Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Procedural aspect);No violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Alena Poláčková;András Sajó;André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Dmitry Dedov;George Nicolaou;Georgios A. Serghides;Guido Raimondi;Helena Jäderblom;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Luis López Guerra;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Nebojša Vučinić;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Lemmens;Paul Mahoney;Robert Spano;Yonko Grozev;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer;Ksenija Turković;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and is detained in FAC .

On DATE CARDINAL armed individuals burst into a bureau de change in GPE . Shots were fired and CARDINAL staff members were killed . The criminals fled with a sum of money . On DATE the GPE investigation department instigated criminal proceedings against a person or persons unknown for armed robbery and homicide .

NORP The bodies responsible for the criminal investigation implemented a number of investigative measures : inspection of the LOC , autopsies on the victims and questioning of witnesses . The investigators quickly made a connection with the applicant and a certain GPE

By decision of CARDINAL DATE a police officer ordered the applicant ’s detention for TIME , in accordance with the relevant provisions of ORG . The order mentioned the detainee ’s right to assistance from a lawyer as from the time of his arrest . It also stated that a copy of the order should be presented to the arrestee . The copy of the relevant order in the case file is not signed by the applicant , who was on the run and being sought by the police at that time .

On DATE the applicant was arrested in GPE . None of the case papers indicate whether he received a copy of the DATE order after his arrest . He remained in detention in GPE DATE and the next .

On DATE an investigator from GPE , on the basis of LAW , ordered the applicant ’s detention for TIME from TIME

On DATE the applicant was transferred to GPE . His detention was extended by a prosecutor that DATE .

The document containing the CARDINAL decisions of CARDINAL and DATE does not mention the applicant ’s right to the assistance of a lawyer and does not bear his signature .

The applicant affirmed that he had submitted CARDINAL requests , on CARDINAL , DATE , CARDINAL and DATE , for contact with a lawyer , PERSON , and that the authorities had not acceded to those requests .

He stated that he had been questioned by the officers in charge of the investigation over the period from DATE . While being questioned he had explained that he had taken part in the hold - up at the bureau de change but denied having committed the CARDINAL murders .

The criminal case file contains no written trace of any such questioning . On the other hand , it includes a handwritten statement by GPE , the applicant ’s presumed accomplice , dated DATE , in which GPE explained that the applicant had instigated the hold - up , that he himself had agreed to cooperate with the applicant and that the latter had used a gun during the incident .

On DATE the investigator in charge of the investigation appointed an official lawyer for the applicant . At TIME , assisted by his officially appointed lawyer , the applicant was formally charged with the double murder and the hold - up in the bureau de change in GPE . When questioned immediately after being charged , he made the following statements :

“ I have read the charge sheet in the presence of my officially appointed lawyer , D. ORG .

I have been informed of my rights and obligations as a charged person and of my right to refuse to give evidence .

I shall make no submissions concerning the charges until my parents , who have been informed , have had time to engage a lawyer . ”

On DATE A.S. was questioned by the investigator in the presence of a lawyer . GPE related the circumstances surrounding the preparation , execution and aftermath of the hold - up , and explained how he had helped the applicant at all those stages . He affirmed that it had been the applicant who had killed both victims .

On DATE the applicant engaged a lawyer practising in GPE , PERSON . During his questioning in the presence of that lawyer on DATE he remained silent and stated that he would give evidence at DATE .

On DATE the applicant confessed in the presence of his lawyer , PERSON . He admitted that he had prepared and committed the hold - up at the bureau de change and claimed that the CARDINAL victims had been killed by GPE

On DATE the applicant engaged a second lawyer , this time practising in GPE , PERSON .

Subsequently , the officers responsible for the investigation gathered several different types of evidence , that is to say witness statements and medical , scientific , physical and documentary evidence .

On DATE the applicant and GPE , assisted by Counsel , took cognisance of the case papers . They retracted their confessions , and their lawyers requested that their clients be questioned once again .

On DATE the GPE regional prosecutor returned the file to the investigator for further inquiries . He asked him , in particular , to conduct several investigative measures and to formally charge both suspects afresh .

On DATE the applicant was charged with an additional offence , namely the unlawful purchase of the firearm which had been used during the robbery of DATE . On DATE the CARDINAL suspects were questioned in the presence of their lawyers . In his statement the applicant related a version of events to the effect that the robbery and murders in question had been committed by a certain PERSON , an NORP national , aided and abetted by an unknown second person .

On DATE the regional prosecutor ’s office drew up the indictment and committed the applicant and his presumed accomplice for trial before ORG .

ORG considered the criminal case DATE and DATE . During the proceedings the applicant , who was assisted by a lawyer , submitted that he and his presumed accomplice had indeed been in GPE on DATE and that they had indeed intended to commit a robbery in the bureau de change , but that they had changed their minds and returned to GPE DATE .

On DATE ORG delivered its judgment . The applicant was found guilty of armed robbery in the GPE bureau de change , committed jointly with GPE and resulting in the murder of CARDINAL persons . He was also found guilty of the unlawful purchase of a pistol and ammunition for it . ORG imposed the heaviest sentence available under LAW , namely a whole - life sentence . In accordance with section ORG ( CARDINAL ) of LAW , ORG ordered the applicant ’s placement under the “ special ” prison regime .

Drawing on the evidence gathered during the preliminary investigation and at the trial , ORG established the facts as follows : the applicant ’s former partner , GPE , had started work as a cashier in the bureau de change in question in DATE when she was still living with him . While working there she had met the first victim , a certain GPE , who was a close relative of the owner and an employee in the same establishment . In DATE PERSON had left the applicant and moved in with GPE in GPE . The applicant had then decided to kill GPE and to steal the cash kept in the bureau de change . He had acquired a “ Makarov ” pistol , a silencer and ammunition . The applicant had persuaded a friend , GPE , to take part in the robbery . On TIME the applicant and FAC had arrived in GPE by coach . They had then gone to the building in which the bureau de change was located , and had gone up to the top floor to spend TIME there . TIME , TIME , they had gone down to the floor on which the bureau de change was located and noted that GPE was in the LOC alone . GPE , who had been carrying the pistol , had burst into the LOC and fired CARDINAL point - blank shot at the victim ’s left temple . The victim had died instantly . The CARDINAL accomplices had then placed the money found in the bureau de change in a bag which they had brought with them . Meanwhile the armed security guard of the bureau de change , a certain GPE , had rushed into the LOC where the first victim had been killed . GPE had fired QUANTITY shots at him , hitting him in the face . The security guard had been killed instantly . GPE and the applicant had left the building . They had then concealed the murder weapon under a rubbish bin , thrown away the clothes they had been wearing and hidden the stolen money . Some time later the CARDINAL men had ordered a certain FAC to fetch the money for them , which he had done .

