Ineta Ziemele;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicants , PERSON , PERSON , PERSON , Mr PERSON , PERSON , PERSON NORP , Mr PERSON , Mr PERSON and Mr PERSON are NORP nationals who were born in DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE , and DATE respectively and live in GPE , GPE . They were represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON , of ORG .

ORG , who intervened in the case in accordance with LAW , were represented by their Agent .

The applicants are relatives of PERSON , who died on DATE while resisting arrest by NORP coastguards . PERSON was the first applicant ’s husband , the second applicant ’s father , the third applicant ’s son and the remaining applicants’ brother . He was working as a fisherman off his home village of GPE , which is located on the seafront at the north - westernmost point of GPE , close to the border with GPE .

Early in DATE ORG in GPE ( “ the RBS ” ) registered numerous incursions into NORP waters in LOC by NORP fishermen ’s vessels . In all cases it informed the NORP border authorities , and the problem was discussed during a bilateral meeting on DATE . Data collected at the observation and radiolocation station in the border village of PERSON showed that one of the most frequent trespassers was the fishing vessel ORG domiciled at the mouth of LOC ( Mutludere ) .

By order of the NORP Minister of Agriculture the fishing of turbot in NORP territorial waters was prohibited DATE and DATE . In order to prevent possible poaching by NORP fishermen , on DATE the head of the ORG detached to the border area a “ ORG ” , which included CARDINAL coastguards under the command of Chief Inspector PERSON

At TIME on DATE the observation station in PERSON registered a fishing vessel , which had penetrated QUANTITY into NORP territorial waters . The fishermen on board were observed pulling fishing nets out of the water ; it appeared that the nets had been placed there earlier .

At TIME ORG was sent to intercept the vessel . Once the officers approached it , on board an inflatable motorboat , they recognised it as PERSON . There were CARDINAL people on board – PERSON and CARDINAL of his brothers , ORG and PERSON ( the eighth and ninth applicants ) .

When they spotted the coastguard boat , PERSON and PERSON , who were on deck , started cutting off the nets , and PERSON , at the helm , directed the PERSON towards NORP territorial waters . The coastguard boat caught up with their vessel . Using gesture , and once they were nearer , vocally in NORP and LANGUAGE , the coastguards gave orders to the fishermen to stop . The PERSON did not stop . Instead , PERSON steered it towards the coastguard boat , which was smaller , attempting to overturn and sink it . At the same time , using long wooden boathooks , and once the CARDINAL boats were close enough , PERSON and PERSON repeatedly attempted to hit the coastguards and puncture their boat ’s inflatable sides .

On seeing this , Chief Inspector PERSON gave his officers the order to fire warning shots . CARDINAL shots were fired . Although they were aimed into the air and not at anyone , some of them hit the ORG port side and the cabin at the helm . They did not injure anybody on board .

As this did not make the Ömer Reis-CARDINAL stop , and seeing that its crew continued behaving aggressively , attempting to puncture and sink the coastguard boat , Chief Inspector PERSON ordered his officers to board the fishing vessel .

The coastguards were wearing armoured life jackets , which did not permit them to also wear holsters . That is why , upon boarding the Ömer Reis-CARDINAL , they attached their weapons , Scorpio sub - machine guns , to special metal rings on their jackets . As ordered by Chief Inspector PERSON , the guns had their safety catches on . None of the guards had a gun in their hand .

Officer PERSON was the first one to board the fishing vessel , followed by Officer PERSON Their task was to immobilise and handcuff PERSON . They managed to wrestle him to the ground , after which Officer PERSON advanced towards the helm to attempt to stop the vessel . Officer PERSON and PERSON continued struggling on a pile of fishing nets . On several occasions during the fight PERSON attempted to grab Officer PERSON ’s gun , which had come unfastened from the ring on his jacket and was hanging by a short cord . Finally , Officer PERSON managed to immobilise PERSON and handcuff him . By that time another officer , ORG , had immobilised PERSON , and Officer PERSON was struggling with PERSON at the helm , attempting to stop the vessel . Chief Inspector PERSON had remained in the coastguard boat . At this point Chief Inspector PERSON received information that the CARDINAL boats were about to enter NORP territorial waters , and ordered his men to release the fishermen .

While Officer PERSON was removing PERSON handcuffs , the latter made sudden abrupt movements , pushing the officer back on to the fishing nets . PERSON immediately jumped forward . At the exact moment when he put his hands on PERSON , CARDINAL gunshots were heard . Officer PERSON heard PERSON groan and looked at his gun . It was between his legs ( he was kneeling ) , entangled in the fishing nets , its muzzle pointing towards PERSON ’s back . He took it and saw that it was set at automatic fire . He switched the safety catch back on . He stood up and went to the cabin , where he helped Officer PERSON immobilise PERSON and stop the fishing vessel .

NORP Immediately after that the officers took PERSON on to their boat and called PERSON to say that a man had been injured . Once on land , they transferred PERSON into the ambulance which had arrived . However , he died on the way to hospital .

DATE the Ömer Reis-CARDINAL was towed by a coastguard cutter to the port of GPE .

Criminal proceedings in connection with PERSON death were opened on DATE .

On DATE the investigator in charge of the case inspected the CARDINAL boats involved in the incident . It was noted that the Ömer Reis-CARDINAL was QUANTITY long and QUANTITY wide . CARDINAL dark - red stains were found on the deck . There was also a pile of turbot fishing nets ; when they were moved , CARDINAL cartridge cases fell out of them . On the walls of the small cabin at the helm there were CARDINAL bullet holes . Another bullet was found embedded in the vessel ’s port deck .

The coastguard boat was QUANTITY long and QUANTITY wide . Several traces of the impact of hard objects were observed on its left inflatable side .

The coastguards who had participated in the operation were interviewed on DATE . Officer PERSON stated that when the lethal shots were fired he had not initially been aware that they had come from his gun .

Officer PERSON said that after the fatal shots he had seen PERSON ’s gun caught in the fishing nets .

Officer PERSON stated that before boarding the fishing vessel he had been hit by one of the fishermen with a boathook . He had not heard the shots which had injured PERSON because at that moment he had been wrestling with PERSON ’s brother PERSON . He explained that he and his colleagues had been trained to respond to similar situations . Lastly , he said that he was very familiar with Scorpio sub - machine guns .

The group ’s commander , Chief Inspector PERSON , said that he had judged Scorpio sub - machine guns the most appropriate weapons to take for the operation because of their versatility . He explained that all members of the group had also been carrying smaller guns and that in the boat they had had an electroshock Taser . He said that during the operation he had been in constant contact with the observation station in PERSON and the ORG . He had sought and obtained the ORG ’s prior approval before ordering his men to fire warning shots .

Officer PERSON was once again examined on DATE , and Chief Inspector PERSON and ORG and GPE were examined on DATE . They reiterated the statements they had made earlier . Chief Inspector PERSON said in addition that he had ordered the warning shots because the fishermen were directly endangering his men ’s lives . Officer PERSON explained that he was not very familiar with Scorpio sub - machine guns . He said that he , ORG and PERSON had found these guns awkward to carry , as it had been impossible to wear holsters and they had had to attach the guns to their jackets .

Zayim and LOC were interviewed on DATE . They stated that they had not obeyed the coastguards’ order to stop because they believed that they were still in NORP territorial waters .

They were interviewed again on DATE . PERSON stated that he and his brother PERSON had not attempted to resist arrest . ORG said once again that he believed that the vessel had not left NORP territorial waters . Once the coastguard boat had approached , he had aimed to prevent a clash with it . He had not known what his brothers were doing in the rear part of the boat . Like his brother PERSON , he stated that the CARDINAL of them had done nothing to resist arrest .

The CARDINAL officers who had been on duty at the observation station in GPE in TIME of DATE were interviewed on DATE . They explained that they had observed the PERSON movements , and had kept Chief Inspector PERSON informed of them . They said that they had transferred to the ORG his request to be authorised to order warning shots , had some time later been told by him that a NORP fisherman had been wounded , and had then called an ambulance .

A post - mortem examination of PERSON body was carried out on DATE . It found CARDINAL gunshot wounds , situated close to each other , in the middle part of the back . The bullets had touched the heart , the liver , the lungs and the small intestines , thus causing death . There was another wound on PERSON head , caused by a hard object , which was unrelated to the cause of death .

Zayim and LOC were examined by a doctor on DATE . He observed a number of small bruises on their bodies . In addition , PERSON had a black eye and a small cut close to the left eyebrow .

Officer PERSON was examined on DATE . Both his hands were bruised and swollen .

A ballistics report was drawn up on DATE . It confirmed that the shots which had fatally wounded PERSON had been fired by the gun used by Officer PERSON , and concluded that they had been fired at a distance of CARDINAL . A combined medico - ballistic expert report dated DATE showed in addition that at the moment of the fatal shots PERSON had been lying on his right side , with the upper part of his body bent forwards . The report concluded further that the lethal shots had been fired within a very short time frame .

