Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 37-1 - Striking out applications;Article 37-1-b - Matter resolved);Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life);Non-pecuniary damage - award

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Ann Power-Forde;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

A. Facts at the time the application was lodged

In the course of DATE the applicant , a NORP national , was granted refugee status under the mandate of the ORG High Commissioner for Refugees in GPE ( hereafter ORG ) . According to his certificate of refugee status , he was accompanied by his wife , who also held such a certificate , and his children ( PERSON , born in GPE in DATE , and PERSON , born in DATE in GPE ) . The couple had a third child ( PERSON ) who was born in GPE ( GPE ) in DATE , but the applicant was absent when his son was born , having left GPE to claim asylum in GPE .

On DATE ORG ( hereafter , the OFPRA ) rejected his claim . On DATE the applicant appealed against that decision . By a decision of CARDINAL DATE , ORG ( the Commission des recours des réfugiés , formerly ORG , the Commission nationale du droit d’asile , ORG ) granted the applicant refugee status . He obtained a DATE residence permit and in DATE the OFPRA issued him with a marriage certificate and a family record book ( livret de famille ) , serving as civil - status documents .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE , for the purpose of family reunion and on the basis of the “ family reunification ” procedure for certified refugees ( see paragraph DATE below ) , the applicant applied for long - stay visas for his wife and CARDINAL children . By a letter of DATE , ORG at ORG informed the applicant that it would contact the OFPRA to verify , on the basis of the statements which had enabled him to be granted refugee status , whether those persons were indeed members of the family group , before contacting the NORP consular services in GPE with a view to compiling an application file for long - stay visas .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE , ORG at ORG informed the applicant that the consular services in GPE would be summoning his family for an interview .

The applicant ’s wife was requested to attend an interview at the consulate on DATE . After she had submitted the necessary documents for compiling the application , the consular authorities asked her to contact the ORG delegation to obtain travel papers for herself and her children , in accordance with LAW DATE . She was assured that once she had brought those documents to the consulate she would be issued with an acknowledgement of receipt of the visa application . On DATE the applicant ’s wife submitted to the consulate a travel document , issued in her name after a favourable opinion had been obtained from ORG . This document , which could substitute a national passport , indicated that she was accompanied by her CARDINAL children . She did not receive an acknowledgment of receipt of her visa application .

Having received no news on examination of his request , the applicant applied to various authorities , including the consulate in GPE , for information as to why the visas had not been issued , and included a copy of all of the documents in his possession , including his residence permit , the reconstituted documents issued by the OFPRA , his wife ’s certificate of refugee status , the document serving as his elder daughter ’s birth certificate , and the birth certificates of the CARDINAL other children .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal with ORG to refuse Entry Visas to GPE ( the CRRV , hereafter the “ ORG ” ) , against the consular authorities’ implicit refusal .

By a letter of DATE , the ORG replied to a letter from the applicant dated DATE in the following terms :

“ I have the honour to inform you that on DATE the ORG certified your family ’s situation to the visa section . You are registered with the ORG as the husband of PERSON and father of CARDINAL children ( PERSON , born on DATE ; PERSON , born on DATE ; and PERSON , born on DATE ) . I further observe that your family has been or will shortly be invited to lodge an application for a visa with the consular authorities in GPE ” .

On DATE the applicant lodged an urgent application before the ORG d’État , requesting a stay of execution of the consular authorities’ implicit decision to refuse the visas .

On DATE the ORG d’État acknowledged receipt of the appeal for abuse of authority lodged by the applicant calling for judicial review of this implicit decision .

By an order of DATE , the urgent - applications judge at the ORG d’État dismissed the urgent application for a stay of execution , on the grounds that ORG had not yet ruled on the matter .

On DATE , after DATE without any reply from ORG , which amounted to implicit rejection , the applicant lodged a new urgent application for a stay of execution , as well as an urgent application for protection of a fundamental freedom ( requête en référé - liberté ) , dated DATE .

By an order of CARDINAL DATE , the urgent - applications judge at the ORG d’État rejected the urgent application for protection of a fundamental freedom .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE , the applicant was summoned to a hearing on the urgent application for a stay of execution , scheduled for DATE . The applicant , who attended the hearing on that date , learnt of pleadings by ORG , which he received only on DATE , contesting the birth certificates of his children PERSON and PERSON . Following this hearing , the applicant submitted a memorandum for the deliberations .

According to the Government ’s observations , the transcripts of the certificates obtained on CARDINAL and DATE from the relevant local authorities had revealed that birth certificate no . CARDINAL held by the civil - status authorities of the CARDINALth arrondissement of GPE concerned the birth of a boy and not that of PERSON , and that birth certificate no . CARDINAL , held by the civil - status authorities of DATE arrondissement of GPE , concerned the birth of a girl and not that of PERSON .

On DATE , the urgent - applications judge informed the applicant that he had decided to reopen the investigation in the case and that he had communicated the memorandum for the deliberations to the relevant Minister for Immigration .

By an order of DATE , the ORG d’État dismissed the urgent application for a stay of execution :

“ [ the applicant ] alleges that ... the criterion of urgency has been met , in that he has been living separately from his wife and children for DATE ; [ that the impugned decision ] is tainted by error of law , in that by refusing to issue visas on the grounds that certain civil - status documents were absent , it breached LAW ( ORG ) no.CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE on the right to family reunification ; ... that the submitted documents can not be considered of doubtful authenticity ; that he [ had ] provided evidence establishing his family ties with his wife and his children ; that his children ’s birth certificates had been registered by ORG ;

... the Minister alleges ... that the criterion of urgency has not been met , in that responsibility for the separation lies with the applicant ; that the latter has not established that he has maintained regular written or telephone contact with his family or has contributed to their upkeep since his departure ; that the argument alleging a breach of the Directive of DATE is ineffective , in so far as it has been correctly transposed into domestic law and can not therefore have direct effect ; that this text does not require the national authorities to issue a visa to an applicant who has not established his or her filiation with the refugee ; that the submission of fraudulent documents is a public policy reason justifying the rejection of visa applications submitted in a family context ; ...

It appears from the facts of the case ... that visa applications submitted by [ the applicant ] , who has refugee status in GPE , in respect of his wife PERSON and his CARDINAL children , PERSON , PERSON and PERSON , were refused on the grounds that filiation had not been established for the latter CARDINAL children on account of the doubtful authenticity of the submitted birth certificates ; the argument that such a ground could not be a legal basis for the decision to refuse [ the visas ] is not such , as the evidence stands , to give rise to serious doubts as to the lawfulness of this decision , in view of the outcome of the civil - status verifications carried out by ORG in GPE and the fact that the fraudulent nature of the request was such as to entail refusal not only of visas applied for in respect of these CARDINAL children , but also in respect of his wife and his third child ... ”

On DATE , in the context of an appeal for judicial review , the relevant Minister filed a memorial concluding that the birth certificates of PERSON and PERSON were fraudulent . With regard to the alleged violations of ORG and CARDINAL of the Convention , he responded that it had already been shown that the applicant had abandoned his wife and putative children , that the parent - child relationship had not been established and that the applicant had not shown that he had maintained ties with them . The applicant responded by arguing that an anomaly in the referencing of the birth certificates was not sufficient to establish the doubtful authenticity or fraudulent nature of the documents submitted by his wife . He noted firstly , with regard to PERSON ’s birth certificate , “ that it was not certain that the certificate sought by the authorities was related to the document in question , given that the first component of its reference number seemed to be made up of CARDINAL figures , rather than QUANTITY ( “ ? CARDINAL ” ) ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , which would be more coherent , given the date it had been drawn up , in DATE ” . He argued that the Minister did not explain how ORG had issued LAW ( dated DATE , referring to his wife and his CARDINAL children ) and official travel documents permitting his family to travel internationally . He pointed out that he had submitted to the court correspondence from ORG , dated DATE and CARDINAL DATE , drawn up in the context of the checks conducted with a view to issuing those travel documents ( travel document for the child PERSON , issued on CARDINAL DATE following the favourable opinion of CARDINAL DATE ) . He added that the authenticity of the other documents submitted to the court had not been called into question , namely the declaration of PERSON ’s birth , issued by ORG in GPE , and the declaration of PERSON ’s birth , issued by ORG , nor that of the travel documents for his first CARDINAL children , drawn up on DATE . Lastly , he indicated that other evidence submitted to the court , photographs and bank transfer statements , invalidated ORG arguments as to the reality of his ties with his wife and children .

On DATE ORG drew up a “ certifiate of parenthood ” , stating that the applicant and his wife were the legitimate parents of the children known as PERSON and PERSON .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE , the applicant ’s lawyer informed him that a hearing had taken place before the ORG d’État on DATE ; the public rapporteur had proposed that his appeal be dismissed and had suggested that judicial rectification of the civil - status documents of the children concerned be carried out in GPE .

