George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney

NORP The applicant , Mr Jevgēņijs Jegorovs , is a “ permanently resident noncitizen ” of GPE , who was born in DATE and is currently serving a prison sentence in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent at the time , PERSON , and subsequently by PERSON .

The relevant facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant was admitted to hospital with severe head injuries . Information provided by ORG ( ORG ) on DATE stated that he “ had undergone an urgent operation – skull trephination ” .

NORP The hospital records stated that on DATE the applicant “ had fled ” from the hospital . According to information provided by ORG on DATE , he had left the hospital “ without completing the treatment , which [ included ] possible plastic surgery on his skull , and without receiving further recommendations for treatment ... ” . It appears that after having left the hospital the applicant did not request medical assistance .

On DATE a doctor visited the applicant at home in connection with cramps . The applicant refused to go to a hospital .

According to the applicant , he started to have epileptic seizures DATE after the surgery in DATE . He learnt from a conversation with a doctor who had operated on him that he would need to pay for the plastic surgery and he could not afford it . On DATE the applicant informed the ORG that he had enquired with the ORG authorities whether he could donate CARDINAL of his kidneys in exchange for payment , in order to have the plastic surgery .

On DATE the applicant was detained in LOC .

On DATE the applicant was transferred from FAC to FAC .

On DATE Daugavpils Prison was merged with FAC . The newly established prison was renamed FAC .

The applicant was held in the NORP wing of FAC .

NORP The applicant submitted that he had been placed in the following prison cells :

- cell no . CARDINAL , DATE and DATE ;

- cell no . CARDINAL , between DATE and DATE ;

- cell no . CARDINAL , DATE ( investigation cell ) ;

- cell no . CARDINAL , DATE ( quarantine cell ) ;

- cell no . CARDINAL , between CARDINAL and DATE ;

- cell no . CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE ;

- cell no . CARDINAL , DATE and an unspecified date .

On DATE the applicant was transferred to ORG to serve the remainder of his sentence .

On DATE the applicant underwent a medical examination in FAC . The diagnosis read as follows :

“ Consequences following a head trauma with skull trephination in DATE . Symptomatic epilepsy ( ? ) Post - traumatic encephalopathy . Alcohol and heroine dependency since DATE . ”

According to information from ORG dated DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , on DATE the applicant had stated that he was having seizures in which he lost consciousness . A prison psychiatrist then recommended that a warden ( uzraugs ) be assigned to the applicant and that he be supervised by medical staff .

On DATE the following entry was made in the applicant ’s medical file : “ Condition after a paroxysmal seizure with loss of consciousness ( stāvoklis pēc paroksizmālas samaņas zuduma lēkmes ) ” . It was noted that TIME the applicant had had a seizure with loss of consciousness and cramps , but without biting of the tongue .

In that connection , the applicant was prescribed anti - epileptic medication . He was hospitalised from DATE for monitoring and treatment , and received preventive treatment ( NORP ) . No seizures were observed .

On DATE the applicant requested that ORG ( “ the MADEKKI ” ) refer him to a hospital for treatment . On DATE the PERSON responded that the request was outside its competence and advised the applicant to consult the prison medical staff .

NORP In DATE the applicant requested a disability assessment , which he had not had prior to his detention .

NORP In DATE the applicant underwent a full medical examination , including a pulmonary X - ray .

On DATE an electro - encephalogram revealed “ slightly increased epileptiform activity ( nedaudz izteikta epileptiforma aktivitāte ) ” . The applicant was administered medication for the treatment of epilepsy and for the improvement of the brain function , and tranquilisers .

On DATE the applicant was certified category CARDINAL disabled ( moderate disability ) due to the consequences of the head injuries in DATE and post - traumatic encephalopathy .

NORP In DATE the applicant had CARDINAL out - patient medical examinations , CARDINAL of which related to headaches . In DATE he had CARDINAL out - patient examinations , CARDINAL of which concerned headaches .

NORP The applicant did not have a pulmonary X - ray examination in DATE .

On DATE the applicant underwent a pulmonary X - ray examination .

On DATE the applicant was taken to the prison hospital in GPE with suspected tuberculosis .

At the hospital the following diagnosis was made :

“ Infiltrative tuberculosis pneumonia [ of ] the left lung ... Consequences following a serious head trauma with skull trephination in DATE . Symptomatic epilepsy . Prolonged depressive reaction . Alcohol and heroine dependency . Factors contributing to illness – smoking as of DATE [ and ] use of alcohol and drugs . ”

A neurologist at the prison hospital in ORG concluded that the applicant had not had an epileptic seizure for a considerable period of time and epileptiform activity had not been observed . Therefore , the applicant was prescribed an anti - epileptic drug ( NORP ) for DATE . The doctor noted that in CARDINAL months’ time the applicant should undergo an electrocardiogram and a decision would be made about stopping the anticonvulsant medication .

The applicant remained in hospital until DATE .

On DATE the applicant was transported back to Daugavgrīva Prison .

In DATE the applicant had CARDINAL out - patient medical examinations , CARDINAL of which concerned headaches .

The information from ORG dated DATE stated that the applicant did not appear to have had any epileptic seizures while in detention , but that he had received “ throughout his detention antiepileptic medication ( NORP , carbamazepine ) ... in order to prevent possible epileptic seizures ... ” . It was also noted that while in detention he had periodically refused to take the medication , which fact had been attested by entries in his medical file .

With respect to tuberculosis , information from ORG dated DATE stated that in DATE the applicant had been provided with full treatment . He had been cured and discharged in a satisfactory state of health .

According to the applicant , he experienced epileptic seizures and required plastic surgery on his skull .

NORP In response to the Government ’s additional observations , the applicant submitted the decision establishing his disability for the period from DATE to DATE . That decision stated that the applicant had functional limitations related to traumatic epileptic seizures . It was based on an expert report of DATE . The applicant did not furnish a similar report indicating that he had experienced epileptic seizures while in FAC up until DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the applicant complained to ORG and the prosecution about the conditions in Daugavpils Prison . He described the conditions of detention and specified the state of affairs in cell no . CARDINAL . The description he gave appeared to be broadly the same as the one he submitted before ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . He indicated , inter alia , that the conditions were in breach of LAW and requested that his complaint be considered in substance .

The prosecution forwarded the submission to ORG .

In connection with the applicant ’s complaints , on DATE Daugavpils Prison informed ORG that the applicant had been held in cell no . CARDINAL , which complied with article CARDINAL of LAW but was in need of “ cosmetic repair ” .

ORG response no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL-J/CARDINAL/CARDINAL dated DATE stated that in the course of its inquiry it had been established that cell no . CARDINAL in FAC , in which “ [ the applicant ] had stayed , [ did ] not , indeed , comply with the ... statutory requirements and cosmetic repair of the cell [ was needed ] ... ” .

NORP The letter also stated that following the applicant ’s submission of DATE to ORG , the matters raised by him had been explained to him and that he had no claims against Daugavpils Prison . ORG thus deemed that it had examined the applicant ’s complaints of CARDINAL DATE .

According to the applicant , he withdrew his complaints under pressure from the ORG administration .

It appears that in DATE and DATE the applicant wrote to ORG , the prosecution and ORG in connection with his having contracted tuberculosis .

The applicant claimed that , whereas he was supposed to have been X - rayed DATE , he had not been X - rayed at all in DATE and had had to wait DATE , until DATE , for an X - ray . Referring to document no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL-J/CARDINAL/CARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , he pointed out that the prison governor had agreed that the cells were damp and had told him that there were no funds for repair work . He requested that a comment be made on the fact that he had fallen ill with tuberculosis . The relevant documents would then be attached to his complaint and sent to the ORG .