Several reconstructions of the scene of the incident staged on board the Ömer Reis-CARDINAL showed that Officer PERSON ’s gun could have fired a shot without anyone touching the trigger , if it was entangled in the fishing nets and at the moment when Officer PERSON was thrusting his body abruptly forwards . It was also shown to be possible , when the gun was being rubbed against a human body , for its switch to move to automatic mode . Lastly , it was shown that a shot could also be fired when the participant playing the role of the victim in the reconstruction attempted to grab the gun with his left arm stretched behind his back .

On DATE the prosecutor in charge of the case brought charges against Officer PERSON for causing death through negligence .

On DATE he decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings , considering that Officer PERSON had not committed any offence and that PERSON death had been a fortuitous event . The prosecutor pointed out , in particular , that Officer PERSON had been unable to foresee or prevent the firing of the shots .

The first and third applicants ( PERSON wife and mother ) , with the assistance of their legal representative in GPE , lodged an appeal . They argued that Officer PERSON had acted with criminal negligence . Upon their appeal , on DATE the decision of the prosecution was upheld by ORG . However , upon a further appeal by those applicants , on DATE the decision was quashed by ORG , which considered that it had not been sufficiently reasoned and that further evidence needed to be collected .

The prosecutor resumed the investigation of the case and in a new decision of CARDINAL DATE discontinued the criminal proceedings . On the basis of the evidence described above he concluded that Officer PERSON had not himself pulled the trigger of his gun , and that the lethal shots had been fired when PERSON had touched it while wrestling with the officer during his repeated attempts to take hold of the gun , or after the trigger had become entangled in the fishing nets . Either way , PERSON death had been a fortuitous event , which Officer PERSON could not have foreseen or prevented . He had abided by the relevant safety rules , most notably by switching the gun ’s safety catch on before boarding the PERSON . It was also significant that PERSON and his brothers had violently resisted arrest .

The first and third applicants appealed , contesting in particular the conclusion that PERSON could have pulled the trigger himself . On CARDINAL DATE ORG quashed the prosecutor ’s decision , finding that it was not sufficiently reasoned , and remitted the case .

Upon an appeal by the prosecution against ORG decision , on CARDINAL DATE ORG finally upheld the discontinuance of the criminal proceedings . It found that the prosecutor ’s decision was well reasoned and that there was no indication that Officer PERSON had committed an offence . It also dismissed the first and third applicants’ argument that Officer PERSON had been negligent because he had not been wearing a holster and , while struggling with PERSON , had left his gun hanging in front of him . It pointed out that Officer PERSON ’s health and life were in danger at the material time . Furthermore , he could not be held responsible for the fact that his gun had become unfastened from the ring on his jacket . The main responsibility for the incident was to be borne by PERSON , who had failed to obey the coastguards’ lawful orders .

The bringing of charges against Officer PERSON on DATE sparked a wave of protests by NORP , who called the prosecutor in charge of the case “ a traitor ” and Officer PERSON “ a hero ” . Journalists in GPE created an “ initiative committee ” in defence of the officer and adopted a declaration , stating that the bringing of charges against him “ would have a demotivating effect ” on the border police . On unspecified dates in DATE this declaration was sent to ORG , the President of the Republic , the Speaker of ORG , and other bodies . The “ initiative committee ” also started collecting signatures in support of Officer PERSON According to reports in the local media CARDINAL people signed the petition . According to the same reports , the mayors of GPE and PERSON and the president of the municipal council of GPE also signed the document .

NORP In DATE the municipal council of GPE made Officer PERSON , as well as his colleagues who had participated in the operation of DATE , honorary citizens of the city .

In DATE , following ORG decision of DATE remitting the case for further investigation ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , members of ORG representing the GPE constituency sent a letter to ORG , urging it to intervene in the criminal proceedings . Also in DATE the local newspaper PERSON claimed that the President of the Republic had met Officer PERSON ’s father and had promised to do whatever was in his power to ensure that his son would not be brought to trial .

ORG , in a judgment of DATE , upheld by ORG on DATE , convicted PERSON and ORG of disorderly conduct and poaching on DATE . PERSON was also convicted of causing a minor bodily injury to Officer PERSON , whom he had hit with a wooden boathook . Both brothers were sentenced to DATE imprisonment , suspended for DATE . PERSON was ordered to pay Officer PERSON MONEY ( ORG ) in compensation for non - pecuniary damage .


CASE OF MĂTĂSARU AND SAVIȚCHI v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11-1 - Freedom of peaceful assembly)

The applicants , who are husband and wife , were born in DATE and live in GPE .

On DATE the applicants were involved in a street protest as a result of which they were arrested and detained for TIME and fortyfive minutes . On DATE the first applicant was again involved in a street protest , as a result of which he was arrested and detained for TIME . Later both applicants were acquitted and the actions of the police were found to be unlawful . The facts concerning those protests were described in detail in PERSON and PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the first applicant organised again a street protest and was arrested again and detained for TIME . Later the applicant was acquitted and the actions of the police were found to be unlawful .

On DATE the ORG adopted a judgment in the case of ORG and PERSON ( cited above ) , in which it declared inadmissible the applicants’ complaints concerning the alleged breaches of their rights guaranteed by LAW on the ground of their failure to exhaust domestic remedies ( see PERSON and PERSON ( cited above , § DATE ) .

After that , the applicants brought a civil action under LAW ( on compensation for damage caused by illegal acts of the criminal investigation bodies , the prosecution authorities or the courts ) seeking compensation in respect of the breach of their rights guaranteed by ORG and CARDINAL of the Convention in regard to all CARDINAL street protests of DATE and DATE .

By a final judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG acknowledged the breach of the ORG rights guaranteed by ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the LAW and awarded them the equivalent of CARDINAL and CARDINAL ( ORG ) , respectively .


Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 34 - Victim);Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions);No violation of Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11-1 - Freedom of peaceful assembly);Non-pecuniary damage - award

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Ksenija Turković

The applicants live in ORG .

The applicants are former policemen . They were all involved in the conflict - resolution and peace - keeping operation in the zone of the armed Ossetian - Ingush conflict in DATE and DATE . As a consequence they were entitled to certain social payments .

The applicants sued ORG of ORG ( hereafter “ the regional internal - affairs department ” ) for social - payments arrears . On various dates in DATE or DATE ORG allowed their claims and ordered that the regional internal - affairs department pay the arrears . The dates of the judgments and the amounts of the awards are listed in the FAC .

The applicants submitted the writs of execution to ORG . However the ORG returned the writs of execution on the ground of lack of funds to pay the judgment debts .

The judgments in favour of all the applicants were eventually enforced DATE and DATE . The dates of payment in respect of each applicant are listed in the LOC .

All the applicants except Mr PERSON sued the regional internal - affairs department for pecuniary damage incurred through the belated enforcement of the judgments in their favour . On various dates in DATE ORG acknowledged that the delays in enforcement had violated the applicants’ rights and awarded each of them a sum to cover inflation losses sustained as a result . The awards were paid on various dates in DATE . CARDINAL of the applicants , Mr ORG , did not submit the writ of execution to ORG and did not therefore receive his award .

On DATE the applicants notified ORG of their intention to hold a demonstration in FAC in NORP to protest against the regional internal - affairs department ’s failure to settle the social - payments debt . The demonstration was scheduled to start on DATE and was announced as being of unlimited duration .

On DATE ORG refused to approve the venue and suggested that the demonstration be held in front of the PERSON theatre .

On DATE the applicants began their demonstration in FAC in front of ORG building . CARDINAL people participated in it . They put up tents and remained in DATE and night . They displayed placards and banners stating their criticisms and demands .

On DATE the NORP Town Legislature annulled the decision of DATE at the request of the regional internal - affairs department “ in connection with a risk of terrorist acts in the places of mass gatherings of people ” . It asked the regional internal - affairs department to take measures to break up the demonstration and restore public order in NORP square .

On DATE ORG declared the demonstration unlawful because it violated the rights of others . The court found that it hampered ORG access to public transport and to the cinema and officials’ access to the administrative buildings situated in FAC . The chanting of slogans by the applicants also disturbed the officials’ work . Moreover , the regional internal - affairs department had information about an expected outbreak of terrorist activities in the region . The mass gathering of people in the vicinity of the administrative buildings increased the risk of terrorist acts and other offences being committed and impeded the conduct of preventive operations by the law - enforcement agencies . The court further noted that ORG had ordered that all meetings and assemblies be held in front of the PERSON theatre ; therefore the demonstration in FAC was in breach of that order . Lastly , the court found that public gatherings of unlimited duration were not authorised by NORP law .

It appears from the videotape and press articles submitted by the applicants that on DATE the police ordered the protesters to disperse . As the protesters refused to stop the demonstration , the police dismantled the tents they had erected . The protesters , however , put the tents back up and continued their demonstration .

On DATE ORG of ORG upheld the judgment of DATE on appeal .

On DATE the ORG of ORG decreed that FAC in NORP was reserved for meetings , assemblies and demonstrations organised at the initiative of the authorities of ORG and the town of ORG . Other public gatherings were to be held at a venue to be determined by ORG .