By a judgment of DATE , served on CARDINAL DATE , the PERSON d’État rejected the appeal . It pointed out that the transcripts of the certificates , obtained by the NORP authorities in the NORP civil - status offices for the purpose of verifying the civil - status documents of the CARDINAL children born in that country , had shown that CARDINAL totally different birth certificates had been issued under the same reference numbers , and concerned third parties . It considered that even if the fraudulent nature of CARDINAL of the CARDINAL certificates had not been demonstrated , this did not create any doubt as to evidence of the inauthenticity of the second certificate , and concluded that “ in those circumstances , neither the submission of declarations of birth from ORG and ORG , not the allegation that this discrepancy originated in dysfunctions within the NORP civil - status authorities , allow for the fraudulent nature of CARDINAL of the documents thus produced to be set aside ” . Lastly , it specified that the fraudulent nature of CARDINAL of the submitted documents was such as to entail refusal of all of the requested visas .

On DATE a psychologist from the ORG inter - mouvements auprès des évacués ( ORG ) certified that the applicant ’s psychological health had deteriorated , and described a worsening state of depression . She submitted that “ in addition to the traumatic events experienced in his country , [ the applicant ] is currently developing reactional depression as a result of the separation from his family , which has lasted for DATE ... Although he was simultaneously actively engaged in preparing a professional insertion plan , the applicant is finding it increasingly difficult to take the necessary steps and is sliding into a form of apathy ” .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE , the applicant ’s lawyer confirmed that the appeal had been dismissed and informed him that the public rapporteur ’s closing arguments were not available in writing .

Following that decision , the applicant contacted ORG and the Director of the OFPRA . By a letter of CARDINAL DATE , the former replied that , according to the information communicated by the NORP delegation , ORG in GPE was willing to issue a visa to his wife and to CARDINAL of his children , PERSON and PERSON . With regard to the birth certificate for his daughter PERSON , he was advised to submit a request to the GPE tribunal de grande instance for a supplementary judgment relating to a birth certificate . By a letter of CARDINAL DATE , the Director of the OFPRA wrote to the ORG , which had also received the applicant ’s file ; he was considering transferring his refugee status to another country . In that letter , the Director pointed out that his department , by a memorandum of DATE , had certified his family situation to the sub - directorate for visas in GPE , the only administrative body with competence for the family reunification of foreigners .

The applicant ’s wife brought proceedings before ORG , seeking to obtain a supplementary judgment concerning PERSON ’s civil status . By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , that court declared that it did not have jurisdiction . On DATE she brought proceedings before the GPE tribunal de grande instance for the same purpose .

By a decision of DATE , following a further request by the applicant ’s family , the consular authorities refused to issue long - stay visas .

According to the Government , new checks carried out in DATE established that it had been possible to authenticate PERSON ’s birth certificate but the doubtful authenticity of the birth certificate produced for PERSON , which had been double - checked , had prompted the consular authorities to maintain their refusal to issue visas to the whole family .

On DATE the applicant brought proceedings before ORG against the decision of DATE . His request was implicitly refused .

B. Facts which occurred after communication of the application

On DATE the applicant applied to the urgent - applications judge at ORG seeking an order for a stay of execution of ORG implicit decision to refuse his request . By an order of CARDINAL DATE , the urgent - applications judge ordered a stay of execution of that decision on the ground that the reasons for the rejection had not been communicated . He added :

“ ... further , as the evidence stands , although there is uncertainty as to the parent - child relationship in respect of CARDINAL of the CARDINAL children , PERSON , [ the applicant ] refers , without however submitting it , to a supplementary judgment which purportedly substantiates his allegations ; having regard to the length of time that the applicant has been separated from his family , the criterion of urgency is met ; ... it is appropriate to direct the Minister to re - examine the visa application within DATE of notification of the present order ” .

According to the applicant , on DATE ORG lawyer forwarded to him , and to the NORP authorities , the original copy of a judgment delivered by the NORP tribunal de grande instance on DATE , reconstituting the birth certificate for the child PERSON . That judgment indicates that , on DATE following PERSON ’s birth , a declaration of birth had been duly drawn up by the doctor at ORG and handed to her mother , for the purpose of having the child ’s birth certificate issued by the LOC district office . However , as the applicant ’s wife had been unaware of the rules in force in GPE for this administrative procedure , she had entrusted this declaration of birth to a third party , who had demanded and obtained from her the sum of MONEY ( CFA ) in order to obtain the birth certificate ; this third party had given her a document presented as birth certificate no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , allegedly drawn up and signed by the mayor of PERSON . The tribunal de grande instance specified that since this document was a forgery PERSON ’s birth certificate had never been issued , and it ordered that this step be taken .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE , the Government informed the ORG that on DATE the NORP consular authorities had issued the long - stay visas requested by the applicant ’s wife and children . They alleged that , during the period in which the visa applications were re - examined , the applicant had communicated to the consular authorities the judgment of DATE to which he had referred but had not produced in the course of the proceedings .


Carlo Ranzoni;Egidijus Kūris;Ganna Yudkivska;Iulia Motoc;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their former Agent , PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicants were judges and presidents of their respective courts :

- the first applicant at ORG ;

- the second applicant at FAC ; and

- the third applicant at ORG .

On DATE the NORP authorities arrested GPE and ORG , who were suspected of smuggling a large quantity of cigarettes . PERSON , who was also implicated in the ensuing criminal investigation , feared that ORG and GPE would disclose information about the other people involved in the smuggling if they were detained .

NORP In DATE , with the aim of preventing GPE and GPE from testifying against him , PERSON contacted the third applicant , at the time president of ORG and father of the woman PERSON was living with . PERSON asked the third applicant to use his position , personal contacts , authority as a judge and possible influence on other judges to make sure that GPE and GPE were released from detention pending trial .

The third applicant , acting in GPE ’s interests , contacted the second applicant by telephone and conveyed PERSON ’s request . The second applicant also used his authority and personal contacts and , by telephone , conveyed the message to the first applicant , who on DATE refused to grant a prosecution request to remand ORG and GPE in custody .

DATE there were CARDINAL other episodes of GPE and the second and third applicants , communicating by telephone calls and by themselves or through other judges , successfully preventing or attempting to prevent the suspected smugglers from being detained pending trial . In particular , on DATE , PERSON asked the third applicant to exert his influence on a judge at a higher level court , the regional court , so the judge would reject the prosecutor ’s request to remand ORG and GPE in custody . Afterwards , on DATE , PERSON and the second and third applicants again attempted to influence the first applicant so that another suspected smuggler , GPE , who was in pre - trial detention , would be released . However , the first applicant refused to continue such criminal activity and neither decided the question of ORG ’s detention herself , nor transmitted the request to other judges . On DATE PERSON was placed in pre - trial detention , pending a criminal case for smuggling . DATE the second and third applicants again attempted to exert influence on the first applicant to act in a way that would lead to PERSON being released , but the first applicant did not respond to their request . Lastly , on DATE the third applicant attempted to influence the second applicant to get the latter to exert influence on a higher instance – regional court and have PERSON released from pre - trial detention . However , the second applicant did not respond to that request .

The prosecutors considered that ORG and the CARDINAL applicants had by such actions caused serious damage to the ORG because they had made it more difficult to bring people to justice who had committed crimes . They had also obstructed the course of justice , damaged the authority of the judiciary and discredited the title of judge of GPE ( pažemintas teisminės valdžios autoritetas ir diskredituotas PERSON teisėjo vardas ) .

After gathering information about the activities of the CARDINAL applicants , on DATE Deputy Prosecutor General PERSON wrote to the President of ORG to inform him that the CARDINAL applicants had possibly seriously violated the ethical rules of the judicial profession and asked that ORG initiate proceedings against them . The operational information was based on evidence gathered , inter alia , by ORG .

On DATE and DATE the CARDINAL applicants were charged with abuse of office and perverting the course of justice . The President of ORG was immediately informed about the charges and that a pre - trial investigation had been going on .

On DATE another Deputy Prosecutor General , GPE , who was acting in place of the Prosecutor General PERSON while he was on summer vacation , on the basis of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , asked the ORG President at the time , PERSON , in writing to consent to lifting the CARDINAL applicants’ immunity so that criminal proceedings could be started against them in connection with the aforementioned allegations . Materials from the criminal case file were provided to the ORG President to support the request .

On DATE the President signed CARDINAL decrees : no . CARDINAL , suspending the applicants’ powers as judges , and , on the basis of LAW CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the LAW , decree no . CARDINAL , by which he consented to having the CARDINAL applicants charged with criminal offences and detained if necessary ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Both decrees came into force that day and were published in ORG ( PERSON žinios ) on DATE .

On DATE ORG informed the President of ORG in writing that the second and the third applicants had acknowledged carrying out the acts specified in the notice of suspicion ( see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) , however , according to the prosecutor , “ they did not regard those actions as criminal deeds , but as violations of LAW and conduct discrediting the title of judge ” .

On DATE , CARDINAL DATE , ORG asked ORG ( ORG taryba ) for advice on whether the CARDINAL applicants should be removed from office ( on the function of ORG , see LAW § CARDINAL of the LAW , cited in paragraph CARDINAL below ; also see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . On DATE ORG , presided over by the President of ORG , gathered to review the material provided to it by the prosecutor ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) and to hear the applicants . The first applicant was notified of the hearing of ORG ; she did not attend it . The second applicant was present and gave an explanation . According to TIME , the second applicant “ agreed that he should not have behaved in such a manner , acknowledged having made telephone calls , but thought that it would be a little too harsh to consider that he had discredited the title of judge ( NORP Japertas sutinka , ORG nederėjo taip elgtis bei pripažįsta , jog skambino , tačiau mano , ORG tokia formuluotė , jog pažemino teisėjo vardą , kiek per griežta ) ” . The third applicant was not present at the hearing ; instead he had already submitted a request to be dismissed as a judge and as president of ORG of his own will , under LAW ( see paragraphs MONEY and CARDINAL below ) .

ORG then decided to advise the President that the CARDINAL judges should be removed from office for discrediting the title of judge ( LAW ( CARDINAL ) of ORG ; also see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE , the ORG President signed decree no . CARDINAL , removing the applicants from their positions as judges and presidents of their respective courts . The decree was based on Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) , CARDINAL , and CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of the LAW , and also on the advice of ORG ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) . The decree came into force on DATE . It was published in ORG ( PERSON žinios ) on DATE .

On DATE , in the DATE newspaper ORG , the President of ORG , in answer to a journalist ’s question as to whether the information about the judges helping the smugglers had come as a surprise , stated :

“ I very much regret that the judges could have done this . Personally , I am very taken aback , astonished even , by this information . I did not believe that such gross violations occurred . Unfortunately , they do . ”

NORP In response to a journalist ’s question as to how he would react to the CARDINAL judges’ actions , he replied :

“ A pre - trial investigation is ongoing at this time and I do not wish to talk on that topic ... I have already responded . I think that the ORG President will ask the Seimas to suspend the powers of those judges . I understand that the ORG President will also make sure that those judges are removed from office . For that , the approval of ORG is necessary . DATE I again explained the situation to the ORG President . How did he react ? He was decisive . The matter has been discussed with the ORG President more than once . He [ the ORG President ] is for decisive action ” .

On DATE the DATE newspaper PERSON wrote that the President of ORG had initially thought that disciplinary sanctions would suffice in the applicants’ case , but quoted him as adding :

“ However , after looking into the matter more carefully , it was agreed [ with ORG ] that a criminal investigation must be conducted . ”

The same article stated :

“ Officials have established that all the judges consciously acted for the benefit of the smugglers and might have received remuneration [ from them ] . ”

On DATE the Internet site of GPE , CARDINAL of the ruling political parties at the time , published the following statement by the Speaker of the Seimas :

“ The disclosed facts of corruption among the [ CARDINAL ] judges have shown that neither big salaries nor good social guarantees ... protect the court system from corruption . ”

On DATE the newspaper PERSON published an article in which the ORG President ’s press officer outlined the President ’s position on the CARDINAL applicants :

“ The court system will not be a safe haven for such judges ; the [ response of the ] President will be categorical in respect of these judges ( “ ORG sistema tokiems teisėjams netaps užuovėja , jų atžvilgiu GPE elgsis kategoriškai ” ) . ”

The same publication quoted the President of ORG as stating that “ it is very unlikely that those judges [ the applicants ] will ever work in the justice system again ” .

On DATE , in DATE publication ORG , the chairman of Seimas ’s ORG , in response to the journalist ’s statement that DATE CARDINAL corrupt judges had been exposed , said :

“ People say that smuggling without a ‘ ORG is not possible . Consequently , if smuggling took place , there must have been ‘ ORG . It was the ORG and myself who first received information about this smuggling , in which ... judges were involved . ... I think that it would be most appropriate to conduct a joint pre - trial investigation in the smuggling case which came to light and to try the [ CARDINAL ] judges , like the other suspects , as members of a criminal organisation . ”

On DATE the news agency ORG cited the head of ORG as saying after a meeting with the ORG President that the possible connections between the CARDINAL judges and the smugglers were only “ a fragment of a big case ” , in which even politicians could be involved .

In DATE , Mr PERSON was elected as the President of GPE . In DATE , on his proposal , the ORG appointed the Prosecutor General PERSON to ORG judges .

On DATE and DATE , the first applicant ’s lawyer unsuccessfully applied to ORG to suspend the criminal proceedings and ask ORG whether the ORG President ’s decree no . CARDINAL , by which the President had lifted the applicants’ immunity from prosecution , and LAW were in conformity with LAW .

The first applicant ’s lawyer did not challenge before the trial court the statements made by ORG officials in the press .

On DATE the ORG acquitted the applicants of abuse of office and perverting the course of justice .

The court , however , convicted PERSON of attempting to influence a judge .

After the trial court ’s judgment , on DATE the newspaper PERSON interviewed the former President , PERSON , who stated :

“ I remember those events very well . It happened DATE , when the ORG was not in session . I think that my decision was in line with the information that I had received from the President of ORG and ORG ( see paragraphs CARDINAL above ) . I learned the information from the file on the criminal investigation into the crime that had been committed ( operatyvinius duomenis apie padarytą nusikaltimą ) and I could not have acted otherwise . ”

PERSON also stated that when signing the decree to remove the CARDINAL applicants from office he had not only taken into consideration the fact that they had possibly taken part in a crime , but also emphasised that “ Disciplinary liability was also very important ( PERSON svarbi yra drausminė atsakomybė ) ” .

The prosecutor , PERSON and the third applicant appealed against the trial court ’s judgment . The third applicant argued that his acquittal should have been on a different legal basis . He also challenged decree no . CARDINAL of the ORG President as the basis for his prosecution .

The CARDINAL other applicants asked the appellate court to dismiss the prosecutor ’s appeal .

It transpires from ORG judgment that none of the applicants argued a breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence on account of the statements in the press by ORG officials .

On DATE ORG upheld the trial court ’s verdict . The appellate court dismissed the third applicant ’s argument that decree no . CARDINAL had not given a sufficient basis on which to prosecute the CARDINAL applicants .

The prosecutor , ORG and the third applicant lodged appeals on points of law .

The third applicant argued that the criminal proceedings against the CARDINAL judges had been initiated in breach of the procedural rules applicable when a judge was charged with a criminal offence . He asked ORG to specify additional grounds for his acquittal , without arguing a breach of his right to the presumption of innocence on account of the public statements by high - ranking ORG officials .

On DATE ORG , sitting in an enlarged chamber of CARDINAL judges , quashed ORG decision , noting that the latter had not thoroughly examined the prosecutor ’s appeal and , as a result , it had committed a substantive breach of criminal procedure . The former Prosecutor General PERSON did not sit on ORG bench .

The third applicant ’s appeal on points of law was dismissed .

The case was remitted to ORG for fresh examination .

The third applicant made written submissions , arguing that domestic criminal law had been applied erroneously . The other CARDINAL applicants made oral requests to the appellate court to dismiss the prosecutor ’s appeal . They did not raise the matter of the presumption of innocence .

On DATE ORG found that DATE and DATE PERSON and the CARDINAL applicants had acted jointly , and that the CARDINAL applicants had used their personal connections and authority as judges to make sure that some of the suspects in the smuggling cases would not be detained on remand . The appellate court therefore found the applicants guilty of abuse of office , under LAW . The punishment for abuse of office was either imprisonment for DATE , or , as an alternative , a prohibition on taking up a particular activity or working in a certain area . When considering the most effective and just punishment to be imposed on the CARDINAL applicants , ORG underlined that they had committed the crime “ within the area of their work and professional activity ” , and “ performed actions discrediting the title of judge ” , and that therefore they should be prohibited from working in law - enforcement , law and order and judicial institutions ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The first applicant was barred for DATE and DATE ; the second applicant was barred for DATE and DATE ; and the third applicant was barred for DATE .

The criminal charges of perverting the course of justice ( LAW , see paragraph CARDINAL below ) against PERSON and the CARDINAL applicants were dropped as time - barred .

In addition , ORG was found guilty of organising an act of abuse of office ( CARDINAL episodes ) . The court sentenced him to DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment , suspended for DATE .

The Court of Appeal decision came into force on DATE it was pronounced , and the CARDINAL applicants and PERSON started serving their sentences from DATE .

The prosecutor , ORG and the CARDINAL applicants lodged appeals on points of law . The CARDINAL applicants alleged , inter alia , that there had been breaches of procedural requirements when the criminal proceedings had been instituted against them as judges and that the appellate court had wrongly applied and interpreted the provisions of LAW .

In his appeal on points of law , invoking LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and LAW , the third applicant further argued that there had been a breach of the right to the presumption of innocence . Firstly , he contended that pending the pretrial investigation some information about the case had been leaked to the media , including transcripts of telephone conversations between the CARDINAL applicants and comments on those conversations . As a result , an opinion had been formed in advance as to the applicants’ guilt . He had thus not had a fair trial , in breach of LAW . Secondly , before the guilty verdict had been reached , high - ranking ORG officials – the ORG President and the Speaker of the Seimas – had on many occasions made public statements to the effect that the applicants were guilty . They had also commented on the crimes which the applicants were said to have committed . In the third applicant ’s view , the ORG President had publicly acknowledged in his interviews that he had removed the CARDINAL applicants from office after he had found that they had committed the crimes in question .

On DATE ORG dismissed the CARDINAL ORG appeals on points of law . As regards the third applicant ’s complaint of an alleged violation of the right to the presumption of innocence , ORG noted that there was no indication that the public disclosure of the facts about the criminal case had had an effect on its outcome . The dismissal of CARDINAL judges was a noteworthy event , about which society had a right to be informed . The publicity had also been unavoidable because the ORG President ’s decrees dismissing the applicants had been public documents . Nonetheless , there was no proof that any of the public comments on the case had been made by the prosecutors or judges who had been dealing with it .

ORG observed that the public statements by the ORG President and other ORG officials or politicians could not be examined on points of law since those questions had not been raised before the lower courts . The issue of the presumption of innocence had been mentioned only when the case had been examined on points of law a second time , and it was not for ORG to gather evidence or examine it , because under domestic law its competence was to examine questions of law and to ensure its uniform application . Even assuming that the third applicant had correctly understood the statements by the politicians , there was no reason to find that those statements had prevented the appellate court from impartially and objectively deciding the case and adopting a lawful and reasonable judgment .

Lastly , ORG dismissed the CARDINAL applicants’ suggestion that the criminal proceedings against them had been started in breach of domestic law .

The former Prosecutor General PERSON did not sit on ORG bench .

On DATE the first applicant started civil proceedings with ORG , alleging that she had been unlawfully removed from office by the ORG President ’s decree no . CARDINAL of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . She argued that by initially suspending her from her duties by the earlier decree , no . CARDINAL of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , the President had already passed judgment on her actions , which had still been the subject of an ongoing criminal investigation . As a result , her removal from office for those actions , before a criminal court had found her guilty , had been a form of political pressure on the criminal courts , and had also been in breach of the right to the presumption of innocence under LAW . She asked ORG to refer questions to ORG about whether decree no . CARDINAL had been in breach of the LAW and the principle of the presumption of innocence .

By a ruling of DATE the ORG suspended the civil proceedings and asked ORG to rule on the constitutionality of decree no . CARDINAL . It also asked , inter alia , whether the decree in the first applicant ’s case , as far as its content and adoption procedure were concerned , had been in conflict with , inter alia , LAW , which establishes the principle of the presumption of innocence , LAW on the grounds for a judge ’s removal , or with ORG DATE , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of ORG , which regulate judges’ disciplinary liability ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) .

After receiving similar requests in the other CARDINAL ORG cases ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) , in DATE ORG joined them in CARDINAL case .

On DATE the ORG delivered a ruling . It found that decree no . CARDINAL of DATE , by which the CARDINAL applicants had been removed from office for discrediting the title of judge , had not been in breach of the LAW or ORG . It also held that the first applicant ’s removal from office by the same decree of the ORG President had not been in breach of LAW reasoning is given in paragraphs CARDINAL below ) .

In DATE the first applicant asked ORG to discontinue the civil proceedings for unlawful dismissal and reinstatement . The court granted that request on DATE .

On DATE the second applicant brought a civil claim with ORG , asking it to quash the ORG President ’s decree no . CARDINAL as regarding this applicant ’s dismissal . He argued , inter alia , that there had been a breach of the right to the presumption of innocence because he had been dismissed as a judge while criminal proceedings against him had still been pending .

On DATE ORG dismissed the second applicant ’s claim . The court considered that the criminal charges against the applicant , as indicated by the prosecutor ’s report of CARDINAL DATE and given to the ORG President ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , had been sufficient to hold that by his behaviour the applicant had discredited the title of judge . The judgment of DATE by ORG , finding the CARDINAL applicants guilty ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , had only confirmed that there had been grounds to dismiss the second applicant for discrediting the title of judge . ORG also relied on ORG aforementioned ruling regarding the CARDINAL applicants’ case . The civil court also rejected the argument that the ORG President ’s decree on the ORG dismissal had been in breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence . In fact , the decree had specified another ground for his dismissal , which was discrediting the title of judge , and not that a crime had been committed . The ORG President ’s decree had thus had no influence on the subsequent criminal proceedings against the second applicant . Lastly , the civil court found no breaches of law as regards the domestic proceedings for the second applicant ’s dismissal .

The Government submitted that the second applicant lodged no appeal against that decision .

The third applicant challenged the lawfulness of the decision of ORG of DATE , which had recommended that the ORG President remove the CARDINAL applicants from office for having discredited the title of judge ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The third applicant requested that he be allowed to step down voluntarily , under LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . He also alleged that ORG had committed numerous violations of procedural and substantive legal rules when suspending him from his duties and removing him from office . As it transpires from the summary of the third applicant ’s lawsuit , he did not argue that statements by ORG officials in the press had breached his right to the presumption of innocence . However , he argued that the right to the presumption of innocence had been breached because conclusions as to his guilt had been made and he had been dismissed as a judge before the criminal proceedings had finished .

On DATE ORG dismissed the third applicant ’s claims as unfounded . Relying on ORG ruling of CARDINAL DATE , the civil court found that ORG had acted lawfully when recommending that the CARDINAL applicants be removed from office . The prosecutor ’s request to the ORG President of CARDINAL DATE , where the CARDINAL applicants’ actions had been described ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , as well as the fact that criminal charges had been brought against them , had been sufficient grounds to hold that the third applicant ’s actions had discredited the title of a judge . The court also dismissed the argument that the ORG President ’s decree on the removal of the CARDINAL applicants had been in breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence . In fact , the decree had not stated that the judges had been removed for committing a crime . In other words , the applicant had been removed from office not for committing a crime , but for discrediting the title of judge . Lastly , the court found that no laws had been broken during the proceedings for the CARDINAL judges’ removal from office .

The third applicant appealed . He argued , inter alia , that the presidential decree on his dismissal had been in breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence because after the applicants’ acquittal the ORG President had allegedly acknowledged in the press that he had dismissed the applicants because they had committed a crime . Such statements by the ORG President had also been in breach of the principle of the independence of courts . The criminal courts had subsequently been obliged to find the applicants guilty . Undue influence on the criminal courts had also been exerted by the statements of other politicians in the press .

On DATE ORG endorsed the lower court ’s reasoning . For ORG , the ORG President ’s prerogative to dismiss someone for discrediting the title of judge could not be seen as undue influence on the criminal courts .

By a ruling of CARDINAL DATE , ORG refused to examine an appeal on points of law by the third applicant . Even so , ORG underlined the fact that the third applicant had erred in his appeal on points of law by ignoring the fact that a judge ’s removal from office for committing a crime and discrediting the title of judge , as foreseen in LAW ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of the LAW , were CARDINAL distinct grounds for a judge ’s dismissal .

On DATE ORG issued a ruling regarding the constitutionality of presidential decree no . CARDINAL ( also see paragraphs CARDINAL above ) . Firstly , it emphasised that under LAW § CARDINAL and CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) the ORG President retained the right to remove a judge from office who had discredited the title of judge , whether or not there had been disciplinary proceedings before ORG , however , on condition that removal had been recommended by ORG . As that had been the situation in the CARDINAL applicants’ case , decree no . CARDINAL had not been in conflict with Articles CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of ORG .

ORG also underlined the fact that the Law on Courts provided for CARDINAL separate grounds for removing a judge from office – if a court judgment which has entered into force has established that a judge has committed a crime ( LAW ( CARDINAL ) ) , or if a judge has discredited the title of judge ( LAW ( CARDINAL ) ) , the latter provision being the relevant legal ground in the ORG case . For ORG , it was paramount that the disputed decree no . CARDINAL of the ORG President did not stipulate that the CARDINAL applicants had committed a crime . Nor did that decree declare that actions for which the CARDINAL applicants had been removed from office had been a crime .

ORG also held that the principle of the presumption of innocence , as enshrined in LAW , could not be interpreted as prohibiting the ORG President from removing a judge , who by his or her actions had discredited the title of judge , until a criminal court had found that person guilty in criminal proceedings . In fact , LAW contained distinct grounds for a judge ’s dismissal , those being “ when their conduct discredits the title of judge ” in point CARDINAL , and “ upon the entry into force of court judgments convicting them ” , in point CARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Those CARDINAL grounds could not be considered to be the same ( negali būti tapatinami ) . On the one hand , actions which discredited the title of judge might not necessarily be a crime . On the other hand , conduct discrediting the title of judge might be recognised as a criminal act later by a court conviction . Under point CARDINAL of LAW therefore , a judge could be dismissed for discrediting the title of judge , whether or not the conduct in question was later judged by a court to have been a criminal deed , and regardless of whether a corresponding court conviction came into effect . ORG further noted :

“ ... the content of the principle of the presumption of innocence which is entrenched in LAW CARDINAL of the LAW can not be construed that it , purportedly , implies , inter alia , that the President of the Republic can not dismiss a judge who by his conduct has discredited the title of a judge , until a conviction in regard of that judge has been adopted and come into force . In this context , it should be noted that LAW establishes various grounds for the removal of judges from office , that judges may be removed from office also ‘ when their conduct has discredited the title of ORG ( point CARDINAL ) , and ‘ upon the entry into force of court judgments convicting them’ ( point CARDINAL ) . In its ruling of DATE , ORG held that the LAW does not expressis verbis establish any type of conduct by judges which discredits the title of judges ; that the formula ‘ conduct discrediting the title of judges’ is wide , and includes not only conduct which discredited the title of a judge while implementing his powers as a judge , but also conduct which discredited the title of a judge which has no relation to the implementation of the powers of the judge ; that , under LAW , the legislature , as well as the self - governing institutions of the judiciary , have the discretion to establish what conduct should be regarded as that which discredits the title of a judge , however , neither laws nor the decisions of self - governing institutions of the judiciary may establish any thorough ( final ) list of actions by which a judge discredits the title of a judge . In the said ORG ruling it was also held that when deciding whether the conduct of a judge is such that the title of a judge has been discredited , all the circumstances related to the said conduct and its significance to the case must be assessed each time . ”

ORG also gave weight to the fact that by its judgment of DATE in the applicants’ criminal case ORG had acknowledged that within their area of work and professional activity the applicants had performed actions which had discredited the title of a judge and undermined the authority of the judiciary ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

Consequently , there were no grounds to find a violation of the right to the presumption of innocence , as enshrined in LAW and in LAW , on account of the ORG President ’s decree no . CARDINAL removing the first applicant from office .

By a letter of DATE , the Government informed ORG that Article CARDINAL of the Law on the Bar had been amended , thus having an impact on the applicants’ eligibility to work as advocates ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The Government submitted that the applicants were therefore no longer prevented from working as advocates , given that their convictions had expired and the period in the law of DATE after serving their sentence had passed . The ORG also stated that the second and the third applicants had been admitted to the Bar by decisions of ORG on , respectively , CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE . To the ORG ’s knowledge , the first applicant had not addressed ORG with a request to be recognised as an advocate .

All CARDINAL applicants were informed about the ORG ’s letter but none of them commented on it .

In DATE ORG website listed the third applicant among the advocates practising in GPE . The other CARDINAL applicants were not listed among advocates practicing in GPE .

DATE LAW provides that a person is presumed innocent until proved guilty by a final court judgment and in accordance with a procedure established by the law .

As to the appointment of judges and their removal from office , the LAW reads as follows :

“ The President of the Republic :

CARDINAL ) ... shall appoint the judges and presidents of regional and district courts and change their places of work ... ”

The justices of ORG , and its President chosen from among them , shall be appointed and released by the Seimas upon submission by the President of the Republic .

Judges of ORG , and its President chosen from among them , shall be appointed by the President of the Republic with the assent of the Seimas .

The judges and presidents of district , regional , and specialised courts shall be appointed , and their places of work shall be changed , by the President of the Republic .

A special institution of judges , as provided for by law , shall advise the President of the Republic on the appointment , promotion , and transfer of judges , or their release from their duties .

“ Interference with the activities of a judge or court by any institutions of ORG power and governance , Members of the Seimas or other officials , political parties , political or public organisations , or citizens shall be prohibited and lead to liability provided for by law .

Judges may not be held criminally liable or be detained , or have their liberty otherwise restricted , without the consent of the LAW or , in the period between sessions of the Seimas , without the consent of the President of GPE . ”

“ Judges of the courts of GPE shall be removed from office according to the procedure established by law in the following cases :

CARDINAL ) NORP of their own will ;

CARDINAL ) NORP on the expiry of their term of office , or upon reaching the pensionable age established by law ;

CARDINAL ) NORP owing to their state of health ;

CARDINAL ) NORP on election to another office , or upon transfer , with their consent , to another place of work ;

CARDINAL ) when their conduct discredits the title of a judge ;

CARDINAL ) NORP on the entry into effect of court judgments convicting them . ”

The Law on Courts ( ORG įstatymas ) also reads that a judge may be removed from office if the title of judge has been discredited through his or her conduct ( LAW ) ) . A judge may also be removed from office if a court judgment convicting him or her comes into force ( įsiteisėja ) ( LAW ) ) . In such cases , ORG , a body assuring the independence and self - governance of judges , advises the ORG President .

The hearings of ORG are public , and a judge whose removal from office is to be considered at such a hearing has a right to take part in that hearing and to be heard . Should the ORG recommend the ORG President to remove a judge from office and the ORG President would pass such a decree , the removal may be appealed against to the civil courts of CARDINAL instances .

Historically , ORG has recommended the ORG President to remove from office judges for having discredited the title of a judge by behaviour such as being drunk at work , drunk driving , swearing in a public place , negligent performance of work duties , undue influence on other judges in order to affect outcome of court proceedings , accepting objects of material value , and sometimes also whilst criminal proceedings had still been pending .

The Law on Courts also reads that disciplinary proceedings may be brought against a judge in ORG if a judge has discredited the title of judge or breached the requirements of LAW ( Articles CARDINAL § § CARDINAL and CARDINAL and CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) .

The Law on Courts further reads that criminal proceedings against a judge may be started and his or her liberty restricted only with the agreement of the ORG , or with the agreement of the ORG President when the Seimas is not in session ( LAW ) . Criminal proceedings against a judge can only be initiated by ORG ( LAW ) .

At the time of the applicants’ conviction on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , the PERSON on the Bar ( Advokatūros įstatymas ) read that a person who wished to become an advocate must be of high moral character . The law stipulated :

“ A candidate is not considered of high moral character and thus can not be recognised as an advocate , if he or she :

CARDINAL ) NORP has been convicted of a serious or very serious crime ( teistas PERSON sunkų ar ORG sunkų nusikaltimą ) , irrespective of whether the conviction has expired , or has been convicted of another crime , until the conviction expires ;

CARDINAL ) NORP has been dismissed from the post of judge , prosecutor , advocate , trainee advocate , notary , trainee notary , bailiff ... or dismissed from the civil service ... for professional misconduct ... and DATE has passed ... ” .

On DATE , which was after the applicants had started serving their sentences ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , LAW on the Bar was amended and , as regards the concept of high moral character , stated the following :

“ A candidate is not considered to be of high moral character and thus can not be recognised as an advocate , if he or she :

CARDINAL ) NORP has been convicted of an intentional crime , irrespective of whether the conviction has expired or not ; or , alternatively , if a candidate has been convicted of another crime , until the conviction has expired ;

CARDINAL ) NORP has been dismissed from the post of judge , prosecutor , advocate , trainee advocate , notary , trainee notary , bailiff ... or dismissed from the civil service ... for professional misconduct ... and DATE have passed ... ” .

After the latest amendments of DATE , LAW on the Bar reads as follows :

“ A candidate is not considered to be of high moral character and can not be recognised as an advocate , if he or she :

CARDINAL ) NORP has been convicted of a serious or very serious crime and until the conviction has expired ... , and less than four years have passed since serving the sentence or being released from serving the sentence ;

CARDINAL ) NORP has been convicted of any other intentional crime and the conviction has not expired ... , and DATE have passed since serving the sentence , a suspension of the sentence , or release from serving the sentence ;

CARDINAL ) NORP has been dismissed from the post of judge , prosecutor , advocate , trainee advocate , notary , trainee notary , bailiff ... or dismissed from the civil service ... for professional misconduct ... and less than three years have passed ... ” .

The PERSON on ORG ( GPE įstatymas ) currently reads that a person who wishes to become a prosecutor must be of high moral character . Those convicted of a crime by a court judgment that has come into force , or , alternatively , those dismissed from the civil service for a gross professional misconduct and DATE have passed , may not be considered as being of high moral character ( LAW ) .

The PERSON on the ORG currently reads that a person can not be considered as being of high moral character , and therefore may not be appointed as a judge , if he or she has been convicted by a court judgment which has come into force , or if he or she has been dismissed as a judge , prosecutor , notary , or from the police or civil service for professional misconduct and DATE have passed ( Article CARDINAL ) .

DATE . The Government referred to the following domestic court decisions regarding the recognition of a person as an advocate and the concept of high moral character .

By a ruling of CARDINAL DATE ORG held that gross violations of the law ( šiurkštūs įstatymų pažeidimai ) committed by a judge were incompatible with the high moral character requirement applied to a person who wished to become an advocate . Respect for the law was a particularly important quality for a person who wished to become an advocate . The case concerned a complaint by a former judge who had been disciplined twice for negligence at work and for showing a serious disregard to the rules of court proceedings . He resigned as a judge of his own free will , but afterwards wished to become an advocate .

On DATE ORG examined a claim by a plaintiff who once had been an advocate but had been convicted for attempting to bribe a judge . The plaintiff complained that ORG had argued that he was not of high moral character and had therefore refused to admit him to the Bar , even though his conviction had expired . ORG , however , held that the commission of a crime had a significant impact when assessing a person ’s reputation . The fact that a person had served his or her sentence showed that person was no longer a criminal . However , those facts could not be ignored when assessing a person ’s character . Even after a criminal conviction had expired , they were still relevant when assessing character . ORG therefore dismissed the plaintiff ’s claim , noting that he could not be considered as being of high moral character , as required by the PERSON on the Bar .

The case concerned the personal situation of a plaintiff who in DATE had been convicted for an intentional but not serious crime ( nesunkus tyčinis nusikaltimas ) related to his activities as an advocate and had been disbarred . In DATE the conviction had expired . In DATE the plaintiff asked to be recognised as an advocate . ORG refused the request , relying on the legal rule that a person who had been dismissed from the Bar for breaches of professional activity could not be considered as being of high moral character . The plaintiff argued that because of that decision he had been punished twice for the same crime .

On DATE ORG held that an advocate who had been convicted of an intentional crime of such severity as in that case could start proving that he was again of high moral character once the conviction had expired .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW at the relevant time provided for criminal liability for the crime of abuse of office where a ORG official or a person of similar legal status had abused his or her office for pecuniary or other gain , and that abuse had caused significant damage to the ORG . The sanction for this crime was a prohibition on taking up a particular activity or working in a certain area or , alternatively , a deprivation of liberty for DATE . Abuse of office is an intentional crime .

Under LAW , crimes were put into categories , in accordance with the possible sanction they could attract . Abuse of office did not fall into the categories of serious or very serious crimes ( sunkūs arba labai sunkūs nusikaltimai ) , but was considered to be a crime of medium severity ( apysunkis nusikaltimas ) .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW at the relevant time provided for criminal liability for an attempt of any kind to influence an investigator , prosecutor or judge with the aim of preventing a pre - trial investigation from being concluded properly and objectively , or preventing the proper examination of the case in court .

Article CARDINAL § § CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the material time read that an appellate court could examine a case to the extent it had been asked to do so in the appeal , and only in respect of the persons who or on whose behalf the appeal had been lodged . An appellate court could aggravate the situation of a convicted or acquitted person only if there had been such an application by a prosecutor .

The Code of Criminal Procedure also provides that the court must suspend the criminal proceedings if a question must be referred to ORG for interpretation ( LAW ( CARDINAL ) ) . Analogous rule and right of a court is set out in LAW .


No violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Positive obligations;Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Positive obligations;Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Erik Møse;Mārtiņš Mits;Síofra O’Leary;Yonko Grozev

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in ORG . At the material time the applicant held a pilot licence and was undergoing aviation training .

In DATE the applicant used the services of a company , PERSON ( the name of this company was subsequently changed , but it will be referred to hereinafter as “ KD.C. ” or “ the company ” ) . PERSON held PERCENT of the shares in the company ( he was its sole owner ) and he was also its sole board member . The company provided private flights and organised private pilot training courses . ORG had issued the company with a registration certificate for the provision of private pilot training courses .

The company did not provide commercial flights , therefore it fell outside the scope of the Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers on Procedures Regarding the Issuing of an Air Operator ’s Certificate for Aerial Work ( CARDINAL DATE ) , and was not certified by ORG .

On DATE PERSON organised a private flight from GPE to ORG using a multi - engine aircraft , a ORG PA-CARDINAL with a maximum allowed mass of QUANTITY . The applicant and CARDINAL other people boarded the aircraft as passengers . The applicant occupied the front seat of the aircraft , next to the pilot , GPE , and maintained radio communication with the air traffic control service .

At TIME the pilot , GPE , lost control of the aircraft and it crashed ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . As a result , the pilot died and all passengers sustained serious injuries .

According to a forensic medical examination , the applicant suffered serious , life - threatening injuries . He permanently lost the vision in his right eye and sustained other permanent damage to his health . He underwent treatment in GPE and abroad .

After rehabilitation , the applicant was able to continue working as an aviation specialist , but under certain limitations . He was not permitted to operate an aircraft independently and was required to undergo medical checks more often than other aviation specialists .

Following the accident on DATE officials from ORG ( Transporta nelaimes gadījumu un incidentu izmeklēšanas birojs , hereinafter “ the LAW ” ) , whose main task was to establish the circumstances of an accident , went to the scene of the accident and carried out an investigation .

According to the TAIIB ’s final report of DATE , on DATE of the accident , when operating in cloudy weather , GPE , the pilot , made a series of chaotic manoeuvres , as a result of which the aircraft , which was CARDINAL from the ground , lost altitude . The attempts to stabilise it were unsuccessful . As a consequence of hitting the ground and damaging its tank , the aircraft caught fire .

The investigation concluded that the primary cause of the accident was “ human error ” ( cilvēka faktors ) , namely GPE having insufficient skills and experience to independently operate a multi - engine aircraft in accordance with instrumental flight rules and , in particular , to operate a ORG aircraft . The pilot had not obtained authorisation from ORG to fly that particular type of aircraft . In particular , PERSON had started the “ differences training programme ” for the ORG aircraft on DATE , but had not finished it . Nevertheless , on DATE he had flown without sufficient qualifications .

The final report indicated several aspects which had contributed to the accident , such as unfavourable weather conditions with poor visibility , and the “ unsafe supervision ” ( nedroša uzraudzība ) carried out by ORG “ [ to ensure ] that the aviation legislation and visual flight rules were complied with ” .

With regard to PERSON , the company which owned the aircraft , the investigation concluded that it had not followed up on the pilot ’s differences training programme and its outcome . On DATE of the accident the company had not checked whether the pilot ’s documents complied with the requirements of the legislation , and it had unjustifiably ( nepamatoti ) handed over the aircraft to him and verbally authorised him to fly .

The above report , inter alia , addressed to ORG CARDINAL recommendations concerning flight safety . The second recommendation advised ORG to impose a duty on aircraft owners to set up a procedure for aircraft handovers which would prevent pilots from operating a flight without a licence and would contain confirmation of an appropriate qualification certificate issued by ORG .

On DATE a criminal investigation was opened into the aircraft accident . In the course of the investigation the police gathered evidence , ordered that forensic examinations be carried out , and interviewed numerous witnesses , including various aviation specialists .

Questioned as a witness , PERSON stated that he himself had no experience of operating aircrafts , and that GPE had been the company ’s de facto associate , although legally he had had no contractual relationship with the company ; PERSON also stated that he had had no doubts that GPE had had sufficient qualifications , because he had undergone the necessary training and obtaining a certificate had only been a formality . It had been supposed that GPE would at all times be accompanied by a more experienced instructor during the training flights . On DATE of the accident GPE had a telephone conversation with GPE and the latter informed him that he had finished his “ instruction ” and would soon be starting a flight . Only afterwards did GPE find out that another aeroplane had returned to the same airport owing to bad weather conditions .

The investigation revealed that ORG had undertaken to fly the aircraft even though he lacked the requisite skills , which had caused the accident in question . On DATE the proceedings with regard to GPE were terminated due to his death .

The material in the criminal case contained a letter from the LAW dated DATE which stated , inter alia , that at the material time the legislative acts regulating aviation safety in GPE had not provided for a procedure setting out how to hand over an aircraft for a general aviation flight .

This was further confirmed in a statement given by a ORG official during the investigation , that in general aviation , unlike in commercial aviation , there were no established ( nebija sakārtots ) regulations regarding an aircraft owner ’s responsibility in relation to a specific flight and a pilot ’s skills . Therefore the recommendations of the TAIIB were adopted to address that issue within the existing system ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . During the investigation , an official of ORG testified that in commercial aviation , the question of an operator ’s responsibility with regard to the qualifications and rights of a pilot was sufficiently regulated , however this regulation did not apply to general aviation flights .

On DATE the prosecution indicted GPE for negligence in the performance of his professional duties ( section CARDINAL of LAW ) and violation of air traffic safety or operation regulations ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ) . The prosecution alleged that GPE had handed over the aircraft to GPE knowing that the latter lacked the requisite permit and skills to operate it . On DATE the prosecution referred the case for trial .

On DATE the ORG found GPE guilty on both counts . It established that GPE had not applied any measures to verify ORG qualifications . He had given the aircraft to the pilot knowing that the latter lacked the appropriate authorisation and had permitted him to fly . PERSON was given a suspended prison sentence of DATE . He was also ordered to pay the applicant CARDINAL NORP lati ( MONEY ( ORG ) ) in compensation for non - pecuniary damage .

On DATE ORG , acting as an appellate court , quashed the above judgment and acquitted PERSON In the appeal proceedings , GPE testified that in his telephone conversation with GPE on DATE they had agreed that GPE would not fly , owing to the bad weather conditions . He explained the inconsistency in relation to his pretrial testimony ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) as follows . Firstly , he had been a witness at that stage . Secondly , he had been interviewed in LANGUAGE , which was not his mother tongue , and he had not been as fluent as was necessary . He had no doubt that PERSON was responsible for the accident , and he could not envisage also being charged in criminal proceedings .

With regard to negligence in the performance of his professional duties ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , the court deemed that neither the indictment nor the first - instance judgment had shown what professional duties in particular GPE had neglected . Also , not being an aviation specialist , he could not have been regarded as a “ special subject ” for the purposes of this section of LAW ( an organisation ’s responsible employee ) .

Concerning the alleged violation of air traffic safety or operation regulations ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , the appellate court concluded that it had not been established precisely what regulations GPE had violated and by what conduct in particular . Besides , section CARDINAL of the Criminal Law required that the prohibited conduct be committed by a transport employee , which GPE was not .

The appellate court indicated that , even though DATE could not be held criminally liable , PERSON had an obligation to provide compensation for the damage sustained by the victim , and therefore the applicant had rights to seek damages in civil proceedings .

Both the applicant and the prosecutor submitted appeals against the appellate court ’s judgment .

On DATE the ORG of ORG endorsed the appeal court ’s findings that it had not been shown that PERSON had committed the requisite actus reus . The ORG confirmed that DATE ’s actions did not contain the necessary elements of a crime under sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) of LAW .

The ORG stated that the prosecution should not have relied on certain provisions of LAW , LAW , ORG and ORG ( hereinafter “ the GPE Convention ” ) . Those provisions were applicable when determining the civil and not criminal liability of an aircraft owner . In accordance with section CARDINAL of ORG , a pilot was prohibited from performing his functions in the event that he had not acquired the appropriate qualifications . The above provision had been binding upon the pilot and not GPE The ORG also stated that only on DATE had Part II of ORG DATE to ORG , Seventh Edition , come into force , making provision for the liability of an aircraft owner and a pilot ; before that date the Chicago Convention provided the responsibility only of the pilot ( see also paragraph CARDINAL et seq . below ) .

Furthermore , at the material time , no legislation had provided for a procedure for handing over an aircraft to a pilot , designating a person responsible for verifying pilots’ training , or checking flight planning and implementation . Only subsequent to the accident in question had recommendations been issued to ORG on the preparation of statutes relevant to flight safety . As of DATE , section CARDINAL of ORG had provided that an aircraft owner or operator was not allowed to hand over an aircraft to a person lacking the appropriate qualifications and insurance cover ( see paragraph DATE below ) .

On DATE the applicant lodged a claim for damages against PERSON ( the company which owned the aircraft ) , PERSON ( the sole owner and board member of the company ) , and the insurance company . In the claim , inter alia , the applicant relied on DATE , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) . In the meantime , by a final decision of ORG of DATE , PERSON was declared bankrupt ( maksātnespējīgs ) upon application by CARDINAL of its creditors and respective proceedings were started with retrospective effect from DATE .

On DATE ORG , acting as a court of first instance , dismissed the claim in full on the grounds that the defendants had not committed unlawful actions ( prettiesiska darbība ) . There was no dispute that GPE had agreed to the pilot starting a “ differences training programme ” for the ORG aircraft with a flight instructor , PERSON However , there was no evidence that on DATE PERSON had allowed the pilot to operate this aircraft carrying CARDINAL passengers . On the contrary , the instructor and another witness ( FAC ) had testified that it had been planned that the pilot would operate the aircraft with the flight instructor , who had not arrived at the airport to take the flight on that date because of the bad weather conditions . The pilot had been informed of the bad weather conditions and the fact that the flight instructor would not arrive for the flight .

By referring to the investigation carried out by the ORG , ORG noted that the primary reason for the accident was “ human error ” on the part of the pilot , and that the lack of sufficient procedure in relation to handing over an aircraft had contributed to the accident , but was not the sole cause of it . Moreover , the applicant had occupied the front seat of the aircraft , next to the pilot , and had maintained radio communication . Taking into account that he was a pilot himself and that he had received information about the unfavourable weather conditions , he could have avoided any damage by choosing not to fly in such circumstances .

By referring to the second recommendation ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , the court concluded that , at the material time , there had been no obligation for aircraft owners to verify the qualifications and health of pilots .

On DATE ORG of ORG , acting as an appellate court , dismissed the applicant ’s claim in full on the following grounds .

With regard to PERSON , the civil proceedings were terminated because the company had ceased to exist ( on DATE it had been excluded from ORG ) and there was no legal successor .

Next , the appellate court found that DATE could not be held liable under sections DATE and CARDINAL of LAW for the damage sustained by the applicant . By referring to the investigation carried out by the LAW , the appellate court also noted that the primary cause of the accident had been “ human error ” on the part of the pilot . While the lack of a sufficient procedure in relation to handing over the aircraft had contributed to the accident , there was no causal link between the accident and the actions of GPE , who managed the company .

The appellate court also referred to the conclusions made in the criminal proceedings to the effect that GPE was not liable for the flight operated by the pilot , and the fact that he had been acquitted . Moreover , the appellate court referred to evidence given to the first - instance court and concluded that on DATE PERSON had not allowed the pilot to operate the aircraft independently and that the pilot ’s course of action ( to operate the aircraft independently ) had been arbitrary and unlawful . It had been planned that the pilot would operate the aircraft with the flight instructor ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

In the light of sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of ORG , the owner of the aircraft was the company and not PERSON Thus , the latter could not be held responsible under LAW . In so far as the applicant referred to LAW , this was inapplicable , because it only provided for the responsibility of a pilot - in - command and , from DATE , the responsibility of an owner ; GPE was neither a pilot nor an owner .

Neither could GPE be held liable under section CARDINAL of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) because the pilot had not been an employee of the company . Nor could he be held liable under sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ( see paragraph DATE below ) . Referring to the conclusions made in the criminal proceedings , the appellate court held that GPE had not engaged in any unlawful ( prettiesiska ) or liable ( vainojama ) activity . Therefore , he could not be required to pay damages to the applicant . There was no doubt that the aircraft was a source of dangerous activity , but PERSON was not its owner . Instead , PERSON was the owner of the aircraft , therefore it was liable for loss caused by the source of dangerous activity .

The appellate court also refused to hold GPE liable as a board member of the company . It concluded that , under the relevant provisions of LAW , board members were liable for damage caused to a company . In the present case , the company had not incurred any losses because it had not provided compensation for any damage sustained by the applicant .

Lastly , the appellate court dismissed the claim against the insurance company . In the judgment , it stated that the aircraft accident fell outside the terms of the aircraft ’s insurance , which provided that compensation was not awarded if an accident was caused by a pilot who had no right to operate an aircraft . In the present case , the pilot had not had a permit to operate the aircraft in question .

In a preparatory meeting on CARDINAL DATE the ORG of ORG dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant in the case against PERSON , GPE and the insurance company .

NORP In a letter dated CARDINAL DATE addressed to the Government regarding the accident in question , ORG stated :

“ As regards the responsibility of the aircraft owner , we note that the legislative acts [ at the material time ] provided that the owner of an aircraft was responsible for ensuring the maintenance of the aircraft ’s airworthiness , but not its safe operation during a flight , which was the pilot ’s responsibility . In particular , in accordance with ORG ( ORG ) No DATE on the continuing airworthiness of aircraft and aeronautical products , parts and appliances , and on the approval of organisations and personnel involved in these tasks , under PERSON I ( Part M ) M.A. CARDINAL ( a ) , the owner is responsible for the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft and shall ensure that no flight takes place unless : the aircraft is maintained in an airworthy condition ; and any operational and emergency equipment fitted is correctly installed and serviceable or clearly identified as unserviceable ; and the airworthiness certificate remains valid ; and the maintenance of the aircraft is performed in accordance with the approved maintenance programme . ”


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property;Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Civil rights and obligations;Reasonable time);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Helena Jäderblom

The applicants are pensioners . On various dates they successfully sued the authorities for miscalculating and adjustment of their pensions . The judgments became final .

On various dates the Presidia of Regional Courts or ORG allowed the defendant authorities’ applications for supervisory review and quashed the judgments delivered in the ORG favour , considering that the lower courts misapplied the material law .

Some of the judgments remained unenforced or partially enforced until the date of their quashing or were enforced with delay .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Extradition) (Conditional) (Kyrgyzstan);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention)

András Sajó;Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in the town of PERSON , in LOC .

The applicant is a NORP national of NORP ethnic origin . He originally lived in the town of NORP in GPE .

NORP In DATE , which was a time of mass disorders and interethnic clashes in the region , the applicant had been the head of the territorial board of a municipal authority in which most residents were ethnic NORP . He was , according to him , considered as a leader of the local NORP community .

After the clashes , the applicant had repeatedly been invited by the NORP investigative bodies for questioning as a witness .

In DATE the applicant learned that criminal proceedings had been opened against him ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The applicant submits that law - enforcement officers started to extort money from him , threatening him with imprisonment . Due to this he moved to a different city in GPE , to his sister ’s home , where he stayed for DATE .

Afterwards , in DATE , the applicant left GPE for GPE . He settled in GPE , and after obtaining a work permit , worked as a sports instructor .

On DATE the NORP authorities charged the applicant with the commission of violent crimes in DATE ( attempted murder , participation in mass disorders and unlawful firearms trafficking ) and ordered his arrest . It appears that when the authorities eventually tried to execute the arrest order , the applicant had left the country ( see paragraphs DATE above ) . The applicant was therefore put on the international wanted list .

On DATE the applicant was arrested in GPE and detained in custody pending extradition

On DATE the NORP authorities lodged an extradition request with ORG , asking that the applicant be extradited to GPE for prosecution and trial .

On DATE ORG granted the extradition request and ordered the applicant ’s extradition .

The applicant appealed , arguing that due to his NORP ethnic origin the aforementioned decision would expose him to a serious risk of torture . The applicant supported his appeal through reference , inter alia , to various ORG sources , NGOs’ reports and the judgment of the ORG in the case of PERSON ( see GPE v. GPE , no . GPE , DATE ) .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal against the extradition order , giving the following reasoning :

“ The charges pressed against [ the applicant ] [ by NORP authorities ] are criminal offences liable to punishment in GPE ... They are not time - barred ...

Pursuant to LAW , an extradition request lodged by a foreign state in respect of a NORP citizen should be denied ...

It is apparent from the conclusions of ORG ( ORG ) for GPE that [ the applicant ] is not a NORP citizen . ... He holds a NORP passport ... and is a NORP national . ...

On DATE the ORG for PERSON rejected a request from [ the applicant ] for refugee status in GPE .

[ The applicant ’s ] allegations of persecution by the NORP authorities on false criminal charges on the basis of his [ NORP ] ethnic origin were addressed [ within the refugee status procedure ] .

The lawfulness of the refusal [ to grant the applicant refugee status in GPE ] was confirmed by GPE ’s ORG on DATE ...

[ The applicant ’s ] argument [ that ] the decision to extradite him was taken before any judicial review of the refusal to grant him refugee status is groundless .

It is apparent from the evidential material gathered during the extradition check that [ the applicant ] arrived in GPE ... for employment purposes and that he had not been persecuted in GPE on racial , national or religious grounds ...

It is likewise apparent from the evidential material gathered during the extradition check that [ the applicant ] lodged his request for refugee status on DATE , while being held in custody following his arrest in GPE ... , [ therefore ] his appeal against the decision of the ORG did not prevent ORG from taking a decision concerning extradition , in line with ruling no . CARDINAL of DATE of the Plenary Session of ORG ...

[ The applicant ] does not have immunity from prosecution [ and ] there are no grounds preventing his extradition .

ORG of GPE provided assurances that [ in the event of extradition ] [ the applicant ] would have the benefit of [ legal assistance ] ; that he would not be extradited to a third ORG ; that he would be prosecuted only for the offence for which he was being extradited ; that [ he ] would not be subjected to torture , inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment ; that he was being prosecuted for an ordinary criminal offence devoid of any political character or discrimination on any grounds ; that he would be able to freely leave GPE after he had stood trial and served a sentence ; and that NORP diplomats would be allowed access to him .

It is apparent from the above guarantees that [ the applicant ] is being prosecuted for ordinary criminal offences ; his prosecution is not politically motivated and is not connected with his [ ethnic origin ] .

[ The applicant ’s ] allegations concerning his persecution on political grounds , lack of fair trial in GPE , and persecution of his family members by law - enforcement bodies in GPE are not supported by any objective data .

The court has established that [ the applicant ’s ] wife and daughter live in GPE , [ that there is ] no substantiated information concerning their alleged persecution by the NORP authorities , [ and ] that they do not travel outside the territory of GPE . [ The applicant himself ] did not apply for refugee status until his arrest .

... ORG does not have any information that would prevent [ the applicant ’s ] extradition to GPE .

Therefore , there are no grounds ... preventing [ the applicant ’s ] extradition to GPE for criminal prosecution .

The argument of [ the applicant ’s ] lawyer referring to international sources ( report of ORG , report of the ORG High Commissioner for Human Rights on technical assistance and cooperation on human rights for GPE , report of ORG on ORG , ORG report ) to the effect that after the interethnic clashes in the south of GPE in DATE the lawenforcement bodies had subjected ethnic NORP to torture and that there are grounds to believe that [ the applicant ] might be subjected to torture in the event of his extradition , is unsubstantiated . The aforementioned international documents describe the general human rights situation in GPE , are unspecific and unsupported by evidence , and are countered by the guarantees offered by GPE , which relate directly to the applicant and are sufficient to eliminate the risk of [ the applicant ’s ] being subjected to inhuman treatment .

[ As to ] the reference by the defence to ... the judgment of ORG in the case of PERSON , [ the case ] has no connection with [ the applicant ’s ] case and can not be taken into consideration .

The applicant appealed to ORG .

In the meantime , on DATE ORG indicated to the Government , under Rule CARDINAL of ORG , that the applicant should not be extradited or otherwise involuntarily removed from GPE to GPE or another country for the duration of the proceedings before the ORG .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of DATE on appeal , endorsing the reasoning of the first - instance court :

“ The court has taken into consideration the arguments of the defence and the documents submitted , including the concluding observations of ORG [ dated DATE ] on GPE ’s second periodic report , in which the ORG expressed its deep concern with regard to apparent impunity regarding widespread acts of torture and ill - treatment that remained uninvestigated by the authorities of GPE ... and the report that the investigations , persecutions , convictions and punishments in connection with the events of DATE are mainly directed at persons of NORP ethnic origin .

At the same time , these circumstances can not in themselves be considered to constitute sufficient grounds for refusing to extradite [ the applicant ] to GPE ...

Pursuant to LAW , ORG shall expel , return or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be at risk of being subjected to torture . For the purpose of determining whether such grounds exist , the competent authorities must take into account all relevant considerations including , where applicable , the existence in the ORG concerned of a consistent pattern of gross , flagrant or mass violations of human rights .

The provisions of LAW imply that it is necessary not only to verify the existence in the ORG concerned of gross and mass violations of human rights , but also the existence in that ORG of the likelihood that the individual concerned would personally be at risk of torture if returned to his or her country . That risk must be real , immediate and foreseeable .

According to the legal position of ORG as outlined in a number of its decisions ( ... ) , the existence of a consistent pattern of gross , flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not of itself constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether the person in question would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon return to that country . Additional grounds must be adduced showing that the individual concerned would be personally at risk ...

The ORG ... noted that it is necessary to establish the existence of substantial grounds for believing that the person would be at risk of torture if returned , and that such risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion . The risk need not be highly probable , but it must be personal and present . In this regard the ORG has determined , in previous decisions , that the risk of torture must be foreseeable , real and personal .

The evidential material submitted by ORG – on the basis of which the decision to extradite [ the applicant ] was taken – does not contain any information demonstrating that [ the latter ] personally would be at risk of torture , inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the event of his extradition .

[ A long passage on the guarantees provided by the NORP authorities ] .

Neither [ the applicant ] nor his lawyers provided any substantial evidence showing that [ the former ] was at risk of being subjected to torture , inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by the NORP authorities , or that he might be persecuted on grounds [ such as ] race , religion , national or social origin , or political opinion .

... [ The applicant ] does not belong to any political or other party , organisation or group that opposes [ the present government of GPE ] .

While living in GPE [ the applicant ] was not subjected to any torture , inhuman or degrading treatment by the authorities ; he arrived in GPE in DATE , that is to say DATE and DATE after the crimes of which he stands accused had been committed in DATE . [ The applicant ’s ] wife and daughter remain in GPE .

No evidence has [ therefore ] been provided showing that [ the applicant ] or his relatives were persecuted by [ the NORP ] authorities .

[ The applicant ’s ] statement to the effect that he is a “ leader of NORP diaspora ” and belongs to the ethnic NORP DATE which allegedly gives him reason to believe that he would be subjected to repressive criminal prosecution and unfair conviction – is an assumption unsupported by any evidence . It can not therefore be considered to constitute sufficient grounds for concluding that he is personally at risk of being subjected to torture and other ill - treatment in the event of his extradition to GPE .

On DATE ORG in GPE ordered the applicant ’s detention pending extradition until DATE .

On DATE the same court extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE . On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer lodged an appeal against this decision . On DATE ORG upheld the extension order on appeal .

On DATE ORG of GPE extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE . On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer lodged an appeal against this decision . The appeal was dispatched by post on DATE . ORG received the applicant ’s appeal on CARDINAL DATE . On DATE a copy of the appeal was forwarded to the applicant and the local prosecutor ’s office , and the latter was invited to submit comments by CARDINAL October CARDINAL . On DATE ORG forwarded the case file to ORG for examination . On DATE an appeal hearing was scheduled for DATE and the parties were informed accordingly . On DATE ORG upheld the extension order of CARDINAL DATE on appeal .

On DATE the deputy Prosecutor of the Primorye Region decided to release the applicant in the light of the decision of the ORG to apply Rule CARDINAL of ORG to the present case . The applicant was released on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a request for refugee status with GPE ’s ORG , alleging persecution on the grounds of ethnic origin .

On DATE the ORG for GPE rejected the applicant ’s request , having found that the applicant had left his country of nationality for reasons falling outside the scope of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of LAW .

On DATE GPE ’s ORG upheld the refusal of DATE .

The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision before ORG of GPE . In his appeal he referred to reports concerning the widespread ill - treatment of NORP detainees in GPE , as confirmed by various ORG sources , NGOs’ reports and the judgment of ORG in the case of PERSON .

On DATE ORG of GPE rejected the applicant ’s appeal against the ORG ’s decisions . ORG considered that the applicant had failed to substantiate his fears of persecution in GPE and that his allegations that the criminal charges against him were unlawful fell outside the scope of the refugee status proceedings . ORG pointed out that his application for refugee status contained no indications that he had been previously accused or convicted of a criminal offence , or that he had been a member of any political , religious or military organisations . It also took into account the fact that the applicant had not applied for refugee status until after his placement in detention .

In his appeal against the judgment of CARDINAL DATE the applicant requested a rigorous examination of his arguments regarding the risk of illtreatment . He again referred to various reports by international organisations and reputable NGOs to support his position .

On DATE ORG upheld that decision on appeal , reiterating the conclusions of the migration authorities and the firstinstance court .

On DATE the ORG for GPE issued a decision granting the applicant temporary asylum in GPE until DATE , referring to the existence of circumstances preventing the applicant ’s extradition , namely the application of Rule CARDINAL of ORG in the applicant ’s case before the ORG and the impossibility of foreseeing the duration of those proceedings .

On DATE the ORG for GPE extended the term of the temporary asylum granted to the applicant until DATE , with reference to the same grounds .