In its reply of CARDINAL DATE ORG indicated that the applicant had been suspected of having contracted tuberculosis on DATE , after the annual pulmonary X - ray , as required by paragraph CARDINAL of Cabinet of Ministers Regulation no . CARDINAL ( DATE ) . The applicant had then been referred to the prison hospital .

The ORG stressed that the applicant had had no clinical indications of tuberculosis requiring an unplanned X - ray examination .

The ORG also stated that it had sent to ORG the part of the applicant ’s request concerning unsatisfactory living conditions in FAC .

The ORG did not indicate in its letter that the responses given could be appealed against .

In DATE ORG received the applicant ’s CARDINAL complaints . CARDINAL of them had been forwarded by ORG and another by the prosecution .

DATE . On DATE ORG gave the applicant identical responses to all CARDINAL complaints , to the effect that they had not been made in the ORG language . ORG referred to section ORG ) of LAW ( NORP valodas likums ) and indicated as follows :

“ Documents may be submitted in a foreign language in exceptional situations , where immediate action by the State operational services or other competent institutions is required in order to protect a person ’s rights and property interests , which may be violated as a result of unforeseen , exceptional circumstances or an offence committed or planned . ”

ORG found that the circumstances set out in the applicant ’s complaints did not amount to exceptional circumstances in which a document in another language could be considered . It refused , therefore , to consider the applicant ’s complaints .

ORG indicated that each of the CARDINAL refusals could be appealed against to ORG .

On DATE the applicant informed the ORG that as of DATE he had been complaining to the prison medical unit of weight loss . Therefore he had difficulty understanding ORG response of DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the ORG received a request from the applicant to expedite the surgery recommended on his skull because he had been suffering from headaches and epileptic seizures .

DATE the PERSON carried out an inquiry .

On DATE the PERSON declared that it had found no violations in the applicant ’s treatment in Daugavpils Prison . It stated that no one had seen the applicant ’s epileptic seizures and that no related injuries had been observed . The applicant had not submitted any documents on the recommended surgery and his medical file contained no entries about it .

The PERSON decided to terminate the administrative violation proceedings .

NORP That decision was subject to appeal to the head of the MADEKKI .

On DATE the ORG received a request from the applicant concerning the refusal to carry out a head tomography free of charge at the prison hospital .

DATE ORG ( former MADEKKI ) carried out an inquiry .

On DATE ORG found no violations in the applicant ’s treatment DATE and DATE . It noted that he had complained of headaches and dizziness , and had claimed to have had epileptic seizures , which no one had ever seen . Furthermore , on DATE he had refused to take his medication .

It decided to terminate the administrative violation proceedings .

That decision was subject to appeal to the head of ORG .

On DATE ORG received a complaint from the applicant that the head of the Daugavpils Prison medical unit had not provided in the notes on the applicant ’s health ( veselības izziņas ) the dates of his epileptic seizures .

On DATE ORG responded that it had never been recorded in the applicant ’s medical file that he had been observed in a state of unconsciousness , suffering from cramps or the consequences of seizures – a bitten tongue or signs of injuries , or in a state of confusion . Seizures with loss of consciousness had been recorded on DATE , when a doctor had visited the applicant at home , and on DATE , when the applicant had been examined in FAC . However , those entries had been based on information given by the applicant himself . The ORG further provided information as outlined above ( see paragraphs CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE and DATE ORG received requests from the applicant that plastic surgery be carried out on his skull because during epileptic seizures he could sustain a brain injury and die .

DATE and DATE ORG carried out an inquiry .

On DATE ORG established that the applicant had regularly been administered NORP and had received treatment with respect to his complaints of dizziness . The ORG concluded that the applicant was continuing to claim that he was having epileptic seizures which no one had ever observed . The ORG found no violations in the applicant ’s treatment in FAC .

DATE . That decision was subject to appeal to the head of ORG .

Following the ORG ’s inquiry , on DATE the applicant stated that he had appealed against ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE . The appeal had been sent from the prison on DATE , but it had not been received by ORG .

In his application to the ORG the applicant stated that he could have applied to the administrative courts , but that submissions needed to be made in the ORG language , which he barely knew . No translation service was provided for detainees , and in any case he could not have afforded such a service .

Article CARDINAL of LAW ( ORG izpildes kodekss ) reads as follows :

“ Convicted persons ... shall be ensured living conditions that are in conformity with epidemiological safety and hygiene standards . The standard living space in dormitorytype prison premises for CARDINAL convicted person may be CARDINAL CARDINAL.CARDINAL square metres for men ... but in single - occupancy cells – QUANTITY .

Convicted persons shall be allotted an individual sleeping place ( guļamvieta ) and shall be provided with bedding items ( gultas piederumi ) . Convicted persons shall be provided with underwear ( veļa ) corresponding to DATE .

Convicted persons shall receive nutrition that ensures the normal functioning of the body . Nutritional norms may vary in view of the nature of work performed by a convicted person .

Paragraph CARDINAL of Cabinet of Ministers Regulation no . CARDINAL ( DATE ) , effective from DATE , provides that penal institutions must ensure that hygiene standards of convicted persons are complied with . Under paragraph CARDINAL of the Regulation , a convicted person must take a sauna or a shower , and change underwear and bed linen , at least once DATE .

ORG no . CARDINAL ( DATE ) , effective DATE and DATE , governed the medical care of convicts in penal institutions . Its relevant provisions were cited in the case of PERSON v. GPE ( ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL , § DATE , DATE ) . Furthermore , under paragraph CARDINAL of the Regulation a preventive examination of a convicted person had to be carried out once a year . The types of preventive examination were determined every year by the head of ORG .

The functions under the domestic law of the PERSON and its successor , ORG , have been set out in the case of ORG v. GPE ( ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL et seq . , CARDINAL DATE ) . ORG no . CARDINAL ( DATE ) , in force as of DATE , stipulates the functions of ORG . Its relevant provisions read as follows :

“ CARDINAL . Decisions and action of a public authority ( faktiskā rīcība ) of the [ ORG officials may be appealed against ... to the head of the ORG . A decision of the head of the ORG may be appealed against to a court .

Decisions and action of a public authority ... of the head of the [ ORG ... may be appealed against to ORG . A decision of ORG may be appealed against to a court . ”

Paragraph CARDINAL of Cabinet of Ministers Regulation no . CARDINAL ( DATE ) , effective from DATE , reads as follows :

“ Administrative acts ( administratīvie akti ) issued by the head of the [ Prisons ] Administration and his or her action of a public authority may be disputed by applying to ORG . A decision of ORG may be appealed against to a court . ”

DATE . The Administrative Procedure Law ( Administratīvā procesa likums ) took effect on DATE . It provides , among other things , for the right to challenge administrative acts and actions of public authorities before the administrative courts ( see GPE v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § DATE , CARDINAL DATE , and PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § DATE , CARDINAL DATE ) .

Section CARDINAL of LAW , which was passed on DATE and entered into force on DATE , reads as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) All institutions , organisations and establishments ( companies ) shall ensure acceptance and examination of documents drawn up in the ORG language .

( CARDINAL ) ORG and local government institutions , courts and institutions belonging to the judicial system , and ORG or local government establishments ( companies ) shall accept ... and examine only documents in the ORG language , except in cases as prescribed in subsection ( CARDINAL ) ... The provisions of this section do not apply to submissions of persons to the police and medical institutions , rescue services and other institutions in cases of urgent calls for medical assistance , the commission of crimes or other violations of the law , or calls for emergency assistance in cases of fire , accident or other emergencies .

