CASE OF NAVALNYY AND OFITSEROV v. RUSSIA

Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;George Nicolaou;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Johannes Silvis;Luis López Guerra

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE .

The first applicant is a political activist , opposition leader , anticorruption campaigner and popular blogger . He is a lawyer and was , before his criminal conviction , a member of the GPE bar association . The second applicant , a businessman , was at the material time a director of the limited liability company OOO PERSON ( ООО « ВЛК DATE hereinafter “ VLK ” ) .

NORP In DATE the GPE region ’s ORG founded the ORG unitary enterprise ORG DATE ) . According to its incorporation documents , GPE commercial activities were woodcutting and timber processing . It owned CARDINAL timber mills registered as its operational branches . It appears that by DATE the company was in substantial debt and continued to make losses .

NORP In DATE the Governor of the GPE region , PERSON , invited the first applicant to be a volunteer consultant on enhancing transparency of the region ’s property management . At first , Mr PERSON carried out this role de facto , before being officially appointed on DATE . CARDINAL of his projects was to help steer the region ’s loss - making timber industry out of crisis .

NORP In DATE the first applicant discussed GPE financial and logistical problems with its director , X. He suggested that the company join forces with a timber trading company to bring in customers and , in particular , curtail the GPE timber ORG practice of direct sales for cash bypassing GPE accounts . X agreed , and the first applicant invited the second applicant , who he knew would be interested in working in the industry , to set up the timber trading company . The second applicant created ORG and registered it in DATE .

On DATE Kirovles , represented by X , concluded a framework contract with ORG , represented by the second applicant . The contract provided for non - exclusive sales by ORG , who would then sell the goods on to the customers at PERCENT commission . The timber specifications and prices were set out in CARDINAL annexes to the contract , which were signed in the period DATE to CARDINAL DATE . In accordance with the contract , from CARDINAL May to CARDINAL DATE Kirovles supplied ORG with timber worth MONEY ( ( RUB ) , the equivalent of MONEY ( ORG ) at the material time ) .

On an unidentified date PERSON ’s stepdaughter , PERSON , the then director of GPE commercial department , was employed by ORG part - time as its deputy director general .

DATE and DATE the first applicant commissioned GPE audit . In view of its results , the Governor ’s office set up a working group for restructuring GPE , to which the first applicant was appointed .

On DATE the property management department suspended X as GPE director , and on CARDINAL DATE he was dismissed for mismanagement .

On DATE Kirovles terminated the contract with ORG .

In the course of DATE the first applicant pursued an anticorruption campaign and published a number of articles and documents exposing high ranking officials’ involvement in large - scale fraud . In particular , on DATE he published an article claiming that MONEY of ORG funds had been misappropriated during the construction of LOC oil pipeline . In the article , he referred to a DATE audit report and suggested that the President , PERSON , and the Deputy Prime Minister , PERSON , had both been personally implicated .

On DATE the ORG department of ORG ( later replaced by ORG Russian Federation – “ the ORG ” ) opened an inquiry on suspicion that the applicants had defrauded GPE by inducing its director to enter into a loss - making transaction . When questioned , PERSON stated that he had met PERSON and Mr PERSON at the Governor ’s office and had complained to them that GPE was making losses because of falling timber prices and a lack of customers , among other reasons . Mr PERSON had later returned to him with the idea of setting up a trading intermediary , ORG , to bring customers to GPE , and they had concluded the contract . He indicated that although ORG had paid average market prices for the timber , he had later realised that their commission and the terms of supply had cost GPE extra , making it unprofitable . He had therefore terminated the contract . X further stated that when concluding the contract he had been under the impression that Mr PERSON had been acting in his official capacity at the Governor ’s office , and that as a ORG enterprise director he had to comply with the decisions of regional government . CARDINAL other former GPE employees were questioned , Ms B. and its deputy director PERSON They confirmed that although ORG had paid average market prices , GPE could have increased its margins by selling the timber directly and it had therefore made a limited profit on these sales . They also claimed that the contract had been entered into under pressure from both applicants , whom their director had perceived as acting for the Governor .

ORG also questioned the second applicant . He stated that he had approached PERSON directly because he knew that GPE needed customers and he had offered to act as an intermediary . The other party had not been subjected to pressure or deception , the prices had been fair , and the first applicant had not been involved in the negotiations . The first applicant was not questioned because “ his whereabouts could not be established ” .

On DATE ORG decided not to open a criminal investigation against either applicant for lack of corpus delicti .

On DATE criminal proceedings were instituted against X for alleged abuse of his official position , unrelated to ORG ; he was suspected of preferential treatment of a different private company he was affiliated with through his family .

On an unidentified date the inquiry resumed in respect of the applicants . The investigator questioned X , PERSON , GPE deputy director PERSON , the Deputy Head of ORG , PERSON , and both applicants . The first applicant stated , in particular , that after PERSON had reported to the Governor on GPE losses and lack of customers , the Governor had made an appeal to businesses interested in a commercial partnership with GPE . ORG had responded , along with others ; the Governor ’s office had not asked GPE to show any preference for ORG or taken part in the contract negotiations . The sales to ORG amounted to PERCENT of the total volume of GPE sales .

On DATE ORG decided not to open a criminal investigation against the first applicant for lack of corpus delicti . As regards the second applicant , they decided to transfer the inquiry file to ORG of the ORG , which had competence to decide whether there were grounds to open a criminal investigation .

On DATE the first applicant gave a radio interview with a strong anti - corruption message , describing the ruling party of GPE as “ a party of crooks and thieves ” .

On DATE the inquiry resumed . The investigators questioned both applicants , X , CARDINAL other former GPE employees , Ms B. , CARDINAL other former ORG employees and its then director ( the second applicant ’s brother ) , as well as CARDINAL high - ranking officials of the GPE region , including its Governor . He stated that in DATE Kirovles had been in a difficult financial situation and had substantial debt . He had therefore assigned the first applicant to study ways of restructuring GPE , and the latter had participated in working groups and working meetings concerning this matter . He explained that the first applicant had not been able to put pressure on X or influence the commercial activities of the timber industry , including GPE . It was he himself who had ultimately taken the decision to terminate the contract between FAC and ORG as a result of a series of working meetings between him , X and both applicants .

On DATE ORG of the GPE region placed FAC in administration .

On DATE the ORG decided not to open a criminal investigation in respect of the applicants for lack of corpus delicti .

On DATE the acting Chief of the investigation division of ORG decided to open a criminal investigation in respect of both applicants . They were suspected of deception and abuse of trust of GPE director , an offence under LAW ( b ) of LAW .

During the investigation , which lasted for DATE , both applicants were questioned , as well as X , PERSON , CARDINAL former GPE employees and CARDINAL timber mill directors . Kirovles and ORG ’s accounts were examined , and CARDINAL reports were ordered from experts in accounting , finance and economics . It follows from the parties’ submissions that the following witnesses were also questioned . Witness PERSON , Chief of ORG , made a statement about how the contract between ORG and GPE had been concluded and how the first applicant and PERSON had been at odds . Witness PERSON , Deputy Chief of ORG , stated that the first applicant had insisted on an independent audit of GPE and proposed restructuring it to prevent financial manipulation by X. CARDINAL other witnesses , all managers of ORG , gave details about ORG ’s work to find customers for Kirovles in accordance with the contract . Based on this evidence , the investigators found that there was no case against the applicants .

On DATE ORG closed the criminal investigation in respect of both applicants for lack of corpus delicti .

On DATE ORG reversed that decision .

On DATE the Chief of ORG , Mr PERSON , spoke at its general meeting and condemned , in particular , the decision to close the criminal investigation in respect of the first applicant . In the extract broadcasted on GPE ’s main TV channels he stated :

“ You have got a man there called Mr PERSON . The criminal case , why have you terminated it without asking ORG superiors ? DATE the whole country is discussing [ this fraud ] , the talks [ between Mr PERSON and PERSON Belykh ] have been published , and we can not hear anything except grunting . You had a criminal file against this man , and you have quietly closed it . I am warning you , there will be no mercy , no forgiveness if such things happen again . If you have grounds to close it , report it . Feeling weak , afraid , under pressure – report ! We will help , support you , take over the file , but quietly , like that – no ... ”

On DATE the first applicant published an article accusing Mr Bastrykin of breaking laws imposing restrictions on high - ranking public servants . The article included copies of documents stating that he held a NORP residence permit and owned a private business during his tenure at ORG .

On DATE ORG investigator for high profile cases decided to open a criminal investigation against NORP on suspicion that he had conspired with unknown individuals to dissipate GPE assets through ORG , thus committing an offence under LAW of LAW .

On DATE the case against X was joined with the criminal case against the applicants .

On DATE charges were formulated against the first applicant under LAW of LAW . On DATE the same charges were formulated in respect of X , and on DATE in respect of the second applicant . They were all suspected of conspiring to dissipate GPE assets .

