Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Impartial tribunal);Violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression);Pecuniary damage - award;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Aleš Pejchal;André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Ann Power-Forde;Dean Spielmann;Egidijus Kūris;Erik Møse;Ganna Yudkivska;George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Ineta Ziemele;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Julia Laffranque;Luis López Guerra;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paul Lemmens;Zdravka Kalaydjieva;Ksenija Turković

The applicant , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE , is a lawyer ( avocat ) , member of ORG .

On DATE Mr PERSON , a judge who had been seconded by GPE for DATE as technical adviser to the PERSON Minister of ORG , in the context of cooperation agreements between GPE , was found dead QUANTITY from the city of GPE . His CARDINAL - naked and partially burnt body was lying QUANTITY below a remote road . The investigation by the GPE gendarmerie in DATE that followed concluded that he had committed suicide by self - immolation .

On DATE a judicial investigation was opened at the GPE tribunal de grande instance to determine the cause of death . PERSON body , which was repatriated and interred in GPE , underwent an autopsy on DATE . The report concluded that the death was not suspicious , although the body ’s state of decomposition did not permit a precise cause to be established .

On DATE Mrs PERSON , the widow of PERSON GPE and also a judge , disputing the finding of suicide , filed a complaint as a civil party , in her own name and on behalf of her CARDINAL minor children , against a person or persons unknown for premeditated murder . She appointed the applicant , Mr GPE , to represent her in the proceedings .

On DATE and DATE CARDINAL judicial investigations were opened in respect of premeditated murder committed by a person or persons unknown .

In a decision of DATE the judicial investigation into the cause of death and the CARDINAL investigations in respect of premeditated murder were joined .

On DATE ORG accepted a request by the applicant to withdraw the case from the LOC court and it was transferred to the tribunal de grande instance of GPE , where it was assigned on DATE to PERSON , assisted by Mr GPE on DATE , both investigating judges , who were to conduct the judicial investigation jointly .

On DATE a lawyer at ORG informed the police that A. , a former senior officer and member of ORG , who had found asylum in GPE , had certain revelations to make concerning Judge PERSON . The information thus disclosed was transmitted to the NORP authorities via ORG . A judgment of ORG of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) records the following sequence of events : Judges PERSON and GPE did not reply , owing to the fact that the witness wished to remain anonymous , and the information was not followed up ; the witness ’s NORP lawyer thus contacted the applicant , who arranged for the witness to be interviewed by journalists from the DATE newspaper ORG and the NORP TV channel TFCARDINAL , at DATE ; lastly , it was as a result of the publication and broadcasting of that interview in DATE that Judges PERSON and PERSON decided to go to GPE to assist the NORP investigator in taking evidence from the witness .

On DATE Judges PERSON and GPE interviewed the witness in GPE . It was subsequently alleged by A. that he had been pressurised and intimidated by Judge PERSON so that he would withdraw his testimony , those complaints being expressly made in a letter of DATE from his lawyer to ORG . In addition , the witness accused the public prosecutor of GPE of having threatened him to make him recant his statement , and alleged that the head of the GPE secret services had ordered the head of ORG , PERSON , to draft a statement discrediting him . Captain I. confirmed A ’s accusations concerning him .

Proceedings were brought in GPE against the public prosecutor of GPE and the head of the country ’s secret services for the procuring of false evidence , and Judge PERSON ’s widow and son , the witness NORP , Captain PERSON , and a NORP lawyer PERSON , who was implicated , intervened as civil parties . Evidence was taken from Judge PERSON in her capacity as witness . The public prosecutor and the head of the secret services of GPE were sentenced , respectively , to CARDINAL and QUANTITY months’ imprisonment , and ordered to pay damages to the civil parties , in a judgment of ORG of DATE , before being acquitted by ORG on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE , in the context of the judicial investigation in respect of premeditated murder , CARDINAL professional unions of judges and prosecutors , namely PERSON , the ORG professionnelle des magistrats and the ORG , applied to be joined to the proceedings as civil parties .

On DATE the applicant , acting on behalf of PERSON , requested , first , that evidence be taken from the witness , PERSON , in GPE , and secondly that a visit to the scene of the crime in GPE , in the presence of the civil parties , be organised .

NORP In a decision of CARDINAL DATE the investigating judges PERSON and GPE accepted the request concerning PERSON , finding that a new interview was absolutely necessary . They refused , however , to agree to a site visit , as such a visit had already been made twice , once in DATE and again DATE before the decision in question , as they did not see “ how a visit to the site in the presence of the civil party would , at th[at ] stage of the proceedings , be helpful for the discovery of the truth ” . They added that during their visit to GPE DATE before , they had been accompanied by CARDINAL experts , including the director of ORG , adding that the scene had been filmed and photographed on that occasion .

The applicant and another lawyer appealed against that decision . They filed their pleadings with ORG , like the lawyer acting for PERSON magistrature , arguing that the last site visit in the presence of an expert could be regarded as a reconstruction from which the civil parties had been excluded , and that the sole aim of the investigation was to demonstrate that the victim had committed suicide . They also requested that ORG take over the case from the investigating judges and continue the investigation itself .

In a judgment of DATE ORG of ORG found that after CARDINAL site visits in the absence of the civil parties , CARDINAL of which closely resembled a reconstruction , the need to organise an on - site reconstruction in the presence of the civil parties so that they could exercise their rights was indispensable for the discovery of the truth . Accordingly , it set aside the decision of Judges PERSON and PERSON on that point . In addition , it withdrew the case from them and appointed a new investigating judge , Judge PERSON , to continue the investigation .

On DATE the GPE public prosecutor , further to the request of the investigating judge then handling the case , on the basis of LAW , paragraph CARDINAL , of LAW , issued a statement to clarify publicly that “ whilst suicide had once been the preferred theory , the evidence gathered , especially DATE , now point[ed ] to a criminal act ” , adding that the experts’ reports had determined that “ PERSON was lying on the ground when liquids were poured over him in a random manner ” .

The proceedings are currently still pending .

NORP The Minister of Justice , by acts of DATE and DATE , referred to ORG ( ORG magistrature DATE the “ FAC ) , in its capacity as disciplinary board for judges , certain shortcomings attributable to Judge PERSON in the judicial investigation into the “ NORP ” case for which she was responsible and in which the applicant also represented the civil parties . Judge PERSON was criticised for not devoting the necessary care and attention to the case file , leaving it practically untouched for DATE , for having recourse to a friendly settlement procedure which went beyond the jurisdiction of an investigating judge and for not making copies of all the documents in the case file , thus making it impossible to reconstruct the file after its partial disappearance from her chambers . Judge PERSON requested that the referral to the ORG be declared null and void , particularly on account of the fact that it had been made public by the director of the Minister ’s private office at a press conference , even before she had been personally notified of the decision . In parallel , on DATE , ORG of ORG upheld a request by the applicant for the withdrawal of the “ Scientology ” case from Judge PERSON

On DATE , at a general meeting of judges of the GPE tribunal de grande instance , the issue of the disciplinary proceedings against Judge PERSON was raised , in particular because they had been announced in the press whereas the judge concerned had not been officially informed and the President of that court had not yet been notified . During that meeting a judge , PERSON , stated as follows :

“ We are not prohibited , as grassroots judges , from saying that we stand by Judge [ M. ] It is not forbidden to say that Judge [ M. ] has our support and trust . ”

The general meeting drafted the following motion , which was adopted unanimously :

“ The general meeting of judges of the GPE tribunal de grande instance held on DATE , without disputing the authority conferred on the Minister of ORG to take disciplinary proceedings in the conditions prescribed by law , is surprised to learn from the press that such proceedings have been initiated against Judge [ M. ] , investigating judge in GPE , whereas to date neither the judge herself nor her judicial hierarchy have been officially informed thereof . ”

In the context of a magazine interview published in DATE , the chair of PERSON magistrature , a civil party in the GPE case , criticised the “ lack of impartiality on the part of Judge M. in the GPE and [ L. ] cases ” , adding that the judges who had signed the motion “ could not have been unaware that in CARDINAL sensitive cases , the GPE case and the [ L. ] case , her impartiality was seriously called into question ” .

In a judgment of DATE , the GPE tribunal de grande instance , in a case brought by the applicant as counsel acting for CARDINAL civil parties , had found the ORG liable for gross negligence on the part of the courts service on account of the disappearance of the so - called “ Scientology ” file from the office of Judge PERSON It awarded damages to the complainants .

On DATE the ORG dismissed a plea of nullity from Judge PERSON and , on the merits , while reproaching her for a certain lack of rigour or a failure to keep track of the case sufficiently , did not impose any disciplinary penalty on her .

On DATE Judge PERSON , who had been appointed to replace Judges PERSON and PERSON , drafted a report in which he noted the following chain of events . In response to the applicant ’s request concerning the video - recording made in GPE in DATE and cited by Judges PERSON and LOC in their decision of CARDINAL DATE , Judge PERSON replied that it was not in the judicial investigation file and was not registered as an exhibit ; on DATE , Judge PERSON asked Judge PERSON whether she still had the video - cassette ; Judge PERSON promptly gave him a closed and undated envelope with her name on , showing no sign of having been placed under seal , bearing the address of Judge PERSON as addressee and that of the public prosecutor of GPE as sender ; the envelope contained a video - cassette and a handwritten card with the letter head of the public prosecutor of GPE , these items then being taken by Judge PERSON and placed under seal . The public prosecutor ’s card addressed to Judge PERSON read as follows ( translated from NORP ) :

“ Hi PERSON ,

As agreed , I am sending you the video - cassette of the PERSON site visit . I hope the picture will be clear enough .