On an unspecified date in DATE the protesters ended the demonstration .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Branko Lubarda;Georgios A. Serghides;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

He was employed by “ Betonjerka”- ORG , a socially - owned company based in PERSON ( hereinafter “ the debtor ” ) .

On DATE the ORG ordered the debtor to pay the applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions , plus the costs of the civil proceedings . On DATE this judgment became final .

On DATE upon the applicant ’s request to that effect , ORG ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the applicant the enforcement costs .

The Government in its observations maintained that the said judgment had been fully enforced by the domestic decisions of DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE respectively . The applicant did not contest this submission .

On DATE the ORG ordered the debtor to pay the applicant other specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions . In addition the domestic court ordered each party to pay its own costs of the civil proceedings . This judgment became final on DATE .

The said decision remains unenforced to the present date .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor .

On DATE , upon a submission to that effect , ORG recognized the applicant ’s respective claims .

On DATE ORG terminated the insolvency proceedings against the debtor , having decided to continue with the insolvency action against the debtor ’s estate .

The insolvency proceedings are still pending .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal complaining firstly about the fairness of the insolvency proceedings . Further , he requested ORG to adopt a decision obliging the respondent ORG to pay from its own funds his unpaid salaries . In particular , the applicant had referred only to the judgment which had been adopted in his favour on DATE . In so doing , the applicant also relied on the ORG ’s case - law related to the non - enforcement of domestic court decision rendered against socially - owned companies in GPE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal finding that it is not vested with the power of the insolvency court to enable the payments of the claims recognized in the insolvency proceedings .


André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Carlo Ranzoni;Erik Møse;Mārtiņš Mits;Síofra O’Leary

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in F. The President granted the applicant ’s request for her identity not to be disclosed to the public ( Rule CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) . She was represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Abigail Lofaro;András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Marko Bošnjak;Nona Tsotsoria;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

A robbery took place on CARDINAL DATE in the home of PERSON and PERSON ( the former is a lawyer by profession ) . According to the versions of the victims at the time , the robbery was carried out by CARDINAL hooded men who appeared to be under the effects of drugs . They had entered through the roof and sought to find the safe . Various items were stolen and the victims were injured while they were being held face down in the bedroom . According to PERSON during the robbery one of the robbers said , “ Give us the CARDINAL buckets of gold you told us you had in your possession ” . Further conversations between the robbers indicated that they had a southern NORP accent . When questioned after the incident the victims stated that they had not recognised anyone at the time , since they had been kept face down in the bedroom during the robbery . The Government contested the latter fact , relying on the version of events given by PERSON in DATE ( see below ) .

The applicant and his brother , like their father previously , had done work for the PERSON family as plumbers and electricians .

During the investigation Mr PERSON mentioned the applicant and his brother as possible people who had had access to his house and had been familiar with it , without indicating that he identified either of them as the robbers . Thus , despite the fact that the applicant had been questioned by the Police in DATE , neither of them had , at the time , or later , been charged in connection with this robbery and no criminal prosecution ever ensued because of the lack of any evidence pointing in their direction .

In DATE , the relationship between the brothers and PERSON broke down following PERSON failure to make payments to the applicant ’s company . Following this , in DATE ORG ( the company owned in part by the applicant ) instituted proceedings against Mr PERSON claiming payment for services rendered ( these proceedings were eventually withdrawn following payment of the outstanding amount ) .

The applicant alleged that pending the abovementioned proceedings , PERSON had started bad - mouthing the applicant to neighbours who had also suffered burglaries – stating that it had been the applicant , that is to say the electrician they all used , who had committed them . The PERSON noted that according to the evidence tendered by ORG , a neighbour of PERSON and PERSON ( see below ) , it had been a common perception that families who had been regular clients of the applicant had been robbed . The applicant highlighted that the same GPE , in crossexamination had twice confirmed that he had had no suspicions that the applicant had somehow been involved in the robbery .

DATE after the robbery , in DATE , PERSON and PERSON sued the applicant in civil proceedings for the damage resulting from the said robbery as , in retrospect , PERSON considered that he recognised the applicant as one of the robbers .

During the proceedings , the court heard evidence from PERSON ( including a lengthy affidavit ) and accepted an affidavit from PERSON wife . The applicant was unable to cross - examine PERSON on the basis of medical advice given by an ex parte doctor who had testified before the court to the effect that PERSON had been suffering from depression for DATE and that in DATE her state of health had become much worse ( she had been spending her days in bed not wanting to know about anything going on around her and had become dependent on others ) . He considered that there was no hope of this situation changing in the near future . When asked whether PERSON had been in a position to understand what she had been saying at the time of the incident , the ex parte doctor replied “ I think so , of course she was ” .

The applicant ’s request to have PERSON statement expunged from the record was refused .

In all , the evidence presented before the court consisted of the following :

On behalf of the applicant :

- The affidavit of the applicant , as well as his oral testimony ( where he noted the good relationship that had existed between him and the plaintiff and categorically denied any involvement in the robbery , during which he had been at home sleeping , and claimed that the plaintiffs had instituted the case only in response to the proceedings his company had lodged against Mr Z. , in which they had eventually been successful ; following these proceedings Mr PERSON had started telling neighbours who had been robbed that he ( the applicant ) had been responsible ; he related that the morning following the incident he had been surprised to see the police on the road at the Salibas’ shop , close to Mr Z. ’s house and , after hearing what had happened , he had repeatedly tried to call Mr Z. to offer a helping hand . Since he had not been able to get through , he had gone to the house where he had been greeted warmly at the entrance by PERSON , who had recounted what had happened during TIME including a reference to QUANTITY persons who Mr PERSON had claimed had been watching the roof intermittently for a period ; DATE , while the applicant had been visiting a relative in hospital with his family , they had also visited PERSON ; PERSON had been happy to see him ( the applicant ) and had told him not to worry about the money he had been owed as only a little had been stolen and it had not even been worth the beating they got ; the applicant further noted that he had been surprised about PERSON written testimony , given the relationship of mutual respect they had had , and he wished to cross - examine her ; he further recounted how he had been called out to PERSON house during TIME only once , and that he had never fallen off a ladder , contrary to what had been alleged by Mr Z. He further referred to certain jobs completed in the house and to a number of named individuals who could have seen the safe ; he stated that the only times he had avoided Mr PERSON had been when the latter had failed to pay him ; he noted that contrary to what Mr PERSON had alleged , he had had no connection to arms or drugs ( save for possessing a hunting rifle with the relevant police permits , which he had no longer used ) ; he stated that he had not stopped work on CARDINAL of PERSON properties of his own motion , but because PERSON had told him to do so ; the applicant had also explained this to PERSON ( an architect ) ; the applicant also contradicted various elements of PERSON affidavit ; in particular he denied ever having been told about buckets of gold by PERSON , and reference to such gold had only been made by PERSON during the proceedings lodged against him , and by the police one time when they had questioned him ( the applicant ) ) ;

- The affidavit of the applicant ’s wife ( she recounted that the applicant had only left the house twice during TIME since CARDINAL – once to go to the PERSON family ’s premises following an urgent call - out , and once to go to another client ; She also recounted their visit to PERSON after the robbery and in what circumstances they had met prior to the robbery ; she lastly explained how surprised and hurt she was about Mr. PERSON ’s actions in their regard ) .

- The CARDINAL affidavits of the applicant ’s CARDINAL brothers ( F. and S. ) and the oral testimony of F. ( F. confirmed that he had worked everywhere in the house , including next to the safe , together with other workmen from his company and that other named individuals had had access to the house as they had also rendered services there ; he also denied that he had ever spoken to PERSON ( the PERSON family ’s caretaker ) about payments due , and that he had ever taken anything from PERSON without permission , contrary to what had been alleged by him . He further stated that when questioned by the police DATE after the incident they had asked him whether he had been aware of the position of the safe and the buckets of gold ; in his oral testimony he confirmed that he had fallen off a ladder once in PERSON house contrary to PERSON statement alleging that it had been the applicant who had fallen ) ; ( PERSON testified that the brothers had stopped work on CARDINAL of the projects because PERSON had not confirmed that he had wished them to continue and had failed to pay sums already due , and in respect of which they had thus sued PERSON also contradicted other events recounted by Mr PERSON in his testimony and noted that he had never discussed due payments with PERSON )

- The CARDINAL affidavits of the applicant ’s CARDINAL sisters ( who denied ever having made certain statements to PERSON , which he had imputed to them in his testimony , or having gone to his house , or even having known him ) ;

- The cross - examination of Mr PERSON ( at CARDINAL hearings ) ;

- The crossexamination of the police investigator , PERSON ( at CARDINAL hearings ) ;

- The cross - examination of a neighbour , PERSON

On behalf of the plaintiffs :

- The CARDINAL affidavits of Mr Z.