On DATE the Deputy Prosecutor General granted X ’s request to conclude a plea - bargaining agreement and to have his criminal case examined in accelerated proceedings .

On DATE the plea - bargaining agreement was signed by X and the Deputy Prosecutor General . Among other conditions , X undertook to “ actively provide the investigation with information ” about “ Mr Ofitserov and Mr PERSON ’s involvement in the misappropriation [ of assets ] , their roles in the commission of the crime , the specific steps taken to implement the criminal plan , including at the stages of preparation and conclusion of the sales contract and demonstration of its feasibility and utility . ” On DATE the criminal case - file against X was disjoined from the applicants’ case .

On DATE the first applicant learned of the pleabargaining agreement from the press and filed a complaint with ORG and ORG , alleging that it had breached his procedural rights in the criminal case against him . He requested that PERSON ’s case , if it had been severed , be joined with their case again .

On DATE the prosecutor ’s office replied that the pleabargaining agreement had been concluded lawfully .

On DATE the first applicant served ORG of GPE ( “ the ORG ” ) with a complaint challenging the decision to sever GPE ’s criminal case and examine it in accelerated proceedings . On DATE he filed another complaint with ORG , challenging the decision to disjoin X ’s criminal file from his own .

On DATE ORG dismissed the request to join X ’s criminal case with the applicants’ case .

On DATE the prosecutor ’s office replied that the cases had been disjoined lawfully .

On DATE the ORG gave judgment in X ’s case , after examining it in accelerated proceedings , without an examination of evidence . The court found X guilty of dissipating GPE assets ( Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW ) and handed him a DATE suspended sentence with DATE parole . The judgment indicated that X had conspired with CARDINAL others , “ N. ” and “ O. ” and contained , in particular , the following findings :

“ ... at DATE [ to the ] beginning of DATE ... the Governor of the GPE region ... met the directors of the big State enterprises , including [ X ] ... and introduced his volunteer consultants including ORG , who was officially appointed to this role ... on CARDINAL DATE .

In DATE N. ... developed a criminal plan to misappropriate GPE assets in favour of a newly created entity under his control , to be founded and led by O.

In DATE N. continued to implement his criminal intent to dissipate GPE assets , ordered the commission of the crime ... informed [ X ] about the forthcoming creation of an intermediary enterprise ... aimed at dissipating the assets in [ X ’s ] charge .

[ X ] ... did not take any steps to prevent ORG ’s unlawful acts [ and ] agreed with him , thus entering into a criminal conspiracy with ORG and ORG aimed at large - scale dissipation of the assets ... entrusted to him .

To implement ORG ’s criminal plan , ORG , acting in agreement with him , created in DATE ... the limited liability company “ OOO VLK ” ... thus facilitating the commission of the crime ...

Later , [ X ] ... acting deliberately and in agreement with ORG and ORG , signed a sales contract with ORG ... in full realisation of the damaging consequences ... because of [ ORG ’s ] lack of adequate collateral ...

In doing so , [ X ] , ORG and ORG had sound knowledge that PERSON would pay for the goods under the terms of the contract and its annexes at a price known to be lower than that GPE could have received without an intermediary ...

In the period DATE to CARDINAL DATE ... [ X ] and ORG , in conspiracy with ORG , who had organised the crime and ordered its implementation , signed [ DATE ] annexes to the contract ... which stipulated ... a price which was deliberately reduced by all [ of the ] partners in crime without any economic need compared to the price GPE could have sold its products for if it supplied the ORG customers of directly .

While doing so , ORG and ORG realised that [ X ] was unlawfully depriving ORG the possibility of independent sales of its timber products at market prices and was thus placing its timber products at ORG ’s disposal without a sufficient and equivalent reimbursement of its market value .

In the period DATE to DATE in GPE , [ X ] , acting in abuse of his official position , and O. , in conspiracy with and on the instructions of N. , deliberately implemented the terms of the sales contract ... and its annexes ...

[ X ] , acting in premeditated conspiracy with N. and O. , out of acquisitive motives therefore abused his official position , ... unlawfully dissipated the assets he was in charge of ... for the benefit of third parties – partners in crime and OOO VLK under their control , thus causing significant damage to the assets of their owner , GPE .

The Deputy Prosecutor General ... proposed [ using ] accelerated proceedings for the judicial hearing and issuing the judgment ... in respect of [ X ] ...

The accused [ X ] has pleaded guilty to the entirety of charges , accepted the indictment and the proposal ... of accelerated proceedings on the basis of the concluded plea - bargaining agreement .

Information stated by [ X ] in compliance with the terms of the concluded pleabargaining agreement , is full and true and corroborated by the evidence gathered in the case . The court therefore concludes that [ X ] has complied with the obligations set out in the plea - bargaining agreement , and that judgment may therefore be given in respect of the accused without an examination of evidence , in accordance with the procedure set out in LAW as required by LAW

On DATE the first applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment given in GPE ’s case . He challenged , in particular , the use of accelerated proceedings in that case , the fact that it had been disjoined from the case against him and the second applicant and alleged that the judgment had been prejudicial to the outcome of their case .

On DATE the judgment against X acquired legal force .

On DATE ORG informed the first applicant that he could not appeal against the judgment in GPE ’s case because he had not been a party to those proceedings . He was denied access to the transcript of the court hearing for the same reason .

On DATE the charges under LAW ( b ) of LAW were lifted in respect of both applicants . The charges LAW CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW were maintained , although they were reformulated in respect of the second applicant .

On DATE the first applicant filed a complaint with ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) about the refusal to consider his appeal .

On DATE the Deputy President of ORG replied , stating that his appeal could not be examined because he had not been a party to the proceedings . Moreover , he indicated that the judgment against X could not be prejudicial to the applicant ; his guilt had not been established , he had not participated in those proceedings and his name had not been mentioned in it .

DATE . On DATE the indictment was issued in respect of both applicants .

On DATE ORG fixed the hearing in the applicants’ case for DATE .

On DATE the applicants filed a request with ORG to have the judgment given in GPE ’s case excluded from evidence . They argued , in particular , that admitting it would prejudice the outcome of their case .

On DATE the court dismissed the request on the grounds that the judgment against X did not predetermine the applicants’ guilt and , moreover , their names had not been mentioned in it .

During the hearing , PERSON was called and examined as a witness . He was first questioned by the public prosecutors , who then asked to read out his statements given during the investigation on the grounds that he could not remember some details and had given contradictory answers to some questions . The applicants objected on the grounds that during the investigation X had made the statements in his capacity as an accused , and an accused had the right to make false statements , not being under oath . Moreover , reading out his previous statements , especially in full , would hinder his cross - examination by the defence as it would remind the witness of the “ correct ” version of events he had accepted during his trial but could not remember at the applicants’ hearing . The court dismissed these objections and allowed the statements made by X during the investigation to be read out . The applicants and their defence team questioned PERSON afterwards .

The court also allowed , despite the ORG objections , the statements of PERSON and QUANTITY other witnesses to be read out . They were each first questioned by the prosecutor , then their previous testimony and statements were read out in their presence . Only then could the defence question them .

On DATE and DATE a challenge by the applicants to the trial judge was rejected .

On DATE the court dismissed the ORG request to have material obtained by interception of the applicants’ telephone calls excluded . On DATE it admitted this material as evidence .

On DATE and DATE the court rejected the ORG requests to have several people called and examined as witnesses , including PERSON , Chief of ORG , Mr PERSON , Deputy Chief of ORG , and the CARDINAL ORG managers who had been questioned during the investigation , as well as CARDINAL expert witnesses .

On DATE the court rejected the applicants’ request for the following evidence : documents relating to GPE insolvency proceedings , GPE financial reports , an approved list of standard minimum prices for timber , complete records of intercepted telephone calls between the applicants , material relating to the criminal proceedings against X instituted on DATE and the criminal case file relating to X ’s conviction in the PERSON case .

On DATE , at the ORG request , the court admitted as evidence a report issued by a trade specialist indicating that the prices paid by ORG to GPE were above average . On DATE it rejected their request for the court to order expert reports by finance , economics and merchandising experts .

On DATE the first applicant was registered as a candidate for the GPE mayoral elections .

On DATE the ORG gave judgment , finding the first applicant guilty of organising , and the second applicant of facilitating , large - scale embezzlement . The court relied on the testimony of X and his statements made during the investigation . It also relied on the testimony of CARDINAL witnesses and statements made by CARDINAL of them during the investigation , material obtained by way of operational - search activities , in particular intercepted email correspondence and telephone calls between the applicants , accounting documents and expert reports . As regards the judgment in respect of X , the court said :

“ It follows from the judgment of ORG of GPE given on DATE that [ X ] was found guilty of dissipation [ and ] embezzlement , that is stealing GPE assets entrusted to [ X ] , on an especially large scale , committed by abuse of his official position in conspiracy with NORP O. ... a criminal offence under LAW of LAW . ”

The court further noted that it found X ’s testimony , as well as his statements made during the investigation , truthful and concordant with other evidence ; it also found that they were admissible and had been lawfully obtained .

