Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life)

Dmitry Dedov;Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE ( GPE ) .

On DATE the applicant married PERSON , a NORP national , in GPE ( GPE ) . On DATE PERSON gave birth to their son , N.A. In DATE she moved to GPE to join her husband .

NORP In DATE the applicant ’s wife and son spent DATE in GPE . They were supposed to return to GPE on DATE . Instead , the applicant ’s wife sent him an e - mail , informing him that she and their son were to remain in GPE and that she had brought a civil action against him there , seeking a divorce ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the applicant ’s legal representative sent an e - mail to ORG ( ORG zdravstva i socijalne skrbi , hereafter “ the relevant Ministry ” ) , as ORG within the meaning of the DATE LAW on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ( “ the Hague Convention ” , see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . She asked the Ministry to urgently contact the applicant ’s wife and take other appropriate measures to seek the voluntary return of the child until the receipt of the official request under LAW from ORG .

On DATE the Ministry forwarded the applicant ’s request to the competent local social welfare centre with a view to establishing his wife ’s intentions regarding their son and the possibility of a voluntary return to GPE . The centre immediately invited her for an interview . During the interview of DATE she stated that while living in GPE she had been subjected to constant psychological abuse by the applicant . She did not oppose the applicant ’s having contact with their son , but insisted that any contact take place under the supervision of a child welfare professional .

On DATE the ORG received an official request from ORG under LAW for the return of the applicant ’s son .

On DATE the ORG forwarded the request for return to ORG ( Općinski građanski sud u GPE ) and thus instituted non - contentious proceedings for the return of the applicant ’s son . The court received the request DATE .

On DATE the court invited the local social welfare centre to submit a report on the applicant ’s wife ’s social and financial situation , the reasons for her taking the child to GPE , the child ’s general and psychological condition , and the potential effects on his mental development of any decision to return him to GPE . On DATE the court also invited the applicant ’s wife to respond to her husband ’s request for the boy to be returned .

In her response of CARDINAL DATE the applicant ’s wife opposed his request for the return of their child , with or without her . She submitted in particular that the applicant had agreed to her trip to GPE and that his consent was not time - limited . She also stated that the applicant had expressly forbidden her to return to their flat in GPE , that he had been abusing her , and that there , unlike in GPE , she had been completely dependent on him in every way ( financially , economically , and in terms of accommodation ) . Lastly , she claimed that no significant changes had occurred in the care the child was receiving , given that she had been the CARDINAL taking care of their son thus far , which was the reason why the child was very emotionally attached to her .

On DATE the court reiterated its request of CARDINAL DATE to the local social welfare centre .

On DATE the local social welfare centre submitted its report and supplemented it , at the court ’s request , DATE . The report stated that the applicant ’s wife was taking adequate care of their son and recognised his needs , that she was emotionally positively focused on him and that he was affectionate towards her . The report also stated that she did not undermine the applicant ’s role as a father , and that she encouraged the child to have contact with him , but that she felt the need to protect him from the applicant ’s possible irrational behaviour , which concern the centre considered credible . The child was mentally stable , showed no signs of trauma due to the separation from his father , and had adapted well to the new situation . The report noted that the child was emotionally attached to his mother , with whom he had spent DATE since birth , and that separation from her and returning him to his father would be traumatic . The centre therefore considered that returning the child to GPE would not be in his best interest .

On DATE the applicant submitted to the court a certified copy of the decision of a court in GPE of CARDINAL DATE granting him interim custody of his son .

In her submissions of CARDINAL DATE his wife argued that the report of the social welfare centre suggested that returning her son to GPE would expose him to psychological harm or place him in an intolerable situation within the meaning of LAW paragraph CARDINAL ( b ) of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . She therefore invited the court to dismiss the applicant ’s request for return on that ground .

On DATE the relevant Ministry asked the court to inform it of developments in the case . The court delivered the requested information on DATE .

On DATE the court invited the applicant ’s representative to submit rectified translations of the documents submitted on DATE , given that certain dates had been wrongly translated . The applicant did so on CARDINAL DATE .

In his submissions of DATE and CARDINAL DATE the applicant argued that the report and recommendation of the local social welfare centre did not correspond to the objectives , spirit and purpose of LAW . He explained that the purpose of LAW was the prompt return of the child , and not an assessment of the child ’s adaptation to a new environment . The applicant further argued that his wife had not presented any evidence for her allegations of abuse , and that she had never intended to establish a permanent relationship with him . He averred that tolerating his wife ’s conduct in the proceedings constituted a violation of LAW , LAW and LAW .

In her submissions of CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE the applicant ’s wife replied by contesting all the applicant ’s arguments , and submitted evidence in support of her allegations of abuse . In particular , she submitted a letter from the president and founder of the association for the protection of victims of domestic violence WISH , based in GPE , where she had sought help while living in GPE . She also stated that the applicant no longer lived in their matrimonial home in GPE and wondered where the child was supposed to return .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request for the return of the child . The relevant part of that decision reads as follows :

“ ... having regard to the fact that the separation of ORG from his mother and from a safe environment would without a doubt have harmful and traumatic consequences for his psychological development , and that granting the applicant ’s request might cause psychological trauma to the child and place him in an unfavourable position within the meaning of LAW paragraph CARDINAL ( b ) of the [ LAW , and having regard to the mother ’s fear that the child would , upon his return to GPE , be subject to psychological and verbal abuse , which fear was deemed justified by the psychologist and the social worker of the social welfare centre ... and having regard to the fact that on DATE proceedings for divorce of the parties were instituted , in which proceedings the court should decide on custody of the child and on the other parent ’s contact rights , the petitioner ’s request must be dismissed , without violating LAW , it was decided as in the operative part of this decision . ”

On DATE the applicant appealed against that decision , alleging procedural errors , incomplete findings of fact , and misapplication of substantive law as grounds for appeal . In particular , the applicant argued that his wife ’s submissions of CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE had been served on him together with the contested first - instance decision and thus in breach of the principle of equality of arms , that the court had not held a single hearing in the case , and that it had wrongly applied LAW paragraph CARDINAL ( b ) of LAW .

On DATE ORG ( Županijski sud u GPE ) allowed the applicant ’s appeal , quashed the first - instance decision and remitted the case . The relevant part of that decision reads as follows :

“ ... the first - instance court based [ its ] decision in part on undisputed facts , and in the relevant part on the arguments and the evidence submitted by the counterparty ... even though it failed to give an opportunity to the petitioner to comment on them ... [ T]herefore the petitioner ’s appeal had to be allowed , the first - instance decision quashed and the case remitted ... ”

On DATE the decision of ORG was served on ORG .

In the resumed proceedings , on CARDINAL DATE the applicant sought the withdrawal of Judge PERSON , the first - instance court judge sitting in the case , for alleged bias on her part in favour of his wife . On DATE the President of ORG granted the application for the judge ’s withdrawal , and on DATE assigned the case to another judge .

In his submissions of CARDINAL DATE the applicant invited the court to review recordings of his conversations with his son via ORG , and asked for a provisional measure ordering the seizure of his son ’s passport with a view to preventing his wife from removing him from GPE .

On DATE the court invited the applicant to submit certificates from the relevant GPE authorities on his son ’s habitual residence in that country and the social background of the child within the meaning of LAW paragraph CARDINAL of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . On DATE the applicant submitted documents on his permanent residence and his son ’s habitual residence in GPE , and on DATE he submitted information on the social background of the child .

On DATE the applicant urged the court to schedule a hearing .

On DATE the court ordered the local social welfare centre to promptly assess whether the child was settled in his new environment in terms of LAW paragraph CARDINAL of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

In submissions she made on DATE , CARDINAL DATE , the applicant ’s wife reiterated that she believed that the evidence showed that the applicant was abusive , and in that respect pointed to the opinion of the psychologist from the local social welfare centre , who had indicated that the applicant ’s communication with his son via ORG constituted emotional blackmail and amounted to emotional abuse . She emphasised that she could not return to GPE , because her green card had expired and she did not have any means of supporting herself there .

On DATE the local social welfare centre submitted the opinion of its psychologist prepared on the basis of interviews with the applicant ’s wife and son . The psychologist stated that the child ’s physical and mental development was normal and that he had adapted well . She emphasised that owing to his age and his mother ’s constant care for him since birth the child was emotionally primarily attached to her ; separating them would therefore be traumatising for him .

In his submissions of DATE the applicant argued that the psychologist ’s opinion was flawed , unprofessional and arbitrary . He therefore proposed that his son be examined by independent experts , namely an institution with no role in the proceedings . The court eventually agreed to the applicant ’s proposal , and on DATE and DATE decided to obtain an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry ( see paragraph DATE below ) .

In submissions made on CARDINAL and DATE the applicant ’s wife commented on the documents on the child ’s social background submitted by the applicant ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . She stated that those documents were not relevant , because they had not been provided by the competent authorities of GPE but by a private law firm lacking in professional competencies and jurisdiction for issuing such documents . She stated , inter alia , that the lawyer who had compiled the report did not speak NORP and thus could not possibly have understood the applicant ’s conversations with his son and make an assessment .