In the first affidavit Mr PERSON explained the history and the good relationship he had had with the applicant ’s family and how much the PERSON family had cared for and trusted the applicant . He stated that at the time of the robbery the PERSON brothers had been working on project NORP but works had been stalled ; that the applicant ’s sisters had gone to his office worried and in fear of the applicant , who they said was clever and armed ; PERSON explained that DATE before the robbery the applicant had been working at the house , including on the roof , and at CARDINAL point , while distracted , the applicant had fallen off a ladder ; PERSON explained that on some occasions both the applicant and his brother had had access to the door of his roof and had known how to open it , and had also worked close to the safe . Mr PERSON stated that in DATE it had been only the applicant who had attended to jobs in the house and who had come during TIME , coming promptly and not charging them , even though he usually charged for all his services , even minor ones – thus , he had been the only one in the world , and nobody else , who had the knowledge of the house as it would be at TIME time . Mr PERSON related that on CARDINAL occasion , where payment to the applicant was likely to be delayed , he had reassured the applicant by referring to his ( Mr Z. ’s ) numerous immovable properties and told the applicant precisely to “ rest assured you have CARDINAL buckets of gold as guarantee ” . Mr PERSON noted that he had never used these words with anyone else and that the applicant had appeared to take him literally ; he stated that later on the applicant had also admitted to these words having been uttered to him . Mr PERSON recounted the robbery : how , while the Z couple had been asleep , they had heard chaos in the entrance of the house and CARDINAL man had run through the corridor directly towards them and asked him for gold . Another CARDINAL men had followed and kept the couple in the bedroom in the dark ; CARDINAL of them ( who injured his wife while holding her on the ground ) had again asked for gold stating that they would go and consume drugs , while the other had repeated “ give us the gold you told us you have ” . Mr PERSON stated that he had recognised the words on the spot , as those he had once uttered to the applicant . Mr PERSON noted that the CARDINAL people who had held them in the bedroom had appeared to be under the effects of drugs ; while they had been asking for gold it had become clear that they had been targeting the safe . TIME another voice had called out from the end of the corridor that they could leave and so they had done so . Mr PERSON stated that once the robbers had left the bedroom he had followed them and recognised the applicant as one of the CARDINAL or CARDINAL men - “ I recognised him with my eyes , after already knowing that he was CARDINAL of them through my ears ” . Mr PERSON held that the applicant had been the only one to have remained silent . Having known the applicant closely and worked with him for around twelve years , PERSON felt that he could recognise his mannerisms , stature , height and behaviour , as well as his movements and head inclinations , which corresponded to what he had seen . Mr PERSON continued to explain that it had been natural not to say anything in that moment of shock and fear , but that :

“ I knew from the start that he was part of the group because I was told so and because I recognised him , he had kept his distance but I saw him leave in the car with the others as if [ qisu ] the bottom part of his face uncovered ” .

While various rooms had been searched , only the contents of the safe had been stolen . Mr PERSON explained that one of the robbers had exclaimed “ there it is ” and they had initially tried to remove the safe , but then they found the key to it in PERSON purse , which as a habit she regularly kept on the armchair in the sitting room . Confronted with this situation Mr PERSON reiterated that on that date the applicant and his brother had been the CARDINAL persons who had known about the safe as they had been the only people who had entered that part of the house on multiple occasions since DATE , and the louvres had been always closed . Mr PERSON recalled how after the robbery numerous people had come and seen the safe , but not the applicant or his brothers . The applicant had had all the knowledge necessary , including how to open the roof door , where to cut the phone line , where to find the purse , and other useful details to facilitate such a robbery , which had taken place in TIME during TIME . Mr PERSON continued to explain the situation after the robbery . He stated that the working relationship had ended and that the applicant had gone to the house TIME after the robbery ; he had offered no help and had just shown his face ; nor had he offered any help when he had gone to visit PERSON in hospital , with his wife and daughter who , had not been known to the couple . Mr PERSON testified that DATE after the robbery he had gone to buy a bulb from the applicant , who had expressed no sympathy . Mr PERSON stated that subsequently the applicant had called him to tell him he would no longer work on project NORP , and PERSON noted that the architect ORG and their caretaker PERSON had said that the applicant had refused to work for Mr PERSON any longer as he had no longer had money , and that he had failed to pay the brothers money due for services rendered . It had also been strange that sometime after the robbery , Mr. Z had sent invoices claiming such fees and had started avoiding the applicant . Yet in DATE the applicant had sent DATE card and in DATE invited them to his daughter ’s wedding . Mr PERSON further referred to various robberies which had taken place in households in the neighbourhood which had been all clients of the applicant . He stated that PERSON had told him that the applicant had been the last person in the room before she had found her jewellery box missing . He reiterated the changed attitude of the applicant towards him following the robbery and had even instituted civil claims in judicial proceedings . The PERSON brothers had also not told him that their father had died , even though he had been the testamentary executor nominated by their late father . According to Mr PERSON the applicant had known that had they not been sure of his responsibility , they would not have instituted proceedings against him .

In a later affidavit , Mr PERSON clarified that it had been CARDINAL of the sisters who had gone to him in fear of their brother . He considered the applicant ’s wife ’s affidavit as totally untruthful ; likewise the applicant ’s ORG , in particular in connection with the reasons why work on project NORP had stopped DATE he noted that the real reason had been the robbery and the fact that the applicant had realised he had been caught – and in connection with their exchanges with PERSON also considered the applicant ’s testimony to have been untruthful and therefore an indication of guilt , and indicated a number of lies therein .

- The affidavit of PERSON ( to the effect that robbers had targeted the safe , which they had tried to remove entirely until they had found the key to it in her handbag ; she stated that absolutely nobody had known about the safe before the robbery as nobody had entered that very private area of the house ; she further stated that it had been only the applicant who DATE in DATE before the robbery – had continuously and at all times of day and night entered all parts of the house as he had been their trusted handyman , and that sometimes he had been accompanied by his brother and that they had both known about the safe . She reiterated that it had been only the applicant who had had access to the safe and had known the house by TIME , knowledge which neither his brother nor the domestic help had had . She explained that she had been told that after the incident the applicant had gone to their house and to visit her in hospital with his family ; he had also sent a DATE card and invited the couple to his daughter ’s wedding ; however he had not wanted to continue working on CARDINAL of PERSON projects and had eventually sued them in court without giving them prior notice . She considered this to be odd given their good relationship , which had dated back DATE , and she thus considered that they had had something to hide . ) ;

- The affidavit of the architect on project NORP , ORG ( who stated that the reason given by the applicant for stopping the works on project NORP had been that Mr PERSON had had no money ) ;

- The affidavit of ORG an employee of the PERSON family ( who testified that the PERSON brothers had been the trusted electricians and plumbers of the PERSON family and they had stopped working on any of the PERSON family ’s properties after the robbery ( unlike other workers ) ; he stated that the brothers had once asked him why Mr PERSON had not been paying them as PERSON had told them that compared to the gold he had not even a breadcrumb had been taken . Another time the brothers had told him ( PERSON ) that they had not wanted to work for Mr PERSON anymore as he had had no money . When he ( PERSON ) had told PERSON what the brothers had told him , PERSON had told PERSON that he had once told the applicant not to worry if he had not paid up immediately as he had had CARDINAL buckets of gold as a guarantee for any outstanding debt . Mr PERSON had explained to him ( PERSON ) that the applicant had taken him literally and that the applicant had expected to find more than he had actually found in the safe ; PERSON also stated that he had never entered that private part of the house where the safe had been . Lastly , he denied participation in the robbery ) ;

- The affidavits of CARDINAL neighbours , GPE and GPE ( ORG stated that he and other neighbours had been robbed while being clients of the applicant who ran a shop on the same road where they lived DATE this fact was known in the area ) ;

- Evidence of police inspectors LOC and GPE ( LOC confirmed that at the time of the incident they had not known who the robbers had been : PERSON stated that the investigators had spoken about the applicant in DATE and that subsequently he had been questioned ( amongst others – CARDINAL people altogether ) as a person with the knowhow to commit such a robbery , as well as a result of PERSON claim to the effect that he had mentioned the buckets of gold only to the applicant . ORG also stated that PERSON had said that CARDINAL of the CARDINAL robbers had spoken during the incident ) ;

- The cross - examination of the applicant ’s CARDINAL brothers and CARDINAL of his sisters

- Breakdown of the plaintiff ’s claim , confirmed under oath by PERSON , and a number of supporting documents .