The applicant appealed against that judgment . He complained that insufficient reasons had been given for the conviction , that his guilt had not been established , that the first - instance court had reached an erroneous decision , that there had been several breaches of procedural and substantive rules under domestic law and that ORG had shown bias .

The applicant ’s lawyer requested the withdrawal of all the judges of ORG . He argued that the media coverage of the criminal case had created a climate of intolerance and hostility towards his client . The defence called for an additional witness to be summoned , the reexamination of CARDINAL of the witnesses already heard by the trial court , and several additional expert opinions . On DATE the reporting judge responsible for the criminal case rejected the requests for further evidencegathering as irrelevant . He dismissed the challenge to the judges of ORG for lack of any evidence of bias .

ORG considered the criminal case DATE . It examined a new witness and received additional conclusions from psychiatric experts on the mental state of the CARDINAL accused .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of the first - instance court , giving its full backing to the latter ’s factual and legal findings . The evidence gathered during the preliminary investigation , presented before the first - instance court and produced for the first time before ORG had demonstrated that the CARDINAL accused had planned and carried out the robbery in the bureau de change and that the CARDINAL victims had been killed by FAC Yet the applicant had been the instigator of those crimes and had provided the weapon used by his accomplice . ORG drew on the statements of the many witnesses questioned during the assessment of the case , on the results of the ballistic , technical and NORP reports and the medical and psychiatric opinions , and also on the physical and documentary evidence gathered .

ORG observed that the accused ’s initial statements during the preliminary investigation had differed considerably from their submissions to the first - instance court . The initial statements had corroborated the finding concerning their participation in committing the criminal offences in issue , whereas the subsequent ones set out a version of events to the effect that an NORP national had committed those offences . ORG gave credence to the accused ’s initial statements , which had been made to an investigator in their ORG presence after they had been formally charged . The CARDINAL individuals thus charged had been advised that their statements could be used in court with a view to establishing the facts , and their prior medical examination had revealed no sign of physical violence , which contradicted the defence lawyer ’s allegation that the applicant ’s initial confession had been extracted from him .

ORG turned its attention to the applicant ’s version of events to the effect that the CARDINAL murders and the robbery had been committed by a certain PERSON , an NORP national , and that the applicant himself had been at his place of work in GPE at the material time . Checks carried out in ORG database had shown that no NORP national of that name was present in GPE . It was true that the applicant had been at his place of work in GPE on DATE . However , he had been working as a night watchman and the robbery and murders had been committed early in the morning , which had given him enough time to cover the distance between GPE and GPE and to arrive at work TIME . ORG deemed unconvincing the statement by the only witness who had corroborated the applicant ’s version of events .

ORG noted that the judgment of the first - instance court displayed none of the procedural defects mentioned by the defence . The factual and legal findings of ORG had not been exclusively based on the accused ’s confessions but on the whole body of consistent evidence gathered during the criminal proceedings . The applicant had participated actively in the proceedings and his lawyers had submitted several requests linked to the progress of the trial and the gathering of evidence . ORG had responded to all those requests and had provided full reasons for its procedural decisions . There had , moreover , been no sign of bias on the part of the judges who had examined the case , and the proceedings had been conducted in such a way as to safeguard the parties’ interests .

The Court of Appeal excluded a statement by CARDINAL witness from the evidence for non - compliance with the procedural rules , but did not consider that statement decisive in terms of the factual and legal conclusions in the case . It held that even though ORG had been dilatory in issuing the grounds for its judgment , the defence had nonetheless been able to submit additional observations on appeal after having secured a copy of those grounds .

The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law , reiterating his submissions to ORG . In that appeal , which ran to CARDINAL pages , his lawyer raised CARDINAL objections concerning the gathering and the interpretation of various pieces of evidence , as well as the factual and legal findings of the lower - level courts . In paragraph CARDINAL of his submissions the lawyer contested the admissibility of a record of a reconstruction of the events of DATE , arguing that on DATE his client had not been assisted by a lawyer of his choosing . At the time his client had been assisted by an officially appointed lawyer who had not been nominated by the local bar association , as required by the applicable legislation . The applicant ’s lawyer added that his client had undeniably been deprived of a defence lawyer on DATE , when he had been taken into custody ; he regarded this as an infringement of the provisions of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of ORG and of the LAW . That was the only sentence relating to the circumstances of the applicant ’s detention in police custody .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal on points of law . It found that none of the circumstances mentioned by the defence demonstrated the existence of bias on the part of the judges who had considered the criminal case . The applicant had had an opportunity to defend himself effectively during the criminal proceedings : he had given evidence and challenged the evidence against him . Some of his requests for further evidence - gathering had been accepted by the lower - level courts , and proper reasons had been given for their rejection of other requests by the defence for evidence to be taken .

Furthermore , in endorsing ORG other arguments , ORG considered that the facts had been well established , that the substantive and procedural rules had been appropriately applied and that the accused ’s rights had been fully respected .

The applicant was held in ORG from DATE to DATE , and again from DATE to DATE . He was incarcerated in FAC from CARDINAL DATE to DATE , and again from DATE to DATE . On DATE he was transferred to FAC , where he is still being held .

The applicant submitted that he had been held in a cell without windows , a toilet or running water . The LOC had had poor ventilation and lighting . He had not been allowed to exercise in the open air . Access to sanitary facilities had been restricted and the time allowed for washing had been insufficient . The applicant emphasised that the conditions of hygiene in the detention facility had been deplorable . He had subsequently been moved to another cell with CARDINAL other detainees . The CARDINAL detainees had had to take turns sleeping because the cell only had one bench .