The court dismissed the first applicant ’s allegations of political persecution or revenge by individuals who had lost their jobs at GPE or were otherwise disconcerted with his role in reforming the timber industry in the GPE region . It also dismissed the objection to admitting X and Ms B. ’s testimony and statements on the grounds that X had a vested interest in the proceedings , finding the objection unfounded and illogical . It explained the discrepancies between the testimony and pre - trial witness statements by the passage of time that had elapsed since the events in question and held that , in any event , the witnesses at the trial had confirmed the validity of their previous statements .

The court noted that X had treated the first applicant as an official from the Governor ’s office and that the applicant knew this . However , it stressed that the first applicant had not been accused , or convicted , of any abuse of his official position at the Governor ’s office :

“ Mr PERSON [ is not suspected of ] committing a crime by abuse of his official position ; consequently , the defence ’s arguments that the Governor ’s volunteer consultant had no powers to give binding instructions to the ORG management do not refute the accusation [ or ] prove that it was impossible for Mr PERSON to commit the crime and order its execution . ”

As regards the legal classification of the ORG offences , the court held :

“ The court finds that the arguments put forward by the defence about the absence of unlawfulness , a necessary element of theft , because a regular civillaw transaction has been concluded by persons with legal capacity , are unfounded .

The GPE region ’s ORG , acting on behalf of the owner of GPE , has provided in the certificate of incorporation and [ X ’s ] employment contract that [ X was under an ] obligation to carry out his duties in good faith , reasonably and in accordance with the applicable legislation .

In accordance with LAW , it is not permitted to exercise one ’s civil rights with the exclusive purpose of causing damage to another person , act in circumvention of the law with unlawful intent , [ or any other ] intentional exercise of civil rights in bad faith ( abuse of rights ) .

The court has established that contrary to the said provisions of the certificate of incorporation , the employment contract and the law , [ X ] , acting on behalf of the company directed by him , has entered into a sales contract ... with OOO ORG represented by PERSON to exclusively facilitate stealing GPE property and transferring [ it ] for the benefit of OOO VLK ... The conclusion of this sales contract has resulted in material damage [ being caused ] to GPE .

The court notes that neither Mr PERSON nor Mr GPE is charged with organising and facilitating the conclusion of a legally invalid sales contract . On the contrary , what the [ applicants are suspected of ] is organising and facilitating the dissipation of GPE assets by concluding a sales contract with OOO VLK intended exclusively to create the impression that GPE had civil - law obligations towards TIME to transfer timber goods to shipment recipients , as if for collateral , whereas in reality the goods would be transferred without OOO ORG [ having ] equivalent and sufficient collateral .

According to the ruling of the Plenary of ORG of the Russian Federation no . CARDINAL dated DATE “ On ORG in Cases of Fraud , Misappropriation or Embezzlement ” , a perpetrator of misappropriation or embezzlement may only be someone entrusted with the assets of another legal person or individual , based on legal grounds for a specific purpose or for a defined activity . Based on the provisions of LAW , those who do not possess these special subjective characteristics qualifying [ them ] for misappropriation or embezzlement , but who directly participated in stealing assets in prior agreement with the person entrusted with the assets , must be criminally liable under LAW in conjunction with LAW in their capacity as organisers , inciters or facilitators .

It follows from the judgment of ORG of GPE given on DATE , which has acquired legal force , that the perpetrator of the crime Mr PERSON and Mr GPE [ are suspected of ] was found to be [ X ] , who had been entrusted with Kirovles assets as its director general . [ X ’s ] acts were classified by the court as falling under LAW of LAW . ”

The court estimated that the damage caused to GPE amounted to RUB DATE . It concluded that the first applicant was guilty of organising the theft of GPE assets by X ( LAW in conjunction with LAW § CARDINAL of LAW ) , and the second applicant of facilitating that theft ( LAW in conjunction with LAW § CARDINAL of LAW ) . They were sentenced to CARDINAL and CARDINAL years’ imprisonment respectively , to be served in a correctional colony . In addition , they were both fined RUB CARDINAL .

The applicants were taken into custody immediately after the hearing .

DATE . On DATE the prosecutor ’s office of the GPE region asked the court to release the applicants pending appeal , particularly since the first applicant was a registered candidate in the GPE mayoral elections .

On DATE ORG granted the request and released the applicants on parole .

On DATE both applicants lodged an appeal against the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . They challenged their conviction , insisting that it was unlawful and unfounded and that the first - instance court had relied on the judgment of DATE against X in violation of the rules of criminal procedure . They also complained about the court ’s assessment of evidence and the manner in which it had examined the witnesses .

On DATE the first applicant stood as a candidate in the GPE mayoral elections . He came second , securing PERCENT of the votes .

On DATE the applicants questioned the accuracy of the transcript of the first - instance hearing . The requested amendments were set out in an CARDINAL page document .

On DATE ORG accepted a small number of amendments but rejected the rest .

On DATE the applicants filed additional grounds of appeal elaborating on those lodged previously .

On DATE ORG dismissed the ORG appeal and upheld the first - instance judgment in substance . It amended their sentence and gave them both suspended prison terms on an undertaking not to change their place of residence .

DATE . On DATE the applicants each lodged appeals on points of law . On CARDINAL and DATE ORG , sitting in a single judge formation , refused to give them leave to appeal .

On DATE ORG ordered that the first applicant be placed under house arrest pending another , unrelated , criminal case against him . To justify the application of this preventive measure the court referred to , among other factors , the first applicant ’s prior criminal conviction in the GPE case . The conditions of the house arrest included a number of restrictions , in particular a ban on communicating with anyone other than his immediate family and legal counsel , a ban on using the Internet and a ban on making public statements or comments to the media . The first applicant remained under house arrest for DATE .


Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON . She was represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

During DATE and DATE NORP para - military forces gained control of CARDINAL of the territory of GPE and proclaimed the so - called “ GPE of LOC ” ( PERSON autonomna oblast LOC , hereinafter the “ LOC ” ) . The applicant continued to live in the LOC . At the beginning of DATE the NORP authorities announced a campaign of military action with the aim of regaining control over LOC . The action was codenamed “ Storm ” and lasted from CARDINAL to CARDINAL DATE . Before that action , the vast majority of the population of the LOC fled GPE , initially for GPE , but later many of them went to live in GPE . Some returned to GPE after the war . The number of people who fled is estimated at CARDINAL .

According to the applicant , on CARDINAL DATE she and her nephew GPE – in a vehicle of the “ Lada ” make – and her other nephew GPE – in a vehicle of the “ Zastava ” make – were driving along the road between the villages of Strmen and PERSON , trying to flee GPE and reach GPE . After overtaking a convoy of tractors and while passing through a forest called GPE , NORP soldiers started to fire at them . The applicant and both her nephews were wounded . The applicant and GPE got out of the vehicle and ran into the woods . Later on , they both managed to flee into GPE and GPE . GPE surrendered to the NORP soldiers and was provided with first aid .

The NORP authorities learned about the applicant ’s wounding in DATE when she submitted a request for damages to the State Attorney ’s Office in that connection .

On DATE the police interviewed GPE and GPE , who both gave an account of the events of CARDINAL DATE like that described in paragraph CARDINAL above .

On DATE the police interviewed the applicant , PERSON and GPE The applicant confirmed the accounts of GPE and GPE P.T. said that he had been checking on his cattle in the same area on DATE and had hidden in the woods during the shooting . After that he had been captured by the NORP soldiers . He had seen GPE , who had a head wound that had already been tended to , being held by NORP soldiers .

I.Š. , the commander of a unit comprising CARDINAL soldiers of ORG of ORG , said that their task on CARDINAL DATE had been “ to cut communication on the road between Strmen and LOC ” . They had completed that task in TIME and in TIME had stationed themselves in the forest known as PERSON , near that road . Tractors and people had occasionally passed along the road . In the afternoon he had received the order to “ destroy a foresters’ lodge ” in LOC and had sent CARDINAL soldiers to carry out that task . A battle between these soldiers and NORP para - military forces issued . At that moment CARDINAL vehicles , a ORG and a Lada , and a tractor appeared on the road . PERSON was not sure who had fired at the vehicles , since they had found themselves in crossfire from both sides . The crossfire lasted for TIME . He had no knowledge about the wounding of the applicant .

On DATE the police interviewed GPE , who said that on DATE she had been in a convoy of tractors and that while they had been passing through the forest of GPE , NORP soldiers had started to fire at them and several people had been killed or wounded .

On DATE ORG sent the daily log of ORG ’s unit for CARDINAL DATE to ORG . This log confirmed the events described by ORG in his statement of DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with ORG against ORG on charges of war crimes against the civilian population . On DATE she extended her complaint to GPE

DATE the police interviewed GPE , GPE , the applicant and PERSON They all repeated their prior statements .