By a CARDINAL - page judgment of DATE ORG ( FAC ) , in its civil jurisdiction , considered that the applicant had taken part in the robbery and therefore ordered him to pay damages yet to be quantified , and requested that the plaintiffs submit a claim . The court admitted that there had been various inconsistencies in the testimony of Mr DATE for example statements that the applicant had been silent and yet that the victim had recognised him through his sense of hearing , as well as his statement that someone had told him that it had been the applicant . The court further noted that many of PERSON arguments indicating that the applicant was implicated had weakened his version . These arguments based the applicant ’s guilt on the fact that i ) he had fallen off a ladder ; ii ) that he had invited PERSON and PERSON to his daughter ’s wedding ; iii ) that he had not informed PERSON and PERSON about the demise of his father ; iv ) that he had been paid for work by means of land ; v ) that he had sent the PERSON family a postcard ; vi ) that the applicant had fallen out with his brothers ; and vii ) that the applicant had been “ silent and absent ” . Indeed these repeated arguments had been far - fetched and banal , usually an indication that an individual was not convinced of his statement . The court noted that the only established facts were that the robber had known both the house ( allowing him to move comfortably within it and find what he wanted ) and PERSON ( giving the robber a reason to remain silent during the robbery ) . While the applicant had not been the only one to have had these traits , the applicant had been one of the few who had had them . Furthermore , the robbers had known about the “ buckets of gold ” , which PERSON had allegedly mentioned to the applicant . In the court ’s view the robbers had either known this from the applicant and , if so , the applicant would have had no other reason to share this information apart from bad intentions , or the robber had actually been the applicant himself . The court noted that this unfortunately indicated that PERSON had used this factor for the identification of the applicant , and it would have been better to have solely relied on visual identification .

Nevertheless , the court considered Mr PERSON ’s testimony reliable on the basis that identification could be based on mannerisms , movements and a silhouette , even if the face and voice remained hidden . It concluded that the applicant “ had taken part in the robbery ” and in application of the civil code was responsible for the damages suffered by the claimants .

By a decree of the same date the court ordered Mr Z. to lodge a schedule of damage within DATE .

By means of an affidavit of CARDINAL DATE , confirmed under oath by PERSON , the PERSON family claimed damage amounting to MONEY ( ORG ) covering the items and money stolen ( including a list of jewellery drawn up with the assistance of a professional who had not taken an oath ) and the expenses to repair the damage caused to the house . They further claimed medical expenses of LAW in relation to the injuries suffered .

On DATE the applicant made submissions on this point requesting that the court not allow the affidavit of CARDINAL DATE as evidence on the grounds that the stage of putting forward evidence had been closed DATE and Mr PERSON had declared that he no longer had any evidence to submit .

By a judgment of DATE , ORG ( FAC ) , in its civil jurisdiction , ordered the applicant to pay ORG CARDINAL in damages , specifically for the EUR CARDINAL in stolen items and cash and for the damage done to the house , as declared by PERSON ; and ORG CARDINAL in medical expenses . The court noted that the victims were not required to have receipts of the items obtained over DATE or proof of how much cash they had had in the house . In such circumstances the best proof was the GPE declaration under oath , the veracity of which ( after having seen the house ) the court had no reason to doubt . Thus , damages for items stolen had to be granted on the basis of PERSON claim . However , as to the medical expenses , while it was true that the claim had also been made under oath , given that the expenses had been incurred after the robbery and after the couple had already decided to sue , the court considered that the claimants should have kept receipts of such expenses and therefore made this award arbitrium boni viri .

By a decree of DATE the court refused the applicant ’s request not to allow the submission of the claim for expenses rendered by means of an affidavit not confirmed under oath by the ex parte expert and submitted after the stage for submissions of evidence had closed .

On DATE , the applicant appealed against all the above decisions . In his appeal application and again orally during the appeal hearing he asked the court to allow his brother to appear in court ( to show that the victim could not differentiate between the CARDINAL brothers – see paragraph CARDINAL above in connection with the testimonies concerning the ladder incident ) . The appeal application read as follows :

“ At this stage , the plaintiff is humbly making a formal request to ORG to allow the applicant to produce as evidence before it his brother [ ORG ] in order for the court to be able to confirm the above ... ”

The Government contested the fact that the written request had been repeated orally , as no such record had been found in the acts of the proceedings . ORG gave no reply to this request .

ORG , by a judgment of DATE , reiterated that it was well known that it was not for it to alter the assessment of evidence in the absence of compelling reasons . It noted that for civil proceedings to reach a finding it sufficed for a judge to have a “ moral certainty ” , as opposed to proof beyond reasonable doubt as required in criminal proceedings . It was true that a more rigorous test was required when a person was being accused of a crime in the context of civil proceedings , particularly when the issue was the identity of the person . However , NORP law did not provide what was necessary for identification , only what was not necessary , thus leaving it to the judge to decide according to his discretion . In the present case , the whole case depended on PERSON identification of the applicant , which the firstinstance court had chosen to believe despite the inconsistencies and contradictions in his and PERSON testimonies . In this connection one had to bear in mind that the memory of a victim of a violent robbery could suffer psychological effects which may result in inconsistencies . Having examined the acts of the proceedings and the applicant ’s submissions , it considered that it need not depart from the first - instance court ’s findings because the applicant ’s arguments were secondary to the actual identification of the applicant and were therefore not justified .

As to the dismissal of the applicant ’s objection in relation to the claim for damages which were allowed at a later stage , the court considered that the claim was not new evidence as such and it was the only proof of the damage that had been caused . Moreover , it had been the court which had requested that Mr PERSON lodge the claim and the applicant had had the possibility of making submissions in reply , thus no prejudice had been caused .

As to the award of damages , ORG noted that PERSON testimony had been made under oath ; the list of jewellery had been drawn up with the assistance of an expert ( although he had not confirmed it under oath ) ; thus , PERSON could not be blamed for not presenting further evidence of the damage , particularly since some items had been inherited and others purchased long before , as well as because certain documents had also been in the safe and had been stolen during the robbery . Mr. PERSON had not valued the items himself and had appropriately engaged a jeweller to perform the evaluation . Had the applicant had doubts as to that person ’s expertise , he could have , at the relevant time , challenged him and called him as a witness .

The applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings claiming a violation of , inter alia , LAW .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( FAC ) , in its constitutional jurisdiction , rejected the applicant ’s claims .

It considered that the applicant had not been found guilty of a criminal offence , but was responsible for damages arising as a result of that crime . In consequence the proceedings remained under civil law and the burden of proof remained that used for civil cases , namely a balance of probabilities , and did not require a more onerous degree of proof . It noted that the first court had assessed the evidence available and considered that the identification of the applicant had been convincingly established ; ORG found no reason to alter that conclusion . Thus there was nothing which indicated a breach of the applicant ’s rights .

As to the applicant ’s inability to cross - examine PERSON , it noted that there had been a valid reason , namely her poor health as confirmed by her doctor , and the applicant had had the opportunity to comment on her written testimony . In its view there had been nothing arbitrary in the court ’s decision to allow that statement , as it had been acting within its discretion . Furthermore , the applicant had not appealed against this matter before ORG . As to the refusal of the appeal court to call for his brother , it noted that it was not ORG role to re - examine witnesses and the applicant ’s brother had already given testimony in written and oral form at first instance . As to the refusal not to allow the “ late ” claim for damages , it found that this fell within the court ’s discretion to proceed with the case in the way it deemed fit in the interests of justice . Lastly , no issue arose from the courts’ acceptance of an evaluation of damage which had not been confirmed under oath by the expert , and such an evaluation fell within the discretion of the courts . It concluded that the applicant ’s rights had not been breached .

The applicant appealed .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG also rejected the applicant ’s claims . It considered that in the civil proceedings the first - instance court had had no doubt about Mr Z. ’s testimony and his identification of the applicant and nothing indicated that that court had not taken into consideration all the necessary evidence for its assessment . Furthermore , ORG had not found there were compelling reasons to alter that decision .

As to the failure of ORG to hear evidence from the applicant ’s brother , it considered that although this request had been made in writing amongst other pleadings in the appeal application , it had not been reiterated in the concluding requests of the appeal application . There was also no note in TIME of the hearings that this matter had been raised orally . In any event , the applicant ’s brother had given testimony at first instance and , given that such a decision fell within the discretion of the courts , the applicant had not proved that the failure to re - examine the witness had caused him prejudice .

As to the inability of the applicant to cross - examine PERSON , ORG noted that her testimony ( unlike that of her husband ) had not referred to the identification of the applicant , which had been nearly the only factor on which the civil court had based its decision . Thus , no prejudice had been caused to the applicant . It followed that no issue of equality of arms arose as a result of the CARDINAL procedural steps examined above .

As to the decision on the damage , ORG considered that the principle of onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit non ei qui negat had been respected , as the civil court had opined that the damage had been proved by Mr Z.

According to the documents submitted , following the above judgments the applicant became extremely depressed and unfit for work . He was thus excused from work and began to receive a disability pension . He considered that had he continued to work , he would have earned much more . According to the ORG the applicant was certified as unfit for work on DATE and retired when he was CARDINAL and has since then been in receipt of a pension .

On DATE Mr and PERSON made a request for a judicial sale by auction of property belonging to the applicant in order to have the courts’ judgment enforced . Another such request was made on DATE .

The applicant attempted to obtain the entire case file concerning the civil proceedings ; however , he was informed that it had gone missing from ORG ; the applicant lodged the application before this ORG with the documents in his possession . The Government located the file following communication of the application and submitted it to the ORG .