( CARDINAL ) Documents ... in a foreign language shall be accepted if attached thereto is a translation into the ORG language , certified in accordance with the procedures prescribed by ORG , or notarised . Documents issued on the territory of GPE by DATE this PERSON comes into force do not require translation into the ORG language .


CASE OF GORESKI AND OTHERS v. "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA"

Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

The applicants were born in DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE respectively . The second and third applicants live in NORP .

On DATE the applicants initiated restitution proceedings . On DATE they lodged a “ silence of administration ” appeal . After CARDINAL remittal , on DATE ORG dismissed their claim to have the property restored into their possession and awarded them compensation instead . The type of compensation ( видот на надоместокот ) was to be decided with a separate decision ( дополнително решение ) . On DATE ORG finally upheld the restitution order . On DATE the applicants were requested to specify the type of compensation , which on DATE they refused to do until , according to them , the ORG would decide their case .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;George Nicolaou;Helena Jäderblom;Johannes Silvis;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE following a trial , the PERSON criminal judge ( juez de lo penal ) no . CARDINAL sentenced the applicant to CARDINAL months’ imprisonment for serious disobedience to public authority ( desobediencia grave a la autoridad ) . The applicant was acquitted of other charges against him , namely false accusation of a crime ( calumnias ) , defamation ( injurias ) and concealment ( encubrimiento ) .

The judge established that the applicant was the webmaster of an Internet forum on which defamatory messages against the complainants in the proceedings had been published , and that he had deliberately disregarded the request made to him by a police officer within the framework of the criminal investigation not to alter the messages in question . In fact , the applicant had proceeded to have the forum webpage removed altogether , despite the police officer ’s request to leave it unchanged . As regards the charges for defamation and false accusation of a crime , the judge held that there were reasonable doubts as to whether the applicant had been aware of the messages in question before his police interview and that he should therefore be acquitted in that regard . It was also alleged that he had protected the individuals who had made the defamatory statements ; however , the judge considered that he could not be found guilty of concealment as it had not been proved that he had been aware at the time of his police interview that it had been possible for him to have access to LAW ( IP ) numbers of the participants on the forum .

Both the prosecution and defence appealed against the judgment before the Cáceres Audiencia Provincial . The applicant did not request a hearing , nor did the ORG order one . Instead , the court watched a video - recording of the trial .

On DATE ORG upheld the applicant ’s conviction for serious disobedience to public authority and , unlike the first - instance judge , found him guilty of continuous and false accusation of a crime ( delito continuado de calumnias ) . His punishment was a DATE fine of QUANTITY ( ORG ) for a period of DATE . He was also required to pay damages . In finding the applicant guilty , the appellate court stated that it had relied on the facts established by the first - instance judge and on the testimony given by the complainants , the applicant and the witnesses in the earlier trial . The court stated :

“ Fourth . The facts declared proved in the first - instance judgment constitute continuous and false accusation of a crime and defamation regulated and punished by LAW and seq . of LAW in relation to LAW of the same LAW for which the defendant PERSON ORG should be declared guilty as a principal pursuant to sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Code with the mitigating factor of undue delays pursuant to section CARDINAL paragraph CARDINAL of the Code .

It is undisputed that documentary evidence does not require judicial immediacy for its assessment because it is written down and can be read and interpreted in the ’ brief and proved in the hearing , both with respect to what was written on the forum and the people against whom those expressions were directed . Those expressions imputed the commission of crimes to the complainants ( sexual assault , sexual slavery of a person ) and were detrimental to their fame and reputation to the extent that it is obvious that the imputations were serious in themselves and related to public understanding , which is an open - ended concept of which interpretation depends on the particular facts of the case . It is worth remembering that we are speaking here of a small town where everybody knows each other , where everybody runs into each other , where everybody attends the same places , where everyday life is routine and there is little room for novelties , where anything breaking the monotony is something which attracts public attention , where the genealogy of every inhabitant is known to the rest . For these reasons we find the applicant guilty of the crime of continuous and false accusation of a crime ... which he had been acquitted of at first instance .

The applicant states that he was the administrator of the forum ; that he did not log onto it very often ; that he lacked computer skills and that he had removed some phrases and messages which in his view might be considered insulting for the purposes of the case now before us . We disagree with the accused when he states that he was unaware of what was written on the forum , the argument on which the first - instance judge relied to acquit him of false accusation of a crime and defamation . And we disagree for the following CARDINAL reasons . Firstly , because it was part of his duties as the administrator of the forum to be aware of what was written on it , to the extent that he was its ‘ ORG , so to speak , on account of the fact that he had created it ; and secondly , because it is untrue that he was unaware of what was written on it , since he had removed some phrases and messages which were insulting to the complainants , thus proving that he had read what was written on the forum in question and demonstrating that he had regarded what was written there as insulting to a specific individual or individuals , which led him to the decision to remove what he regarded as defamatory or insulting . ”

The applicant applied to ORG to have the previous proceedings before it declared void . His application was dismissed on DATE on the grounds that no legal provision had been infringed and none of his rights had been breached in those proceedings .

The applicant lodged an amparo appeal with ORG . He cited LAW ( right to a fair hearing ) , complaining that FAC had convicted him on appeal without giving him the opportunity to plead his case in open court .

By a decision served on CARDINAL DATE ORG declared the applicant ’s amparo appeal inadmissible as it had no special constitutional significance .


CASE OF DZHANARALIYEV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA

Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment)

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention , which were incompatible with their disabilities , and of the lack of an effective remedy in that regard . Some applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .


Aleš Pejchal;Ledi Bianku;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos

The applicants were placed in GPE police station in GPE , either in pre - trial detention or serving prison sentences . Applicants nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL were detained in cell no . CARDINAL , applicants nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL were detained in cell no . CARDINAL and applicants nos . CARDINAL , DATE and CARDINAL were detained in cell no . CARDINAL . At the time they submitted their application they had been detained for periods ranging from DATE .

The first CARDINAL applicants were transferred to ORG on the following dates : applicant no . CARDINAL was transferred on DATE , applicant no . CARDINAL was transferred on DATE , applicant no . CARDINAL was transferred on DATE , applicant no . CARDINAL was transferred on DATE and applicant no . CARDINAL was transferred on DATE . The parties disputed the date on which applicant no . CARDINAL was transferred : according to the Government ’s submissions , he was transferred on DATE , whereas the applicant argued that he was transferred on DATE . According to the material in the ORG ’s possession , applicant no . CARDINAL was still being detained in GPE police station on DATE .

The applicants alleged that NORP police station had been entirely inappropriate for long periods of detention , as in their cases . It had consisted of CARDINAL cells on the first floor and CARDINAL sanitary facilities situated outside the cells . Cells nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL had measured QUANTITY and had accommodated CARDINAL detainees each , while cell no . CARDINAL had measured QUANTITY and had accommodated CARDINAL detainees . The cells had been equipped with beds but had no blankets . The applicants further stressed that the cells had been filthy and that there had been inadequate access to natural light . Cell no . CARDINAL , in particular , had not had a window .

Detainees had been confined to their cells and had not been allowed to spend time outside , which had affected their psychological health . They had had to ask permission from the guards to use the restroom . Recreational activities had not been offered and cells had not been equipped with televisions .

Healthy detainees had been held together with drug users or sick detainees , resulting in their exposure to contagious diseases . The police station had not had the necessary means to transfer detainees to a hospital in case of emergency .

Instead of food , detainees had been offered CARDINAL per day , which had not sufficed to cover their DATE dietary needs , either in terms of quantity or quality .

On DATE the applicants had lodged a complaint with the public prosecutor , complaining of the conditions of their detention but had not received a reply .

