No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant and CARDINAL others were charged with extorting money from PERSON

On DATE ORG ( okresný súd ) remanded the applicant and CARDINAL of his alleged accomplices in custody from DATE . The court held that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence with which he was charged , that the offence had been committed in an organised way , and that therefore there was a risk that he could put pressure on witnesses , contact other perpetrators and tamper with evidence . The court relied on the testimony of ORG , who allegedly had been warned by one of the applicant ’s accomplices about instructions from the applicant not to cooperate with the police . On DATE ORG ( krajský súd ) dismissed an interlocutory appeal ( sťažnosť ) by the applicant .

On DATE a police investigator charged the applicant and CARDINAL other people with establishing , masterminding and supporting a criminal group . The applicant was also charged with aggravated coercion , extortion , and causing bodily harm .

On DATE ORG ( špeciálny súd , hereafter “ the ORG ” ) , where the case had been transferred in the meantime owing to the organised nature of the crimes , dismissed an application by the applicant for release . It relied on the particularly serious and organised nature of the offences he was charged with , and held that there was a real danger that he might influence witnesses and contact other perpetrators in order to tamper with evidence . On DATE ORG ( Najvyšší súd ) dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE . In addition to the reasons mentioned above , it relied on a reasonable suspicion that the applicant was the leader of a criminal group which had been operating for DATE , and that not all of the members of that criminal group had been identified . The court pointed out that the criminal investigation was particularly complex . On DATE ORG dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant .

On DATE the police investigator charged the applicant with another count of extortion .

On DATE ORG dismissed another application by the applicant for release . It relied on the testimony of several witnesses who were afraid to testify against him . The court took into account the complexity of the criminal investigation , finding that there had been no undue delays . On DATE ORG dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant .

On DATE the applicant was charged with CARDINAL other counts of extortion .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE , and extended the grounds for his detention by including the risk of his reoffending . It held that it was reasonable to suspect that , if released , the applicant would continue his criminal activities , taking into account : the motives for such activities and their duration and extent ; the methods of intimidation and violence used by the criminal group ; the hierarchical and organised nature of the group ; and the fact that not all of the members of the group had been identified . On DATE ORG dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant .

On DATE the applicant ’s detention was extended until DATE . ORG added that his detention assisted the investigation , since the victims were willing to testify , but still not all of the members of the criminal group had been identified . On DATE ORG dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant .

The applicant was indicted before ORG on DATE . The bill of indictment concerned QUANTITY criminal acts , CARDINAL defendants and CARDINAL victims . The applicant was charged with establishing , masterminding and supporting a criminal group , aggravated coercion , causing bodily harm , and QUANTITY acts of extortion . All the crimes were qualified as particularly serious crimes . The sums extorted ranged from QUANTITY ( ORG ) .

On DATE ORG examined the grounds for the applicant ’s detention and ruled that he should remain in detention . It pointed out that , according to the indictment , he was allegedly the leader of a criminal group , a group which had been conducting criminal activities for DATE against people who were victims and witnesses in the trial , by means of threats and the use of physical and psychological violence . On DATE ORG dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant .

On DATE , when conducting a preliminary examination of the bill of indictment , ORG again reviewed the grounds for the applicant ’s detention and ruled that he should remain in detention . On DATE ORG dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant .

On DATE ORG dismissed another application by the applicant for release . It held that several witnesses were afraid to testify against him in his presence and had thus been heard in his absence . In particular , CARDINAL witness had been contacted and threatened by unknown persons in an attempt to get him to change his testimony . The court also took into account that not all the witnesses had been heard by the trial court . On DATE ORG dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE . The court limited the grounds for his detention to the risk of his reoffending , because the trial court had already heard all witnesses . It stated that there was substantial evidence suggesting that the applicant was the leader of a criminal group which had operated systematically for DATE , and therefore it was reasonable to assume that , if at liberty , he might continue with the criminal activities . The court further held that it was essential to protect victims and witnesses who had expressed a fear of the applicant when testifying at the trial .

On DATE the applicant was convicted by ORG of establishing , masterminding and supporting a criminal group , CARDINAL acts of extortion , CARDINAL acts of aggravated coercion and fraud and was sentenced to DATE imprisonment . He remained in detention pending the outcome of an appeal .

On DATE a request for release lodged by the applicant was dismissed by ORG . ORG dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant on DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against his conviction , which thereby became final . The applicant started to serve a prison sentence , and the time spent in detention was taken into account when calculating his prison term .

On DATE the applicant filed a constitutional complaint ( ústavná sťažnosť ) against ORG decision of DATE to dismiss his interlocutory appeal ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . Among other things , he complained that his detention was no longer justified , that it had lasted an excessively long time , and that ORG had not answered all the arguments raised in his interlocutory appeal ( “ the first constitutional complaint ” ) . He complained under LAW DATE and LAW , and under their constitutional equivalents .

On DATE he filed another constitutional complaint , alleging a lack of speediness in relation to the judicial review of his detention by the decisions of ORG of DATE and ORG of DATE ( “ the second constitutional complaint ” – see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE ORG ( Ústavný súd ) accepted a part of the applicant ’s first constitutional complaint for further examination , including the complaint regarding the length of his detention . It held that the formal requirements under sections CARDINAL of LAW had been satisfied . At the same time , it dismissed the rest of the complaint as manifestly ill - founded .

On DATE ORG accepted the second constitutional complaint for further examination , and joined the proceedings relating to the first and the second constitutional complaint .

On DATE ORG found a violation of the applicant ’s rights under LAW . It held that ORG , in its decision of DATE , had failed to respond to all of the applicant ’s arguments . Although ORG had examined in detail the applicant ’s arguments regarding the grounds for his detention , it had failed to respond to his other arguments , such as one about the impartiality and independence of the tribunal reviewing his detention , and another about alleged shortcomings in his representation during the judicial review , and thus the court had breached LAW .

ORG further held that the judicial review of the applicant ’s detention DATE and DATE had not been sufficiently speedy , and found another violation of LAW on this account .

It quashed ORG decision of DATE and awarded the applicant ORG CARDINAL as just satisfaction . It did not order his release , since the applicant had been convicted in the meantime and had started to serve a prison term .

ORG considered it unnecessary to examine the rest of the applicant ’s complaints , including the CARDINAL under LAW of the LAW regarding the length of his detention .

Between the applicant ’s arrest and the completion of the pre - trial investigation , the authorities conducted interviews with CARDINAL defendants , interviewed CARDINAL victims and twentythree witnesses , commissioned CARDINAL expert opinions , analysed telecommunication recordings , conducted home searches and identity parades , and gathered a large amount of documentary evidence .

Between the lodging of the indictment with the trial court and the applicant ’s conviction by the court of first instance , the trial court held hearings over the course of DATE . The hearings were scheduled on a DATE or near DATE basis .

On DATE the presiding judge of ORG appointed a substitute defence lawyer for the applicant to prevent the obstruction of court hearings .

On DATE the presiding judge of ORG fined CARDINAL of the applicant ’s defence lawyers : CARDINAL for failing to appear at CARDINAL court hearings , and the other for obstructing justice .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Luis López Guerra

The relevant details of the application are set out in the appended table .

Mr PERSON , PERSON , PERSON and Mr T. GPE complained about the excessive length of their pre - trial detention . Mr PERSON complained about his unlawful detention on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE PERSON revoked her application .


Violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression)

The applicants were born in DATE , DATE and DATE and live in GPE and GPE respectively .

At the material time , PERSON was Vice - President and PERSON and Mr Bakó were activists of ORG ) , a registered left - wing political party . The party had no known intention of participating in NORP political life in defiance of the rule of law .

On DATE the applicants organised an event in front of a shopping mall in GPE , entitled “ NORP PERSON ” , with the intention to demonstrate against consumerism , draw attention to poverty , point out the shortcomings of market economy , and demand free internet access for all .

To express their affiliation with Communism , QUANTITY persons , including the applicants , displayed a sheet and a flag with a CARDINAL - pointed red star and distributed leaflets with their political message , depicting red stars .

In application of section CARDINAL/B(CARDINAL ) of LAW , a police patrol which was present called on the applicants to terminate the demonstration , checked their identity and committed them to GPE ORG for interrogation .

On DATE the applicants lodged a complaint with ORG against the police measures . They relied on the judgment of ORG adopted in the case of PERSON v. GPE ( no . DATE ) . They referred to the ORG ’s finding that the prosecution for having worn a red star had amounted to a violation of PERSON freedom of expression enshrined in LAW .

NORP The applicants’ complaints were dismissed by ORG on DATE .

NORP The applicants’ further complaints against the measures were dismissed by ORG on DATE . This decision was upheld by ORG , acting as a second - instance authority , on DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the ORG requests for judicial review . The court held that the display of the red star contravened section CARDINAL/B of LAW , despite the PERSON judgment , whose application in the circumstances had been no task of the police officers present on the LOC . Consequently , the applicants’ identity check and committal to ORG was justified under sections CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of Act no . ORG of DATE on the Police .

In review proceedings , ORG upheld ORG decision on DATE ( in the case of Mr Bakó ) , DATE ( in the case of PERSON ) , and DATE ( in the case of PERSON ) , endorsing in essence the first - instance NORP reasoning .