I watched the show PERSON ( Without any doubt ) on GPE . I noticed once again how PERSON and her lawyers were determined to carry on orchestrating their manipulation .

I ’ll call you soon .

Say hello to PERSON if he ’s back , and also to GPE [ NORP ] .

Speak to you soon .

Best wishes ,


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Päivi Hirvelä;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in FAC .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of committing a number of offences in an armed organised criminal group .

On DATE ORG ( Sąd Rejonowy ) remanded the applicant in custody . The court relied on a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question . The risk of the applicant fleeing was also taken into account since he had spent DATE in hiding after a ‘ wanted’ notice ( list gończy ) had been issued against him . The court also referred to the likelihood of a heavy prison sentence being imposed on the applicant after conviction .

The applicant ’s detention on remand was extended by ORG ( PERSON ) on DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE . Subsequently it was extended by ORG ( Sąd Apelacyjny ) on DATE , DATE , DATE and on DATE . The applicant ’s appeals filed against some of the above decisions were dismissed by ORG on DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE .

In their detention decisions the courts relied on the original grounds for the applicant ’s arrest . They stressed , in particular , the danger of the applicant absconding referring to the fact that he had remained in hiding before his arrest . They further referred to the need to apprehend other members of the criminal group and to obtain additional evidence supporting the case against the applicant . In the courts’ view , the applicant , if released , would try to obstruct the proceedings by passing vital information about the preliminary proceedings onto the other members of the criminal group and by influencing witnesses . The courts concluded that in the context of the applicant ’s case , which concerned organised crime , detention on remand was the only security measure to guarantee the proper conduct of the proceedings .

On an unspecified date in DATE the charges against the applicant were severed to a separate set of the proceedings as he was to undergo a psychiatric examination .

On DATE the ORG ( Prokurator Prokuratury Apealacyjnej ) lodged a bill of indictment against the applicant with ORG . The applicant was charged with several counts of robbery and drug trafficking committed in an organised criminal group .

On DATE the ORG extended the applicant ’s detention on remand until DATE . Subsequently , the same court ordered prolongation of his detention on DATE ( detention extended until DATE ) , on DATE ( detention extended until DATE ) and on DATE ( detention extended until DATE ) . The applicant appealed against all of those decisions but to no avail .

In their decisions the courts repeated the grounds previously given for the applicant ’s detention . They also stressed the likelihood of a heavy prison sentence being imposed on the applicant after conviction .

Meanwhile , on DATE , ORG joined the applicant ’s case with the case against the other members of the criminal group . The joined proceedings concerned altogether CARDINAL defendants charged with CARDINAL offences . The prosecution authorities requested that CARDINAL witnesses be heard before the court .

The court scheduled QUANTITY hearings for DATE . Due to sick - leaves of the presiding judge and of some of the accused those hearings did not take place .

The trial was eventually opened on DATE . Subsequent scheduled hearings were adjourned due to absences of some of the coaccused and due to problems with sound system in the court room .

In DATE ORG gave a severance order and decided to determine charges against CARDINAL co - accused separately .

The bill of indictment was finally read out to the defendants at the hearing held on DATE .

At the hearing of CARDINAL DATE ORG started taking evidence from the accused . It subsequently held CARDINAL hearings until DATE , during which some of the accused gave evidence . CARDINAL of the scheduled hearings were adjourned due to sick - leaves of the accused . In particular , the hearing scheduled for DATE was cancelled because the applicant and another defendant in the case were feeling unwell . CARDINAL hearing was adjourned because of the motion for disqualification of the judge lodged by CARDINAL of the co - accused .

In DATE ORG continued taking evidence from the defendants . Of the CARDINAL hearings scheduled for DATE , CARDINAL took place . The trial court adjourned DATE hearings due to justified absences of the parties , QUANTITY hearings were cancelled due to sick - leaves of the presiding judge and the lay judges .

Meanwhile , the applicant ’s detention on remand was lifted on an unspecified date in DATE . He continued to remain in custody as pretrial detention was imposed on him in a separate set of proceedings .

ORG scheduled CARDINAL hearings for DATE , of which CARDINAL hearings were eventually held . At the hearing of DATE the trial court started taking evidence from witnesses .

Of the CARDINAL hearings cancelled DATE , CARDINAL were adjourned because of a sickleave of the presiding judge , CARDINAL because of absences of witnesses , and the remaining QUANTITY hearings – because of absences of the parties .

Until DATE ORG scheduled CARDINAL hearings for DATE , of which CARDINAL were adjourned due to justified absences of the defendants . In particular , the hearing of DATE was adjourned because of the absence of the applicant .

The criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending before the firstinstance court .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG under LAW on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time ( ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki DATE “ the CARDINAL Act ” ) . He sought a finding that the length of the criminal proceedings against him had been excessive and MONEY ( ORG ) in compensation .

On DATE the ORG dismissed the applicant ’s complaint . The appellate court found that , considering the complexity of the case and the number of co - accused , who actively tried to obstruct the proceedings , the first - instance court had conducted the proceedings in a correct and timely manner . Consequently , the court refused to award the applicant compensation .


Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life);Non-pecuniary damage - award

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE .

On DATE the applicant married PERSON , also a national of GPE . On DATE she gave birth to their son , ORG At some point relations between the couple deteriorated . As was established by the NORP courts in subsequent proceedings , on DATE PERSON moved to the town of GPE , in GPE , where her parents lived . The boy , GPE , went with her .

On DATE PERSON initiated divorce proceedings before ORG of GPE . She also sought a residence order in her favour in respect of GPE On DATE the applicant filed a counterclaim seeking a residence order in his favour in respect of the child .

On DATE , while the proceedings were still pending , Ms E.P. left GPE with the child and settled in GPE , GPE .

On DATE the court fixed a contact schedule , pursuant to which the applicant was to be allowed to visit his son .

On DATE the applicant sought a court order prohibiting ORG from leaving the country with the child without his consent . On the same date the court granted the order sought by the applicant . An interim restraining order was issued with immediate effect .

On DATE PERSON , by letter , informed the court and the police that she was opposed to any contact between the applicant and their son . Her letter was certified by a notary public in GPE .

On DATE PERSON obtained a certificate of “ temporary residence registration ” with ORG in GPE . In DATE she went through this process several times , obtaining such a certificate for the last time on DATE .

In DATE did not take part in the proceedings before the NORP courts ; however , she was represented by a lawyer .

On an unspecified date the applicant contacted the NORP police in order to establish the whereabouts of the child . According to a written reply from the police dated DATE ( which was apparently based on information provided by PERSON parents ) , the applicant ’s son was living with his mother at an address on PERSON . Street in GPE .

According to the applicant , on DATE PERSON returned to GPE with the boy . During their stay in GPE she allowed the applicant to see the child twice . During CARDINAL of the visits PERSON informed the applicant that she was living with a new partner , Mr ORG , in GPE and that she had told her son that Mr PERSON was his father .

On DATE left for GPE again , taking the child with her .

On DATE the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the NORP police , seeking the institution of criminal proceedings against ORG for abduction of their child . A police officer of ORG questioned PERSON and Mr ORG , and established that ORG was not preventing the applicant from seeing his son . The police officer concluded that the situation was within the jurisdiction of the civil courts and that there was no need for the criminal prosecution of PERSON

The applicant contacted the NORP police and asked them to verify whether the child and the mother were in fact living at the address on PERSON . Street . On DATE and DATE the NORP police informed the applicant that , according to their information , PERSON and her son were not living at that address .

On DATE the ORG public prosecutor charged PERSON , in absentia , under LAW . On the same date her name was put on GPE ’s wanted list by the police .

PERSON was represented by CARDINAL lawyers in the divorce and child residence proceedings before ORG . According to a letter issued by ORG , PERSON was properly notified of the hearings , but failed to appear .

On DATE ORG decided the case in favour of the applicant . In its judgment the court analysed the child ’s living conditions , the circumstances of separation of the parents , their respective home lives , income , occupation , social habits and so forth . The judgment was upheld at CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction DATE on DATE and , in the final instance ( ORG ) , on DATE . The judgment of CARDINAL DATE , as upheld , dissolved the marriage and ordered that the boy ’s habitual residence ( domicile ) for the purposes of his upbringing and education should be with his father ( the applicant ) .

On DATE the NORP police ( ORG ) detained PERSON in connection with the criminal proceedings which had been opened against her in GPE , but she was released within TIME .

On DATE PERSON married Mr PERSON in GPE . For some time they lived together in GPE at an address on PERSON . Street . Ms E.P. enrolled the boy in a kindergarten situated in GPE . She requested the kindergarten not to allow the applicant to see the child . The child was also registered with and started to receive treatment at one of the public polyclinics in GPE .

On DATE the applicant asked ORG to issue a warrant of execution on the basis of ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE . As per the Government ’s explanations , the applicant lodged this request not directly , but through ORG , which , in turn , forwarded it to ORG of GPE .

On DATE ORG of GPE , with reference to the bilateral treaty between GPE and GPE of DATE , asked ORG to assist the applicant in the enforcement of the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . They informed ORG that ORG was living with his mother at an address on PERSON . Street in GPE .

