Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Reasonableness of pre-trial detention)

Branko Lubarda;Georgios A. Serghides;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE ORG in GPE remanded the applicant in custody on the charge of fraud . Subsequently ORG extended the applicant ’s detention on DATE and on DATE , DATE , CARDINAL May and DATE . Each time ORG attached preponderant weight to the gravity of the charges against the applicant . On DATE and CARDINAL DATE ORG rejected the appeals against the detention orders of DATE and CARDINAL DATE , respectively .

ORG authorised further extensions of the applicant ’s detention on DATE and DATE . ORG rejected his appeals on DATE and DATE , respectively .

On DATE the case was submitted for trial . On DATE , DATE and DATE and DATE and DATE ORG in GPE prolonged the applicant ’s detention pending trial , referring mainly to the gravity of the charges . The most recent extension order was issued for the period until DATE .

DATE and DATE the applicant was detained in the IZ-CARDINAL/CARDINAL remand prison in GPE . The prison was filled beyond the design capacity and cells were severely overcrowded . He was later transferred to another remand prison in GPE .


Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)

George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Päivi Hirvelä;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE at CARDINAL household workers ( “ GPE ” and “ ORG ” ) discovered the body of the applicant ’s daughter ( “ PERSON ) at her home in GPE . She had a rope around her neck , the other end of which was thrown over the top of a door and tied to the door handle on the other side .

At CARDINAL GPE and GPE reported the incident to GPE and ORG of ORG ( “ the GPE State Police ” ) . CARDINAL police officers from ORG were dispatched to PERSON ’s home . PERSON ’s husband ( “ PERSON ” ) , who worked as a policeman - driver for ORG , arrived separately .

The Government have provided details of the investigation which followed . Their account has not been disputed by the applicant .

From CARDINAL to CARDINAL officers G.A. and ORG from ORG examined PERSON ’s home . They prepared the procedural record , photographed the scene and seized material evidence . DATE PERSON ’s body was transported to FAC and ORG requested an autopsy and forensic medical examination of the body . He also submitted an internal report to the Head of ORG which stated that he and PERSON had arrived at the scene , established that PERSON was dead , arranged for the transportation of the body , examined the scene , and took statements . In the report he noted that the persons transporting PERSON ’s body to the morgue had removed the rope from around her neck .

In a letter dated DATE a Prosecutor from ORG admitted to the applicant that the examination of the scene by ORG had not been done “ qualitatively ” or in compliance with the requirements of LAW . He had been subjected to disciplinary action and prosecuted under LAW ) and under LAW ) ( Forgery of a Document by a State Official ) . The second prosecution would appear to relate to the forgery of a Doctor ’s signature on a document purporting to set out an expert ’s conclusion . ORG was later released from criminal liability .

In the same letter the Prosecutor from ORG informed the applicant that another officer from ORG ( “ TIME ” ) had been subjected to disciplinary action for violating LAW when verifying the fact of PERSON ’s death . It is not clear whether or not the disciplinary action related to the examination of the scene on DATE .

On DATE the police took statements from the applicant and PERSON ’s sister ( “ ORG ) , both of whom expressed the opinion that PERSON had no reason to commit suicide .

On DATE a forensic expert , having examined PERSON ’s body , concluded that she had died on DATE and attributed the cause of death to mechanical asphyxiation . The report stated that there was no evident sign of violence , aside from the strangulation , although it noted that PERSON had bruises on her shoulder , hands and legs and CARDINAL scratches on her right palm which could have been acquired DATE prior to her death .

The following day the police obtained statements from a neighbour ( “ ORG ” ) and CARDINAL of PERSON ’s colleagues . PERSON recalled that CARDINAL on DATE she had observed a red vehicle similar to the one driven by PERSON parked in the courtyard of the building where PERSON and PERSON lived . Another neighbour ( “ PERSON . N. ” ) subsequently recalled seeing such a vehicle in the courtyard from CARDINAL to CARDINAL .

S.J. ’s colleagues confirmed that she had finished her shift in the shop she worked in at CARDINAL and headed to an office where she had a second job as a cleaner . Another witness later confirmed that she had arrived at the office at CARDINAL and left at CARDINAL CARDINAL .

The Government submitted that on DATE ORG of ORG ( “ the OCCD ” ) requested a list of incoming and outgoing calls to PERSON ’s mobile phone from her operator .

On DATE the son of PERSON and PERSON ( “ Av . J. ” ) made a statement . He said that PERSON had picked him up at home at CARDINAL on DATE . He had remained with his father until TIME , when his father returned to work and he went to the home of his sister ( “ D.J. ” ) . A colleague of PERSON later reported going with him to the cafeteria in the police station at CARDINAL and the chief officer on duty that TIME confirmed that PERSON had remained with the squad until his shift ended at CARDINAL on DATE . He also told the investigators that after TIME the police station was locked and the main gate closed , with the consequence that no person DATE or vehicle DATE could leave the LOC without his permission .

On DATE Officer A.M. performed a further examination of PERSON ’s home . He examined marks and traces left by the rope on the door and seized several samples for forensic traceology examination .

On DATE a household worker gave a statement to the police confirming that on DATE PERSON had returned home at CARDINAL to collect Av . J. On DATE PERSON confirmed that PERSON and ORG J. had arrived at her home at TIME .

On DATE ORG reported that the groove marks on the upper fragment of the door had been chafed into the wooden surface by the rope attached to PERSON ’s neck . MONEY could only have been made by pulling the weight of PERSON ’s body towards the door handle , to which the rope was subsequently tied .

On DATE the ORG initiated criminal proceedings to investigate the aggravated murder ( murder with mercenary intent ) of PERSON From this point onwards , Inspector PERSON of the ORG was responsible for the investigation under the supervision of ORG . PERSON was the Prosecutor in charge and he reported to PERSON , who was the supervising Prosecutor .

On DATE PERSON was interrogated as a suspect and he was informed that he could not change his registered place of domicile . Av . J. , PERSON and GPE were questioned as witnesses .

DATE , ORG and PERSON . N. were again interviewed about the red vehicle parked in the courtyard of PERSON ’s home . Both indicated that they had believed the vehicle to be the one driven by PERSON

NORP Throughout DATE witnesses were interviewed , including PERSON ( who was questioned repeatedly ) , his relatives and acquaintances , PERSON ’s relatives ( including the applicant ) , the couple ’s neighbours , a number of police officers , PERSON ’s employer and some of her colleagues , her household workers and her dentist . ORG also instructed the ORG to order further forensic tests , although records indicate that many were in fact ordered by ORG .

Attempts were made to establish the exact time of death but on DATE the forensic expert indicated that “ considering that the forensic medical examination of PERSON ’s body had been performed DATE after it was found and that livor mortis appears within TIME of death , a more precise time of death could not be established ” .

PERSON ’s uniform and the seat covers of his service car were seized on DATE and DNA samples were taken from him . On DATE the expert reported that there were several different DNA samples on the rope used to hang PERSON but none belonged to PERSON The expert was unable to establish the gender identification of the samples . On DATE an expert concluded that some fibres found on PERSON ’s coat possibly came from PERSON ’s car seat but the results were inconclusive .

Further tests were also carried out on PERSON ’s body , but no injuries were found which would indicate a struggle or self - defence .

Furthermore , ORG bank records were requested , as were details of all red vehicles matching the description of the one seen at the scene of the crime . PERSON ’s family members were also questioned repeatedly about whether or not she had kept a personal diary . On DATE the diary appears to have been handed over to the police and attached to the criminal file .

On DATE a further forensic traceology report suggested that there was a “ high probability ” that if PERSON had committed suicide the grooves on the top of the door would not have appeared as they did .

On DATE PERSON was again declared a suspect . Further DNA tests were performed on the rope and experiments were carried out to determine the driving time from FAC to LOC home . The results of the latter test appeared to confirm PERSON ’s alibi and on CARDINAL DATE the decision to once again declare him a suspect was quashed .

On DATE a new ORG investigator ( “ GPE . ) assumed jurisdiction over the case file .

On DATE the ORG acknowledged PERSON ( the applicant ’s granddaughter ) as a victim in the criminal proceedings .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant wrote to the Head of the ORG alleging that PERSON had been murdered . The PERSON informed the applicant on DATE that the circumstances of PERSON ’s death were still being investigated .

The applicant subsequently submitted further complaints to ORG concerning the conduct of the investigation . In the course of these complaints , he implied that PERSON was directly or indirectly implicated in PERSON ’s murder and that his colleagues on the police force were deliberately obstructing the investigation .

On DATE . , a senior Prosecutor of the Prosecutor ’s Office attached to ORG , informed the applicant that an in - depth investigation was being carried out . It was being conducted in an impartial manner and there was no evidence of any deliberate obstruction by the police . GPE . noted that the investigation was complicated and was supervised by another prosecutor from the same office ( “ PERSON ) .