In his submissions of CARDINAL DATE the applicant argued that his wife ’s conduct in the proceedings amounted to abuse of process and warned the court that the resultant delay was operating in her favour .

On DATE the court invited the applicant to submit evidence that his wife , as his son ’s mother , could return to GPE , in particular that she would be provided with a visa , accommodation and a work permit . The applicant did so on DATE ; his wife made further comments on DATE .

In his submissions of CARDINAL DATE the applicant stated that the way the court had conducted the proceedings was unacceptable in view of their nature and the ORG ’s obligation under LAW . He further submitted that his rights under LAW had also been violated .

On DATE the applicant ’s wife responded to his submission , also citing LAW . She also reiterated that she could no longer return to GPE , because her green card had expired .

On DATE the forensic expert in psychiatry ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) submitted her expert opinion and report on whether the return to GPE would expose the child to psychological harm . The opinion and report were prepared after conducting CARDINAL interviews with the applicant ’s son on DATE , the first in the presence of the mother and the second in her absence . She stated that : ( a ) the child was well adapted to his new environment , ( b ) he was showing no signs of trauma , ( c ) the applicant ’s wife did not have a negative influence on the child regarding his relationship with the applicant as his father , ( d ) the separation from his mother as primary caregiver and “ safe base ” would traumatise him , ( e ) transferring the child into a different environment would also constitute a trauma , but that he would be able to overcome it if his mother lived with him and if he lived in a harmonious environment , ( f ) the relationship between the child and his mother was positive , enabling him to develop a “ secure attachment ” to her , ( g ) the relationship between the child and his father could not be assessed , as the father had not been subjected to an expert assessment . As regards this last point the expert nevertheless made the following observations :

“ ORG is a boy who is securely attached to his mother but also has a positive attitude towards his father , which means that the mother did not influence him [ in that regard ] by expressing negative views , stories , and so on ... CARDINAL important factor is that the boy talks with his father , which he mentioned during the assessment , and in this way forms an opinion about him . What is most important however is that the parents coordinate their [ behaviour ] towards the child in order not to confuse him , which could jeopardise his normal mental development . During the assessment of the boy I did not find that such an issue was present ... [ The child ] does not object to going to GPE , but accepts it only if it is temporary and his mother can come along ... He does not show , verbally or non - verbally , any aversion to his father . It is therefore assumed that the mother influences him positively in that regard . ”

NORP On DATE the relevant Ministry invited ORG to speed up the proceedings and again submit a progress report ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The court submitted the requested report on DATE .

In his submissions of CARDINAL DATE the applicant commented on the expert report and opinion . He argued that the report suggested that his son had good memories of him and a positive attitude towards him , and that it was therefore evident that his return to GPE would not expose him to the risk envisaged in LAW paragraph CARDINAL ( b ) of LAW . As regards the expert ’s finding that the child ’s return would be a traumatic experience for him , the applicant submitted that this would not have been the case had the domestic courts ordered his return within the time - limit set forth in LAW paragraph CARDINAL of LAW . In any event , the evidence he submitted had suggested that his wife could accompany his son on his return to GPE , which according to the expert would have eliminated the risk of trauma .

On DATE the applicant ’s wife commented on the expert report and opinion by endorsing it . She argued that they , together with the previous opinions and reports of the local social welfare centre , suggested that it was evident the child should not be returned , as he would thereby suffer psychological trauma . The conditions set forth in LAW paragraph CARDINAL ( b ) had therefore been met .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request for his son to be returned . It first held that the applicant ’s wife ’s removal of their son from GPE to GPE was “ wrongful ” within the meaning of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . It then held , relying exclusively on the opinion and report of the local social welfare centre of DATE and the opinion of the forensic expert in psychiatry of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) , that the applicant ’s son ’s return to GPE would expose him to risk envisaged in LAW paragraph CARDINAL ( b ) of the said Convention , but only if he returned without his mother . However , since the applicant had not proved that she could freely return to GPE and get a job there , the court concluded that the conditions for refusing the return of the child set forth in that Article had been met .

On DATE the applicant appealed against that decision . He referred to procedural errors , incomplete findings of facts , and misapplication of the substantive law as grounds for appeal . In particular , the applicant submitted that the first - instance court had , in breach of the principle of adversarial hearing , not held a single hearing in the case , and that it had not informed him of its decision to obtain an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry , thus preventing him from objecting to the choice of the expert . He further complained that he had not been involved in the expert ’s assessment , even though he had previously expressed willingness to make himself available for such an assessment . The applicant also stated that the court had required him to prove that his wife could return to GPE and find a job there , instead of asking her to prove that she could not . It had thereby unjustifiably shifted the burden of proof to him as regards those matters . Moreover , as regards those matters the court had drawn the wrong conclusions from the evidence presented , and had embarked on an interpretation of foreign law it was not familiar with . Lastly , the applicant argued that the first - instance court had wrongly applied LAW paragraph CARDINAL ( b ) of LAW .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal and upheld the first - instance decision .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the second - instance decision . It would appear that the proceedings are currently pending before ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) .

Meanwhile , on DATE the applicant lodged a request for protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time ( zahtjev za zaštitu prava na suđenje u razumnom roku ) with ORG about the length of the above proceedings . He argued that the proceedings had lasted for DATE and DATE without a scheduled hearing or a decision rendered , contrary to LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and LAW .

By a decision of DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request . It held that the proceedings complained of had thus far lasted DATE and DATE , which could not be considered excessive , especially as there had been no substantial periods of inactivity .

DATE . On DATE the applicant appealed against that decision .

By a decision of DATE ORG ( PERSON ) dismissed the applicant ’s appeal and upheld the first - instance decision of DATE .

Meanwhile , on DATE the applicant ’s wife brought a civil action against the applicant in ORG seeking a divorce and custody of their son .

On DATE she asked the court to issue a provisional measure granting her interim custody of ORG until delivery of the final judgment in those proceedings .

In his submissions of DATE the applicant argued that the NORP courts lacked international jurisdiction in the case , and submitted a certified translation of the decision of a court in GPE of DATE granting him sole custody of his son .

At the hearing held on DATE the court dismissed the applicant ’s objection regarding lack of jurisdiction .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE the court issued the provisional measure requested by the applicant ’s wife and awarded her interim custody of their son .

On DATE the applicant appealed against that decision to ORG .

On DATE that court returned the case file to ORG , warning it that under LAW the judicial or administrative authorities of the ORG to which the child had been removed were not entitled to decide on the right of custody of the child until it had been determined under LAW that the child was not to be returned ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Accordingly , it instructed ORG to ascertain whether a final decision had been given in the proceedings for the return of the child . If no such decision was adopted , ORG further instructed ORG to stay the proceedings until the delivery of such a decision .


Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-3-a - Ratione materiae);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Ledi Bianku;Robert Spano;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant ’s husband , PERSON , entered into an agreement with a truck owner , PERSON , for the transportation of some personal goods and furniture from GPE to GPE on DATE . According to the applicant ’s allegations , her husband was informed that the truck in question had been booked by a transport company for DATE and that it would also be carrying some raw materials belonging to another client .

On the date in question the applicant ’s husband loaded his goods into the truck and got into it as a passenger . However , before reaching its destination the truck collided with another vehicle and caught fire . The truck ’s driver and substitute driver died at the scene of the accident as a result of the fire . The applicant ’s husband died DATE at the hospital where he had been receiving treatment for his burns .

It was discovered after the accident that the “ raw materials ” being transported in the truck with the applicant ’s husband ’s goods were in fact an inflammable liquid , which had caught fire upon impact . According to the police scene - of - incident report , the containers that had contained the spilt inflammable liquid bore the words “ Şenocak chafing fuel ” .

An autopsy report issued on DATE by ORG stated that the applicant ’s husband had died as a result of the burns he had sustained at the time of the accident rather than from trauma caused by the impact of the crash .

According to the initial report prepared by the traffic police at the scene , the driver of the truck , whose identity could not be established at the time , bore the main responsibility for the accident as he had hit the other vehicle , driven by ORG , from behind .

On DATE officers from Sultanbeyli police station took statements from the applicant , ORG and the owner of the truck , GPE , who was also the son of CARDINAL of the truck drivers , PERSON confirmed in his statement that he was the owner of the truck , which his father PERSON had loaded with goods to be transported to GPE . He stated that a third person , namely GPE , had also been in the truck to help his father during the journey . He was not asked any questions about the nature of the goods transported .

On DATE the applicant filed a criminal complaint with the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor ’s office against GPE , GPE , and the transport company to which the truck had been leased , if any , for causing her husband ’s death by illegally carrying dangerous inflammable goods . The applicant stressed in her complaint that the incident in question had not been a simple traffic accident caused by negligence , and that her husband had lost his life because of the inflammable goods that had been loaded unlawfully in the truck without his knowledge and consent . The applicant argued that if her husband had been properly informed of the nature of the truck ’s cargo , he would never have agreed to travel in it . The applicant therefore requested the identification of all the individuals or companies who may have been responsible for her husband ’s death , including the transporter , the seller and the buyer of the inflammable goods . She also requested to be informed of developments in the investigation as she intended to join the proceedings as a civil party ( müdahil ) .

On DATE submitted a petition to the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor ’s office for an investigation into the liability for the accident of both the transport company which had leased his truck and of the seller and buyer of the inflammable cargo , whom he accused of concealing the dangerous nature of the goods in question . As evidence , he submitted the invoice and delivery note ( sevk irsaliyesi ) prepared on DATE by the transport company ORG Ltd. PERSON . ( “ PERSON Ltd. GPE . ” ) for the recipient , PERSON ve ORG PERSON . ( “ PERSON Ltd. GPE . ” ) , where the shipment was described as “ raw materials ” without any further details . GPE stated that if it had been made clear that the goods involved were inflammable then they would have been transported in accordance with the conditions set out in the law , which might have prevented the fatal accident .

On DATE the applicant filed an additional complaint against the producer of the inflammable liquid , which she had identified as ORG GPE . based on the information provided in the scene - of - incident report ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The applicant claimed that the liquid in question contained ethanol and methanol , which had both been classified as “ hazardous goods subject to control ” in the Regulation on Dangerous Goods and the Regulation on the Transport by Land of Dangerous Goods , and which accordingly had to be packed , labelled , stored and transported in compliance with the strict requirements set down in those regulations . Moreover , under the Regulation on the Transport by Land of Dangerous Goods , it was prohibited to carry passengers , apart from a substitute driver and a guard , in vehicles transporting dangerous goods . Having regard to the various responsibilities imposed by the relevant legislation on the producer , seller , transporter and buyer of such goods , the applicant requested that the public prosecutor ( i ) check if PERSON Ltd. PERSON . was the producer and whether it also engaged in the distribution of such material ; ( ii ) establish whether the truck in question had been leased by a transport company or by PERSON Ltd. GPE . itself and whether it had a licence to carry such dangerous goods ; and ( iii ) identify the buyer of the goods . She also repeated her request to be informed of developments in the investigation .

On DATE , at the request of the Sultanbeyli prosecutor , a traffic engineer submitted an expert report , where it was found that the deceased truck driver PERSON had been responsible for the accident by failing to comply with the law applying to vehicles carrying inflammable goods on keeping a distance of QUANTITY . The expert found that S.S.H. , the driver of the other vehicle , had not been at fault .

Relying mainly on the expert report , on DATE the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor found that the only person responsible for the accident within the meaning of LAW of LAW ( causing death by negligence – see paragraph DATE below ) was PERSON However , since PERSON had also lost his life in the accident , the public prosecutor decided against prosecution . GPE was listed as the sole complainant in the decision , which was not notified to the applicant .

After finding out about the decision on her own initiative , on DATE the applicant objected to the public prosecutor ’s decision not to prosecute , arguing mainly that the issues she had raised in her petitions of CARDINAL DATE and DATE had not been taken into account by the public prosecutor . She reiterated that her husband had not been informed that the truck was carrying inflammable liquids , and also argued that the prosecutor had failed to identify the companies involved in the shipment of such dangerous goods , including the seller , buyer and transport company , and had not established the relations of the truck owner , GPE , to those companies . She argued that it was of the utmost importance to collect that information in order to establish the facts and to identify those responsible for the accident , apart from the driver of the truck . She added that despite the numerous complaints she had lodged with the public prosecutor ’s office and her requests to be informed of developments in the investigation , she had not been named as a complainant in the public prosecutor ’s decision and the decision had not been notified to her .

It appears that GPE , as the other complainant , did not lodge an objection against the public prosecutor ’s decision .

On DATE ORG rejected the objection against the decision of the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor not to prosecute PERSON and S.S.H. It held , nevertheless , that complaints lodged by ORG PERSON . and PERSON Ltd. PERSON . had remained unanswered and instructed the PERSON public prosecutor to investigate their liability for the accident . GPE was once again listed as the sole complainant in the decision , which was not notified to the applicant .

On DATE the applicant submitted a petition to the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor ’s office , asking it to investigate the matters raised in her previous petitions . The applicant also stressed that despite her numerous requests , she had , once again , not been recognised as a complainant in ORG decision .

It appears that on DATE an agent of the transport company ORG GPE . , a certain PERSON , was questioned about the accident for the first time by the police . ORG stated that ORG PERSON . had requested a truck from them to transport some goods . The company had , however , put PERSON Ltd. GPE . in touch with GPE , who provided transportation services with his truck upon request , and they had had no further involvement with the shipment in question .

In a further petition submitted by the applicant to the PERSON public prosecutor ’s office on DATE , she expressed her concern that the investigation after ORG decision had appeared to focus solely on the liability of the transport company ORG GPE . , whereas both PERSON Ltd. GPE . , as the producer and/or the shipper of the goods , and GPE , as the owner of the truck , also bore responsibility for the accident on account of their failure to comply with the relevant legislation on the transport of dangerous goods .

On an unspecified date the PERSON public prosecutor asked the traffic branch of ORG to prepare a report to determine the respective liability of ORG GPE . and PERSON Ltd. GPE . , or any others , for the accident in question . In its response dated DATE ORG stated that there was no information in the case file on ORG PERSON . and that , in the absence of such information , it could not report on the requested matters .

On DATE GPE , the owner of ORG GPE . , was questioned about the accident for the first time by the police . PERSON stated that he had requested a truck from ORG GPE . to send goods to his company ’s GPE branch . A truck owned by GPE had been provided to him by ORG GPE . and he had loaded it with the goods in question . He confirmed that the truck had been involved in an accident shortly after loading and that it and his goods had been destroyed in a fire .

Following the receipt of the above information , on DATE ORG submitted its report on the accident . It found that there was no information in the file that the truck in question had been loaded with inflammable goods by ORG GPE . There was , furthermore , no information on the identity of the recipient of the shipment . Although containers bearing the name “ Şenocak ” had been found in the truck after the accident , there was no other evidence in the file to enable the Institute to determine who had loaded the truck . In those circumstances , it had not been possible to establish the liability of PERSON Ltd. GPE . , PERSON Ltd. GPE . , or anyone else for the accident .

On DATE the applicant submitted objections to ORG report . She contested the finding that there had been no evidence to suggest the involvement of ORG GPE . with the shipment in question . She argued that the owner of ORG GPE . had made it clear in his police statement that the truck had been loaded with his company ’s goods , which had consisted of chafing fuel . Moreover , in response to the compensation request she had made to ORG ( see below paragraph CARDINAL for further details ) , the owner of ORG GPE . had stated , inter alia , that he had also suffered a loss as a result of the accident as he had lost all of his merchandise . A representative of PERSON Ltd. GPE . had similarly told ORG of First Instance that the truck involved in the accident had been sent to ORG GPE . for loading , accompanied by a delivery note prepared by them on DATE . In the applicant ’s opinion , those statements provided sufficient proof that the inflammable goods loaded in the truck had belonged to ORG GPE . On the basis of that information , and having regard to the legal requirements in the relevant legislation on the packaging , labelling , storing and transportation of inflammable goods , none of which had been observed in the instant case , it was clear that both PERSON Ltd. PERSON . and PERSON . , as well as the owner and driver of the truck , had been responsible for the accident .

On CARDINAL DATE the ORG prosecutor decided not to prosecute representatives of ORG GPE . and PERSON Ltd. GPE . on the basis of ORG report of DATE . In the decision , the public prosecutor did not respond to any of the applicant ’s allegations .

On DATE the applicant objected to that decision . Reiterating mainly the arguments she had raised in her objection to ORG report , she submitted that the public prosecutor had failed to establish the facts of the case and had disregarded essential evidence in the investigation file which pointed to the representatives of ORG GPE . and PERSON Ltd. GPE , GPE and the deceased driver of the truck as being criminally liable for the accident .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s objection , without responding to any of her arguments .

On DATE the applicant brought an action for compensation before ORG of First Instance against ORG GPE . , PERSON Ltd. GPE , the owner of the truck , GPE , the heirs of both dead truck drivers , and an insurance company . Reiterating the legal requirements for the packaging , labelling , storage and transportation of dangerous goods that she had referred to during the criminal proceedings , the applicant argued that the defendants had caused her husband ’s death by their failure to comply with the relevant legislation .

On unspecified dates , representatives of ORG GPE . and PERSON Ltd. PERSON . responded to the applicant ’s allegations , as noted in paragraph CARDINAL above .

At the request of ORG of First Instance , on DATE CARDINAL experts from the traffic branch of ORG submitted a report ( “ the first report ” ) on the GPE liability for the accident in question , where they made the following findings :

- Şenocak Ltd. GPE . , which was the producer of the inflammable goods in question , had requested PERSON Ltd. GPE . ’s services for the transportation of merchandise from its headquarters in GPE to its GPE office ;

- Salihli Ltd. PERSON . had subcontracted FAC for the business ;

- in the consignment note it had prepared , Şenocak Ltd. PERSON . had described the consignment as QUANTITY tonnes of raw material , without indicating that it consisted of inflammable goods ;

- the fire that had broken out upon impact with ORG ’s vehicle and that had claimed the applicant ’s husband ’s life had been caused by the inflammable goods loaded in the truck ;

- Şenocak Ltd. PERSON . was liable for the accident because it had failed to comply with the consignor ’s obligations set out in the relevant legislation ;

- Salihli Ltd. PERSON . and GPE were liable on account of their failure to pay heed to the type of raw material they had accepted , which had resulted in the transportation of dangerous goods in a truck which had not fulfilled the relevant criteria for such transportation ;

- A.S. was also liable for having unlawfully loaded other goods in the truck and accepting a passenger ( the applicant ’s husband ) ;

- the driver of the truck was liable owing to his failure to drive with care .

In the light of those considerations , ORG found that ORG GPE . bore PERCENT of the liability for the accident , ORG GPE . and ORG each , while the remaining liability lay with the driver .

On DATE PERSON Ltd. GPE . objected to ORG report .

Following that objection , CARDINAL experts from the traffic branch of ORG , including the CARDINAL experts who had prepared the previous report , issued another report on DATE ( “ the second report ” ) . They found that while PERSON Ltd. GPE . , PERSON Ltd. PERSON . and GPE may all have disregarded their legal obligations on the transport of dangerous goods , the accident had been caused by the driver ’s carelessness rather than the other defendants’ failure to comply with those obligations . They could not therefore be held accountable for the accident in any way .

On DATE the applicant objected to ORG report , which in her opinion conflicted with its previous report of DATE . The applicant reiterated that her husband had not died as a result of a simple traffic accident , but had burned to death because of the inflammable goods carried unlawfully in the truck , for which all the defendants bore responsibility . The applicant requested that ORG of First Instance obtain a third report from independent experts to resolve the contradictions between the CARDINAL reports prepared by ORG .

At a hearing held on DATE , the civil court of first instance appointed a group of experts , consisting of a mechanical engineer and CARDINAL professors of mechanical engineering and chemistry from ORG . The court asked them to comment on the contradictions between the CARDINAL ORG reports and to state which report they agreed with .

In their report dated DATE ( “ the third report ” ) , the experts established at the outset that the action brought by the applicant concerned the death of her husband as a result of the burns he had sustained because of the fire caused by the accident . The examination in the instant case therefore had to focus not on the technical cause of the accident per se , which was what the second report had done , but on the reasons and the responsibility for the fire that had claimed her husband ’s life . The experts stated in that connection that the fire had been caused by chafing fuel , which was a “ highly inflammable liquid ” , according to the Regulation on the Transport by Land of Dangerous Goods and which therefore had to be transported in accordance with the relevant legislation concerning the transportation of such dangerous substances . The truck in which the chafing fuel had been loaded in the instant case had , however , not been suitable for the transportation of dangerous goods : it had not been equipped with an electrical system to prevent short circuits and fire ; it had had no warning signs ; and the driver had not been trained in the transportation of such goods . ORG GPE . , as the producer of the chafing fuel , bore the principal liability ( PERCENT ) for the fire on account of its failure to ensure the safe transportation of its merchandise in accordance with the relevant legal requirements . PERSON Ltd. PERSON . , which had procured the truck in question , and GPE , the owner and operator of the truck , were each PERCENT liable for agreeing to transport such dangerous goods in a vehicle unfit for the job . GPE was further liable because he had accepted additional cargo in the truck . The remaining responsibility lay with the deceased driver , who had not kept a safe distance from the vehicle in front . On the basis of those findings , the experts stated that they agreed with the first report ’s conclusions .

At a hearing held on DATE the civil court of first instance decided to appoint an expert to calculate the applicant ’s pecuniary damage , on the basis of the findings of the third report of CARDINAL DATE .

In a report dated DATE the expert calculated the applicant ’s pecuniary damage as MONEY ( TRY ) ( MONEY ( ORG ) at the material time ) .

According to the latest information in the case file , the compensation proceedings are still ongoing in the court of first instance .


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions;Article 1 para. 2 of Protocol No. 1 - Control of the use of property);Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The first applicant , PERSON , was born in DATE and lives in GPE ; the second applicant , PERSON , was born in DATE and lives in GPE ; the third applicant , Mr PERSON , was born in DATE and lived in PERSON .

The applicants were co - owners of a vacant plot of land situated in the urban area of the municipality of ORG . It was originally designated as non - agricultural land and registered under plot no . DATE .

On an unspecified date , ORG ( PERSON ) established a protection zone for the water reserve of ORG . According to this decision , the applicants’ property , together with other plots of land , formed part of the protection zone . The administrative decision ordered the owner of the protected water reserve , ORG , to make an offer compensating the owners of the plots of land within the protection zone within DATE .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) upheld the first - instance decision on the establishment of a protection zone for the municipality ’s water reserve . The decision also required that if the owner of the protected water reserve was different from that of the land in the protection zone , the owner of the protected water reserve had the obligation to acquire ownership of the land in the protection zone , either through expropriation or through a sale and purchase agreement ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) . That decision also quashed the obligation to proceed with compensation for the landowners within DATE .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG redesignated the applicants’ plot of land as an “ inner protection zone ” .

Under the law , owners of land within the water protection zone were under an obligation to refrain from any activity that could endanger water quality or lead to pollution and from constructing any facility that did not serve the purposes of the water reserve . Moreover , they were obliged to allow the use of their property for any work necessary for the maintenance of the water reserve ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the owners of the plots of land within the protection zone addressed a letter to ORG ( PERSON ) , the trustee of the water reserve , offering their plots of land for sale and asking the ORG to make an offer .

The ORG transferred the request to ORG , ORG ( ORG Dunavölgyi Környezetvédelmi és PERSON ) , which , due to lack of jurisdiction , returned the case to the ORG on DATE , informing ORG about the measure . On DATE the Ministry instructed ORG ( PERSON . ) , the managing body of the water reserve , that the expropriation fell within the PERSON competence .

Meanwhile , in proceedings initiated by some of the landowners , the Pest County Regional Court established that ORG was under an obligation to proceed with the expropriation . Accordingly , the applicants made a new representation to ORG on DATE , asking it to make an offer within DATE of receipt of the letter .

On DATE they re - submitted their request to ORG ( PERSON és PERSON ) , the body appointed by ORG for further decision - making .

On DATE the owners of the plots of land , including the applicants , asked ORG ( PERSON - magyarországi ORG ) to instruct the Ministry to proceed with the expropriation by setting a time - limit .

Their request was dismissed on DATE . According to ORG , the owners had first requested the expropriation of their properties on DATE , thus the statutory DATE period during which the ORG could acquire the property had not expired . The owners sought judicial review of this decision .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE the ORG overturned the administrative decision and remitted the case to ORG , stating that the DATE period had expired since the expropriation proceedings were initiated , on DATE , at which time the claimants had offered their plot of land for sale .

On DATE ORG informed the applicants that any measure concerning the ownership of the disputed plot of land fell within the competence of the State .

On DATE ORG informed the applicants that it had appointed a limited liability company to prepare the sale and purchase agreements and the documents necessary for the expropriation by CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the limited liability company forwarded a purchase offer for the acquisition of the applicants’ plot of land for MONEY ( ORG – CARDINAL ( ORG ) ) . The applicants disputed the amount of the compensation ; nevertheless , the case file indicates that they never received an answer to their submissions .

On DATE ORG ( Pest PERSON ) ( the legal successor of ORG ) ordered ORG ( ORG ) ( the legal successor of ORG ) to serve an expropriation notice on the land owners within DATE of receipt of the decision . This did not take place . After the deadline had passed the applicants applied to ORG seeking the enforcement of the compulsory expropriation decision . The application was granted by ORG ; despite ORG did not respond to any of the measures taken by ORG . Accordingly , ORG proceeded with the expropriation of its own motion , commissioning an expert opinion and holding hearings .

Finally , the decision on the expropriation of the applicants’ plot of land was issued by ORG on DATE , establishing the amount of compensation at ORG MONEY ( approximately EUR CARDINAL ) .

The applicants received the compensation on DATE .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Deprivation of property;Peaceful enjoyment of possessions);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

NORP In DATE a local factory , which was the owner of a block of flats , assigned the flat at QUANTITY , GPE , to ORG under a social housing agreement . In DATE the title to the building was transferred to GPE . P. resided in the flat as a tenant until his death on DATE .

Following P. ’s death , GPE started the process for registering the flat as vacant in order to assign it to another person eligible for social housing . However , it turned out that , according to the documents , the flat was no longer municipal property and that it belonged to L. The federal registration service sent the relevant data to the head of the municipality ’s administration on DATE . The head of the administration asked the regional prosecutor to look into the situation with the flat .

NORP The prosecutor established that the flat had been subject to a number of transactions . According to the relevant documents , on DATE the factory had signed a privatisation agreement to transfer the flat to Kh . On DATE the transaction was registered by the registration service . On DATE Kh . sold the flat to L. , who sold it on CARDINAL DATE to Ya . Those transactions were also registered by the registration service .

A police investigator questioned PERSON . , who denied having anything to do with the flat . As regards his passport details indicated in the privatisation agreement , he explained that in DATE and DATE he had lost his passport twice and that he had never met PERSON or PERSON The police further established that PERSON , who was serving in the army at the time , had also lost his passport in DATE .

On DATE the prosecutor responded to the head of the administration advising him as follows :

“ It appears that the persons who were parties to the transactions with the flat committed a crime in this respect . Accordingly the materials have been forwarded to the [ police ] for further inquiry ... .

[ The police ] will inform you of the results of the inquiry ... .

Furthermore , in order to prevent further transactions with the flat , I have asked ORG to refuse state registration of any future transactions with the flat . ”

On an unspecified date the police opened a criminal investigation into the transactions involving the flat .

On DATE Ya . sold the flat to the applicant .

On DATE , acting on behalf of the municipality , the prosecutor brought an action against Kh . , L. and Ya . to seek repossession of the flat and the annulment of all transactions executed in respect of it . The prosecutor argued that PERSON . , had never resided in the flat and that the flat had never been transferred to him from the municipality under a privatisation scheme . The prosecutor asked the court to invalidate the privatisation agreement of CARDINAL DATE and subsequent transactions in respect of the flat as having no basis in law . ORG of GPE fixed a hearing for DATE .

On DATE the registration service issued a certificate confirming the purchase of the flat by the applicant and her title to it .

On DATE ORG granted the applicant ’s request and allowed her to take part in the proceedings initiated by the prosecutor . She claimed that she had bought the flat in good faith and that the municipality could not recover it from her .

On DATE ORG issued an injunction against the registration of any transactions involving the flat .

On DATE ORG of GPE granted the prosecutor ’s claims brought on behalf of the municipality . The applicant ’s title to the flat was annulled and transferred to the municipality . The court also ordered the applicant ’s eviction . Lastly , it ruled that Ya . should return to the applicant the sum she had paid for the flat . The court reasoned as follows :

“ Pursuant to Article CARDINAL of LAW of GPE , if a property has been purchased from a person who had no right to sell it , and the purchaser is unaware and could not have been aware [ of that fact ] ( the bona fide purchaser ) , the owner shall have the right to reclaim that property from the purchaser , if the said property was lost by the owner or by the person into whose possession the owner has conveyed the property , or if it was stolen from either of them , or if it left their possession against their will in another way .

It has been established in the course of the proceedings that the flat in question left the municipality ’s possession against the latter ’s will . Accordingly , the flat ... should be recovered from [ the applicant ] and transferred to the municipality . ”

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of DATE on appeal . The court also noted that the applicant could not be recognised as a bona fide purchaser given that she had known that the flat had been resold CARDINAL times within DATE .

On DATE Ya . died . The part of the judgment of DATE concerning the monetary award in the applicant ’s favour remains unenforced .

According to the ORG , the applicant has not been evicted and continues to reside in the flat .

On an unspecified date the applicant brought an action against the ORG , alleging that the local authorities’ inaction had resulted in her buying a flat from a person who had no right to sell it to her .

On DATE the ORG of GPE dismissed the applicant ’s claims .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)

NORP The applicant has been detained in various departments of correctional colony no . CARDINAL of GPE , GPE ( hereinafter “ GPE ” ) , since CARDINAL DATE .

NORP The applicant disposed of CARDINAL . square metres ( sq.m . ) of personal space during different periods of his detention .

The applicant complained of overcrowding , insufficient number of toilets and of the fact that the toilets were not separated from the rest of the cells .


Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for home);Non-pecuniary damage - award

Alvina Gyulumyan;Ján Šikuta;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos

The applicant , Mr PERSON , was born in DATE and lives in Murgeşti .

On DATE police officers PERSON and GPE were carrying out an investigation into the theft of CARDINAL cars in the village of Murgeşti . The applicant , who lived alone in a house with a yard , was away from home on a trip abroad . On DATE at TIME , the CARDINAL officers entered the applicant ’s yard by breaking the main gate which had a closing system made by the applicant from metal wires . The officers took note of the chassis series of CARDINAL cars found in the applicant ’s shed . They also looked in several boxes which contained spare parts for cars .

After a certain period of time , the applicant ’s neighbour , PERSON , entered the yard and questioned the CARDINAL officers about the reason for their presence there . PERSON and GPE disclosed their identities and informed GPE that they were carrying out an investigation into the theft of CARDINAL cars . Before leaving the yard , the officers informed PERSON that the CARDINAL cars found in the applicant ’s shed were not the ones reported stolen and left him a summons ordering the applicant to report to the police station as soon as possible .

On DATE , upon his return home , the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG of ORG against the QUANTITY police officers for the crime of trespassing under LAW . He alleged that the officers had entered his yard in his absence and without his consent . He also sought civil damages from the CARDINAL alleged perpetrators .

NORP In his statement given before the prosecutor on DATE , the applicant mentioned that he was a car mechanic and that he often travelled to GPE to buy spare parts . He alleged that he felt harassed by local police officers working in the Car Theft Department who , on several occasions , had entered his yard in his absence in order to check whether he was hiding stolen cars . The applicant also alleged that , although the police never found stolen cars in his possession , the frequent police checks gave him a reputation in the village of being a car thief .

The CARDINAL officers declared before the prosecutor that they had found PERSON in the applicant ’s yard and had entered believing that he was the owner and assuming that they had his permission .

On DATE ORG of the Târgu ORG of Appeal decided to discontinue the proceedings against GPE and GPE The prosecutor investigating the case noted that the CARDINAL officers had entered the applicant ’s yard in his absence and without his permission . However , when PERSON had arrived at the scene , they had immediately disclosed their identities . Moreover , they had been on duty and had only noted the chassis series of the applicant ’s cars . The prosecutor therefore concluded that the officers had had no intention of committing a crime . On DATE a complaint by the applicant against this decision was rejected by the superior Prosecutor from ORG of the Târgu ORG .

On DATE the applicant appealed against the ORG decisions before the Târgu ORG . He alleged that the CARDINAL officers had illegally entered his home in his absence , without his consent and without a search warrant . He also complained that his rights as guaranteed by LAW had been breached by the unlawful search carried out by the QUANTITY police officers .

ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal on DATE holding that GPE and GPE had acted in accordance with their duties as provided for by articles CARDINAL , DATE and CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL on ORG . The court underlined that the officers had disclosed their identities and the purpose of their presence on the premises as soon as the applicant ’s neighbour enquired . It was further held that they had been on duty and carrying out an investigation , and therefore it could not be held that they had intended to commit a crime .

The appeal by the applicant on points of law ( recurs ) against this decision was dismissed on CARDINAL May CARDINAL by a final judgment of ORG and ORG which held that the officers had acted in accordance with the provisions of the PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL on ORG . The court held that the officers had been in the presence of a witness and that they had disclosed their identities , and therefore had no intention of illegally entering the applicant ’s home .


Aleš Pejchal;Armen Harutyunyan;Ledi Bianku;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Päivi Hirvelä;Robert Spano

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON . He was represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr PERSON of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP The applicant made a technical invention , for which he applied for a patent on DATE . Subsequently , on DATE , he received a patent for his invention which was , however , later withdrawn .

On DATE the applicant joined a big telecommunications company in GPE . He told the company early on about his invention and proposed cooperation with the company . The company apparently learned about his patent application on DATE but was not interested in cooperation . On DATE the applicant ’s employment with the company ended .

In DATE the applicant noticed that the company was infringing his patent and informed the company of this . The company initiated civil proceedings against the applicant , claiming ownership of the applicant ’s invention . On DATE the Helsinki ORG ( käräjäoikeus , tingsrätten ) rejected the company ’s claim to ownership of the applicant ’s invention but accepted its alternative claim and confirmed that the applicant had made the invention in question while working for the company . The court also confirmed that the company held a licence for the invention and that it had to pay the applicant reasonable compensation for this patent licence . On DATE ORG ( hovioikeus , hovrätten ) upheld ORG judgment . This judgment became final .

As the applicant and the company could not agree on reasonable compensation for the patent licence , the applicant initiated civil proceedings against the company in LOC on DATE . He claimed , inter alia , compensation of MONEY ( ORG ) for the use of the patent licence .

On DATE the GPE ORG accepted the applicant ’s claims partly and ordered the company to pay him ORG CARDINAL in compensation . The applicant was also ordered to pay the company ’s costs and expenses before ORG , which after mitigation amounted to LAW . The court found that the applicant had not been able to show that the company had actually used the invention for which it held the licence . The invention had thus had no greater value for the company . The fact that the company held the patent licence had not prevented the applicant from patenting the invention or giving further licences to it , as the applicant still held all rights . As there were CARDINAL separate patents , the court estimated the proper compensation to be LAW for each patent and thus ORG CARDINAL in total . At the same time as the judgment , the parties also received , for information , a statement drafted by the technical experts appointed by the court and given to the court in the present case .

NORP By letter dated DATE the applicant appealed to the ORG requesting , inter alia , that the company be ordered to pay him ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL in compensation for the holding of the patent licence and that he be freed from the obligation to pay the company ’s costs and expenses . He requested that an oral hearing be held and that the technical experts attend this hearing . Moreover , the applicant complained about the fact that the obligation to pay costs and expenses completely cancelled out his right to compensation and asked to be dispensed from paying . The company lodged a counter appeal , requesting that the compensation be reduced to LAW and that the applicant be ordered to pay the company ’s costs and expenses .

On DATE the ORG , after having held an oral hearing , accepted the company ’s claims and reduced the amount of compensation payable to the applicant to ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL . It also ordered the applicant to pay the company ’s costs and expenses before FAC and ORG to a total of EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL plus interest . The court found that as the compensation concerned just CARDINAL patent , to which the company held only a licence , ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL was proper compensation . As to the costs and expenses , the court found that the different material positions of the applicant and the company spoke for the mitigation of the payment obligation in the applicant ’s favour . However , even though the invention had been important to the applicant , he had requested compensation equal to PERCENT of the DATE turnover of the whole company - group . His claims had , from the outset , been manifestly ill - founded and non - itemised , and no evidence had been presented to support them . The grounds for mitigation were not therefore fulfilled and the applicant was ordered to pay the costs and expenses of the company in full .

NORP By letter dated DATE the applicant appealed to ORG ( korkein oikeus , högsta domstolen ) , reiterating the grounds of appeal already presented before ORG . Moreover , he stressed the fact that the technical experts had not attended ORG hearing and requested that they be asked to present a further statement on the matter at hand . If that option was not available , he requested that the case be referred back to ORG for the hearing of the experts .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG refused the applicant leave to appeal .

According to sections DATE and CARDINAL of LAW ( patenttilaki , patentlagen , Act no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , as in force at the material time ) , ORG is competent to hear patent matters . When examining a patent matter , ORG is to be assisted by CARDINAL technical experts appointed by the court . The experts are to give their views on the matters submitted to them by the court . Their views are entered in the record and they are entitled to question the parties and witnesses .

Section CARDINAL of the Patents Act provides the following :

“ The ORG shall appoint an appropriate number of experts as referred to in CARDINAL for DATE . Before making the appointments , the ORG shall request the opinion of ORG . Such appointment may not be refused without statutory justification .

Before taking up his appointment , an expert shall be required to take the prescribed oath .

Experts shall be paid a reasonable fee for each case as laid down by ORG together with compensation for travelling expenses as prescribed by the Government . ”

It appears from the ORG proposal HE CARDINAL vp that the practice at the relevant time was that the experts practically always gave their statement after the conclusion of the oral hearing . The parties to the proceedings were not given a possibility to comment on the experts’ statement .

NORP This state of affairs changed when LAW was amended with effect from DATE ( Act no . CARDINAL ) . According to the new section CARDINALc of the LAW , the ORG shall provide the parties a possibility to comment on the statement of the experts before deciding the case . According to the transitional provisions , if such a matter has already become pending in a ORG before the entry into force of the amendment , the previous provision is applicable .

Chapter CARDINAL , section CARDINAL , of LAW ( oikeudenkäymiskaari , rättegångsbalken , Act no . CARDINAL ) provides that :

“ Before an expert witness is appointed , the parties shall be heard on this . If the parties agree on an expert witness , that person shall be used if he or she is deemed to be suitable and there is no impediment to the same . In addition , the court may appoint CARDINAL expert witness .

No one may be appointed an expert witness against his or her will , unless he or she is under the obligation to serve as an expert witness by virtue of public office or function or on the basis of a special provision . ”

LAW , section DATE , of the same LAW as amended by LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) further provides that :

“ An expert shall give a detailed account on the findings in his or her investigation and , on the basis of the account , a substantiated statement on the question put to him or her . The statement shall be compiled in writing , unless the court deems there to be reason to allow for its being given orally . When a person is appointed as an expert witness not on the basis of his or her official position or function , the court shall determine the time within which the statement is to be given .

An expert witness who has given a written statement shall be orally heard in court , if a party so requests and the hearing is not evidently irrelevant , or if the court deems the hearing of the expert witness necessary . If there are several expert witnesses , one or several of them may be called to be heard . ”


Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant ’s son , Mr PERSON , was taken to ORG ( больница скорой медицинской помощи г. PERSON ) with a severe head trauma . He lapsed into a coma DATE , and died on DATE .

On DATE ORG Office of FAC ( “ ORG Office ” ) received a pre - investigation inquiry file containing evidence of the elements of a crime under LAW ( intentional infliction of serious bodily harm causing the victim ’s death ) .

The pre - investigation inquiry established that at QUANTITY on DATE the applicant ’s son had started a fight with a certain PERSON In the course of the fight the applicant ’s son had inflicted several blows on ORG with a wooden baseball bat . On the third blow the bat had struck a wall and had broken into CARDINAL pieces . The applicant ’s son had continued to beat PERSON with his bare hands and kick him with his feet . PERSON had then managed to pick up a fragment of a broken bat and had hit the applicant ’s son several times on the head , causing the latter the physical injuries that resulted in his death on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE an investigator of ORG issued a decision refusing the institution of criminal proceedings against ORG , being of the opinion that PERSON had acted in necessary self - defence .

On DATE ORG set aside the above decision . Criminal proceedings into the death of the applicant ’s son were instituted on DATE ( criminal case no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

On DATE PERSON confessed to having inflicted on the applicant ’s son bodily injuries which caused his death . On DATE a preventive measure in the form of an undertaking not to leave the town and to behave properly was imposed on him .

On DATE PERSON was charged with homicide committed as a result of exceeding the limits of necessary self - defence ( LAW ) . He was questioned as an accused and fully acknowledged his guilt in relation to the actions with which he was charged .

On DATE CARDINAL fragments of the baseball bat were seized and examined by the investigator .

On DATE the applicant was admitted to the proceedings as an aggrieved party . She was questioned by the investigator DATE , but could not submit any information regarding the circumstances of her son ’s death . During her additional questioning as a victim on DATE she stated that her son had told her that he had been beaten by police officers from ORG of the Interior of FAC ( ORG района г. ORG ) .

The investigation established that on DATE officers from ORG of the Interior of FAC had arrived at the scene of the incident in order to stop a disturbance of public peace caused by the applicant ’s son ’s unlawful actions . Upon his arrival at the police station the police officers , having assessed the victim ’s medical condition as critical , called an ambulance for him .

On DATE during an on - site verification of his testimony , PERSON demonstrated with the help of an assistant and an improvised object how the applicant ’s son had struck him with a wooden baseball bat , how this bat had broken when it struck the wall , and how he had afterwards inflicted several blows on the applicant ’s son ’s head with a fragment of this bat .

On DATE the forensic medical examination was carried out , establishing that the applicant ’s son ’s death had been caused by an open blunt traumatic brain injury accompanied by contused head wounds and bruises , haemorrhages in the soft tissues of the head , fractures of the skull bones , haemorrhages above and under the layers of mater , complicated by brain oedema and compression ( forensic medical report no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

On DATE ORG approved the bill of indictment and referred the case to ORG of FAC ( “ the ORG ” ) for examination on the merits .

On DATE ORG returned the criminal case to the Prosecutor for re - drafting of the bill of indictment and remedying of deficiencies that prevented examination of the case , in particular , the formulation of exactly how ORG ’s actions had exceeded the limits of necessary self - defence .

On DATE the chief investigator from the FAC investigative division of ORG at ORG Prosecutor ’s Office for GPE ( “ the GPE investigative division ” ) discontinued the criminal proceedings , having arrived at the conclusion that the injuries resulting in the death of the applicant ’s son on DATE had been inflicted by ORG as actions of necessary self - defence . The decision was not supported by reference to any evidence .

On DATE the Deputy Head of the FAC investigative division set aside the above decision and ordered a fresh investigation .

Subsequently , DATE and DATE the criminal proceedings were discontinued and resumed on CARDINAL occasions . CARDINAL of the decisions , namely those of DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE , repeated word for word the previous decision of CARDINAL DATE . The following CARDINAL decisions , namely the decisions of DATE and DATE , DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE , reached the same conclusion , relying on :

- forensic medical report no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) ;

- statements by ORG submitting that on CARDINAL DATE he had had a fight with the applicant ’s son and had administered to the latter CARDINAL blows to the head with a piece of broken baseball bat , following which he had called the police , who had taken the applicant ’s son to the police station ;

- statements by witnesses PERSON and P. who were present at the scene of the fight and confirmed ORG ’s statements ;

- statements by police officer PERSON , who arrived at the scene and saw the applicant ’s son squatting down , with blood streaming from his head and a bruise below his eye ; he submitted that the applicant ’s son , PERSON , ORG had been taken to the police station , following which an ambulance had been called for the applicant ’s son as his head was bleeding ; no violence had been used against the latter ;

- statements by duty officer ORG . , who had received information about the fight and had seen the applicant ’s son brought to the police station in a state of alcoholic intoxication , with a lacerated wound in the region of CARDINAL eye and several abrasions , following which an ambulance had been called to take him to hospital ; he submitted that nobody in his presence had subjected the applicant ’s son to any beatings ;

- similar statements by duty officer Ser . ;

- statements by operative agent FAC . , who saw the applicant ’s son at the police station with injuries to his body ; he submitted that he had not seen anybody beating the applicant ’s son at the police station ;

- statements by witness PERSON , who arrived at the police station having been told that the applicant ’s son had been taken there ; however , she had then been informed that the latter had been taken to hospital to be treated for his injuries ; she further submitted that in the hospital the applicant ’s son told her that he had been beaten up by the police in the entrance to ORG ’s house ;

- statements by witness PERSON , who had accompanied the applicant ’s son in his car to the scene of the fight ; he submitted that the applicant had told him that he had a score to settle with a man called “ PERSON ” who had cooperated with the police ; he had seen the applicant ’s son knock on a window and enter the building with a baseball bat in his hands ; TIME he had seen the police arrive at the exit from the building ; the applicant ’s son had been walking unassisted , he had not been handcuffed , but had been holding his head ; CARDINAL of the police officers had been holding a plastic bag containing CARDINAL fragments of the baseball bat ; the applicant ’s son had got into the police car and been taken to the police station ; he had not seen anybody hitting the applicant ’s son or threatening him ;

- statements by the applicant , who submitted that her son had told her that he had been beaten up by the police ;

- statements by witness ORG . , who had heard about the fight from GPE ;

- statements by witness PERSON . , who had heard about the fight from T. ;

- statements by neighbours PERSON . and ORG . , who knew nothing about the events in question ;

- statements by witness PERSON . , the applicant ’s son ’s partner , who had been told by the applicant ’s son that he had been beaten by the police ;

- statements by witness ORG . , who was receiving treatment in the hospital at the time when the applicant ’s son was admitted and who submitted that the latter had told him that he had sustained the injuries through being beaten with a baseball bat ;

- the police station ’s registration log , which contained no mention of the applicant ’s son being arrested on the DATE ;

- expert report no . CARDINAL , according to which ORG had an abrasion on his right forearm which could have been caused on DATE by a blow from a hard blunt object ;

- expert report no . CARDINAL on the examination of a sample of the applicant ’s son ’s skin from the left CARDINAL of the parietal region of the head containing well - defined diffuse microinclusions of iron ;

- expert report no . CARDINAL of DATE stating that the applicant ’s son ’s open blunt brain injury had been caused by a combination of traumatic impacts in the region of the head which could have resulted from the circumstances described by ORG , that is to say by the infliction of multiple blows by a baseball bat fragment in the region of the head .

In the meantime , the applicant repeatedly challenged the adequacy of the investigation alleging the involvement of police officers in the death of her son . In particular , she complained about the failure of the investigator to inform her of the decisions taken in the case and to explain the possible avenues for appeal . She further complained about the refusal of her requests for information about the exact time when ORG ’s call was registered at the police station , the exact time when her son was brought to the police station and when the ambulance was called for him . The applicant also sought to have clarified the reasons why her son had not been questioned about the circumstances of the incident during DATE before he lapsed into a coma , to obtain an expert examination of the bloodstains on his clothes which could have clarified whether he had been standing up or lying down when he sustained his injuries , and an expert examination which could have clarified the origin of metal particles found in the wounds of her son .

NORP In response to her complaints , ORG on DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE found the investigator ’s refusals and lengthy inactivity unlawful and unjustified and ordered him to remedy the above deficiencies by conducting a thorough and comprehensive investigation .

On DATE the applicant ’s son ’s clothes were seized from the applicant for expert examination .

On DATE ORG found the investigator ’s inactivity unlawful , having noted that when taking the decision of DATE the investigator had failed to comply with his own ruling of CARDINAL DATE granting the applicant ’s requests .

On DATE the Deputy Head of ORG at ORG Prosecutor ’s Office for GPE set aside the decision of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) as having been taken in violation of the criminal procedure . As a result , all the evidence obtained after DATE was found inadmissible .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE forensic biological and forensic trace examinations of the applicant ’s son ’s clothes were ordered , which duly established that the latter had been in an upright position , or close to such a position , when the bloodstains appeared on his clothes ( report no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ) .

On DATE a forensic medical examination by an expert commission was ordered . The examination established that the open blunt traumatic brain injury inflicted on the applicant ’s son had been caused by CARDINAL traumatic impacts , and that it could have arisen in the circumstances indicated by the accused ORG during his questioning on DATE and the on - site verification of his testimony on DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and DATE above ) ( report no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ) .

On unspecified dates the applicant and the witnesses were questioned for a second time and confirmed their previous statements .

Between DATE and CARDINAL DATE the criminal proceedings were discontinued on CARDINAL occasions on the grounds of absence of the constituent elements of a crime under LAW of LAW in the actions of GPE , and were subsequently resumed .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG found the decision of CARDINAL DATE unlawful and unsubstantiated . ORG also found unlawful the investigator ’s failure to notify the applicant of the procedural decisions taken in reply to her requests .

On DATE the acting head of LOC of the FAC investigative division set aside the decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the investigator for LOC from the FAC investigative division discontinued the criminal proceedings . The decision noted that the investigation had identified the constituent elements of a crime under LAW of LAW in the actions of ORG However , since the crime belonged to the category of minor crimes and had been committed over DATE , in DATE , ORG was to be exempted from criminal liability pursuant to LAW ( exemption from criminal liability due to expiration of statutory time - limits for criminal prosecution ) .

On DATE the acting head for LOC of the FAC investigative division took the decision to resume the proceedings in view of the necessity of conducting psycho - physiological expert examinations − using a polygraph − of the police officers who had brought the applicant ’s son to the police station so as to verify the veracity of their statements .

According to information contained in the case file , the proceedings were still pending in DATE .

The case file contains no information regarding further developments in the investigation of the circumstances surrounding the applicant ’s son ’s death .

On DATE the applicant sought the institution of criminal proceedings against the police officers allegedly involved in the death of her son .

On DATE the chief investigator of the FAC investigative division issued a decision refusing the institution of criminal proceedings against officers PERSON . , PERSON , ORG . and PERSON . of Kaliningrad ’s ORG of the ORG under ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ( abuse of power by an official , actions of a public official which clearly exceed his or her authority ) .

On DATE the Deputy Head of the FAC investigative division set aside the above decision and ordered a fresh pre - investigation inquiry . In particular , the investigator was instructed to assess the actions of the police officers under LAW ( leaving without help a person in danger ) and CARDINAL ( knowingly false accusation ) of LAW .

On DATE the investigator of the FAC investigative division again issued a decision refusing the institution of criminal proceedings against officers .

On DATE ORG found the above decision unlawful . ORG established that no fresh inquiry had been conducted and that the instructions given in the decision of DATE had not been complied with .

On DATE ORG ( “ the Regional Court ” ) upheld the decision of DATE on appeal .

On DATE the FAC investigative division ’s investigator refused to open criminal proceedings against the police officers under LAW , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW on the grounds that the constituent elements of a crime were absent in their actions .

On DATE ORG found the above decision lawful . The applicant did not appeal .

On DATE the applicant brought civil proceedings against ORG seeking compensation in respect of nonpecuniary damage caused to her by the failure of the domestic authorities to investigate her son ’s death .

On DATE the ORG of GPE dismissed the applicant ’s claims .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment on appeal .


No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1-f - Expulsion) (Syria);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention)

George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Ineta Ziemele;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Paul Mahoney;Yonko Grozev

The applicant was born in DATE . His current whereabouts are unknown .

On DATE the applicant fled GPE and on an unspecified date entered GPE . It appears that he applied for asylum , but on DATE he left the country before his application was examined .

On DATE the applicant crossed the NORP border on foot . On CARDINAL DATE ORG ( NORP roberžsardze ) stopped him near the border .

On DATE ORG completed an asylum application form and the applicant signed it in the presence of an LANGUAGE - speaking interpreter .

On DATE an initial interview ( sākotnējā aptauja ) with the applicant was conducted with the assistance of an NORP - speaking interpreter . The applicant explained that he could speak , read and write in LANGUAGE and LANGUAGE .

On DATE a personal interview ( pārrunas ) with the applicant took place . The applicant was assisted by an LANGUAGE - speaking interpreter .

On DATE the closed facility in which the applicant was being held ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) received a parcel addressed to him . The sender was unknown . The parcel contained the applicant ’s identity card and military service certificate in LANGUAGE . Their translation was requested and on DATE it was received .

On DATE those documents , together with their translations into NORP , were sent to ORG ( GPE un migrācijas lietu pārvalde ) . The latter was also informed that it would receive certified translations as soon as possible . On DATE ORG received the certified translations and , on DATE , sent them to ORG .

On DATE DATE authenticity of the applicant ’s identity card was confirmed by CARDINAL forensic experts . On DATE ORG received their report and , on DATE , sent it to ORG .

On DATE the applicant appointed a lawyer to assist him in the administrative proceedings . The same lawyer continued to represent him before ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE ORG ( Patvēruma lietu nodaļa ) of ORG informed the applicant that they had received his application for asylum and would examine it within DATE .

On DATE ORG decided to refuse the applicant ’s asylum application . However , they granted him subsidiary protection status ( alternatīvais statuss ) and issued a temporary residence permit for DATE . It was noted that that decision would take effect from the time the applicant had been informed of it . A reference was made to section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the Administrative Procedure Law and section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE , which was a DATE , a letter was sent to ORG in NORP informing them of the decision and stating that the applicant was to be informed of it immediately . They also asked that CARDINAL copy of the decision be handed over to the applicant and that the second copy be sent back to ORG with the applicant ’s signature confirming that he had been informed of it . The letter , together with CARDINAL copies of the decision , was received in GPE on DATE ( see paragraphs DATE below ) and the applicant was informed of it . Accordingly , the decision took effect on DATE .

The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision with the administrative courts , as he wished to be granted asylum ; he considered that the subsidiary protection status was not sufficient .

On DATE administrative proceedings were instituted .

On DATE ORG issued summonses and scheduled a hearing for DATE . That hearing was postponed as the applicant did not appear . Another hearing was scheduled for CARDINAL DATE , but the applicant failed to appear again .

On DATE ORG left the applicant ’s appeal without examination for repeated failure to appear without good reason .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant was detained under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , but he refused to sign the detention record . At that time , he had no personal identification or valid travel document . He identified himself as “ PERSON ” , born on DATE . He was informed ( in LANGUAGE ) of his rights to appeal against the detention order , receive legal aid , acquaint himself with the detention records and communicate in a language understood by him . The following day several documents were found in the place where he had been arrested : a document testifying that an application for short - term asylum had been made by a NORP national , PERSON , born on DATE , and was being examined in GPE ; a torn train ticket ; and other documents in LANGUAGE . The applicant explained that he had hidden those documents in order to avoid being sent back to GPE .

On DATE the applicant was detained under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) ( undetermined identity ) and CARDINAL ) ( misuse of the asylum procedure ) of LAW , but he refused to sign the detention record . He was informed ( in LANGUAGE ) of his rights to appeal against the detention order , receive legal aid and communicate in a language understood by him . He was also informed about the reasons for his detention . He was placed in a closed facility in Daugavpils – an accommodation centre for foreign detainees and asylum seekers ( ORG ārzemnieku un patvēruma meklētāju izmitināšanas centrs – “ the NORP accommodation centre ” ) .

On DATE , following a hearing in the applicant ’s presence , a judge of the Daugavpils ( City ) Court ( GPE tiesa ) ordered his detention for DATE . The judge examined the material brought before him and , with the assistance of an NORP - speaking interpreter , heard evidence from the applicant . The applicant explained that he had applied for asylum in GPE , but had left as he realised that he would not receive it . He had crossed the border illegally and had identified himself by giving another name in order not to be deported back to GPE . The applicant was not assisted by a lawyer . The judge concluded that there were grounds to detain him as his identity had not been determined and there were reasons to consider that he had misused the asylum procedure . He had arrived in GPE from a country , where his life had not been endangered and where he had applied for asylum ; these facts evidenced that he misused the asylum procedure . On DATE , the applicant lodged an appeal ( CARDINAL page ) against that decision in LANGUAGE , stating in simple terms that he had received the court ’s decision and wished to appeal against it . He submitted that he had been in danger in GPE and had been ill ; he expressed the wish to be granted refugee status in GPE and undertook to provide all his documents as soon as possible . On CARDINAL DATE his appeal was sent for translation ; on DATE a translation was received . On DATE , the appeal , its translation and the case file were forwarded to ORG ( ORG apgabaltiesa ) and the applicant was informed that a single judge would examine his appeal following a written procedure ; the applicant could submit further observations within TIME . That information was handed to him by ORG and he signed to acknowledge receipt of it on DATE . On DATE the applicant was informed that examination of his case had been rescheduled to CARDINAL DATE ; it would be decided by a single judge following a written procedure . That information was handed to him by ORG and he signed to acknowledge receipt of its translation on DATE .

On DATE a judge of ORG examined and dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . He relied on largely the same factual and legal grounds for detaining the applicant as the first - instance court judge . The judge concluded that there were grounds to consider that the applicant attempted to misuse the asylum procedure . It was evidenced by the facts surrounding his arrival and application for asylum in GPE . He had crossed the border illegally . He had not arrived directly from the country where his life or liberty was endangered . He had spent DATE in GPE , where he had applied for asylum , but had left illegally ; without awaiting for a final decision . It was impossible to predict his further actions in case of release . The decision was drafted in NORP , but its contents were explained to the applicant , for which he signed on DATE .

On DATE , following a hearing in the applicant ’s presence , the judge of the Daugavpils ( City ) Court authorised the extension of his detention for a further DATE ; the applicant was assisted by an interpreter . The applicant ’s lawyer was not present , but the judge examined her written request to release the applicant on account of the fact that he had provided his identity documents and had not misused the asylum procedure . She argued that the applicant could be placed in an open and specialised institution – an accommodation centre for asylum seekers in GPE . The judge disagreed and concluded that there were grounds to detain the applicant under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of LAW . The fact that his application for asylum was accepted for examination did not indicate that he would comply with the requirements arising from the asylum procedure as he testified that he would again apply for an asylum in another NORP country in case he received a negative decision in GPE , which was contrary to the applicable procedure . In such circumstances , it was impossible to predict his further actions if placed in an open accommodation centre ; there was a possibility that he might leave GPE and thereby obstruct the asylum procedure as he had already done in a safe third country ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . On DATE , the applicant lodged an appeal ( CARDINAL page ) against that decision in NORP , stating that there was no evidence that he had misused the asylum procedure , might leave the country or obstruct the asylum procedure . He disputed the relevance of the fact that he had applied for asylum in GPE as it was not a safe third country . His appeal was forwarded to ORG together with the case file . On DATE the applicant was informed that his case would be examined on DATE by a single judge following a written procedure ; it was explained that the applicant could submit further observations within TIME . That information was handed to him by ORG and he signed to acknowledge receipt of its translation on DATE .

On DATE another judge of ORG examined and dismissed the applicant ’s appeal , upholding the decision to detain him under section CARDINAL ) of LAW . She referred to the findings of the city court to the effect that there were grounds to believe that the applicant might misuse the asylum procedure . There was evidence that he had left GPE after DATE and without awaiting a final decision in response to his application for asylum . Upon arrival in GPE , he had withheld his real identity . It was due to diligent work of border guards that his identity could be established . Moreover , the applicant admitted that he had left GPE because he believed that his application for asylum would be refused ; he also admitted that he would attempt to obtain asylum in another NORP country if it was refused in GPE . Therefore , the judge upheld the conclusion of the lower court that it was impossible to predict the applicant ’s further actions upon release . The decision was drafted in NORP , but its contents were explained to the applicant . On DATE he signed the decision , confirming that it had been explained to him in LANGUAGE ; he respected the decision and agreed with it .

On DATE the judge of the Daugavpils ( City ) Court authorised the applicant ’s detention for a further DATE , again on the grounds of section CARDINAL ) of LAW . During the hearing , the applicant explained that he would continue to pursue the asylum proceedings ; he was aware of the relevant procedures and duties , he would not leave GPE until the end of the asylum procedure . The judge concluded that the applicant misused the asylum procedure on the same grounds as indicated in the previous decisions and that he should remain in detention . With reference to section QUANTITY ( CARDINAL ) of LAW , the judge noted that the time - limit for his detention had not yet expired . The applicant did not lodge an appeal against that decision , as ORG was due to make a decision in DATE and his previous experience had shown that detention appeals took DATE to be examined .

On DATE ORG informed the applicant that he had been granted subsidiary protection status but that they could not release him until they received the original version of that decision ; the relevant authority had sent it by post ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

ORG ordered the applicant ’s release at TIME on DATE . In the release order , a reference was made to the fact that the applicant had been granted subsidiary protection status and that grounds for his detention had ceased to exist .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant complained to the ORG about his prolonged detention .

On DATE the ORG replied [ in LANGUAGE ] as follows :

“ In your complaint you request ORG ’s assistance in obtaining order for your release as well as assistance with contacting your family in GPE .

In the process of examining your complaint I have contacted the centre for detained foreigners and asylum seekers ‘ Daugavpils’ ( hereinafter DATE the Centre ) . According to information provided by the ORG , your application for asylum is currently under examination in ORG . The expected date of decision is DATE .

According to the decision of GPE from DATE , as well as ORG you are currently detained on the basis of [ section PERSON ) ] of LAW . The next periodical review of your detention is due before DATE . [ Section CARDINAL ) ] of the Asylum PERSON states that ‘ ORG ] has the right to detain an asylum seeker for a period DATE and nights if there are reasons to believe that the asylum seeker is attempting to use the asylum procedure in bad faith.’

The decision of GPE is based on the fact that you have crossed the NORP border under the name of PERSON having previously requested temporary asylum in GPE with your established identity as ORG . In the court hearing you have also indicated that in case of a negative decision you will proceed to seek asylum in another NORP country , which would be contrary to the procedure and regulations of requesting asylum in ORG . Thus the court has established reasons to believe that you are attempting to use asylum procedure contrary to its objective and purpose .

Having reviewed the decision of GPE and ORG , it is established that you have been detained according to the procedures prescribed by law . Your rights to periodical review of detention have also been observed according to NORP law . Furthermore , the decisions ordering your detention contain sufficient motivation to establish legal and factual grounds for such detention . Therefore , there has been no violation of your right to liberty and security under LAW ] and LAW .

With regard to the possibility to contact your family from the detention facility , I would like to inform you that upon your request , you have the right to contact your family on your own expense . The NORP law does not grant detained asylum seekers a possibility to contact their families free of charge . ”