According to a rapport by the Director General of Prisons submitted by the Government , at the time the only furniture in the cells in ORG had been a bench . The cells had had no windows and the only daylight had entered through holes in metal plates affixed to the doors . The facility in question had only had CARDINAL shared washroom and lacked any open - air facilities for detainees . The report also mentioned that DATE the facility had been completely renovated and redeveloped to bring the conditions of detention into line with the GPE human dignity .

The applicant alleged that his cell in FAC had had a surface area of QUANTITY m. It had contained a bed and a metal rack . There had been neither running water nor a toilet in his cell . He had used a plastic bucket for his bodily functions . Like all the prisoners he was allowed out of his cell for TIME CARDINAL times a day , in order to empty the bucket and fill his water bottle . The applicant submitted , in support of those allegations , a statement by his co - accused GPE , who had been detained with him under the same conditions in FAC . The applicant added that he had been forced to wear a convict ’s uniform even though he should have been allowed to wear his own clothes , under the prison rules .

The applicant explained that at the beginning of his term in FAC he had been deprived of open - air exercise . According to ORG statement ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , prisoners were allowed TIME open - air exercise every other day . The applicant was not involved in any organised activities in FAC . He had submitted several requests to the prison authorities to allow him to join in the various vocational training and occupational programmes and had applied for a transfer to FAC in order to be closer to his family , but no action had ever been taken on his requests .

According to a report by the governor of ORG submitted by the Government , the applicant had problems adapting to the prison regulations ; his attitude to the wardens and the prison authorities had been refractory and disrespectful . However , the applicant had enjoyed all the rights afforded to persons deprived of their liberty . He had board and lodging in accordance with normal prison standards . He had open - air exercise every day and free access to the prison library . He had consulted a psychologist on several occasions and had had a number of meetings with the prison ’s activity coordinator .

Following his transfer to FAC the applicant was subject to the “ special ” prison regime , involving virtually total isolation from the rest of the prison population .

The applicant submitted that over the period from DATE to DATE he had been confined to a cell measuring QUANTITY , which he had shared with another prisoner . The CARDINAL beds had taken up most of the floor area , leaving the QUANTITY prisoners with a free area of QUANTITY m. There had been no running water in the cell and the prisoners had used a bucket as a toilet .

The applicant stated that he had spent most of DATE sitting on his bed for lack of free space in the cell . He had eaten his meals in the cell and had been allowed to walk in the prison yard for TIME every day . His access to the prison library had been limited to TIME it took to choose and borrow a book , after which he had been immediately taken back to his cell . He had been allowed to attend the prison chapel twice a year , at GPE and DATE , although not during worship so that he would not meet other prisoners .

Up until DATE the high - security wing of the prison had been overcrowded and ill prisoners had not been held separately from other prisoners , which had fostered the transmission of infectious diseases . The physical conditions had improved somewhat after the renovation work in the high - security wing in DATE and DATE . In DATE the applicant ’s prison regime had relaxed . However , like all prisoners in his category , he had still been kept separate from the rest of the prison population and his cell had been kept locked during DATE . In DATE and DATE he had occasionally worked in his cell folding envelopes . Since DATE he had been allowed into an activities room , where he could talk to other life prisoners and read books .

According to a report by the governor of PERSON dated DATE , the high - security wing of FAC had been completely renovated in DATE and DATE . On the date of the report in question the applicant had been held in an individual cell measuring QUANTITY . m. , with a bed , a table , a rack , a shower and a private toilet . His cell had been heated and had running water and proper lighting .

Apart from the restrictions imposed by his prison regime , the applicant had access to all the activities provided to other prisoners : he could work , visit the library and the prison chapel , receive visits from his relatives , and write and receive letters . He was also eligible for relaxation of his prison regime under section CARDINAL of LAW , subject to a favourable opinion from the relevant special panel , and could ultimately be accommodated with the rest of the prison population .

Furthermore , in DATE the applicant applied to have a number of the provisions of the implementing regulations of LAW declared void as regards the conditions for the execution of his life sentence . His application was dismissed with final effect by a judgment of DATE delivered by ORG , which found that the impugned provisions of the implementing regulations were not contrary to LAW and that the adoption of the regulations had not involved any irregularities justifying their being declared void .


Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Johannes Silvis;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

NORP The applicant , Mr M.H.A. , is an NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . The duty judge decided that the applicant ’s identity should not be disclosed to the public ( Rule CARDINAL § CARDINAL of ORG ) . He was represented before the ORG by Mr W. Boelens , a lawyer practising in GPE .


Egidijus Kūris;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and is serving a prison sentence in Bolu F - type prison . He is represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) are represented by their Agent .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

According to the applicant ’s submissions , he was arrested at gunpoint by police officers from the anti - terrorist branch of ORG on DATE . The arrest and custody report drafted by the police indicate that he was taken into custody on CARDINAL DATE . According to this report , during the arrest , officers used force as the applicant attempted to flee .

DATE and DATE the applicant made statements to the police . He was questioned , in particular , about his alleged links to ORG , an illegal organisation , and complicity in a homicide .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant was referred to a doctor at the end of his detention in police custody . According to the medical report issued in respect of the applicant , he had sustained injuries to the right and left sides of his back and his left elbow . The doctor concluded that these injuries rendered the applicant unfit to carry out DATE activities for DATE .

On DATE the applicant was brought before a public prosecutor and then before the duty judge at ORG . He denied his statements taken in police custody , alleging that he had been tortured . The judge ordered the applicant ’s detention on remand on suspicion of membership of ORG and committing offences on its behalf .

On DATE the public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the applicant , along with a number of other persons , with ORG . The applicant was charged with attempting to undermine the constitutional order , an offence proscribed under LAW § CARDINAL of the former LAW .

In DATE the case against the applicant and his co - accused was joined with another case brought against a number of other persons who had been charged with membership of ORG .