The Government submitted that NORP police station had been housed in a building constructed in DATE on the basis of quality specifications necessary to ensure proper conditions of detention . It had consisted of CARDINAL cells : cell no . CARDINAL had measured QUANTITY and had CARDINAL built - in beds , cell no . CARDINAL had measured QUANTITY with CARDINAL built - in beds and cell no . CARDINAL had measured QUANTITY with CARDINAL beds . The capacity of the police station had never been exceeded .

The Government affirmed that there had been CARDINAL sanitary facilities with hot water outside the cells . They submitted CARDINAL contracts with cleaning companies for the building for the periods in question : CARDINAL from DATE to CARDINAL DATE and the other from CARDINAL DATE to CARDINAL DATE . The contracts included cleaning the detention areas and the sanitary facilities DATE and disinfecting the detention areas once DATE .

When the number of detainees had allowed it , drug addicts had been detained separately from the rest of the detainees . In addition , the staff at GPE police station had made every possible effort to accommodate GPE needs by painting the facilities often , cleaning or replacing the bedding and by resolving any problem in general that might have risen .

Regarding recreational activities , the Government stressed that detainees had had unlimited access to telephone cards and that it had been standard practice for them to receive newspapers and magazines .

The Government confirmed that the applicants had not been provided with meals but had received CARDINAL a day to order food from restaurants , given that police stations did not have any cooking facilities .

An on - call doctor had been available on a CARDINAL-hour basis in ORG ( PERSON ) . In urgent cases , inmates had been transferred to local hospitals . Additionally , police staff had been responsible for administering prescribed medications to detainees , as ordered by a doctor .

The Government pointed out that the applicants had not referred to or adduced any evidence that they had needed medical treatment which they had not received . On the contrary , according to the police station ’s records , applicants nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL and DATE had been taken to local hospitals on various occasions .


Guido Raimondi;Ineta Ziemele;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney;Yonko Grozev

NORP The applicant is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . The President granted the applicant ’s request for his identity not to be disclosed to the public ( Rule CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) . The applicant was granted permission by the President of the Section to represent himself in the proceedings before the ORG .

NORP At TIME on CARDINAL DATE the applicant took a trolleybus without purchasing a ticket ; he attempted to purchase CARDINAL only after ticket inspectors had entered the trolleybus . When they ordered him to pay a fine , he stamped on CARDINAL of the ticket inspector ’s feet and kicked her legs , before grabbing both inspectors by their necks . When the driver stopped the trolleybus and approached the applicant , the latter started hitting him with his umbrella . At that point the police arrived and took the applicant to the police station , where he arrived at TIME

At the police station the applicant continued behaving aggressively : he tried to attack police officers , uttered threats and said that he had robbed the President of GPE . The police sought the assistance of ORG , which took the applicant to GPE psychiatric hospital ( VSIA“Rīgas psihiatrijas un narkoloģijas centrs ” ) at TIME

At TIME the applicant was examined and PERSON noted that he was in a state of psychomotor agitation and was “ not accessible for productive contact ” . He was administered appropriate medical treatment .

At TIME DATE , DATE , the applicant and his medical file were examined by a panel of CARDINAL doctors in order to establish whether there were grounds to prescribe involuntary psychiatric treatment . None of the doctors had been involved in assessing the applicant ’s state of health on DATE .

The applicant ’s behaviour during the interview with the panel of doctors was reported as follows :

“ No symptoms of unclear consciousness . Not accessible for productive contact . Answers questions with counter - questions . Behaves in an expressive , defiant way . Suspicious . Asks what drugs have been given , who has allowed [ him ] to be given drugs without his agreement . Does not explain his actions [ in the police station and against the ticket inspectors ] . Denies having said that he has robbed the president . Says that “ everything will be alright ” . Refuses to [ give consent to being treated in the psychiatric hospital ] . Thinking is confused , inconsistent . Gives an impression that [ he ] is listening to what is happening around him . Patient is entirely under the spell of his own psychotic experiences . Complete lack of criticism [ sic ] towards the necessity of being treated , concerning his illness and actions . ”

NORP The report went on to diagnose the applicant in the following manner :

“ Diagnosis : FCARDINAL.CARDINAL Paranoid schizophrenia – continuous course , acute phase . Hallucinatory - paranoia syndrome . ”

NORP The report concluded that the applicant ’s involuntary inpatient treatment in a psychiatric hospital should be continued under section CARDINAL ) of LAW . It stated that the applicant had expressed a wish to participate in the court hearing concerning his compulsory treatment .

The hearing took place before GPE on DATE . It was attended by the applicant , a sworn attorney , PERSON , and a representative of the hospital . During the hearing the representative of the hospital maintained the proposal to order the applicant ’s involuntary in - patient psychiatric treatment , referring to , among other things , the fact that the patient was “ angry ” , that he did not want to talk to doctors , had stated that he had killed the president , and was aggressive . She also referred to the applicant ’s history of psychiatric treatment . In response to the applicant ’s question as to why he had been taken to the hospital , the representative of the hospital explained to him that it was because he had “ talked nonsense ” . The applicant admitted that there had been a conflict in the trolleybus but denied having said that he had killed or robbed the president . He explained that he knew himself how and when he should get medical treatment , and that he had been receiving out - patient medical treatment .

The decision adopted by the court on CARDINAL DATE referred to the applicant ’s history of psychiatric treatment , noting that he had been regularly visiting a psychiatrist on an out - patient basis but had been taking the prescribed medication whenever he chose to . The decision then cited the report of the panel of doctors who had examined the applicant , summarised the oral submissions of the participants of the hearing , and decided to endorse the recommendation of the panel that the applicant should be hospitalised . In establishing that the applicant posed a danger to others , the court referred to the record of the applicant ’s detention drawn up by the police on DATE . That record stated that the applicant had uttered threats , and claimed to have stolen from the President of GPE and to have robbed several houses .

The court went on to note the following :

“ An analysis of the application [ for the applicant ’s involuntary treatment ] confirms that it has been found that [ the applicant ] is suffering from a psychiatric disorder , for which he has been repeatedly treated in [ a psychiatric hospital ] . The symptoms of the psychiatric disorder are characterised by aggressive and conflictual behaviour , which give the court no reasons to doubt the circumstances of the patient ’s behaviour [ and ] the reasons for his placement in the [ hospital ] , as described in the decision of the panel and the material appended to it .

Such behaviour on the part of the patient creates a real danger to the life and health of the patient himself as well as to that of other people ” .

NORP The court agreed with the medical panel ’s conclusion that an improvement in the applicant ’s health was only possible if he received in - patient treatment . In relation to the out - patient treatment , the court noted that as there was no evidence – apart from the applicant ’s own statement – that he had been taking the prescribed medication , it was unable to conclude that he had a serious attitude towards the out - patient regime . The court further considered that the applicant had remained sceptical about the suggestion that he was suffering from a mental disorder and denied that he needed any treatment . In the light of those considerations , the court came to the conclusion that ordering involuntary treatment was in the best interests of the applicant . The court ordered that the applicant receive in - patient treatment for DATE .

The applicant appealed and his appeal was examined in written proceedings by the president of LOC on DATE . In his appeal the applicant indicated that he disagreed with the interference by the psychiatric hospital in his personal life and that he did not understand in what context he had been detained . The president of the court considered that the applicant ’s appeal did not contain any grounds that would put the legitimacy of the impugned decision in question .

The applicant was discharged from the hospital on DATE .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW provides that psychiatric assistance should be provided on a voluntary basis . In - patient assistance is to be provided in a psychiatric establishment only where , owing to the state of health of the patient , such assistance can not be provided on an out - patient basis or at the patient ’s place of residence .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) provides an exhaustive list of situations in which involuntary psychiatric treatment may be administered . The first subparagraph authorises involuntary treatment in cases where

“ [ the patient ] has threatened or is threatening , has attempted or is attempting to inflict bodily injuries on himself or on another person or has been or is violent towards other persons and if a medical specialist concludes that the patient has a mental health disorder , which might result in serious bodily injury to the patient himself or to another person ” .