It would appear that , subsequent to her marriage ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) to Mr ORG , a NORP national , PERSON applied for NORP citizenship on the basis that her birthplace had been in GPE and she was married to a NORP national .

On DATE the applicant ’s application for a warrant of execution was received by the GPE branch of ORG . On DATE that application , together with enclosed documents , was forwarded to ORG .

On DATE ORG received the application together with the enclosed documents .

On DATE a judge of ORG refused to examine the validity of the judgment of DATE for the purposes of enforcement on the territory of GPE . The judge held that , pursuant to the bilateral treaty between GPE and GPE of DATE and LAW of DATE , such judgments were self - executing and did not need any further action in order to be enforced . In addition , the judgment of CARDINAL DATE had not imposed on the defendant PERSON ) any obligation to act or to refrain from acting in a particular way . ORG concluded that it had no competence to examine the applicant ’s application .

The decision of DATE was forwarded to the applicant on DATE by registered mail . According to the Government , it was received by the applicant in GPE on DATE .

On DATE ( on DATE ) , the documents enclosed by the applicant with his application for a warrant of execution were returned to him . As is apparent from the explanations of the Government , those documents were sent through the GPE branch of ORG , which forwarded them to the federal ORG , which , in turn , forwarded the documents to ORG for further dispatch to the applicant .

Having received the decision of DATE , the applicant appealed . However , since by that time the time - limits for lodging an appeal had expired , he first introduced a motion with ORG for waiver of the time - limit .

On DATE ORG examined the applicant ’s motion and ruled that , in view of the applicant ’s explanations , the timelimit had to be waived . The appeal was consequently forwarded to ORG of GPE .

On DATE the ruling of DATE was quashed by ORG of GPE . ORG disagreed with the lower court ’s interpretation of LAW . Furthermore , ORG noted that the first - instance court was not in a position to conclude whether ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE did not require enforcement , as the materials of the case did not contain a “ certified copy of that decision ” . The case was remitted to ORG for fresh examination . On DATE the case file was forwarded from ORG to ORG .

On an unspecified date PERSON brought court proceedings before a NORP court seeking to obtain a residence order in respect of the child .

On DATE ORG of GPE refused to consider her application , holding that the dispute had already been resolved by another court , namely ORG .

On DATE the applicant wrote a letter to ORG in which he reiterated his original position and arguments and informed the court that PERSON was continuing to live at an address on PERSON . Street .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE a judge of ORG examined the case file and issued procedural rulings ordering additional evidence to be gathered . In particular , the judge decided to call ORG for a preliminary discussion concerning the case on DATE . On that date the judge set the case for an open hearing and ordered that the parties be notified .

The judge also invited the applicant to resubmit the package of documents he had previously submitted together with his first application of CARDINAL DATE ( letter of CARDINAL DATE , no . CARDINALM-CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . The judge indicated that those documents should reach ORG before DATE .

On DATE ORG of GPE received from ORG of GPE a renewed application for a warrant of execution together with supporting documents . A cover letter by ORG of GPE referred to the provisions of LAW and was very similar to the first letter sent on DATE . The request contained CARDINAL pages of enclosures , consisting of court decisions by the NORP courts in the applicant ’s case .

On an unspecified date the request by ORG was forwarded by the federal ORG to its GPE branch .

On DATE the GPE branch of ORG received the application and on DATE forwarded it with the enclosed documents to ORG . In a cover letter addressed to the President of ORG , ORG asked to be kept informed about the developments in the applicant ’s case . According to the Government , application and the enclosed documents were only received by ORG on DATE .

On DATE ORG , following the remittal of the case from ORG of GPE , re - examined the first application . PERSON was present at the hearing . She argued that the original judgment of DATE had been unlawful , as the GPE court had been incompetent to examine the dispute . She insisted that the applicant and the GPE courts had been perfectly aware of her moving to GPE with the child on DATE . She also argued that the NORP courts should not have examined the case , as only the courts of the country where the child and his resident parent or lawful guardian had established de facto residence were competent to hear such a case . According to PERSON , the NORP courts had based their jurisdiction on the “ registration ” ( propiska ) status of the child , whereas his de facto residence was in GPE , together with his mother . PERSON also argued that she was working and was capable of taking proper care of her son in GPE .

ORG rejected the arguments made by ORG It ruled that the child ( PERSON ) was residing in GPE on a temporary basis , as confirmed by the temporary registration certificates , and that his permanent place of residence was in GPE . Consequently , the GPE court had been competent , under LAW and the bilateral treaty of DATE , to examine the matter .

Further , ORG held that none of the reasons preventing enforcement of a foreign judicial decision stated in Article CARDINAL of ORG existed in the case at hand . The alleged “ unlawfulness ” of the judgment of ORG under LAW and LAW did not prevent the NORP courts from issuing a warrant of execution .

As a result , the GPE court granted the application and ordered the enforcement of the judgment of DATE on the territory of GPE . It stipulated that that judgment had ordered that the child reside , for the purposes of his upbringing and education , with his father .

Ms E.P. appealed . In her statement of appeal she developed the arguments she had put forward before ORG . In particular , she referred to the provisions of NORP law on the legal status of foreigners which defined a foreigner ’s place of “ permanent residence ” as the place where the foreigner lives permanently and lawfully for a significant amount of time . She also maintained that the enforcement of ORG judgment would be contrary to the best interests of the child , as set forth in the DATE LAW . In particular , she argued that the child did not remember the applicant and considered her new husband , Mr ORG , to be his father , and that returning him to the care of his biological father would endanger his psychological well - being and development . PERSON claimed that the decision of ORG had ignored her son ’s best interests : in particular , she referred to the decision of ORG in the case of PERSON , where the NORP courts had refused to enforce a decision of an NORP court , finding that the children involved were living permanently on the territory of GPE and therefore only the NORP courts were competent to decide , on the basis of NORP law , the child residence dispute between the parents .

The applicant lodged a written memorandum in reply to the statement of appeal by PERSON The applicant contested her argument concerning the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the NORP courts in the child residence proceedings . He further insisted that PERSON conduct had been immoral and harmful for the child .

On DATE ORG wrote a letter to the applicant explaining that on DATE it had received a package of documents from the applicant . It appears that this was the same package which the applicant had previously submitted together with his first application for a warrant of execution ( that of CARDINAL DATE ) , which had later been returned to him by ORG on DATE , and which ORG had requested from him again on DATE .

On DATE ORG of GPE examined PERSON appeal . The hearing took place in presence of ORG ; the applicant was absent from the hearing . She repeated her argument concerning the distinction between “ registration ” and “ residence ” , insisted that the NORP courts had misinterpreted the relevant provisions of LAW , and asserted that they had lacked jurisdiction to hear the case . ORG also referred to the provisions of LAW ( “ the ORG ” ) , which provided that a foreign judgment should not be executed on the territory of GPE if it could harm the sovereignty or security of GPE or if it was contrary to public policy . PERSON claimed that separating a small child from his mother would be contrary to the public policy of GPE .

Following the hearing ORG quashed ORG judgment of DATE . ORG found that the applicant had failed to follow the procedure established by ORG . In particular , he had not submitted the following documents to the NORP courts : a certified copy of ORG judgment , a letter from ORG asking for the enforcement of the judgment on the territory of GPE , a statement by the judge that the judgment had not yet been enforced in GPE , a confirmation by the same judge that ORG and her representative had been duly notified of the date and place of the hearing before ORG , and , finally , a statement by ORG that the judgment had entered into force . ORG also noted that the translations into NORP of the court documents submitted by the applicant had not been made . In such circumstances , ORG should not have granted his application for a warrant of execution – instead , under LAW was obliged to adjourn the proceedings and give the applicant the opportunity to submit the missing documents . ORG ordered that the case be remitted for fresh consideration .

On DATE the case was received by a judge of ORG . The judge ordered that PERSON be summoned and that she provide details of the address she had stated when obtaining temporary registration in GPE .

On DATE the judge set CARDINAL DATE as the date of the hearing of the case and ordered that PERSON second husband , PERSON ORG , be summoned .

On DATE PERSON left her second husband , Mr ORG , and took the child with her . Mr ORG stated ( see below ) that he was aware that she had moved in with a new partner , but he did not know his name or where they were living .

On DATE a police officer from the ORG visited Mr ORG and inquired about the whereabouts of GPE On DATE a municipal council worker visited Mr ORG and asked him the same question , but Mr PERSON was unable to give any specific information in response . It appears that by that time relations between Mr PERSON and ORG had seriously deteriorated and Mr PERSON was considering starting divorce proceedings .

On DATE the applicant lodged a motion for interim measures with ORG . He informed the court that PERSON and PERSON ORG had split up , that she had taken the child with her , and that their whereabouts were unknown . He also alleged that her new partner was potentially violent and that he had previously threatened to beat up Mr ORG The applicant claimed that in order to protect the child from the unpredictable behaviour of his mother and her new partner interim measures were needed . First , the applicant asked the court to obtain from the police details of the new address where PERSON was living with the child . Second , the applicant sought an order prohibiting PERSON from leaving GPE and GPE without the applicant ’s written consent . Third , the applicant asked the court to make a temporary residence order in respect of the child in his favour , pending the conclusion of the proceedings before ORG .