State Security Courts were abolished by PERSON no . CARDINAL of DATE , published in ORG on DATE . The case against the applicant was therefore transferred to ORG .

On DATE the applicant maintained before ORG that his police statements did not reflect the truth , as he had been subject to ill - treatment during his detention in police custody .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer submitted to the firstinstance court that the applicant ’s police statements as well as a number of documents in the case file should not be used as evidence against him as the applicant had been subjected to torture in police custody . He further noted that no investigation had been initiated into the applicant ’s allegations of ill - treatment .

On DATE ORG ordered the applicant ’s release pending trial . However , he was not released from prison on account of other charges against him .

On DATE the applicant was released from prison .

On DATE ORG convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole . With the final decision ORG issued an order for the applicant ’s arrest .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld the judgment of CARDINAL DATE in so far as it concerned the applicant .

According to the applicant ’s submissions , meanwhile , in DATE , he lodged a petition with the PERSON public prosecutor ’s office against the police officers who had allegedly inflicted torture on him . During DATE , the PERSON public prosecutor initiated an investigation into the allegations of ill - treatment of the applicant , along with CARDINAL other persons , who were the applicant ’s co - accused .

On DATE the PERSON public prosecutor decided not to bring criminal proceedings against the police officers suspected of torture and inhuman treatment , holding that there was insufficient evidence in support of the ORG allegations . In his decision , the public prosecutor also decided that the decision be served on the complainants in accordance with LAW . According to this decision , within the context of the investigation , the PERSON public prosecutor examined the medical reports issued in respect of the complainants and obtained statements of a number of police officers who had been on duty at the time of the ORG detention in police custody . There is nothing in the case file demonstrating that the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of the PERSON public prosecutor .

A description of the relevant domestic law can be found in PERSON and Others v. GPE , nos . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , GPE , CARDINAL , ORG , CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL , § DATE , DATE ; PERSON v. GPE ( ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) ; and PERSON and Others v. GPE ( ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , CARDINAL DATE ) .


Preliminary objection allowed (Article 34 - Locus standi);Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect) (Conditional)

Aleš Pejchal;André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Dean Spielmann;Egidijus Kūris;Erik Møse;George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Helena Jäderblom;Ján Šikuta;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mark Villiger;Nona Tsotsoria;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicants , who are all NORP nationals , are Mr PERSON and his wife PERSON , who were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE , Mr PERSON , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE , and PERSON , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . They are the parents , a CARDINAL - brother and a sister respectively of PERSON , who was born on DATE .

PERSON sustained serious head injuries in a road - traffic accident on DATE , which left him tetraplegic and in a state of complete dependency . According to the expert medical report ordered by the ORG d’État on DATE , he is in a chronic vegetative state ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

From DATE he was hospitalised in the resuscitation wing , and subsequently the neurology ward , of ORG . DATE he was cared for in the heliotherapy centre in GPE , before being moved on DATE to the unit in ORG providing follow - up and rehabilitative care to patients in a vegetative or minimally conscious state , where he remains to date . The unit accommodates CARDINAL patients . PERSON receives artificial nutrition and hydration which is administered enterally , that is , via a gastric tube .

In DATE PERSON was assessed by a specialised unit of ORG , ORG , which concluded that he was in a chronic neuro - vegetative state characterised as “ minimally conscious plus ” . In line with the recommendations of ORG he received DATE sessions of physiotherapy from DATE to DATE , which yielded no results . He also received CARDINAL speech and language therapy sessions DATE , in an unsuccessful attempt to establish a code of communication . Attempts were also made to sit the patient in a wheelchair .

As PERSON carers had observed increasing signs in DATE of what they believed to be resistance on his part to DATE care , the medical team initiated in DATE the collective procedure provided for by LAW of DATE on ORG rights and end - of - life issues ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . PERSON , the patient ’s wife , was involved in the procedure .

The procedure resulted in a decision by PERSON , the doctor in charge of PERSON and head of the department in which he is hospitalised , to withdraw the patient ’s nutrition and reduce his hydration . The decision was put into effect on DATE .

On DATE the applicants applied to the urgent - applications judge of ORG on the basis of Article PERSON of LAW ( urgent application for protection of a fundamental freedom ( référé liberté ) ) , seeking an injunction ordering the hospital , subject to a coercive fine , to resume feeding and hydrating PERSON normally and to provide him with whatever care his condition required .

In an order dated CARDINAL DATE the urgent - applications judge granted their requests . The judge held that , since no advance directives had been drawn up by PERSON , and in the absence of a person of trust within the meaning of the relevant provisions of LAW , the collective procedure should be continued with his family , despite the fact that the latter was divided as to what should become of the patient . The judge noted that , while PERSON wife had been involved in the procedure , it was clear from examination of the case that his parents had not been informed that it had been applied , and that the decision to withdraw nutrition and limit hydration , the nature of and reasons for which had not been disclosed to them , had not respected their wishes .

The judge held accordingly that these procedural shortcomings amounted to a serious and manifestly unlawful breach of a fundamental freedom , namely the right to respect for life , and ordered the hospital to resume feeding and hydrating PERSON normally and to provide him with whatever care his condition required .

In DATE a fresh collective procedure was initiated . Dr PERSON consulted CARDINAL doctors , including CARDINAL from outside the hospital ( a neurologist , a cardiologist and an anaesthetist with experience in palliative medicine ) chosen by PERSON parents , his wife and the medical team respectively . He also had regard to a written contribution from a doctor in charge of a specialised extended care facility within a nursing home .

Dr PERSON also convened CARDINAL meetings with the family , on DATE and DATE , which were attended by PERSON wife and parents and his CARDINAL siblings . PERSON and CARDINAL of the CARDINAL brothers and sisters spoke in favour of discontinuing artificial nutrition and hydration , while the applicants were in favour of maintaining it .

On DATE Dr PERSON called a meeting of all the doctors and almost all the members of the care team . Following that meeting Dr PERSON and CARDINAL of the CARDINAL doctors consulted stated that they were in favour of withdrawing treatment .