The applicants , jointly ( they had a lawyer in common ) , incurred altogether QUANTITY in legal costs .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11-1 - Freedom of peaceful assembly)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicants either owned businesses at GPE municipal market and rented the market pitches for their businesses , or worked as vendors for these businesses .

It appears that in DATE the title to the plot of land on which the market was located was transferred from the town to a municipal enterprise and then to a private company , which intended to demolish the market and build a shopping centre . It appears that in DATE and DATE court proceedings were ongoing between the prosecutor ’s office and the municipal enterprise in relation to the land in question .

Disagreeing with this course of action , which would adversely affect their businesses and employment , the applicants and some other people ( CARDINAL in total ) decided to remain on the market LOC permanently , doing “ TIME shifts ” .

According to the applicants , on an unspecified date and in a specified manner , the entrepreneurs notified the town administration of their intention to “ constantly do night shifts at the market until the matters relating to the legality of the land ’s transfer and the demolition of the market [ were ] settled ” . They started their “ TIME shifts ” on an unspecified date .

On DATE the police told the entrepreneurs who had gathered at the market to leave the LOC . Some refused to comply in the absence of any court order , and argued that , under their rent contracts , they had a right to remain at the market .

On DATE some of the applicants ( Mr PERSON , PERSON PERSON , PERSON PERSON , PERSON PERSON , Ms Suprunova , Ms Zakharova and PERSON ) were arrested ( see also paragraphs QUANTITY - CARDINAL below ) .

These applicants were accused of an offence under LAW ( “ the CAO ” ) , which punished disobeying or resisting the lawful order of a public official ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The applicants , who were assisted by counsel before the trial court , pleaded not guilty and denied that they had disobeyed or resisted any specific lawful orders from the police , or that they had otherwise breached the public order or endangered public safety .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE a justice of peace convicted PERSON of the offence and sentenced him to CARDINAL days’ administrative detention . The court held as follows :

“ [ The defendant ] violated the procedure for organising and managing a gathering ( собрание ) ; he disobeyed a lawful order issued by police officers in relation to their duties to ensure public order and safety , he also obstructed their exercise of the above duties ...

[ The defendant ’s ] guilt is confirmed by the following documents : the record of the administrative offence , a complaint and written statements issued by the market director , written reports by police officers , and statements from witnesses ... ”

On DATE Mr PERSON was sentenced to CARDINAL days’ detention . The court held as follows :

“ [ The defendant ] violated the procedure for organising and managing a gathering ; he disobeyed a lawful order issued by police officers in relation to their duties to ensure public order and safety , he also obstructed their exercise of the above duties ...

ORG , a witness , made the following statement before this court , ‘ on DATE a group of entrepreneurs were doing night shifts to prevent the demolition of the market building . Suddenly , police officers arrived and started to grab people and take them to the police station . [ The defendant ] was also grabbed by the police ; he did not show any resistance during this procedure ... ’

The court adopts a critical stance in relation to the testimony of this witness , who is the [ defendant ’s ] acquaintance and colleague , because this testimony is refuted by the bulk of the other evidence , namely the ORG written reports made in their official capacity ... ”

A judgment , apparently in similar terms , was issued in respect of PERSON PERSON , who was sentenced to CARDINAL days’ detention .

As required under the ORG , the applicants started to serve their sentences of administrative detention immediately following the trial judgments in their cases .

At the same time , the applicants appealed to ORG of GPE ( hereafter “ the ORG ” ) . Mr PERSON argued that the trial court had not made a proper assessment of the testimonies of eyewitnesses . He and PERSON PERSON argued , inter alia , that they had taken part in a “ gathering ” , and LAW did not require that prior notice be given to the competent public authority for this type of public event ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Moreover , in breach of the LAW , no written requirement to cease any unlawful conduct had been issued to them or the other entrepreneurs , and the penalty of administrative detention had been disproportionate .

Mr PERSON argued before the appeal court that he had been present on the market premises in the early morning of CARDINAL DATE , because he had been performing a “ duty ” . Having heard some noise , he had gone out of the building and had seen other entrepreneurs being arrested ; he had started to film the events on his camera but had then been ordered to delete the video and had been arrested .

The appeal court examined a written statement from PERSON , the new executive director of the market . He had arrived at the marketplace , but could not get into the office building because a number of entrepreneurs were blocking the entrance by holding hands or linking their arms . Following a request by him for assistance , the police had ordered the entrepreneurs to stop their activity . The entrepreneurs , including PERSON , had not complied with that order .

The appeal court also examined written statements from B. , PERSON . and PERSON , who provided testimony in the following terms . While passing through the marketplace on the morning of CARDINAL August DATE , they had seen a group of CARDINAL people . These people had been shouting slogans and calling for people in the town and regional administrations to be dismissed , as well as calling for the violation of public order . The police had told them to stop , but they had not complied with that order . Thereafter , the police had repeated the warning to the most active participant . After he had failed to comply , he had been taken to a police car , while grabbing the ORG uniforms and trying to run away .

Officers S. , NORP and PERSON submitted written reports in the following terms . On DATE , noting the blocking of the entrance to the office building , they had ordered the people present to disperse . The same thing had happened on DATE . Approaching CARDINAL of the most active participants , Mr Finskiy , they had ordered him to stop . After he had refused , they had taken him to the police station .

NORP The appeal court heard PERSON , who stated that Mr PERSON had been trying to film the ongoing events when the police had taken him away ; he had not shown any resistance .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment in respect of Mr Finskiy , stating as follows :

“ The court has no reason to doubt the testimonies of police officers and PERSON , PERSON . , because they were not previously acquainted with the defendant or other entrepreneurs , and have no reason to give false testimony against him ... The court dismisses the argument that PERSON , PERSON . could not be eyewitnesses since the market was surrounded by a wall . Their testimonies indicate that they effectively passed through the marketplace ... The court dismisses the argument that the police acted unlawfully in relation to the ORG presence at a gathering requiring no prior authorisation . As the material in the file and testimonies indicate , the police acted lawfully with the aim of ensuring public order and public safety , because the entrepreneurs were blocking access to the market for employees and had not reacted to lawful orders from the police to stop these actions ... The court adopts a critical attitude in respect of the testimony of NORP , who tried to help her colleague avoid responsibility for the offence , because this testimony is refuted by the other evidence ... ”

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE , in respect of PERSON PERSON , ORG held :

“ P. , a witness , stated before the appeal court ‘ on DATE ... people in plain clothes and the police arrived at the market and , following orders from the chief officer of the Sovetskiy police station , started to arrest entrepreneurs without explaining the reasons for such arrests . [ The defendant ] was also arrested , while showing no resistance or disobedience to any specific orders ... ’

The fact that [ the defendant ] committed the offence is confirmed by :

– the record of the administrative offence stating ‘ after his violation of the procedure for organising and managing public events , while being arrested , he disobeyed the lawful order of a police officer , grabbed his uniform and tried to escape ... ’ ;

– written statements from [ CARDINAL passers - by ] who , while passing through the market area , saw CARDINAL people chanting slogans and calling for the dismissal of the mayor and the governor and for violations of the public order . Despite the police ’s order to stop what they were doing , the entrepreneurs refused ; thereafter the police approached [ the defendant ] , who appeared particularly active , and again ordered him to stop what he was doing , but he did not respond to this order . While being placed in the police car , he resisted , and threated the officers with violence and prosecution ;

– [ the ORG written statements in similar terms ] : ... Having approached one of the most active men ( subsequently identified as the defendant ) , they warned him against committing offences , but he did not react and refused [ to stop ] ; PERSON [ sic ] was thus arrested and taken to the police station .

The court dismisses the defence ’s argument that [ the defendant ] lawfully participated in a gathering requiring no prior authorisation , because the police ’s actions were lawful and aimed to secure public order and public safety , since the entrepreneurs were blocking the market employees’ access to the building ... The court adopts a critical attitude in respect of the testimony of P. , who is the defendant ’s colleague and wants to help him , because this testimony is refuted by the bulk of the other evidence . ”

An appeal decision in similar terms was issued in respect of PERSON PERSON .

Thereafter , learning in DATE that the court decisions in respect of certain other participants in the same events had been quashed on appeal in DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , on CARDINAL DATE Mr PERSON , PERSON PERSON and Mr PERSON lodged applications under LAW CAO for review of the final judgments in respect of them . On DATE the Deputy President of ORG upheld the lower courts’ decisions . In respect of each defendant , the reviewing judge stated as follows :

“ I dismiss the defence ’s argument that the lower courts’ judges omitted to specify the type of public event in which the defendant had participated , the relevant regulations on such public events , and the specific details concerning the police ’s orders to the defendant . It was established by the justice of the peace that the impugned event was a ‘ gathering’ ... ”

By judgments of CARDINAL DATE the female defendants in the proceedings and Mr PERSON were fined .

On CARDINAL , DATE and DATE ORG set aside the judgments in respect of the female defendants and PERSON .