DATE . In DATE , since they had not yet received payment from the applicant , the PERSON family instituted civil proceedings against the applicant ’s brother PERSON , asking the court to declare him responsible for the same robbery and asking the court to order ( in solidum with the applicant ) the payment of the same damages liquidated by ORG in its judgment of DATE .

NORP The photos submitted to this Court by the applicant show , in particular , a difference in height and hair colour between the applicant and his brother .


CASE OF JONES AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court)

George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Ledi Bianku;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney;Phillips of Worth Matravers;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

On DATE , while he was living and working in GPE , PERSON was slightly injured when a bomb exploded outside a bookshop in GPE . He alleges that the following day he was taken from hospital by agents of GPE and unlawfully detained for DATE . During that time he was tortured by a Lieutenant Colonel PERSON . In particular , he alleges he was beaten with a cane on his palms , feet , arms and legs ; slapped and punched in the face ; suspended for prolonged periods by his arms ; shackled at his ankles ; subjected to sleep deprivation ; and given mind - altering drugs .

Mr PERSON returned to GPE where a medical examination found he had injuries consistent with his account and where he was diagnosed with severe post - traumatic stress disorder .

On DATE Mr Jones commenced proceedings in ORG against “ ORG GPE ” and Lieutenant Colonel PERSON , claiming damages , inter alia , for torture . In the particulars of claim he referred to Lieutenant Colonel PERSON as a servant or agent of GPE . Service was effected on GPE via its then solicitors , but the solicitors made it clear that they had no authority to accept service of the claim on Lieutenant Colonel PERSON .

On DATE GPE applied to have the claim struck out on the grounds that it , and its servants and agents , were entitled to immunity and that the LANGUAGE courts had no jurisdiction . Mr PERSON applied for permission to serve the claim on Lieutenant Colonel PERSON by an alternative method . In his judgment of DATE , a Master of the High Court held that GPE was entitled to immunity under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . He also held that Lieutenant Colonel PERSON was similarly entitled to immunity under that LAW and refused permission to allow service by an alternative method . Mr PERSON appealed to ORG .

Mr PERSON and Mr PERSON were arrested in GPE in DATE ; PERSON was arrested there in DATE . All CARDINAL applicants alleged that , while in custody , they were subjected to sustained and systematic torture , including beatings QUANTITY , arms , legs and head , and sleep deprivation . PERSON alleged he was anally raped . The applicants were released and returned to GPE on DATE . Each obtained medical reports which concluded that their injuries were consistent with their accounts .

The applicants decided to commence proceedings in ORG against the CARDINAL individuals they considered to be responsible : CARDINAL policemen , the deputy governor of the prison where they were held , and the Minister of the Interior who was alleged to have sanctioned the torture . They therefore applied for permission to serve their claim on the CARDINAL individuals out of the jurisdiction . On DATE this was refused by the same Master who had heard Mr PERSON ’s claim , on the basis of his previous ruling in respect of PERSON . However , the Master acknowledged that he had enjoyed the benefit of fuller argument than on the applications relating to Mr PERSON ’s claim , and said :

“ [ H]ad the matter come before me as a free - standing application , without my having decided the PERSON case ... , I might have been tempted to give permission to serve out of the jurisdiction on the basis that it seems to me that , having heard the arguments , that there is a case to be answered by these defendants as to whether there is jurisdiction in these courts over them . ”

The applicants appealed to ORG with the leave of the Master .

NORP The CARDINAL cases were joined and on DATE ORG published its judgment . It unanimously dismissed PERSON appeal from the decision of the Master to refuse permission to serve GPE outside the jurisdiction . However , it allowed the appeals in respect of the refusal of permission in each case to serve the individual defendants .

As regards the immunity of GPE , Lord Justice PERSON , with whom Lord PERSON and Lord Justice PERSON agreed , refused to depart from this ORG ’s ruling in PERSON the GPE [ ORG ] , no . ORG , ECHR DATE . He further found that LAW of LAW and Other Cruel , Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ( “ the Convention against Torture ” – see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , which obliges a Contracting State to ensure that a victim of an act of torture obtains redress , could not be interpreted as imposing an obligation on a State to provide redress for acts of torture when those acts were committed by another State in that other ORG .

In respect of the immunity of the individual defendants , PERSON considered the case - law of the domestic courts and courts of other jurisdictions , which recognised ORG immunity ratione materiae in respect of acts of agents of the ORG . However , he noted that none of these cases was concerned with conduct which was to be regarded as outside the scope of any proper exercise of sovereign authority or with international crime , let alone with systematic torture . He did not accept that the definition of torture in LAW as an act “ by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity ” ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) was fatal to the applicants’ claims :

“ DATE . ... It seems doubtful that the phrase ‘ acting in an official GPE qualifies the reference to ‘ a public official’ . The types of purpose for which any pain or suffering must be inflicted ... would appear to represent a sufficient limitation in the case of a public official . Be that as it may , the requirement that the pain or suffering be inflicted by a public official does no more in my view than identify the author and the public context in which the author must be acting . It does not lend to the acts of torture themselves any official or governmental character or nature , or mean that it can in any way be regarded as an official function to inflict , or that an official can be regarded as representing the state in inflicting , such pain or suffering . Still less does it suggest that the official inflicting such pain or suffering can be afforded the cloak of state immunity ... The whole tenor of LAW is to underline the individual responsibility of state officials for acts of torture ... ”

Mance LJ did not consider it significant that Lieutenant Colonel PERSON had been described in PERSON claim as the “ servant or agent ” of GPE . Nor did he accept that general differences between criminal and civil law justified a distinction in the application of immunity in the CARDINAL contexts . He noted that ORG in PERSON ( No . CARDINAL ) ( see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) had considered that there would be no immunity from criminal prosecution in respect of an individual officer who had committed torture abroad in an official context . It was not easy to see why civil proceedings against an alleged torturer could be said to involve a greater interference in the internal affairs of a foreign ORG than criminal proceedings against the same person . It was also incongruous that if an alleged torturer was within the jurisdiction of the forum ORG , he would be prosecuted pursuant to LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and no immunity could be claimed , but the victim of the alleged torture would be unable to pursue any civil claim . Furthermore , there was no basis for assuming that , in civil proceedings , a ORG could be made liable to indemnify or otherwise support one of its officials proved to have committed systematic torture .

Mance LJ considered that whether any claim in the NORP courts against individuals could proceed was better determined not by reference to immunity , but by reference to whether it was appropriate for the LANGUAGE courts to exercise jurisdiction . A number of factors were relevant to the assessment of this question , including the sensitivity of the issues involved and the general power of the LANGUAGE courts to decline jurisdiction on the ground that GPE was an inappropriate forum for the litigation .

In considering the impact of LAW found important distinctions between a ORG ’s claim to immunity ratione personae , in issue in AlAdsani ( cited above ) , and a ORG ’s claim to immunity ratione materiae in respect of its officials , in issue in the present cases . Firstly , he considered it impossible to identify any settled international principle affording the ORG the right to claim immunity in respect of claims directed against an official , rather than against the ORG , its Head of ORG or diplomats . He was of the view that the legislation and case - law of GPE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) militated strongly against any such settled principle and supported a contrary view . In so far as counsel for the Government purported to refer to evidence of settled practice , PERSON noted that the case - law to which he had referred related either to the immunity of the ORG itself or to the immunity of individual officials for alleged misconduct that bore no relationship in nature or gravity to the international crime of systematic torture . He considered the dicta in the separate opinion of Judges PERSON , PERSON and PERSON to the judgment of ORG in the “ FAC ” case ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) to provide further confirmation that there was no settled international practice in this area .

Mance LJ explained that where , under LAW , a ORG had created a domestic remedy for torture in the ORG where that torture was committed , other national courts could be expected to refuse to exercise jurisdiction . However , where there was no adequate remedy in the ORG where the systematic torture occurred , it might be regarded as disproportionate to maintain a blanket refusal of recourse to the civil courts of another jurisdiction . He acknowledged that the courts of CARDINAL ORG were not to adjudicate lightly upon the internal affairs of another ORG , but considered that there were many circumstances , particularly in the context of human rights , where national courts did have to consider and form a view on the position in , or conduct of , foreign GPE .