On conclusion of the consultation procedure PERSON announced on DATE his intention to discontinue artificial nutrition and hydration on DATE , subject to an application to the administrative court . His decision , comprising a reasoned CARDINAL - page report , a sevenpage summary of which was read out to the family , observed in particular that PERSON condition was characterised by irreversible brain damage and that the treatment appeared to be futile and disproportionate and to have no other effect than to sustain life artificially . According to the report , the doctor had no doubt that PERSON had not wished , before his accident , to live under such conditions . Dr PERSON concluded that prolonging the patient ’s life by continuing to treat him with artificial nutrition and hydration amounted to unreasonable obstinacy .

On DATE the applicants made a further urgent application to ORG for protection of a fundamental freedom under LAW , seeking an injunction prohibiting the hospital and the doctor concerned from withdrawing PERSON nutrition and hydration and an order for his immediate transfer to a specialised extended care facility in ORG run by the association PERSON ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . PERSON and PERSON , ORG nephew , intervened in the proceedings as third parties .

ORG , sitting as a full court of CARDINAL judges , held a hearing on DATE . In a judgment of DATE it suspended the implementation of PERSON decision of DATE .

ORG began by observing that LAW did not prevent GPE from making provision for individuals to object to potentially life - prolonging treatment . It likewise did not prevent the doctor in charge of a patient who was unable to express his or her wishes and whose treatment the doctor considered , after implementing a series of safeguards , to amount to unreasonable obstinacy , from withdrawing that treatment , subject to supervision by ORG , the hospital ’s ethics committee , where applicable , and the administrative and criminal courts .

ORG went on to find that it was clear from the relevant provisions of LAW , as amended following LAW of DATE and as elucidated by the parliamentary proceedings , that artificial enteral nutrition and hydration – which were subject , like medication , to the distribution monopoly held by pharmacies , were designed to supply specific nutrients to patients with impaired functions and required recourse to invasive techniques to administer them – constituted a form of treatment .

Observing that Dr PERSON ’s decision had been based on the wish apparently expressed by PERSON not to be kept alive in a highly dependent state , and that the latter had not drawn up any advance directives or designated a person of trust , ORG found that the views he had confided to his wife and CARDINAL of his brothers had been those of a healthy individual who had not been faced with the immediate consequences of his wishes , and had not constituted the formal manifestation of an express wish , irrespective of his professional experience with patients in a similar situation . The court further found that the fact that PERSON had had a conflictual relationship with his parents , since he did not share their moral values and religious commitment , did not mean that he could be considered to have expressed a clear wish to refuse all forms of treatment , and added that no unequivocal conclusion as to his desire or otherwise to be kept alive could be drawn from his apparent resistance to the care provided . ORG held that Dr PERSON had incorrectly assessed PERSON wishes .

ORG also noted that , according to the report drawn up in DATE by ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , PERSON was in a minimally conscious state , implying the continuing presence of emotional perception and the existence of possible responses to his surroundings . Accordingly , the administering of artificial nutrition and hydration was not aimed at keeping him alive artificially . Lastly , the court considered that , as long as the treatment did not cause any stress or suffering , it could not be characterised as futile or disproportionate . It therefore held that Dr PERSON ’s decision had constituted a serious and manifestly unlawful breach of PERSON ’s right to life . It issued an order suspending the implementation of the decision while rejecting the request for the patient to be transferred to the specialised extended care facility in PERSON .

In CARDINAL applications lodged on DATE PERSON , ORG and ORG appealed against that judgment to the urgent - applications judge of the ORG d’État . The applicants lodged a cross - appeal , requesting PERSON immediate transfer to the specialised extended care facility . ORG and ORG ( ORG , see paragraph CARDINAL above ) sought leave to intervene as a third party .

At the hearing on the urgent application held on DATE the President of ORG of the ORG d’État decided to refer the case to the full court , sitting as a CARDINAL - member ORG .

The hearing before the full court took place on DATE . In his submissions to the ORG d’État , the public rapporteur cited , inter alia , the remarks made by ORG to the members of the ORG examining the bill known as the Leonetti bill :

“ While the act of withdrawing treatment ... results in death , the intention behind the act [ is not to kill ; it is ] to allow death to resume its natural course and to relieve suffering . This is particularly important for care staff , whose role is not to take life . ”

The ORG d’État delivered its ruling on DATE . After joining the applications and granting ORG leave to intervene , the PERSON d’État defined in the following terms the role of the urgentapplications judge called upon to rule on the basis of LAW of the Administrative Courts Code :

“ Under [ Article L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL ] , the urgent - applications judge of the administrative court , when hearing an application of this kind justified by particular urgency , may order any measures necessary to safeguard a fundamental freedom allegedly breached in a serious and manifestly unlawful manner by an administrative authority . These legislative provisions confer on the urgent - applications judge , who normally decides alone and who orders measures of an interim nature in accordance with Article PERSON MONEY of LAW , the power to order , without delay and on the basis of a ‘ plain and obvious’ test , the necessary measures to protect fundamental freedoms .

However , the urgent - applications judge must exercise his or her powers in a particular way when hearing an application under LAW ... concerning a decision taken by a doctor on the basis of LAW which would result in treatment being discontinued or withheld on grounds of unreasonable obstinacy and the implementation of which would cause irreversible damage to life . In such circumstances the judge , sitting where applicable as a member of a bench of judges , must take the necessary protective measures to prevent the decision in question from being implemented where it may not be covered by CARDINAL of the situations provided for by law , while striking a balance between the fundamental freedoms in issue , namely the right to respect for life and the patient ’s right to consent to medical treatment and not to undergo treatment that is the result of unreasonable obstinacy . In such a case , the urgentapplications judge or the bench to which he or she has referred the case may , as appropriate , after temporarily suspending the implementation of the measure and before ruling on the application , order an expert medical report and , under LAW CARDINAL of LAW , seek the opinion of any person whose expertise or knowledge are apt to usefully inform the court ’s decision . ”

The ORG d’État found that it was clear from the very wording of the relevant provisions of LAW ( Articles L. CARDINAL , L. DATE and NORP DATE ) and from the parliamentary proceedings that the provisions in question were general in scope and applied to PERSON just as they did to all users of the health service . The PERSON d’État stated as follows :

“ It is clear from these provisions that each individual must receive the care most appropriate to his or her condition and that the preventive or exploratory acts carried out and the care administered must not subject the patient to disproportionate risks in relation to the anticipated benefits . Such acts must not be continued with unreasonable obstinacy and may be discontinued or withheld where they appear to be futile or disproportionate or to have no other effect than to sustain life artificially , whether or not the patient is in an end - of - life situation . Where the patient is unable to express his or her wishes , any decision to limit or withdraw treatment on the ground that continuing it would amount to unreasonable obstinacy may not be taken by the doctor , where such a measure is liable to endanger the life of the patient , without the collective procedure defined in LAW and the rules on consultation laid down in LAW having been followed . If the doctor takes such a decision he or she must at all events preserve the patient ’s dignity and dispense palliative care .

