DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL above ) , they lodged applications with ORG for monetary compensation under LAW of DATE .

Thus , the first applicant requested GEL CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) . She referred , amongst other circumstances , to her age ( she was DATE ) , poor state of health and , most importantly , to the fact that her father had been recognised , by a court decision of CARDINAL DATE , as a victim of NORP repression on account of his arbitrary conviction by a NORP military tribunal for proffering anti - NORP statements and his consequent execution by a firing squad in DATE .

As to the second , third and fourth applicants , who are siblings , they jointly requested GEL MONEY ( ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) . The applicants submitted that their father had been recognised as a victim of political repression in DATE on account of his arbitrary conviction in DATE by a NORP military tribunal for high treason ; their father had first been sentenced to DATE imprisonment but had been pardoned and released from detention in DATE .

On DATE and DATE ORG , in the context of CARDINAL separate and unrelated sets of proceedings , allowed the ORG claims in part . On CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld those decisions on appeal . The first applicant was granted compensation of GEL CARDINAL ( ORG CARDINAL ) , whilst the second , third and fourth applicants were jointly awarded the sum of GEL CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) .

The reasons given by the domestic courts in their decisions were similar in both sets of proceedings . Thus , at first instance , ORG , taking into account the relevant domestic provisions as well as the ORG ’s judgment of DATE in the case of PERSON and PERSON ( cited above ) , noted that the amount of compensation payable under section QUANTITY of the Act of DATE had not been fixed by law but , on the contrary , had been left to be determined by the relevant court on the basis of the particular circumstances of each individual case . On the other hand , since it was impossible to assess all the suffering , injustice and harm caused by the various drastic forms of NORP political repression , any such amount of compensation could only be , by its very nature , symbolic . No monetary compensation could ever serve as sufficient non - pecuniary relief . More important in this regard was the fact that ORG had acknowledged the historical injustice as such . The court added that the respondent ORG had fully complied with the ORG ’s judgment of CARDINAL DATE by introducing legislative amendments aimed at filling “ the legislative vacuum ” which had been criticised by ORG .

As to the appellate proceedings , ORG , in reply to the applicants’ argument that the domestic awards were derisory and disproportionate in comparison with the sums awarded by ORG in its judgment in the case of PERSON and PERSON ( cited above , § CARDINAL ) , stated that the domestic courts retained a broad discretionary power to determine amounts of compensation . The appellate court pointed out that the ORG itself had acknowledged that the respondent ORG should remain free to choose , subject to supervision by ORG , the general and/or , if appropriate , individual measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by ORG ( ibid . § CARDINAL ) ; the ORG had not indicated to the respondent ORG any specific amount of compensation to be paid under LAW of DATE . The appellate court also stated that , although the amount of compensation should not be less than the minimum wage in GPE ( some EUR CARDINAL ) , the ORG ’s budgetary capacities and the overall number of victims of NORP political repression ( CARDINAL of people ) should also be taken into account when determining the award .

For the purposes of further implementation of the general measures indicated by ORG in its judgment of DATE in the case of PERSON and PERSON ( cited above ) , a second wave of legislative measures was initiated by the respondent ORG on DATE . Notably , on the latter date ORG made a number of significant amendments to LAW DATE and LAW , which came into force on DATE ( hereinafter “ the Amendments of DATE ” ) .

NORP In particular , the amended section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the Act of DATE determined the range of compensation payable to victims of NORP political repression . Thus , the minimum amount payable under the law was fixed at GEL CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) , whilst the maximum amount within the range was set at GEL CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) . The provision further specified that the exact amount payable as compensation should be determined by a domestic court within the above - mentioned range in the light of the particular circumstances of each case , such as the gravity or the type of persecution in question , the age and health of the claimant – the victim of NORP political repression or of his or her first - generation heir DATE and other relevant factors .

Furthermore , in order to assist those victims of NORP political repression whose claims had already been decided under the preceding version of section ORG ) of the Act of DATE , the Amendments of CARDINAL DATE provided that the legislation would have retroactive effect . In particular , they stated that those victims of NORP political repression , or their first - generation heirs , who had already been awarded compensation by ORG in amounts falling below the minimum threshold set by the new section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the LAW ( compare paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) were entitled to re - apply to a court for a fresh assessment of the particular circumstances of their case , determination of the amount of compensation payable under the amended section ORG ) and , if applicable , payment of the difference between the new amount thus determined and the previous award .

The LAW of DATE further re - worded LAW § CARDINAL of LAW to state that together with ORG , which maintained jurisdiction to hear claims from victims of NORP political repression or their first - generation heirs residing in the east of GPE , ORG was vested with jurisdiction to hear claims emanating from claimants residing in the west of the country .

During their CARDINAL meeting held on DATE , in the context of their supervision of the execution of the ORG judgment of DATE in the case of PERSON and PERSON ( cited above ) , ORG adopted a decision , which reads as follows :

“ The Deputies ,

took note with satisfaction that the just satisfaction as well as the default interest due have been paid to the applicants ;

took note with interest of the preliminary action plan which has been submitted by the NORP authorities according to which a draft law has been prepared which will be submitted to the ORG in DATE ;

invited the NORP authorities to submit to them a consolidated action plan for their FAC meeting ( DATE ) . ”

During their LOC meeting held on DATE , ORG adopted another decision on the matter , which reads as follows :

“ The Deputies ,

took note , with satisfaction , of the action plan submitted by the NORP authorities according to which in DATE draft laws were being discussed before ORG with implementation by the GPE court expected to begin in DATE : the first amending LAW of DATE ] , in order to provide for compensation for victims ; the second one amending LAW in order to organise the practical modalities of granting such compensation ;

also took note with satisfaction of the subsequent information ( adoption on CARDINAL/CARDINAL/CARDINAL of the amendment to [ Act of DATE ] and publication in ORG of CARDINAL DATE ) showing that the action plan is being implemented within the foreseen timeframe ;

decided therefore to transfer this case for examination under the standard supervision procedure . ”

Lastly , during their CARDINAL meeting held on DATE , ORG adopted a ORG ( CM / ResDH(CARDINAL)CARDINAL ) on the closure of supervision of the execution of the ORG ’s judgment of CARDINAL DATE in the case of PERSON and PERSON ( cited above ) . The relevant parts of the ORG read as follows :

“ Having regard to the final judgment transmitted by ORG in this case and to the violation established ; ...

Having invited the government of the respondent ORG to inform ORG measures taken to comply with the above - mentioned obligation ;

Having examined the action report provided by the government indicating the measures adopted in order to give effect to the judgment including the information provided regarding the payment of the just satisfaction awarded by the ORG ... ;

Having satisfied itself that all the measures required by LAW , paragraph CARDINAL , have been adopted ,

Declares that it has exercised its functions under LAW , paragraph CARDINAL , of the LAW in this case and

Decides to close the examination thereof . ”


András Sajó;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She is represented before the Court by PERSON and PERSON , lawyers working for ORG in GPE . In DATE PERSON was appointed to the post of ORG and no longer represents the applicant .

The NORP Government ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON , of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP Since DATE the applicant has been serving various prison sentences . The end of her current sentence falls in DATE .

The Government maintained that during her imprisonment in various prisons the applicant had been given constant medical care . The applicant had been treated for various illnesses and had received specialist treatment , specifically gynaecological , dental and psychiatric care .