On DATE a Prosecutor from ORG informed the applicant that the investigation was still ongoing and that the evidence which had been gathered was not sufficient to bring charges against any specific persons . The Prosecutor admitted that ORG had not carried out the initial examination of the scene of PERSON ’s death “ qualitatively ” , that both PERSON and DATE had violated the requirements of the laws on criminal procedure and that the CARDINAL officers had received disciplinary penalties . In addition , criminal proceedings had been initiated against ORG for criminal inaction of a ORG official ( section CARDINAL of LAW ) and for the forgery of official documents ( section CARDINAL of LAW ) . However , on DATE ORG attached to ORG had decided to release PERSON from criminal liability pursuant to LAW .

On DATE the applicant wrote to PERSON , the supervising Prosecutor , and asked to see certain expert reports and other specific information concerning the investigation into PERSON ’s death . More particularly , he asked for additional information concerning the violations committed by the police officers PERSON and ORG He also enquired when the case would be sent to a court .

On DATE the Prosecutor replied to the applicant . He informed him that the pre - trial investigation was still ongoing and a forensic biological analysis of DNA was being carried out . Further investigative steps would be planned after receiving the results of that analysis and it was therefore impossible to predict the date of the completion of the pre - trial investigation . The applicant was further informed that under LAW he had no right to read the case file or to receive copies thereof . The only persons who had such a right were the accused and the victims , but only after the completion of the criminal proceedings . With regard to the violations committed by the police officers , the applicant was advised to contact ORG .

On DATE the applicant submitted a complaint to the Prosecutor General concerning the ORG responses of , inter alia , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE . He principally complained that the investigation was being deliberately delayed in order to protect ORG ) .

The applicant ’s complaint was forwarded to ORG attached to ORG . On DATE he received a response from GPE . informing him that the investigation and the gathering of evidence were continuing “ in order to establish important facts ” . Unspecified expert reports had apparently been ordered and their results were expected no DATE . Finally , the applicant was informed that his “ allegation that the investigator and the supervising Prosecutor were not sufficiently active and were uninterested in establishing the truth were unfounded ” .

On DATE the applicant submitted a further complaint to ORG . He criticised ORG decision to forward his complaint to ORG attached to ORG . He also denounced the response of DATE as “ passive and unfounded ” and considered that the fact that it did not address the substance of his complaints demonstrated that GPE . was not interested in establishing the truth about PERSON ’s murder .

On DATE the Prosecutor General gave a final response to the applicant ’s complaint . In the relevant parts of the response the applicant was informed :

“ ... [ the senior prosecutor TIME ] in his response of CARDINAL October [ DATE ] informed you that the investigation of the criminal case ... was ongoing , that expert reports had been ordered , and that after receiving expert reports further investigative steps would be planned . While criminal proceedings are pending , the materials in the criminal case file are an investigative secret ( section CARDINAL of GPE ) , which is why it is impossible to give you more specific information concerning the investigative steps that have been taken and will be taken . It might be for that reason that you have formed an incorrect opinion that the investigation is being intentionally delayed and not conducted with the aim of establishing the culprit ; however , such an opinion does not find support in the steps actually taken in the criminal proceedings .

In the course of the pre - trial investigation of the criminal case ... a sufficient amount of investigative steps were carried out : CARDINAL expert reports were ordered and received and the need to order [ additional ] expert reports and the planning of further investigative steps was determined by the [ findings of the ] expert reports already received . In addition , the preparation of expert reports took significant time ; CARDINAL witnesses were questioned and other investigative steps carried out . Unfortunately the pre - trial investigation to this date has not allowed us to establish the circumstances [ of PERSON ’s death ] or the culprit . ”


Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;George Nicolaou;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Johannes Silvis;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in DATE and until his arrest lived in the town of GPE , GPE .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of attempted drug trafficking and placed in custody . He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) convicted the applicant of attempted drug trafficking and sentenced him to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment in a high - security correctional colony . The court noted that the term of the applicant ’s detention was to be calculated with effect from the date of his arrest on DATE .

On DATE ORG upheld the sentence on appeal . It mentioned , inter alia , that at the time of the hearing the applicant was detained in temporary detention facility no . IZ-CARDINAL/CARDINAL in the town of GPE in LOC .

The applicant asked the Presidium of ORG to re - examine his case by way of a supervisory review . In DATE the applicant submitted additional observations to the ORG , which were dispatched from facility no . IZ-CARDINAL/CARDINAL . The application for supervisory review was rejected .

The applicant ’s request for a re - examination of his case by way of a supervisory review was , however , granted by ORG , which on DATE reduced the applicant ’s sentence to DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment .

Having served his sentence in full , the applicant was released from detention on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of another episode of attempted drug trafficking .

On DATE ORG convicted the applicant of attempted drug trafficking and sentenced him to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment in a high - security correctional colony .

On DATE the applicant died in detention .

The applicant and the Government offered different versions of the applicant ’s detention and treatment in the temporary detention facility .

According to the applicant , from DATE to DATE he was detained mostly in facility no . IZ-CARDINAL/CARDINAL . His letters to the ORG dated DATE and DATE and CARDINAL DATE were dispatched from that facility . A letter from the ORG dated DATE was sent to and received by the applicant in the same facility .

The applicant also submitted that on several occasions he had been transported to court hearings and to penal medical institution no . ORG in GPE ( “ institution no . LIU-CARDINAL ” ) and that he had spent very short periods , in transit , in temporary detention facility no . IZ-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of the town of GPE . In particular , the applicant had been sent to institution no . LIUCARDINAL in DATE , where he had undergone successful treatment for tuberculosis . A chest X - ray examination on DATE indicated that his tuberculosis had been cured , although extensive calcification and fibrosis remained in his lungs . On DATE a medical commission confirmed his recovery . The applicant was prescribed anti - relapse treatment , but this was never provided to him after his return to the temporary detention facility .

The applicant filed a number of complaints ‒ for instance with ORG of the Volgograd Region ‒ arguing that he had not been afforded adequate medical treatment in facility no . IZ-CARDINAL/CARDINAL . On DATE the Prosecutor ’s Office re - directed the applicant ’s claim to ORG in LOC . DATE the authorities rejected the applicant ’s claim as ill - founded . They confirmed that from DATE he had been detained in facility no . ORG . Referring to the decision of the medical commission on DATE , the authorities held that the applicant ’s tuberculosis had been fully cured .

The Government , relying on a certificate issued on DATE by the head of facility no . IZ-CARDINAL/CARDINAL , asserted that from DATE to CARDINAL DATE the applicant had been detained in that facility . In their observations of DATE , however , the Government mentioned the applicant ’s detention in facility no . IZ-CARDINAL/CARDINAL , but did not provide any further details .

Despite the ORG ’s request for the applicant ’s entire medical file , the ORG submitted no medical documents dating from the period after his arrest and up until DATE . They merely noted that the applicant had contracted hepatitis C and tuberculosis before his arrest . The applicant did not dispute that submission .

On DATE the applicant was transferred to correctional colony no . IK-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of GPE .

According to the applicant , the medical service in the colony was very poor . The colony did not employ a tuberculosis specialist and the GPE access to drugs , which were often out of stock , was limited . The applicant only received basic anti - fever medication .

The Government did not provide any information regarding the medical assistance afforded to the applicant in colony no . IK-CARDINAL/CARDINAL and did not submit his medical record or any medical certificates from his time there .

On DATE , after the applicant complained of coughing up blood , he was transferred to institution no . ORG .

The Government provided the ORG with copies of the applicant ’s medical documents for the period DATE to CARDINAL DATE .

The medical records show that on admission to institution no . LIUCARDINAL the applicant had undergone a general medical examination , a chest X - ray examination and a clinical blood test . A sputum culture test was performed DATE . The applicant was diagnosed with recurrent smear - positive infiltrative tuberculosis of the upper lobe of his left lung at the stage of lung tissue destruction caused by mycobacterium tuberculosis ( “ ORG ” ) . He was prescribed protiocomb , a complex medicine containing protionamide , pyrazinamide , ethambutol hydrochloride , lomefloxacin hydrochloride and vitamin BCARDINAL .

On DATE the applicant was tested for HIV , syphilis , hepatitis B and C. The test confirmed his hepatitis C infection , but no antibodies associated with the other infections were found .

DATE the applicant again underwent a chest X - ray examination . It revealed that the cavity in the lung had decreased in size , and some negative changes in the lung tissues had progressed further .

On DATE the applicant was examined by a doctor , who noted in the “ epicrisis ” ( medical report issued on the applicant ’s discharge ) that no significant changes in the applicant ’s health had occurred and prescribed continued treatment with protiocomb and ciprofloxacin , an antibiotic used to treat a number of bacterial infections .

On DATE the applicant ’s treatment was modified . He was prescribed a combination of anti - tuberculosis drugs and injections . A chest X - ray examination on DATE showed no changes in the applicant ’s lungs .

The applicant sent an application to ORG of the town of GPE seeking early release on medical grounds . That request was dismissed on DATE upon the court ’s finding that the applicant ’s state of health did not warrant his release from detention .

In DATE the applicant ’s blood was twice taken for testing and his liver function was tested for the first time . On CARDINAL further occasions in DATE the institution carried out a sputum culture test and also performed the first drug susceptibility test . The test was smear - positive . It revealed that the ORG was resistant to streptomycin . On CARDINAL and DATE the applicant underwent a chest X - ray examination and a tomography examination . They showed no changes . The treatment regimen was modified . The applicant was prescribed , among other medicines , pyrazinamide , ethambutol , prothionamide , cycloserine , rifampicin and isoniazid .

As follows from the epicrisis of CARDINAL DATE and a “ regime violation record ” dated DATE signed by CARDINAL deputy heads of institution no . ORG and the head of the detention ward , the applicant refused to take the drugs pyrazinamide , ethambutol , prothionamide and cycloserine ‒ citing their adverse effects on his health through inducing negative development of his hepatitis C ‒ and claiming that doctors should first treat his hepatitis . According to the same record , the applicant also refused to give a written explanation of the reasons for his refusal .

On DATE the applicant ’s X - ray examination established increased infiltration of the left lung tissue . According to a medical certificate dated DATE , his health had deteriorated due to his consistent refusal to take the prescribed medicines .

According to an extract from the applicant ’s medical history , on an unspecified date he agreed to take isoniazid , rifampicin and capreomycin on condition that he would be provided with hepatoprotectors .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant was released from detention with a diagnosis of infiltrative contagious tuberculosis of the left lung at the stage of lung tissue destruction .

From DATE to CARDINAL DATE the applicant received in - patient medical treatment in a civilian anti - tuberculosis hospital , where he was diagnosed with active chronic fibrous - cavernous pulmonary tuberculosis at the stage of infiltration with bacilli emission , as well as hepatitis C. There is no information in the ORG ’s possession concerning the details of the applicant ’s treatment during that period .

The parties did not provide the ORG with any information about the applicant ’s detention and treatment after his renewed arrest on DATE . The applicant ’s letters to PERSON submitted to the ORG indicate that DATE and DATE he was detained in facilities nos . CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL/CARDINAL , that he had no access to medical treatment , and that institution no . ORG had refused to admit him for treatment before his conviction .

On DATE the applicant underwent a chest X - ray examination which indicated negative changes in his right lung . The volume of his left lung had decreased , its tissue was infiltrated and it contained a number of cavities .

Following the fresh conviction , on CARDINAL DATE the applicant was admitted to institution no . ORG . He was examined by a doctor , who diagnosed him with hepatitis C and ORG positive infiltrative tuberculosis of the left lung at the stage of tissue destruction . The doctor ordered blood , urine , sputum culture and drug susceptibility tests and an electrocardiogram examination . The applicant was prescribed a long list of medicines , including capreomycin , isoniazid , ethambutol and hepatoprotectors .

DATE , after the results of the tests had been received , the applicant ’s treatment was slightly modifed to include ofloxacin .

In DATE the applicant was examined on CARDINAL occasions by doctors , who recommended continuing the prescribed treatment .

On DATE the applicant ’s electrocardiogram examination revealed that he had mitral insufficiency .

A medical record drawn up on DATE by the applicant ’s attending doctor indicated that the applicant had refused to take tuberculosis medicines on that date . The following entries in the applicant ’s medical record dated DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE do not contain any similar information . The Government did not submit any other document ( for instance , a regime violation record ) showing that the applicant had refused to continue the treatment .

On DATE a medical commission examined the applicant and established no significant changes in his condition . The most recent entry in the medical record , made on DATE , showed no significant development in his health .

No further information about the applicant ’s treatment was provided after DATE .

The applicant was certified as having second - degree disability on DATE .

A medical panel examined the applicant on DATE with the aim of determining whether his state of health warranted early release . The panel stated that the applicant was suffering from multi - drug resistant progressive tuberculosis aggravated by cavernosal fibrosis of the lungs and cardiopulmonary decompensation in the third stage . The applicant ’s left lung was completely destroyed by the infection . The panel concluded that his state of health could warrant his release on parole .

On DATE the applicant died from tuberculosis in institution no . ORG .

The documents from the case - file , including a court judgment , indicate that the applicant was not married . According to certificate no . ORG issued by institution no . ORG on DATE , when being asked about his relatives , the applicant stated that he had a partner , PERSON . The authorities noted that statement in the applicant ’s personal file and allowed PERSON to visit him in detention as his de facto wife . By a telegram on DATE the authorities informed PERSON of the applicant ’s death , addressing her as his wife .

According to PERSON submissions , which were not contested by the Government , she was in a close family - like relationship with the applicant from DATE until his death in detention . She visited him on many occasions , sent him letters and parcels . In DATE when the applicant was released from detention they lived together and ran a common household .

PERSON submitted that she had had intense and intimate correspondence with the applicant before his death . She provided the ORG with CARDINAL letters sent to her by the applicant in DATE to confirm that they had shared strong feelings for each other .

On DATE the applicant formally authorised Ms Yusupova to withdraw money from his bank account . In his letter to ORG the applicant expressly asked ORG to award her non - pecuniary damage if he died .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy)

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant brought an action against the GPE ORG challenging an administrative decision whereby the registration document of her car had been revoked .

On DATE ORG adopted a final judgment quashing the administrative decision in question .

It appears that the ensuing administrative proceedings to have the registration document reissued have been pending ever since .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Georges Ravarani;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in Bolu . At the material time he was a military official .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the applicant ’s superiors imposed on him an administrative restriction for DATE and room confinement for DATE as disciplinary penalties . The penalties were enforced MONEY ( DATE ) , CARDINAL and DATE ( DATE ) , DATE and CARDINAL DATE ( DATE ) .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention;Reasonableness of pre-trial detention)

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of threatening to use violence against the investigator in charge of the criminal case against his ex - wife .

On DATE the applicant was charged with the same crime .

On DATE the investigator filed a motion with ORG seeking to have the applicant detained for DATE .

On DATE ORG examined and granted the investigator ’s application , ordering the applicant ’s detention for DATE , namely until DATE . It found that the motion was substantiated , since the applicant partially admitted his guilt and the case materials provided sufficient grounds for believing that he might abscond and obstruct the investigation , having regard to the nature and degree of dangerousness of the offence in question .

On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal seeking to cancel the detention order and claiming that the investigating authority had not obtained any materials or evidence to substantiate the reasons for which it had sought to detain him and that they failed to take into account the applicant ’s personality .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal , finding that the applicant ’s detention was based on a reasonable suspicion , and found the grounds invoked by ORG in justification of detention to be sufficient . It also noted that less severe measures were insufficient to safeguard the applicant ’s proper conduct .

On DATE the applicant lodged a cassation appeal against the decision of CARDINAL DATE of ORG .

NORP On DATE the investigation into the applicant ’s case was concluded and the case was transferred to ORG for trial .

On DATE the applicant ’s criminal case was set down for trial . By the same decision the trial court decided that the applicant ’s detention on remand was “ to remain unchanged ” .

On DATE ORG returned the applicant ’s cassation appeal as it was unsubstantiated and did not met the formal requirements imposed by law .

On an unspecified date the applicant filed a motion with ORG seeking to be released . He argued , inter alia , that there were not sufficient reasons to keep him in detention .

On DATE ORG examined and dismissed this motion . ORG found that the applicant ’s detention was ordered by its decision of CARDINAL DATE . It also noted that the existing materials of the case were sufficient to conclude that the applicant ’s detention was justified .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision .

On DATE ORG left the appeal unexamined . ORG found that there was no possibility under domestic law to appeal against the decision of ORG “ to leave the applicant ’s detention unchanged ” .

The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision .

On DATE ORG declared the applicant ’s appeal inadmissible for lack of merit .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant filed a new motion with ORG seeking to be released . He argued , inter alia , that the collection of evidence against him had been finalised and that there were not sufficient reasons to keep him under detention .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s motion having regard to the dangerousness and nature of the alleged offence and the fact that the applicant might abscond and obstruct the investigation .

On DATE ORG left the applicant ’s appeal unexamined on the same grounds as indicated in its decision of DATE .

On DATE ORG found the applicant guilty as charged , imposing a sentence of DATE years’ imprisonment .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

He was employed by Holding Kompanija “ Komgrap ” – DD “ Komgrap gradnja ” , a socially - owned company based in GPE ( hereinafter “ the debtor ” ) .

On DATE , ORG ordered the debtor to pay the applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions , plus the costs of the civil proceedings . This judgment became final on DATE .

On DATE , upon the applicant ’s request to that effect , ORG accepted the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the applicant the enforcement costs .

On DATE ORG opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor ( ORG ) .

On DATE the applicant submitted his respective claims .

On DATE ORG dismissed these claims as out of time . ORG upheld that decision on DATE .

NORP The insolvency proceedings against the debtor are still ongoing .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal .

ORG dismissed his appeal on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a new constitutional appeal .

On DATE ORG dismissed again his appeal . On DATE that decision was delivered to the applicant .


George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Paul Mahoney;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in Bydgoszcz . She was represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in PERSON .

The NORP Government ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Ms J. Chrzanowska , of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

In DATE the applicant and her husband PERSON divorced . The applicant submitted that prior to the divorce her former husband had thrown her out of their flat . He changed the locks and prevented the applicant from entering to take personal items belonging to her , their daughter and granddaughter .

On DATE the applicant and her former husband reached a friendly settlement as regards the division of their marital property , i.e. the flat . The applicant became the sole owner of the flat against the payment to T.W. of MONEY ( ORG ) until DATE . Her former husband retained the right to stay in the flat until that date . However , PERSON made it impossible for the applicant to sell the flat so that she could have the money to pay him his share .

The applicant ’s former husband obtained an enforcement order against the applicant with the result that part of her retirement pension was seized by the bailiff to help pay off her debt . She was also obliged to pay CARDINAL of the maintenance costs for the flat .

In DATE the applicant brought a civil case for eviction against her former husband . On DATE ORG allowed the applicant ’s action and ordered the eviction of T.W. At the same time it ordered that the defendant be allocated social housing by the municipality . The execution of the judgment was to be stayed until he had been allocated social housing .

The applicant appealed , complaining about the part of the court ’s judgment obliging the municipality to award her former husband social housing . Her appeal was dismissed on CARDINAL DATE by ORG . The appeal lodged by PERSON was rejected for formal reasons .

On DATE ORG issued an order confirming that the judgment of DATE was final .

Subsequently T.W. instituted proceedings in which he sought to quash the enforcement order arguing that the flat allocated to him by the municipality had been in bad condition . On DATE ORG finally dismissed his application to quash the enforcement order .

On an unspecified date the applicant made use of a remedy provided by LAW DATE on complaints about a breach of the right to an investigation conducted or supervised by a prosecutor and to a trial within a reasonable time ( LOC o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki– “ the CARDINAL Act ” ) . She complained about the length of the enforcement proceedings conducted by the court bailiff .

NORP On DATE ORG dismissed the complaint finding that there had been no delay on the part of the bailiff .

The applicant ’s former husband refused CARDINAL offers of social housing in DATE . In DATE he was offered another flat which had to be refurbished before he could move in .

The applicant submitted that in DATE T.W. finally moved out and she regained possession of her flat .

On an unspecified date in DATE the applicant brought a civil claim for damages against her former husband , PERSON She relied on sectionCARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of the CARDINAL Act claiming that PERSON had been living in her flat without legal title to it . She sought compensation from him in the amount calculated in reference to the cost of rent for a similar apartment on the free market .

On DATE ORG partly granted the action and awarded the applicant LAW ( QUANTITY ( ORG ) ) in compensation for ORG ’s use of the flat without legal title . The court established that since the eviction order the applicant ’s former husband had no right to stay in the flat and since he continued to live there he had been liable to pay compensation . PERSON appealed .

On DATE ORG allowed the appeal and dismissed the applicant ’s action . The court agreed with the lower court ’s findings as to the facts of the case , in particular that PERSON had no right to stay in the flat . However the appellate court noticed that since PERSON had had the right to social housing , on the basis of section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW , he had been liable to pay only his share of rent . There was no legal basis to order him to pay compensation on the basis of free - market calculations . Since the applicant sought compensation and not the reimbursement of CARDINAL of the maintenance costs , the court dismissed her action .

DATE to the Act of DATE on the protection of the rights of tenants , housing resources of municipalities and on amendments to LAW ( LOC o ochronie praw lokatorów , misszkaniowym zasobie gminy I o zmianie kodeku cywilnego , “ the DATE LAW ) added a new provision ( subsection ( CARDINAL ) ) to section CARDINAL , which makes the municipality liable , under the rules of tort , for any damage sustained by the landlord on account of the municipality ’s failure to provide the tenant with social housing . This provision reads :

“ ( CARDINAL ) If the municipality has not provided social housing to a person who is entitled to it by virtue of a judgment , the landlord shall have a claim for damages against the municipality on the basis of LAW . ”

Consequently , the municipality ’s failure is statutorily deemed to be an “ unlawful omission ” within the meaning of LAW .

Article CARDINAL of the Civil Code reads in so far as relevant :

“ CARDINAL . ORG , municipality or another legal person wielding public power by virtue of the law shall be liable for damage caused by an unlawful act or omission in the exercise of that power . ”

ORG , in its ruling of DATE ( no . CZP CARDINAL ) concerning a claim for damages under section PERSON ) of the CARDINAL Act read in conjunction with LAW , confirmed that a landlord was entitled to full compensation for any damage sustained on account of a municipality ’s failure to provide social housing to a tenant .

Pursuant to section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW , as long as the municipality has not supplied social housing , the tenant pays the same amount of rent that he would have paid if the tenancy had not been terminated . According to section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) , other tenants in respect of whom the tenancy has terminated and who have not vacated the flat pay compensation to a landlord corresponding to the market - related rent that the landlord could normally receive . If such compensation does not cover losses incurred by a landlord , he may seek supplementary compensation .


CASE OF DUBSKÁ AND KREJZOVÁ v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC

No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life)

Aleš Pejchal;András Sajó;André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Dmitry Dedov;Egidijus Kūris;Ganna Yudkivska;George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paul Lemmens;Síofra O’Leary

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE and live in GPE and GPE respectively .

The applicant gave birth to her first child in hospital in DATE without any complications . According to her , during the birth the medical personnel present were urging her to agree to undergo various kinds of medical intervention even though she had expressly stated her wish not to be subjected to any unnecessary medical treatment . She was also forced to give birth in a position she did not find comfortable . She wanted to leave the hospital TIME after the birth as both she and the baby were healthy , but a doctor ordered her to stay in the hospital . She therefore did not leave until DATE , when she presented a letter from her paediatrician , who confirmed that the applicant would take care of the child .

In DATE the applicant became pregnant for the second time with an expected delivery date in DATE . The pregnancy was free from complications and the medical examinations and tests did not indicate any problems . Since she considered that giving birth in a hospital had been stressful for her , the applicant decided to give birth at home and searched for a midwife to assist at the birth . However , she was unable to find any midwife who was willing to assist her with a home birth .

On DATE she wrote to her health - insurance company and to ORG ( krajský úřad ) asking for help in finding a midwife .

On DATE the health - insurance company replied that NORP legislation did not provide for the possibility of a public health - insurance company covering costs arising from home births and that it therefore had no contracts with any health professionals providing such services . Moreover , prevailing expert medical opinion did not approve of home births .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE ORG added that the midwives listed in its register of health professionals were , in any event , only allowed by law to attend births at LOC possessing the technical equipment required by Decree no . CARDINAL and not in a private home .

Not having found any health professional to assist her , the applicant gave birth to her son alone at home on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE she lodged a constitutional appeal ( ústavní stížnost ) , complaining that she had been denied the possibility of giving birth at home with the assistance of a health professional , in violation of her right to respect for her private life .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) dismissed the appeal , holding that it would be contrary to the principle of subsidiarity for it to decide on the merits of the case , because the applicant had not exhausted all the available remedies , which included an action for protection of personal rights under LAW and an application for judicial review under LAW . It nevertheless expressed its doubts as to the compliance of NORP legislation with LAW and asked the relevant parties to initiate a serious and well - informed debate about new legislation . CARDINAL out of the CARDINAL judges attached separate opinions to the decision , in which they disagreed with the reasoning behind it . Most of them considered that ORG should have dismissed the appeal as an actio popularis and should have refrained from expressing any views on the constitutionality of the legislation concerning home births .

The applicant is the mother of CARDINAL children who were born at home in DATE and DATE with the assistance of a midwife . The midwives attended the births without any authorisation from the ORG .

According to the applicant , before deciding to give birth at home , she had visited several hospitals , which had all refused her requests to deliver the baby without any medical intervention that was not strictly necessary . They had also refused to agree to her wish for uninterrupted contact with the baby from the moment of birth , as the regular practice was to take the child away from the mother immediately after the birth to be weighed and measured and for further medical observation for a period of TIME .

At the time of lodging the present application , the applicant was pregnant again , with an expected delivery in DATE . The pregnancy was free from complications and she again wished to give birth at home with the assistance of a midwife . However , she was unable to find a midwife willing to assist because of the risk of a heavy fine if medical services were provided without authorisation . The applicant asked various authorities to help to find a solution .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE ORG replied that it did not provide medical services to individual patients and that the applicant should make enquiries to GPE ( Město Praha ) , which , acting as a regional office , registered and issued licences to health professionals .

On DATE the applicant ’s health - insurance company informed her that the attendance of a health professional at a home birth was not covered by public insurance .

On DATE GPE informed the applicant that no midwife registered in GPE was authorised to assist with home births .

On DATE the applicant gave birth to a child in a maternity hospital in GPE , QUANTITY away from GPE . She had chosen that hospital because of its reputation for respecting the wishes of mothers during delivery . Nevertheless , according to her , not all her wishes had been respected . Despite the fact that both she and the child had been healthy and that no complications had occurred during the birth , the applicant had had to stay in the hospital for TIME . The newborn baby had been separated from her after the birth , and before leaving the maternity hospital the remains of the child ’s umbilical cord had been cut off despite her wishes to the contrary .


No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for private life)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Nebojša Vučinić;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He is a professor of theology . As a professor of theology he was qualified to teach NORP religious education and courses in ethics and culture , as provided under the relevant domestic law ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On the basis of a proposal from the applicant ’s local priest , the archbishop of ORG ( PERSON ) issued the applicant with a canonical mandate ( missio canonica ) ( no . DATE ) authorising him to teach NORP religious education .

On DATE , following the intervention of ORG of ORG ( PERSON ured riječke ORG ) , the applicant was offered , without having to undergo a public competition , a contract of employment of indefinite duration as a layman teacher of NORP religious education in CARDINAL ORG high schools in ORG .

The applicant ’s appointment was based on the Agreement of DATE between ORG and GPE on education and cultural affairs and the relevant complementary domestic regulations ( see paragraphs CARDINAL , DATE , DATE below ) . He was thereby employed in the public service and remunerated by the ORG .

At the time , the applicant was married to T.F. They had married in a religious ceremony on DATE and their marriage had been recognised at the same time by the civil authorities , as provided for under the relevant domestic law ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) .

The applicant ’s subsequent divorce from GPE was registered before the civil authorities , and in DATE he married another woman in a civil ceremony .

On DATE ORG informed the applicant that his civil marriage to another woman while still bound , in the eyes of the ORG , by the religious marriage to his previous wife was contrary to NORP doctrine and disqualified him from teaching religious education . The relevant part of the letter read :

“ It has been established that in DATE this year you concluded a civil marriage although you are still bound by ORG to a third person . The local ORG of ORG issued you a mandate to teach NORP religious education in school . Each religious education teacher must demonstrate that he is ‘ outstanding in true doctrine and the witness of a NORP life’ ( ORG CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) and must participate in the sacramental and evangelical community of a parish . The new situation does not enable you to do this .

You are therefore invited to explain in writing as soon as possible the manner in which your canonical situation can be harmonised with canonical mandate no . DATE and then , by DATE , to come for a meeting in ORG . ”

After obtaining the applicant ’s explanation of his situation , on DATE ORG withdrew his canonical mandate to teach NORP religious education .

On DATE ORG informed the CARDINAL schools in which the applicant was employed of the new situation . The relevant part of the letter read :

“ We should inform you that on DATE canonical mandate no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL - DATE was withdrawn from the teacher of religious education , PERSON .

The canonical mandate was withdrawn under LAW of the LAW between the Holy See and GPE on education and cultural affairs ( ORG no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) because of a breach of ORG ( ORG CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) . PERSON explained his situation in writing . ”

On DATE , relying on section CARDINAL § CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ( regular termination of an employment contract ) , the schools dismissed the applicant from his teaching job on the grounds that he could no longer be a teacher of NORP religious education without a canonical mandate . They stressed that it had been impossible to find another position for the applicant or to offer him an alternative post within the schools . The applicant was given two months’ notice and the right to an indemnity .

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings in ORG ( PERSON ) , challenging the decisions on his dismissal .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s civil action on the grounds that as stipulated in the LAW between the Holy See and GPE and the related Agreement between the Government of GPE and ORG on NORP religious education in ORG schools and pre - school institutions , he could not teach NORP religious education without a canonical mandate . ORG also found that the schools had examined the possibility of appointing the applicant to another suitable post , but that as there was no such post , they had justifiably terminated his contract of employment .

The applicant challenged the judgment of ORG by lodging an appeal before ORG ( Županijski sud u ORG ) . He argued that he had not breached LAW or any other relevant legislation and that the LAW between the Government of GPE and ORG did not require that a person whose canonical mandate had been withdrawn should be dismissed .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal , endorsing the findings and reasoning of ORG .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with ORG ( PERSON ) and a constitutional complaint with ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) respectively . He relied , inter alia , on ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the LAW , and the corresponding provisions of the LAW , arguing that there had been an unjust interference with his private and family life as a result of the decisions on his dismissal , and that his dismissal had been of a discriminatory nature . He contended , in particular , that the conclusion of a second marriage contract in a civil ceremony could not be a reason for dismissal under LAW or any other ORG laws . He therefore considered that his dismissal based on the fact that he had divorced his former wife and remarried in a civil ceremony had disproportionately affected his private life .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal on points of law as unfounded , endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts . In particular , ORG stressed that the applicant ’s dismissal had been based on the withdrawal of his canonical mandate , which was a necessary requirement for employment as a teacher of NORP religious education as provided for under the relevant domestic law . ORG also held that it was not for the schools or the courts to enter into the examination of the reasons for the withdrawal of the applicant ’s canonical mandate by the ORG .

On DATE the applicant supplemented his constitutional complaint by extending his arguments to the judgment of ORG . He contended in particular that ORG refusal to examine the reasons for his dismissal had essentially deprived him of the possibility to have those reasons effectively challenged in court .

A public hearing was held and on CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s constitutional complaint , finding that there had been no violation of his right to respect for his private and family life , or any discrimination against him . The relevant part of the decision reads :

“ DATE . It follows from the available material and the [ appellant ’s ] constitutional complaint that the appellant ’s first marriage had been concluded in a religious ceremony before an official of the religious community and that [ the appellant ] was divorced on the basis of a final court decision as provided for under the relevant NORP law . ORG notes that the appellant subsequently concluded a new marriage in a civil ceremony without any restriction imposed by the ORG . It follows that the ORG did not inhibit his determination to remarry , nor did it prevent him from remarrying and founding a new family .

Accordingly , the appellant ’s right to marry under LAW and his constitutional right to respect for his family life under LAW and LAW has not been breached .

DATE . ... [ ORG starts by observing that GPE and ORG concluded an Agreement on education and cultural affairs , signed in GPE on DATE . The Act ratifying that Agreement came into force on DATE and thereby this international treaty became part of the internal legal order of GPE with precedence in terms of its legal effects over the [ domestic ] statutes .

By LAW undertook certain obligations which must be abided by and respected . Primarily , it undertook to secure NORP religious education in all ORG elementary and high schools and all pre - school institutions as a mandatory class for all those who have chosen that course , under the same conditions applicable to other mandatory classes .

[ The Agreement ] stipulates that NORP religious education will be taught by qualified religious education teachers who are suitable for that position , in the opinion of ORG authorities , and meet the requisite legal requirements of the NORP legislation . It also stipulates that teachers of religious education must hold a canonical mandate ( missio canonica ) issued by the diocesan bishop , and that withdrawal of the mandate leads to an immediate loss of the right to teach NORP religious education . Under the ORG , teachers of religious education are members , together with their pupils , of the educational corps ... GPE undertook to regulate the programme and functioning of NORP religious education in schools of all types and levels by a special agreement DATE .

ORG considers it necessary to note at this point that the appellant is wrong when he argues that the Agreement between the Holy See and GPE on education and cultural affairs does not require a canonical mandate as a condition for employment and that such a requirement only flows from the ORG between the Government of GPE and ORG on NORP religious education in ORG schools and pre - school institutions of DATE . The appellant specifically contends that the Agreement between the Government [ of GPE ] and ORG is a bilateral agreement which ‘ is not a statute and does not have the status of an international treaty’ and thus could not be binding for [ him and the ORG ] nor could it be applied to [ his ] case , as was done by the [ lower ] courts .

Although the appellant relies on an erroneous premise that the canonical mandate , as a condition for employment as a teacher of religious education , has been stipulated ( only ) by the Agreement between the Government [ of GPE ] and ORG , it could be held that in essence he considers that the consequences of the withdrawal of the canonical mandate on his contract of employment , and his position of teacher of religious education , are contrary to LAW .

ORG reiterates that the requirement to hold a canonical mandate in order to teach religious education , and the consequences of its withdrawal ( loss of the right to teach NORP religious education ) , are provided for LAW between the Holy See and GPE on education and cultural affairs . ...

ORG considers it necessary to examine the special requirement stipulated by the FAC agreements for employment as a teacher of religious education – the canonical mandate .

ORG TIME notes that the Government of GPE have so far concluded CARDINAL agreements on questions of mutual interest with different religious communities , in particular with :

- ORG in GPE ( ORG no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) ;

- the NORP community in GPE ( ORG no . CARDINAL ) ;

- ORG in GPE and ORG in GPE ( ORG no . CARDINAL ) ;

- the NORP ( Pentecostal ) Church in GPE , ORG in GPE and GPE of GPE ( ORG no . CARDINAL ) ;

- ORG in GPE , ORG and ORG in GPE ( ORG nos . DATE ) ;

- the NORP community Bet GPE in GPE ( ORG no . CARDINAL ) ; and

- the Coordination of NORP townships in GPE ( ORG no . CARDINAL ) .

All these agreements have been concluded under LAW on the Legal Status of Religious Communities ( Official Gazette no . CARDINAL ) and they all contain identical provisions concerning , for example , mandatory religious education classes for those who have chosen them , the teaching of these courses under the same conditions as other mandatory courses , and the necessity for teachers of religious education to hold the requisite mandate to teach religious education , which can always be withdrawn ‘ for reasons of deficiencies related to the correctness of teaching and personal morality’ .

Such a requirement , given the nature of their job and its proximity with the mission of dissemination of the church ’s teaching , in ORG view , is not an excessive burden for persons who have chosen to become teachers of religious education . The assessment of a person ’s adequacy [ to teach religious education ] by the competent church authorities is a concretisation of the freedom of the church ’s activity and the right to religious freedom , which [ also ] includes the right of parents to a religious education of their children .

ORG . The enforcement of the obligation undertaken by an international agreement , namely the organisation of NORP religious education in ORG elementary and high schools and pre - school education institutions , as provided for under the ORG between the Holy See and GPE on education and cultural affairs and the ORG between the Government of GPE and ORG , brought religious education teachers into the employment system of GPE . Although their employment status is not fully defined by these Agreements , the provisions of the LAW between the Holy See and GPE on education and cultural affairs in themselves show that the employment status of religious education teachers is a sui generis employment status – in order to teach religious education they must be suitable for that position in the opinion of the ORG authorities ; they must hold a canonical mandate and the withdrawal of the mandate leads to the loss of the right to teach NORP religious education .

At the public hearing DATE on the basis of evidence given by ORG for legal affairs of ORG , Education and ORG of GPE , it has been undoubtedly established that the employment of all teachers of religious education was conducted without an open competition , although that has not been provided for under the relevant law . It was only [ later ] , after the public hearing , by section CARDINAL of the amendments to the Act on Tuition and Education in GPE and High Schools ( ORG no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) that a new section CARDINAL § CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) was introduced , which provides that a contract of employment without an open competition may be concluded for the position of religious education teacher .

In DATE ORG and ORG forwarded to all county offices for education , culture , information , sport and technical culture a letter concerning the employment status of religious education teachers in elementary and high schools ; more precisely , concerning their hiring and dismissal .

The letter indicates that a contract of employment is to be concluded with religious education teachers meeting the relevant requirements , and that if the diocesan bishop by means of a decree withdraws the canonical mandate to teach NORP religious education from a religious education teacher due to deficiencies related to the correctness of the teaching and personal morality , the contract of employment is to be terminated under LAW as an extraordinary dismissal .

DATE . It therefore follows that the appellant also entered the ORG education system without participating in an open competition . At the public hearing he stated that , on the basis of the local priest ’s recommendation the bishop had given him the mandate , the Ordinary had acted as an intermediary , and the school had given him the employment . Thus , by having the canonical mandate and meeting all other requirements , the appellant and the defendants concluded a ‘ classical’ contract of employment under LAW , which does not mention the canonical mandate or the consequences of its possible withdrawal .

At the public hearing , when asked whether he had been aware of the consequences of his conduct on the right to teach religious education , the appellant stated that he had passed the exam in canon law which he could not have passed without learning [ also the issues ] concerning those consequences . It follows that the appellant knew that his position depended on the mandate given by the diocesan bishop and that he would lose it if the mandate were withdrawn .

Accordingly , although he had concluded a ‘ classical’ employment contract under LAW , the appellant could not have expected , after he had lost the canonical mandate as a consequence of entering into a new civil marriage while he was still in a ‘ ORG marriage with a third person , that he would be able to continue to teach religious education . However , he could have expected , irrespective of the internal instructions of the Minister , that the schools where he was employed would take all necessary measures to employ him in another post . This is because the withdrawal of the canonical mandate leads to the loss of the right to teach NORP religious education and not dismissal or the loss of his degree in theology . Under LAW of the By - law on the educational level and pedagogical - psychological education of teachers in high schools ( ORG nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) , a degree in theology [ opens the possibility ] of teaching courses in ethics and culture .

According to the findings of the first - instance court , the defendants had examined the possibility of employing the appellant in another post but , as such a post had not existed , they terminated his contract of employment by so - called regular dismissal , which gives rise to the right to a notice period and an indemnity . In so doing , the defendants acted in the usual manner for terminating a contract of employment by so - called regular dismissal . ORG therefore finds that the appellant has not been treated differently from other workers , including employees in schools , in the situation of a termination of a contract of employment by so - called regular dismissal .

The assessment of the lawfulness of the termination of the appellant ’s contract of employment was , in the light of the relevant labour law , conducted by the [ competent ] courts at CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction . In view of the fact that for the position of teacher of religious education there is a further special requirement , without which it is impossible to conclude a contract of employment ( a canonical mandate ) , and having found that the appellant , due to the withdrawal of [ the canonical mandate ] no longer met the requirements for teaching NORP religious education , and the fact that the defendants had tried to find him another post ... , the [ competent ] courts , in ORG view , applied a constitutionally acceptable interpretation according to which the appellant ’s contract of employment had been terminated in accordance with the relevant law .

ORG . Against the above background , in view of the GPE conduct following the withdrawal of the appellant ’s canonical mandate and in view of the manner in which the competent courts provided him with judicial protection in terms of the ORG ’s obligations under the FAC agreements , ORG finds that the appellant has been afforded sufficient protection of his [ employment rights ] . ”

Judge PERSON appended a concurring opinion to the decision , agreeing with the findings of the majority . However , he argued that ORG had not sufficiently appreciated the fact that the applicant had voluntarily consented to his position depending on the canonical mandate , which the diocesan bishop was authorised to issue and to withdraw .

NORP The President of ORG gave a dissenting opinion in which she argued , in particular , that the normative framework for the employment of teachers of religious education , based on the Agreement between the Holy See and GPE on education and cultural affairs , had not been implemented sufficiently precisely in the relevant domestic employment system , which had left a number of issues undetermined .

The decision of ORG was served on the applicant ’s representative on DATE .

In DATE PERSON applied to the PERSON First - instance ORG diocesan ORG ( GPE ženidbeni ORG prvog stupnja u ORG ) for the annulment of her religious marriage to the applicant on the grounds that , when entering into the marriage , he had demonstrated “ a positive act of the will excluding marriage itself ” ( see paragraph CARDINAL below , canon CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) .

On DATE the PERSON First - instance ORG diocesan ORG accepted GPE ’s application and annulled her religious marriage to the applicant . The decision was then forwarded for examination to the ORG - diocesan ORG ( Međubiskupijski prizivni sud u GPE ) .

The proceedings were held in the applicant ’s absence because he had failed to respond to the court ’s summons . During the proceedings , an email sent by the applicant to GPE on DATE was admitted as evidence . In the email the applicant stated that if he “ could return all other sacraments [ he ] would gladly do it . This way , if [ he ] managed to get rid of only one , which , as [ they ] both knew , never existed , [ his ] heart would be happier . ”

On the basis of the evidence adduced , on DATE the ORG - diocesan ORG upheld the decision of the Rijeka First - instance ORG diocesan ORG annulling the applicant ’s religious marriage to GPE


Remainder inadmissible (Article 35-3 - Manifestly ill-founded);Violation of Article 7 - No punishment without law (Article 7-1 - Nulla poena sine lege;Criminal offence)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Nebojša Vučinić;Georges Ravarani;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant claims to have been living in GPE since DATE , when the NORP authorities granted him a visa for an extended stay ( a long - term residence permit ) . On DATE the applicant was granted the right to reside permanently in GPE ( a permanent residence permit ) . However , he did not de - register his domicile ( prebivalište ) in GPE .

On DATE the applicant bought a car ( a Mercedes S CARDINAL L ) in GPE and on DATE he registered it in GPE in his name .

On DATE the applicant entered GPE in his car . He claimed that the purpose of his visit was , inter alia , to de - register his domicile in GPE .

On DATE the applicant was stopped by the police in GPE while driving his car . The police authorities , finding it suspicious that a NORP national was driving a car with foreign licence plates , impounded the car and reported the matter to ORG , suspecting that the car had been imported into GPE without payment of the relevant taxes and that an administrative offence had thus been committed .

On DATE the applicant de - registered his domicile in GPE .

On DATE the applicant re - registered his domicile in GPE .

Meanwhile , on DATE ORG had instituted administrative proceedings ( upravni postupak ) with a view to establishing whether the applicant was liable to pay taxes on the importation of his vehicle and if so , in what amount . On DATE ORG had issued a decision impounding the applicant ’s car , against which the applicant did not appeal .

On DATE ORG issued a decision ordering the applicant to pay , by DATE , the customs debt ( consisting of the ORG and the special tax on motor vehicles ) owed on the importation of his car , which amounted to MONEY ( HRK ) .

The applicant did not appeal against that decision , which thus became final and enforceable on DATE .

NORP Since the applicant did not pay the above sum , on DATE the ORG instituted administrative enforcement proceedings and issued a decision confiscating his car and ordering its sale with a view to collecting the above - mentioned customs debt .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG , as the second - instance administrative authority , dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first - instance decision of DATE .

On DATE the applicant brought an action in ORG ( ORG ) .

On DATE that court , which in the meantime had become ORG ( ORG upravni sud PERSON ) , dismissed the applicant ’s action .

In the meantime , on DATE ORG had also instituted administrative offence proceedings ( prekršajni postupak ) against the applicant for importing his car into GPE without paying the relevant taxes .

On DATE ORG found the applicant guilty of committing an administrative offence under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) subparagraph CARDINAL of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , and fined him HRK CARDINAL . ORG found that the applicant had had his domicile in GPE at the time of the commission of the offence . Therefore , it was irrelevant that he did not pay income tax in GPE , that he had health insurance in GPE and not in GPE , and that he had been granted the right to reside permanently in GPE . By having his domicile in GPE he failed to satisfy the conditions for exemption from payment of customs duties set forth in LAW to LAW ( “ FAC ” ) , which stated that the registered owner of a vehicle registered abroad must , in order to qualify for exemption , have his domicile outside the territory of the ORG into which the vehicle was being brought ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE ORG ( ORG prekršajni sud PERSON ) quashed the first - instance decision on account of incomplete facts , and remitted the case to ORG . The relevant part of that decision reads as follows :

“ [ ORG ] states , as the decisive reason for its decision to find the accused guilty , that [ he ] has his domicile in ... GPE , at [ an ] address in GPE , ... , and that the fact that he possesses a residence permit , that is , a valid visa , of GPE , is not sufficient evidence for the accused to be entitled to import [ his ] vehicle with total exemption from customs duties under LAW .

However , it is precisely such explanation of the contested decision that , along with the other elements in the case file , shows that the taking of evidence was flawed , that [ ORG ] did not give [ sufficient ] reasons for the decisive facts on which it based its decision , and that they [ that is , those facts and the reasons given ] are in strong contradiction with each other . [ In particular , ORG ] while acknowledging the fact that [ the accused ] possesses a residence permit , that is , a visa , of GPE , further gives as reasons [ to support the finding ] that the accused has a domicile in ... GPE , that he is not a taxpayer in ... GPE , and that he is not even insured with ORG .

... [ NORP the first - instance proceedings [ before ORG ] the accused stated circumstances and furnished evidence which , in his view , suggested that he had not committed the offence of which he was accused . [ ORG therefore ] needed to examine the evidence more thoroughly with a view to establishing the [ relevant ] facts completely and correctly .

This court considers that what is missing in the present case are the reasons for not accepting the status of the accused in GPE , the explanation of where the accused actually lives [ resides ] and , consequently , a clear conclusion as to whether or not he satisfied the conditions set out in LAW .... ”

In the resumed proceedings , by a decision of DATE ORG again found the applicant guilty of committing the same administrative offence and fined him HRK CARDINAL,CARDINAL . ORG again found that at the time of the commission of the offence the applicant had had his domicile in GPE according to ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and thus did not satisfy the conditions for exemption from payment of customs duties set forth in LAW to LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Therefore , the fact that the applicant resided in GPE was of no relevance as he had not proved that he had his domicile there . The relevant part of that decision reads as follows :

“ After having examined the evidence ... , this authority finds that the accused , ORG , committed the customs - related administrative offence he was charged with , defined in section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) subparagraph CARDINAL of LAW .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) subparagraph CARDINAL [ of LAW ] provides that a fine for an administrative offence is to be imposed on a person who treats goods as if they satisfy the conditions for temporary admission , and that conduct is contrary to the conditions for the temporary admission of goods set forth in LAW or in the [ GPE ] Convention .

In the proceedings it was established beyond doubt that on DATE the accused was found operating the vehicle in question with foreign licence plates of GPE on the territory of GPE as if he satisfied the conditions for temporary admission , and that conduct was contrary to the conditions for temporary admission of goods set forth in LAW or in the [ GPE ] Convention because he was a NORP national who at the time of the commission of the offence had his domicile in GPE .

The rights and obligations of participants in customs proceedings and the powers of the customs authorities as regards means of transport imported by natural persons into NORP customs territory are regulated by the provisions of the [ GPE ] Convention . Likewise , customs proceedings and supervision of means of transport with foreign licence plates in the NORP customs territory is regulated by the provisions of LAW and the Decree on the implementation of LAW .

It is established beyond dispute that the accused is a NORP national who at the time of ... the offence had his domicile in ... GPE . His defence that he had a registered residence in GPE was not accepted as a ground for exemption from liability ... Namely , the mere fact that he possesses a residence permit is not a proof that would entitle him to import [ his ] car with total relief from payment of customs duties under LAW because he does not have his domicile abroad .

This is so because the procedure for temporary admission of private means of transport is regulated by LAW to the [ GPE ] Convention in such a way that means of transport for private use must be registered in a territory other than that of temporary admission in the name of a person having a seat or domicile outside the territory of temporary admission and be imported and used by persons residing in that territory .

As regards his personal status , it has been established beyond doubt that the accused is a NORP national , and that until DATE he had [ his ] domicile in GPE , in GPE . Furthermore , after the accused was reported as having committed the administrative offence , he de - registered his domicile in GPE – in this authority ’s view – merely to avoid liability for the offence . At the time of the commission of the offence the accused did not satisfy the conditions for temporary importation with total relief and [ was thus not entitled to ] operate a vehicle with foreign licence plates . Namely , [ LAW to the [ LAW expressly provides that the right to temporary importation belongs to persons who have domicile outside the territory of temporary admission , that is , outside GPE .

This authority has examined the argument of the accused that he is not a taxpayer in GPE , which is evident from the certificate of DATE issued by ORG , as well as the evidence [ to the effect ] that he is neither insured with ORG nor has social security [ cover ] in GPE . However , that evidence can not lead to the adoption of a different decision , because the fact of [ having or not ] health insurance or social security is not evidence of domicile abroad .

This authority has also taken into account the fact that the accused had health insurance in GPE as of DATE . However , having [ health ] insurance is itself not relevant for the adoption of a different decision because the fact of [ possessing ] insurance , which according to the accused ’s own statement is voluntary , does not give [ him ] the right to temporary admission of the vehicle in question with total relief .

On the basis of these findings of fact , and in accordance with the foregoing provisions , this authority has established beyond doubt that the accused did not satisfy the conditions for temporary admission , and that , by handling the vehicle in question contrary to [ those ] conditions , he committed the administrative offence defined in section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) subparagraph CARDINAL of LAW .

This authority has [ also ] examined the argument of the accused that he is registered in GPE [ as an alien ] for an extended stay , of which he submitted evidence [ in the form of ] a certificate [ issued ] by LAW . However , that evidence does not prove his domicile abroad , but only his stay . What is more , at the hearing held on DATE the accused himself stated only the fact of his residence in GPE , which confirms that at the time of the commission of the offence he did not satisfy the conditions for the temporary admission of vehicles with total relief , in accordance with ORG to the [ GPE ] Convention .

In particular , it is beyond doubt that at the time of the commission of the offence the accused had his domicile in GPE . LAW provides that a citizen ’s domicile is the place where he has settled with the intention of permanently living there , and in which he has permanent accommodation secured .

The solemn statement of the commercial company [ ORG ] of CARDINAL DATE stating that it would provide accommodation for ORG as of DATE was also examined in the proceedings . However , [ that statement ] is not decisive for exempting [ the accused ] from liability because it was issued after this authority adopted its [ first ] decision of DATE and because the statement in question does not give him the right to temporary admission with total relief .

The statement given by ORG before a notary public on DATE ) , which was also examined during the proceedings , is illogical and contrary to [ both ] the statement of ORG and the solemn statement of CARDINAL DATE in that it suggests that the flat [ in GPE in which the applicant claimed to be living ] was rented to NORP , and not to the accused , whereas the solemn statement of ORG of CARDINAL DATE suggested that it provided PERSON with accommodation at the address [ in GPE ] . After examining that evidence , this authority considers that it was obtained with a view to proving that the accused had rented accommodation to live in abroad .

Moreover , the evidence of the accused that his wife is a director of company ORG in GPE is not relevant either , because in his statement of DATE he stated that his wife lived in GPE and had her business in GPE .

This authority does not dispute the fact that the accused is disabled , with a degree of disability of PERCENT , of which he submitted as evidence a membership card [ issued by an association of disabled persons ] in his name indicating his domicile [ as being ] in GPE ...

In the proceedings all the evidence furnished by the accused was examined . However , by that evidence the accused did not prove that he had been living abroad .

From all the evidence it is apparent that at the time of the commission of the offence the accused was a NORP national who had his domicile in GPE , with all the rights and obligations attached to that . The accused could not pose in GPE as a person having domicile abroad and enjoy the rights of [ such ] a person in [ his own ] country , where until DATE he had his domicile . Therefore , the accused did not satisfy the conditions for the temporary admission of a foreign car to the territory of GPE with total relief under Annex C [ to LAW ] and the Decree on the implementation of LAW because his domicile was in GPE at the time of the commission of the offence .

In the light of the foregoing , this authority has adopted a decision finding the accused guilty , as stated in the operative provisions . ”

By a decision of DATE ORG dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first - instance decision , endorsing the reasons given therein . The relevant part of that decision reads as follows :

“ Against the first - instance decision the accused ... lodged ... an appeal on the grounds of breaches of procedure , incomplete and incorrect findings of fact , misapplication of the substantive law , and a wrong decision on the sanction . In the appeal the accused essentially argues ... that he has proved that at the time of entry into GPE he satisfied all statutory requirements for legally entering [ GPE ] with the car in question , that the first - instance authority called into question the validity of the visa of GPE , where he was [ first ] granted an extended stay , and from DATE the right to reside permanently , [ and ] that he uses the flat in GPE without restrictions . He therefore considers that there are no legal grounds or evidence for a finding that he committed the administrative offence in question .

The appeal is unfounded .

The accused unjustifiably denies liability for the administrative offence committed , because the first - instance authority [ , ] ... on the basis of his statement given at the hearing of DATE and ... the written evidence [ , ] ... correctly concluded that his conduct had all the elements of the administrative offence defined in section CARDINAL ) subparagraph CARDINAL of LAW . [ The accused ] was on DATE in GPE found operating a ORG vehicle ... with foreign licence plates of GPE as if he satisfied the conditions for temporary admission , and that conduct was contrary to the conditions for temporary admission of goods given that at the time of the commission of the offence he had his domicile in GPE . Since that conduct was contrary to the conditions for temporary admission of goods set forth in LAW and the [ GPE ] Convention , he committed the administrative offence defined in section CARDINAL ) subparagraph CARDINAL of LAW .

The other appellate arguments are also unfounded because the ... ORG ... correctly and accurately established the [ relevant ] facts ... and correctly applied the substantive law ...

In particular , special conditions for the temporary importation of means of transport are prescribed in LAW to LAW in LAW , where subparagraph ( b ) provides that means of transport for private use must be registered in a territory other than that of temporary admission , in the name of a person having seat or domicile in a territory other than that of temporary admission , and [ must ] be imported and used by persons having domicile in such a territory . ORG in its LAW provides that domicile is the place where a citizen has settled with the intention of permanently living there .

Therefore , given that during the [ first - instance ] proceedings the decisive fact that the accused is a NORP national who at the time of the commission of the offence had his domicile in the territory of GPE was established beyond doubt , he did not satisfy the conditions for temporary admission of a foreign car to the territory of GPE set out in the above - cited provisions of the Annex to FAC .

[ This court ] therefore upholds as correct in its entirety the decision of the first - instance authority ... whereby the accused was found guilty and sanctioned for the administrative offence defined in section CARDINAL ) subparagraph CARDINAL of LAW ... ”

NORP The applicant then , on DATE , lodged a constitutional complaint against the second - instance decision , alleging violations of his constitutional rights to fair proceedings , equality before the law and equality before the courts and other public authorities . In so doing he relied on LAW paragraph CARDINAL , LAW paragraph CARDINAL of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . He argued that ORG had misinterpreted the text of LAW to LAW , which in the official text did not refer to “ domicile ” but to “ living ” abroad . Therefore , the fact that while living in GPE he had kept his domicile in GPE was not relevant . The applicant further argued that the meaning given to certain legal terms in domestic legislation could not be relied on in interpreting the same or similar terms used in international agreements . In particular , the applicant argued as follows :

“ In the decision [ of DATE ] ORG totally wrongly quoted the text of LAW subparagraph ( b ) ... of ORG [ C ] to ORG by stating [ that it ] ‘ provides that means of transport for private use must be registered in a territory other than that of temporary admission , in the name of a person having seat or domicile in a territory other than that of temporary admission , and [ must ] be imported and used by persons having domicile in such a territory’ [ emphasis added ] .

However , the text LAW subparagraph ( b ) ... of LOC [ C ] to ORG published in ORG [ – International agreements ] no . CARDINAL is completely different and reads :

‘ ... means of transport for private use must be registered in a territory other than that of temporary admission , in the name of a person having seat or domicile in a territory other than that of temporary admission , and [ must ] be imported and used by persons living in such a ORG [ emphasis added ] .

The obvious difference between [ the CARDINAL texts ] is that ORG refers to [ having ] domicile in the territory of another ORG as a condition for using a foreign car whereas the text of the LAW [ on Temporary Admission ] ... refers to ... living in the territory of another ORG , which is legally not the same .

Besides , the fact of living in the territory of another ORG , that is , in the ORG from which the disputed car originates , can not be assessed in accordance with NORP laws , and especially not in the way [ ORG ] did it , but in accordance with the LAW [ on Temporary Admission ] itself and the Decree on the implementation of LAW , .... [ T]hat fact of living in the territory of another ORG is to be proved by work or residence permit .

... all customs offices in GPE have , upon a citizen ’s entry into [ GPE ] by car , been establishing the fact of living in another ORG by checking only work or residence permit .

It is evident that in the instant case [ the authorities ] departed from the relevant law and the established practice ... by deliberately misquoting the relevant provisions with a view to creating conditions for the complainant ’s conviction at all costs .

[ T]he complainant proved beyond doubt , by presenting a valid visa for an extended stay , the contract on the use of a flat and a social security certificate , that he has de jure and de facto been living in GPE , and that he had legally bought the car in accordance with the NORP laws . [ It follows that ] the complainant perfectly legally entered GPE in accordance with LAW subparagraph ( b ) ... of [ Annex C to ] LAW , and that by so doing he did not commit a customs offence defined in section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) subparagraph CARDINAL of LAW . In any event , the customs office [ in question ] would not have allowed the complainant to enter the territory of GPE if he did not satisfy the said conditions .

It is totally unclear why the complainant should , as stated in the first - instance decision , pay any customs debt [ in the situation ] where he did not ask for customs clearance but only temporary admission . If the customs authorities considered that temporary admission was not allowed then they could have ordered that the car be exported from GPE ... at the expense of the complainant .

The above described proceedings are certainly a chicanery for the reasons as stated and at the same time constitute a dangerous precedent for all other citizens of GPE ...

If such proceedings would apply to all NORP nationals operating cars with foreign licence plates , only a few [ such ] cars daily could enter GPE . Besides , if that view of the lower judicial and other authorities on the [ interpretation of the relevant ] substantive law is to be accepted , not a single CARDINAL of CARDINAL of NORP citizens temporarily working in GPE , GPE or GPE could enter GPE because they all legally have domicile in GPE . [ In this way ] CARDINAL of cars should be confiscated DATE , especially from citizens of GPE and GPE having double nationality who enter GPE on a DATE basis .

In particular , the [ contested ] decisions infringed the right to impartial and fair proceedings guaranteed by LAW because for the reasons set out above those decisions are certainly neither fair nor impartial . On the contrary , they are absolutely biased and blatantly unfair .

The decision to prosecute only the complainant and not CARDINAL of others certainly constitutes a violation of LAW paragraph CARDINAL of the LAW whereby equality before the law is guaranteed to the complainant , and also of LAW which guarantees equality of all NORP citizens before courts and other ORG authorities . ”

By a decision of DATE ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) dismissed the applicant ’s constitutional complaint , finding that the contested decisions were based on a “ constitutionally acceptable interpretation and application of the relevant substantive law ” . ORG decision was served on the applicant ’s representative on DATE . It reads as follows :

“ CARDINAL . According to section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) subparagraph CARDINAL of LAW a ... natural person shall be liable for an administrative offence if he or she handles [ the ] goods as if they satisfy the conditions for temporary admission , and that conduct is contrary to the conditions for temporary admission of goods set forth in LAW or in LAW ,

Convention on Temporary Admission , ORG , LAW subparagraph ( b ) provides as follows :

( b ) means of transport for private use must be registered in a territory other than that of temporary admission , in the name of a person having seat or domicile in a territory other than that of temporary admission , and be imported and used by persons living in such a territory .

Having regard to the cited provisions of LAW and LAW subparagraph ( b ) of FAC to LAW , as well as the facts established in the proceedings ... ( in particular the fact that it was established ... that at the time of the commission of the offence the complainant had registered domicile in GPE in accordance with the relevant provisions of ORG ) , ORG finds that the legal views expressed in the contested decisions are based on a constitutionally acceptable interpretation and application of the relevant substantive law . ORG considers that the relevant administrative authority and ORG , relying on the facts established in the proceedings , gave reasons for their views expressed in the contested decisions , which undoubtedly do not result from an arbitrary interpretation and application of the relevant substantive law .

The Constitutional Court therefore finds that the complainant ’s right to equality before the law guaranteed by LAW paragraph CARDINAL of the LAW was not violated by the contested decisions .

LAW paragraph CARDINAL of the LAW provides as follows :

Everyone has the right that an independent and impartial court established by law decides fairly and within a reasonable time on his rights or obligations , or as regards suspicion or accusation of a criminal offence .

[ In the present case ] the administrative and judicial authorities acted within their jurisdiction established by law . It is evident from the case - file that the first - instance administrative authority took evidence in accordance with LAW and that ORG decided on the complainant ’s appeal on the merits . It is also evident that the complainant had an opportunity to follow and participate in the proceedings , and that he could undertake all permitted procedural actions and lodge a remedy . The contested decisions are sufficiently reasoned and adopted in accordance with the relevant procedural rules .

For these reasons , the [ Constitutional ] Court finds that the contested decisions did not violate the complainant ’s constitutional right to fair proceedings .

As regards the complainant ’s argument that in similar cases the relevant authorities proceed differently , that in itself does not mean that the complainant ’s constitutional right was violated by the contested decisions . In the [ Constitutional ] Court ’s view , in the proceedings [ complained of ] the contested decisions were adopted in accordance with the relevant legislation . [ T]herefore the fact that different decisions may have been adopted in other proceedings is of no relevance for the lawfulness of the decisions contested before ORG in these proceedings , nor can it lead to a different decision in this particular case .

LAW ... is not relevant in this case . ”