Furthermore , it is clear from the provisions of Articles L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL and PERSON of LAW , as elucidated by the parliamentary proceedings prior to the passing of LAW of DATE , that the legislature intended to include among the forms of treatment that may be limited or withdrawn on grounds of unreasonable obstinacy all acts which seek to maintain the patient ’s vital functions artificially . Artificial nutrition and hydration fall into this category of acts and may accordingly be withdrawn where continuing them would amount to unreasonable obstinacy . ”

The PERSON d’Étatwithdraw treatment whose continuation would amount to unreasonable obstinacy had been met . To that end it needed to have the fullest information possible at its disposal , in particular concerning PERSON state of health . Accordingly , it considered it necessary before ruling on the application to order an expert medical report to be prepared by practitioners with recognised expertise in neuroscience . The experts – acting on an independent and collective basis , after examining the patient , meeting the medical team and the care staff and familiarising themselves with the patient ’s entire medical file DATE were to give their opinion on PERSON current condition and provide the ORG d’État with all relevant information as to the prospect of any change .

The Conseil d’État decided to entrust the expert report to a panel of CARDINAL doctors appointed by the President of ORG on proposals from the President of ORG , ORG and the President of ORG respectively . The remit of the panel of experts , which was to report within DATE of its formation , read as follows :

“ ( i ) to describe Mr. PERSON ’s current clinical condition and how it has changed since the review carried out in DATE by ORG ;

( ii ) to express an opinion as to whether the patient ’s brain damage is irreversible and as to the clinical prognosis ;

( iii ) to determine whether the patient is capable of communicating , by whatever means , with those around him ;

( iv ) to assess whether there are any signs to suggest at the present time that PERSON PERSON reacts to the care being dispensed to him and , if so , whether those reactions can be interpreted as a rejection of that care , as suffering , as a desire for the life - sustaining treatment to be withdrawn or , on the contrary , as a desire for the treatment to be continued . ”

The ORG d’État also considered it necessary , in view of the scale and the difficulty of the scientific , ethical and deontological issues raised by the case and in accordance with LAW , to request ORG , ORG and ORG , together with Mr PERSON , the rapporteur for the LAW of DATE , to submit general written observations by DATE designed to clarify for it the application of the concepts of unreasonable obstinacy and sustaining life artificially for the purposes of Article L. CARDINAL - CARDINAL , referred to above , with particular regard to individuals who , like PERSON , were in a minimally conscious state .

Lastly , the ORG d’État rejected the ORG request for PERSON to be transferred to a specialised extended care facility ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

The experts examined PERSON on CARDINAL occasions . They familiarised themselves with the entire medical file , and in particular the report of ORG in GPE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , the treatment file and the administrative file , and had access to all the imaging tests . They also consulted all the items in the judicial case file of relevance for their expert report . In addition , DATE and DATE they met all the parties ( the family , the medical and care team , the medical consultants and representatives of ORG and the hospital ) and carried out a series of tests on PERSON .

On CARDINAL DATE the experts sent their preliminary report to the parties for comments . Their final report , submitted on CARDINAL DATE , provided the following replies to the questions asked by the ORG d’État .

NORP The experts found that PERSON clinical condition corresponded to a vegetative state , without any signs pointing to a minimally conscious state . Furthermore , they stressed that he had difficulty swallowing and had seriously impaired motor functions of all CARDINAL limbs , with significant retraction of the tendons . They noted that his state of consciousness had deteriorated since the assessment carried out in GPE in DATE .

The experts pointed out that the CARDINAL main factors to be taken into account in assessing whether or not brain damage was irreversible were , firstly , the length of time since the accident which had caused the damage and , secondly , the nature of the damage . In the present case they noted that DATE had passed since the initial head injury and that the imaging tests showed severe cerebral atrophy testifying to permanent neuron loss , near - total destruction of strategic regions such as both parts of the thalamus and the upper part of the brain stem , and serious damage to the communication pathways in the brain . They concluded that the brain damage was irreversible . They added that the lengthy period of progression , the patient ’s clinical deterioration since DATE , his current vegetative state , the destructive nature and extent of the brain damage and the results of the functional tests , coupled with the severity of the motor impairment of all CARDINAL limbs , pointed to a poor clinical prognosis .

In the light of the tests carried out , and particularly in view of the fact that the course of speech and language therapy carried out in DATE had not succeeded in establishing a code of communication , the experts concluded that PERSON was not capable of establishing functional communication with those around him .

The experts observed that PERSON reacted to the care provided and to painful stimuli , but concluded that these were nonconscious responses . In their view , it was not possible to interpret them as conscious awareness of suffering or as the expression of any intent or wish with regard to the withdrawal or continuation of treatment .

On CARDINAL and DATE and CARDINAL DATE the ORG d’État received the general observations of ORG , Mr PERSON , rapporteur for the LAW of DATE , ORG and ORG .

ORG made clear in particular that , in using the expression “ no other effect than to sustain life artificially ” in LAW DATE of LAW , the legislature had sought to address the situation of patients who not only were being kept alive solely by the use of methods and techniques replacing key vital functions , but also , and above all , whose cognitive and relational functions were profoundly and irreversibly impaired . It emphasised the importance of the notion of temporality , stressing that where a pathological condition had become chronic , resulting in the person ’s physiological deterioration and the loss of his or her cognitive and relational faculties , obstinacy in administering treatment could be regarded as unreasonable if no signs of improvement were apparent .