Egidijus Kūris;Ganna Yudkivska;Iulia Motoc;Marko Bošnjak;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Georges Ravarani

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by Dr PERSON and Dr PERSON , lawyers practising in GPE .

NORP The applicant suffered from Attention - Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ( hereinafter referred to as “ ADHD ” ) , and was the subject of a treatment order . In view of the treatment order , he was being kept at ORG ( the ORG mental health hospital ) .

On DATE a shop in GPE , GPE , was burgled .

On DATE the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of committing the burglary in question . The applicant was questioned at police headquarters and detained overnight .

On DATE , the applicant was arraigned before ORG ( as a ORG ) charged with aggravated theft and other related offences . During the arraignment procedure the applicant requested that he be released on bail , but this was refused . Since the applicant was the subject of a treatment order , the court ordered that he be kept under arrest at ORG . However , the applicant was kept under arrest at ORG rather than the hospital .

On DATE , the applicant ’s lawyers became aware that on CARDINAL DATE a certain ORG had admitted committing the burglary in PERSON ( of which the applicant had been accused ) , and that that person had , on DATE , confirmed his admission before ORG . On DATE , the applicant applied to ORG to be released on bail .

Later on CARDINAL DATE , the police inspector who had arrested the applicant was informed of ORG ’s arrest for the same incident the applicant had been accused of , and that ORG had admitted to committing the crime . The inspector communicated DATE with the Attorney General ( hereinafter referred to as “ the ORG ” ) , who directed him to submit an urgent application to ORG for the applicant ’s release .

At TIME DATE , in the light of the applicant ’s and the police ’s applications for his release on bail , ORG ordered the applicant ’s conditional release against a personal guarantee of CARDINAL ( ORG ) . He was forbidden to leave the country , approach witnesses or commit any other crimes . He was also obliged to sign in at the police station DATE and a curfew was imposed from TIME

On DATE , the police withdrew the charges against the applicant . According to the applicant , he lost his right to the treatment order at ORG as a result of the arrest and arraignment .

On DATE , the applicant filed proceedings before ORG ( FAC ) in its constitutional jurisdiction . He argued that he had been arraigned without there having been a reasonable suspicion against him . Moreover , on the basis of that arraignment he had been denied release on bail . The applicant further submitted that the Commissioner of Police , despite realising that the applicant had been detained for no reason ( because ORG had admitted to committing the crime the applicant had been accused of ) , had failed to withdraw immediately the accusations against the applicant . In the applicant ’s view , all those facts , either taken together or separately , had resulted in an infringement of his right to liberty under LAW .

On DATE , ORG ( FAC ) in its constitutional jurisdiction found that the applicant had not suffered any violation of his rights . The costs of the proceedings were to be paid by the applicant .

The court held that it would not substitute its own discretion for that of the police . Its role was to analyse whether the police could have had a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the crime , in the light of the evidence they had had before them at the time they had made the decision to arrest and eventually arraign the applicant . It noted firstly that when the applicant had been arraigned he had failed to contest the validity of his arrest . In determining whether the police could have had a sufficiently reasonable suspicion , the court considered factors , including , but not limited to : the fact that the police had received a tip - off / confidential information that the applicant had committed the crime ; ORG footage of the shop that had been held - up and ORG footage of some of the neighbours of the shop . According to the court , in the light of other information the police had had in its possession , it had been reasonable for them to conclude that the person seen in the footage was the applicant , especially given the similar build and hair style . Indeed , once the police had seen the applicant in person they had confirmed that he looked like the person in the ORG footage . Moreover , the court noted that , according to the police , the applicant ’s mother had failed to confirm that her son had been at home at TIME ( the time of the commission of the offence ) , leading the chief investigator to believe that he had no alibi for the time of the crime . Also , the police had found out that on DATE where the burglary occurred the applicant had been on leave from the hospital . In addition , the applicant ’s past had been taken into account , including : the fact that the applicant was known to the police as a person taking drugs ; that he had ongoing proceedings against him for theft with aggravated assault allegedly committed in DATE ; and that he had previously been found guilty of crimes related to theft and drug abuse . Furthermore , the police had discovered that on DATE of the hold - up the applicant had argued with his mother about money and drugs - related issues . Taking all those factors into account , ORG ( FAC ) in its constitutional jurisdiction confirmed the existence of a reasonable suspicion and thus a justification for the arrest .

It also concluded that the ORG of GPE refusal to grant the applicant release on bail had not been unreasonable . ORG had considered the applicant ’s regular visits to ORG ; his past involvement in crimes involving violence ; and factors associated with the risk and gravity of the crime at issue .

With regard to the applicant ’s complaint that the criminal proceedings against him had not been withdrawn immediately upon ORG ’s arrest and admission to the crime , the court noted that the only person who could have shed light on what had happened was the inspector , but he had not been produced as a witness . Nevertheless , based on the evidence before it , the court observed that as soon as the inspector who had carried out the applicant ’s arrest had found out that another person ( ORG ) had been arrested for the same crime , he had requested direction from the ORG . The inspector had then proceeded to submit an urgent application to ORG for the applicant ’s release . The first time a third person had come into the scene had been on DATE , when ORG had been arraigned . The applicant had been released from detention DATE . In the light of those facts the court concluded that there had been no failings by the police . It noted that LAW concerned protection from arbitrary arrest or detention and that the applicant had been released on DATE . The fact that the accusations against the applicant had only formally been withdrawn on CARDINAL DATE did not raise any issue under LAW .

On DATE , the applicant lodged an appeal with ORG . He reiterated his claims and argued , inter alia , that there had been no reason for ORG to fear that he would not attend court proceedings , or that he would in any way influence the proceedings against him because he had been undergoing a treatment order at ORG . The applicant also stated that the police had found out about ORG ’s involvement in the hold - up on DATE but had waited until DATE ( when ORG had been arraigned before ORG and had pleaded guilty to the charges ) to take action towards remedying the applicant ’s situation . He argued that the police were obliged to remedy a situation of unlawful detention as soon as they became aware of it , as was also contemplated under LAW . He complained that as a result of their delay he had spent DATE in detention and had later been subject to conditional release .

ORG upheld his claims in part . It found a violation of the applicant ’s rights as protected under LAW ( c ) of LAW CARDINAL ) of the LAW for the limitation of liberty the applicant had suffered DATE and CARDINAL DATE , but rejected his other complaints . It awarded him CARDINAL as compensation for non - pecuniary damage .

The Constitutional Court confirmed the first - instance court ’s finding in respect of the existence of a reasonable suspicion justifying arrest which had persisted until the applicant ’s arraignment before ORG . The applicant had thus not suffered a violation of his rights protected by LAW ) of the LAW during that period .

The Constitutional Court considered that until DATE the applicant ’s situation had remained the same as on DATE . However , it had changed on CARDINAL DATE , when a third party had been arraigned before ORG for the same crime . ORG observed that as soon as the inspector responsible for the applicant ’s arrest had been informed that another person had been arrested for the same offence the inspector had taken action . On DATE , as requested by both the police and the applicant himself , ORG had ordered the applicant ’s conditional release . The applicant had been released DATE , against a personal guarantee . ORG found that the amount of time that had passed between the third party being arrested and the applicant ’s release had been reasonable . Therefore , the applicant ’s detention until his release on DATE had not been arbitrary and had not violated his rights protected under LAW ( c ) .

According to ORG , the same could not be said of the period DATE , during which the prosecution had no longer held a reasonable suspicion against the applicant . At that point , the restriction of liberty had , according to ORG , no longer been justified under LAW ( c ) of the LAW .

NORP In awarding compensation , ORG considered that the applicant had contributed to the violation himself by only requesting conditional release on DATE , rather than unconditional release . The court ordered the applicant to pay DATE of the costs of the proceedings before the first - instance court and ORG and the Commissioner of Police to pay DATE .


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions;Article 1 para. 2 of Protocol No. 1 - Control of the use of property)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Paul Lemmens;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in Split .

She is the owner of a flat in GPE with a surface area of QUANTITY . The flat is occupied by a “ protected lessee ” ( zaštićeni najmoprimac ) , a certain PERSON Under LAW Act ( Zakon o najmu stanova ) , which entered into force on DATE , such lessees are subject to a number of protective measures , such as the duty of landlords to contract a lease of indefinite duration , payment of protected rent ( zaštićena najamnina ) , the amount of which is set by the ORG and significantly lower than the market rent ; and better protection against termination of the lease .

The applicant refused to recognize ORG , who had been living in her flat since DATE , as a holder of a specially protected tenancy ( “ stanarsko pravo ” ) and to conclude a lease contract with her . On DATE ORG brought a civil action against the applicant before ORG ( PERSON građanski sud u GPE ) relying on sections CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ) of ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , seeking recognition of her legal status of a protected lessee and obtaining a judgment in lieu of the lease contract .