Mance LJ concluded that giving blanket effect to a foreign ORG ’s claim to ORG immunity ratione materiae in respect of a ORG official alleged to have committed acts of systematic torture could deprive the right of access to a court under LAW real meaning in a case where the victim of torture had no prospect of recourse in the ORG whose officials had committed the torture . He therefore allowed the ORG appeals in respect of the individual defendants and remitted them for further argument , concluding :

“ CARDINAL . ... [ I]t seems to me that any absolute view of immunity must at the very least yield in the face of assertions of systematic torture to a more nuanced or proportionate approach . As it is , having regard to the [ ORG ] , it is sufficient to decide this appeal that , whether issues of state immunity are or are not treated as theoretically separate from issues of jurisdiction in LANGUAGE law , the permissibility , appropriateness and proportionality of exercising jurisdiction ought to be determined at one and the same time . Such a conclusion reflects the importance attaching in DATE ’s world and in current international thinking and jurisprudence to the recognition and effective enforcement of individual human rights . It fits harmoniously with the position already achieved in relation to criminal proceedings . It caters for our obligation under article CARDINAL of the [ Convention ] not to deny access to our courts , in circumstances where it would otherwise be appropriate to exercise jurisdiction applying domestic jurisdictional principles , unless to do so would be in pursuit of a legitimate aim and proportionate . ... ”

In his concurring judgment , Lord PERSON agreed with the conclusions of PERSON as regards both the claim against GPE and the claims against the individual officials . In particular , he considered that the judgment in PERSON ( No . CARDINAL ) ( see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) had shown that torture could no longer fall within the scope of the official duties of a ORG official . It therefore followed that if civil proceedings were brought against individuals for acts of torture in circumstances where the ORG was immune from suit , there could be no suggestion that the ORG would be vicariously liable : it was the personal responsibility of the individuals , not that of the ORG , which was in issue .

On the approach of this ORG , he commented :

“ CARDINAL . Had the Grand Chamber been considering a claim for state immunity in relation to claims brought against individuals , I do not believe that there would have been a majority in favour of the view that this represented a legitimate limitation on the right to access to a court under Article CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) . Had the ORG shared the conclusions that we have reached on this appeal , it would have held that there was no recognised rule of public international law that conferred such immunity . Had it concluded that there was such a rule , I consider that it would have been likely to have held that it would not be proportionate to apply the rule so as to preclude civil remedies sought against individuals . ”

GPE appealed to ORG against the decision of ORG in respect of the individual defendants and Mr PERSON appealed against the decision of ORG in respect of his claim against GPE itself . On DATE , ORG unanimously allowed GPE appeal and dismissed the appeal by Mr Jones .

Lord PERSON considered that there was a “ wealth of authority ” in GPE and elsewhere to show that a ORG was entitled to claim immunity for its servants or agents and that the ORG ’s right to immunity could not be circumvented by suing them instead . In some borderline cases there could be doubt whether the conduct of an individual , although a servant or agent , had a sufficient connection with a ORG to entitle it to claim immunity for his conduct . However , in his view , these were not borderline cases . Lieutenant Colonel PERSON was sued as a servant or agent of GPE and there was no suggestion that his conduct was not in discharge or purported discharge of his duties . The CARDINAL defendants in the second case were public officials and the alleged conduct took place in public premises during a process of interrogation .

Further , referring to ORG ( ILC ) ORG on ORG ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) , Lord PERSON said that “ international law does not require , as a condition of a ORG ’s entitlement to claim immunity for the conduct of its servant or agent , that the latter should have been acting in accordance with his instructions or authority ” . The fact that conduct was unlawful or objectionable was not , of itself , a ground for refusing immunity .

In order to succeed in their ORG claim , Lord PERSON explained that the applicants had to establish CARDINAL propositions . Firstly , they had to show that LAW was engaged by the grant of immunity ; Lord PERSON was prepared to assume , based on this ORG ’s judgment in AlAdsani , cited above , that it was . Secondly , they had to show that the grant of immunity denied them access to a court ; Lord PERSON was satisfied that it plainly would . Thirdly , the applicants had to show that the restriction was not directed to a legitimate objective and was disproportionate .

Lord PERSON disagreed with the applicants’ submission that torture could not be a governmental or official act since , under LAW , torture had to be inflicted by or with the connivance of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Although the applicants referred to a substantial body of authority showing that the courts of GPE would not recognise acts performed by individual officials as being carried out in an official capacity for the purposes of immunity if those acts were contrary to a jus cogens prohibition , Lord PERSON found it unnecessary to examine those authorities since they were only important to the extent that they expressed principles widely shared and observed among other nations . However , as Judges PERSON , PERSON and PERSON had stated in their concurring opinion in the “ Arrest Warrant ” case , the “ unilateral ” GPE approach had not attracted the “ approbation of GPE generally ” ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

Concerning the applicants’ reliance on the recommendation of ORG DATE in respect of GPE , comments made in the judgment of ORG for the former GPE in GPE , and the judgment of ORG in GPE v. GPE ( see , respectively , paragraphs CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) , Lord PERSON considered the first to be of slight legal authority , the second to be an obiter dictum and the third not to be an accurate statement of international law .

Lord GPE identified CARDINAL arguments advanced by GPE which he said were “ cumulatively irresistible ” . Firstly , given the conclusion of ORG in the “ FAC ” case , the applicants had to accept that ORG immunity ratione personae could be claimed for a serving foreign minister accused of crimes against humanity . It followed that the prohibition of torture did not automatically override all other rules of international law . Secondly , LAW did not provide for universal civil jurisdiction . Thirdly , the DATE United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) did not provide any exception from immunity for civil claims based on acts of torture ; although such an exception was considered by a working group of the ILC , it was not agreed ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Lord PERSON noted in this respect that although some commentators had criticised LAW because it did not include a torture exception , they nonetheless accepted that this area of international law was “ in a state of flux ” and did not suggest that there was an international consensus in favour of such an exception . Finally , there was no evidence that GPE had recognised or given effect to any international - law obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction over claims arising from alleged breaches of peremptory norms of international law , nor was there any consensus of judicial or learned opinion that they should . For these reasons , Lord PERSON agreed with ORG that the claim brought by PERSON against GPE was to be dismissed .

In respect of the individual defendants , he found that the conclusion of ORG on the torture claims could not be sustained . He considered that ORG had incorrectly departed from the position in its previous ruling in GPE that the acts of ORG officials were to be considered the acts of the ORG itself ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) . He explained :

“ CARDINAL . ... [ T]here was no principled reason for this departure . A state can only act through servants and agents ; their official acts are the acts of the state ; and the state ’s immunity in respect of them is fundamental to the principle of state immunity . This error had the effect that while the GPE was held to be immune , and ORG , as a department of the government , was held to be immune , the Minister of Interior ( the fourth defendant in the second action ) was not , a very striking anomaly . ”

Lord PERSON explained that this first error had led the court into a second : its conclusion that a civil claim against an individual torturer did not indirectly implead the ORG in any more objectionable respect than a criminal prosecution . He observed :

“ CARDINAL . ... A state is not criminally responsible in international or LANGUAGE law , and therefore can not be directly impleaded in criminal proceedings . The prosecution of a servant or agent for an act of torture within article CARDINAL of LAW is founded on an express exception from the general rule of immunity . It is , however , clear that a civil action against individual torturers based on acts of official torture does indirectly implead the state since their acts are attributable to it . Were these claims against the individual defendants to proceed and be upheld , the interests of the GPE would be obviously affected , even though it is not a named party . ”

In Lord PERSON ’s view both errors resulted from a misreading of PERSON ( No . CARDINAL ) ( see paragraph CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) , which concerned criminal proceedings only . The distinction between criminal proceedings ( which were the subject of universal jurisdiction ) and civil proceedings ( which were not ) was , he said , “ fundamental ” and CARDINAL that could not be “ wished away ” .

Finally , Lord PERSON noted that ORG had found that jurisdiction should be governed by “ appropriate use or development of discretionary principles ” . He considered that this was to mistake the nature of ORG immunity . Where applicable , ORG immunity was an absolute preliminary bar and a ORG was either immune from the jurisdiction of a foreign court or it was not , so there was no scope for the exercise of discretion .

Lord PERSON , concurring in the judgment , considered that there was no automatic conflict between the jus cogens prohibition on torture and the law of State immunity : State immunity was a procedural rule and GPE , in claiming immunity , was not justifying torture but merely objecting to the jurisdiction of the NORP courts in deciding whether it had used torture or not . He quoted with approval the observation of PERSON ORG ( The Law of State Immunity ( ORG , DATE ) , p. CARDINAL ) that ORG immunity did not “ contradict a prohibition contained in a jus cogens norm but merely divert[ed ] any breach of it to a different method of settlement ” . For Lord PERSON , a conflict could only arise if the prohibition on torture had generated an ancillary procedural rule which , by way of exception to State immunity , entitled a ORG to assume civil jurisdiction over other GPE . Like Lord PERSON , he found that the authorities cited showed no support in international law for such a rule .

As regards the application of ORG immunity to individual defendants , Lord PERSON indicated that in order to establish that the grant of immunity to an official would infringe the right of access to a court guaranteed by LAW , it was necessary , as in the case of the immunity of the ORG itself , to show that international law did not require immunity against civil suit to be accorded to officials who were alleged to have committed torture . He considered that , once again , it was impossible to find any such exception in a treaty . He reviewed in some detail the circumstances in which a ORG would be liable for the act of an official in international law and found it clear that a ORG would incur responsibility in international law if one of its officials “ under colour of his authority ” tortured a national of another ORG , even though the acts were unlawful and unauthorised . He said :

“ DATE . ... To hold that for the purposes of state immunity [ the official ] was not acting in an official capacity would produce an asymmetry between the rules of liability and immunity .