As regards PERSON , the appeal court held as follows :

“ Neither the record of the administrative offence nor the judgment contains references to specific circumstances or actions relating to the corpus delicti of the imputed offence ( disobeying the lawful order of a police officer ) . In particular , neither of the CARDINAL documents specifies what order was given to the defendant which was then not complied with . Moreover , the judgment does not indicate that the defendant did disobey a lawful order issued by a police officer . ”

In respect of PERSON , the appeal court held as follows :

“ It is indicated in the record of the administrative offence that the defendant violated the procedure relating to the organisation and management of demonstrations , meetings and gatherings , and that during her arrest she disobeyed the lawful order of a police officer in relation to his work to ensure public order . The record does not specify what type of public event was being held , which above - mentioned procedure was violated , or what orders relating to maintaining public order during a public event were not complied with by the defendant . ”

“ The record of the administrative offence indicates that on DATE the defendant violated the procedure relating to the organisation and management of demonstrations , meetings and gatherings , [ and that ] during her arrest she resisted the lawful order of a police officer and grabbed his uniform and tried to escape ... The record does not indicate what type of public event was being held , which applicable procedure the defendant allegedly violated , what orders relating to maintaining public order during such an event were issued to the defendant by the police , or which of those orders was not complied with . ”

“ Neither the record of the administrative offence nor the first - instance judgment refers to specific facts and actions forming part of the offence imputed to the defendant , namely disobeying the lawful order of a police officer ... or the specific order given to her which she failed to comply with . Moreover , it does not follow that what the defendant disobeyed was a lawful order given by a police officer . The record does not specify what the defendant ’s violation of the procedure concerning the organisation and management of demonstrations , meetings and gatherings was , or what type of event was being held . ”

The appeal court ordered the return of the case files to the relevant justice of the peace . Thereafter , the justice of the peace returned the files to the police station , apparently for the documents to be amended or the administrative - offence records to be redrafted . The files were not resubmitted for a retrial .

At TIME on DATE the police arrested some CARDINAL people at the market , including certain applicants such as Mr PERSON , Ms Garkavets , PERSON , Ms FAC and PERSON .

On DATE a justice of the peace examined a case against Mr PERSON . The court heard PERSON . , who stated that a group of people had impeded security guards as they tried to re - establish access to the market building . The police had then arrived and had taken some people to the police station .

It appears that during the hearing the applicant , who was assisted by counsel , first sought to have some other witnesses and police officers examined in open court . However , according to the Government , he then withdrew his application .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE Mr PERSON was convicted of an offence under LAW ORG and was sentenced to CARDINAL days’ administrative detention . The justice of the peace found as follows :

“ [ The defendant ] disobeyed the police officers and did not comply with lawful orders to stop violating public order ...

The defendant ’s guilt is confirmed by : the administrative - offence record , the police ORG reports and the written testimonies of witnesses ... ”

According to the Government , PERSON did not serve his sentence , as he was taken to the cardiology unit of a local hospital on TIME CARDINAL DATE .

Mr PERSON appealed to ORG , which held a hearing on CARDINAL DATE . It heard his lawyer and PERSON . , who stated that she had seen the applicant making a video recording while he was surrounded by security guards who had torn his clothes . Colleagues had managed to “ get him of the security QUANTITY grasp ” , then the police had arrived and had started to push certain entrepreneurs aside . CARDINAL of the security guards “ had given an order to arrest [ Mr PERSON ] ” . Mr PERSON had not disobeyed any orders and had not resisted arrest ( see also paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE the appeal court upheld the judgment of CARDINAL DATE in respect of the applicant .

Learning in DATE that the court decisions in respect of certain other participants in the events on DATE ( and CARDINAL DATE ) had been quashed on appeal ( see paragraphs CARDINAL above and paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) , the applicant and his counsel , PERSON , thought that they had a reasonable prospect of success in seeking a further review of the court decisions of CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE . In DATE they lodged an application for review of those court decisions . They argued , inter alia , that : the lower courts had not specified what specific order the applicant had disobeyed or whether such an order was lawful under NORP law ; the courts had not heard any officers or eyewitnesses who had witnessed the impugned reprehensible conduct on the part of the applicant ; and the courts had not specified any particular actions on his part which constituted a breach of public order .

On DATE the Deputy President of ORG upheld the lower courts’ decisions . The judge held as follows :

“ [ The applicant ] was part of the group of people who impeded market officials as they tried to gain access to their office building . The guards from a private security company intervened and a fight ensued between them and some participants . These participants did not respond to orders from police officers . The officers required [ the applicant ] , who was one of the most active participants , to cease his unlawful conduct , but he did not respond to this order . Thereafter , he was taken to the police station . ”

On DATE a justice of the peace sentenced several female defendants to a fine . However , on DATE the ORG heard appeals from them and set aside the judgments against them .

In respect of PERSON , it held as follows :

“ LAW ORG requires that a record of an administrative offence must describe , among other things , the factual elements relating to the offence and the circumstances in which it was committed . The record concerning the defendant specifies that ... she disobeyed the police officers , did not respond to their lawful requests to stop unlawfully violating the public order , and grabbed the ORG uniforms while being escorted to the police vehicle , trying to push them away and run away .

The record of the administrative offence does not specify which requests relating to public order were addressed to the defendant and were not complied with , or which actions of the applicant such requests related to . The deficiencies of the record make it impossible to establish the defendant ’s liability for an administrative offence , and the record must be returned to the [ police ] . ”

In respect of PERSON and Ms Garkavets , the appeal court held as follows :

“ Neither the record of the administrative offence nor the justice of the peace ’s judgment specifies how the defendant violated public order , or which specific order was given by the police in this connection but not complied with by her . ”

It appears that the files were then returned to the police for the documents to be amended . The files were not resubmitted to the relevant justice of the peace for a retrial .

On DATE Mr PERSON ’s wife ( PERSON , also an applicant in the present case ) lodged a criminal complaint with ORG .

PERSON alleged that Officer PERSON . , a senior officer at the Sovetskiy police station , had subjected her elderly husband to ill - treatment on DATE . She sought the institution of criminal proceedings against this officer . She stated as follows : at her request , her husband had arrived at the market in the early morning of CARDINAL DATE , where she had been doing “ TIME shifts ” with others , in order to bring her some warm clothes ; Officer PERSON . had struck a blow to his chest , causing the man to fall to the ground and sustain a head injury as he hit his head against the corner of a table .

Mr PERSON was examined on DATE by a neurosurgeon , a traumatology specialist and a therapist , who concluded that he had a contused wound on his head measuring QUANTITY by QUANTITY by QUANTITY , some swelling on his upper right arm , and some other injuries ( this part of the certificate is not legible ) . In her submissions before the ORG the applicant ’s lawyer alleged that PERSON had sustained a rib fracture . She maintained this assertion following communication of the case to the Government ; the latter did not comment on this matter .

Unspecified officials carried out an inquiry CARDINAL DATE , looking into whether any police officers had committed the offence of abuse of power ( defined at the time as “ actions manifestly outside the scope of official duties , causing a significant violation of one ’s rights or legitimate interests ” ) , an offence under LAW .

CARDINAL other applicants ( PERSON , PERSON and Ms Zakharova ) also sought medical assistance on DATE . PERSON was diagnosed with concussion and soft - tissue bruises on her head and right arm . PERSON was diagnosed with soft - tissue bruises on her head and right shoulder . PERSON was examined by a forensic expert , who concluded that she had bruises on the front upper part of her right arm ( measuring QUANTITY by QUANTITY , and QUANTITY by QUANTITY ) and a smaller one on the inner part of her right arm , abrasions on her right and left hip measuring QUANTITY by QUANTITY and QUANTITY by QUANTITY respectively , and abrasions on her right and left ankle joints measuring QUANTITY by QUANTITY and QUANTITY by QUANTITY respectively .

It appears that on an unspecified date PERSON , Ms Zakharova and PERSON were heard in the context of the pre - investigation inquiry regarding PERSON PERSON .

PERSON stated that she had arrived at the market early on the morning of CARDINAL August DATE and had seen a police officer dragging PERSON . She had protested to Officer PERSON . , who had then pushed her . She had fallen to the ground , hitting her shoulder and the back of her head against wooden objects on the ground .

PERSON stated that Officer PERSON . had ordered “ Take this CARDINAL ” and had started to pull her hair and hands , but other entrepreneurs had tried to shield her .

PERSON stated that she had tried to shield PERSON from Officer PERSON . , who was pulling her hair . Officer PERSON . and Officer PERSON . had pushed PERSON against a wall , causing her to fall to the ground and lose consciousness . She had then been dragged along the ground by her hands , and had been kicked in the back by one of the officers as she was placed in the police car .

Ms Yef . , the ORG colleague , made a written statement that in TIME of CARDINAL DATE some CARDINAL people had been at the market . Upon being alerted to the arrival of the police , she had gone out and seen some QUANTITY police officers , including Officer PERSON . , a senior officer , who was giving orders and indicating that the officers should “ Take this CARDINAL ” or something similar . She had seen an officer twisting PERSON arms and PERSON being dragged along the ground . Then she had seen Mr PERSON ask Officer PERSON . “ What are you doing ? ” , and Officer PERSON . had suddenly hit him in the chest , causing PERSON to fall to the ground and hit against the top of a table . PERSON had fainted . Officer PERSON . had then kicked him on the leg and ordered “ Take this CARDINAL ” .