Shortly afterwards in DATE the applicant brought a counterclaim before the same court seeking to obtain a judgement ordering ORG and the members of her household to vacate the flat in question . She also sought that ORG be ordered to pay her CARDINAL NORP kunas ( HRK ) per month together with the accrued interest , for the period DATE . The applicant specified that the said amount represented her estimate of a freely negotiated rent ( “ slobodno ugovorena najamnina ” ) as provided by LAW and the Government of GPE ’s Decision on the determination of the level of freely negotiated rent ( ORG o utvrđivanju slobodno ugovorene najamnine , Official Gazette no . CARDINAL ) .

By a judgement of CARDINAL DATE ORG found in favour of ORG It recognised her legal status of a protected lessee and substituted the lease contract stipulating protected rent in the amount of HRK CARDINAL.CARDINAL per month . The court dismissed the applicant ’s counterclaim as unfounded .

On DATE ORG ( Županijski sud u GPE ) dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first - instance judgement , which thereby became final .

The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) alleging violations of her right to equality before the law guaranteed by LAW and of her ownership rights guaranteed by ORG , DATE and CARDINAL of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s constitutional complaint . This decision was served on the applicant ’s representative on DATE .

NORP The applicant submitted a document dated CARDINAL DATE from which it follows that the protected rent for her flat was set at HRK CARDINAL.CARDINAL . The ORG submitted a document dated DATE from which it follows that the protected rent was set at HRK CARDINAL .

According to the documents submitted by the parties , the applicant was not obliged to pay the condominium fee into the common reserve fund for the flat . That fee was incumbent on another individual .

According to the applicant , she never paid any income tax on the income generated by renting her flat subject to the protected lease scheme . The Government did not contest this information .

The applicant furnished information as regards the DATE market rent for renting out flats in the vicinity of hers . She submitted an advertisement from the Internet dated DATE offering for rent a flat of a similar size as hers ( CARDINAL m² ) for ORG CARDINAL per month , and another one dated DATE of CARDINAL ORG for ORG DATE . In addition to this she submitted a copy of a lease agreement of DATE for a flat with the surface area of CARDINAL ORG rented out for HRK CARDINAL per month .

The Government did not furnish any information in this respect .


CASE OF MILANKOVIĆ AND BOŠNJAK v. CROATIA

Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention;Reasonableness of pre-trial detention)

Julia Laffranque;Paul Lemmens;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Georges Ravarani;Ksenija Turković

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in NORP .

On DATE the ORG ( FAC Uprava Sisačko - moslavačka ; hereinafter : the “ police ” ) lodged a criminal complaint against the applicants and CARDINAL other person , alleging that in DATE and DATE they had committed war crimes against the civilian population in the area of NORP and PERSON .

Having collected extensive evidence in the course of the preliminary investigation , on DATE the GPE State Attorney ’s ORG ( GPE državno odvjetništvo u PERSON ) requested an investigating judge of ORG ( Županijski sud u GPE ) to open an investigation in respect of the applicants on suspicion of war crimes against the civilian population , as alleged in the criminal complaint lodged by the police .

The investigating judge questioned the applicants in connection with the request of the GPE State Attorney ’s ORG . Both applicants denied the allegations against them .

On DATE the investigating judge opened an investigation in respect of the applicants on suspicion of war crimes against the civilian population . The investigating judge found , on the basis of the available material , that there was a reasonable suspicion that the first applicant , acting in his capacity as commander of police combat units in the area of NORP , had ordered and carried out arbitrary arrests and ill - treatment of civilians , and that he had failed to prevent , supress and punish arbitrary arrests and searches and seizures , as well as ill - treatment and killings perpetrated by his subordinates . With regard to the second applicant , the investigating judge found that there was a reasonable suspicion that , as a member of a special police unit of the NORP police , he had organised a group which had carried out arbitrary arrests , ill - treatment and killings .

During the investigation the investigating judge heard evidence from the applicants and questioned numerous witnesses . He also obtained a number of relevant forensic reports on the crime - scene examinations , autopsies and ballistic expertise , and voluminous evidence and documentation concerning the actions of the police units in ORG at the relevant time .

On the basis of the evidence obtained during the investigation , on DATE the GPE State Attorney ’s Office indicted the applicants in ORG on charges of war crimes against the civilian population . The first applicant was charged with CARDINAL counts of arbitrary arrests , ill - treatment and the killing of civilians , and the second applicant with CARDINAL counts of ill - treatment and the killing of civilians . The relevant part of the indictment concerning the applicants’ participation in those events reads :

“ I. Defendant PERSON

in the period DATE and DATE , while defending the wider area of NORP and PERSON from armed attacks carried out by paramilitary formations of a part of the local NORP population and ORG in the conflict on the LAW and territorial integrity of GPE , ... as a commander of the police units in the wider area of NORP and PERSON ...

authorised thereby to give orders to all police units and responsible for [ securing ] compliance with and application of the laws of war and international humanitarian law relative to the protection of civilian persons on that territory and for the humane treatment of prisoners of war ,

aware that , due to the conflict and occupation of an important part of PERSON and the terrorising and expulsion of the non - NORP population from the occupied territories , intolerance towards the NORP citizens of NORP was growing , that the security situation in the city was ... extremely complex , that inter - ethnic relations were very tense , that there was a perception amongst the NORP and other non - NORP citizens of NORP that all NORP were collectively responsible for the war , ...

at the same time aware that the police units under his command were mostly composed of members of the local population affected by the suffering , that amongst the members of his subordinate police units there were some individuals who had been previously in conflict with the law , while the members of the reserve police units had not been instructed about or trained on all the obligations arising from the norms of international laws of war and humanitarian law ,

aware that in the NORP area members of his subordinate units frequently and without any legal basis carried out searches [ and seizures ] in the houses and flats of persons of NORP origin , ... who were , in the course of these unlawful actions , often arrested ...

although aware that the arrested persons were subjected to unlawful actions , that during questioning they were accused of collaboration with the enemy , offended , humiliated and coerced , that some of them were physically and psychologically ill - treated and that grave bodily injuries were inflicted on them , and that already on CARDINAL August CARDINAL , during CARDINAL such intervention ... PERSON [ was arrested and subsequently ] brutally beaten by a number of unknown members of the reserve police unit ... , and that the numerous injuries he had sustained led to his death TIME in the NORP hospital ,

although aware that in the above - noted circumstances , if he failed to take timely and adequate measures , the members of his subordinate units would continue their unlawful actions against the citizens of NORP of NORP origin and their inhumane treatment of prisoners of war ,

although under the commonly recognised rules of international laws of war and humanitarian customary law relative to the protection of civilian persons , and the command responsibility for the acts of subordinates in times of armed conflict , contrary to Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( a ) and ( c ) , CARDINAL , DATE , DATE and CARDINAL of the LAW relative to ORG in Time of War of DATE , Article CARDINAL § § CARDINAL and QUANTITY ( a ) and LAW to LAW of DATE , and relating to ORG DATE ( PERSON ) , Articles DATE and CARDINAL of the LAW additional to LAW of CARDINAL DATE , and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts ( Protocol I ) and LAW ( a ) and ( c ) and LAW relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of DATE , he was required to take measures to prevent , supress and punish such unlawful actions , he failed to do so . On the contrary , by using his authority as commander of the police units , he prevented the taking of necessary measures to identify the direct perpetrators and thereby condoned the unlawful actions of his subordinates and encouraged them to take such actions , accepting that they would continue with their actions and condoning their consequences . Meanwhile he also personally participated in ill - treatment and attacks on certain civilians and ordered the unlawful detention of a number of civilians of NORP origin ...

II . Defendant PERSON

in DATE , ... , as a member of the special police unit PERSON of ORG , together with , at present , unknown members of that unit , ... , in order to carry out coercion and revenge on citizens of NORP origin , contrary to LAW ( a ) and ( c ) , CARDINAL , DATE and CARDINAL of the LAW relative to ORG in Time of War of DATE , Article CARDINAL § § CARDINAL and CARDINAL ( a ) and LAW to LAW of DATE , and relating to ORG DATE ( PERSON ) , organised and led a group of unknown members of the said unit with whom he carried out unlawful arrests , ill - treatment and the killing of persons of NORP origin ... ”

The applicants objected to the indictment . On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG confirmed the existence of a reasonable suspicion that they had committed the offences listed in the indictment , and sent the case to trial .

At a hearing held on CARDINAL DATE before ORG the applicants pleaded not guilty to the charges .

In the further course of the proceedings a number of hearings were held before ORG , notably on DATE ; CARDINAL and DATE ; CARDINAL - CARDINAL and DATE ; CARDINAL and DATE ; CARDINAL , DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE ; as well as on DATE and DATE ; DATE ; DATE ; CARDINAL and DATE ; CARDINAL DATE ; DATE ; and DATE . Several witnesses were questioned and voluminous evidence was examined .

The closing hearing was held on DATE . By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG found the first applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment . It acquitted the second applicant on the grounds of lack of evidence .