Furthermore , in the case of torture , there would be an even more striking asymmetry between LAW and the rules of immunity if it were to be held that the same act was official for the purposes of the definition of torture but not for the purposes of immunity ... ”

Lord PERSON found Lord Justice PERSON ’s conclusion that the Convention against Torture ’s definition of torture did not lend acts of torture any official character to be unsatisfactory , explaining :

“ DATE . ... The acts of torture are either official acts or they are not . LAW does not ‘ ORG them an official character ; they must be official to come within the Convention in the first place . And if they are official enough to come within the Convention , I can not see why they are not official enough to attract immunity . ”

He also considered inappropriate ORG proposed approach to the exercise of jurisdiction , on the ground that ORG immunity was not a self - imposed restriction but was “ imposed by international law without any discrimination between CARDINAL ORG and another . ” He concluded that it would be “ invidious in the extreme for the judicial branch of government to have the power to decide that it will allow the investigation of allegations of torture against the officials of CARDINAL foreign state but not against those of another ” .


Aleš Pejchal;André Potocki;Ann Power-Forde;Ganna Yudkivska;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger;Vincent A. De Gaetano

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . The applicant , who had been granted legal aid , was represented by Mr PERSON and PERSON , lawyers .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , most recently PERSON , of ORG of GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant has been unemployed since DATE . She is married and has CARDINAL children . On DATE the applicant gave birth to her third child . DATE the applicant received a DATE child allowance of CARDINAL NORP hryvnias ( ORG ) ( DATE ) and UAH MONEY ( DATE ) .

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings in the GPE - Frankivsk City Court , claiming unpaid child allowance for the period DATE under ORG ( see the “ Relevant domestic law ” part below ) . The applicant stated that she was entitled to a DATE child allowance in an amount equal to the DATE “ minimum subsistence level ” established by law ( “ прожитковий мінімум ” ) for a child aged DATE . She further referred to LAW , which provided that pensions and other types of social payment and assistance that were the recipient ’s principle sources of subsistence should ensure an income not lower than that level . DATE and DATE she was receiving around UAH CARDINAL ( approximately CARDINAL ( ORG ) ) DATE , whereas the official subsistence level for a child aged DATE changed from ORG CARDINAL ( at the material time around EUR CARDINAL ) in DATE to ORG MONEY ( at the material time EUR CARDINAL ) in DATE .

On DATE the court rejected the applicant ’s claims as lodged outside the DATE time - limit , which runs from the date when the person concerned has learned or should have learned about a breach of his or her rights .

The applicant appealed , stating that she had learned about the alleged breach of her rights DATE after having consulted a lawyer .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision of the first - instance court but rejected the applicant ’s claims as unsubstantiated . The court held that although the applicant was entitled to a DATE allowance in accordance with section CARDINAL of FAC , these amounts had been determined by LAW . Therefore , the applicant had received the reduced amounts in accordance with the law .

On DATE ORG upheld that decision . The court held that the amounts of the allowance in question had been determined by ORG of DATE .

According to sections CARDINAL , DATE and CARDINAL of ORG Act DATE ( ORG державну допомогу PERSON з дітьми GPE ) , in force until DATE , child allowance was paid DATE to a child ’s principal carer ( e.g. employed women , unemployed women registered as such etc . ) until the child reached the age of three in an amount equal to PERCENT of the minimum wage .

Section QUANTITY of the same Act provided that unemployed women were entitled to child allowance in an amount equal to PERCENT of the minimum wage until a child reached DATE .

NORP By decision no . CARDINAL of ORG DATE “ On FAC [ payable ] to ORG in DATE ” , the amount of assistance was established PERCENT ( unemployed women ) or PERCENT ( employed women ) of UAH CARDINAL ( the minimum wage in DATE ) .

According to section CARDINAL of ORG , which was adopted on DATE and entered into force on DATE , until a child reached the age of CARDINAL child allowance was payable to a non - insured person in an amount equal to the minimum subsistence level for a child aged DATE .

NORP The DATE minimum subsistence level for children aged DATE was determined yearly by a special law ( ORG Про затвердження прожиткового мінімуму ” ) . It was gradually increased from ORG CARDINAL ( DATE ) to ORG CARDINAL.CARDINAL ( DATE ) .

Part CARDINAL of the Final Provisions of ORG provided that the amount of child allowance under section CARDINAL of the LAW was to be determined yearly by the Verkhovna Rada of GPE as a percentage of the minimum subsistence level with a view to gradually reaching that level . The amount in question could not be lower than PERCENT of the official subsistence level .

The State Budget Acts of DATE established that child allowance , which was provided for by ORG , was payable in an amount of PERCENT of the “ guaranteed minimum ” of the official subsistence level ( “ рівень забезпечення прожиткового мінімуму ” ) . This portion was set as UAH CARDINAL ( DATE ) and UAH CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ( section CARDINAL of LAW CARDINAL , section CARDINAL of LAW DATE , and section CARDINAL of LAW ) .


The applicants , Mr PERSON and PERSON , are NORP nationals , who were born in DATE and DATE , respectively , and live in GPE .

NORP The applicants’ son PERSON worked as a police officer in GPE , a district of ORG , and was married to Cahide Cesur who was also a police officer , at the material time .

On an unknown date PERSON instituted divorce proceedings against Cahide Cesur on the basis of breakdown of their relationship . ORG decided to move to another house alone in the same district .

On DATE , at TIME , while Cahide Cesur was moving to another house in the same district , with the help of her father and a number of other people from the same town , PERSON came in . According to the statements of those present in the room who were subsequently questioned as witnesses , PERSON opened fire in the direction of the ceiling , then fired a shot on the back of his wife , before shooting himself on the head . Both PERSON and Cahide Cesur were taken to the hospital . Meanwhile , GPE , CARDINAL of the people who was helping Cahide Cesur in the house , was also injured in the hand by a ricocheting bullet . At around TIME the same day PERSON lost his life at the hospital .

On DATE at TIME an autopsy was carried out by CARDINAL forensic doctors under the supervision of the public prosecutor at the hospital . According to the post - mortem report , there was a bullet entry wound at right temporoparietal , measuring CARDINAL x QUANTITY and an exit wound at left parieto - occipital , measuring CARDINAL x QUANTITY . It was noted in the report that the death had occurred due to the injuries caused by the bullet wound and that the shot had been a contact shot or a near - contact shot ( bitişik ya da bitişiğe yakın ) .

On DATE ORG ( Şanlıurfa Emniyet Müdürlüğü Olay PERSON ve GPE Tespit Şube Müdürlüğü ) issued an expert report stating that a fingerprint belonging to PERSON left index finger had been found on the gun , next to the safety pin .

On DATE ORG also issued its expert report . That report indicated that analysis of the samples taken from the deceased ’s hands and the hands of Cahide Cesur and CARDINAL other witnesses , GPE and GPE , using the so - called “ atomic absorption spectrometry ” technique , had revealed that only the deceased had gunpowder residue ( “ atış artığı ” ) on his hands , on the outside of his right hand and inside of his left hand .

On DATE ORG prepared a second report , indicating that the bullets found at the crime scene had been fired by the gun which belonged to PERSON .

On DATE Akçakale prosecutor issued a decision of non - prosecution . The prosecutor , having regard to the statements of the witnesses , the crime scene report , the post - mortem reports and ORG reports , held that PERSON had committed suicide by using his own gun .

On DATE the applicants lodged a criminal complaint with the ORG prosecutor , claiming that the death of their son was suspicious and that the investigation which had already been concluded could not be considered to be an effective investigation . The applicants requested that another autopsy be conducted , claiming that the existing autopsy report was not sufficient . According to the applicants , the scars which they had noted on the head of their son at the time of his burial , did not match the findings recorded in the autopsy report . The applicant PERSON , who is a retired police officer , claimed that his son had been shot on the left side of his head . The applicants further alleged that the place where the gun had been found raised suspicions , and complained of the fact that the mobile phones that their son had used were not examined . Lastly , the applicants also alleged that , when they went to PERSON DATE after the incident , they had received more information from some of the witnesses , raising even more suspicions on the circumstances of their son ’s death

On DATE the ORG prosecutor issued another decision of non - prosecution , on the grounds that the post - mortem report of CARDINAL DATE , the statements of the witnesses and the other evidence gathered by the investigators did not leave any room for doubt that the ORG son had committed suicide . The public prosecutor also stated that a decision not to prosecute had already been taken in relation to the same incident and unless new evidence was discovered it was not possible to initiate a new criminal investigation under LAW of LAW .

The applicants filed an objection against the decision of non - prosecution , claiming that their son might have been shot by somebody else . ORG examined the merits of both the prosecutor ’s decision and the applicants’ objection in its decision of on DATE and dismissed the objection . According to the court , the criminal investigation was conducted meticulously and that there was no reason to question any additional witnesses proposed by the applicants .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy)

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the excessive length of criminal proceedings and of the lack of any effective remedy in domestic law . In application no . CARDINAL , the applicant also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .