Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 35-3 - Ratione materiae);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6-2 - Presumption of innocence)

Geoffrey Valenzia;George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Ledi Bianku;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On an unspecified date the applicant was charged with multiple counts of theft ( burglaries dating from DATE ) and/or receiving stolen goods .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( as a court of criminal judicature ) found the applicant guilty of a series of offences of receiving stolen goods , but acquitted him of the theft of those goods , holding that it was clear that he had had nothing to do with the thefts . The court found it curious that the applicant had given a detailed explanation as to the origin of each item , and yet a number of the victims of the thefts had identified the objects as belonging to them . During the investigation stage the applicant had admitted to the police that because of his fascination with antiques , he would purchase items even though he would have been aware that they had been stolen . During the proceedings , other than declaring that such statements were false , the applicant did not contest the statements or explain why he had made them in such detail and precision , and why he eventually showed the police where the items were kept . The police also confirmed that such statements had been made . Moreover , the court observed that , even though the applicant was a coin collector , the fact that he had been found in possession of tools for melting down metals such as silver and of a number of pieces of silver bullion did not favour his credibility . Furthermore , although not all the items stolen had been found in the applicant ’s possession , in the court ’s view it was curious that all the items found had been connected with specific , well - organised thefts , where it was clear that the robbers knew what they were looking for and were well aware of where they would place the merchandise . Indeed , the court had no doubt that the applicant had been aware of the illicit origins of the items in his possession . It sentenced him to DATE imprisonment .

On DATE the applicant appealed on various grounds and complained that he had not been able to prove the origins of all the items because the police had raided his house , seizing all the relevant documents and receipts , which had then gone missing in their custody .

By a judgment of DATE , ORG modified the judgment in part . It affirmed the applicant ’s innocence in respect of the theft charges , as there had not been a shred of evidence in that respect , and it reversed the part of the judgment concerning the majority of the remaining charges of receiving stolen goods ( see below for detail ) . It disagreed with the first - instance court ’s conclusion that the applicant could not but have been a receiver of stolen goods on the ground that since a number of people had recognised the items they could not all have been lying , and therefore it must have been the applicant who was wrong and was therefore responsible . ORG observed that the applicant was a collector of and dealer in antiques , who appeared to purchase any item of interest without enquiring in detail into its legitimate origins . It appeared , from both the case file and the fact that certain items had been hidden , that the applicant was aware that some items had previously been stolen . However , the appeal court considered that the applicant should not suffer prejudice as a result of his inability to prove the origins of certain items , since this was a result of negligence on the part of the police , who had lost the relevant documentation ( and some of the items ) . Moreover , no inferences could be drawn from the fact that he possessed certain tools , as it was normal for a coin collector to melt down coins which had become worthless . Examining the records of the proceedings , the court concluded that the crime of receiving stolen goods had only been proved in respect of objects of antiquarian value stolen from CARDINAL specific venues , A. , PERSON , and C. , ( during CARDINAL burglaries ) and found in the applicant ’s possession . His sentence was in consequence reduced to a DATE suspended sentence .

Pending the criminal proceedings against the applicant , a number of individuals alleging that they owned the items referred to in the list of charges against the applicant ( also alleged victims of the relevant thefts ) instituted civil proceedings to vindicate their ownership of the items . They requested that the items be returned to them and , where necessary , in the event that they could not be returned , that the applicant be held liable for damages . The relevant decisions on appeal were delivered subsequent to ORG judgment finding the applicant innocent of the charges of receiving stolen goods in relation to a majority of the items .

Proceedings were instituted against the applicant on CARDINAL DATE in relation to items stolen in DATE from venue P. The items had been found in his possession and seized by the police . The claimants asked the court to find that they were the owners and to order their return . All were items in relation to which the applicant had eventually been acquitted of charges of theft and receiving stolen goods . The applicant argued that he had acquired the items in accordance with the law and in good faith .

By a judgment of DATE , having heard the parties’ addresses and having assessed the evidence , ORG found that the claimants were the owners of the items at issue in the case ( except for CARDINAL items , the ownership of which had been claimed by other third parties ) . Costs were to be divided accordingly . The court found , however , without prejudice to any further action , that it would be premature to order the return of the said items .

The court observed that the applicant had declared that he did not know the claimant , but that she had recognised the applicant as a person who had gate - crashed a party she had once given at venue PERSON , PERSON , a police officer , had testified that during the criminal investigations the applicant had admitted that “ a number of items seized by the police had not been purchased honestly ( bis - sewwa ) ” . Thus , contrary to the applicant ’s testimony , it could be inferred that certain objects had not come into the applicant ’s possession by proper means . Although the court was convinced that the applicant had been involved in the antiques trade for DATE , he had not been able to put forward any evidence in relation to the items at issue or any detail as to his trade . By contrast , the claimants had identified as theirs the items which had previously been stolen . The court thus , having to choose between the CARDINAL versions , opted for that of the claimants . The court considered that the fact that numerous people had been to the police station and identified various objects of which they claimed to be the owners and which had been seized from the applicant ’s house was enough evidence to discredit the applicant ’s testimony .

By a judgment of DATE ORG ( civil jurisdiction ) upheld the first - instance judgment . From the evidence submitted it appeared that the claimants had suffered CARDINAL burglaries at venue P. and that the police had seized some of the stolen items from the applicant , amongst many other items identified by various third parties as theirs . While the applicant was able to show that he had been a collector since his youth , he had not managed to prove ownership of the relevant items . As to their origin , he vaguely mentioned names of individuals , some of whom were deceased . He referred to receipts which were currently with the police and which could not be exhibited to the court . The applicant submitted declarations by individuals with whom he had traded . As to his trading , however , it appeared that the applicant had not hesitated to purchase items with dubious or suspicious , if not illicit , origins . Indeed , the applicant had been investigated and various items found in his possession had been seized . The origins of the items gave rise to more than a simple suspicion that they had not been acquired legitimately . According to police officer PERSON , the applicant had even admitted this . During the criminal proceedings PERSON had been asked whether the applicant had admitted to the theft and the police officer had replied “ yes ” . PERSON further stated that the applicant had referred to the dishonest purchase of a sofa ( “ PERSON bis - sewwa ” ) and had only shown receipts in respect of certain items in connection with which the applicant had been charged , but not all of them . In that light , the court was not satisfied that the applicant had submitted sufficient proof to show that he was the owner of the said items . Moreover , the fact that numerous people , apart from the applicant , had claimed to be the owners of the items did not suffice to support the view that the applicant was the owner .

Proceedings were instituted against the applicant on CARDINAL DATE in relation to items stolen in DATE from venue ORG , which had been found in his possession and seized by the police . The claimants asked the court to find that they were the owners of the items and to order their return . All were items in relation to which the applicant had eventually been acquitted of charges of theft and receiving stolen goods . The applicant argued that he had acquired the items in accordance with the law and in good faith .

By a judgment of DATE ORG found in favour of the claimants . It held , however , without prejudice to any further action , that an order for the return of the said items would be premature .

ORG noted that there was a certain disagreement in respect of the list of objects identified by the original claimant ( the deceased ancestor of the current claimants ) , in that certain items had been added later . However , the claimant had produced a number of witnesses who had confirmed his declarations as to which items had been stolen . The applicant declared under oath that all the items referred to by the claimants , as well as all the other items seized , were owned by him , as he had bought them over DATE . In his testimony he gave the names of people from whom he had purchased each item . He also submitted a receipt dated DATE , DATE of the burglary , which indicated that he had bought a number of objects for the sum of CARDINAL NORP liri ( ORG , MONEY ( ORG ) ) from a certain S.A. Nevertheless , the court considered the PERSON version to be more reliable , as it was corroborated by photos and other witnesses . Moreover , police officer PERSON had testified that the applicant had stated that various items seized from his house “ had not been purchased honestly ” and this could not but weaken the applicant ’s testimony . Therefore the court had no other option but to find in favour of the claimants , at least in respect of those items that were not being claimed by other third persons .

By a judgment of DATE , ORG ( civil jurisdiction ) upheld the first - instance judgment . It considered that ORG had properly assessed the evidence and delivered a reasoned judgment . In any case , ORG considered that the applicant had not provided a reliable explanation in respect of the origin and purchase of the relevant items . Indeed , during the criminal proceedings PERSON had testified , inter alia , that “ at no time had the applicant stated that he had stolen the items from here or there , but he had mentioned that he had bought certain items from ORG , and that he knew about their dubious origins ( kienu ġejjin bil - ħazin ) ” . ORG considered that had ORG based its decision solely on that testimony and stopped there , the relevant burden of proof might not have been satisfied . However , all the evidence advanced indicated the probability that the relevant items belonged to the claimant ’s heirs – they had been stolen from venue ORG , and had been identified by the claimants , even though third parties had also claimed ownership of some of the items . Although the applicant had testified under oath that he had purchased the items legally , his testimony had not been consistent and had lacked veracity . In particular , he had given the impression that he was a trader in antiques and that he had traded with various lawyers , but when questioned in respect of each of them , it transpired that he had not bought any of the items relevant to the case . The other people mentioned by the applicant were deceased and could not testify . Neither could the applicant submit receipts for those purchases , giving as the reason for this that they had been seized by the police and were being held as evidence in the criminal proceedings against him . Even if that were so , the applicant had not provided proof . By contrast , the claimants had submitted photographs of the relevant items taken before they had been stolen .

Proceedings were instituted against the applicant on DATE in relation to items stolen from venue PERSON ( including items allegedly transformed into silver bullion ) , which had been found in his possession and seized by the police . All were items in relation to which the applicant had eventually been acquitted of theft but found guilty of receiving stolen goods . The claimants requested that the applicant be found responsible for the theft or receiving of the stolen goods and therefore liable for damages . They asked the court to quantify such damages and to order the applicant to pay them . The applicant argued that he had acquired the items in accordance with the law and in good faith .

By a judgment of DATE the court found that the claimants were the owners of the relevant items , ordered the applicant to return the said items , and held the applicant liable for damages for holding the relevant items in bad faith .

The court noted the expert evidence , which found that there was sufficient proof that the items were owned by the claimants . Indeed , the applicant had not denied that the items could have been previously owned by the claimants . During the criminal investigations the applicant had admitted that he had previously purchased stolen items . The declarations used in the criminal proceedings were exhibited before the court and the applicant only contended that police officer PERSON had invented certain things . Having re - read the witness statements , the experts took the view that the applicant rarely acquired items lawfully and in good faith . He actually was perfectly well aware of their dubious origins , as he was told by the sellers that the items had been stolen . This could not be ignored , especially as the applicant never stated that he had sale receipts for the relevant items . The items were found in his possession , he did not remember from whom he had bought them and he had no receipts . In consequence , it could not be said that he had purchased them in good faith . The court held that the applicant ’s statements used in the criminal proceedings were admissible evidence ( Article CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( “ the COCP ” – see Relevant Domestic Law below ) ) . Officer PERSON presented CARDINAL statements made by the applicant during the investigation , and the applicant explained which parts of those statements he agreed with and which parts he contested . The court considered that in doing so the applicant was picking and choosing , and yet there existed contradictions . For example , in CARDINAL statement the applicant said that he had purchased CARDINAL chalices from a taxi driver , and he subsequently confirmed that statement . In another statement he repeated this in more detail and subsequently stated that he had never made such a statement . At DATE he repeated the story , but differently , saying that he had bought more items . The court noted that the taxi driver had not been called as a witness to corroborate the applicant ’s version . While the applicant stated that he had purchased the items from various persons , CARDINAL of those persons had been called as a witness and the latter only testified to the effect that the applicant had an interest in antiques . Another witness confirmed that the applicant was also a moneylender . Indeed , the applicant submitted a number of documents in evidence of this , but did not submit any evidence in relation to the origins of the items at issue . The court therefore concluded from the totality of the evidence that the claimants had been burgled , that they had identified the stolen items , and that the applicant had not proved that he had acquired the items in good faith . The court found it of particular relevance that in CARDINAL of the applicant ’s statements , which he did not contradict , he had said “ when I see an antique , whatever it may be ... I go blind . I want it for myself in order to be able to take pleasure in looking at it ” . Thus , the court considered that any other comment would be superfluous . The court found in the applicant the very image of a receiver of stolen goods ( ricettatur ) .

As to the claim for damages , the court accepted and shared the expert ’s conclusions : as had emerged from the evidence , not all the stolen items were found in the applicant ’s possession , but a quantity of silver bullion was found which the claimants argued was the product of melted - down silver statues which had been stolen from them . Indeed , it had been shown that the bullion seized from the applicant was home - made and not pure . Thus , although there was no proof that the applicant had stolen the items , there was sufficient proof to hold that the claimants were indeed the owners of the relevant items , that those items had been in the applicant ’s possession in bad faith and that the applicant had previously melted down silver . Indeed , both the bullion and the tools for making it had been found in his possession . The applicant gave an explanation about the bullion , but it was not corroborated by any witness statement . The applicant gave no credible explanation for the clearly home - made bullion . It was therefore very probable that objects stolen from the claimants and acquired in bad faith had , together with other items , been melted down to hide their identity . The court further highlighted , of its own accord , the absence of corroboration as regards the bullion , and the presence of tools used to melt down silver . Thus , the PERSON case had been made out on the balance of probabilities . The applicant was therefore liable for damages because he had been in possession of stolen goods and because of the damage he had caused by melting down such items . The amount of damages was fixed at ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) .

NORP The applicant appealed , arguing , inter alia , that the legal expert whose conclusions had been endorsed by the court had relied on evidence ( the applicant ’s statements during the criminal investigation ) which should not be given any weight in civil proceedings , and that the first - instance court had erred in finding him guilty in respect of items which were never found by the police , referring to the items that had allegedly been melted down .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( civil jurisdiction ) upheld the first - instance judgment ( in so far as relevant ) . It held , however , that the applicant could not be ordered to return items which were no longer in his possession . It further considered that LAW below ) applied to the statements made by the applicant during the criminal investigation , even though they had not been signed by him . It sufficed that officer PERSON had witnessed those statements being made by the applicant for them to be admissible in evidence . It was for the first - instance court to assess them and reach its conclusions . Moreover , LAW ( see Relevant Domestic Law below ) did not imply that evidence used in criminal proceedings could not be used in analogous civil proceedings . Furthermore , the applicant had not objected to the use of that evidence before the firstinstance court . Having examined in detail the evidence produced , ORG further considered that the first - instance court had not made an incorrect assessment and that it would therefore not interfere with its finding . It found it pertinent to point out that the fact that only CARDINAL silver bars had been found in the applicant ’s possession , despite the fact that the items melted down should have amounted to many more bars , was not a thesis favourable to the applicant . Indeed , the applicant could easily have disposed of the other bars resulting from the melted - down items before the police found the bars . He was , thus , responsible for the damage caused by the melting down of the items , in accordance with the estimates provided by the expert . Any difficulties in evaluating the original items were of the applicant ’s own making , as it had been his choice to melt them down .

On DATE the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings , complaining that the CARDINAL judgments of ORG ( civil jurisdiction ) referred to above and another still pending set of proceedings had violated , inter alia , his right to be presumed innocent .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , ORG ( FAC ) , in its constitutional jurisdiction , rejected claims lodged by the applicant . In the context of the applicant ’s various complaints , it held that the civil proceedings against the applicant had not amounted to a repetition of the criminal proceedings , as the intention of the civil proceedings had not been to find whether the applicant was guilty of any charge , but solely to secure the return of the property to its owners and , where that was not possible , to determine the level of compensation due . Moreover , the different proceedings were not comparable in relation to the burden of proof required . Indeed , each of the proceedings was capable of resulting in different findings of responsibility , including findings which conflicted with each other . The court noted that in the civil proceedings the applicant had not been found guilty of any crime . The civil courts had assessed the evidence in relation to the ORG ownership rights to the property against the applicant ’s explanation as to how the items had been found in his possession , within the relevant parameters of civil proceedings of that nature . Considering the applicant ’s complaint under LAW , it held that the provision could not be applicable , since the applicant was no longer accused of a criminal offence , and his complaints were directed against civil proceedings which , save for one , had also been concluded . At a later stage , in relation to LAW , the court also considered that the conclusions reached by the civil courts were based on a proper assessment of evidence which did not violate the applicant ’s presumption of innocence . Those conclusions were based on the principle of juxta allegata et probata ( delivering a judgment on the basis of what has been alleged and proved ) , as expected in this type of proceedings . The court considered that the applicant ’s case could not be compared to any of the cases cited by him LAW CARDINAL § CARDINAL concerning the request of acquitted applicants for compensation for detention , and therefore the principles enunciated therein did not apply .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , ORG rejected an appeal lodged by the applicant and upheld the first - instance judgment . It considered that there had been no breach of the applicant ’s rights since criminal and civil proceedings were separate and distinct : CARDINAL was brought by the ORG , had a specific set of rules and aimed at the imposition of a punishment , whereas the other was brought by an interested individual for the restitution of his or her property rights . During criminal proceedings various rules played in favour of the accused , who might be found innocent simply because there was not sufficient evidence . This should not deny any third party the possibility of access to court to obtain relevant redress on the basis of a different burden of proof . The applicant had been cleared of all charges except those of receiving certain goods stolen from certain properties . However , that did not mean that the items in question , found in the applicant ’s possession , were his own . The civil proceedings instituted by individuals claiming certain items against the possessor were independent of the defendant ’s good or bad faith . ORG had in each case found for the claimants , after considering that the latter had proved that they were the owners of the stolen items and that the applicant had not proved his ownership . The cases had dealt solely with the establishment of the ownership of the items , and nothing more , and if the outcome was that the items were not his own , then he was bound to give them back to their rightful owners , regardless of how they came to be in his possession .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-5 - Compensation);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

André Potocki;Mārtiņš Mits;Síofra O’Leary

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the excessive length of their pre - trial detention . Some applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .


András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Nebojša Vučinić

NORP The applicant , Mr Atalay Öztürk , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and is currently serving a prison sentence in Muğla prison . He was represented before the ORG by Ms Y. Kavak Kılınç , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent .

NORP The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE at TIME the applicant got involved in a bar brawl which resulted in the death of GPE The applicant was also injured during the incident . Subsequently , he absconded for a short period of time .

On DATE , at TIME , the applicant called the police and introduced himself as GPE ’s murderer . The transcript of the telephone conversation was reproduced in the incident report ( ihbar kayıt tutanağı ) made by the police superintendent . It revealed that the applicant had expressed his wish to surrender but had been concerned about the reaction of the deceased ’s relatives .

Thereafter , at an unspecified time , the applicant surrendered to the police . He was subsequently hospitalised under police guard for the injuries he had sustained during the fight .

A medical report drawn up DATE indicated that the applicant had abrasions on his left eyebrow , which had probably been caused by a bullet . It was further noted that there was a bullet hole in his left wrist .

At TIME police officers arrived at the hospital and drafted a record of statement ( ifade zaptı ) quoting the written record of the applicant ’s telephone conversation with the police . According to this document , when the applicant had called the police he had stated to the chief police officer that he had gone to the bar looking for a mobile phone that he had lost and he had seen the fight . Some people had attacked him and he had drawn his gun in self - defence . When they had tried to grab the gun from his hand , the gun had gone off accidentally during the struggle . The record of statement further revealed that subsequent to his phone call , police officers had met with the applicant in GPE . He had then been brought to the hospital , where his left eyebrow had been sutured and his broken left arm had been encased in plaster . After being reminded of his rights , the applicant had had a telephone conversation with his lawyer and refused to make a statement to the police in the absence of his lawyer . He and his father had signed the record of statement .

Again on DATE , the Selçuk Investigating Judge issued a warrant for the applicant to be brought before ORG following his recovery .

On DATE , the FAC Investigating Judge questioned the applicant at the hospital in the presence of his lawyer . The applicant refused to make a statement , as he was still suffering from the injuries sustained in the incident . He stated that he would make defence submissions before the trial court . The judge ordered the provisional detention of the applicant in order to secure a statement from him following his discharge from the hospital .

On DATE , the applicant was brought before ORG , when he denied the content of the record of statement . He alleged that his conversation with the police on the phone had been misunderstood and incorrectly transcribed . He added that he had not been carrying a gun at the material time . During this statement , the applicant benefited from the assistance of a lawyer .

On DATE , the Selçuk Investigating Judge questioned the applicant in the presence of his lawyer . The applicant submitted that there had been a struggle between him and the deceased , and that the deceased had been shot during the struggle while the applicant had been trying to take the gun from his hand . He maintained that the gun had been fired while he had been acting in self - defence . He further stated that he had not been carrying a gun at the time of the incident . After the questioning was over , the judge ordered the applicant ’s pre - trial detention .

NORP On DATE the ORG issued an autopsy report , specifying that the deceased , GPE , had been shot in the head at long range . It concluded that the cause of his death had been a skull fracture , damage to the brain stem and haemorrhaging in the brain membrane resulting from the gunshot . The report also revealed that QUANTITY mg / dl of ethyl alcohol had been found in his blood .

On DATE ORG lodged an indictment with the assize court , charging the applicant with the intentional killing of GPE

During the proceedings the assize court heard several witnesses who had been in the bar at the material time . PERSON , the owner of the bar , testified that he had argued with the deceased for a while and that GPE had drawn his gun several times during their quarrel . Thereafter the applicant had come to the bar and GPE had begun quarrelling with the applicant and had lunged towards the applicant . PERSON had heard gunshots but had not seen the incident .

Another witness , PERSON , stated in his initial statements to the public prosecutor and the GPE court that the applicant had walked into the bar , sworn at him and the deceased and then started shooting at them . Subsequently , before the trial court PERSON testified there had been a quarrel between the applicant and the deceased . GPE had shot towards the applicant and then the applicant had tried to take the gun from GPE During the struggle , someone had hit GPE ’s head with a hard object and he had lost consciousness .

PERSON stated that the applicant had come to the bar looking for his mobile phone and a fight had broken out . GPE had walked up to the applicant while his hand had been in his pocket . At that time , PERSON had left the bar but he had heard a gunshot from outside . He had returned , and seen the deceased lying on the ground and V.S. taking the gun from his hand .

A.D. testified that during the fight in the bar , GPE had drawn his gun and fired into the air . The applicant had tried to grab it from GPE ’s hand .

On DATE the ORG convicted the applicant of intentional homicide .

On DATE ORG quashed the firstinstance court ’s judgment on procedural grounds .

On DATE the assize court convicted the applicant of intentional homicide and sentenced him to DATE and QUANTITY months’ imprisonment . In convicting the applicant , the court took into consideration the fact that throughout the proceedings the applicant had stated that he had not been carrying any weapon at the time of the events , and that he had been attacked with a gun and had acted in self - defence . It held that the applicant ’s defence submissions were implausible , taking into account the content of the case file , the record of statement , the entirety of the case file and the preliminary submissions of FAC The court found it established that the applicant had deliberately shot and killed GPE , having regard , among other things , to the distance between the applicant and the deceased , the number of shots fired and the circumstances of the incident .

On DATE ORG upheld the conviction .

The relevant domestic law and practice in force at the material time can be found in GPE v. GPE ( [ ORG ] , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , CARDINAL DATE ) .


Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a dual NORP and NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON . She was represented before the ORG by PERSON Schrevelius , a lawyer practising in GPE .


George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and is detained pending trial in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by PERSON , of ORG , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) are represented by their Agent , Mr PERSON , of ORG .

The applicant was indicted in GPE as a co - conspirator in respect of a conspiracy to establish a jihad training camp in GPE , GPE . ORG consequently requested his extradition under LAW DATE .

The applicant , along with Mr PERSON , lodged a first application against GPE and GPE with ORG under LAW ( “ the LAW ) on DATE ( see application no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . He alleged that if extradited and convicted he would be at real risk of ill - treatment either as a result of conditions at ORG ( a “ supermax ” prison ) or by the length of his possible sentence . The proceedings in the case of the applicant and Mr PERSON were originally conducted simultaneously with the cases of Mr PERSON ( application no . CARDINAL ) and PERSON ( application no . ORG ) . Interim measures under LAW were granted on DATE and on DATE the applications were granted priority status under LAW . On DATE the President of the ORG decided under LAW ( b ) of ORG to give notice of the applications lodged by Mr PERSON ( application no . CARDINAL ) and Mr PERSON ( application no . MONEY ) to the Government of GPE . Both of these applications raised the same issues regarding extradition to GPE , namely conditions of detention at ORG and the length of possible sentences . The ORG therefore decided to deal with the CARDINAL applications together .

On DATE the ORG delivered its judgment in the case of PERSON and Others v. the GPE , nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , ORG , CARDINAL and CARDINAL . However , as the applicant suffered from mental health problems of sufficient severity to require his transfer from ORG to ORG , the ORG considered that it was not in a position to rule on the merits of his complaints without further submissions from the parties . It therefore decided to disjoin and adjourn the examination of the applicant ’s complaints .

The ORG delivered its judgment in PERSON v. the GPE , no . CARDINAL on DATE wherein it held , unanimously , that there would be a violation of LAW in the event of the applicant ’s extradition on account of the current severity of his mental condition ( see in particular LAW CARDINAL ) . In particular the ORG noted that there was a lack of certainty as to the where the applicant would be detained , either before or after trial ; it was unclear how long the applicant might expect to remain on remand pending trial ; it was unclear whether the applicant ’s legal representatives would be entitled to challenge his competency to stand trial in GPE on account of his mental disorder ; there was no information before the ORG concerning the potential length of a competency assessment or any subsequent appeals procedure ; there was a complete absence of any information about the consequences for the applicant if the District Judge were to find that he was not fit to stand trial ; and there was no guarantee that if tried and convicted the applicant would not be detained in ORG , where he would be exposed to a “ highly restrictive ” regime with long periods of social isolation .

A request for a referral to ORG made by ORG was refused on DATE . The ORG ’s decision therefore became final and the Rule CARDINAL measure previously in place lapsed .

Meanwhile , on DATE the Secretary of ORG received a letter from ORG , a copy of which has not been provided to this ORG . It would appear that this letter stated that on the basis of the trial of other individuals in situations similar to that of the applicant , he would be held in pre - trial detention for DATE ; that if his competency was at issue , he would be hospitalised for treatment for a maximum period of DATE for assessment ; that if deemed unfit , he would be committed to the custody of the Attorney General and thereafter referred to a psychiatric referral centre ; that the exact timing of the process was difficult to estimate in advance owing to the fact - specific nature of any assessment ; that it was not suggested that the applicant , in his current state , was unfit to plead ; and that it was highly likely that he would only become incompetent if , as a result of the conditions in which he was detained , he relapsed into an acute psychotic state . In terms of his likely treatment postconviction , the DATE letter also stated that if “ it is determined that he is unable to manage his activities or DATE living by himself ( including his taking of prescribed medication ) it is highly unlikely that he would be placed at the ORG , but rather , at a medical centre . ”

On DATE the Secretary of ORG advised the applicant of her decision to proceed with his extradition to GPE as the information obtained from ORG on DATE had led her to be entirely satisfied that extradition could take place without infringing LAW . The Secretary of ORG did not invite the applicant or his legal representatives to make submissions before she made her decision .

On DATE the applicant sought permission to apply for judicial review of the Secretary of ORG ’s decision . He relied on CARDINAL principal grounds , namely : ( i ) that the Secretary of ORG had been obliged , but had failed , to afford him the opportunity to make representations before making her decision on extradition ; and ( ii ) that the further information provided by ORG was not materially different from that previously placed before ORG . Therefore it would be impermissible to depart from its conclusion that there would be an LAW violation in the event of his extradition . A ORG report , dated DATE , by PERSON , a ORG and the applicant ’s responsible clinician at ORG , was prepared and placed before the domestic court .

The High Court heard oral arguments on CARDINAL and DATE and promulgated its judgment on DATE . The court stated that :

“ CARDINAL . The contentious and determinative issue is : what will happen to the claimant if he is extradited .