The first applicant challenged the first - instance judgment before ORG ( PERSON ) , alleging a number of substantive and procedural flaws . The GPE State Attorney ’s ORG also lodged an appeal before ORG , challenging the acquittal of the second applicant and complaining that the sentence given to the first applicant was lenient .

On DATE ORG upheld the acquittal of the second applicant and increased the first applicant ’s sentence to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment . The judgment of ORG thereby became final .

On DATE the applicants were arrested in connection with the criminal complaint lodged against them by the police ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the investigating judge ordered the applicants’ pre - trial detention for DATE under LAW ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( risk of collusion and gravity of charges ) . The relevant part of the decision reads :

“ As an investigation has been opened in respect of the defendants concerning the offences at issue , the general condition [ related to the existence of reasonable suspicion ] for ordering detention against ... the second defendant PERSON and the third defendant PERSON has been met .

A request for the questioning of CARDINAL witnesses has been made . Most of these witnesses live in the NORP area and most of them still work or have worked as police officers ... who were subordinate to the second defendant PERSON . Specifically , in the period at issue the second defendant PERSON was a deputy to the Chief of ORG ... and the real commander of the entire police force [ in the NORP area ] . The records of the police interviews show that several witnesses who should be questioned [ during the investigation ] are in fear of the second defendant because they gave statements concerning the impugned actions ... and the second defendant was their superior in the period at issue . Furthermore , amongst the witnesses – including victims who have been ill - treated or are family members of the victims , there is a fear of the defendant and the available material in the case file shows that the witnesses have been threatened ... There is therefore a risk of collusion , [ that is to say a risk ] that the defendant could , if at large , hinder the investigation by influencing the witnesses . Thus detention under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW is justified .

Furthermore , since the defendant ... has been charged with individual and command responsibility for the unlawful deprivation of liberty and ill - treatment of CARDINAL civilians of NORP origin and the killing of CARDINAL persons of NORP origin from the NORP area , all of which was perpetrated in a particularly brutal manner , including entire families irrespective of the sex or age [ of the victims ] , and in view of the fact that the criminal offence at issue carries a sentence of PERCENT twelve years’ imprisonment , and also the circumstances described in [ the decision on opening of the investigation ] , ... it follows that detention under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW is justified .

Detention under LAW ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW is also justified in respect of the third defendant PERSON . ... A number of witnesses who should be questioned during the investigation , and who were members of unit ORG , have given different statements about the [ relevant ] events from those given by the defendant ... which suggests that there is a risk that if at large he could hinder the conduct of the investigation by influencing these witnesses ...

The same circumstances which have been stated above concerning the first and the second defendants accordingly apply to the third defendant with regard to the existence of a risk that if at large they could continue with threats to the mentioned witnesses , who have already been threatened several times concerning their statements against the defendants in the proceedings at issue . Thus the detention under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW is justified .

In respect of the third defendant , reasons for detention under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW also exist .

In particular , he is suspected of individual responsibility in the commission of war crimes against the civilian population and arbitrary arrests , ill - treatment and the killing of CARDINAL families PERSON . and T. in a highly brutal manner . The description of the offences [ referred to in the decision on opening of the investigation ] suggests that the circumstances of the offences were particularly serious . The offences were motivated by revenge and ethnic discrimination and were committed in a highly brutal manner against civilians and entire families ... Detention under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW is therefore justified . ”

The applicants appealed against the decision of the investigating judge before a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG , arguing that it lacked the relevant reasoning .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed the ORG appeals as unfounded , endorsing the reasoning of the investigating judge . In particular it noted the following :

“ There is therefore a reasonable suspicion that the defendants committed the offences alleged [ in the decision on opening of the investigation ] and thus the general condition for ordering pre - trial detention under LAW has been met . The impugned decision contains sufficient reasoning as to the existence of a reasonable suspicion , and the appeal arguments , concerning the manner in which the offences were committed or the extent of the criminal wrongdoing relate to something which will be examined during the proceedings . At this stage of the proceedings the existence of a reasonable suspicion is a sufficient condition for ordering pre - trial detention ... and when examining an appeal against the decision ordering detention , the second - instance court is not authorised to examine the facts with regard to the actual existence of the offences at issue or the criminal responsibility of the perpetrator .

The justification for pre - trial detention under LAW ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW in respect of the defendants follows from the material in the case file . In this respect the impugned decision provided relevant and detailed reasons , which this second - instance panel accepts .

Furthermore , the appeal arguments that in the case at issue the same purpose of the detention could be achieved by CARDINAL of the alternative measures under LAW can not be accepted ...

On DATE the investigating judge extended the applicants’ detention for a further DATE under LAW ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( risk of collusion and gravity of charges ) . He found that some more witnesses needed to be questioned and that some of them had been threatened with regard to their statements in the criminal proceedings at issue . The investigating judge also reiterated the previous findings concerning the gravity of the charges against the applicants .

The applicants appealed against that decision and on CARDINAL DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed their appeals as ill - founded , reiterating its previous arguments .

The applicants challenged that decision , arguing that their continued detention was not justified . On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed their appeals as ill - founded , endorsing the findings of the investigating judge .

On DATE the first applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) , contending that his pre - trial detention was not based on relevant and sufficient reasons .

On DATE ORG dismissed the first applicant ’s constitutional complaint , endorsing the reasoning of ORG . ORG in particular stressed :

“ ORG reiterates its opinion , on which the appellant relies in his constitutional complaint , that the mere existence of a ‘ reasonable suspicion’ is not sufficient after a certain lapse of time to justify pre - trial detention . It is necessary in such instances , ( even under ) the case - law of ORG [ of Human Rights ] , to ascertain the conditions for a possibility [ of detention ] : a ) the existence of ‘ relevant and sufficient’ reasons justifying [ the detention ] , and b ) whether the competent criminal justice authorities displayed the necessary diligence in the conduct of the proceedings . ...

Since LAW ) of LAW does not explicitly provide for a legitimate aim of detention , as provided for in the other relevant provisions on detention , it is particularly important that the competent criminal justice authorities correctly establish the necessity of applying LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ...

In view of the findings of ORG , and taking into account the sentence of imprisonment which can be imposed in this specific case , as well as the gravity of the charges , ORG finds that the decisions of the investigating judge and the CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG comply with the relevant opinions and requirements when extending the pre - trial detention under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ... ”

Following the filing of the indictment against the applicants in ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , on DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of that court extended the first applicant ’s detention pending trial under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( gravity of charges ) . The relevant part of the decision reads :

“ There is a reasonable suspicion ( and therefore the existence of the general condition for pre - trial detention ) that the accused PERSON and PERSON committed the [ war crimes against the civilian population ] . ...

The second condition [ for detention ] under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW has also been met . This follows from the indictment against the accused PERSON and PERSON , which describes the physical and mental ill - treatment of the detained civilians , who were beaten until they lost consciousness , subjected to such brutality as to cause bodily harm , arbitrary arrests and beatings . [ The accused are suspected of ] shooting and bombing family houses , locking civilians in basements without windows or light , taking civilians to unknown locations and shooting them or killing them with hard or sharp objects , and the killing of the entire PERSON family and part of the PERSON family out of revenge and ethnic discrimination ... Therefore both defendants are suspected of particular cruelty and mercilessness ... , which , in view of the number of [ victims ] and the consequences of such conduct , the impugned offences in their entirety significantly surpass the usual circumstances pertinent to such grave offences . This justifies detention under LAW § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW in respect of the accused PERSON and PERSON ...

The preventive measures [ under LAW ] , in view of the specific circumstances of the offences at issue , could not achieve the purpose of detention ... ”

The first applicant appealed against that decision to ORG ( PERSON ) , challenging the necessity of and the lack of relevant and sufficient reasons for his continued detention .

On DATE ORG dismissed the first applicant ’s appeal , upholding the decision of ORG . The relevant part of the decision reads :

“ The impugned conduct of both accused , which includes ill - treatment and other extreme forms of inhumane treatment of civilians , and in the case of the accused PERSON also of prisoners of war , some of whom were killed , as well as the failure to prevent such conduct by [ PERSON subordinates ] ... suggests a particularly high level of brutality , mercilessness and unimaginable cruelty . Taking also into account that the seriousness of the impugned conduct of both accused on account of its intensity , recurrence and modality , as well as the period in which it took place , significantly surpasses the usual circumstances and consequences of such offences , which are in themselves particularly grave , [ ORG finds ] that the circumstances of the offence are particularly grave [ justifying detention ] under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW .

The appellate arguments of both accused that the purpose of detention could be achieved by alternative preventive measures can not be accepted ... as there is public interest justifying the restriction of the accused ’s right to personal liberty , guaranteed under LAW and LAW . The fact that the impugned offences took place DATE does not diminish their gravity and their moral public condemnation ... In particular , the conclusion as to the existence of particularly grave circumstances [ of the offences ] follows from the specific facts and the conduct with which the accused are charged , and they significantly surpass the usual circumstances related to the commission of such offences .