PERSON stressed that the LAW was applicable to patients who had brain damage and thus suffered from a serious condition which , in the advanced stages , was incurable , but who were not necessarily “ at the end of life ” . Accordingly , the legislature , in the title of the LAW , had referred to “ ORG rights and endoflife issues ” rather than “ ORG rights in endoflife situations ” . He outlined the criteria for unreasonable obstinacy and the factors used to assess it and stated that the reference to treatment having “ no other effect than to sustain life artificially ” , which was stricter than the wording originally envisaged ( namely , treatment “ which prolongs life artificially ” ) was more restrictive and referred to artificially sustaining life “ in the purely biological sense , in circumstances where , firstly , the patient has major irreversible brain damage and , secondly , his or her condition offers no prospect of a return to awareness of self or relationships with others ” . He pointed out that the LAW gave the doctor sole responsibility for the decision to withdraw treatment and that it had been decided not to pass that responsibility on to the family , in order to avoid any feelings of guilt and to ensure that the person who took the decision was identified .

ORG reiterated the fundamental prohibition barring doctors from deliberately taking another ’s life , which formed the basis for the relationship of trust between doctor and patient . The ORG reiterated its long - standing position according to which the Act of DATE was applicable not only to the various “ end - of - life ” situations , but also to situations raising the very difficult ethical issue of the “ ending of life ” in the case of patients in “ survival ” mode , in a minimally conscious or chronic vegetative state .

ORG conducted an indepth analysis of the difficulties surrounding the notions of unreasonable obstinacy , treatment and sustaining life artificially , summarised the medical data concerning minimally conscious states and addressed the ethical issues arising out of such situations . It recommended in particular a process of reflection aimed at ensuring that the collective discussions led to a genuine collective decision - making process and that , where no consensus could be reached , there was a possibility of mediation .

A hearing took place on DATE before the ORG d’État . In his submissions the public rapporteur stressed , in particular , the following :

“ ... [ t]he legislature did not wish to impose on those in the caring professions the burden of bridging the gap which exists between allowing death to take its course when it can no longer be prevented and actively causing death by administering a lethal substance . By discontinuing treatment , a doctor is not taking the patient ’s life , but is resolving to withdraw when there is nothing more to be done . ”

The PERSON d’État delivered its judgment on DATE . After granting leave to ORG , PERSON CARDINAL - sister , to intervene as a third party , and reiterating the relevant provisions of domestic law as commented on and elucidated in the general observations received , the PERSON d’État examined in turn the ORG arguments based on the LAW and on domestic law .

On the first point the ORG d’État reiterated that , where the urgentapplications judge was called on to hear an application under LAW CARDINAL - CARDINAL of LAW ( urgent application for protection of a fundamental freedom ) concerning a decision taken by a doctor under LAW which would result in treatment being discontinued or withheld on grounds of unreasonable obstinacy , and implementation of that decision would cause irreversible damage to life , the judge was required to examine any claim that the provisions in question were incompatible with LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

In the case before it the ORG d’État replied in the following terms to the arguments based on ORG and CARDINAL of the Convention :

“ Firstly , the disputed provisions of LAW defined a legal framework reaffirming the right of all persons to receive the most appropriate care , the right to respect for their wish to refuse any treatment and the right not to undergo medical treatment resulting from unreasonable obstinacy . Those provisions do not allow a doctor to take a life - threatening decision to limit or withdraw the treatment of a person incapable of expressing his or her wishes , except on the dual , strict condition that continuation of that treatment would amount to unreasonable obstinacy and that the requisite safeguards are observed , namely that account is taken of any wishes expressed by the patient and that CARDINAL other doctor and the care team are consulted , as well as the person of trust , the family or another person close to the patient . Any such decision by a doctor is open to appeal before the courts in order to review compliance with the conditions laid down by law .

Hence the disputed provisions of LAW , taken together , in view of their purpose and the conditions attaching to their implementation , can not be said to be incompatible with the requirements of LAW ... , or with those of LAW

The PERSON d’État also rejected the ORG arguments based on ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Convention , finding that the role entrusted to the doctor under the provisions of LAW was not incompatible with the duty of impartiality flowing from LAW , and that LAW , which applied to criminal convictions , was not relevant to the case before it .

Regarding the application of the relevant provisions of LAW , the ORG d’État held as follows :

“ Although artificial nutrition and hydration are among the forms of treatment which may be withdrawn in cases where their continuation would amount to unreasonable obstinacy , the sole fact that a person is in an irreversible state of unconsciousness or , a fortiori , has lost his or her autonomy irreversibly and is thus dependent on such a form of nutrition and hydration , does not by itself amount to a situation in which the continuation of treatment would appear unjustified on grounds of unreasonable obstinacy .

In assessing whether the conditions for the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration are met in the case of a patient with severe brain damage , however caused , who is in a vegetative or minimally conscious state and is thus unable to express his or her wishes , and who depends on such nutrition and hydration as a means of life support , the doctor in charge of the patient must base his or her decision on a range of medical and non - medical factors whose relative weight can not be determined in advance but will depend on the circumstances of each patient , so that the doctor must assess each situation on its own merits . In addition to the medical factors , which must cover a sufficiently long period , be assessed collectively and relate in particular to the patient ’s current condition , the change in that condition since the accident or illness occurred , his or her degree of suffering and the clinical prognosis , the doctor must attach particular importance to any wishes the patient may have expressed previously , whatever their form or tenor . In that regard , where such wishes remain unknown , they can not be assumed to consist in a refusal by the patient to be kept alive in the current conditions . The doctor must also take into account the views of the person of trust , where the patient has designated such a person , of the members of the patient ’s family or , failing this , of another person close to the patient , while seeking to establish a consensus . In assessing the patient ’s particular situation , the doctor must be guided primarily by a concern to act with maximum beneficence towards the patient ... ”

The Conseil d’État

In that connection the ORG d’État ruled as follows :

“ Firstly , it is clear from the examination of the case that the collective procedure conducted by PERSON ... , prior to the taking of the decision of DATE , was carried out in accordance with the requirements of Article R. CARDINAL - DATE of LAW and involved the consultation of CARDINAL doctors , although that Article simply requires that the opinion of CARDINAL doctor and , where appropriate , of a second be sought . PERSON was not legally bound to allow the meeting of DATE to be attended by a second doctor designated by PERSON parents in addition to the one they had already designated . Nor does it appear from the examination of the case that some members of the care team were deliberately excluded from that meeting . Furthermore , PERSON was entitled to speak with Mr PERSON , the patient ’s nephew . The fact that PERSON opposed a request for him to withdraw from PERSON case and for the patient to be transferred to another establishment , and the fact that he expressed his views publicly , do not amount , having regard to all the circumstances of the present case , to a failure to comply with the obligations implicit in the principle of impartiality , which PERSON respected . Accordingly , contrary to what was argued before the ORG - en - Champagne Administrative Court , the procedure preceding the adoption of the decision of CARDINAL DATE was not tainted with any irregularity .

Secondly , the experts’ findings indicate that ‘ PERSON current clinical condition corresponds to a vegetative ORG , with ‘ swallowing difficulties , severe motor impairment of all CARDINAL limbs , some signs of dysfunction of the brainstem’ and ‘ continued ability to breathe ORG . The results of the tests carried out from DATE to assess the patient ’s brain structure and function ... were found to be consistent with such a vegetative state . The experts found that the clinical progression , characterised by the disappearance of the fluctuations in PERSON state of consciousness recorded during the assessment carried out in DATE by ORG at ORG and by the failure of the active therapies recommended at the time of that assessment , were suggestive of ‘ a deterioration in the [ patient ’s ] state of consciousness since that time’ .

Furthermore , according to the findings set out in the experts’ report , the exploratory tests which were carried out revealed serious and extensive brain damage , as evidenced in particular by ‘ severe impairment of the structure and metabolism of the sub - cortical regions of crucial importance for cognitive function’ and ‘ major structural dysfunction of the communication pathways between the regions of the brain involved in consciousness’ . The severity of the cerebral atrophy and of the damage observed , coupled with the CARDINAL - and - a - half - year period that had elapsed since the initial accident , led the experts to conclude that the brain damage was irreversible .

Furthermore , the experts concluded that ‘ the lengthy period of progression , the patient ’s clinical deterioration since DATE , his current vegetative state , the destructive nature and the extent of the brain damage , the results of the functional tests and the severity of the motor impairment of all CARDINAL ORG pointed to a ‘ poor clinical prognosis’ .

Lastly , while noting that PERSON was capable of reacting to the care administered and to certain stimuli , the experts indicated that the characteristics of those reactions suggested that they were non - conscious responses . The experts did not consider it possible to interpret these behavioural reactions as evidence of ‘ conscious awareness of suffering’ or as the expression of any intent or wish with regard to the withdrawal or continuation of the treatment keeping the patient alive .

These findings , which the experts reached unanimously following a collective assessment in the course of which the patient was examined on CARDINAL separate occasions , thorough cerebral tests were performed , meetings were held with the medical team and care staff involved and the entire file was examined , confirm the conclusions drawn by PERSON as to the irreversible nature of the damage and Mr PERSON ’s clinical prognosis . The exchanges which took place in the adversarial proceedings before the PERSON d’État subsequent to submission of the PERSON report do nothing to invalidate the experts’ conclusions . While it can be seen from the PERSON report , as just indicated , that PERSON reactions to care are not capable of interpretation and thus can not be regarded as expressing a wish as to the withdrawal of treatment , PERSON in fact indicated in the impugned decision that the behaviour concerned was open to various interpretations , all of which needed to be treated with great caution , and did not include this aspect in the reasons for his decision .

Thirdly , the provisions of LAW allow account to be taken of a patient ’s wishes expressed in a form other than advance directives . It is apparent from the examination of the case , and in particular from the testimony of PERSON , that she and her husband , both nurses , had often discussed their respective professional experiences in dealing with patients under resuscitation and those with multiple disabilities , and that PERSON had on several such occasions clearly voiced the wish not to be kept alive artificially if he were to find himself in a highly dependent state . The tenor of those remarks , reported by PERSON in precise detail and with the corresponding dates , was confirmed by CARDINAL of Mr PERSON ’s brothers . While these remarks were not made in the presence of PERSON PERSON ’s parents , the latter did not claim that their son could not have made them or that he would have expressed wishes to the contrary , and several of PERSON siblings stated that the remarks concerned were in keeping with their brother ’s personality , past experience and personal opinions . Accordingly , in stating among the reasons for the decision at issue his certainty that PERSON Lambert did not wish , before his accident , to live under such conditions , PERSON can not be regarded as having incorrectly interpreted the wishes expressed by the patient before his accident .

Fourthly , the doctor in charge of the patient is required , under the provisions of LAW , to obtain the views of the patient ’s family before taking any decision to withdraw treatment . PERSON complied with this requirement in consulting PERSON wife , parents and siblings in the course of the CARDINAL meetings referred to earlier . While PERSON parents and some of his brothers and sisters opposed the discontinuing of treatment , Mr PERSON ’s wife and his other siblings stated their support for the proposal to withdraw treatment . PERSON took these differentd that the fact that the members of the family were not unanimous as to what decision should be taken did not constitute an impediment to his decision .

It follows from all the above considerations that the various conditions imposed by the law before any decision can be taken by the doctor in charge of the patient to withdraw treatment which has no effect other than to sustain life artificially , and whose continuation would thus amount to unreasonable obstinacy , may be regarded , in the case of PERSON PERSON and in the light of the adversarial proceedings before the ORG d’État , as having been met . Accordingly , the decision taken by Dr PERSON on DATE to withdraw the artificial nutrition and hydration of Mr PERSON can not be held to be unlawful . ”

Accordingly , the ORG d’État set aside ORG judgment and dismissed the ORG claims .