Approaching that issue in the same manner as did ORG , as it is common ground we should the starting point must be its clearly stated reason for holding that there would be a violation of LAW :

‘ There would be a violation of LAW ... in the event of the applicant ’s extradition solely on account of the current severity of his mental PERSON

It is the likely impact of extradition and all that it entails on that condition which was central to ORG decision and must be to ours . ”

The court found , on the basis of the evidence before it , that the information provided on DATE by ORG ( the content of which has been outlined above ) had addressed the uncertainties referred to by ORG in paragraph CARDINAL of its DATE judgment both in terms of pre - trial and post - conviction detention . In particular , the court noted that the applicant would be admitted to ORG ( “ MCC ” ) , a remand prison in GPE , upon arrival and his mental health condition would be assessed immediately ; that if his condition could be met within the ORG , his detention would continue in that facility ; that in the ORG , he would have access to mental health services and would be provided with appropriate , but different , medication from that prescribed at ORG ; that if assessed as being “ acutely mentally ill ” , he would likely be housed in a psychiatric referral centre managed by ORG ( “ BOP ” ) ; and that if “ it is determined that he is unable to manage his activities or DATE living by himself ( including his taking of prescribed medication ) it is highly unlikely that he would be placed at the ORG , but rather , at a medical centre . ”

Both the applicant ’s legal representative and PERSON , a criminologist who had visited and reported upon numerous federal prisons DATE , provided a bleak picture of the conditions at the ORG . The court found that their reporting of conditions was controversial and that in any event , it was not necessary to reach a final decision in that regard . The ORG was a prison , the primary purpose of which was to detain those awaiting trial on serious charges . It was not an institution whose primary function was to treat and care for those with serious mental health problems . However the court also observed that there remained some detailed gaps as to the precise circumstances in which the applicant would be detained in the ORG . Particular reference was made to whether the applicant would be housed in a single cell ; and what opportunities he would have for contact with others and for undertaking the types of educational and recreational facilities such as those available to him at ORG .

Assessing the medical evidence and referring to the previous approach by this ORG , the court held that the applicant ’s mental health problems were well controlled by the regime as applied at ORG ; and that it was established , at a minimum , that removal from ORG ( or an equivalent hospital with a similar regime ) to a prison , even one with significant mental health provision , would put the applicant at risk of relapse into an acute psychotic state .

In light of its findings , ORG set out what it considered necessary to ensure that the applicant ’s extradition would not be in breach of GPE obligations under LAW . It noted :

“ CARDINAL The only means which I can see by which the basic concerns of ORG can be answered are that GPE offers an assurance to the Secretary of ORG that , upon arrival in GPE , the claimant will immediately be transferred to a ORG and kept there unless and until the equivalent of his treating clinician , Dr. PERSON , determines that he could be transferred to another institution without compromising his health and safety ; and if not , that he will be kept at a ORG until trial . His extradition would have to be preceded by detailed discussions and the exchange of information between Dr. PERSON and the receiving psychiatrist . By those means , the real risk of relapse into an acute psychotic state which formed the basis of ORG decision would be removed . ”

In conclusion , the court found that the Secretary of ORG was not duty - bound to have given the applicant the opportunity to make submissions before she made her decision to proceed with his extradition . The applicant had , in any event , been afforded full opportunity to present his case on that issue in the current proceedings and the court had to consider for itself whether or not his extradition would infringe LAW . Moreover , the court adjourned the final decision in the matter for DATE for the Government of GPE to consider whether or not it wished to give the assurances outlined above .

On DATE ORG , by way of ORG , submitted a number of assurances in which it undertook as follows : that the applicant would be transported to GPE on a flight that would enable him to be processed by ORG ( ORG ) and promptly produced before a judge for purposes of his initial appearance and a detention determination ( on DATE of arrival if possible ) ; that while awaiting court during business hours , the applicant would be kept in a ORG cellblock and that he would be transported to the hospital for emergency care should such a need arise ; that should TIME detention be required , the applicant would be held either at a contract jail facility or at the local ORG ( BOP ) facility and that he would have access to emergency medical care if required ; that the applicant would be advised of the charges against him and represented by counsel at his initial appearance ( either self - funded or court- appointed ) ; that the applicant could , without objection , immediately request an assessment as to his competency ; that if the evaluation was granted , the applicant would be transported to a ORG psychiatric referral centre for assessment ; that should the applicant not make an application for a competency assessment , he would in any event , with the approval of LOC , be detained at an undisclosed private detention healthcare facility for a determination of his health needs ; that the District Judge ’s consent was required to house the applicant outside of GPE state ( where any trial would take place ) ; that assuming the defense consented , the prosecution believed that judicial consent would be forthcoming on the basis of the current undertakings ; that prior to extradition , a psychiatrist would undertake to receive from PERSON , the applicant ’s treating clinician in GPE , all relevant medical information ; and that whether the applicant was housed at a psychiatric referral centre or in the unspecified private facility , he would be kept in such a facility unless and until his treating clinician determined that he could be transferred to another institution without compromising his health and safety .

Additional information was provided by ORG on DATE . This included details of the treating clinician who would take responsibility for the applicant ’s case postextradition . Furthermore , it was noted that CARDINAL of the medications used to treat the applicant was not available in GPE ; that other medications were available to treat the same symptoms ; and that discussions between physicians in the respective jurisdictions could take place . In addition , ORG advised that federal law made provision for an individual to participate in pre - trial proceedings via videolink ; that any trial would take place in GPE city ; and that during trial , the applicant would be housed in a local jail facility close to the court house , where he would have access to any necessary medical treatment , including at hospitals within GPE city . Finally an estimate of DATE was given with respect to the applicant ’s trial .

On DATE ORG , satisfied with the assurances given by ORG , held that there was no risk of an LAW violation in the event of the applicant ’s extradition . That judgment was made final on DATE . Although an official transcript has not yet been made available , Counsel for both the applicant and the Government took notes during oral delivery of the judgment . Counsel for the ORG ’s note indicated that it had been accepted on the part of the applicant that there was no live issue as to his being unfit to plead and therefore he would be detained pre - trial in a specified private medical facility . Otherwise , it is recorded that the court accepted that the assurances given were sufficient and that the process would not imperil the applicant ’s mental health condition ; that in considering the placement of the applicant outside of GPE state , the District Judge would not deliberately put at risk the applicant ’s mental health ; that arrangements were in place for discussions to take place between treating clinicians ; that during the applicant ’s trial in GPE , there were facilities available which provided for mental health care and treatment ; that the concerns raised by this ORG and the domestic court in DATE had been eliminated ; and that there was no risk of an LAW breach . Nothing in the Counsel for the applicant ’s note of the hearing contradicted those comments .

On DATE the applicant made a request for an interim measure under Rule CARDINAL of ORG to prevent his extradition to GPE . On DATE the President of the Section to which the case had been allocated decided to apply Rule CARDINAL until the ORG had been afforded the opportunity to consider the request made . The following questions were asked of ORG : ( i ) Do the undertakings as provided by ORG by way of ORG , dated DATE , adequately respond to the concerns raised by this ORG in its judgment of DATE regarding the extradition of the applicant ? ; and ( ii ) Would the extradition of the applicant to GPE be in breach of GPE obligations under LAW ?

On DATE ORG submitted its response . It stated that since the GPE judgment of DATE , there had been further domestic decisions which demonstrated that the concerns that had given rise to that decision had been comprehensively addressed . Moreover , the Government asserted that those concerns could be summarised as follows : a lack of information concerning the circumstances of the applicant ’s detention pre - trial ; a lack of clarity as to how long the period of pre - trial detention might last ; the implications of a finding in GPE that the applicant was unfit to stand trial ; and an on - going concern that the applicant might be subjected to prolonged periods of social isolation in detention at ORG following a conviction . The culmination of the information and assurances received by ORG had addressed those concerns . Specifically , the applicant would be detained at a private detention medical facility for an approximate period of DATE ; if a competency assessment was requested and the applicant was found to be unfit to plead , he would be placed in the custody of the Attorney General and detained at a psychiatric referral centre ; and if found to be unable to manage his DATE activities , including his taking of prescribed medication , it was unlikely that the applicant be detained at ORG , rather he would be detained at a medical centre . The Government concluded that the extradition of the applicant would not be in breach of GPE obligations under LAW .

On DATE the ORG , having considered the applicant ’s case based on the new factual information before it , decided to lift the interim measure previously indicated .

NORP The applicant was extradited to GPE on DATE .

For a general summary of the relevant domestic and international law and practice regarding extradition , see the ORG ’s judgment in PERSON and Others v. the GPE , nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , ORG , CARDINAL and CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 6+6-1 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

André Potocki;Ganna Yudkivska;Síofra O’Leary

The applicant , a former police officer , was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He is also acting on behalf of his son , PERSON , who was born in DATE .

On DATE CARDINAL people , including the applicant , were apprehended by officers of the GPE office of ORG of GPE ( ORG “ the FAC ” ) in LOC while attempting to transport opiate drugs with a view to selling them on . They were taken to the ORG ’s premises for questioning . After being informed of his privilege against self - incrimination , the applicant made a written statement to the effect that he had appeared at the crime scene by chance , at the request of a friend with whom he and his son had been looking for a place to fish .

Later the same day criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant and CARDINAL other people on suspicion of illegal production , storage and sale of drugs .

On DATE criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant and the CARDINAL others on suspicion of membership of an organised crime group .

On DATE the applicant was arrested . Having been informed of his procedural rights as a suspect , he refused to give evidence without a lawyer present .

On DATE the applicant ’s wife hired a lawyer , PERSON , to represent the applicant .

On DATE the applicant ’s pre - trial detention was ordered by a court .

On DATE the applicant requested that PERSON be admitted to the proceedings as his lawyer .

On DATE , in the presence of his lawyer , the applicant denied his involvement in the crime .

On DATE , in the presence of his lawyer , the applicant was charged with drug - related crimes and questioned . He did not want to be informed of his rights and stated that he would not give any evidence during the pre - trial investigation .

On DATE the applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer . He provided some biographical details as well as information on his family status , state of health and place of residence .

On DATE the applicant was again questioned in the presence of his lawyer .

On DATE all the criminal proceedings against the applicant were joined .

On DATE the applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer . He did not confess to the crimes .

On DATE and DATE confrontations between the applicant and his co - accused were conducted with his lawyer present .

On DATE amended charges were brought against the applicant in his lawyer ’s presence . The applicant pleaded not guilty .

On DATE the applicant ’s wife was admitted to the proceedings as the applicant ’s lay representative .

On DATE , upon his written consent , the applicant was questioned without a lawyer .

On DATE the criminal case against the applicant and his coaccused was sent to the GPE ORG of Zaporizhzhya ( “ the ORG ” ) . During the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty . He maintained that the case had been fabricated by his enemies and that all the evidence had been falsified and was inadmissible . In fact , he , a retired police officer , had been arrested in the company of drug addicts with whom he had been in contact as an advisor to the local police . They might have been producing drugs for their own use . He further claimed that his case should benefit from being examined in camera by a judge who had security clearance , to protect ORG secrets concerning the functioning of his network of informants .

In DATE F. , a lawyer hired by the applicant ’s wife , was admitted to the proceedings to represent the applicant .

On DATE , after having heard the case in public hearings , ORG convicted the applicant and his co - defendants of drugrelated offences . The applicant was sentenced to CARDINAL - and - a - half years’ imprisonment and the confiscation of his personal property was ordered .

The applicant , represented by his lawyer and his wife , appealed . He repeated his arguments advanced at trial and complained that he had been unable to defend himself properly during the trial as he had been reticent in order to safeguard confidential information concerning the network of informants . He also complained of various procedural breaches in the collection of evidence . He alleged , with no further details , that he had had no access to a lawyer from the first questioning and , even after his lawyer had been allowed access , the authorities had tried to carry out a number of investigative steps without the lawyer present .

On DATE the ORG of Appeal allowed the defence ’s request to have the proceedings held in camera to prevent public disclosure of information concerning the network of informants and required all the defence lawyers and representatives to undergo security clearance to continue taking part in the proceedings . The applicant ’s wife did not receive security clearance in time for the appeal hearing and did not attend it .

On DATE ORG upheld the trial court ’s judgment .

On DATE , following a prior appeal by the applicant , ORG of GPE quashed this decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration . It noted , in particular , that the applicant ’s right to defence had been breached since the applicant ’s wife had been unable to take part in the appeal hearing . It further found that ORG had addressed the parties’ arguments in a summary way only , while it should have given detailed explanations in response to those arguments .

On DATE ORG reviewed the case in the presence of the applicant ’s wife . It upheld the applicant ’s conviction , reduced his sentence to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment and ordered the confiscation of his personal property . The conviction was mainly based on the records of the crime - scene inspection and the testimonies of the applicant ’s co - defendants , which the trial court found to be corroborated by witness statements , and other evidence in the case .

On DATE ORG of GPE rejected the applicant ’s request for leave to appeal on points of law .

The applicant ’s DATE son was with him when he was apprehended on DATE . He was taken with him to the ORG and remained in the same room with the applicant for most of the time . No other family members were informed of the boy ’s whereabouts .

On TIME DATE , after the applicant had been formally arrested , his son was returned to his mother .

On DATE the applicant ’s wife lodged a criminal complaint with the GPE regional prosecutor ’s office ( “ the prosecutor ’s office ” ) in which she alleged , inter alia , that her son had been unlawfully detained at the ORG ’s premises CARDINAL and DATE .

On DATE , having questioned the applicant and the ORG officers , the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings as it had been established that no pressure had been applied to the applicant ’s son and that he had been able to move freely and had not been deprived of his liberty . It was further noted that the applicant had not complained of the ORG staff ’s attitude towards his son .

On DATE the applicant ’s son challenged the above decision before the Prosecutor General .

In DATE the applicant and his wife lodged another complaint concerning the alleged unlawful detention of their son with the prosecutor ’s office .

On DATE the prosecutor ’s office , having questioned the applicant , his wife and son , as well as the ORG officers and some witnesses , refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the above complaint , having found no corpus delicti in the ORG actions . It was established during the relevant investigation that the applicant ’s son had been taken to the ORG ’s premises at the applicant ’s request and had not been arrested or detained and had been returned to his relatives as soon as the decision to arrest the applicant had been taken ; and that the applicant had raised no complaints during his son ’s stay at the ORG . It was also noted in the relevant resolution that the applicant ’s wife had refused to provide her son ’s medical file to prove her allegations concerning the worsening of his state of health and that there had been a contradiction in the applicant ’s statements and between his and his son ’s account of events . The prosecutor thus concluded that the allegations of unlawful deprivation of liberty or of other violations of the applicant ’s son ’s rights appeared to be ill - founded . He noted that no intention on the part of the officers to interfere with the applicant ’s son ’s personal security , specifically his freedom of movement , had been established . Likewise , there had been no evidence that the applicant ’s son had been subject to any form of pressure or ill - treatment .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant ’s wife and son instituted civil proceedings against the ORG before ORG of GPE claiming damages for the unlawful detention of her son . Following a request of the applicant ’s wife of DATE , her civil claim was joined to the criminal proceedings against the applicant .

NORP On DATE the deputy prosecutor of GPE quashed the resolution of DATE as being premature , given that no evidence regarding the applicant ’s son ’s state of health had been obtained .

On DATE , having questioned the applicant ’s son ’s doctors who had observed him in the course of his care previously , the prosecutor again refused to institute criminal proceedings for the same reasons as before . It was noted , inter alia , that none of the doctors had observed any worsening of the applicant ’s son ’s state of health and that no worsening of his health had been evident from his medical file either .

On DATE the prosecutor ’s office instituted disciplinary proceedings against CARDINAL officers of the FAC for their negligence towards the applicant ’s son . It noted , inter alia , that the applicant ’s son had not been formally arrested ( затриманий ) but had been kept at the ORG ’s premises for no reason and no measures had been taken to return him to his relatives . The prosecutor further observed that the applicant ’s son had not been subject to any form of ill - treatment . He also stressed the fact that the applicant ’s arrest report had been drafted DATE after the applicant ’s initial arrest , in breach of the requirements of the domestic law . This resolution had been sent to the ORG for relevant measures to be taken .

On DATE the ORG informed the prosecutor ’s office that the respective officers could no longer be disciplined as the DATE statutory time - limit had expired . It was also observed in that letter that no violations of domestic law by the ORG officers had been established by a number of investigations into the events complained of and that the applicant ’s son had stayed with the applicant at the ORG ’s premises from CARDINAL to DATE at the applicant ’s own request .

On DATE the applicant ’s wife complained to ORG about the prosecutor ’s decision of DATE .

On DATE , when convicting the applicant , ORG delivered a separate ruling , in which it listed the procedural violations committed by the investigating authorities in the criminal proceedings against the applicant . The fact that the applicant ’s son had remained in the ORG ’s premises for TIME after the applicant ’s initial arrest , without his relatives having been informed of his whereabouts and with no medical assistance provided in view of the stress he had been under , was listed among the violations referred to by the court . The Chief of the ORG in GPE was invited by the court to take appropriate measures in view of the above mentioned violations .

On DATE the applicant appealed to the ORG of GPE against the prosecutor ’s refusal of DATE to institute criminal proceedings against the ORG officers .

On DATE the applicant ’s complaint was left without consideration on the merits . The court noted in this connection that the relevant investigation files had been joined to the criminal case against the applicant and that therefore the prosecutor ’s decision was not subject to appeal outside of those criminal proceedings .

During the proceedings in his criminal case before ORG and ORG the applicant and his wife repeatedly requested , referring to the separate ruling of DATE by ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , that measures be taken to bring the respective officers to trial for the unlawful detention of their son . The case file does not suggest that in their appeals the applicant or his wife claimed damages in this connection .

DATE . On DATE , in its judgment upholding the applicant ’s conviction , ORG observed that the complaint related to the unlawful detention of the applicant ’s son had been considered by the prosecutor ’s office and no corpus delicti under criminal law had been found on the part of the ORG officers . The court made no separate ruling in this connection . ORG did not address this issue in its decision of DATE .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Reasonableness of pre-trial detention)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Paul Lemmens;Georges Ravarani;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE ORG of ORG for ORG ( PERSON nacionalni ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta , PERSON za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta PERSON ; hereinafter : “ the police ” ) lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant before ORG for ORG ( PERSON odvjetništvo , Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta ; hereinafter : “ the ORG Attorney ’s Office ” ) , alleging that he had participated in an organised international drug - trafficking scheme .

On the basis of the extensive evidence collected during the preliminary investigation , including through mechanisms of international legal assistance in criminal matters from the authorities in GPE , GPE and the GPE , and the results of secret surveillance measures , on CARDINAL DATE the State Attorney ’s ORG opened an investigation in respect of the applicant and CARDINAL other persons suspected of drug trafficking . In particular , it was alleged that the applicant had participated in an organised drug - trafficking scheme by securing the means of communication between other members of the group .

During the investigation , the ORG Attorney ’s ORG questioned a number of witnesses and obtained further voluminous evidence from the police . It also commissioned telecommunication expert reports and requested assistance in obtaining evidence from the authorities in GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE and the GPE .

On DATE the ORG Attorney of GPE ( PERSON državni odvjetnik PERSON ) extended the investigation for DATE .

Following the completion of the investigation , on CARDINAL DATE the State Attorney ’s ORG indicted the applicant and CARDINAL other defendants in ORG PERSON ) on charges of drug trafficking . It alleged that the applicant had facilitated communication between other members of the group operating an international drug - trafficking scheme .

On CARDINAL DATE the investigating judge forwarded the indictment to the defendants , instructing them that they could submit their comments on it within DATE .

On DATE the applicant denied the charge , alleging numerous substantive and procedural flaws .

Several hearings for the confirmation of the indictment were held before a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG . Meanwhile , the defence lawyers challenged the decision on the admissibility of evidence before ORG .

On DATE the applicant complained to ORG of a lack of diligence in the conduct of the proceedings . He pointed out that ORG had not yet decided on the question of the admissibility of the evidence , which was incompatible with the requirement of due diligence in the conduct of the proceedings .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG confirmed the indictment and referred the case to trial .

The criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending .

On DATE the applicant was arrested in connection with the criminal complaint lodged against him by the police ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

DATE , after hearing the applicant ’s defence , ORG ordered that he be remanded in custody for a period of TIME .

Following the opening of the investigation against him , on CARDINAL DATE the State Attorney ’s ORG asked an investigating judge ( sudac istrage ) of ORG to order the applicant ’s pre - trial detention ( istražni zatvor ) . It also requested that the other defendants be remanded in custody .

On DATE the investigating judge accepted the request and ordered the applicant ’s pre - trial detention for DATE under LAW CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) , ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( risk of collusion , risk of reoffending and gravity of charges ) . He also ordered the pre - trial detention of CARDINAL other defendants in the proceedings . The relevant part of the decision reads :

“ Reasonable suspicion that the suspects committed the offences at issue follows from the criminal complaint lodged by [ the police ] and the [ supporting material ] ...

The pre - trial detention of all the suspects , save for GPE and GPE who are detained in GPE , was ordered under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW . The suspects PERSON and GPE ... are still at large and there is therefore a risk that if the other suspects were at large , they could hinder the proper conduct of the proceedings by influencing [ GPE and PERSON ] . In addition , a number of witnesses should be questioned concerning the offences at issue ... and , since they know the suspects or are relatives of theirs , there is a risk that the suspects , if at large , could hinder the proper conduct of the proceedings by influencing the witnesses ...

The pre - trial detention of all the suspects , save for ORG , was also ordered under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW . This court finds it necessary to order detention under this provision also so as to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings , given that the case concerns a particularly grave offence under LAW of LAW for which a sentence of long - term imprisonment has been prescribed . Specifically , it is alleged that the suspects have smuggled QUANTITY of cocaine , which can be used to make a significant number of individual doses and thus to endanger the health of a high number of persons . Moreover , the suspects have allegedly operated on the territories of several countries , where they organised networks of persons helping them in the commission of the offences , which suggests a particularly organised and systemic approach in the commission of the offences . Apparently large sums of money were also spent for the [ distribution and ] transport of the drugs from LOC . This suggests , in the view of this court , that the circumstances of the offence are particularly serious , surpassing the circumstances in which such offences are ‘ usually’ committed ... ”

NORP The applicant challenged the decision of the investigating judge before a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG , arguing that the judge had failed to take into account the extent of his specific participation in the alleged offences at issue . He pointed out that his alleged role in the commission of the offences was peripheral and irrelevant , since his only contact with the case was through the third defendant , whom he had known from the past but had not suspected of being involved in a criminal activity . The applicant also stressed that he was a self - employed car mechanic and had had no previous conflict with the law . He therefore requested that less severe preventive measures be applied for securing his proper participation in the proceedings .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed the appeals lodged by the applicant and CARDINAL other defendants . The relevant part of the decision reads :

“ It is alleged that the suspects , acting within an organised group , obtained cocaine abroad and transported it to GPE for the purpose of its further distribution . The proceedings at issue concern not only a serious and socially dangerous offence , but there are also other specific circumstances showing the seriousness of the case . The suspects obtained the drugs in LOC , in large quantities of QUANTITY , and the whole process of transporting the drugs required a high degree of organisation and distribution of work . The quantity of drugs found , namely QUANTITY [ sic ] of cocaine , is higher than in other [ similar cases ] . The investigating judge thus correctly concluded that in respect of the suspects PERSON and PERSON the circumstances of the offence are particularly serious , which also justifies the fear that the suspects might reoffend . There are therefore sufficient reasons for pre - trial detention under LAW ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW .

Furthermore , since in the further course of the proceedings , as indicated in the investigating judge ’s decision , it is necessary to question a number of witnesses who have relevant knowledge of the offences at issue and know the suspects PERSON , PERSON and ORG , the investigating judge correctly ordered the detention under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW .

Given that the investigating judge ’s decision ordering the detention is justified , there are no grounds for accepting the requests of the suspects , put forward in the appeals , to replace their detention by alternative measures . ”

On DATE the investigating judge extended the applicant ’s pre - trial detention for DATE under LAW ( CARDINAL ) , ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( risk of collusion , risk of reoffending and gravity of charges ) , reiterating his previous arguments .

NORP The applicant challenged that decision , . On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed his complaints , endorsing the reasoning of the investigating judge .

On DATE the investigating judge extended the applicant ’s pre - trial detention for DATE under LAW ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( risk of reoffending and gravity of charges ) . He found that all the relevant witnesses had been questioned and that there was no further possibility of remanding the applicant in detention on the grounds of the risk of collusion . As to the other grounds relied upon for the applicant ’s detention , the investigating judge reiterated his previous findings .

The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision before a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG , arguing that his detention had been constantly extended without providing any reasons relevant to his particular situation . He also requested that his detention be replaced by house arrest .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal , endorsing the findings of the investigating judge . It provided no reasoning concerning the applicant ’s request for the replacement of his detention by house arrest .

On DATE the investigating judge extended the applicant ’s pre - trial detention for DATE under LAW ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( risk of reoffending and gravity of charges ) . The relevant part of the decision reads :

“ The pre - trial detention of all the suspects was also ordered under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW . Given the scale of the alleged criminal activity , the period in which it has taken place , the extent of the [ ORG ] organisation , and the fact that they have allegedly smuggled QUANTITY of cocaine , QUANTITY of which has been seized in GPE , this court finds that it suggests special circumstances justifying the fear that they may reoffend . ...

The pre - trial detention of all the suspects , save for ORG , was also ordered under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW . This court finds it necessary to order detention under this provision , also so as to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings , given that the case concerns a particularly grave offence under LAW of LAW for which a long prison sentence has been prescribed . Specifically , it is alleged that the suspects have smuggled QUANTITY of cocaine , which can be used to make a significant number of individual doses and thus to endanger the health of a high number of persons . Moreover , the suspects have allegedly operated on the territories of several countries , where they organised networks of persons helping them in the commission of the offences , which suggests a particularly organised and systemic approach in the commission of the offences . Apparently large sums of money were also spent for the [ distribution and ] transport of the drugs from LOC . This suggests , in the view of this court , that the circumstances of the offence were particularly serious , surpassing the circumstances in which such offences are ‘ usually’ committed ... ”

The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision , asking to be released and for less severe preventive measures to be applied . On CARDINAL DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed his appeal as ill - founded , reiterating its previous arguments and without providing further reasons for refusing the applicant ’s request .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) against those decisions , arguing that the reasons given for his continued detention were neither relevant nor sufficient . He pointed out that ORG had collectively extended the pre - trial detention of all the defendants in the proceedings , without taking into account his specific arguments .

On DATE the investigating judge extended the applicant ’s pre - trial detention for a further DATE under LAW ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( risk of reoffending and gravity of charges ) . In his decision , the investigating judge stated that the initial grounds for the applicant ’s detention had not changed . The judge also noted that owing to the complexity of the case , the investigation would be extended for DATE .

The applicant appealed against that decision , arguing that it lacked the relevant reasoning . He also asked to be released on bail or for the application of other less severe preventive measures .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal as ill - founded , reiterating its previous arguments . It held that , in view of the gravity of the offences at issue , the applicant ’s detention could not be replaced by less severe preventive measures , nor could he be released on bail .

On DATE and DATE the applicant urged ORG to decide on his constitutional complaint of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE ORG declared the applicant ’s constitutional complaint of CARDINAL DATE inadmissible on the ground that a new decision on his detention had been adopted in the meantime , namely on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , and that his detention was no longer based on the impugned decision . This decision was served on the applicant ’s representative on DATE .

On DATE the investigating judge extended the applicant ’s detention for a further DATE under LAW ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( risk of reoffending and gravity of charges ) on the ground that the relevant circumstances warranting his detention had not changed .

The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision , arguing that it lacked the relevant reasoning and asking that his detention be replaced by less severe preventive measures .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal as ill - founded , reiterating its previous arguments concerning the necessity of the GPE continued detention .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before ORG , arguing that in extending his detention throughout the investigation , the court had always used the same wording and phrases . He pointed out that ORG had failed to make a proper assessment of the necessity of his continued detention given that its decisions were merely a reproduction of the same wording provided in the initial decision ordering his detention on DATE .

NORP On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s constitutional complaint as ill - founded , endorsing the reasoning of ORG . The relevant part of the decision reads :

“ The impugned decision of the investigating judge ... provides detailed and clear reasoning with regard to the relevant legal circumstances related to the appellant ’s [ detention ] .

The Constitutional Court finds that the impugned decisions comply with the relevant constitutional [ requirements ] concerning the extension of the appellant ’s pre - trial detention under LAW ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW . ”

On DATE the investigating judge extended the applicant ’s detention for a further DATE under LAW ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( risk of reoffending and gravity of charges ) on the ground that nothing had changed in the relevant circumstances warranting his continued detention .

The applicant appealed against that decision , reiterating his request for release and the application of less severe preventive measures .

On DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal as ill - founded , reiterating its previous arguments . It found that it was not possible to release him and to apply less severe preventive measures in view of the particular gravity and seriousness of the charges against him .

Following the submission of the indictment against the applicant to ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , on CARDINAL DATE a CARDINAL - judge panel of that court extended the applicant ’s detention pending trial under LAW ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ( risk of reoffending and gravity of charges ) without setting any time - limits for the detention . The relevant part of the decision reads :

“ Against the defendant :