The second subparagraph of section CARDINAL ) allows involuntary treatment in cases where the patient displays an inability to take care of himself and if a medical specialist concludes that the patient has a mental health disorder which might result in an irreversible and serious deterioration of his or her state of health .

Section CARDINAL ) provides that in the event that the involuntary hospitalisation of a patient is considered necessary , a panel of psychiatrists should examine the patient within TIME and adopt a decision in that regard . Pursuant to section ORG ) , such a decision must be sent to the competent ORG within QUANTITY . ORG will then examine the decision of the panel and decide whether to approve the patient ’s involuntary hospitalisation for a period of DATE . The application for involuntary admission to a psychiatric hospital must be examined within DATE after receipt of the decision adopted by the panel of psychiatrists .

Section CARDINAL of LAW provides as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) If a person disrupts public order due to a mental disorder or a mental disease , that person shall be detained , transported to a psychiatrist and supervised there by the police in accordance with LAW .

( CARDINAL ) The police shall submit to the psychiatrist a written report concerning the antisocial nature of the [ patient ’s ] behaviour ” .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 6+P1-1-1 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court) (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property;Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Luis López Guerra

All the applicants were party to civil proceedings in which the firstinstance and appeal courts found in their favour . These judgments became binding and enforceable but were subsequently quashed by the supervisory review courts on the ground of incorrect application of substantive law or incorrect assessment of evidence by lower courts ( for more details see the Appendix ) .


No violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 - Right not to be tried or punished twice-{general} (Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 - Right not to be tried or punished twice;Criminal offence)

András Sajó;Angelika Nußberger;Armen Harutyunyan;Dag Bugge Nordén;Erik Møse;Guido Raimondi;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Kristina Pardalos;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Luis López Guerra;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Nona Tsotsoria;Paul Lemmens;Paul Mahoney;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Yonko Grozev;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer;Ksenija Turković

The first applicant , PERSON A , was born in DATE and lives in GPE . The second applicant , Mr B , was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE .

The applicants and Mr ORG owned a ORG - registered company ORG ( “ Estora ” ) . Mr GPE and Mr G.A. owned the GPE / GPE - registered company ORG ( “ Strategic ” ) . In DATE ORG acquired PERCENT of the shares in ORG . Strategic acquired PERCENT of the shares in ORG . In DATE all the shares in ORG were sold to ORG , at a substantially higher price . The first applicant ’s share of the sale price was MONEY ( ORG ) ( MONEY ( ORG ) ) . He transferred this amount to the GPE - registered company ORG , in which he was the sole shareholder . The second applicant ’s share of the sale price was ORG CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL ) . He transferred this amount to ORG , in which he was the sole shareholder .

Mr GPE , Mr G.A. and Mr T.F. made gains on similar transactions , while Mr GPE , PERSON and Mr PERSON were involved in other undeclared taxable transactions with ORG .

The revenue from these transactions , amounting to approximately ORG CARDINAL ( approximately ORG CARDINAL ) , was not declared to the NORP tax authorities , resulting in unpaid taxes totalling some ORG MONEY ( approximately ORG CARDINAL ) .

In DATE the tax authorities started a tax audit on ORG and looked into the owners behind PERSON . On DATE they filed a criminal complaint against ORG ( ORG ) with regard to matters that later led to the indictment of the first applicant , along with the other persons mentioned above and the second applicant , for aggravated tax fraud .

The persons referred to in paragraph CARDINAL above were subsequently prosecuted , convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment for tax fraud in criminal proceedings . It may also be noted that :

- the prison term to which Mr GPE was sentenced at first instance was upheld at second instance , even though the second - instance court found it somewhat mild ; in the meantime he had had a PERCENT tax penalty imposed on him ;

- the length of Mr GPE ’s term of imprisonment was fixed in the light of his having previously had a PERCENT tax penalty imposed on him ;

- Mr G.A. was neither sentenced to a fine nor had a tax penalty imposed on him ;

- Mr T.F. was in addition sentenced to a fine corresponding to the level of a PERCENT tax penalty ;

- Mr GPE and Mr GPE were each sentenced to a fine in accordance with the approach set out in ORG ruling in GPE . DATE p. DATE , with reference to ORG . DATE p. CARDINAL , summarised at paragraph CARDINAL below .

A summary of the particular circumstances pertaining to the first and second applicants is given below .

The first applicant was interviewed first as a witness on DATE ; on DATE he was arrested and gave evidence as a person charged ( “ siktet ” ) . He admitted the factual circumstances but did not accept criminal liability . He was released after DATE .

On DATE the first applicant was indicted for violations of sections CARDINAL - CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) , cf . CARDINAL - CARDINAL , of LAW DATE ( ligningsloven ) ( see paragraph CARDINAL below for the text of these provisions ) .

On DATE ORG ( skattekontoret ) amended his tax assessment for DATE , after issuing a warning to that effect on DATE , with reference inter alia to the tax audit , to the criminal investigation , to the evidence given by him , as mentioned in paragraph CARDINAL above , and to documents seized by ORG in the investigation . For DATE the amendment was made on the ground that the first applicant had omitted to declare a general income of ORG CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) , having instead declared a loss of ORG CARDINAL . Moreover , with reference to sections CARDINAL - CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ) of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below for the text of these provisions ) , ORG ordered him to pay a tax penalty of PERCENT , to be calculated on the basis of the tax that he owed in respect of the undeclared amount . The decision had regard inter alia to evidence given by the first and second applicants during their interviews in the criminal investigation . The first applicant did not lodge an appeal against that decision and paid the outstanding tax due , with the penalty , before the expiry of the DATE time - limit for lodging an appeal .

On DATE the ORG ( tingrett ) convicted the first applicant on charges of aggravated tax fraud and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment on account of his having failed to declare , in his tax return for DATE , the sum of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL in earnings obtained abroad . In determining the sentence ORG had regard to the fact that the first applicant had already been significantly sanctioned by the imposition of the tax penalty .

The first applicant appealed , complaining that , in breach of LAW No . CARDINAL to ORG , he had been both prosecuted and punished twice : in respect of the same offence under section CARDINAL he had been charged and indicted by the public prosecutor , had then had a tax penalty imposed on him by the tax authorities , which he had paid , and had thereafter been convicted and sentenced .

In a judgment of DATE ORG ( lagmannsrett ) unanimously rejected his appeal ; similar reasoning was subsequently given by ORG ( PERSON ) in a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( summarised below ) .

NORP In its judgment of DATE ORG first considered whether the CARDINAL sets of proceedings in question had concerned the same factual circumstances ( samme forhold ) . In this connection it noted the developments in the Convention case - law expounded in the ORG judgment of PERSON v. GPE ( [ ORG ] , no . CARDINAL , § § MONEY , DATE , DATE , ECHR DATE ) and the attempt in that judgment to harmonise through the following conclusion :

“ ... LAW CARDINAL must be understood as prohibiting the prosecution or trial of a second ‘ offence’ in so far as it arises from identical facts or facts which are substantially the same . ... The ORG ’s inquiry should therefore focus on those facts which constitute a set of concrete factual circumstances involving the same defendant and [ are ] inextricably linked together in time and space ... ” .

In the present instance , ORG observed , there was no doubt that the factual circumstances underlying the decision to impose tax penalties and the criminal prosecution had sufficient common features to meet these criteria . In both instances , the factual basis was the omission to declare income on the tax return . The requirement that the proceedings relate to the same matter had accordingly been met .