The appellate arguments challenging the existence of a reasonable suspicion , and the assessment of evidence , are not relevant for the decision on detention , as at this stage of the proceedings the existence of a reasonable suspicion follows from the indictment . The second - instance panel , when examining an appeal against a decision on detention , can not examine the factual findings or the criminal responsibility of the accused . ”

The first applicant challenged the decision of ORG by lodging a constitutional complaint with ORG . He argued that his continued detention had been arbitrary and contrary to LAW and the Convention .

On DATE ORG dismissed the first applicant’

“ ORG accepts the findings of ORG ... that detention is justified by the public interest in the case . ORG correctly stated that the fact that the impugned offences took place DATE does not diminish their gravity or their moral public condemnation ... ”

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG extended the first applicant ’s detention under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( gravity of charges ) , reiterating its previous arguments .


Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention;Reasonableness of pre-trial detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing;Adversarial trial;Equality of arms);Non-pecuniary damage - award

Dmitry Dedov;Erik Møse;Georgieva;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE . Prior to his arrest and detention , which gave rise to the case at issue , the applicant worked as a police officer in FAC uprava Osječko - baranjska ) .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of conspiracy and abuse of power and authority .

The following day he was brought before an investigating judge ( sudac istrage ) of ORG ( Županijski sud u GPE ) who ordered that he be placed in pre - trial detention ( istražni zatvor ) for a further DATE under LAW ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( risk of collusion and risk of reoffending ) or , alternatively , released on bail , which was set at CARDINAL NORP kunas ( HRK ) . The judge held that the applicant ’s detention was necessary because some further physical evidence had to be collected , and in order to prevent him from coordinating his defence with the second suspect , who was still at large . She also considered that there was a risk that the applicant might suborn witnesses and , given and his employment as a police officer , that he might reoffend .

On DATE the State Attorney ’s Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime ( Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta ; hereinafter : the “ ORG Attorney ’s Office ” ) opened an investigation against the applicant and CARDINAL others persons in connection with suspected conspiracy and abuse of power and authority .

The applicant and ORG also lodged appeals against the investigating judge ’s decision on the applicant ’s detention . The applicant challenged the reasons for his pre - trial detention while the State Attorney ’s Office challenged the part of the investigating judge ’s decision allowing for the applicant ’s conditional release on bail .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG allowed the appeal of ORG and reversed the investigating judge ’s decision allowing for the applicant’detaining the applicant was the only way to prevent the risk of collusion and reoffending .

On DATE the same CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed the applicant’ate his defence with the second suspect , who was still at large , and that he might interfere with the seizure of further physical evidence and suborn CARDINAL witnesses ( NORP , ORG , ORG , GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE , PERSON and PERSON ) who worked as police officers in FAC . It also endorsed the investigating judge ’s finding as to the possibility of the applicant ’s reoffending .

On DATE the State Attorney ’s ORG requested the investigating judge to extend the applicant ’s pre - trial detention on the grounds of the risk of collusion and risk of reoffending , relying on the same grounds on which the applicant had initially been detained .

The investigating judge extended on DATE the applicant ’s pre - trial detention for DATE under LAW ) of LAW ( risk of collusion ) and dismissed the request to extend his detention under LAW ) of LAW ( risk of reoffending ) . She held that there were sufficient reasons to believe that , if at large , the applicant could suborn witnesses and coordinate his defence with the second suspect , who still had not been apprehended . However , the judge found that in the meantime the applicant had been suspended from service and therefore she considered that there was no longer a risk that he might reoffend .

The decision of the investigating judge was upheld by a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG on DATE .

At a detention hearing on DATE the State Attorney ’s ORG again motioned for the extension of the applicant ’s detention . The applicant objected , pointing out that there was sufficient time for the questioning of the witnesses and that it was no longer necessary to keep him in detention .

The investigating judge accepted the request of ORG and extended the applicant ’s detention for DATE under LAW ) of LAW ( risk of collusion ) reiterating the arguments that there was a risk that the applicant might suborn witnesses and coordinate his defence with the second suspect .

The applicant appealed against this decision , and on DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG allowed his appeal and remitted the case to the investigating judge for re - examination but without releasing the applicant from detention . It held that the decision lacked the relevant reasoning as it was not clear whom exactly the applicant might suborn and under what circumstances .

At a detention hearing on DATE the applicant pointed out that his detention depended on the questioning of witnesses whom the State Attorney ’s ORG had had sufficient time to question and that there was no reason to believe that he might suborn the second suspect . He also asked the investigating judge to examine the possibility of his conditional release under preventive measures .

The investigating judge extended the applicant ’s detention for a further DATE under LAW ) of LAW ( risk of collusion ) . She pointed out that in fact it had been necessary to question CARDINAL witnesses ( PERSON , PERSON , T.P. , GPE , GPE , GPE and DATE noted above in paragraph CARDINAL ; and CARDINAL others , ORG and ORG . ) who worked as police officers in FAC and that there was a risk that the applicant might suborn them . However , the judge dismissed the request to keep the applicant in detention on the grounds that he might coordinate his defence with the second suspect , who was still at large , holding that he had given his defence and therefore there was no risk that he might coordinate it with the second suspect . The judge noted that :

“ .. all the suspects have given their defence so there is no risk that , if at large , they could coordinate their defences with the second suspect , and the fact that they might be questioned as suspects again during the proceedings is not a reason to extend their detention now under LAW § CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW with regard to the second suspect ... ”

The applicant appealed against that decision , arguing that the investigating judge had failed to show that he might suborn the witnesses .

On DATE at a detention hearing ORG asked the investigating judge to extend the applicant ’s detention on the grounds that he might suborn the above - mentioned CARDINAL witnesses ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . It also considered , pointing out that a number of witnesses had to be questioned and that a considerable amount of other evidence had to be taken during the investigation , that the investigation had not lasted an unreasonably long time .

The investigating judge accepted the request and extended the applicant ’s detention for DATE under LAW ) of LAW ( risk of collusion ) on the grounds that there was a danger that he might suborn the witnesses . She also considered that the danger of his suborning the witnesses could not be averted by the application of preventive measures .

The applicant appealed against this decision and on DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed his appeal as ill - founded .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against the investigating judge ’s decision of DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL above ) as ill - founded .

On DATE the State Attorney ’s ORG ( ORG odvjetništvo PERSON ) extended the investigation , based on a proposal made by the lower ORG Attorney ’s Office conducting the proceedings , for a further DATE on the grounds that it was necessary to question a number of witnesses and take other evidence and to request international assistance in obtaining the relevant information .

At a detention hearing on DATE the applicant contended that there had been sufficient time for ORG to question the witnesses against him and asked the investigating judge to order that the witnesses be questioned without any further delay .

The investigating judge extended the applicant ’s detention for a further DATE under LAW ) of LAW ( risk of collusion ) reiterating the same reasoning that the applicant might suborn the CARDINAL witnesses referred to above and holding that his detention could not be replaced by preventive measures .

On an unspecified date in DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision , arguing that there had been more than sufficient time to question the witnesses and that his detention was no longer reasonable and justified .

On DATE the applicant submitted a request asking the investigating judge to order the State Attorney ’s Office to question the QUANTITY witnesses , pointing out that he had already been detained for DATE and that the witnesses had still not been questioned . He also argued that his detention had been ordered and extended only in relation to the questioning of those witnesses and no action had been taken in that respect .

On DATE the investigating judge accepted the applicant ’s request and ordered the ORG Attorney ’s ORG to question the witnesses within DATE . In her order , the judge noted :

“ The suspect PERSON has been detained since DATE and his detention was extended [ several times ] based on the decisions of this court .

Bearing in mind that the suspect has been detained for DATE , and that throughout that period the ORG Attorney ’s ORG has repeatedly relied on the need to question those very witnesses , it is beyond doubt that in the said period those witnesses could have been questioned .

Since in the period at issue the above - mentioned witnesses have not been questioned and the suspect PERSON has been detained [ for the entire time ] it is necessary to question the witnesses promptly . This is because detention is a measure of last resort and as such it must be reduced to a minimum while all procedural actions must be taken without delay .

This judge considers that a time - limit of DATE is sufficient for the questioning of the witnesses since there are CARDINAL of them . ”

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against the decision on his detention of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL above ) , reiterating the arguments they had used to order the applicant ’s detention pending the questioning of the witnesses .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) against the decision of the CARDINAL - judge panel of DATE dismissing his appeal against the decision on his detention of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) and against the decision of a CARDINAL - judge panel of CARDINAL DATE dismissing his appeal against the decision on his detention of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The applicant argued that his detention was arbitrary , since although the investigating judge had found that the witnesses could be questioned within DATE , he had been detained on the ground that they needed questioning for DATE .

On an unspecified date in DATE the applicant lodged a further constitutional complaint against the decision of the CARDINAL - judge panel of DATE dismissing his appeal against the decision on his detention of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , reiterating the same reasoning .

On DATE ORG declared the applicant ’s constitutional complaint of DATE inadmissible on the grounds that in the meantime , on DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) , a new decision on the applicant ’s detention had been adopted and that he was no longer detained in connection with the decisions complained of .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s constitutional complaint against the decision of the CARDINAL - judge panel of DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) as ill - founded , endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts .

In the meantime , the State Attorney ’s ORG complied with the order of the investigating judge of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) and questioned CARDINAL of the CARDINAL witnesses in DATE ( on DATE ) and the remaining one on DATE . On DATE it applied for the extension of the applicant ’s detention under LAW § CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ( risk of collusion ) on the grounds that he could coordinate his defence with the second suspect , who was still at large .

On DATE the applicant requested to be released from detention , arguing that no relevant reasons for keeping him in custody existed .

A hearing concerning the applicant ’s request was held on DATE , at which the applicant reiterated his arguments and the Deputy ORG Attorney pointed out that the second suspect was still at large and that the prosecuting authorities were doing their utmost to apprehend him . She therefore considered that the applicant should be kept in detention in order to prevent him from coordinating his defence with the second suspect .

The investigating judge dismissed the applicant ’s request for release on the grounds that the applicant could contact the second suspect and that they could coordinate their defences . The relevant part of the decision reads :

“ The second suspect is still at large and he has had contact with the fifth suspect , PERSON , which means that the fifth suspect , if released , could get in touch with the second suspect , which would allow them to coordinate their defences and to obstruct the conduct of the proceedings . ”

A further detention hearing was held on DATE , at which the applicant pointed out that he had been detained on the sole ground that he might suborn the witnesses , while no other reason , in particular the possibility of his coordinating his defence with the second suspect , had been adduced , and that it was only now , after the witnesses had been questioned , that an extension of his detention was requested on the ground that he might collude with the second suspect . The applicant considered that that was not possible , because according to the available information the second suspect lived in GPE and , given the media coverage of the proceedings at issue , it was unlikely that he would come to GPE . The applicant therefore asked the investigating judge , if she considered that there was a possibility of them contacting each other , to release him on condition that his passport be seized and other preventive measures which would prevent him from contacting the second suspect be applied if necessary .

NORP The investigating judge extended the applicant ’s pre - trial detention for a further DATE under LAW ) of LAW ( risk of collusion ) on the grounds that there was a danger that he might contact the second accused . The relevant part of the decision reads :

“ As regards the fifth suspect [ PERSON ] and the sixth suspect , the investigating judge finds that a risk of collusion with the second suspect , ORG , who is at large , still exists . The defence arguments that the detention could be replaced by preventive measures and that ORG is a citizen of GPE and has not come to GPE since DATE are of no relevance at this stage of the proceedings . It should be noted that that the suspects at issue were police officers who most certainly knew a lot of people and could therefore easily get in touch with the second suspect , ORG This risk could not be averted by the seizure of their passports , because they could travel to certain countries with their identity cards alone and could easily meet the second suspect somewhere else . The analysis of the telephone conversations shows that the fifth suspect [ PERSON ] previously contacted the second suspect and that therefore he more or less knows where to find him and how to reach him , while the sixth suspect is his colleague and friend , and [ therefore ] they could both get in touch with the second suspect without difficulty . That risk can be averted only by their detention and therefore the conditions under LAW ) of LAW have been met . ”

The applicant appealed against that decision and on DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed his appeal as ill - founded , endorsing the reasoning of the investigating judge .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against that decision and on DATE ORG dismissed it as ill - founded , endorsing the arguments of the lower courts .

On DATE a detention hearing was held at which the parties reiterated their previous arguments . The investigating judge extended the applicant ’s detention for a further DATE under LAW ) of LAW ( risk of collusion ) , or alternatively , set bail for his release at HRK CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL . The judge held that there was a risk that the applicant would contact the second suspect , which warranted his detention . He could , however , be released on bail , the amount of ’s personal situation , namely , the fact that he was in employment , owned property and had a family who could support him financially .

The applicant appealed against that decision , arguing that there were no relevant reasons to keep him in detention and that the amount set for bail was excessive .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed his appeal as ill - founded , endorsing the reasoning of the investigating judge .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against that decision with ORG , arguing that the lower courts had failed to provide relevant and sufficient reasons for his detention .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s constitutional complaint as ill - founded , endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG extended the applicant ’s detention for a further DATE under Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ( risk of collusion ) and set bail for his release at HRK CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL . It held that there was a risk that the applicant might contact the second suspect and that they could coordinate their defences . It also considered that the risk could be averted by the deposit of bail in an amount which corresponded to the circumstances of the offence and the fact that the applicant was employed and had a regular income .

The applicant appealed against that decision to ORG ( PERSON ) , reiterating his previous arguments and asking that his detention be replaced with preventive measures .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision of the CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG extending the applicant ’s detention and remitted the case for re - examination but without releasing the applicant from detention . ORG held that ORG had not given consideration to the possibility of imposing less severe preventive measures on the applicant and that the amount of bail requested for his release had been excessive .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG again extended the applicant ’s detention under LAW ) of LAW ( risk of collusion ) on the grounds that the applicant could contact the second applicable preventive measures .

On DATE the State Attorney ’s Office indicted the applicant and CARDINAL other persons in ORG on the charges of conspiracy and abuse of power and authority . The State Attorney ’s Office also requested that the applicant be kept in detention pending trial .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal with ORG challenging the decision of ORG of DATE extending his detention , arguing that ORG had failed to comply with the instructions provided in ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE ORG accepted the applicant ’s appeal and , without releasing the applicant from detention , remitted the case to ORG for re - examination on the grounds that the decision of ORG lacked the relevant reasoning .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG released the applicant from detention on condition that he refrain from contacting the second accused and ordered the seizure of his travel documents . It held that the applicant had been detained for DATE whereas it was uncertain when , and indeed if , the second accused would be arrested . It also found that the applicant ’s financial situation was not secure , as he was a divorced father of CARDINAL and was without employment or income . Therefore , there were no grounds to request that bail be posted for his release .

The State Attorney ’s ORG lodged an appeal against that decision , arguing that the applicant should be kept in detention and on DATE ORG dismissed the appeal as ill - founded , endorsing the reasoning of ORG .

The criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending .

Parallel to the criminal proceedings , on DATE the Chief of the GPE - baranja ORG ordered the applicant ’s suspension from duty pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings .

On an unspecified date in DATE the applicant , represented by a lawyer , challenged that decision before an appeal panel of ORG ( GPE unutarnjih poslova PERSON ) , arguing that there had been no reason for his suspension .

On DATE the appeal panel of ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal as ill - founded . The relevant part of the decision reads :

“ The suspension was ordered under LAW ) of LAW , which provides that the minister or a commanding officer , which is in the case at issue the Chief of ORG , can order the suspension of a police officer even before disciplinary proceedings have been opened ... when he or she considers that the breach of duty at issue is of such a nature that keeping the police officer on duty could harm the interests of the service .

Taking into account the circumstances of the present case , namely , the reasonable suspicion that the appellant had abused [ his ] power and authority , for which reason he was arrested , this panel considers that the first - instance body correctly and lawfully suspended him from service under LAW of LAW ... ”

Through his lawyer the applicant lodged an administrative action against that decision with ORG ( PERSON ) challenging the reasons for his suspension and arguing that the decisions of the lower bodies had not been sufficiently reasoned .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer submitted further written observations on the merits of the case and requested that a hearing scheduled for DATE be adjourned until the applicant ’s release from detention .

On DATE ORG held a hearing in the absence of the applicant and his representative and dismissed the applicant ’s administrative action as ill - founded . It found that the request for the adjournment of the hearing had been no more than an attempt to delay the proceedings and that the applicant ’s representative , although duly informed , had failed to appear at the hearing without providing any relevant reasons . As to the merits of the case , ORG noted :

“ There is no dispute between the parties that the plaintiff was suspended due to a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a grave breach of his official duty .

The dispute between the parties relates to the question of whether the defendant [ had the right to ] suspend the plaintiff from duty on the basis of the reasonable suspicion alone .

... [ T]he fact that the plaintiff has been remanded in custody on a reasonable suspicion that he has committed an offence under LAW ( abuse of power and authority ) justifies the decision of the defendant , because the placing of a police officer in detention for the offence at issue could be damaging for the interests of the service and therefore his suspension is justified . ”

Through his lawyer the applicant lodged an appeal with ORG ( ORG upravni sud PERSON ) and on CARDINAL DATE that court declared his appeal inadmissible on the grounds that ORG had not itself decided on the merits of the applicant ’s rights and obligations but only dismissed his administrative action .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer lodged a constitutional complaint on behalf of the applicant with ORG , challenging the lower courts’ decisions .

On DATE ORG declared the applicant ’s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill - founded .