Officer PERSON . made the following written statement during the inquiry :

“ On DATE the police station received information that in the early morning of CARDINAL DATE a group of CARDINAL people might take violent action in order to take possession of the market . At TIME officers under my supervision arrived at the market to prevent disorder and unlawful actions . We saw CARDINAL people outside the building who were holding a meeting , chanting slogans and shouting about the regional prosecutor and the governor . The entrepreneurs had previously been issued with warnings against unlawful actions on their part . Suddenly , CARDINAL women started to shout and call for help , grabbing our uniforms . We arrested some CARDINAL people , including the most active perpetrators ; all of them resisted during the arrest ... We did use physical force against some people , namely sambo fighting techniques such as twisting hands behind backs . None of the officers , including myself , inflicted any blows ... ”

On DATE an investigator issued a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings , referring to the statements of several officers , including Officer PERSON . , and the testimonies of PERSON , PERSON , Ms Zakharova and PERSON .

It appears that the refusal of CARDINAL DATE was then overruled for unspecified reasons and the inquiry was resumed . Written statements were obtained from some other participants in the gathering . Officer PERSON . was also heard and he confirmed Officer PERSON . ’s earlier statement .

On DATE the investigator issued a new refusal to institute criminal proceedings against Officer PERSON . , Officer PERSON . or other officers . Having summarised the above testimonies , he concluded as follows :

“ No sufficient and objective data could be gathered during the inquiry to show that any police officers had committed any criminal offence ... The grievances presented in the complaints are refuted by the testimonies from the officers ... Injuries could have been sustained during the arrest procedure owing to the resistance displayed to the police officers ( such resistance later being confirmed by the prosecution for the administrative offences ) . Furthermore , in view of the important and irremediable inconsistencies in various testimonies , there is no possibility of drawing a truthful conclusion regarding the commission of a criminal offence by PERSON . , PERSON . or others ... ”

For unspecified reasons , a new refusal to prosecute was issued on CARDINAL DATE . It was then overruled on DATE by the deputy director of ORG . He indicated that it was necessary to : assess the available court decisions regarding administrative offences concerning the events on DATE ; identify and interview people who had been kept with the arrested people at the police station ; identify and interview all police officers who had been present at the station and had compiled administrative - offence files against the arrested entrepreneurs ; and identify and interview all the officers who had been on duty on that date and had been present at the market .

CARDINAL applicants ( Mr Annenkov , PERSON , PERSON and Ms Zakharova ) sought judicial review in respect of the refusal dated QUANTITY DATE . They learnt at a hearing on DATE that the refusal had already been overruled . The case was therefore discontinued .

A new refusal was issued on DATE .

On DATE ORG set aside the refusal of CARDINAL DATE because it contained an insufficient assessment of the factual circumstances , no plausible explanation for the applicants’ injuries , and no assessment of the legality of the police ’s actions .

Being unaware of the above decision , CARDINAL of the applicants sought judicial review of the refusal to prosecute dated DATE . On CARDINAL DATE ORG discontinued the proceedings because the supervising authority had overruled the impugned refusal decision .

According to the ORG , a new refusal to prosecute was issued on DATE . It was overruled on DATE by the district prosecutor ’s office . Thereafter , a criminal case was opened under LAW of LAW . Apparently , PERSON and PERSON at least were interviewed again by an investigator . Mr PERSON also had a formal confrontation procedure with an unspecified witness who had allegedly seen the applicant stumble and fall to the ground by himself on CARDINAL DATE .


Violation of Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11-1 - Freedom of peaceful assembly)

Carlo Ranzoni;Egidijus Kūris;Ganna Yudkivska;Iulia Motoc;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Georges Ravarani

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant notified the police that he planned to organise a demonstration from TIME on DATE in front of the FAC prison in GPE , in order to draw attention to the “ situation of political prisoners ” . FAC is a broad cul - de - sac with a service lane .

On DATE the head of ORG banned the demonstration on the grounds that traffic could not be diverted to alternative routes ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ) . In the decision , he referred to LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL.AB of ORG .

On DATE , within the statutory time - limit , the applicant sought a judicial review of the decision .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s case . It noted that in assessing whether or not traffic could be diverted to other routes , the authority had reckoned on the participation of CARDINAL demonstrators , as per the applicant ’s notification , and DATE after having obtained the opinion of a traffic expert – it had established that lawful parking and traffic circulation in the neighbourhood would become impossible should the event take place . The court agreed with the police ’s decision in that although the right to assembly was a constitutional fundamental right , it was not absolute and must not give rise to a violation of the fundamental rights of others , and could therefore be restricted . The court was satisfied that the decision had been lawful as the police had adequately established the facts , complied with the procedural rules and applied clear assessment criteria , and the assessment of the evidence had been logical .


CASE OF ALPEYEVA AND DZHALAGONIYA v. RUSSIA

Remainder inadmissible (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria;(Art. 35-3-a) Manifestly ill-founded;(Art. 35-3-a) Ratione materiae;Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom

The first applicant is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE , in LOC .

At the relevant time she was a NORP national and lived in GPE .

In DATE the first applicant applied to the NORP embassy in GPE for NORP citizenship .

In DATE she was granted NORP citizenship and the NORP embassy in GPE put a stamp in her NORP passport to this effect .

Thereafter the first applicant moved to GPE .

On DATE she obtained a new NORP “ internal passport ” ( a citizen ’s identity document for use inside GPE ) .

In DATE the first applicant applied to ORG ( ORG ) for an “ international passport ” required for foreign travel .

On DATE an official from the ORG seized her NORP passport , which was later destroyed . The ORG referred to a report of CARDINAL DATE on a check carried out by the agencies of the interior , according to which the first applicant had never properly acquired NORP citizenship and therefore had no right to be in possession of a NORP passport . The report stated , in particular , that whereas the first applicant had been issued with a NORP passport on DATE , she was not registered in the database of ORG as a person who had acquired NORP citizenship . Furthermore , according to a letter of DATE from the NORP embassy in GPE , it had no records on her obtaining NORP citizenship either . Accordingly , she had been issued with a NORP passport erroneously in DATE .

The first applicant complained to the prosecuting authorities .

On DATE the Volzhskiy prosecutor ’s office rejected the complaint .

In a response of DATE the ORG prosecutor ’s office stated that the ORG was not competent to seize passports , something which only the agencies of the interior could do ; that the first applicant ’s passport had been seized in breach of the law ; and that the prosecutor ’s office recommended that the ORG rectify the situation .

On DATE the ORG issued report no . CARDINAL to the effect that the first applicant had never properly acquired NORP citizenship , and that a NORP passport had been issued to her unlawfully .

The first applicant appealed to a court against the findings of the report of DATE .

On DATE ORG found in favour of the first applicant and held that the check which had been carried out by the agencies of the interior had been unlawful .

The decision was subsequently quashed by means of supervisory review and the case was remitted for fresh examination .

On DATE ORG again held that the check had been unlawful .

NORP However , the ORG did not set aside the decision to seize the first applicant ’s passport , and a new passport was not issued to her either .

The first applicant again instituted court proceedings , this time for a finding that the seizure of her passport had been unlawful .

On DATE ORG dismissed the first applicant ’s complaint . It accepted the ORG ’s arguments that she had never acquired NORP citizenship , although it also found that the FMS officials’ actions of DATE had been procedurally incorrect , as the ORG did not have competence to seize passports .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision on appeal .

A request by the first applicant for supervisory review was dismissed on DATE .

The first applicant then instituted another set of court proceedings against the ORG concerning its inaction in relation to issuing her with an identity document . She also contested the ORG report no . CARDINAL of DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the complaint .

The first applicant reapplied for LANGUAGE citizenship .

On DATE she was granted NORP citizenship under a simplified procedure on the basis of a ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE to this effect .

On DATE the first applicant was issued with a NORP passport .

The second applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

According to the second applicant , DATE he lived in GPE . Initially , he had a GPE passport issued on DATE by ORG of the Interior of GPE .

On DATE , in accordance with the procedure then in force , the second applicant was issued with an insert for his passport ( вкладыш ) specifying that he was a citizen of GPE .

On DATE the ORG and ORG no . CARDINAL of ORG , in GPE , issued the second applicant with a NORP passport .

In DATE the second applicant moved to GPE .

On DATE the second applicant applied to the ORG of GPE of GPE to register his place of residence .

According to the Government , owing to doubts as to whether the second applicant had been issued with a NORP passport in accordance with the established procedure , the ORG of GPE of GPE sent a request to the ORG of GPE .

On DATE the ORG of GPE issued a certificate which reads , in so far as relevant :

“ On DATE [ the second applicant ] was issued with [ a NORP passport ] following the exchange of [ his passport ] issued on DATE by ORG of the Interior of GPE .

In section CARDINAL of the application for issue ( exchange ) of [ the second applicant ’s ] passport it is noted ‘ ORG citizen according to section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)’ .

According to the information [ available to the ORG of GPE ] , [ the second applicant ] has not been registered at the address [ in ORG ] since DATE , as he has moved to GPE .

In the database of [ ORG ] , available to the ORG of GPE , there is no information as to whether [ the second applicant ] has obtained NORP citizenship .

A copy of [ the second applicant ’s ] passport issued on DATE by ORG of the Interior of GPE contains a [ glued ] insert issued by ORG of Rostov - on - Don on DATE illegible ] to the effect that [ the second applicant ] is a citizen of GPE in accordance with section PERSON ) of LAW of DATE .

On DATE ... a request was sent to [ the ORG of GPE ] to confirm that [ the second applicant ] had LANGUAGE citizenship .

According [ to the information received ] , the issue of the above insert to [ the second applicant ] and its lawfulness or otherwise is [ not ] [ section illegible ] confirmed ...

The decision to issue [ the second applicant ] with [ a NORP ] passport was made ... by [ ORG ] , former head of the ORG and ORG no . CARDINAL of ORG , in GPE , who on DATE was ... dismissed from service because she had reached retirement age .

It appears to be impossible to question [ V. ] concerning the circumstances of the issue of the NORP passport [ to the second applicant ] , since she is absent from her place of residence .

Accordingly , [ V. ] ... issued [ the second applicant ] with a NORP passport in the absence of documents confirming that he was a NORP citizen , and without checking the documents presented for the issue ( exchange ) of the passport , in breach [ of the rules ] then in force .

The above circumstances allow the supposition that [ ORG ] might have had an interest in issuing [ the second applicant ] with a NORP passport in breach of the established rules , which constitutes an offence punishable under LAW . Furthermore , it may be conjectured that [ the second applicant ] presented a passport [ issued in DATE ] which contained wrong information to the effect that he had NORP citizenship .

On the basis of the foregoing , [ it is proposed ] ... to consider that [ the second applicant ’s passport ] was issued in breach of the established rules ... ”

NORP On DATE , when the second applicant turned DATE , in accordance with the applicable procedure , he applied to the ORG to exchange his passport .

The second applicant received a verbal refusal to issue him with a new passport . According to the official who notified him of the refusal , the second applicant had failed to prove that he had had a permanent place of residence in GPE on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , and he had only had a registered place of residence in GPE since DATE .

On DATE the second applicant provided LOC FMS with a written explanation to the effect that DATE his place of residence had been registered in PERSON - on - Don , although he had actually been living with his partner , PERSON , in LOC .

On DATE ORG of LOC of GPE - on - PERSON provided the second applicant with a certificate confirming that he was not registered in LOC and there was no information about him in the archives either .

On DATE the Krasnodar Region FMS informed GPE FMS that its archives contained no information about the second applicant , and that it appeared to be impossible to question PERSON because she was absent from her place of residence .

On DATE the Kostroma Region FMS issued a decision to the effect that the second applicant was not a NORP citizen . With reference to the certificate of DATE issued by the ORG of GPE , the decision stated , in particular , that according to the enquiries carried out , the second applicant ’s NORP passport had been issued in breach of the applicable rules . It further stated that it had proved impossible to obtain documentary evidence that the second applicant had been living in GPE on DATE , and the stamp in his passport only confirmed that he had been registered as resident in GPE from DATE to CARDINAL DATE . The decision also noted that the database of ORG contained no information as to whether the second applicant had obtained NORP citizenship . Accordingly , the enquiries made had obtained no evidence that the second applicant had acquired NORP citizenship or that he had been living in GPE on DATE .

The second applicant appealed to ORG against the refusal to exchange his passport .

At a hearing on DATE a representative from the ORG of GPE of GPE stated , in particular :

“ On the basis of the written instructions from the ORG that there should be an urgent check on all passports previously issued to individuals not born in the territory of GPE , we sent a request for information to the ORG of GPE . The FMS of GPE sent a certificate confirming that the [ second applicant ’s ] passport should be considered as having been issued in breach of the applicable rules . I sent a report stating that it was necessary to obtain corroboration that [ the second applicant ] either had or did not have LANGUAGE citizenship . The head of the ORG ... issued a decision to the effect that [ the second applicant ] was not a NORP citizen . [ The second applicant ] was invited to familiarise himself with that decision . [ I]t was suggested that he apply for a residence permit and subsequently NORP citizenship , under a simplified procedure .

In DATE the ORG issued instructions for checks to be carried out only in respect of individuals who had applied to exchange their passports . [ The second applicant ] applied [ to exchange his passport ] , and I discovered that he had not been born in the territory of GPE , and sent the request . [ His ] passport was not seized : the ORG did not issue instructions to this effect , so that people would not be left without [ an identity ] document . ”

On DATE the GPE ORG of GPE upheld the decision of the ORG . It noted that , as a result of a check carried out pursuant to sections DATE Regulation on ORG , the ORG had found that the second applicant had been issued with a NORP passport in breach of the applicable rules , and was not entitled to NORP citizenship . In particular , it had not been confirmed that he had been living in GPE on DATE . This justified the refusal to exchange his passport . The court also noted that the reports of the checks carried out by the ORG had not been appealed against or set aside in accordance with the established procedure , and that they were not the subject of the court ’s examination in those proceedings .

The court further dismissed the second applicant ’s argument that the fact that he had been using the previously issued NORP passport for DATE constituted a valid reason to exchange the passport . The court likewise dismissed his argument that he had not violated any laws or regulations in DATE , when he had been issued with the NORP passport . The court found that his passport was invalid regardless .

The second applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision . The appeal court noted , in particular , that the certificate issued by GPE FMS on DATE showed that a NORP passport had been issued to the second applicant on the basis of a certificate of DATE issued by ORG of Rostov - on - Don confirming that he was a NORP citizen in accordance with section PERSON ) of the DATE Law on Citizenship of GPE . However , the legal validity of that certificate had not been confirmed . It further noted that , according to the results of the enquiries carried out in the places indicated by the applicant as his places of residence in GPE DATE , no confirmation of his registration and residence as of DATE had been received with respect to any of the addresses indicated .

The appeal court also noted that the second applicant ’s argument that he had not been informed about the report issued following the check carried out by the ORG , and that therefore he could not have appealed against it , had not affected the lower court ’s conclusions .

On DATE , following the entry into force of Law no . CARDINALFZ on ORG to LAW of DATE , the second applicant applied for LANGUAGE citizenship .

On DATE the ORG of LOC decided to grant the second applicant LANGUAGE citizenship .

On DATE the second applicant received a NORP passport .


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Deprivation of property;General principles of international law)

Marko Bošnjak;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Georges Ravarani

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in LANGUAGE .

The applicant was employed at a ORG - owned company from DATE until DATE . Part of his severance payment was taxed at a PERCENT rate in the amount of MONEY ( ORG ) ( MONEY ( ORG ) ) .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy)

Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström

The applicant is a privately owned company which was established in DATE and registered in GPE .

On DATE the applicant and Beranka AD , a sociallyowned company , concluded a guarantee agreement . To secure the payment of obligations under this agreement , the applicant and ORG concluded ORG . CARDINAL on the fiduciary transfer of the latter ’s property to the applicant ( ORG br . CARDINAL ORG o fiducijarnom prenosu prava svojine ) . In this FAC , the property offered as collateral was : ( a ) property no . DATE storehouse ( magacin ) ; ( b ) property no . DATE power plant ( energana ) ; ( c ) property no . DATE boiler - room ( kotlovnica ) ; ( d ) property no . DATE laboratory ( laboratorija ) ; and ( e ) property PMCARDINAL – paper machines ( papir mašine ) .

On DATE the fiduciary transfer of ORG property to the applicant was registered by ORG in Berane ( Direkcija za nekretnine , Područna jedinica LOC

On DATE ORG in PERSON ( NORP sud u ORG ) opened insolvency proceedings in respect of Beranka AD .

On DATE the applicant reported its claim in these proceedings .

On DATE ORG refused to recognise this claim .

Following the decision of DATE , on DATE the insolvency administrator for GPE AD ( stečajni upravnik ) lodged a request with ORG in Berane seeking that the registration of the fiduciary transfer of property to the applicant be erased . On DATE ORG accepted this request .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal with ORG in Berane ( Uprava za nekretnine Područna jedinica Berane ) . On DATE ORG amended the said decision .

On DATE ORG in GPE ( Uprava za nekrentine u GPE ) quashed both decisions on appeal and remitted the case for reconsideration .

On DATE ORG in Berane re - registered the fiduciary transfer on properties nos . CARDINAL and DATE , as well as on PMCARDINAL , but refused to re - register the fiduciary transfer on properties nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL .

On DATE ORG in GPE upheld this decision .

The applicant appealed to ORG . On DATE the ORG quashed the decision of ORG in GPE and remitted case to ORG in Berane . It would appear that the case is still pending before that body .

On DATE ORG issued an enforcement decision ordering the registration of the applicant ’s fiduciary rights in respect of all properties .

Following ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , the applicant lodged an objection . The hearings concerning the objection were held on DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s objection .

On DATE ORG in Berane again erased the fiduciary transfer of ORG property from the public register . On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of ORG to erase the applicant ’s fiduciary rights .

On DATE , upon an appeal by the applicant , ORG quashed the decision of the ORG and remitted the case to ORG in Berane for reconsideration .

On DATE ORG in Berane ordered the removal of the applicant ’s rights on DATE property from the public register .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision of DATE and remitted case to the first instance .

On DATE ORG in Berane stayed the proceedings , because it needed some documents which were in the file of a case pending before ORG . This decision was quashed by decision of ORG and the matter was remitted to the first instance .

On DATE ORG adopted a decision allowing the deletion of the applicant ’s rights from the public register . The same authority confirmed that decision on DATE .

On DATE the applicant filed an objection with ORG .

On DATE the applicant also lodged an appeal with ORG . On DATE ORG rendered a decision in the applicant ’s favour and ordered ORG to reconsider on the applicant ’s prior objection .

On DATE ORG remitted the case to the first instance . The proceedings are still pending before ORG in Berane .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)

Egidijus Kūris;Iulia Motoc;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and are detained in ORG and GPE .

The first applicant was detained in FAC from CARDINAL DATE to CARDINAL DATE . The documents submitted to ORG show that he was held in CARDINAL different remand prison cells : nos . CARDINAL , ORG , CARDINAL and DATE .

In DATE the applicant instituted proceedings for damages . He argued that the conditions in which he had been held in FAC had been degrading : cell no . CARDINAL had not been renovated , had had almost no natural light and the artificial light provided in TIME had been very poor ; the ventilation had been insufficient and the cell was cold ; cell no . ORG , although renovated , lacked sufficient ventilation and was cold , and there was almost no natural light ; cell no . CARDINAL had insufficient light and ventilation ; cell no . CARDINAL was dirty , the electrical system was damaged and thus dangerous , the sanitary facilities were not separated from the cell , the cell lacked light , ventilation and the temperature was too low . The applicant also submitted a document from ORG from DATE , which noted violations of hygiene norms in the remand prison ’s cells .

On DATE ORG held that the applicant ’s right to adequate conditions of detention had been breached but dismissed his claim for compensation . The court held that the applicant had not complained about his conditions of detention while in prison and had only lodged his complaint DATE after leaving it . Moreover , it was up to the applicant to prove that he had sustained damage . The court held that there was no information to show that the remand prison had purposely interfered with his right to dignity or treated him inhumanely , that he had not suffered a great enough negative impact from the hygiene violations , and that there were no grounds to award him compensation .

The applicant appealed but on DATE ORG upheld the first - instance decision . The court observed that the document from ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) had been issued DATE after the applicant had left the remand prison and it was not able to determine the negative impact of the unsanitary conditions on the applicant on the basis of such evidence alone .

The second applicant was detained in FAC from DATE to CARDINAL DATE . The documents submitted to ORG show that he was held in several different cells : CARDINAL . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , DATE , DATE and DATE .

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings for damages and on DATE he submitted a detailed complaint . He argued that the conditions in which he had been held in FAC had been degrading : the cells were damp and dirty , there was insufficient light and ventilation , and the walls had not been painted . As a result , his health had deteriorated : his sight had worsened and he had pain in his joints and his back .

On DATE ORG held that the applicant ’s right to adequate conditions of detention had been breached but dismissed his claim for compensation . The court found that ORG had examined cell no . CARDINAL on DATE , while the applicant had been detained there from CARDINAL DATE to CARDINAL DATE and from DATE to DATE . The cell had been dirty , the toilet doors broken , and there was mould on the walls and ceiling . The health centre also examined cell no . CARDINAL on DATE and established that there was no longer any mould and the temperature was satisfactory , but the lighting was still insufficient . The court thus held that the applicant had proven that the conditions in cell no . CARDINAL had been unsanitary . However , the court noted that the applicant had not proven the existence of unsanitary conditions in the other cells . The court further noted that the inmates were responsible for keeping the cells clean , but that the remand prison had not proven that it had provided the applicant with cleaning materials for DATE . As regards the applicant ’s health , the court observed that he had been prescribed several drugs for spinal osteochondrosis , but that there was no relation between his illness and the unsanitary conditions in cell no . CARDINAL . The court also noted that during the hearing the applicant had claimed that all the cells had been overcrowded but he had failed to mention this in his written complaint . The court thus held that the case concerned sanitary conditions and not overcrowding .

NORP The applicant appealed and on DATE ORG found that the court of first instance had acted unreasonably in dismissing his compensation claim , and awarded him with CARDINAL NORP litai ( ORG , MONEY ( ORG ) ) for non - pecuniary damage .


Ján Šikuta;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Co - Agent , PERSON , from ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant was placed in pre - trial detention on DATE in the Arad Police detention facilities . On DATE he was convicted of corruption committed in the exercise of his duty as a police officer and sentenced to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment by ORG .

DATE and DATE the applicant was detained in the ORG detention facilities in a cell measuring QUANTITY together with CARDINAL other prisoners . The window was very small and could not be opened from the inside . Access to the toilets was allowed twice per day . The mattress on his bed was worn out and the food was of very poor quality .

On DATE the applicant was transferred to FAC where he remained until DATE . He shared a cell measuring QUANTITY with CARDINAL other prisoners and the food was of very poor quality and served in unhygienic conditions . The applicant also alleged that he had been transported to court hearings before ORG in old vans , in overcrowded and overheated conditions .

In the GPE Police detention facilities the applicant shared a cell measuring QUANTITY with CARDINAL other prisoners who were also in pre - trial detention . The cell had CARDINAL windows each measuring QUANTITY by QUANTITY which could be opened from the outside at the ORG request or by the prisoners themselves by pushing the windows towards the exterior . The sanitary facilities and toilets were accessible twice per day for TIME routine . In addition , access to the toilets was granted whenever necessary , upon request , TIME For the rest of the time a TIME pot was available in the cell . The prisoners had the right to a TIME DATE walk .

In FAC the applicant was detained in a cell measuring QUANTITY For certain periods of time he shared the cell with CARDINAL , CARDINAL other prisoners . The cell had a hallway , a separate bathroom with toilet and shower and a sleeping area . In terms of furniture , the cell contained CARDINAL beds and bedside tables , a table for eating , chairs , shelves and a wardrobe . The prison had central heating ; the temperature in the cells during the DATE ranged from CARDINAL to CARDINALoC. The applicant had the right to CARDINAL hours’ walk a day and , during his stay in FAC , he participated in CARDINAL educational activities and CARDINAL sports activities ( such as football during DATE ) . The applicant had been transported to and from the courts in accordance with the relevant legal provisions .

The Government emphasised that the applicant had never complained before the prison authorities about his conditions of detention or transportation .

Excerpts from the relevant parts of ORG of ORG for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment ( “ the ORG ” ) , as well as of ORG adopted by ORG on DATE , are quoted in ORG v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL - CARDINAL , DATE ) .


Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - award

George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Ledi Bianku;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in LOC ( GPE ) .

On DATE the applicant gave birth in FAC ( a municipal enterprise , hereinafter “ the ORG hospital ” ) . Caesarean section was used , with the applicant ’s consent , because uterine rupture had occurred during labour .

In the course of that surgery the surgeon performed tubal ligation ( surgical contraception ) without the applicant ’s consent .

On DATE , after her attempt to achieve an out - of - court settlement with the hospital had failed , the applicant initiated civil proceedings against the hospital , seeking to recover damages for the unauthorised tubal ligation . In DATE her claim was upheld and she was awarded compensation in the amount of CARDINAL NORP lati for the unlawful sterilisation .

On DATE the director of the ORG hospital wrote to ORG ( hereinafter “ the MADEKKI ” ) , requesting it to “ evaluate the treatment received by [ the applicant ] during childbirth in accordance with the legislation in force in DATE ” . The PERSON initiated an administrative procedure on DATE . The administrative inquiry concerned the applicant ’s health care and in particular the gynaecological and childbirth assistance she had been provided from DATE . In the process of that inquiry the PERSON requested and received medical files from CARDINAL different medical institutions , containing detailed information about the applicant ’s health over that period .

In DATE ORG , a MADEKKI staff member , telephoned the applicant and informed her of the on - going inquiry . ORG invited the applicant to comment on the case , which she declined to do , referring the PERSON to her legal representative , PERSON , instead . During the conversation ORG allegedly admonished the applicant for wanting to sue the hospital for damages , and told her that she herself was to blame for her sterilisation .

On DATE Ms PERSON asked the PERSON for information on the legal grounds for , and the factual circumstances of , the inquiry .

On DATE the PERSON issued a report concerning the medical treatment given to the applicant during childbirth in DATE . The report contained medical details about the applicant of a particularly private and sensitive character . It concluded that no laws had been violated during the applicant ’s antenatal care or during childbirth . A summary of the findings of the report was sent to the director of the ORG hospital on DATE .

On DATE the PERSON answered PERSON PERSON ’s questions concerning the administrative inquiry , setting out its opinion on the legal basis for it and providing information on the steps that had been taken in the course of the inquiry .

The applicant ’s representative lodged a claim with ORG , alleging that the PERSON had initiated the inquiry unlawfully , since in essence its purpose had been to help the ORG hospital to gather evidence for the impending litigation , which was outside the PERSON ’s remit . It was also alleged that the PERSON had acted unlawfully in requesting and receiving information about the applicant ’s health , as it had violated the applicant ’s right to respect for her private life . That right had been further violated when the PERSON unlawfully transferred the applicant ’s data to the ORG hospital . Lastly , the court was requested to annul an administrative act – the PERSON ’s report DATE since its findings were erroneous . Compensation in the amount of CARDINAL NORP lati was requested in respect of non - pecuniary damage .

On DATE ORG adopted a judgment by which it terminated the proceedings with regard to the request to annul the PERSON report , as in the court ’s opinion the report did not create any specific rights or obligations for the applicant and thus could not be considered an administrative act , and dismissed the remainder of the application as ill - founded .

Counsel for the applicant appealed and on DATE ORG adopted a judgment by which it upheld in full the first - instance court ’s judgment and endorsed that court ’s reasoning , essentially equating the activities of the PERSON with the provision of health care , which , according to domestic law , was a legitimate reason for gathering personal data .

On DATE the ORG of ORG dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant , in which reference was made , inter alia , to LAW and to the cases of Z v. GPE ( DATE , Reports of Judgments and Decisions DATE ) and PERSON GPE ( DATE , Reports of Judgments and Decisions CARDINALIV ) .

The ORG agreed with the lower courts that the PERSON report could not be considered an administrative act . It further considered that this report was not an action of a public authority ( faktiskā rīcība ) and thus was not amenable to review in administrative courts .

It thus remained for the ORG to address the applicant ’s claims that the PERSON ’s actions in preparing the report had been unlawful . In this regard the ORG considered that LAW gave the PERSON the right to examine the quality of medical care provided in medical institutions not only upon receiving a corresponding complaint from a patient but also when a request for such examination had been submitted by a medical institution , which had an obligation to protect the interests of the society so that , should any irregularities be found by the PERSON , they might be eliminated and their recurrence with respect to other patients avoided in the future .

NORP The ORG agreed with the applicant that the processing of sensitive data concerning her constituted an interference with her rights guaranteed by , inter alia , LAW . The ORG then went on to summarise the findings of ORG in the CARDINAL cases invoked by the applicant , emphasising in particular that the Convention left to the GPE a wide margin of appreciation in balancing the confidentiality of medical data and the necessity to preserve ORG confidence in the medical profession and in the health services in general .

NORP The ORG further held that both LAW and LAW contained exceptions that permitted the PERSON to collect and process the otherwise confidential medical data . The former listed such exceptions explicitly ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , while the latter allowed processing of medical data for the purposes of medical treatment or the provision or administration of heath care services ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) or if processing of personal data was necessary for a system administrator to carry out his legal duties ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The ORG continued as follows : “ according to [ the law ] the PERSON has a duty to control the quality of medical care . In order to carry out such control , the PERSON requires information about the patient and his care ” .

The ORG concluded as follows :

“ Taking into account the aforementioned , the [ ORG ] finds that restrictions to a person ’s private life connected to gathering and processing of sensitive personal data are provided for by law . When regulating this question , the legislator has already assessed the aim and proportionality of such restrictions , as well as has provided for safeguards against unjustified disclosure of the above - mentioned data . Consequently [ the applicant ’s ] argument that ORG ought to have assessed the aim and proportionality of the restriction is unfounded .

Additionally the [ ORG ] considers that ORG has correctly interpreted and applied the above - mentioned legal provisions and has come to the correct conclusion that the PERSON , in order to carry out the control of the quality of medical care , which it is competent to do , had a right to receive and process [ the applicant ’s ] sensitive data without asking for her consent and that the PERSON has acted within its sphere of competence and in accordance with the provisions of the law concerning the processing of sensitive personal data . The PERSON used the information it had collected about [ the applicant ] in order to carry out its functions , namely , to control the quality of the medical care provided to [ the applicant ] , while to the PERSON hospital it only handed over its conclusions concerning the legality of the LOC actions , which did not contain [ the applicant ’s ] sensitive data . ”

For these reasons the ORG decided to uphold the lower courts’ decisions .

Section CARDINAL of LAW ( PERSON likums ) at the relevant time provided that the PERSON was the institution responsible for monitoring the quality of medical care provided in medical institutions .

The PERSON ’s work at the relevant time was governed in more detail by its statute ( nolikums ) , which had been approved by ORG . The statute provided that the PERSON was a government institution , whose main functions were to inspect and monitor the professional quality of health care in medical institutions irrespective of their ownership status ( paragraph CARDINAL ) . Paragraph CARDINAL of the statute listed the principal functions of the PERSON , such as to examine complaints in order to protect the rights of patients ( paragraph CARDINAL ) , to oversee and issue reports concerning the professional quality of medical care in the event of complaints ( paragraph CARDINAL ) , to issue reports on the quality of medical care in medical institutions ( paragraph CARDINAL ) and the like .

According to its statute the PERSON had a right to carry out scheduled ( “ plānveida ” ) checks on the quality of medical care as well as to carry out the required checks in response to complaints and requests ( paragraph CARDINAL ) . Paragraph CARDINAL authorised the MADEKKI “ to request from private individuals and officials documents and information concerning questions within its field of competence ” . If the ORG found that laws had been broken in the course of providing health care , it was authorised to apply administrative fines and issue warnings , as well as to give appropriate recommendations to doctors and administrators of medical institutions .

Lastly , section CARDINAL of the MADEKKI statute provided that its staff had to maintain confidentiality with regard to any information obtained in the performance of their professional duties .

The Personal Data Protection Law ( NORP personu datu aizsardzības likums ) provides , in section CARDINAL , that the processing ( which is defined as any activities with personal data , including collecting , registering , using , and so on ) of sensitive personal data ( including information about a person ’s health ) is permitted only after having received written consent from the data subject . Without such consent personal data may be processed only in a limited number of situations , including “ if ... necessary for the purposes of medical treatment [ or ] the provision or administration of heath care services ” ( section GPE ) ) .

Section CARDINAL of ORG Law provided more generally that processing of personal data was allowed only if that law did not provide otherwise and if CARDINAL of the other conditions was present . CARDINAL of the additional conditions was that the processing of the data was necessary for a system administrator to carry out his legal duties ( section CARDINAL ) ) . A “ system administrator ” for the purposes of this PERSON was “ a natural or legal person who determines the aims of a data processing system and the means of processing [ of the data ] ” .


George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Yonko Grozev

The applicant , Mr Yiannakis PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON . He was represented before the ORG by Mr A. S. Angelides , a lawyer practising in GPE .

The Physical Education Teachers’ Appointment List is used to fill vacancies for physical education teachers in the NORP public education system . The procedure for inclusion on the list is defined by section CARDINALB of ORG “ the PERSON of DATE ” ) and is as follows .

NORP The list is published every DATE . Those wishing to be included on the list must submit applications by DATE of DATE . ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) then examines the applications and ranks the candidates on the list .

A candidate ’s position on the list is determined with reference to various criteria . For first - time candidates , their position is determined first , by DATE they obtained their degree and then by other criteria which are set out in section CARDINALB(CARDINAL ) of the PERSON such as their class of degree , whether they undertook military service , whether they have obtained any additional post - graduate qualifications and so on . For candidates who were already included on the list in DATE , their position on the new list is determined first , by DATE they were first included on the list and , thereafter , by the other criteria set out in section CARDINALB(CARDINAL ) .

The applicant is a holder of a degree in Physical Education . He finished his studies in DATE , having previously deferred those studies in order to complete DATE months’ compulsory military service . DATE , he applied for inclusion on the list . His request was accepted by ORG and he was included in the list for DATE . While it appears he did not apply for inclusion on the list DATE thereafter , in DATE he applied for inclusion in the DATE list .

The ORG published its DATE list on DATE . The applicant was placed CARDINALth . He then filed a recourse before a single judge of ORG ( revisional jurisdiction ) seeking the annulment of the ORG ’s decision to place him CARDINALth . He submitted that section CARDINALB of the PERSON of DATE was unconstitutional . According to the applicant , by determining ranking on the list by reference to DATE an applicant first applied to be on the list , section CARDINALB created indirect discrimination against male candidates . This was because , unlike their female counterparts , male candidates had to complete DATE months’ military service prior to applying for registration . The effect of this was to provide a DATE head start in the rankings to women .

ORG at first instance upheld the applicant ’s recourse and annulled the ORG ’s decision .

The Government , on behalf of ORG , appealed to ORG ( revisional appeal jurisdiction ) inter alia on the grounds that the court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the recourse . This was because , in the ORG ’s submission , the applicant had failed to prove that he was challenging an executory administrative act since he had failed to establish an appropriate comparison between his position and the position of other candidates on the list . Thus , according to the ORG , the judgment of ORG at first instance was based on entirely hypothetical facts . The Government submitted that this was an issue which went to the core of the proceedings .

The applicant argued that the matter raised by the Government on appeal had not been raised in the first instance proceedings . In any case the applicant submitted that the ORG ’s submissions were groundless and should be rejected .

On DATE ORG allowed the ORG ’s appeal . The court found that the applicant ’s challenge to the ORG ’s decision to rank him ORG on the list was not a valid recourse against an executory administrative act . This was because , by its nature , the ORG ’s ranking decision was an act of comparison between candidates : it did not merely affect the position of CARDINAL person on the list . The court could not annul the applicant ’s position on the list without automatically affecting the position of other candidates . In his recourse the applicant should have set out the reasons why he considered the ORG ’s decision was wrong and should have done so by a direct comparison with those candidates to whom the better rankings had been given . This would have given the other candidates an opportunity to set out their arguments or objections before the court and be heard , as required by the rules of natural justice . The fault in question went to the core of the recourse and could not be remedied .

For this reason , ORG did not examine the applicant ’s complaints that the PERSON was unconstitutional and discriminatory ; a decision on the admissibility of the recourse preceded such substantive issues .

Article CARDINAL of the LAW prohibits discrimination providing that :

“ CARDINAL . All persons are equal before the law , the administration and justice , and are entitled to equal protection thereof and treatment thereby .

Every person shall enjoy all the rights and liberties provided for in this LAW without any direct or indirect discrimination against any person on the ground of his community , race , religion , language , sex , political or other convictions , national or social descent , birth , colour , wealth , social class , or on any ground whatsoever , unless there is express provision to the contrary in LAW .

Article CARDINAL of the LAW states that ORG has exclusive jurisdiction to :

“ ( CARDINAL) ... decide on a recourse filed against a decision ... of an authority ... exercising executive or administrative functions when such a decision is contrary to the constitution or the law or is made in excess or abuse of the powers vested in such body , authority or person .

( CARDINAL ) Such a recourse may be made by a person whose existing legitimate interest ... is adversely and directly affected by such decision , act or omission .

Article CARDINAL of the above PERSON ( “ the DATE Law ” ) where relevant provides :

“ ( CARDINAL ) Men and women enjoy equal treatment , prohibiting any discrimination on the ground of gender –

( a ) In access to employment or to a job opening , permanent or temporary ... ;

( b ) in the definition and implementation of the terms and conditions of employment , including the qualifications and other terms and conditions and placement criteria ... ”

According to case law of ORG , only “ executory administrative acts ” can be the subject of a recourse to ORG under Article CARDINAL of the LAW v. PERSON and another [ DATE ] CARDINAL ORG CARDINAL ) . An executory administrative act is one which , inter alia , grant rights to individuals and creates obligations for the administration ( see PERSON v. the Republic [ DATE ] CARDINAL ORG CARDINAL ; and PERSON and others v. ORG [ DATE ] CARDINAL A.A.D. CARDINAL ) .

Issues as to the admissibility of a recourse to ORG may be considered by the court of its own motion even if these are not raised by the parties ( see GPE [ CARDINAL ] CARDINAL A.A.D. CARDINAL ) .

It is well - established that , where there is a dispute between various candidates on a list or where , for example , there is a selection process amongst a number of candidates for a particular post , a candidate wishing to challenge the validity of the administrative body ’s preference for CARDINAL candidate over another , ought not merely to challenge his position on the list or his non - selection , as the case may be , but instead should challenge the position of other people by indicating which candidates in his opinion lacked in qualifications or were unjustifiably favoured in comparison to him . All the other candidates whose positions are affected should be given the opportunity as interested parties to set out their case and objections before the court . Since the administrative authority ’s decision affects a number of candidates , it means that the entirety of the decision should be challenged as that is what constitutes the executory administrative act . The part of the decision affecting solely the applicant can not be considered an autonomous executory act , as that is CARDINAL link in the entire chain of considerations which the administrative body makes in order to form the final decision ( see , among other authorities , ORG v. PERSON and another [ DATE ] CARDINAL ORG CARDINAL ; PERSON v. ORG , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , judgment of DATE , unreported ; PERSON and PERSON v. ORG [ DATE ] CARDINAL A.A.D. CARDINAL ; PERSON v. ORG Scholarships and others , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , judgment of DATE , unreported ) .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court)

Armen Harutyunyan;Branko Lubarda;Carlo Ranzoni;Johannes Silvis;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in NORP . She worked as a judge at ORG .

On DATE the Minister of ORG filed a motion with ORG seeking to have the applicant dismissed from her post under LAW ( CARDINAL) of the LAW on the Status of a Judge . The motion stated that the applicant had been severely reprimanded on CARDINAL occasions , namely in DATE , for various gross violations of the rules of criminal procedure and another set of disciplinary proceedings had been instituted against her on the same grounds in DATE .

On DATE ORG examined the motion and decided to form a CARDINAL - member commission to examine the factual basis of the motion and to report back to the ORG .

On DATE ORG adopted a conclusion recommending to the President of GPE that the applicant be dismissed .

On DATE the President of GPE issued a decree dismissing the applicant from her post .

On DATE the applicant lodged a claim with the ORG and ORG of GPE , seeking to annul the President ’s Decree of DATE as unlawful . She argued that her dismissal from work had been in violation of a number of provisions of domestic law and various NORP instruments relating to the status of a judge . In particular , the motion for dismissal filed by the Minister of ORG on DATE had been based upon matters which had been the subject of earlier disciplinary proceedings and in respect of which penalties had already been imposed . The motion did not contain any reasoning and was not accompanied by any supporting documentation and was , therefore , unsubstantiated . She further argued that judicial decisions were not supposed to be subject to a review other than by way of an appeal procedure prescribed by law . Thus , the commission of gross violations of the law ( the alleged grounds for her dismissal ) could only have been found by a higher court ( which had not happened in her case ) and not by non - judicial bodies and officials , such as ORG or the Minister of ORG . Finally , she claimed that the question of her dismissal had been examined by ORG in her absence , in violation of the relevant rules .

On DATE the GPE and ORG of GPE decided under LAW to terminate the proceedings on the ground that the applicant ’s claim was not subject to examination by the courts of general jurisdiction . In doing so , ORG referred , inter alia , to LAW , LAW and LAW ORG ) .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal .

On DATE ORG examined and dismissed the applicant ’s claim as unsubstantiated .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law .

On DATE ORG quashed the judgment of ORG and decided to terminate the proceedings on the same grounds as ORG .

On DATE , in proceedings unrelated to this case , ORG found the second paragraph of LAW ORG to be unconstitutional .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment)

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention . Some applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .


No violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 - Right not to be tried or punished twice-{general} (Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 - Conviction;Criminal offence)

George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The tax inspector conducted a tax inspection in CARDINAL different companies in DATE and DATE .

On DATE , concerning the first company , the tax authorities considered that the applicant had received , in DATE , MONEY ( ORG ) and in DATE , ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL as disguised dividends . They imposed on the applicant an additional tax and tax surcharges ( veronkorotus , skatteförhöjning ) , amounting to LAW in respect of DATE and to ORG CARDINAL in respect of DATE .

On DATE the tax authorities found in respect of the second company that the applicant had received in DATE ORG CARDINAL as disguised dividends and imposed ORG CARDINAL as tax surcharges . Moreover , the applicant had received in DATE EUR CARDINAL as disguised dividends and ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL were imposed as tax surcharges .

On DATE the tax authorities considered that the applicant had received , in respect of the third company , ORG CARDINAL as disguised dividends in DATE for which a tax surcharge of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL was made .

The applicant apparently did not seek rectification of any of these decisions . Nor were there any appeal proceedings pending . The time - limits for seeking rectification and lodging an appeal ran until DATE and DATE respectively .

On DATE the public prosecutor brought charges against the applicant on , inter alia , CARDINAL counts of aggravated tax fraud ( törkeä veropetos , grovt skattebedrägeri ) and CARDINAL count of tax fraud ( veropetos , skattebedrägeri ) concerning DATE . According to the last count , the applicant was accused of aggravated tax fraud as he had under - declared his income . The undeclared income amounted to ORG CARDINAL for DATE and ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL for DATE . Consequently , the tax imposed in DATE had been EUR CARDINAL too low and in DATE EUR CARDINAL too low . The tax imposed on the applicant had thus been in total ORG too low .

On DATE the GPE ORG ( käräjäoikeus , tingsrätten ) convicted the applicant as charged and imposed a prison sentence of DATE and DATE . He was ordered to pay the taxation authority ORG plus interest in respect of the last count .

By letter dated DATE the applicant appealed to ORG ( hovioikeus , hovrätten ) , requesting that the charges be dismissed or at least , as far as aggravated tax fraud was concerned , that he be convicted of tax fraud . He also requested that the sentence be mitigated .

On DATE ORG upheld the ORG judgment .

NORP By letter dated DATE the applicant appealed to ORG ( korkein oikeus , högsta domstolen ) requesting , inter alia , that as concerned the last count of aggravated tax fraud , the charges be dismissed without examining the merits and that the compensation for damages be rejected . He claimed that in this respect the ne bis in idem principle had been violated as tax surcharges had already been imposed for the same acts . That count concerned at the earliest DATE , in respect of which the time - limit for an appeal in the taxation proceedings was still running until DATE , meaning that those proceedings had not yet been finalised . An effective use of the ne bis in idem principle would require a lis pendens effect preventing the pressing of charges if an administrative tax surcharge matter was still pending . Otherwise CARDINAL separate sets of proceedings concerning the same facts could be pending . Moreover , applicants would be treated unequally if the possibility of pressing charges depended on the finality of the taxation proceedings .

On DATE the applicant was granted leave to appeal as far as the last count was concerned .

On DATE ORG upheld ORG judgment . It found , after a detailed analysis of LAW No . CARDINAL to the LAW and the ORG ’s case - law , that it was clear since the PERSON judgment that the imposition of a tax surcharge rendered the case criminal and that the ne bis in idem principle applied to such a case even though , under the domestic law , it fell within the domain of administrative law . Both the taxation and the criminal proceedings concerned the same facts , namely the failure to declare the same income . For the ne bis in idem principle it was relevant whether the proceedings had become final . The principle did not prohibit a situation in which CARDINAL sets of proceedings concerning the same matter were pending at the same time . There was thus no lis pendens effect attached to this principle . Even if this lack of lis pendens effect was problematic in the sense that it might result in unequal treatment of applicants due to the fact that the point of time when taxation decisions became final varied , its acceptance might create even more profound problems . As the taxation decisions in the present case concerned DATE , the time - limits for seeking rectification ran until DATE and DATE respectively . The charges had been pressed on DATE . The taxation proceedings had thus not become final before the criminal proceedings started . Therefore , there were no impediments to examining the charge concerning aggravated tax fraud . This judgment became a published leading case PERSON .