ORG next examined whether both sets of proceedings concerned an “ offence ” within the meaning of LAW No . CARDINAL . In this regard ORG reiterated its ruling as reported in PERSON ( “ GPE . ” ) DATE p. CARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) that tax penalties at the ordinary level ( PERCENT ) were consistent with the notion of “ criminal charge ” in LAW . That earlier assessment had relied on the CARDINAL socalled “ PERSON criteria ” ( the legal classification of the offence under national law ; the nature of the offence ; and the degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risked incurring ) as spelled out in the ORG ’s judgment in PERSON and Others v. the GPE ( DATE , § CARDINAL , Series A no . CARDINAL ) . Of importance for ORG assessment was the general preventive purpose of the tax penalty and the fact that , because PERCENT was a high rate , considerable sums could be involved . ORG further had regard to its judgment as reported in GPE . DATE p. CARDINAL , where it had held in the light of the GPE case - law ( to the effect that the notion of “ penalty ” should not have different meanings under different provisions of the Convention ) that a PERCENT tax penalty was also a criminal matter for the purposes of LAW No . DATE a stance adopted without further discussion in GPE . DATE p. CARDINAL .

ORG also noted that both ORG ( ORG ) and ORG ) were of the view that it was unlikely that a tax penalty at the ordinary level would not be deemed criminal punishment for the purposes of LAW No . CARDINAL .

ORG further had regard to the ORG ’s more recent case - law ( PERSON v. GPE ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL , DATE ; GPE v. GPE ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL , DATE ; PERSON v. GPE ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE , with references to PERSON v. GPE , DATE , § DATE , Reports of Judgments and Decisions CARDINALVII ; and PERSON v. GPE ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , ECHR CARDINALXIII ) to the effect that a wider range of criteria than merely the PERSON criteria applied to the assessment under LAW . It found confirmation in PERSON ( cited above , § § CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) – later followed in GPE v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) DATE that the CARDINAL PERSON criteria for establishing the existence of a “ criminal charge ” for the purposes of Article CARDINAL applied equally to the notion of criminal punishment in LAW No . CARDINAL .

Against this background , ORG found no ground on which to depart from its above - mentioned rulings of DATE and DATE , holding that tax penalties at the ordinary level were to be regarded as “ criminal punishment ” ( straff ) for the purposes of LAW No . CARDINAL .

It went on to observe that a condition for protection under the abovementioned provision was that the decision which barred further prosecution – in this case the decision of DATE to impose ordinary tax penalties DATE had to be final . That decision had not been appealed against to the highest administrative body within the DATE time - limit , which had expired on DATE , and was in this sense final . If , on the other hand , the expiry of the sixmonth time - limit for lodging a judicial appeal under LAW ) of LAW were to be material , the decision had not yet become final when ORG delivered its judgment of DATE .

The words “ finally acquitted or convicted ” in LAW No . CARDINAL had been formulated with a view to situations where the barring decision was a judgment in a criminal case . ORG had established that a decision was final when it was res judicata , when no further ordinary remedies were available . In this regard , the time when a decision became res judicata according to the rules of national law would be decisive . Neither the wording of the provision , nor its drafting history , nor the case - law provided any guidance for situations where the barring decision was an administrative one . It was pointed out that , in GPE . DATE p. CARDINAL , ORG had expressed an authoritative view to the effect that a tax assessment decision , including a decision on tax penalties , ought to be regarded as final when the taxpayer was precluded from challenging it ( p. CARDINAL ) , without specifying , however , whether it was the time - limit for an administrative appeal , or rather for a judicial appeal , which was decisive . In the present case , ORG observed that the best solution would be to consider that the DATE time - limit for an administrative appeal was decisive in relation to LAW . Otherwise , there would be clarity DATE in cases where the taxpayer did not institute proceedings before the courts and , where he or she did so , only after a legally enforceable judgment DATE that would vary and could be lengthy . The decision of DATE was therefore to be considered as final for the purposes of LAW No . CARDINAL .

ORG noted that the first applicant had been charged on DATE and that the warning about the amendment of his tax assessment had been sent on DATE . Thereafter the case concerning the tax penalties and the criminal case had been conducted in parallel until they had been decided respectively by a decision of DATE and a judgment of CARDINAL DATE . A central question in this case was whether there had been successive prosecutions , which would be contrary to LAW , or parallel treatment , which was permissible to some extent . In this connection ORG had regard to CARDINAL inadmissibility decisions , GPE v. GPE ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE ; and PERSON v. GPE , cited above , in particular the following passage from the latter :

“ However , the ORG is unable to agree with the applicant that the decision to withdraw his driving licence amounted to new criminal proceedings being brought against him . While the different sanctions were imposed by CARDINAL different authorities in different proceedings , there was nevertheless a sufficiently close connection between them , in substance and in time , to consider the withdrawal to be part of the sanctions under NORP law for the offences of aggravated drunken driving and unlawful driving ( see PERSON v. GPE , cited above , and , mutatis mutandis , PERSON v. the GPE , no . FAC , § CARDINAL , ORG CARDINAL-VII ) . In other words , the withdrawal did not imply that the applicant was ‘ tried or punished again ... for an offence for which he had already been finally ... convicted’ , in breach of LAW No . CARDINAL . ”

In the present case , ORG held that there could be no doubt that there was a sufficient connection in substance and time . The CARDINAL cases had their basis in the same factual circumstances – the lack of information on the tax return which had led to a deficient tax assessment . The criminal proceedings and the administrative proceedings had been conducted in parallel . After the first applicant had been charged on DATE , a warning had followed on DATE about an amendment to his tax assessment , then an indictment on DATE , the tax authorities’ decision of DATE to amend the assessment , and ORG judgment of DATE . To a great extent the administrative - law and criminal - law processing had been interconnected .

The purpose behind LAW , to provide protection against the burden of being subjected to a new procedure , had applied to a lesser degree here , in as much as the first applicant had had no legitimate expectation of being subjected to CARDINAL procedure . In such a situation the interest in ensuring effective prosecution was preponderant .

Following the tax audit in DATE referred to in paragraph CARDINAL above , during the autumn of DATE the tax authorities reported to ORG that the second applicant had failed to declare on his tax return for DATE income of ORG CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) earned from his sale of certain shares .

On DATE ORG put the second applicant on notice that it was considering amending his tax assessment and imposing a tax penalty , referring inter alia to the tax audit , the criminal investigation and the evidence given by him , mentioned in paragraph CARDINAL above , and to documents seized by ORG in the investigation . On DATE ORG amended his tax assessment to the effect that he owed ORG CARDINAL ( approximately ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) in tax in respect of the undeclared income . In addition , with reference to sections CARDINAL - CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ) of LAW , it decided to impose a tax penalty of PERCENT . The decision had regard inter alia to evidence given by the first and second applicants during interviews in the criminal investigation . The second applicant paid the tax due , with the penalty , and did not appeal against the decision , which became final on DATE .

In the meantime , on DATE the public prosecutor indicted the second applicant for a violation of section CARDINAL - CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(a ) , cf . LAW CARDINAL - CARDINAL , of LAW on the ground that for the tax year(s ) DATE and/or DATE he had omitted to declare income of ORG CARDINAL on his tax return , which represented a tax liability of ORG CARDINAL . The public prosecutor requested ORG ( tingrett ) to pass a summary judgment based on his confession ( tilståelsesdom ) . In addition , Mr GPE , Mr GPE and Mr G.A. pleaded guilty and consented to summary trials on a guilty plea .

On DATE the second applicant ( unlike GPE , ORG ) withdrew his confession , as a result of which the public prosecutor issued a revised indictment on CARDINAL DATE , including the same charges .