On DATE the GPE police informed the applicant that the whereabouts of PERSON and her son were unknown , and that a “ search file ” was open in respect of a minor , PERSON , in the competent department of the police department for ORG .

On DATE Mr ORG wrote a letter to ORG in which he supported the applicant ’s claims . In particular , he insisted that ORG had manipulated him , and that by moving in with her new partner she had deprived the child of his adoptive father .

On DATE ORG examined the applicant ’s motion applying for interim measures and dismissed it . ORG held that the interim measures sought by the applicant ( a prohibition on ORG leaving GPE and the grant of a temporary residence order in respect of the child ) amounted , in essence , to CARDINAL separate claims , which went beyond the scope of the enforcement proceedings initiated by the applicant .

On DATE ORG held a hearing , in the presence of PERSON and Mr PERSON as a witness . ORG heard both of them ; in particular , PERSON and Mr PERSON both related the story of their separation . Mr ORG ’s testimony was generally consonant with the position of the applicant ; PERSON denied the allegations of improper behaviour and blamed Mr PERSON for their separation . PERSON also informed the court of her current actual address and place of formal registration ( both were in GPE ) .

On DATE ( CARDINAL DATE ) ORG decided to grant the applicant ’s application for enforcement of the judgment of ORG making a residence order in respect of the child . ORG found that the applicant had submitted all necessary documents concerning the original judgments of the NORP courts , the proper notification of the defendant and the final character of those judgments . ORG further established that none of the reasons preventing the execution of the foreign judgment stated by LAW ORG or LAW were present in the case . In particular , ORG dismissed the argument by ORG that the enforcement of the decision of ORG in GPE would be contrary to “ public policy ” . ORG noted that the concept of “ public policy ” was different from the notion of “ national legislation ” , and that it referred to the most basic rules by which society functions in economic and social terms and the foundations of the legal order established in LAW .

Next , ORG repeated its earlier argument that the mother and child ’s “ permanent place of residence ” was to be determined on the basis of their place of registration , which was in GPE . In GPE , ORG had temporary resident status and had changed her address several times . Furthermore , the child residence proceedings had been started by the applicant before PERSON had moved from GPE to GPE . ORG concluded that the NORP courts had had jurisdiction in the child residence proceedings . As a result , ORG issued an execution warrant ( no . DATE ) ordering the enforcement of ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE .

It appears that this judgment was not appealed against and thus entered into force .

On DATE execution warrant no . DATE was sent , by registered post , to ORG .

On DATE the execution warrant issued by ORG ( No . DATE ) was received by ORG .

On DATE the warrant was sent back to ORG without execution . The bailiff to whom the warrant was entrusted decided that ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE was “ not subject to enforcement ” . As is evident from a letter from ORG DATE , ORG did not forward a copy of its decision not to institute enforcement proceedings to the applicant .

DATE . Having become aware of the decision , on an unspecified date the applicant asked ORG to review the case file they held concerning his case . However , those materials were allegedly destroyed during a fire that took place on CARDINAL DATE at the PERSON branch of ORG .

In the meantime the applicant learned , through his own enquiries , that PERSON was living with another man , PERSON , at an address on PERSON . Street . However , on DATE ORG informed the applicant that PERSON and GPE were not living at the address on ORG . Street . According to the owner of the flat , the mother and the child had rented a room in that flat for DATE but had then left without leaving any forwarding address .

On DATE ORG wrote a letter to ORG explaining the reasons for the nonenforcement of execution warrant no . DATE . According to the letter , “ the judicial act [ of the NORP courts ] simply acknowledged the fact that the child was living with his father and , by its [ very ] nature , did not require enforcement action [ to be taken ] , since the court ... did not establish an obligation on the respondent to perform certain actions or refrain from performing them . Similarly , the judicial act did not contain an order for removal of the child from the respondent ’s [ care ] and his return to the plaintiff ” . The ORG recommended that the applicant file a new claim with the courts in GPE in order to obtain an order specifically stating that such actions take place .

On DATE the applicant filed a complaint with ORG of GPE of inaction on the part of ORG , seeking an injunction .

The District Court summoned PERSON , the applicant and the bailiff who had issued the impugned decision . The first hearing was held on DATE , but all of the parties summoned failed to appear , so the court adjourned the hearing to DATE .

The hearing of DATE took place in presence of PERSON and a representative of ORG . However , due to the failure of the applicant to appear , the case was adjourned to DATE .

On DATE the applicant informed the court that he agreed to the examination of the case in his absence .

The new hearing took place on DATE . None of the parties were present , but the court decided to proceed with the examination of the case on the basis of the case file . ORG granted the applicant ’s claim that DATE . It found that the execution warrant issued by ORG , based on ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE , was valid and enforceable on the territory of GPE . It further held that the decision of the bailiff not to start enforcement proceedings in this respect was unlawful . On DATE ORG upheld the decision on appeal .

DATE . According to the Government , the bailiff concerned was not subjected to disciplinary action for his failure to enforce the execution warrant due to his dismissal from the civil service .

On DATE the applicant wrote a letter to the NORP police , asking them to inform him of the whereabouts of his son and PERSON As per the reply of ORG of DATE , ORG was living with her son on PERSON . Street in GPE , while being formally registered at another address in GPE .

On DATE PERSON was detained by the NORP police and questioned in relation to her immigration status . According to the authorities , her resident permit had expired on DATE . Ms ORG confirmed that her residence permit had expired but explained that she was in the process of regularising her status . Her case was submitted to a judge , who decided to give her an administrative fine of MONEY .

According to the applicant , on DATE the GPE authorities instituted criminal proceedings again PERSON for illegal crossing of the border .

On DATE PERSON and the applicant ’s son left GPE and crossed the GPE - GPE border through the PERSON checkpoint . Sometime later they arrived , via GPE , in GPE . According to the respondent Government , the applicant was notified of this in DATE at the latest .

On an unspecified date in DATE , PERSON met the applicant and handed their son over to him . Consequently , ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE was finally executed . In a letter to ORG the applicant confirmed that information .

In DATE the applicant made numerous attempts to initiate criminal proceedings against PERSON in GPE . His letters to the NORP prosecuting authorities led to numerous inquiries which concerned allegations of violence in respect of GPE , the immigration status of ORG and so forth . However , all of those inquiries were terminated , the investigative authorities having concluded that there was no case to answer .

Thus , on DATE ORG refused to extradite PERSON to GPE in connection with criminal proceedings which had been opened against her there . On several occasions the NORP police refused to institute criminal proceedings against PERSON in GPE ( decisions of CARDINAL DATE , DATE , DATE , and CARDINAL DATE ) .

The applicant also called on the NORP child welfare authorities at different levels – municipal , city and federal – to act on a number of occasions . According to the ORG , the competent officials repeatedly tried to establish the whereabouts of PERSON and the child , and inspect their living conditions . An inspection of CARDINAL DATE assessed ORG home environment and living conditions . On DATE PERSON was personally examined by a child welfare board at his kindergarten ; the board concluded that ORG was not a victim of violence at home .

On DATE ORG , at the request of the applicant , rendered a new judgment whereby it ordered PERSON to return the child , PERSON , to the applicant . That judgment came into force on DATE .

In DATE the applicant brought proceedings against the NORP Federation seeking compensation for ORG failure to enforce the warrant of execution of CARDINAL DATE . On DATE ORG returned this claim without examination . ORG held that PERSON no . CARDINAL-FZ of DATE did not give rise to liability on the part of the ORG for non - enforcement of judgments when the obligation on the defendant consisted of the return of a child to the custody of another parent . On DATE ORG , sitting as a court of appeal , upheld that decision .

On DATE ORG ordered that a duplicate of execution warrant no . DATE be issued . ORG found that the original execution warrant had been destroyed in the fire at ORG premises on DATE .

On DATE ORG issued a duplicate warrant of execution in respect of ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE . On DATE ORG opened enforcement proceedings on the basis of that warrant .

On DATE ORG opened enforcement proceedings on the basis of the duplicate of warrant no . CARDINAL ( i.e. the warrant issued on CARDINAL DATE ) . On DATE , DATE , DATE , and on CARDINAL DATE a bailiff visited some of the addresses where ORG had previously lived but did not find her there .


Aleš Pejchal;André Potocki;Ganna Yudkivska;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The first applicant is a NORP private company , PERSON . The second applicant , Mr PERSON Poplavskyy , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He owns PERCENT of the first applicant ’s shares and is its director . The applicants were represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , most recently , PERSON , of ORG of GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the ORG allowed the applicant company to set up a petrol station on ORG in GPE . The petrol station started doing business in DATE .

On DATE ORG gave the applicant company a DATE lease of the plot of land on which the above - mentioned petrol station was situated .

On DATE the applicant company signed a contract with a construction company , B. , to upgrade the petrol station . According to the applicants , company B. had moved the petrol pumps away from the petrol storage tanks . Thus , the petrol station had been changed from a “ container - type ” petrol station ( автозаправна станція контейнерного типу ) , with a moveable fuel storage tank above ground , to a “ permanent - set ” petrol station ( автозаправна станція стаціонарного типу ) , with a fuel storage tank permanently stored underground .

Following the decision of DATE , on DATE the applicant company and ORG signed a long - term lease agreement . It was noted that when fulfilling the contractual obligations the applicant company was obliged “ to comply with the law in force ” .

On DATE ORG of GPE ordered the applicant company to temporarily close down the petrol station with effect from DATE .

On DATE the same entity ordered the applicant company to close the petrol station immediately as it was environmentally unsafe .

On DATE the same ORG informed the applicant company that it could reopen the petrol station since the shortcomings indicated in the order of DATE had been corrected . In particular , the latter had received permission to reopen given the acceptable level of air pollution .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE ORG informed the second applicant that it had approved the documents concerning the development project in respect of the above - mentioned petrol station .

On DATE ORG adopted a decision “ on the closure of ‘ container - type’ petrol stations in GPE and the improvement of the surrounding areas ” . Referring to the decision of ORG no . CARDINAL of DATE ( see Relevant Domestic Law below ) and the conclusions of a petrol station inspection commission created in accordance with a decision of ORG of DATE , ORG decided the following :

“ the executive body of ORG ( namely , ORG ) should undertake the necessary steps ... to prevent petrol stations , ... which are not licensed or are environmentally unsafe , from functioning and to ensure that they are closed in compliance with the current legal requirements ” .

The applicant company ’s petrol station figured among CARDINAL petrol stations listed in the appendix to the above - mentioned decision . The appendix was presented as a table containing the names of the petrol stations , their types and compliance with CARDINAL criteria ( fire safety , the approval of ORG , an operational authorisation certificate ( акт введення в експлуатацію ) and documents certifying rights to a plot of land ) . In respect of the applicant company ’s petrol station , it was specified that it was a “ permanent - set ” petrol station , had documents certifying rights to a plot of land , but had no approval from ORG , had no operational authorisation certificate and did not comply with fire - safety requirements .

By a letter of DATE the GPE ORG informed ORG ( ORG управління контролю за благоустроєм міста Київської міської державної адміністрації ) that a number of petrol stations had stopped doing business . The applicant company ’s petrol station was on that list .

On DATE ORG informed the applicant company that , by virtue of ORG decision of DATE , the petrol station belonging to the applicant company had to be dismantled . However , the applicant company failed to dismantle it or to bring it into compliance with section CARDINAL of LAW and with the ORG of ORG decision no . CARDINAL of DATE . Therefore , the applicant company was told “ either to dismantle the petrol station or to bring it into compliance with legal requirements ” .

According to the applicant company , it had prepared a draft of the proposed changes necessary to bring the petrol station into compliance with the legal requirements , but the relevant ORG authorities had decided to dismantle the station . In particular , on DATE the Head of ORG had instructed ORG , in writing , to dismantle the station . The letter in question read as following :

“ In accordance with the agreement on cooperation regarding the dismantling of abandoned and ownerless property , I request that you dismantle the petrol station ... in LOC at the following address : CARDINAL . MP “ PERSON ” DATE , Geroyiv Stalingradu Avenue . ”

On DATE the station was dismantled and on DATE its equipment was returned to the applicant company . In the relevant document concerning the return of the equipment it was mentioned that some items were missing .

On DATE the applicant company instituted proceedings in ORG against ORG ( former ORG ) and ORG claiming CARDINAL NORP hryvnias ( ORG ) ( equivalent , at the material time , to around MONEY ( ORG ) ) in compensation for pecuniary and non - pecuniary damage .

The applicant company stated that in DATE the petrol station had been upgraded . Initially it had been a “ container - type ” petrol station , but later it had been upgraded and had become a “ permanent - set ” one . Following ORG decision of DATE , the applicant company had asked to be allowed to further upgrade the station . However , by a letter of DATE the Head of ORG had ordered the station to be dismantled . The petrol station ’s equipment had been damaged during the dismantling and the relevant decision to dismantle the station had been unlawful .

On DATE the court found for the applicant company and awarded it the above - mentioned sum , to be paid by ORG . In a court hearing the latter argued that the petrol station in question had been temporary and ORG of ORG had not approved documents concerning the development project . Moreover , there had been plans to build housing on this piece of land for DATE . Therefore , the applicant company had not received a permit to upgrade the existing petrol station . On DATE ORG informed the applicant company that the petrol station had to be dismantled .

The court found that the petrol station in question had been a “ permanent - set ” one and was environmentally safe , and that the Obolon ORG had therefore unlawfully refused to permit further upgrading of the station and that the ORG ’s request to dismantle the station had not been legal .

On DATE ORG of Appeal quashed that judgment and found against the applicant company . It held that the petrol station had been dismantled by ORG , which had been liquidated without any legal successor . Therefore , the court terminated the proceedings in the case in respect of ORG . It further found that on DATE the applicant company had been ordered by ORG to close the petrol station immediately as it was environmentally unsafe . By a letter of DATE LOC had requested ORG to dismantle the station . The reference to an agreement on cooperation in matters of dismantling abandoned and ownerless property in the letter of DATE had been erroneous . The petrol station equipment had been returned to the applicant company and there was no evidence that the ORG had inflicted any damage on the applicant company .

The applicant company appealed against that judgment , but it did not challenge the termination of the proceedings with respect to ORG . In its cassation appeal , a copy of which was submitted by the applicant company to this ORG , the issue of compliance with the request of DATE was not addressed .

On DATE the Higher Commercial Court of GPE upheld the judgment of DATE . The court found that the petrol station owned by the applicant company had been included in the list of stations which “ were not licensed , were environmentally unsafe and were to be closed ” annexed to the decision of ORG of DATE . ORG and ORG had instructed the applicant company several times to dismantle the petrol station or bring it into compliance with legal requirements . However , the applicant company had not responded to those requests and recommendations . Moreover , “ the letter of DATE should be considered not as an instruction but as a request addressed to a structural subdivision of ORG to perform its functions in the Minskiy ( Obolonskiy ) district ” .

On DATE ORG of GPE refused a request by the applicant company for leave to appeal in cassation .

The Government submitted a copy of an undated letter sent by ORG to the Head of ORG . According to that letter , it was impossible to put a petrol station on a plot of land used by the applicant company since it was due to be built on .

The rules of the retail petroleum trade are regulated by the decision of ORG no . CARDINAL of DATE . In accordance with those rules , “ container - type ” petrol stations were to be allowed only in particular places , such as car parks , industrial sites , motor boat moorings and so on . In cities only “ permanent - set ” petrol stations were allowed to be built . On DATE the Cabinet of Ministers amended its decision by allowing “ container - type ” petrol stations which were situated in places other than those indicated in its decision of DATE to continue to function until DATE . By a further decision of CARDINAL DATE that deadline was extended to DATE .

Section CARDINAL of LAW DATE , in force at the material time , reads as follows :

“ Environmental Requirements of Installation , Design , Construction , Modernisation , Putting into Operation and ORG , ORG and Other Facilities

In the process of designing , constructing and commissioning of new , and modernising operating , enterprises , structures and other facilities , improving existing and introducing new technologies and equipment , as well as in the process of operating these facilities , the environmental safety of the population , the rational use of natural resources and the observance of standards regarding the potentially harmful effects on the environment shall be ensured . In doing so , harmful substances and waste shall be captured , recovered and rendered harmless or completely liquidated , and other requirements shall be complied with so as to protect the environment and the health of the population .

Any enterprise , institution or organisation whose activity has a harmful impact on the environment , regardless of when commissioned , shall be equipped with installations , machines and devices to purify and neutralise all emissions and discharges and mitigate harmful factors , as well as with devices to control the quantity and composition of pollutants and characteristics of harmful factors .

Projects for commercial and other activities shall contain information assessing the effects on the environment and on the health of the population . The assessment shall be carried out taking due account of legal requirements for the protection of the environment , the environmental activity of a given territory , the condition of the environment where the facilities are planned to be sited , environmental forecasting , the socioeconomic prospects of the region`s development , the capacity and types of overall impact of harmful factors and facilities on the environment .

Enterprises , institutions and organisations which plan , design , build , reconstruct , modernise , and commission the construction of enterprises , facilities and other objects , as well as conduct research which they believe might negatively impact on the condition of the environment , shall submit a special application to this effect to the special central body of executive power responsible for environment and natural resources and its local bodies .

It shall be prohibited to commission enterprises , structures and other facilities which do not fully meet all the environmental requirements and measures provided for in the construction and reconstruction plans ( expansion and technical modernisation ) . ”


CASE OF STRAND LOBBEN AND OTHERS v. NORWAY

Remainder inadmissible (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria;(Art. 35-1) Exhaustion of domestic remedies;(Art. 35-3-a) Ratione personae;No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Erik Møse;Síofra O’Leary;Yonko Grozev;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

In DATE the first applicant turned to the child welfare authorities because she was pregnant and was in a difficult situation : she did not have a permanent home and was temporarily staying with her parents , the fourth and fifth applicants .

When the first applicant was CARDINAL GPE pregnant she visited the local hospital and requested a late abortion . On DATE the hospital sent a notice to the child welfare authorities indicating that the applicant was in need of guidance concerning the unborn child and follow - up with regard to motherhood . It also indicated that she needed to stay at a parent - child institution ( “ family centre ” ) . The child welfare authorities opened a case with the first applicant ’s consent . She agreed to stay at a family centre for DATE after the child was born , so that her ability to give the child adequate care could be evaluated .