The applicant submitted that the medical attention she had received had not been adequate . For instance she had refused a gallbladder removal as the prison hospital had offered her only standard surgery , not a laparoscopic operation . She had also reported problems with her spine and was undergoing constant psychiatric treatment .

On DATE the applicant consulted a laryngologist who , for the first time , diagnosed a hearing impairment and recommended the use of a hearing aid . On DATE an audiogram was carried out , on the basis of which a doctor confirmed , on DATE , that the applicant was suffering from hearing loss .

Her first request to be provided with a hearing aid had been dismissed by the prison authorities in DATE as it had not been absolutely necessary in her condition . In particular , the prison authorities did not find it established that her hearing impairment had been such as to cause her difficulties in her everyday life in prison .

On DATE , while detained in the NORP prison , the applicant made a new request for a hearing aid . On DATE the director of the prison hospital at the PERSON prison informed her that it had not been possible for the authorities to fund a device .

On DATE the NORP medical prison service issued a certificate referring to the audiogram of DATE and to the consultation with the laryngologist . The doctor stated that the applicant was suffering from a hearing impairment and recommended the use of a hearing aid , paid for either by the applicant or by the prison medical services .

On DATE a doctor from a private practice issued a certificate on the basis of the audiogram of CARDINAL September CARDINAL without examining the applicant . She certified a PERCENT hearing loss , justifying the need for a hearing aid .

On DATE a second audiogram was carried out . The applicant was of the view that it proved deterioration of her hearing but the Government submitted that her condition had remained the same .

During that period the applicant underwent a re - education program to ease her spinal condition and various basic and more specialised medical examinations . Those included scans or X - rays of the spine , abdomen , breasts , and chest , as well as further audiograms .

The applicant submitted that she had requested a hearing aid on numerous subsequent occasions , but to no avail . The prison authorities referred to lack of funds .

On DATE the applicant received a medical certificate confirming her various medical conditions , referring in particular to her spine , ovaries , kidneys and hearing . The certificate concluded that the applicant should continue receiving re - education treatment for her spine and recommended fitting her with a hearing aid .

On DATE the applicant was transferred to ORG . On DATE she consulted a specialist doctor who recommended that the applicant be provided with a hearing aid .

On DATE the authorities provided the applicant with a hearing aid . The entire cost of MONEY ( ORG ) was covered by ORG .

On DATE the director of ORG explained in a letter that its limited financial resources had not allowed the purchase a different model of hearing aid , as requested by the applicant . The model given to her was of a type also used by other detainees , who had never complained about it . The Director referred to the provisions of domestic law , which allow the authorities to partly or entirely cover the cost of medical equipment such as hearing aids .

During her detention the applicant frequently requested leave from prison for various purposes . She was granted leave in DATE and DATE for medical purposes .

On DATE ORG of ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request for temporary leave on health grounds . The court found that the applicant had obtained prison leave in DATE for the purpose of having an operation . During the leave she had committed further offences and had undergone surgery on DATE of her leave . She had also failed to return from the leave on time . The court sought a medical expert opinion which stated that the applicant could be treated in prison for her spinal condition . The court concluded that the applicant ’s medical condition was not incompatible with detention and that she was receiving appropriate medical care from the prison health services . On DATE ORG upheld the decision and refused her leave from prison .

In DATE the applicant again applied for leave from prison in order to take up employment . The penitentiary courts refused the application on DATE . The Government submitted that the medical opinion prepared in this set of proceedings had demonstrated a generally good state of health and the fact that she had been continuously receiving medical attention in prison .

The applicant complained to the prison authorities on many occasions about the conditions of her detention , in particular the allegedly inadequate treatment of her chronic back pain . On each occasion the complaints were dismissed by the authorities as manifestly ill - founded .

The applicant lodged civil claims for compensation against some prisons by way of complaint about the prevailing conditions , for instance the type of cells to which she was assigned , the attitude of the prison guards towards her , etc . There is no evidence that any of those claims referred to the delay before the authorities provided her with a hearing aid .

The provisions pertaining to medical care in detention facilities , and the relevant domestic law and practice are set out in the ORG ’s judgments in the cases of PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) ; PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , CARDINAL DATE ) ; and the decision in PERSON v GPE DATE . ) , no . CARDINAL , DATE .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Marko Bošnjak;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Georges Ravarani

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the non - enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic judgments . In application no . CARDINAL , the applicant also raised other complaints under the Convention .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Egidijus Kūris;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano

The applicant was born in DATE .

The applicant is a transgender person whose gender is recorded in the civil - status register as female . He stated that he had become aware , even as a child , of feeling that he was male , a feeling that was at variance with his anatomical sex .

On DATE the applicant applied to ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) under LAW seeking authorisation to undergo gender reassignment surgery . In the application instituting the proceedings the applicant ’s lawyer gave the following reasons for his client ’s request . His client had , since he was a child , regarded himself as male rather than female and for that reason had been receiving psychological counselling since childhood ; at DATE he had contemplated suicide ; his current biological identity was at odds with the gender to which he felt he belonged ; and gender reassignment was necessary in order for him to achieve harmony between his private perception of himself and his physical make - up . The lawyer stated that several doctors whom his client had consulted since childhood had recommended gender reassignment . The applicant , who was DATE , was living as a man , had been in a relationship with a woman for DATE and was accepted as a man by his family and friends . The lawyer added that his client had been receiving treatment for DATE in the psychiatric department of ORG with a view to undergoing the gender reassignment surgery that he sought . Lastly , the lawyer requested that the proceedings remain confidential in view of his client ’s psychological state .

On DATE ORG granted the request concerning the confidentiality of the proceedings .

On DATE the court heard evidence from the applicant ’s family . The applicant ’s mother stated that as a child her daughter had played mainly with boys and as an adolescent had told her mother that she felt more like a boy and wanted to be one . The applicant ’s mother had therefore consulted psychologists , who had expressed the view that her daughter would be happier if she could live as a man , a view which the applicant ’s mother shared . The applicant ’s older brother also said that his sister had played with boys when she was a child , had started to behave like a boy during adolescence and had had girlfriends , and that she had been determined to undergo gender reassignment by means of surgery . She had made several suicide attempts and was still in therapy . As far as the applicant ’s brother was aware , the doctors had decided to go ahead with the operation .

On conclusion of the hearing ORG sent a request for information to the medical director of the hospital where the applicant was being treated , seeking to ascertain whether the applicant was transgender , whether gender reassignment was necessary to ensure his mental health and whether he was permanently unable to procreate .

On DATE a medical committee of ORG drew up a psychiatric report which found that the applicant was transgender . The report further found that , from a psychological viewpoint , the applicant should henceforth live with a male identity .

On DATE a medical committee of the gynaecology and obstetrics unit of the same medical centre drew up a report which found that GPE had a female phenotype and was transgender .

On DATE ORG examined the CARDINAL medical reports from ORG medical faculty . The court observed that the authors of the report of DATE had diagnosed the applicant as transgender and had found that , from a psychological viewpoint , he should live henceforth with a male identity , but that the authors of the report of CARDINAL DATE had found PERSON ’s phenotype to be female . However , the court considered that these reports had not answered the questions it had asked , namely whether gender reassignment was necessary in order to ensure the claimant ’s mental health and whether the claimant was permanently unable to procreate . The court therefore reiterated its request for information .

On DATE the head of the gynaecology and obstetrics unit attached to the surgical department of ORG medical faculty wrote to the head doctor of the medical centre informing him that the applicant had been examined following a request for a consultation with a plastic surgeon with a view to gender reassignment . She said that an examination had established that PERSON had female external and internal genitalia and was not permanently unable to procreate .

On DATE a medical committee of the psychiatric department of ORG medical faculty wrote to the head doctor of the medical centre informing him that the applicant had been examined on DATE . Following that examination the medical team had concluded that , in the interests of his mental health , the applicant should be allowed to live henceforth with a male identity .

At ORG hearing of CARDINAL DATE the applicant ’s lawyer challenged the report of DATE on the grounds that it had not been adopted by a collegiate body . ORG accordingly requested a fresh expert report on the applicant ’s ability to procreate . The task of preparing the report was entrusted to a medical committee of ORG faculty of medicine .

On DATE CARDINAL doctors from the gynaecology and obstetrics department of ORG faculty of medicine carried out an expert assessment and concluded , after examining the applicant , that he was capable of procreating .

On DATE ORG , basing its decision on the findings of the various expert reports , refused the applicant authorisation to undergo gender reassignment , on the ground that he was not permanently unable to procreate and therefore did not satisfy one of the conditions of eligibility for gender reassignment under LAW .

On DATE the applicant appealed on points of law against that judgment . In his pleadings the applicant ’s lawyer stressed that his client had considered himself since childhood as male rather than female and that this belief was not a mere whim . The applicant had undergone a lengthy course of psychotherapy following which the doctors had concluded that he was transgender and that , from a psychological perspective , it was advisable for him to live as a man . The lawyer further submitted that his client ’s ability to procreate did not in any way prevent him from perceiving himself as a man ; it was a biological fact over which he had no control . In GPE as elsewhere in the world , persons who , like the applicant , were unable to reconcile their biological and psychological state were not necessarily single and unable to procreate . There were numerous examples of people who had a predisposition towards transgenderism and who had married and had children before having gender reassignment surgery . It was unfair to make authorisation for a change of biological gender contingent on the ability of the transgender individuals concerned to procreate , whether they considered themselves as men or as women . Accordingly , in refusing to allow the applicant to undergo gender reassignment surgery under LAW which , in the lawyer ’s submission , did not reflect social reality – the courts had restricted his client ’s rights and freedoms . The lawyer further alleged that the refusal of the applicant ’s request on account of his ability to procreate had been unlawful . In his view , the expression “ permanently unable to procreate ” should be deleted from the provision in question .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld the ORG judgment , taking the view that the first - instance court had not erred in its assessment of the evidence .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer lodged an application for rectification of that decision . In his pleadings he submitted that none of the grounds of appeal advanced by the applicant had been taken into account , and that no comment had been made on the official documents and reports included in the file . The lawyer also contested the use of the report of CARDINAL DATE prepared by the gynaecology and obstetrics department of ORG medical faculty as the basis for rejecting the applicant ’s claims . He argued in that regard that the report in question did not have the status of an expert report and had been drawn up following a purely superficial examination of his client ’s genital organs that was insufficient to establish his ability to procreate . Even assuming that the various medical reports had sufficed to establish that his client was capable of procreating , the only gender with which his client could identify from a physical and psychological perspective was male . Moreover , that fact had been established on DATE in the report of the medical committee of ORG , where his client had also been following a long - term course of psychotherapy . The lawyer criticised the failure to take the latter fact into account . Lastly , he submitted that the courts had infringed the applicant ’s rights by refusing his request for authorisation to undergo surgery aimed at assigning to him the gender with which he naturally identified .

On DATE ORG rejected the application for rectification lodged by the applicant , observing that none of the grounds for setting aside enumerated in LAW applied in the case at hand .

On DATE the applicant lodged a fresh application with ORG on the basis of LAW , seeking authorisation to undergo gender reassignment surgery . In his application instituting the proceedings , the applicant ’s lawyer gave the following reasons for the request . His client had regarded himself from a young age as male rather than female and for that reason had received psychological counselling since childhood ; medical reports had established that , from a psychological viewpoint , it was advisable for him to live henceforth with a male identity ; the applicant ’s biological identity was at odds with the gender to which he felt he belonged ; gender reassignment was necessary to ensure his psychological and mental well - being ; on DATE he had undergone a double mastectomy and was taking various hormones to increase his testosterone levels ; he was working for his brother as a painter and decorator ; he went regularly to the gym and had the physical appearance of a man ; he was now DATE and had always regarded himself as a man ; the friends he had met after a certain age knew him only as a man ; and he did not use the first name indicated on his identity papers . The lawyer added that , in order to bring his physical appearance into line with his perception of himself , his client had resorted to all kinds of methods with damaging side - effects . In his DATE life , and especially when he had to produce his identity papers for the authorities , the applicant was subjected to denigrating and humiliating treatment and encountered numerous difficulties because of the discrepancy between his outward appearance and the identity indicated on his papers . The lawyer summed up by requesting the court to allow his client to begin the requisite formalities in order to change his identity in the civil - status register , to grant his client ’s request to undergo gender reassignment , to authorise him to undergo gender reassignment surgery and to declare the ORG proceedings confidential .

On DATE , following a full medical history and examination of the applicant , a committee made up of psychiatrists from ORG issued a medical report which found that the applicant was transgender and that gender reassignment was necessary in order to ensure his mental health . The report also stated that an expert assessment should be carried out to establish whether the applicant was permanently unable to procreate .

On DATE a forensic medical report was drawn up by a committee from the forensic medicine department of ORG . According to the report , during the examination carried out on DATE in the forensic medical department , the applicant had stated that he wished to undergo gender reassignment surgery and had already taken steps to that end in the past but had had his claims rejected by the courts . He had then applied to ORG and had since brought a fresh action . The medical examination had shown that the applicant had a male phenotype ( all his external characteristics ) . He had a beard and a moustache , his breast tissue had been surgically removed and he was receiving treatment following that operation . He had male hair growth on his arms and legs , was undergoing hormone treatment and was embarrassed by the colour of his identity card and had therefore covered it before putting it in his wallet . Lastly , the applicant had stated that reassignment was a necessity for him .

According to the report , blood tests had revealed that the applicant had a total testosterone count of CARDINAL ng / dl , presumably linked to the hormone treatment he was taking . However , this did not mean that he was permanently unable to procreate .

The report concluded as follows :

“ CARDINAL . [ The applicant ] is transgender ;

gender reassignment is necessary for his mental health ;

[ he ] is not permanently unable to procreate ( as a woman ) ... ”

On DATE ORG granted the applicant ’s request and authorised the gender reassignment surgery which he sought . In its reasoning , ORG found it established that the applicant was transgender , that gender reassignment was needed to ensure his mental health , and that it was clear from the evidence of the witnesses called by the applicant that he lived as a man in every respect and suffered as a result of his situation . Accordingly , in view of the evidence and of the reports produced , the conditions set forth in LAW were satisfied and the request should be granted . The judgment specified that it was final .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström

Ms Fatma Nuray Uncuoğlu ( “ the first applicant ” ) was born in DATE and lives in GPE . PERSON ( “ the second applicant ” ) was born in DATE and also lives in GPE .

The applicants each owned a share in respective plots of land in the area of LOC , in the district of GPE , GPE .

On DATE , a new zoning plan was put into force in the area of GPE , which encompassed the applicants’ plots of land . Under the new plan , the plots of land were designated as “ university area ” . Subsequently , in DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE , annotations ( şerhler ) were made in the land registry records indicating that the applicants’ land would be expropriated by ORG ( hereinafter “ the University ” ) .

On DATE the applicants both asked the ORG to either expropriate the disputed land or to remove the annotations from the land registry records . The University informed the applicants , on DATE and DATE respectively , that the expropriation proceedings would commence when the necessary funding was provided .

On DATE the applicants initiated respective proceedings before ORG , claiming compensation for de facto expropriation .

On DATE , relying on expert reports which had indicated that the applicants’ land had been fenced off by the University , ORG of First Instance awarded the first applicant MONEY ( TRL ) and the second applicant QUANTITY by way of compensation for de facto expropriation . In its respective judgments , the first - instance court held in particular that the land at issue had been under the effective control of the ORG and that access to the land was restricted due to the fences that had been built around the land .

On DATE ORG of ORG quashed the judgments of ORG , holding that the land in question had not been controlled or used effectively by the University .

On DATE both applicants requested the rectification of the respective decisions dated DATE . In their petitions , they drew the attention of ORG of ORG to its previous decisions , dated DATE and DATE , in which it had held that neighbouring plots of land in the same area had been de facto expropriated by ORG because the latter had built fences around the land and because of the annotations made in the land registry records .

On DATE ORG of ORG rejected the ORG requests for rectification of the decisions of DATE . However , it did not express any reason as to why it had reached a different conclusion from its previous decisions dated DATE and DATE .

On DATE ORG complied with the decisions of ORG and dismissed the cases .

On DATE both applicants filed an appeal , reiterating their argument concerning the contradictory decisions ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) delivered by ORG of ORG .

On DATE and DATE respectively , ORG of ORG dismissed the appeals . In its decisions , it gave no reply to the applicants’ arguments regarding the fact that it had given contradictory judgments in respect of similar cases .

NORP The applicants’ requests for the rectification of the decisions were furthermore rejected and the judgments became final on DATE and DATE respectively .

On an unknown date the University paid compensation to the second applicant for her plot of land .


Violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression);Violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Right to free elections-{general} (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Vote);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - award

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Guido Raimondi;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Nebojša Vučinić;Nicolas Bratza;Robert Spano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties and as they appear from the documents submitted by them , may be summarised as follows .

NORP In TIME of CARDINAL DATE the applicant went to a primary school in the town of NORP and poured paint on a statue of PERSON which was situated in the school ’s garden . On TIME , he poured paint on a statue of PERSON in the garden of another primary school .

On DATE he did the same thing in the same CARDINAL primary schools .

On DATE the applicant poured paint on a statue of GPE in NORP town centre .

On DATE the applicant went to the same statue in NORP town centre equipped with a tin of paint , paint thinner and a ladder . As he was about to open the tin of paint he was arrested by police officers and taken to a police station where he was questioned . In a statement taken from him on DATE the applicant was reported as having told the police officers that he had carried out the above - mentioned actions because he resented PERSON and had expressed his resentment by pouring paint on the statues .

On DATE the applicant was brought before a prosecutor and then a judge , who ordered his detention on remand pending the opening of criminal proceedings against him . In his statement to the prosecutor the applicant maintained that he had carried out his actions to express his “ lack of affection ” for GPE .

NORP In his indictment of DATE , lodged with ORG ( hereinafter “ the trial court ” ) , the NORP prosecutor charged the applicant with the offence of contravening LAW Against PERSON ( PERSON no . CARDINAL ; see “ Relevant Domestic Law and Practice ” below ) .

In the course of the trial the applicant admitted that he had poured paint on the statues . He told the trial court that he had completed his university studies and qualified as a teacher . However , he had been unemployed for a long time because his application to work as a teacher had not been accepted by ORG . He had carried out his offences in order to protest against the ORG ’s decision .

On DATE the trial court found the applicant guilty as charged . Having regard to the fact that the offence was committed in a public place and on a number of occasions , the trial court sentenced him to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment instead of the minimum term of imprisonment applicable under PERSON no . DATE , which is DATE . The fact that the offence had been committed in a public place also led the trial court to increase the sentence by CARDINAL in accordance with section CARDINAL of Law no . DATE . The trial court also considered that the applicant had committed the offence on CARDINAL separate occasions , and decided to multiply the sentence by CARDINAL . The applicant was thus sentenced to a total prison term of DATE and DATE for his above - mentioned actions .

The applicant appealed . In his appeal he argued that , according to the provisions of LAW , CARDINAL sentence should have been imposed on him because , regardless of the fact that he had poured paint on the statues on CARDINAL occasions , he had in fact only committed one offence and not multiple offences . In support of his argument , he submitted that his CARDINAL actions had been carried out within a short span of time .

The applicant also pointed out that , instead of imposing on him the minimum DATE prison sentence provided for in PERSON no . DATE in respect of each offence , the trial court had handed down a DATE sentence because it had had regard to the number of times he had poured paint on the statues . The trial court had then gone on to rely on the frequency of his actions when multiplying the sentence by CARDINAL .

The applicant also challenged the trial court ’s reliance on section CARDINAL of Law no . DATE when increasing his sentence by CARDINAL because the offence had been committed in a public place . He drew ORG attention to the fact that , by their nature , statues are placed in public places .

The applicant added that he had carried out his actions in order to express his “ lack of affection ” for PERSON . As such , he had remained within the boundaries of his right to freedom of expression , which was guaranteed by LAW . Thus , although it would have been reasonable to prosecute and punish him for damaging property , he had in fact been punished for expressing his opinions .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s argument that he had been expressing his opinion , but quashed the trial court ’s judgment on the ground of , inter alia , that court ’s failure to give adequate consideration to the possibility that the CARDINAL separate incidents could form CARDINAL offence and not multiple offences . ORG considered that the applicant had carried out his actions in order to protest against ORG decision not to appoint him as a teacher . The case file was sent back to the trial court .

NORP In its decision of DATE the trial court agreed with ORG conclusion , and held that the applicant ’s actions had amounted to a single offence and not CARDINAL offences . However , having regard , inter alia , to the “ contradictory reasons ” put forward by the applicant as justification for his actions , as well as “ the effects of his actions on the public ” , the trial court concluded that the applicant ’s actions had amounted to “ insults ” , and deemed it fit to sentence him to DATE imprisonment , which is the maximum allowed under PERSON no . DATE . The sentence was then increased by CARDINAL because the acts had been committed in a public place . Furthermore , pursuant to LAW ( see “ Relevant Domestic Law and Practice ” below ) , the sentence was further increased by DATE . The applicant was thus sentenced to a total of DATE , DATE and CARDINAL days’ imprisonment .

Furthermore , in its decision the trial court set out the restrictions under section CARDINAL of LAW which were to be placed on the applicant on account of his conviction . Accordingly , until the execution of his sentence , the applicant was banned from , among other things , voting and taking part in elections , as well as from running associations , parties , trade unions and cooperatives ( see “ Relevant Domestic Law and Practice ” ) .

The applicant appealed and repeated his arguments under various provisions of the Convention . He maintained , in particular , that he had carried out his actions in order to express his “ lack of affection ” for PERSON and had thus exercised his freedom of expression guaranteed in LAW .

The appeal was dismissed by ORG on DATE . No mention was made in ORG decision of the arguments raised by the applicant about his freedom of expression .

According to a document drawn up by the prosecutor on CARDINAL DATE setting out the details of the applicant ’s prison sentence , the date of the applicant ’s release from prison was set as CARDINAL DATE , with a possibility of release on DATE for good behaviour .

In the meantime , on DATE the PERSON on the Execution of Prison Sentences and Other Security Measures ( PERSON no . CARDINAL ) entered into force . This law sets out the circumstances in which prisoners can benefit from early release .

On CARDINAL DATE the prosecutor responsible for the prison the applicant was serving his sentence in wrote to the trial court and asked for guidance in calculating the date of the applicant ’s possible early release . The prosecutor stated that , for offences committed DATE , PERSON no . CARDINAL was applicable and , for offences committed after that date , the new Law no . DATE would be applicable . The applicant had carried out his actions both before and after that date .

On DATE the trial court considered that the critical date was the date of the commission of the final act and thus the new law was applicable .

The applicant lodged an objection against that decision and argued that most of his actions had been carried out DATE and that therefore , when calculating his prison sentence , the old law should be taken into account . If his prison sentence were calculated in accordance with the new law , he would spend DATE in prison . That objection was rejected by the trial court on DATE and the date of the applicant ’s possible release from prison was calculated in accordance with the document drawn up by the prosecutor on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

A request made by the applicant to ORG for his conviction to be quashed and another request to ORG to rectify the judgment were rejected on DATE and CARDINAL DATE respectively .

On DATE the applicant was released conditionally .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery committed in an organised group .

On DATE the Vyborgskiy ORG of GPE ( “ the ORG ” ) remanded the applicant in custody . ORG relied on the particularly serious nature of the crime with which the applicant had been charged and his position on the merits of the arrest and the charges brought against him . The court also relied on the risk that he might flee from the investigating authorities and the court , exert pressure on victims , witnesses and other participants in the criminal proceedings , or otherwise hamper the administration of justice in the case .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE .

On DATE and DATE , at the request of the applicant ’s lawyer , ORG adjourned the review of the applicant ’s detention until DATE and CARDINAL DATE , respectively .

On DATE the applicant retained another lawyer to defend him . The newly appointed lawyer joined the proceedings at TIME on DATE .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer asked ORG to adjourn the hearing until DATE so as to enable her to review the prosecution material and discuss her position with the applicant . The judge refused to adjourn the hearing until DATE , but granted a TIME adjournment until TIME

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE , having found no grounds for altering or lifting the custodial measure and having taken note of the particular complexity of the case . The applicant ’s argument to the effect that no investigative measures were being carried out with his participation was rejected with reference to the investigator ’s discretion to lead the investigation .

The applicant appealed against the above decision , claiming , inter alia , that the TIME adjournment of the hearing on CARDINAL DATE had not permitted him to consult his lawyer in private ; nor had it allowed his lawyer to have sufficient time to review the prosecution material .

On DATE GPE ( “ the GPE ” ) found that there were no reasons to vary the preventive measure , and it upheld the decision of CARDINAL DATE on appeal . ORG held that the TIME adjournment granted by ORG had been sufficient for studying the prosecution file consisting of CARDINAL pages . Most of the file consisted of procedural documents concerning issues relating to the institution of the criminal proceedings , the extension of the time - limit for the investigation , the joinder of criminal cases , and documents which had been previously handed to the applicant . Besides , all these documents had been examined in the hearing on DATE . As regards the applicant ’s complaint as to his inability to have a confidential exchange with his lawyer before the hearing of CARDINAL DATE , ORG held that the applicant and his lawyer had been given the opportunity to communicate in the courtroom . However , they had refused to communicate in such conditions . This did not amount to a breach of the applicant ’s right to defence , because the applicant ’s lawyer could have had a confidential meeting with the applicant in the remand prison without any restrictions , and they could have developed their defence position beforehand . In any event , the hearing could not have been adjourned until DATE , since the time - limit for the applicant ’s detention had been due to expire on DATE , and therefore the decision on the preventive measure had had to be taken before then . Both the applicant and his lawyer participated in the appeal hearing .

On DATE , DATE , charges in respect of CARDINAL counts of large - scale robbery committed in an organised group under LAW § CARDINAL ( a ) and ( b ) of MONEY were brought against the applicant .

On DATE the applicant and his lawyer were informed that the pre - trial investigation had been terminated , and on DATE they were given access to the case file .

On an unspecified date in DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer was informed that a review of the preventive measure was to take place on the following day .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer did not appear for the hearing . The applicant asked the court to adjourn the hearing owing to the lawyer ’s illness . However , the adjournment was refused . Legal aid counsel was appointed for the applicant .

On DATE , reiterating the reasons which had prompted the application of the custodial measure in the applicant ’s case , ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE pending examination of the case file .

NORP The applicant appealed , complaining , inter alia , about the refusal to adjourn the hearing so as to enable his lawyer to defend him .

On DATE ORG found that there were no reasons to vary the preventive measure , and it upheld the decision of CARDINAL DATE on appeal . As regards the applicant ’s complaint regarding the alleged violation of his right to defence by the refusal to adjourn the hearing of CARDINAL DATE , ORG held that the applicant ’s lawyer had failed to prove her sickness by providing a medical certificate . This made the examination of the issue of the applicant ’s detention in her absence lawful under domestic law , as legal aid counsel had been appointed for the applicant . Both the applicant and his lawyer participated in the appeal hearing , the applicant by means of a video link from the remand prison .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG further extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE pending examination of the case file . The court noted that the grounds which had prompted the application of the custodial measure in the applicant ’s case had not changed , and referred to the considerable size of the case file , a case file which neither the applicant , nor his co - defendants or their lawyers had been able to examine in full .

On DATE ORG upheld the above decision on appeal .

On DATE ORG acquitted the applicant of all charges in a jury trial . The judgment became final on DATE .

DATE and DATE the applicant was held in remand prison GPE in GPE . The prison was overcrowded . Thus , cell DATE , measuring QUANTITY , was equipped with CARDINAL sleeping places and accommodated up to QUANTITY inmates , and cell CARDINAL , measuring CARDINAL sq . m , was designed for CARDINAL people and housed CARDINAL individuals . Cell CARDINAL , measuring CARDINAL sq . m , offered CARDINAL places , and CARDINAL detainees occupied those places .

As mentioned above , on DATE and DATE respectively ORG examined the applicant ’s appeals against the decisions of ORG of DATE and CARDINAL DATE extending his detention . He participated in the appeals by means of a video link from the remand prison , where he was confined in a metal cage .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Georgia);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicants are husband and wife . They were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in LOC in GPE .

The first applicant , a NORP national , arrived in GPE in DATE . On DATE he received a first residence permit , which was subsequently extended at regular intervals .

The first applicant ’s parents have lived in GPE since DATE . His father and mother acquired NORP nationality in DATE and DATE respectively .

On DATE the first applicant married the second applicant , a NORP national .

On DATE the second applicant gave birth to a son .

On DATE an operative officer of ORG in GPE discovered that the first applicant had injected himself with desomorphine , a derivative of morphine known under the street name “ krokodil ” . An administrative case was instituted under LAW ( “ Use of narcotic substances without a medical prescription ” ) and the matter was referred to ORG .

On DATE the ORG found the first applicant guilty as charged and , pursuant to paragraph CARDINAL of Article CARDINAL concerning foreign nationals , fined him MONEY ( RUB ) and ordered his administrative expulsion from GPE ( the “ expulsion order ” ) .

Counsel for the first applicant appealed . He submitted that the penalty of expulsion was extremely severe given that the first applicant had lived in GPE for DATE , his wife , who was pregnant with their first child , was a NORP national and a majority of his relatives lived in GPE . In the lawyer ’s opinion , the first applicant ’s expulsion would destroy his family life .

On DATE ORG of GPE rejected the appeal , upholding the first applicant ’s conviction . On the alleged disruption of the first applicant ’s family life , ORG pronounced as follows :

“ The representative ’s argument to the effect that , in the light of PERSON family situation , ORG had wrongly ordered his administrative expulsion from GPE can not be taken into account as paragraph CARDINAL of Article CARDINAL of LAW provides for mandatory expulsion of the offender and is not an alternative to the main penalty which may take the form of either detention or a fine . ”

On DATE the first applicant paid the fine .

On DATE the first applicant was issued with a DATE residence permit that was valid until DATE .

On DATE the NORP ORG notified the NORP division of ORG that the first applicant had been diagnosed with HIV .

On DATE ORG revoked the first applicant ’s residence permit in accordance with section CARDINAL ) of LAW , which provided for the revocation of the residence permits of HIV - positive foreign nationals . The first applicant was informed of that decision on DATE and ordered to leave GPE within DATE .

Counsel for the first applicant challenged the decision before a court , claiming that it amounted to a disproportionate interference with the first applicant ’s family life and also put the first applicant ’s life at risk .

On DATE the ORG set aside the decision of DATE , observing that the first applicant had strong family ties in GPE and could receive medical treatment there with the assistance and under the supervision of his family . However , ORG declared itself incompetent to order the reinstatement of the residence permit .

On DATE ORG of GPE heard an appeal against ORG judgment . It endorsed its reasons for setting aside the decision of DATE and noted that the following logical step would be to reinstate the first applicant ’s residence permit . It ordered ORG to proceed accordingly .

On DATE ORG complied with the judgment and reinstated the first applicant ’s residence permit .

On DATE issued a new decision to revoke the permit , referring to ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE and section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of LAW , which provided for the revocation of residence permits of foreign nationals who were liable to be expelled .

On DATE ORG issued a decision on the undesirability of the first applicant ’s presence in GPE ( the “ exclusion order ” ) which read in its entirety as follows :

“ CARDINAL . On the basis of the materials received from the NORP division of ORG , and in accordance with section CARDINAL of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act , to declare undesirable the presence in GPE of the NORP national Mr PERSON ...

To notify the decision to the officers and employees of the drug control authorities ... ”

Counsel for the first applicant challenged the exclusion order in court , claiming that it would disrupt the first applicant ’s family life .

On DATE the ORG found for the first applicant as follows :

“ The grounds for issuing the said decision were the following : use of drugs by the claimant , an offence of which he had been found guilty under LAW by ORG judgment of DATE and fined RUB CARDINAL , and for which his administrative expulsion had been ordered ; the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings on CARDINAL DATE on non - exonerating grounds in connection with his active repentance ; and his repeated convictions in administrative proceedings for breaches of public order .

However , in the court ’s view , these elements are not sufficient to reach the conclusion that PERSON , who has lived in GPE for a long time and who has stable family connections and can undergo treatment under his family ’s supervision , represents a real threat to national security , public order and health .

In these circumstances , taking into account the provisions of LAW ... according to which the rights and freedoms of man and citizen are directly operative and determine the essence , meaning and implementation of laws ... and may be restricted only to the extent necessary for the protection of the foundations of the constitutional system , morality , health , the rights and lawful interests of other people , national defence and security , the court considers that the said decision is unlawful and must be quashed . ”

On an appeal by ORG , ORG of GPE quashed , on DATE , ORG judgment and rejected the first applicant ’s challenge to the exclusion order , finding as follows :

“ It was established by ORG and not disputed by the claimant that PERSON PERSON was a drug user , that he had previously breached the criminal law and that he had been repeatedly charged with administrative offences in the period from DATE to DATE .

Those elements , taken cumulatively , indicate that , while living in GPE , PERSON does not respect the applicable laws and lives an immoral lifestyle which – undoubtedly DATE is an imminent threat to public order and to the health and morals of NORP citizens .

The [ ORG ] considers that his stable family connections in GPE may not be a bar to deciding on the undesirability of his presence in GPE because the law provides that such a decision may be taken against a specific individual not as a punitive measure but as a means of upholding public order and if it pursues , as stated above , the aim of safeguarding the health and morals of the NORP population . ”

In their submissions to ORG , the Government specified that the first applicant ’s previous administrative convictions , referred to in ORG decision , had been in respect of the following offences :

( a ) NORP non - medical use of heroin on DATE ;

( b ) minor disorderly acts on DATE and DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE ;

( c ) drunkenness in a public place on DATE ;

( d ) failure to have his residence registered on DATE ; and

( e ) NORP “ non - compliance with existing procedure ” on DATE .

After ORG judgment dated DATE , the first applicant was found guilty of the following administrative offences :

( a ) breach of public order , public drunkenness and refusal to obey a police officer , all committed on DATE ;

( b ) CARDINAL cases of public drunkenness and a breach of public order on CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE ;

( c ) breach of public order on DATE , for which the first applicant was sentenced to CARDINAL - days’ detention ; and

( d ) CARDINAL driving offences on DATE and CARDINAL DATE .

According to the ORG , the first applicant ’s current whereabouts are not known ; he does not live at home . Nor is there any information showing that either the expulsion or the exclusion order has been executed .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)

Ján Šikuta;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in ORG .

On DATE the applicant , an administrator in a small commercial company , started serving a DATE prison sentence for fraud and tax evasion .

From DATE to DATE , when he was conditionally released , the applicant was detained in GPE , GPE , GPE , PERSON , and ORG .

According to the applicant , the detention conditions in PERSON , GPE , GPE , PERSON , and ORG amounted to physical and psychological torture . His detailed description of the conditions , common to all those prisons , is set out below :

– overcrowding : in FAC , he was briefly held from CARDINAL DATE in the old detention block in a cell measuring QUANTITY . m with CARDINAL other prisoners ; in FAC , in a cell measuring QUANTITY . m with CARDINAL other prisoners ; in FAC , in a cell measuring QUANTITY m with CARDINAL other prisoners ; and in FAC , in a cell measuring CARDINAL sq . m with CARDINAL other prisoners ;

– inadequate heating in DATE and inadequate insulation of the windows . In the prisons of GPE and PERSON there were no glass panes in the toilet window . In addition , in FAC the toilet had no door . The applicant alleged that he contracted rheumatic fever and skin lesions on his hands owing to the cold he had endured ;

– defective sanitary installations / no proper bathrooms : the cells were usually provided with an area where CARDINAL sinks , a shower and a toilet were installed . In GPE and ORG there was no shower , he had to wash in the sink or carry water and wash himself in the toilet if he wanted privacy . Hot water was provided twice a week for a period of TIME , in which there was not always time for everyone to wash ;

– presence of bed bugs and other parasites : in PERSON and ORG he could not sleep at TIME because of bed bugs falling on him from the upper bed . No disinfection was ever carried out by the prison authorities and in PERSON and ORG the detainees were not even allowed to bring in their own disinfectants from outside ;

– the prisons had no place specially designed for eating . He was forced to eat in the cells , most of which did not have the requisite furniture – there were no chairs or tables , and the distance between the bunk beds was such that he could not sit up straight on his bed ;

– insufficient daylight in the cells and electricity provided only for TIME during DATE and evening , so that he was forced to read and write in the dark most of the time ;

– dirty and worn - out mattresses and sheets ;

– very poor quality food ;

– in Vaslui Prison there was so much dampness that there was always water on the floors .

In addition , the applicant alleged that the inhuman conditions of his detention had been aggravated by his constant and unnecessary transfers between prisons and between various cells in the same prison . He also alleged that on numerous occasions he had had to share his cell with mentally ill detainees who sometimes acted strangely , terrifying him or making his life unbearable .

The Government submitted that all of the prisons mentioned by the applicant had adequate natural and electric lighting and ventilation , and that the windows had never been covered by spare beds . All of the prisons had a central heating system providing adequate heating in DATE . All of the cells in which the applicant had been held had had the requisite furniture .

The specific details submitted by the Government with respect to the prisons in question are set out below .

NORP The applicant was held in the old detention block of FAC until DATE in cell no . CARDINAL , which measured QUANTITY . m and accommodated CARDINAL prisoners ( QUANTITY . m of personal space ) .

There were no insect infestations in the prison in DATE .

The applicant was held in FAC for DATE and DATE , from CARDINAL DATE to DATE and from DATE to CARDINAL DATE . During those periods he was placed in CARDINAL different cells measuring from QUANTITY . m to QUANTITY m , which he shared with CARDINAL and CARDINAL other prisoners respectively ( QUANTITY . m to QUANTITY . m of personal space ) .

The cells had their own bathroom containing CARDINAL toilet cabins and a sink . Cold water was available permanently . Inmates had access to the common shower area twice per week .

The block occupied by the applicant during the second period in which he stayed in that prison had been renovated in DATE . Hence , the cells had been provided with showers , and hot water was available DATE for TIME . Television sets had also been installed in the cells . A self - service canteen was created where prisoners could eat their meals in proper conditions .

As regards the presence of insects , the problem was known by the prison administration who explained that it had been caused by the high number of prisoners and their failure to maintain adequate hygiene . Disinfection operations were conducted at least twice per year , within the limits of the budget .

The Government submitted CARDINAL statements written and signed by the applicant on DATE and DATE , in which he had declared that he was satisfied with the conditions of detention in the recently renovated block of FAC .

The applicant was held in FAC for DATE , from DATE to DATE . During that period he was placed in CARDINAL different cells measuring approximately QUANTITY . m , which accommodated CARDINAL prisoners ( CARDINAL sq . m of personal space ) .

The cells had their own bathrooms with a toilet and shower . LOC water , which was also used for drinking , was available DATE from TIME , TIME and TIME had access to hot showers twice per week for TIME , depending on the number of prisoners and the heating capacity of the central heating system .

Cleaning products were provided DATE within the limits of the budget . The mattresses were renewed in DATE .

Food was usually provided in accordance with the regulations but budgetary limitations meant that certain products were sometimes missing .

NORP The applicant was placed in a cell measuring QUANTITY m together with CARDINAL other prisoners ( QUANTITY . m of personal space ) . The cell had CARDINAL rows of bunk beds DATE places .

Access to hot showers was possible twice per week . The provision of personal hygiene products was sometimes reduced for budgetary reasons . Heating and food were provided in accordance with the legal norms . Prisoners were served their meals in their cells .

The applicant ’s cell had CARDINAL television sets on which prisoners could watch programmes during certain time slots .

NORP The prison administration ensured the ORG access to a DATE walk and sports activities .

General disinfection operations were conducted CARDINAL times in the course of DATE and twice in DATE . The Government submitted that the prison had not allocated any funding for disinfectants in the budget for DATE and had thus had to attract outside sponsorship to cover that cost .

The applicant was detained in ORG for DATE and DATE , from DATE to CARDINAL DATE . During that period he was placed in CARDINAL different cells measuring QUANTITY m , which he shared with CARDINAL other prisoners ( personal space ranging from QUANTITY . m to CARDINAL sq . m ) .

Renovated cells were “ put in use ” on CARDINAL DATE and new mattresses , pillows and sheets were distributed on DATE . The cells were equipped with the requisite furniture and a television set . They also had a bathroom with a toilet , a shower , a sink and a window . LOC water was available permanently and hot water twice per week for TIME .

Hygiene products were distributed DATE , but the statutory quantities could not be respected due to budgetary limitations . In DATE prisoners were given washing powder CARDINAL times , soap and toilet paper CARDINAL times and chlorine CARDINAL times .

Food was prepared in accordance with the legal standards , in a fully renovated area . Prisoners were served their meals in their cells .

No disinfection was necessary in the applicant ’s cell during the time he spent in FAC .

The applicant alleged that while in detention he had developed various diseases as a result of the poor conditions in which he had been held . He alleged that the prison doctors had not provided him with adequate medical treatment and that all of the prisons had lacked medicines . More specifically , the prison infirmary had been open DATE ; whenever he had had a cold , an infection or even for the rheumatic fever he contracted in prison , he had usually been given only aspirin , as other medicines had never been available at the prison infirmary . In addition , he had suffered from toothache and other associated aches and pains and , despite repeatedly asking , he had never been taken to a dentist or given any painkillers , even when he finally developed a tooth infection and suffered pain for DATE .

On DATE the applicant was examined at FAC infirmary and was diagnosed with lumbago . He received CARDINAL tube of Diclofenac cream .

On DATE the applicant was admitted to ORG and was diagnosed with osteoarthritis of the hands , chronic tetany ( a neurological syndrome consisting of painful muscular spasms and cramps ) and lower back pain . He was released with the recommendation to avoid effort , exposure to cold and dampness , and was prescribed symptomatic medication . On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the applicant received a total of CARDINAL anti - inflammatory tablets .

With respect to the dental care available to the applicant , the ORG submitted that he had been examined and diagnosed , and had undergone treatment such as extractions , fillings and dental pulp extirpations on numerous occasions . On all those occasions he had also received appropriate treatment with antibiotics and pain killers .

Lastly , the ORG submitted that no complaints concerning any alleged lack of adequate medical treatment had ever been lodged by the applicant during his detention .


Alena Poláčková;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE .

The applicant is a retired person and a World War II veteran with a category CARDINAL disability .

He is the owner of CARDINAL of a house with outbuildings and an adjacent plot of land located in the vicinity of a public highway in GPE . His wife lived there with him from DATE until her death in DATE . They cultivated their garden to grow their own fruit and vegetables .

DATE the municipal authorities repaired the highway and raised the level of the road surface .

Since the completion of the repair works the applicant ’s house and plot of land have been submerged by melted snow and groundwater DATE . The house has been seriously damaged and , according to the applicant , is no longer habitable .

In DATE the applicant brought proceedings against the municipal authorities and the municipal company that had repaired the road . He claimed that a drainage pipe had been installed in breach of technical requirements and in the absence of any specific project documentation . The authorities had not properly supervised or validated the works carried out , despite numerous technical shortcomings . This had resulted in his house being inundated by melted snow and groundwater in DATE . Since then it had been regularly flooded . The applicant claimed compensation for the pecuniary and non - pecuniary damage he had sustained as a result of the flooding . He also asked ORG ( “ the NORP District Court ” ) to order the municipal authorities to develop specific project documentation for the installation of a new drainage pipe and carry out the necessary repairs to the road .

On DATE ORG examined the applicant ’s claims . It established that DATE the municipal authorities had carried out repair works to the public highway in the vicinity of the applicant ’s house and had installed a drainage pipe . Regarding the flooding of the applicant ’s house in DATE , the court held that he had not proved the extent of the damage and that “ no casual connection had been established between the actions of the municipal authorities and the damage ” . Accordingly , there were no grounds to award the applicant compensation for pecuniary and nonpecuniary damage . The court also noted that according to an expert report issued in DATE :

“ ... the most probable cause of the inundation of the applicant ’s house in DATE was its position below the level of the road , lack of preparatory and protective engineering measures , road construction in the absence of project documentation ... ”

ORG concluded that the flooding resulted from a malfunctioning drainage pipe located under the road surface . The authorities were therefore under an obligation to arrange for works to be carried out related to the collection of wastewater from the road and the area near the applicant ’s house .

On DATE ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) quashed the part of the judgment of DATE refusing to award the applicant compensation for pecuniary damage and adopted a new decision to that effect . It held that the case material confirmed that since DATE the applicant ’s house had been regularly inundated by surface water coming from the road , which had not been properly maintained by the town administration . As a result , his property had been damaged . ORG awarded the applicant MONEY ( RUB ) ( MONEY ( ORG ) ) in compensation for the pecuniary damage sustained as a result of his house being flooded . It upheld the remainder of the judgment of DATE .

On DATE the bailiffs’ service initiated enforcement proceedings . On an unspecified date the town administration engaged the services of the municipal highway service to unclog the drainage pipe . According to the certificate of acceptance , the highway service finished the works in DATE .

On DATE the bailiffs’ service terminated the enforcement proceedings . The applicant did not lodge an appeal against that decision .

NORP In DATE the applicant ’s house and plot of land were again flooded . He sued the municipal authorities , claiming that his home and property had been flooded because the town administration had not complied with its obligation to install a waste water collection system for the road . He also claimed compensation for pecuniary and non - pecuniary damage .

On DATE ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) terminated the proceedings in respect of the applicant ’s claim regarding the municipal authorities’ obligation to repair the road , since it had already been examined and decided by ORG on DATE .

On DATE ORG examined the remainder of the applicant ’s claims . It established that since DATE the applicant ’s house had been regularly flooded because the town administration had not carried out the necessary repairs to the road . It further established that the town administration had not enforced the final judgment of CARDINAL DATE and as a result the applicant ’s house had been regularly flooded since its adoption . Having regard to the above , the court concluded that the flooding of the house in DATE had been the fault of the town administration , which had not properly maintained the road . The court awarded the applicant RUB CARDINAL ( about EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) in compensation for pecuniary damage and dismissed his claim in respect of non - pecuniary damage .

On DATE ORG upheld that judgment .

In DATE the applicant brought a new set of proceedings against the municipal authorities . He submitted that his house had been regularly flooded because of the failure of the local authorities to install a waste water collection system next to his house . The flooding had continued after the enforcement of the judgment of DATE . As a result of regular flooding his house had been almost destroyed , the living conditions did not conform to the established sanitary standards and the air inside and around the house was permanently damp . The applicant also claimed compensation for pecuniary and non - pecuniary damage .

ORG ordered an expert construction examination in the applicant ’s case . According to the expert report dated DATE , which relied on FAC pertaining to roads and urban development ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) :

“ ... the installation of a drainage system ordered by the judgment of DATE ... has not been carried out ... [ the applicant ’s ] house has been flooded since DATE [ up to the date ] of examination of [ his ] case in court . The waste water is collecting in [ CARDINAL neighbouring ] streets , including the applicant ’s . The road next to the applicant ’s house is essentially horizontal and the diversion of [ melted snow ] ... has not been technically finalised ( the diameter of the pipe has not been technically justified , its route and gradient not calculated ) ... The water collection system which existed previously has been modified due to the unauthorised elevation of parts of the road and its surface and the newly constructed road ... ”

In the expert ’s opinion , in order to protect the applicant ’s house from DATE flooding it was necessary to carry out a land survey , draft a plan of the project , make the necessary calculations and perform repairs .

On DATE ORG examined the applicant ’s claims . It held that it was competent to do so in so far as they concerned the flooding of his house which occurred after enforcement of the judgment of DATE .

NORP The court allowed the applicant ’s claims in part . It established , in particular , that after enforcement in DATE of the judgment of DATE the applicant ’s house had been regularly flooded as a result of the authorities’ failure to comply with their obligation to properly maintain the applicant ’s street and the road near his house . The court ordered the municipal authorities to commission a project with a specialist firm for the construction of a drainage pipe on the part of the road adjacent to the applicant ’s house , and to carry out construction works in accordance with that project by DATE . It dismissed the applicant ’s claims in respect of pecuniary and non - pecuniary damage as there was “ no causal link between the action or inaction of [ the authorities ] and the damage sustained [ by the applicant ] ” .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . It appears that the applicant did not lodge an appeal against that decision .

On DATE ORG issued a writ of execution .

On DATE the bailiffs’ service instituted enforcement proceedings .

On DATE , after CARDINAL formal demands under the writ of execution and in the absence of any action on the part of the town administration , the bailiffs’ service found it liable for the administrative offence of non - compliance with a writ of execution , and issued a fine of RUB CARDINAL ( about EUR CARDINAL ) .

In DATE the applicant ’s house was again flooded .

On DATE and DATE the town administration signed CARDINAL municipal contracts under the terms of which it engaged CARDINAL companies to perform road repairs and anti - flood works on the part of the road adjacent to the applicant ’s house . On CARDINAL and DATE respectively the works were completed .

On DATE the bailiff terminated the enforcement proceedings following an on - site inspection and determined that the judgment of CARDINAL DATE had been fully enforced .

The applicant appealed against that decision , complaining that the judgment in question had not been fully enforced .

On DATE ORG dismissed his appeal , finding that the judgment had been fully enforced .

On DATE ORG quashed that decision and adopted a new decision allowing the applicant ’s complaint regarding the bailiff ’s decision to terminate the proceedings . It held , in particular , that that decision had been unlawful and ordered the bailiffs’ service to reopen the enforcement proceedings . On DATE the chief bailiff overturned the decision to terminate the enforcement proceedings in the applicant ’s case .

On DATE ORG examined the applicant ’s claim concerning the failure of the town administration to enforce the judgment of DATE within a reasonable time . The applicant claimed RUB CARDINAL ( about EUR CARDINAL ) in respect of nonpecuniary damage . The court acknowledged that he had undeniably sustained non - pecuniary damage and awarded him RUB CARDINAL ( about EUR CARDINAL ) . It also noted that the necessary repairs had been carried out in DATE and that the applicant ’s representative , PERSON , had stated in the proceedings that the flooding of the house had stopped .

On DATE Mr PERSON acknowledged in writing that the judgment had been enforced . On DATE the bailiff terminated the enforcement proceedings .

On DATE the applicant applied to ORG ( “ the Commission ” ) attached to the LOC administration to have his house declared unfit for habitation on account of the damage caused by regular flooding .

On DATE the Commission held that over DATE the applicant ’s house had lost a number of its features . However , it was still possible to recover them by carrying out structural repairs .

On DATE the head of the LOC administration approved those conclusions and held that the applicant ’s house was in need of structural repairs , that it was possible to carry them out and that they should be carried out by the owner .

NORP On DATE ORG dismissed a complaint by the applicant regarding the ORG ’s decision . On an unspecified date ORG upheld that decision on appeal .

On DATE the applicant and his wife applied to the municipal authorities to be placed on the municipal housing list . It appears that up to the date of examination of his case by the ORG the applicant has not been provided with any accommodation .