On DATE ORG , after holding an adversarial hearing , convicted the second applicant on the charges of aggravated tax fraud and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment , account being taken of the fact that he had already had a tax penalty imposed on him .

The second applicant appealed against the ORG procedure to ORG , arguing in particular that by reason of the prohibition against double jeopardy in LAW No . CARDINAL , the fact that he had had a tax penalty imposed on him constituted a bar against criminal conviction . Thus he requested that ORG judgment be quashed ( opphevet ) and that the prosecution case be dismissed ( avvist ) from the courts .

In a judgment of DATE ORG rejected the second applicant ’s appeal , relying essentially on its reasoning in the case of the first applicant , which was similar to that of ORG summarised above ( see paragraphs CARDINAL above ) . Thus , ORG found that the tax authorities’ decision of DATE ordering him to pay a tax penalty of PERCENT did constitute a criminal punishment ( straff ) ; that the decision had become “ final ” upon the expiry of the time - limit for lodging an appeal on DATE ; and that the decision on the tax penalty and the subsequent criminal conviction concerned the same matter .

Moreover , as in the case of the first applicant , ORG considered that parallel proceedings – both administrative and criminal DATE were to some extent permissible under LAW , provided that the second proceedings had commenced before the first had become final . Where that minimum requirement had been fulfilled , an assessment had to be made of the state of progress of the second set and , not least , as to whether there was a sufficient connection in substance and in time between the first and second decisions .

As to the concrete assessment of the second applicant ’s case , ORG observed that the criminal proceedings and the tax proceedings had in fact been conducted in parallel since as far back as the tax authorities’ complaint to the police in DATE and until the decision to impose the tax penalty had been taken in DATE . This state of affairs was similar to the case of the first applicant . The second applicant had been indicted and the case referred to ORG with a request for a summary judgment on the basis of his confession on DATE , before the decision on the tax penalty . The criminal proceedings had thus reached a relatively advanced stage by the time the decision to impose the tax penalty had been taken . The DATE period DATE from when the tax authorities’ decision of DATE had become final until the second applicant ’s conviction of DATE by ORG had been somewhat longer than the CARDINAL - and - a - half - month period in the case of the first applicant . However , this could be explained by the fact that the second applicant had withdrawn his confession in DATE , with the consequence that he had had to be indicted anew on CARDINAL DATE and an ordinary trial hearing had had to be scheduled . Against this background , ORG ( like ORG ) concluded that there was undoubtedly a sufficient connection in substance and time between the decision on the tax penalties and the subsequent criminal conviction .

NORP On DATE ORG refused the second applicant leave to appeal , finding that such leave was warranted neither by the general importance of the case nor by any other reason .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)

Egidijus Kūris;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention .


Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 7 - No punishment without law (Article 7-1 - Nulla poena sine lege;Nullum crimen sine lege)

Aleš Pejchal;Guido Raimondi;Kristina Pardalos;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paul Mahoney;Robert Spano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant was summoned to attend jury service at ORG on DATE .

On TIME the jurors were shown a video in relation to their service and were given verbal instruction from the court ’s jury officer that they were not permitted to research their cases on the Internet or to research the defendants or any of the individuals involved in the trial . Notices in the jury waiting room contained the following warning :

“ You may also be in contempt of court if you use the internet to research details about any cases you hear along with any cases listed for trial at the ORG ... ”

The notices made it clear that contempt of court was punishable by a fine or by imprisonment .

The applicant was selected to serve on a jury in a trial of a defendant charged with grievous bodily harm with intent . The trial commenced that afternoon . When the jury were sworn , the applicant took an oath or affirmation that she would faithfully try the defendant and give a true verdict according to the evidence .

Before the case was opened by the prosecution , the judge gave a number of directions to the jury . These underlined the importance of deciding the case only on the basis of what the jury saw and heard in the courtroom . CARDINAL consequences were identified by the judge . The first was that they should not speak about the case to anybody . He continued :

“ The second consequence is a newer one : that you do not go on the internet . You have probably read in DATE about a juror who did go on the internet ; went on ORG and severe problems followed for that juror . I am sure you will not want any of those . So , the rule is DATE and it is told to every jury DATE that not only do you not discuss it , but you do not go on the internet ; you do not try and do any research of your own ; you do not discuss it on ORG ; you do not tweet about it ; or anything of that nature . So , simply , once you leave this room you do not talk about it or deal with it in any way with anybody .

We ask you to observe what goes on in this room . The evidence has been carefully considered . It is put before you in a carefully considered way . That is why you are not to discuss it with anybody else or do your own research , or discuss it on ORG – because it is carefully controlled ... ”

NORP The trial continued on CARDINAL and DATE . On DATE the trial judge allowed a prosecution application to adduce evidence of the defendant ’s bad character . The disclosure gave details of a previous sentence for assault occasioning actual bodily harm . It was not disclosed that the defendant had also been charged with rape in respect of the same offence but had been acquitted .

On DATE the jury retired to consider their verdict . At the end of the court day the judge sent the jury home to return on DATE .

After the court had risen , CARDINAL of the jurors in the case informed the court usher that a juror , whom she identified as the applicant , had been on the Internet and had found out about the previous conviction and that it involved rape . The trial judge was informed .

On DATE , after hearing from the juror in court , the judge summoned the jury foreman , who confirmed that there had been some reference to the matter to which the juror had referred . The judge then called the applicant into court . He informed her of what had been said and that she should not say anything at that stage . He gave her the opportunity , which she accepted , of speaking to a barrister in order to take advice on the question of contempt of court . After discussion with the applicant , the barrister informed the court that the applicant ’s position was that her behaviour regarding the Internet was not deliberate . She therefore claimed to have a defence to the allegation of contempt of court . The judge explained to her that the matter would be referred to the Attorney General and that there would be a police investigation .

The judge subsequently discharged the jury and the trial was aborted .

The police obtained statements from the CARDINAL other jurors at trial . The statements showed that during the jury deliberations the applicant stated that she had conducted Internet research and that her research had showed that the previous conviction also included an allegation of rape . Most of the other jurors had reacted to this by making it clear that the applicant had introduced extraneous and impermissible facts into their discussion , contrary to the instructions and directions that they had been given .

On DATE the police interviewed the applicant under caution . During the interview , the applicant explained what had happened at the commencement of the trial and set out her recollection of what the trial judge had said as follows :

“ The judge said ... that we should not look , we should not publish anything on ORG , on ORG , we should not tell anybody outside the court about the case ... ”

She said that did not recall that the judge had instructed jurors not to do Internet research .

She explained that she had seen a newspaper article concerning the defendant on the Internet on TIME of CARDINAL DATE . When asked what she was doing on the Internet , she replied that , as she was NORP , she had wished to know the exact translation of the charge facing the defendant . She had therefore searched for “ grievous bodily harm ” . She had then wished to see how frequent such incidents were in GPE so added “ GPE ” to the search terms . The article concerning the defendant ’s previous conviction had appeared in the list of results . She explained that her recollection was hazy but that she did not remember searching for the defendant by name . She admitted that she had informed the other members of the jury of the information she had found . She said that she was not aware that she had missed any element of the judge ’s instructions and that she had had “ absolutely no intention ” of going against the instructions or directions of the judge .

The Attorney General subsequently applied to ORG for permission to make an application for an order of committal under Order CARDINAL of the Rules of ORG ( “ SCR ” – see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) . The applicant was informed of the application by letter dated CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the ORG granted permission to make a committal application .

On DATE a claim form was issued by the Attorney General seeking an order of committal against the applicant for :

“ contempt of court in conducting Internet research on the case she was trying as a juror in ORG and thereafter in disclosing the extraneous information she had obtained to other members of the jury . ”

The grounds on which the applicant ’s committal was sought were that

“ her acts created a substantial risk of seriously prejudicing and/or impeding the course of justice in the proceedings with which she was concerned . ”

Reference was made to further details set out in a sworn affidavit by a legal adviser at the Attorney General ’s office . In the affidavit , it was submitted that the evidence in the case demonstrated that the applicant :

“ deliberately and in breach of instructions given by the jury officer , a warning contained in a written notice , her jury oath or affirmation and directions given by the trial judge , ( a ) conducted internet research on the case she was trying , and thereby obtained extraneous information about the case , and ( b ) imparted that extraneous information to other members of the jury whilst the jury were in deliberation . ”

In her position statement dated DATE , the applicant accepted that she had searched on the Internet for the words “ grievous ” and “ NORP ” while the trial was underway and that she had discussed with other jurors a newspaper report concerning the defendant . She did not accept a specific intent to impede or to cause a real risk of prejudice to the due administration of justice .

In a note on behalf of the Attorney General dated DATE , the test for contempt was set out as follows :

“ At common law , a contempt of court is an act or omission which creates a real risk of prejudice to the administration of justice , done with the intent of creating such a risk . ”

The note went on to claim that the applicant ’s Internet research and subsequent conduct in relation to it had created a real risk of prejudice to the administration of justice and had been done with the intent of creating such a risk .

In written submissions on behalf of the applicant dated DATE , it was submitted that the offence of contempt of court could be stated as follows :

“ Where a person knowingly does an act which he specifically intends to impede , or create a real risk of prejudicing , the due administration of justice ... ”

On DATE the application for committal was heard . Counsel for the applicant submitted that the key element that the prosecution had to prove was “ specific intent ” , that is intent to impede or create a real risk of prejudicing the due administration of justice . He referred to the Attorney General ’s position that intent could be inferred from foresight of the consequences and indicated that , while that might be appropriate in some cases , it did not sit so easily with the kind of intent required in the applicant ’s case . An exchange then took place between the court and counsel for the applicant , as follows :

“ [ Court ] : Can we get this down to the reality of the case . The ORG ’s case is that your client deliberately disobeyed the order of the judge . Is that not the same as what you are saying ? You disagree with it and you are going to submit to us why the ORG ’s case is wrong , but if a juror deliberately disobeys the order if a judge , is that not contempt of court ?

[ Counsel ] : Certainly , yes .

[ Court ] : The ‘ ORG is the point that matters .

[ Counsel ] : Yes . Yes . ”

The Attorney General was subsequently asked whether he accepted that in the context of the case he had to satisfy the court , to the criminal standard , that the applicant had deliberately disobeyed the order of the judge . He confirmed that he did .

At the conclusion of the evidence and submissions , and after the court had already adjourned , the judges returned to seek further clarification of the correct test for contempt of court . The following test was put to counsel by the bench :

“ It is a contempt in the context of jury misconduct within the jury room , for a juror deliberately to disobey the direction of the judge and create a risk of prejudice to the due administration of justice . ”

The judge added :

“ What that removes is a specific intent in relation to the creation of the risk . The intent is directed at the deliberate disobedience . ”

The Attorney General expressed himself to be content with the test proposed . Counsel for the applicant requested that the word “ thereby ” be added following “ disobey the direction of the judge and ... ” , in order to create a link between the CARDINAL elements . The Attorney General fully accepted the proposed modification . Counsel for the applicant was pressed on whether he was content with a definition whereby the intent was the deliberate act of disobeying the order , which then had a causative link in creating the risk . It was noted by the judge that this was a slightly different test from the CARDINAL counsel had earlier proposed . He replied that he was content with the proposed test , and added :

“ I am reacting as I stand . I hope I can venture to submit that actually , if this is the test , it is perhaps redefining an old law but it is new . ”

On DATE an order for committal was made . ORG summarised the applicant ’s version of events as follow :

“ DATE . On her account , effectively , she came across the newspaper reference to [ the defendant ’s ] previous conviction in the local newspaper in GPE by following a route from the word ‘ grievous’ through to ‘ Luton’ and ‘ crime’ and in effect , somehow she stumbled across the newspaper entry . ”

However , the court rejected her account , explaining :

“ CARDINAL . We do not believe that the defendant did not seek information about [ the defendant ] on the internet . Her inability to remember this particular feature of the case , when she has a detailed recollection of so much else , was not credible . We do not believe that she could have just stumbled across the link to [ the defendant ’s ] previous conviction in the way she described . ”

The court concluded :

“ CARDINAL . We have no doubt that the defendant knew perfectly well , first , that the judge had directed her , and the other members of the jury , in unequivocal terms , that they should not seek information about the case from the internet ; second , that the defendant appreciated that this was an order ; and , third , that the defendant deliberately disobeyed the order . By doing so , before she made any disclosure to her fellow jurors , she did not merely risk prejudice to the due administration of justice , but she caused prejudice to it . This was because she had sought to arm and had armed herself with information of possible relevance to the trial which , although not adduced in evidence , might have played its part in her verdict . The moment when she disclosed any of that information to her fellow jurors she further prejudiced the administration of justice . In the result , the jury was rightly discharged from returning a verdict and a new trial was ordered . The unfortunate complainant had to give evidence of his ordeal on a second occasion . The time of the other members of the jury was wasted , and the public was put to additional unnecessary expense . The damage to the administration of justice is obvious . ”

It found that the contempt had been proved to the criminal standard . On sentence , the court explained that misuse of the Internet by a juror was always “ a most serious irregularity ” and that an effective custodial sentence was virtually inevitable to ensure that the integrity of the process of trial by jury was sustained . A sentence of imprisonment for DATE was imposed . The judge noted that pursuant to rules on early release , the applicant would serve DATE in prison .

Following the handing down of the judgment , an exchange took place between the applicant ’s counsel and the bench . The applicant ’s counsel sought clarity on the test for contempt of court , explaining :

“ I am concerned that the test that I was addressing – that we were addressing in preparation of this case DATE was a different test . We conducted the defence to a different test , and the reasons why it was a different test , I suggest , are CARDINAL . First , the intention is different . Secondly , the risk has been diluted from ‘ real risk’ DATE and , after all , ‘ risk’ on the authorities simply means ‘ a possibility of occurrence’ to ‘ risk’ . Thirdly , may I make this submission ? This is the first occasion – I do this with some hesitation for I can find no authority – where there has been a contempt of court flowing from a judicial direction .

... It has always historically been the order which has attracted contempt , not the direction , and the idea that a judge gives directions to a jury in the summing - up which could attract contempt and imprisonment is , in my submission , a novel one .

I therefore submit this question rhetorically : whether this reformulation that this court has applied in this case is consistent with the common law of contempt . ”

NORP The court retired to consider the matter before confirming that the appropriate test was applied in paragraph CARDINAL of its judgment ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , and that it had been understood that applicant ’s counsel had agreed to that test . Leave to appeal was refused .

The applicant applied for permission to appeal to ORG . She argued , inter alia , that the test of contempt of court reformulated by ORG was not consistent with the common law of contempt of court ; and that the reformulation of the offence , after evidence had been led and final submissions concluded , was not compatible with human rights principles and in particular with Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Convention .

On DATE the applicant ’s petition to appeal to ORG was refused because the application did not raise an arguable point of law . In particular , ORG concluded that a suggested distinction between a “ direction ” and an “ order ” was not tenable since the meaning of each depended on the context and both could mean the same ; and that the deliberate disobedience of a specific order of the judge not to use the Internet in connection with the case unquestionably amounted to contempt of court at common law .

From DATE to DATE the applicant was detained at FAC .