On DATE the first applicant gave birth to a son , PERSON , the second applicant . The identity of PERSON ’s father was unknown to the authorities and the first applicant refused to reveal his name . DATE , on DATE , the first applicant and PERSON moved to the family centre . For DATE the fourth applicant ( X ’s grandmother ) also stayed with them . The staff soon became concerned about the first applicant ’s parenting abilities and ORG development . On DATE they asked for an emergency meeting with the child welfare authorities because X had lost a lot of weight and the first applicant did not show any understanding of his needs .

On DATE the first applicant withdrew her consent to stay at the family centre . She wanted to leave and take X with her . On DATE the child welfare authorities decided to take X into immediate compulsory care and place him in a foster home on an emergency basis . In the decision they stated that the family centre ’s staff had had to check on the family TIME to make sure that X was receiving enough food . Without those checks , they doubted whether X would have survived . After the placement , the first applicant had DATE TIME visits with X. The fourth applicant ( the grandmother ) was present at most of the visits , the fifth ( the grandfather ) at some of them .

The first applicant appealed against the decision of the child welfare authorities to ORG ( fylkesnemnda for barnevern og sosiale saker ) , claiming that she and X could live together with her parents . Her mother , the fourth applicant , was staying at home and was willing to help take care of X. They were also willing to accept help from the child welfare authorities .

On DATE the family centre drew up a report of the first and second ORG stay . The report stated , inter alia :

“ The mother does not care for her child in a satisfactory manner . During the time the mother and child have stayed [ at the family centre ] ... , the staff here ... have been very concerned that the child ’s needs are not being met . In order to ensure that the child ’s primary needs for care and food are met , the staff has intervened and followed - up the child closely day and night .

The mother is not able to meet the boy ’s practical care needs . She has not taken responsibility for caring for the boy in a satisfactory manner . The mother has needed guidance at a very basic level , and she has needed advice to be repeated to her several times .

Throughout the stay , the mother has made statements that we find very worrying . She has expressed a significant lack of empathy for her son , and has several times expressed disgust with the child . The mother has demonstrated very little understanding of what the boy understands and what behaviours he can control .

The mother ’s mental functioning is inconsistent and she struggles considerably in several areas that are crucial to the ability to provide care . Her ability to provide practical care must be seen in light of this . The mother ’s mental health is marked by difficult and painful feelings about who she herself is and how she perceives other people . The mother herself seems to have a considerable unmet care need .

Our assessment is that the mother is incapable of providing care for the child . We are also of the opinion that the mother needs support and follow - up . As we have verbally communicated to the child welfare service , we believe it to be important that the mother is taken especially closely care of in the time following the emergency placement .

The mother is vulnerable . She should be offered a psychological assessment and treatment , and probably needs help to find motivation for this . The mother should have an individual plan to ensure follow - up in several areas . The mother has resources ( cf . the abilities tests ) that she needs help to make good use of . ”

On DATE ORG rejected the appeal ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . It concluded that it was the first applicant who would be responsible for the DATE care of X , not the fourth applicant , and that the first applicant was unable to provide the care that X needed . Furthermore , the fourth applicant had stayed with the first applicant and PERSON during DATE at the family centre , but had not noticed the first applicant ’s lack of parenting skills , even though it had been obvious to the staff .

On DATE X was sent to a child psychiatry clinic for an evaluation . The team at the clinic carried out CARDINAL different observations DATE . Their conclusions were set out in a report dated DATE , which read , inter alia :

“ [ X ] was a child with significantly delayed development when he was sent to us for evaluation and observations . DATE he is functioning as a normal DATE baby , and has the possibility of a good normal development . He has , from what can be observed , been a child at high risk . For vulnerable children the lack of response and confirmation , or other interferences in interaction , can lead to more or less serious psychological and developmental disturbances if they do not get other corrective relationship experiences . The quality of the earliest interaction between a child and the closest caregiver is therefore of great importance for psychosocial and cognitive development . [ X ] bears the mark of good psychosocial and cognitive development now . ”

The first applicant appealed against the ORG ’s decision of CARDINAL DATE to ORG ( tingrett ) which , on DATE , upheld it in full . In the judgment the court found that X had shown signs of both psychological and physical neglect when he was taken into local authority care . Moreover , it did not find that the first applicant ’s abilities to take care of X had improved or that the support of the fourth and fifth applicants would be sufficient to ensure that PERSON was given adequate care . The first applicant did not appeal to ORG .

Following the judgment by ORG on DATE , the local authorities applied to ORG for a care order , submitting that the first applicant lacked parenting skills .

On DATE the ORG accepted the child welfare authorities’ application . X remained in the foster home where he had already been placed on an emergency basis in DATE , when first taken into care ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . ORG also decided that contact rights for the first applicant should be fixed at TIME visits per year , under supervision . It concluded , on the basis of the report from the family centre , that if X were returned to the first applicant , there would be serious deficiencies in both the physical and psychological caregiving , which could not be remedied with assistance measures . For those reasons the ORG found that it would be in the best interests of X to be placed in care .

The first applicant appealed against the ORG ’s decision and again submitted that the authorities had not tried to intervene in other ways before immediately taking X into care , and that the decision was based on insufficient evidence .

On DATE ORG overturned the ORG ’s decision and decided that X should be reunited with the first applicant , but that there was a need for a readjustment period . It found , inter alia , that GPE ’s problems with weight gain could have been due to an eye infection .

As a consequence of the judgment , the first applicant ’s visits with X were increased with the goal of reunification . According to the child welfare authorities , the visits were characterised by hostility from the first applicant and her parents towards the foster mother . The authorities claimed that after the visits , X had reacted strongly , he had become tired , anxious and insecure , and his sleeping patterns had changed .

The child welfare authorities appealed against ORG judgment and concurrently applied for its implementation to be suspended . They claimed that it was unlikely that the eye infection could have been the reason for PERSON ’s slow weight gain . Moreover , the first applicant had had visits with X , but they had not worked well even though she had been given advice on how to improve them . X had had strong reactions after the visits .

On DATE , ORG decided to suspend enforcement of its judgment until ORG had adjudicated the case .

On DATE , the child welfare authorities decided to appoint CARDINAL experts , a psychologist , ORG , and a family therapist , E.W.A. , who submitted their report on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

Meanwhile , on DATE , ORG ( lagmannsrett ) granted leave to appeal on the ground that the ruling of , or the procedure in , ORG had been seriously flawed ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . It also upheld ORG decision to suspend the implementation of the judgment .

On DATE , the High Court appointed an expert to assess the case , psychologist PERSON , who also submitted a report .

In its judgment of DATE , ORG confirmed the ORG ’s decision that X should be taken into compulsory care . It also reduced the first applicant ’s contact rights to CARDINAL TIME visits per year .

ORG had regard to the information in the report produced by the family centre on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . It also took account of the family consultant ’s testimony before the court , in which it had been stated that the first applicant ’s mother had lived with her at the family centre for DATE . It went on to state :

“ It was particularly after this time that concerns grew about the practical care of the child . The agreement was that [ the first applicant ] was to report all nappy changes etc . and meals , but she did not . The child slept more than they were used to . [ The family consultant ] reacted to the child ’s breathing and that he was sleeping through meals . Due to weight loss , he was to be fed TIME around the clock . Sometimes , the staff had to pressure the mother into feeding her son . ”

The High Court found that the family centre had made a correct evaluation and DATE contrary to ORG – considered it very unlikely that the evaluation would have been different if X had not had an eye infection .

Furthermore , ORG referred to the report of DATE from the child psychiatry clinic ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . It also took into account the report of the court - appointed expert , PERSON ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

As the stay at the family centre had been short , ORG found it appropriate to consider the first applicant ’s behaviour ( “ fungering ” ) during the contact sessions that had been organised subsequent to X ’s placement in foster care . CARDINAL persons had been entrusted with the task of supervising the sessions , and both had written reports , none of which had been positive . ORG stated that CARDINAL of the supervisors had given an “ overall negative description of the contact sessions ” .

ORG also referred to the report of the psychologist and the family therapist appointed by the child welfare authorities ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . They had assessed X in relation to the reactions that he had shown after visits from the first applicant . In their report , they noted , inter alia :

“ there does not seem to be much contact between the mother and [ X ] , including in the periods with frequent contact sessions . He turns away from his mother and prefers to seek contact with others . He tries to distance and protect himself by protesting against his mother , by refusing to eat , by not looking at her and then seeking out the person to whom he has a secure attachment , namely his foster mother . [ X ] becomes uncertain and insecure when he is not ‘ read’ and understood .

... the biggest source of stress for [ X ] is probably not meeting his mother and her extended family during the contact sessions in itself , but the amount of contact and the pressure arising from [ utterances to the effect that ] ‘ now you ’re coming back home’ , and an atmosphere dominated by the mother ’s hostility towards the foster mother . It is also a problem that the mother makes negative and offensive statements about the foster mother , so that the atmosphere becomes unpleasant and insecure . It is concluded that [ X ] has reached his tolerance threshold for contact on the occasions when he has fallen asleep immediately once the contact session is over , when he has cried afterwards , been difficult to regulate and calm down , and had difficulties sleeping . ”

Furthermore , ORG noted that the court - appointed psychologist , PERSON ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , stated in court that the contact sessions had appeared to be so negative that she was of the opinion that the mother should not have right of access to her son . The contact sessions were , in her view , “ not constructive for the child ” . In conclusion to the question of the first applicant ’s competence as a carer , she stated in her report that the stay at the family centre had illustrated that the first applicant “ had problems handling and retaining information in such a manner that it could be used to guide her behaviour ” . She went on to state :

“ It is not a question of a lack of willingness , but of an inadequate ability to plan , organise and structure . Such manifestations of cognitive impairment will be invasive in relation to caring for the child and could result in neglect . ”

The High Court agreed with the conclusion of expert GPE , before proceeding to the question whether assistance measures could sufficiently remedy the shortcomings in the first applicant ’s lack of parenting skills . In that respect , it noted that the reasons for the deficiencies in competence as a carer were crucial . ORG referred at this point to the expert ’s elaboration on the first applicant ’s medical history , namely how she had suffered from serious epilepsy since childhood and until brain surgery had been carried out in DATE , when the first applicant had been DATE .

ORG noted that expert PERSON had also pointed out that the first applicant ’s medical history must necessarily have affected her childhood in several ways . Her summary as regards the illness and its consequences read as follows :

“ Anamnestic information from the school , the specialist health service and the family provides an overall picture of weak learning capacity and social functioning from early childhood into adulthood . [ The first applicant ] performed poorly at school despite good framework conditions , considerable extra resources and good efforts and motivation on her own part . It is therefore difficult to see any other explanation for her performance than general learning difficulties caused by a fundamental cognitive impairment . This is underlined by her consistently low IQ score – regardless of the epilepsy surgery . She also had problems with socio - emotional functioning , which has also been a recurring topic in all documents that deal with [ the first applicant ’s ] childhood and adolescence . A lack of social skills and social adaptation is reported , primarily related to social behaviour that is not adequate for her age ( ‘ ORG ) and poor impulse control . It is also stated that [ the first applicant ] has been very reserved and had low self - confidence , which must be seen in conjunction with her problems . ”

The High Court based its assessment on the description of expert GPE concerning the first applicant ’s health problems and the impact they had had on her social skills and development . It further noted that placement at a family centre ( see paragraphs CARDINAL above ) had been attempted as an assistance measure . The stay had been supposed to last for DATE , but had been interrupted after DATE . As a condition for staying longer , the first applicant had demanded a guarantee that she be allowed to take her son home with her after the stay . The child welfare authorities could not give such a guarantee , and the first applicant had therefore returned home on DATE .

ORG noted that relevant assistance measures were assumed to consist of a supervisor and further help and training in how to care for children . However , ORG found that it would take so long to provide the first applicant with sufficient training that it was not a real alternative to continued foster - home placement . Furthermore , the result of such training was uncertain . In this connection , ORG attached weight to the fact that both the first applicant and her immediate family had said that they did not want follow - up or assistance if PERSON was returned to them . It agreed with the conclusions of the court - appointed expert , PERSON , who had stated in her report :

“ In my assessment , there are grounds for claiming that there were serious deficiencies in the care the child received from the mother , and also serious deficiencies in terms of the personal contact and security he needed according to his age and development . [ The first applicant ’s ] cognitive impairment , personality functioning and inadequate ability to mentalise make it impossible to have a normal conversation with her about the physical and psychological needs of small children . Her assessments of the consequences of having the child returned to her care and what it will demand of her as a parent are very limited and infantile , with her own immediate needs , there and then , as the most predominant feature . It is therefore found that there is a risk of such deficiencies ( as mentioned above ) continuing if the child were to live with his mother . It is also found that satisfactory conditions for the child can not be created with the mother by means of assistance measures under the LAW relating to ORG , section CARDINAL - CARDINAL ( e.g. relief measures in the home or other parental support measures ) , due to a lack of trust and a reluctance to accept interference from the authorities – taking the case history into consideration . ”

The High Court ’s conclusions in its judgment of DATE was that a care order was necessary and that assistance measures for the mother would not be sufficient to allow the son to stay with her . The conditions for issuing a care order under the second paragraph of section CARDINAL of LAW were thus met ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . In this connection , ORG also gave weight to the attachment that X had formed to his foster parents , particularly the foster mother .

The first applicant did not lodge an appeal against the judgment .

On DATE the child welfare authorities requested ORG to deprive the first applicant of her parental responsibility for X , which would then be transferred to the authorities , and to grant PERSON ’s foster parents , with whom he had stayed since he was taken into care ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , permission to adopt him . The identity of X ’s biological father was still unknown to the authorities . In the alternative , the authorities’ proposed that the first applicant ’s contact rights be removed .

On DATE the first applicant applied for termination of the care order or , in the alternative , extended contact rights with X.

On DATE the first applicant gave birth to Y , the third applicant . She had married the father of Y in DATE . The new family had moved to a different municipality . When the child welfare authorities in the first applicant ’s former municipality became aware that she had given birth to another child , it sent a letter expressing concern to the new municipality , which started an investigation into her parenting abilities .

On DATE , CARDINAL and DATE ORG , composed of a lawyer , a psychologist and a lay person , held an oral hearing at which the first applicant was present together with her legal representative . CARDINAL witnesses were heard .

On DATE the ORG decided that the first applicant should be deprived of her parental responsibility for PERSON and that X ’s foster parents should be allowed to adopt him . The Board found that there was nothing in the case to indicate that the first applicant ’s parenting abilities had improved since ORG judgment of DATE . Therefore she was still considered incapable of giving NORP adequate care . Moreover , the Board stated :

“ In her statement before ORG , the mother maintained her view that the care order was a conspiracy between the child welfare service , [ the parent - child institution ] and the foster parents for the purpose of ‘ helping a woman who is unable to have ORG . In the mother ’s words , it was a question of ‘ an advance order for a child’ . The mother had not realised that she had neglected [ X ] , and stated that she spent most of her time and energy on ‘ the ORG .

The reports from the contact sessions between the mother and [ X ] consistently show that she is still unable to focus on [ X ] and what is best for him , but is influenced by her very negative view of the foster mother and of the child welfare service .

[ The first applicant ] has married and had another child DATE . Psychologist [ GPE ] has stated before ORG that he observed good interaction between the mother and child and that the mother takes good care of the child . ORG takes note of this information . In ORG opinion , this observation can in any case not be used as a basis for concluding that the mother has competence as a caregiver for [ X ] .

ORG finds it reasonable to assume that [ X ] is a particularly vulnerable child . He experienced serious and life - threatening neglect during DATE of his life . Reference is also made to the fact that there have been many contact sessions with the mother , some of which have been very stressful for [ X ] . All in all , he has been through a lot . He has lived in the foster home for DATE and does not know his biological mother . If [ X ] were to be returned to the care of his mother , this would require , among other things , a great capacity to empathise with and understand [ X ] and the problems he would experience , not least in the form of mourning and missing his foster parents . The mother and her family appeared to be completely devoid of any such empathy and understanding . Both the mother and grandmother stated that it would not be a problem , ‘ he just had to be distracted’ , and thus gave the impression of not having sympathy with the boy and therefore also being incapable of providing the psychological care he would need in the event of a return . ”

In addition , ORG had especially noted the conclusions of expert PERSON They were quoted by ORG in its judgment of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . ORG found that this description of the first applicant was still accurate . In any event , it was decisive that X had established such a connection to his foster family that removing him would result in serious and permanent problems for him .

The ORG assumed that the alternative to adoption would have been continued foster care on a long - term basis , and noted that the foster parents were X ’s main caregivers and the ones he thought of as his parents . The foster parents were moreover considered suitable and wanted to take care of X as their own child . The ORG made general reference to ORG decision in PERSON ( Rt . ) DATE page CARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and found that the considerations underlying the following passage from that judgment – reiterated in GPE v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE – were also pertinent to the present case :

“ ‘ A decision that he should remain a foster child would tell him that the people with whom he has always lived and who are his parents and with whom he established his earliest ties and sense of belonging should remain under the control of ORG — the public authorities — and that they are not viewed by society as his true parents but rather as foster parents under an agreement that can be terminated . ... ’ ”

In conclusion , the adoption would be in GPE ’s best interests . ORG took LAW into consideration when making its decision .

The first applicant appealed against the decision , claiming that the ORG had made a wrongful evaluation of the evidence when deciding that she was unable to give NORP adequate care . She considered that it would be in PERSON ’s best interest to be returned to her and stressed that her situation had changed drastically . The first applicant was now married and had another child that she was taking care of . She had a good support system in her husband and her extended family , and was also prepared to accept help from the child welfare authorities . Moreover , in her view , removing X from the foster home would only cause him problems in the short term ; no long - term problems could be expected . She also claimed that the visits between her and X had worked well .

The child welfare authorities opposed the appeal and submitted that the first applicant ’s ability to care for X had not changed since ORG judgment of DATE . The visits between X and the first applicant had not worked well . She had had outbursts during the visits and had left before the time was up . Afterwards X had reacted negatively . The first applicant and her mother had manifested a very negative attitude towards the authorities . Moreover , X had a good attachment to his foster family and had lived with them for DATE . He was a vulnerable child and he needed a caregiver who was sensitive to his needs . They also noted that the first applicant had exposed X and their story on the Internet , together with pictures of them , which could be harmful for X. It was in the best interests of X to be adopted by the foster family .

On DATE ORG , comprised of CARDINAL professional judge , CARDINAL psychologist and CARDINAL lay person , in accordance with section CARDINAL of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , upheld the decision after having held an oral hearing which lasted for DATE and during which CARDINAL witnesses were heard . The first applicant was present together with her legal counsel .

ORG initially noted that the first applicant ’s general situation had improved . She had married in DATE , her husband had a permanent job and they had a daughter , Y. It also noted that the child welfare authorities in the couple ’s current municipality were conducting an ongoing inquiry concerning the mother ’s ability to care for Y. A staff member of the authorities in that new municipality had testified at the oral hearing , stating that they had not received any reports of concern other than that from the authorities in the first applicant ’s former municipality . As part of their inquiry they had made observations at the first applicant ’s home . They had observed many good things but also that the parents might need some help with routines and structure . ORG found that this indicated that the authorities in the municipality to which the first applicant had moved thought that the parents could give Y adequate care if assisted by the authorities . She was not a child with any special care needs .

However , on the basis of the evidence , the situation was different with regard to X , whom several experts had described as a vulnerable child . ORG referred in particular to a statement from a professional at FAC and ORG Psychiatric Out - Patient Clinic ( Barne- og ungdomspsykiatrisk poliklinikk – BUP ) explaining that , as late as DATE , X was easily stressed and needed a lot of quiet , security and support . If he was to have a sound emotional development in the future , the carer would have to be aware of that and take it into account . When the first applicant gave evidence in court , she had clearly shown that she did not realise what challenges she would face if X were to be moved from the foster home . She could not see his vulnerability , her primary concern being that he should grow up “ where he belonged ” . The first applicant believed that returning him would be unproblematic and still did not understand why the child welfare authorities had had to intervene when he was placed in the emergency foster home . She had not wished to say anything about how she thought X was doing in the foster home . In ORG view , the first applicant would not be sufficiently able to see or understand PERSON ’s special care needs , and if those needs were not met , there would be a considerable risk of abnormal development .

Furthermore , ORG took account of how the foster parents and supervisor had described PERSON ’s emotional reactions after contact sessions with his mother in the form of inconsolable crying and his needing a lot of sleep . During the contact sessions , X had repeatedly resisted contact with the first applicant and , as the sessions had progressed , reacted with what had been described as resignation . ORG considered that a possible reason for that could be that the boy was vulnerable to inexpedient interaction and information that was not adapted to his age and functioning . The first applicant ’s emotional outbursts in situations during the contact sessions , for example when PERSON had sought out his foster mother and called her “ mummy ” , were seen as potentially frightening and not conducive to X ’s development .

ORG held that the presentation of evidence had “ clearly shown ” that the “ fundamental limitations ” that had existed at the time of ORG judgment still applied . Nothing had emerged during ORG consideration of the case to indicate that the first applicant had developed a more positive attitude to the child welfare authorities or to the foster mother , beyond a statement made by her to the extent that she was willing to cooperate . She had snubbed the foster mother when she had said hello during the contact sessions and had never asked for information about X. The first applicant had left in frustration TIME before the last visit had been scheduled to end . Everyone who had been present during the contact sessions had described the atmosphere as unpleasant . ORG considered that CARDINAL possible reason why the first applicant ’s competence at contact sessions had not improved was that she struggled so much with her own feelings and with missing PERSON , that it made her incapable of considering the child ’s perspective and protecting him from her own emotional outbursts . An improvement was contingent upon her understanding PERSON and his needs and on her being willing to work on herself and her own weaknesses . The first applicant had not shown any positive developments in her competence in contact situations throughout DATE she had had rights of access . The fact that her parents , the fourth and fifth applicants , had a remarkably negative attitude to the municipal child welfare authorities did not make it any easier for her .

The first applicant had claimed in court that she was a victim of injustice and that she would fight until PERSON was returned to her . To shed light on her own situation , she had chosen to post her story on the Internet in DATE with a photograph of herself and X. In that article and several comments posted during the DATE , she had made serious accusations against the child welfare authorities and the foster parents DATE accusations which she had admitted in court were untrue . The first applicant did not consider that public exposure and repeated legal proceedings could be harmful for the child in the long term .

ORG noted that psychologist PERSON , who had examined and treated the first applicant , had testified that she did not meet the criteria for any psychiatric diagnosis . He had counselled her in connection with the trauma inflicted on her by having her child taken away . The goal of the treatment had been to make the first applicant feel like a good mother . He believed that the previous assessments of the first applicant ’s ability to provide care had at that time been incorrect , and argued before ORG that the best outcome for X would be to be returned to his biological mother . However , ORG stated that psychologist PERSON ’s arguments had been based on research conducted in DATE , and found them to be incompatible with recent infant research . It noted that the other experts who had testified in court , including psychologists ORG and GPE , had advised against returning PERSON to his mother , as this would be very harmful for him .

In conclusion thus far , ORG agreed with ORG that the first applicant had not changed in such a way as to indicate that it was highly probable that she would be able to provide X with proper care . It endorsed ORG grounds , holding that the first applicant ’s clear limitations as a carer could not be mitigated by an adapted transitional scheme , assistance measures or support from her network . It did not find reason to discuss other arguments regarding her ability to provide care in more detail , as returning PERSON to her was in any case not an option owing to the serious problems it would cause him to be moved from the foster home . ORG agreed at this point with ORG in its finding that X had developed such attachment to his foster parents , his foster brother and the general foster home environment that it would lead to serious problems if he would have to move . X had his primary security and belonging in the foster home and he perceived the foster parents as his psychological parents . On those grounds , the care order could not be revoked .

Turning to the issues of deprivation of parental responsibility and consent to adoption , ORG stated at the outset that when a care order has been issued , it is in principle sufficient for removal of parental rights that this is in the child ’s best interests . At the same time , it had been emphasised in several ORG judgments that removal of parental responsibility is a very invasive decision and that therefore strong reasons are required for making such a decision ( see , inter alia , paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The requirements in respect of adoption were even more stringent . However , the questions of deprivation of parental responsibility and consent to adoption had to be seen in conjunction , since the primary reason for depriving someone of parental responsibility would be to facilitate adoption . The court also took into consideration that if the mother retained her parental responsibility , she might engage in conflicts in the future about the rights that such responsibility entailed , such as exposing the child on the Internet .

ORG went on to declare that adoption could only be granted if the CARDINAL conditions in the third paragraph of section CARDINAL of LAW were met ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . In the present case , the decisive factor would be whether adoption was in GPE ’s best interests and whether consent for adoption should be given on the basis of an overall assessment . Regarding that assessment , several ORG judgments had stated that strong reasons must exist for consenting to adoption against the will of a biological parent . There must be a high degree of certainty that adoption would be in the child ’s best interests . It was also clear that the decision must be based not only on a concrete assessment , but also on general experience from child - psychology research . Reference was made to ORG judgment in GPE . DATE page CARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

Applying the general principles to the instant case , ORG first noted that PERSON was at the time DATE and had lived in his foster home since he was DATE . His fundamental attachment in the social and psychological sense was to his foster parents , and it would in any event be a long - term placement . X was moreover a vulnerable child , and adoption would help to strengthen his sense of belonging with his foster parents , whom he regarded as his parents . It was particularly important to a child ’s development to experience a secure and sound attachment to its psychological parents . Adoption would give X a sense of belonging and security in DATE for longer than the period a foster - home relationship would last . Practical considerations also indicated that persons who had care and control of a child and who in reality functioned as its parents should attend to the functions that followed from parental responsibility .

ORG noted that adoption meant that the legal ties to the biological family were broken . In its opinion , X , despite spending DATE of his life with his mother and having many contact sessions , had not bonded psychologically with her . That had remained the case even though he had been told at a later stage that the first applicant had given birth to him .

Furthermore , the court took account of the fact that even if no more contact sessions were organised , the foster parents had taken a positive view of letting X contact his biological parent if he so wished .

Based on an overall assessment , ORG found that it would be in PERSON ’s best interests for the first applicant to be deprived of her parental responsibility and for the foster parents to be allowed to adopt him . The court believed that particularly weighty reasons existed for consenting to adoption in the case .

ORG lastly stated that since it had decided that X should be adopted , it was unable to decide on contact rights for the first applicant , since that question would be up to the foster parents to decide on . It mentioned that section CARDINAL of LAW provided a legal basis for fixing rights to access subsequent to adoption ( see paragraph CARDINAL below , where that provision is reiterated , and paragraph CARDINAL below , on the “ open adoption”-system ) . ORG was , however , not competent to examine or decide on such rights since its competence was dependent on a party to the case having made a request to that effect . In the instant case , none of the parties had done so .

The first applicant appealed against the judgment , claiming that ORG had evaluated the evidence incorrectly when considering her ability to give X the necessary care . She also argued that ORG should have obtained an evaluation by an expert witness concerning her and her husband ’s ability to provide adequate care . She submitted an evaluation made by the municipality in which she currently lived , dated DATE .

On DATE , ORG decided not to grant leave to appeal . It stated that the case did not raise any new legal issues of importance for the uniform application of the law . As concerned the new evidence , the court noted that the evaluation dated DATE had been made by , inter alia , an expert who had testified before ORG and that the document would not change the outcome of the case . Moreover , it observed that the first applicant had not asked for an expert witness to be heard in ORG and had not given any reasons as to why it was necessary to appoint an expert before ORG . Thus there were no reasons for leave to appeal to be granted .

The first applicant appealed against the decision to ORG ( PERSON ) which , on DATE , refused leave to appeal .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment)

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of detention during their transport . Some applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .