Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-f - Expulsion);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Aleš Pejchal;Armen Harutyunyan;Kristina Pardalos;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paul Mahoney;Robert Spano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in Barking .

The applicant arrived in GPE on DATE . He claimed asylum on DATE but his claim was refused by the Secretary of ORG for ORG on DATE and his appeal against that decision was refused on DATE .

On DATE the applicant was convicted of indecent assault in relation to an incident involving CARDINAL DATE girls and was sentenced to CARDINAL months’ imprisonment . He was released on licence on DATE but his licence was revoked on DATE that year because he failed to comply with the terms of the licence .

The applicant was re - arrested on DATE .

On DATE the applicant was served with the decision to make a deportation order . On DATE he was detained pursuant to the Secretary of ORG ’s powers under paragraph CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of Schedule CARDINAL to ORG , etc . ) Act DATE . The deportation order was signed on CARDINAL DATE and served on him on DATE .

On DATE the applicant indicated that he wished to return to GPE . DATE an application was submitted to the NORP authorities for an emergency travel document to enable him to travel there . However , the application was rejected by the NORP authorities on DATE .

The applicant was subsequently interviewed at ORG on DATE . However , DATE the ORG informed his solicitors that they could not issue a travel document as no formal identification of the applicant had been provided . On DATE ORG was informed that ORG required a birth certificate before any travel documents could be issued . It appears that ORG thereafter proposed to submit copy documents . ORG initially agreed to this proposal , but later refused .

On DATE the applicant commenced judicial review proceedings challenging his continued detention .

On DATE the ORG agreed to issue a travel document provided that the applicant was prepared to sign a “ disclaimer ” consenting to his return .

On DATE ORG ordered the applicant ’s release from detention subject to a number of conditions , including that he be subject to a curfew ; that he remain at a fixed address ; that he report on a DATE basis to the nearest ORG office ; and that he take the steps necessary to obtain travel documents .

The applicant refused to sign a “ disclaimer ” on DATE . Although he was released on DATE , DATE the matter was brought back to ORG and a different judge discharged the previous order on account of his failure to comply with the conditions for release ( namely , that he take the steps necessary to obtain travel documents ) . As a consequence , the applicant was once again liable to detention .

On DATE ORG reported that they had on CARDINAL occasions attempted to visit the applicant at his nominated address to install the equipment required for electronic tagging . Both visits took place during TIME of curfew . Very shortly afterwards the applicant reported a different address to the immigration authorities so that they could continue to communicate with him .

On DATE an authority was issued for the applicant ’s detention and on DATE he was detained while reporting to the immigration authorities .

By DATE the authorities had been alerted to the fact that the applicant was showing some signs of psychological disturbance , had been diagnosed with “ reactive depression ” and was receiving medication for his psychological symptoms .

On DATE the claim for judicial review launched on CARDINAL DATE was dismissed .

The applicant attended at ORG on DATE but no travel document was issued . On DATE he again refused to sign a disclaimer .

On DATE the applicant was alleged to have displayed “ inappropriate behaviour ” to a female member of immigration staff at a detention centre . His behaviour was also alleged to have been disruptive .

NORP In or around DATE the immigration authorities discussed the possibility of prosecuting the applicant under LAW of ORG , etc ) Act DATE for failing without reasonable excuse to comply with the Secretary of ORG ’s requirement to take specified action to enable a travel document to be obtained . However , no prosecution was ever mounted .

On DATE the applicant wrote to ORG , indicating that he would be willing to return to GPE if he were to be compensated for the periods of detention which he had undergone . However , ORG refused to agree to any such request .

On DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE the authorities made further attempts to engage the applicant in a voluntary return . However , on each occasion he indicated that he was not willing to co - operate or sign a disclaimer .

On DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE the applicant made CARDINAL applications for bail to ORG . On each occasion the application was dismissed . The reasons given for the dismissal of the applications included the fact that the applicant could end his own detention by signing the disclaimer .

The applicant ’s solicitors wrote a letter before action on DATE and proceedings were issued on DATE . On DATE the ORG granted the applicant permission to apply for judicial review and ORG was ordered to release him on bail within TIME .

At the hearing counsel for the applicant argued that both periods of the applicant ’s detention could properly be looked at as being unlawful , although he focused his attention on the second period . Counsel for the Secretary of ORG for ORG argued DATE and the court appears to have accepted – that the first period could not be in question legally , since the applicant had been released for DATE pursuant to a court order and the order enforcing release had been discharged . However , he conceded that when considering the lawfulness of the second period of detention , the first period of detention would have to be taken into account .

In considering the lawfulness of the second period of detention , ORG judge recalled that the authorities should be free to make strenuous efforts to obtain the assent of a person they proposed to deport . If they were unsuccessful , they could and should seek any way around his consent , for example by persuading the country of origin to issue a travel document without a disclaimer . However , the judge noted that the law did not permit the indefinite detention of someone who was never going to consent to deportation .

Bearing that in mind , the judge considered the history of the applicant ’s second period of detention . He observed that during this period there had been no change in approach to the applicant , no prosecution had been brought under LAW , and there had been no further approach to the NORP authorities to see if they would change their position .

The judge then had regard to the relevant principles of domestic law set out in R v. The Governor of ORG , ex parte ORG PERSON [ DATE ] CARDINAL WLR CARDINAL and in the guidance given by ORG in both R ( A ) v. Secretary of ORG for ORG [ DATE ] EWCA Civ CARDINAL and ORG ) v. Secretary of ORG for ORG [ DATE ] EWCA Civ CARDINAL ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) . Applying those principles and the relevant guidance , the judge noted that the most important factor justifying detention was the applicant ’s refusal to sign the relevant disclaimer . He further noted that lengthy detention could be justified by the applicant ’s offending , by the realistic fear that he would further offend and by the genuine and reasonable concern that he might abscond . However , even given those factors , the judge found that there had to come a time when such a sterile tactic as merely sitting and waiting while repeatedly urging the applicant to change his mind , in full expectation that he would not , ceased to be detention genuinely for the purpose of deportation . The judge therefore concluded that “ the woeful lack of energy and impetus ” applied to this case from at least DATE meant that it could not possibly be said that the Secretary of ORG on this occasion had complied with the obligation in PERSON to act with “ reasonable diligence and expedition ” . He therefore held that the applicant ’s detention had been unlawful from DATE .

With regard to the question of whether there should be guidance on how long it might be appropriate to detain an individual , the judge made the following observations :

“ It can not be right for the Secretary of ORG to be led to believe , by looking at a digest of the range of decisions that have been taken , that it is safe to detain for X DATE or X years .

Equally , it can not be right for those who are in the positon of being detained for considerable periods , stubbornly refusing to comply with the authority ’s requests to facilitate voluntary repatriation , to be put in a position of saying , ‘ If I hold on DATE , or DATE , or DATE , then I am all right’ . A tariff is repugnant and wrong , and it seems to me that it would be wise for those preparing legally for such cases to abandon the attempt to ask the courts to set such a tariff by a review of the different periods established in different cases . ”

In a decision dated CARDINAL DATE the applicant was awarded GBP CARDINAL in damages .

The applicant sought permission to appeal . On DATE permission to appeal was refused . However , on DATE the applicant renewed his application for permission to appeal and on DATE he was granted permission to appeal only in respect of the quantum of damages awarded . The outcome of that appeal is unknown .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Reasonableness of pre-trial detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Helena Jäderblom

The applicant was born in DATE and lived in GPE - on - Don prior to his arrest .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder . By judgment of CARDINAL DATE , ORG of GPE found him guilty and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment . On DATE the Rostov ORG upheld the conviction . The applicant and his counsel lodged an application for supervisory review of the conviction .

On DATE the Presidium of ORG , upon hearing the prosecutor , counsel for the applicant and for the injured party , quashed the conviction for formal defects and ordered a re - trial . The ORG directed that the applicant should be held in custody , without citing grounds for the custodial measure or setting a time - limit for its application .

On DATE ORG held a preliminary hearing and fixed the trial date for DATE . By the same decision , the court determined that the applicant should remain in custody because he was charged with a particularly serious offence and could pervert the course of justice if released . The applicant and his counsel filed an appeal against the extension order .

On DATE ORG examined the appeal in the absence of the applicant and his counsel . It annulled the detention order on the ground that ORG had failed to set a time - limit for the applicant ’s detention , in breach of the requirements of LAW . It did not take any decision regarding the applicant ’s further detention and referred the issue to ORG for a new examination .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s pretrial detention for DATE starting from DATE and lasting until DATE , referring to the gravity of the charges and the applicant ’s new line of defence which , in ORG view , was an indication that he might abscond . On DATE ORG rejected in a summary fashion the appeal against the extension order .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE , referring to the gravity of the charges and the flight risk . On DATE ORG upheld the detention order on appeal .

On DATE ORG examined the applicant ’s request for release . Noting that the trial was approaching the final stage , that the witnesses had been heard , and that the applicant had family and dependent children , the court held that the applicant could be released on bail . The applicant was released DATE . On DATE ORG quashed the bail decision , holding that ORG had not taken proper account of the gravity of the charges . On DATE ORG reconsidered the matter and held that the applicant should be re - detained for a further DATE on account of the gravity of the charges against him . On DATE ORG upheld the detention order on appeal .

On DATE ORG found the applicant guilty of murder and sentenced him to MONEY imprisonment . On DATE ORG upheld the conviction .


CASE OF KORNEYKOVA AND KORNEYKOV v. UKRAINE

Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Carlo Ranzoni;Ganna Yudkivska;Mārtiņš Mits;Síofra O’Leary

The applicants are a mother and child born in DATE and DATE respectively .

On DATE the first applicant , who was in DATE of pregnancy , was detained by the police on suspicion of robbery .

On DATE the Dzerzhynskyy District Court of Kharkiv ( “ the ORG ” ) ordered her pre - trial detention as a preventive measure pending trial .

On DATE she was placed in the Kharkiv SIZO .

On CARDINAL DATE the first applicant was taken to ORG no . CARDINAL ( “ the maternity hospital ” ) .

On the same date she gave birth to the second applicant . He measured QUANTITY and weighed QUANTITY .

Three female security officers guarded the first applicant in the hospital . According to her , they stayed on the ward at all times . The Government submitted that they had left the ward during the delivery .

The first applicant alleged she had been continuously shackled to her hospital bed or to a gynaecological examination chair , the only exception being during the delivery when the shackles had been removed . It is not clear from her submissions exactly how she had been shackled ; on CARDINAL occasion , she submitted that after the delivery she had had her foot shackled to the bed . At the same time , she submitted that the guards had only removed the shackles from her wrists for breastfeeding .

According to the Government , the first applicant was never handcuffed or shackled in the maternity hospital .

On DATE the applicants were discharged .

On DATE the first applicant wrote in a statement for the PERSON administration ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and DATE ) that the maternity hospital staff had treated her well , that she had not been handcuffed or shackled , and that the CARDINAL female security officers who had been on her ward had been helping her take care of the baby .

In DATE and DATE the prosecution authorities questioned some maternity hospital staff and the security officers who had guarded the first applicant with a view to verifying her allegations , particularly as regards her shackling ( see also paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the chief doctor of the maternity hospital wrote to the governor of the Kharkiv SIZO , in reply to an enquiry by the latter , to say that during her stay in the maternity hospital the first applicant had been guarded by GPE officers at all times , that the officers in question had not been on the delivery ward , and that the first applicant had not been handcuffed or shackled during the delivery .

On DATE the chief obstetrician , PERSON . , gave a written statement to the prosecution authorities . She submitted that the first applicant had been shackled by the wrists to the gynaecological examination chair during her examinations both in the admissions unit and later in the obstetric unit , and that it was usual practice for detainees to be shackled and guarded by CARDINAL guards .

CARDINAL other obstetricians , PERSON , and a nurse , Ms To . , made similar statements . PERSON submitted that she could not remember any details regarding the second applicant ’s delivery . Ms To . specified that the first applicant had not been shackled during the delivery or subsequently during breastfeeding .

The chief doctor of the neonatal unit Ms ORG . also submitted that the first applicant had been shackled to a gynaecological examination chair . Furthermore , she indicated that CARDINAL guards had been staying on the ward near the applicants , with a third near the door .

The security officers who had guarded the first applicant denied that she had been handcuffed or shackled in hospital .

NORP The applicant ’s lawyer enquired with a former nurse , PERSON , about the conditions faced by women in detention during delivery , with reference to her related work experience . On DATE Ms P. wrote to him indicating that she had indeed worked as a nurse at ORG and Maternal Health Centre from DATE , and that in DATE or DATE a detained woman had been shackled to her bed during her baby ’s delivery there .

While the first applicant was held in several different cells in the GPE , her application form referred only to the conditions of her detention with her baby in cell no . CARDINAL , in which she had been held from DATE to CARDINAL DATE . The summary of facts below therefore only concerns that cell .

The cell , situated in a semi - basement , was cold and damp . There was no hot water and only an irregular supply of cold water . The first applicant therefore rarely had the opportunity to take a shower and bath her new - born son . She also had to store cold water in plastic bottles for her own use . She boiled water on a defective electric cooker in a kettle , which she had to borrow from the administration and which was provided to her for no longer than TIME each time . The toilet and shower were in a niche not separated from the living area . The toilet was often blocked . There was no baby changing table or cot in the cell .

The first applicant was not provided with any baby hygiene products . Nor did she receive nutrition suitable to her needs . On DATE of court hearings her only meal was breakfast , which consisted of bread and tea . No packed lunches were provided to her .

The applicants were able to have outdoor walks of TIME , but not every day , in a communal walking area .

Lastly , CARDINAL of the inmates she shared with was HIV positive .

Cell no . CARDINAL was a high - comfort cell designed for pregnant women and women with children . It was located on the ground floor , measured QUANTITY and could accommodate up to QUANTITY people . The first applicant shared it with CARDINAL or sometimes CARDINAL inmates .

The cell had CARDINAL windows measuring QUANTITY in total . There was hot and cold water , as well as a drinking water cooler with a capacity of QUANTITY .

Furthermore , there were all the necessary furniture and facilities such as air conditioning , a refrigerator , an electric stove , a baby cot and a pram . There was also a supply of nappies and hygiene products . The toilet and shower were separated from the living area .

The first applicant was provided with adequate nutrition in accordance with the applicable standards ( the total energy value of her DATE meals being QUANTITY ) . She received CARDINAL hot meals per day with the exception of hearing DATE , when she missed lunch . She breastfed her son and refused the baby food provided by the GPE . There were no restrictions on food or other parcels she received from her relatives .

The applicants had a DATE TIME walk in a specially designated area .

They never shared a cell with inmates with HIV .

The Government provided CARDINAL colour photographs of cell no . CARDINAL , showing a spacious and light room in a visually good state of repair . There were CARDINAL large windows with sheer curtains . The cell had a washbasin . There was also a lavatory with a bidet and a shower cubicle , both separated from the living area by opaque glass doors . Also on the photographs were a wardrobe , QUANTITY beds with bedside cabinets , a cot , a table with CARDINAL stools , a baby stool , a shelf with some tableware , a microwave , a television and a baby changing table .

Another photograph showed a walking area for detained mothers with babies , with a flowerbed and a wall with a nature mural . The first applicant and her baby were on the photograph , as well as another woman with a pram .

On CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE the local sanitary and epidemiological service inspected the GPE in the context of an unspecified investigation . It observed that there was a special cell for women with babies , with all the essential amenities . It was noted in the report that there had been no pregnant inmates or inmates with babies in the GPE at the time of the inspection .

On DATE the sanitary and epidemiological service also inspected the drinking water in the GPE to check that it complied with the relevant standards . No irregularities were found .

NORP On DATE ORG informed the Agent of the Government that there had been no complaints from the first applicant regarding the conditions of detention or the second applicant ’s medical care in the GPE .

On DATE the first applicant wrote a statement giving a detailed description of her cell in the GPE similar to that submitted by the Government ( see paragraphs DATE above ) . The last paragraph also concerned her stay in the maternity hospital ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE one of the ORG staff wrote to ORG to say that the first applicant ’s statement had been made freely .

During her detention in the Kharkiv GPE the first applicant received CARDINAL food parcels from her mother , often with basic foodstuffs such as bread , butter , tea , sugar and milk .

The first applicant lodged numerous requests for release with the trial court dealing with her criminal case , subject to an undertaking not to abscond ( dated DATE , CARDINAL , DATE and DATE , CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE ) . She alleged , in particular , that the conditions in the GPE were not adequate for her baby . The court rejected those requests .

NORP The applicants’ case received some media coverage . For example , in DATE the article “ Baby as a victim of inhuman treatment ” was published online by ORG . In DATE a television programme was broadcast , in which the first applicant and the ORG authorities gave accounts , particularly as regards the conditions of the applicants’ detention in the GPE . The parties did not submit to the ORG a copy of the relevant article or video footage or a transcript of the television programme .

On DATE one of the detainees , PERSON , wrote a statement addressed to the head of the local department of ORG . She submitted that in DATE she had been held in the same cell as the first applicant and had been satisfied with the conditions of detention there . It was noted in the statement that there had been large windows in the cell , a shower cubicle with hot and cold water and all the necessary furniture and appliances , including a refrigerator and a television .

On DATE ORG of ORG issued a memorandum stating that the first applicant had not submitted any complaints during her detention in the Kharkiv GPE .

The case file contains CARDINAL statements by detainee PERSON concerning the conditions of detention in the GPE . She wrote CARDINAL of them while detained there ( on an unspecified date and on DATE ) , and a third on DATE when she had already begun serving her prison sentence elsewhere . In the first CARDINAL statements PERSON described the conditions of her detention in cell no . CARDINAL as quite satisfactory and comfortable . Her account was similar to that given by the Government ( see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL above ) . The first CARDINAL statements also contained critical remarks regarding the first applicant claiming , in particular , that she had displayed a careless attitude towards her baby and had acted in bad faith in applying to the ORG . In her third statement , PERSON stated that the food in the PERSON had been poor . More specifically , the bread had been stale and the meat had been tinged blue . She also submitted that there had been no hot water in cell no . CARDINAL . Lastly , she submitted that on CARDINAL occasions she had witnessed the first applicant requesting medical care for her baby when he had had stomachache , but her requests had been ignored .

DATE . On DATE a former detainee , PERSON . , wrote a statement for the first applicant ’s lawyer and had it certified by a notary . She stated that she had shared cell no . CARDINAL with the first applicant from an unspecified date in DATE to CARDINAL DATE . PERSON . had been pregnant at the time . She described the conditions of their detention as follows . The cell was located in a semi - basement and inmates saw practically no daylight . The windows were so high that they could not be opened without the assistance of a guard . There were CARDINAL inmates in the cell , some of them with HIV and some suffering from other illnesses . The toilet was separated from the living area by a waist - high wall and leaked . As a result , there was always a bad smell . The shower also leaked and the cubicle door was broken . It was so humid in the cell that the plaster had fallen off the ceiling and the walls were covered in mould . The cell was infested with mice and lice . There were no household appliances like a kettle or microwave . Nor were there any beds or bedside cabinets as shown by ORG on television ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . PERSON . specified that in fact none of the detainees had ever been held in the cell presented by the authorities on television . There was no hot water and the pressure in the cold water taps was so low that inmates had to store water for their own use . Furthermore , the PERSON administration did not provide them with any tableware . Their daily walk lasted TIME and took place in a small walking area covered with bars . Furthermore , according to PERSON . , the food in the PERSON was neither fresh nor tasty . Lastly , she stated that she had been shackled to her bed when undergoing some treatment in the maternity hospital in GPE while pregnant .

On an unspecified date PERSON . , who had also shared cell no . CARDINAL with the first applicant ( the exact period is unknown ) , wrote a statement about the conditions of detention there . Her description was similar to that given by PERSON . as regards the leaking toilet , high humidity levels , lack of hot water and irregular supply of cold water , as well as the duration and conditions of the DATE outdoor walks and poor nutrition .

On DATE the applicants were discharged from the maternity hospital . The second applicant was found to be in good health .

According to a letter from its chief doctor to the first applicant ’s lawyer dated DATE , on CARDINAL DATE the second applicant was transferred to ORG no . DATE ( “ the children ’s hospital ” ) . All the other relevant documents in the case file indicate that on DATE both applicants were taken to the Kharkiv SIZO .

As submitted by the first applicant and noted in a letter by the chief doctor of the children ’s hospital to the first applicant ’s lawyer dated DATE , a paediatrician from that hospital had examined the second applicant on CARDINAL DATE . The baby was found to be in good health but to have phimosis ( a condition of the penis where the foreskin can not be fully retracted ) .

However , according to the second applicant ’s medical file kept by the GPE , the first time a paediatrician of the children ’s hospital examined him was on DATE . He was found to be in an adaptation period and the first applicant received advice regarding childcare .

According to the second applicant ’s medical file , on DATE he was examined again by a paediatrician , who diagnosed him with intestinal colic and recommended PERSON , massage , feeding on demand and outdoor walks . The doctor also suspected that the boy had a patent ( open ) foramen ovale ( ORG ; the foramen ovale allows blood circulation in the fetal heart and closes in most individuals at birth ) .

The second applicant ’s next medical examination appears to have taken place on DATE . It was noted in his medical file that the paediatrician had given advice to the first applicant regarding feeding and care .

The first applicant denied that any of the examinations following that on CARDINAL DATE had taken place . She alleged that her baby had not been examined by a paediatrician until DATE . She submitted that the records of her son ’s earlier examinations in the medical file had been forged . According to her , the first page of that book referred to an examination on DATE , whereas the records of his earlier examinations had been written on separate pages and subsequently glued into the file . The case file as it stands before the ORG contains a separate copy of each page of the file , which makes it impossible to verify the first applicant ’s allegation .

On DATE the first applicant ’s lawyer asked the ORG administration to provide him with details of when the second applicant had been examined by a paediatrician and whether the conditions of detention had been appropriate for such a small baby . He also requested copies of the relevant documents .

On DATE the PERSON administration replied that it would be able to provide comprehensive information on the second applicant ’s health after a complete medical examination in the children ’s hospital , which was due to take place .

On DATE the first applicant asked the judge dealing with her case to order a medical examination of her son “ given that the PERSON administration [ was ] ignoring her requests to that effect ” . It appears that her request was rejected .

On DATE the chief doctor of the children ’s hospital wrote to the first applicant ’s lawyer in reply to an enquiry by him dated DATE . He said that with no paediatrician at the Kharkiv SIZO , a paediatrician from that hospital monitored babies born there . He also indicated that the second applicant had been examined by the hospital paediatrician on CARDINAL DATE ( see also paragraph CARDINAL above ) . In so far as the lawyer enquired about the baby ’s medical condition at the material time , the chief doctor stated that it was impossible to provide him with such information because the first applicant had not requested any medical care for him until then .

On DATE a dermatologist , cardiologist , ear , nose and throat specialist , neurologist and paediatrician all examined the second applicant . He was found to have allergic dermatitis , dysplastic cardiomyopathy and phimosis . Furthermore , the patent foramen ovale diagnosis had been called into question ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The doctors concluded that the second applicant did not require any medical treatment , but recommended that the mother follow a hypoallergenic diet .

According to the first applicant , the examination was carried out in the context of custody proceedings initiated by the second applicant ’s stepfather . She specified that it had been done with her consent so that the second applicant could be taken from the GPE , where he was not receiving adequate care .

On DATE the GPE sent a copy of the second applicant ’s medical file to the ORG representative , further to a request made by him on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the chief doctor of the children ’s hospital wrote to the first applicant ’s lawyer , in reply to an enquiry made on DATE , to say that hospital was in charge of the medical supervision of children in the Kharkiv GPE where needed , subject to the GPE administration making the relevant application . It was also noted that the second applicant required an additional examination in the regional cardiology centre , and that the children ’s hospital had already requested the PERSON administration ’s cooperation in that regard .

On DATE a paediatrician and a cardiologist examined the second applicant again . He was diagnosed with a patent foramen ovale ( a heart condition , see paragraph CARDINAL above for further details ) and an additional examination was recommended .

On DATE applicant underwent an echocardiogram and was found to be healthy .

DATE . On DATE the first applicant refused to allow her son to undergo a paediatrician examination , which she had been offered .

The following day the first applicant was released ( see also paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the first applicant ’s lawyer enquired with the children ’s hospital whether it had kept a medical file in respect of the second applicant and whether he had been vaccinated during his stay with the first applicant in the GPE .

On DATE the chief doctor replied that the children ’s hospital provided medical care to children residing permanently in its catchment area . As regards children residing there temporarily , a written application by CARDINAL of the parents was required . The first applicant had never submitted such an application . Accordingly , the hospital had not opened a medical file in respect of the second applicant . At the same time , its doctors had examined him when requested by the PERSON administration . The results of each examination had been reflected in the medical file provided by the GPE . In so far as the second applicant ’s vaccinations were concerned , it was noted that he had always been brought for examinations without his mother , and without her consent no vaccinations had been given .

On DATE , CARDINAL May , DATE , CARDINAL and DATE and DATE the first applicant participated in court hearings , during which she was held in a metal cage . Her requests not to be placed in a cage were rejected .

On DATE the judge of ORG , who had been in charge of the first applicant ’s case , wrote to the Agent of the Government , in reply to the latter ’s request , to say that the first applicant had indeed been held in a metal cage in the courtroom during hearings . The judge emphasised that it was a legal requirement to place criminal defendants in a metal cage and there were no exceptions to this rule . Furthermore , he considered that allowing the first applicant to remain outside the cage in the courtroom would have been equal to her temporary release , contrary to the custodial preventive measure applied .

On DATE ORG confirmed once again to the Agent of the Government that the first applicant had been held in a metal cage in the courtroom during hearings . It further specified that the second applicant had remained with the GPE medical specialist outside the cage and had been passed to her for breastfeeding when requested .

On DATE the first applicant was released on an undertaking not to abscond .

DATE . On DATE she complained to ORG that she had been shackled to her bed in the maternity hospital at all times , including during the delivery . She also complained that the conditions of detention and nutrition in the GPE had been inadequate . Lastly , the first applicant alleged that the statement she had written on DATE expressing her satisfaction with the conditions of detention had been made under psychological pressure ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE ORG completed the internal investigation it had undertaken following the media coverage of the applicants’ case ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The first applicant ’s allegations were dismissed as unsubstantiated .

On DATE the first applicant complained to ORG ( “ ORG Office ” ) that she had not been provided with adequate medical care during her pregnancy and the delivery ; that she had been shackled by her wrists and feet to a gynaecological examination chair or her bed in the maternity hospital at all times , including during the delivery ; that the conditions of her detention in the Kharkiv SIZO had been poor ; and that neither she nor her baby had received adequate medical care there . On the same date her complaint was registered in ORG and the investigation was started .

On DATE ORG ordered a forensic medical examination of the case material with a view to establishing : ( i ) whether the first applicant had any injuries and , if so , how they had been caused ; ( ii ) whether there was any forensic medical evidence that the first applicant had been handcuffed or shackled DATE ; ( iii ) whether there was any forensic medical evidence that the applicants had not been provided with adequate or sufficient medical care in the Kharkiv SIZO ; ( iv ) whether there was any forensic medical evidence that the applicants had not been provided with adequate or sufficient medical care in the maternity hospital ; and ( v ) if the applicants had not received adequate or sufficient medical care , whether this had had any negative impact on their health .

The aforementioned examination continued from DATE to CARDINAL DATE . The answers in the report to all CARDINAL questions were negative .

On DATE ORG discontinued the criminal investigation for lack of evidence of a criminal offence .

Also in DATE ORG , following an enquiry by ORG , undertook an internal investigation as regards the lawfulness of the second applicant ’s detention in the GPE . On CARDINAL DATE it was completed , with the conclusion that there had been no violation . It was noted in the report that , although in DATE the first applicant had verbally expressed her intention to transfer the custody of her baby to her mother , she had later changed her mind as she had been breastfeeding .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13+6-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON . She is a single mother and has a son who at the time of the accident in question was DATE .

On DATE the applicant was knocked down by a trolley bus . She suffered an open craniocerebral injury and contusion of the brain . As a result , the applicant received the status of a disabled person with the lowest degree of disability ( третя група інвалідності ) .

NORP In DATE the applicant instituted proceedings in ORG against ORG , claiming compensation for pecuniary and non - pecuniary damage to her health caused by the accident . In particular , as pecuniary damage the applicant claimed compensation for medicines , additional nutrition , treatment in a sanatorium , transport expenses , and compensation for loss of earnings .

On DATE the applicant lodged an application with ORG ( PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) complaining , inter alia , under LAW about the lengthy examination of her case by the domestic courts .

On DATE , while the proceedings were still pending before the national courts , the ORG delivered a judgment on the applicant ’s first application ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , finding that the length of the proceedings in her case had been excessive . The ORG took into consideration the period after DATE , when the Convention had come into force in respect of GPE . The length of the proceedings within the ORG ’s competence was DATE and DATE .

The ORG , in particular , noted the following :

“ DATE . As for the issues that were at stake for the applicant , the ORG notes that following the traffic accident the applicant was seriously injured and received a disability degree . Given that the applicant was a single mother and had a child to raise , the compensations for loss of earnings and for expenses sustained as a result of a poor state of her health were of undeniable importance for the applicant . The ORG therefore considers that what was at stake for the applicant called for an expeditious decision on her claims . ”

On DATE the ORG found against the applicant . On DATE ORG of GPE quashed this decision and remitted the case to a first - instance court for fresh examination . On DATE ORG upheld the decision of the court of appeal .

On CARDINAL DATE the ORG partly found for the applicant . On DATE ORG of GPE quashed this decision and remitted the case to a first - instance court for fresh examination . On DATE ORG upheld the decision of the court of appeal .

On DATE the ORG left the applicant ’s case without consideration because she had failed to appear in court without giving plausible reasons on DATE and DATE . The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision stating that she had not been aware about the above - mentioned hearings . On DATE ORG of GPE rejected the applicant ’s appeal . The court noted that the applicant had been duly notified about the date of the hearings . On DATE ORG of GPE upheld the decisions of the lower courts . A further attempt by the applicant to have the above decisions reviewed in the light of newly discovered circumstances was to no avail .


CASE OF VARDANEAN v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND RUSSIA

No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention) (the Republic of Moldova);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention) (Russia);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Independent tribunal) (the Republic of Moldova);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Independent tribunal) (Russia);No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for home) (the Republic of Moldova);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for home) (Russia);No violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of application)

Dmitry Dedov;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Paul Lemmens;Ksenija Turković

The applicants , Mr PERSON and PERSON , are NORP nationals who were born in DATE and live in GPE .

The background to the case , including the NORP armed conflict of DATE and the subsequent events , is set out in ORG and Others v. GPE and GPE ( [ ORG ] , no . CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL , ORG CARDINAL ) and ORG and Others v. GPE and GPE ( [ ORG ] , ORG . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL , § § DATE , ORG DATE ) .

The applicants are husband and wife and are journalists . At the time of the events they were living in the self - proclaimed “ GPE ” ( the “ FAC ) . The first applicant was employed by a NORP news agency and by a NORP newspaper .

On DATE the first applicant was arrested by agents of the secret service of the “ FAC ” on charges of treason and/or espionage undertaken for GPE . A search was carried out in the applicants’ apartment and many of their belongings – such as pictures , computers and a bank card – were seized .

On DATE , a tribunal from the “ FAC ” convicted the first applicant and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment . Following international pressure , on CARDINAL DATE the president of the “ FAC pardoned him . After DATE , the applicant and his family moved to GPE .

During his detention the first applicant met on several occasions with representatives of the “ FAC secret services , including the chief of the secret services , and was led to believe that his family might suffer if he refused to cooperate with them . He was asked to record a video of himself admitting having worked for the NORP secret services . That video was aired on NORP television . On another occasion he was asked to write a letter to the foreign ambassadors to GPE “ disclosing ” the fact that the NORP secret services were spying on the foreign embassies based in GPE . He subsequently was given to understand by representatives of the “ FAC secret services that the letter had served the purpose of creating tensions between GPE and western countries and that the whole matter , including his arrest , was being coordinated from GPE .

The second applicant could only visit the first applicant on a limited number of occasions during his detention and lawyers representing the first applicant in the proceedings before the ORG were denied access to him on the grounds that they were not members of the “ ORG ” .

NORP In the meantime , the NORP authorities made numerous attempts to secure the first applicant ’s release . In particular , the problem of his detention in the “ FAC ” was raised by the GPE authorities with ORG and GPE authorities in DATE in GPE . The NORP delegation distributed a circular letter during the DATE session of ORG of ORG and raised the first applicant ’s situation during meetings of ORG in DATE and DATE . The first applicant ’s situation was also raised by the NORP authorities in their discussions with the LOC representatives in GPE , and a criminal investigation was initiated by ORG in respect of the applicant ’s detention in the “ FAC . However , the criminal investigation was later discontinued .

ORG also awarded financial assistance to the first applicant ’s family during the period of the first applicant ’s detention in the “ FAC ” and transferred to them ownership of a flat in GPE worth MONEY ( ORG ) after the first applicant ’s release from detention .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

Aleš Pejchal;Angelika Nußberger;Ann Power-Forde;Ganna Yudkivska;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE ORG of Zaporizhzhya ordered the applicant ’s former husband , PERSON , to pay her child maintenance in respect of their daughter , who was living with the applicant .

According to a bailiff ’s report of DATE , the outstanding arrears to the applicant at that date were CARDINAL NORP hryvnias ( ( ORG ) , at the time equivalent to MONEY ( ORG ) ) , of which ORG CARDINAL ( about EUR CARDINAL ) was owed for DATE . The bailiff ’s calculations were based on the average salary indicators in the district where S. lived , since he had been unemployed at the time .

On DATE the same bailiff issued a fresh report , assessing the total amount of the arrears at DATE at UAH CARDINAL . The sum owed for DATE was assessed at UAH CARDINAL . The bailiff recalculated the earlier established amount on the basis of a tax return submitted by the applicant ’s ex - husband for DATE , which showed that he had earned ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL for that period . Viewed as his actual earnings for DATE , that amount was lower than the average salary , which would have otherwise been taken as a basis for the arrears’ calculation .

On DATE the report of CARDINAL April DATE was served on the applicant , who had DATE to challenge it .

On DATE the applicant sought to challenge the accuracy of the report before the NORP ORG of Zaporizhzhya ( “ the GPE ” ) .

On DATE ORG allowed her application and invalidated the impugned report as erroneous . It concluded that the bailiff had had no reasons to depart from the earlier calculation , since the tax return submitted by S. concerned only DATE . In the absence of any appeal , the ruling became final .

On DATE the bailiff issued another report , according to which the outstanding child maintenance arrears owed to the applicant at that date were ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL NORP hryvnias , of which ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL was owed for DATE .

On DATE the bailiff reassessed the arrears owed by S. to the applicant , concluding that they were ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL at DATE ( as S. had made some payments during DATE ) , of which ORG CARDINAL was owed for DATE .

On DATE ORG terminated the child maintenance enforcement proceedings because on DATE the applicant ’s daughter had reached the age of majority . The bailiff assessed the outstanding arrears at DATE at UAH CARDINAL ( equivalent to about ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL at that time ) ; the sum owed for DATE remained unchanged ( ORG CARDINAL , equivalent to about EUR CARDINAL ) . Neither the applicant nor her former husband challenged this assessment .

On DATE the applicant lodged a civil claim against S. for penalties to be imposed on him for late child maintenance payments . She relied on the bailiff ’s report of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the court adjourned its hearing on the applicant ’s request with a view to summoning the bailiff who had issued the aforementioned report . S. did not object to that , but submitted that he had requested recalculation of the arrears owed to the applicant .

On DATE ORG allowed the applicant ’s claim in part and awarded her UAH CARDINAL.CARDINAL ( about EUR CARDINAL ) in penalties to be paid by her former husband . It based its calculation , in so far as the arrears for DATE were concerned , on the bailiff ’s report of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , which had been presented by the bailiff at the hearing on DATE . Having regard to the bailiff ’s explanations as to the reasons for the recalculation , the court held that the aforementioned report took precedence over the report of DATE relied on by the applicant . According to the minutes of the hearing , the applicant did not object to the completion of the examination of the case on the merits , but insisted that the court should rely on the report adduced by her .

On DATE the applicant appealed , claiming that the court had wrongly relied on the report of DATE , which she had only become aware of on DATE , DATE the court had given judgment . She further pointed out that the report in question had not been formally served on her until DATE ( DATE ) and that she had challenged it in accordance with the established procedure ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the ORG ( “ the Court of Appeal ” ) upheld ORG decision of DATE . It held , without giving further details , that the first - instance court had rightly relied on the bailiff ’s report of DATE .

The applicant appealed in cassation for the decisions of DATE and DATE to be quashed and a fresh examination of the case to be carried out . She complained that the courts had disregarded , without any explanation , the key piece of evidence adduced by her – the bailiff ’s report of DATE . It had not been challenged by any of the parties and was final . She reiterated the arguments of her appeal as regards the bailiff ’s report of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , pointing out that her complaint about that report had been successful and that it had been invalidated on DATE .

On DATE ORG , sitting in a single - judge formation , rejected her request for leave to appeal in cassation . Its reasoning was limited to a statement that the cassation appeal was unfounded , and that its arguments did not warrant any verification of the case file materials in accordance with LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the applicant lodged with ORG a civil claim against her former husband , seeking recovery of the child maintenance arrears as assessed by the bailiff on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , with an inflationary adjustment and additional penalties .

On DATE the court found against the applicant . It held that ORG had already determined the outstanding arrears PERSON had to pay ( UAH DATE see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , and that the applicant was not entitled to any further indexation or penalties .

Following an appeal by the applicant , on DATE ORG quashed that decision and ordered the applicant ’s former husband to pay her ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL in arrears ( equivalent to about ORG CARDINAL ) . As regards the arrears owed for DATE , it relied on ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE based on the bailiff ’s report of CARDINAL April CARDINAL ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) .

The applicant appealed in cassation . She argued that the final amount of outstanding child maintenance arrears owed to her by QUANTITY at DATE was UAH MONEY ( equivalent to about EUR CARDINAL ) . The applicant emphasised that none of the parties had ever challenged the accuracy of that calculation . The appellate court had nevertheless chosen to rely on the bailiff ’s earlier report of DATE , which had been invalidated by ORG on DATE after she complained .

On DATE ORG , sitting in a single - judge formation , rejected her request for leave to appeal in cassation . Its reasoning was identical to that given in the ruling of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the applicant lodged a civil claim with ORG , seeking an increase of the child maintenance to be paid by her former husband from DATE .

On DATE the court allowed her claim in part and assessed the amount of DATE child maintenance at ORG CARDINAL , to be paid from CARDINAL May until DATE , the date their daughter reached the age of majority . No appeal was lodged and the decision became final .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing;Equality of arms)

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained that they had been denied an opportunity to appear in person before the court in the civil proceedings to which they were parties .


CASE OF KHAMTOKHU AND AKSENCHIK v. RUSSIA

No violation of Article 14+5 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 5 - Right to liberty and security;Article 5-1 - Deprivation of liberty);No violation of Article 14+5 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 5 - Right to liberty and security;Article 5-1 - Deprivation of liberty)

András Sajó;André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Erik Møse;Guido Raimondi;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Luis López Guerra;Mārtiņš Mits;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer;Ksenija Turković

The applicants , PERSON and Mr Aksenchik , were born in DATE and DATE respectively . They are currently serving life sentences in ORG of GPE .

On DATE ORG of GPE found the first applicant guilty of multiple offences , including escape from prison , attempted murder of police officers and ORG officials , and illegal possession of firearms , and sentenced him to life imprisonment .

On DATE the Presidium of ORG of the Russian Federation quashed the appeal judgment of DATE by way of supervisory review and remitted the matter for fresh consideration .

On DATE ORG of GPE upheld the first applicant ’s conviction on appeal . The court reclassified some of the charges against him but the life sentence remained unchanged .

On DATE ORG found the second applicant guilty on CARDINAL counts of murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment .

On DATE ORG of GPE upheld that conviction on appeal .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Italy);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient

András Sajó;André Potocki;Dean Spielmann;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Ineta Ziemele;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Josep Casadevall;Julia Laffranque;Ledi Bianku;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mark Villiger;Nebojša Vučinić;Nona Tsotsoria;Paul Lemmens;Paul Mahoney;Peer Lorenzen

The facts of the case may be summarised as follows .

On an unspecified date the first applicant left GPE for GPE , where he met and married the second applicant . The couple subsequently moved to GPE , where they lived for DATE .

On an unspecified date the couple and their children left GPE for GPE and from there took a boat to GPE . According to the findings of the NORP police and the identification forms annexed to the observations of ORG , the applicants ( the couple and their CARDINAL oldest children ) landed on the coast of GPE on DATE and were immediately subjected to the ORG identification procedure ( taking of photographs and fingerprints ) after supplying a false identity . DATE the couple and the CARDINAL children were placed in a reception facility provided by the municipal authorities of ORG ( GPE province ) , where they remained until DATE . On that date they were transferred to ORG ( Centro di Acoglienza per PERSON , “ ORG ” ) in PERSON , in the GPE region , once their true identity had been established .

According to the applicants , living conditions in the centre were poor , particularly on account of the lack of appropriate sanitation facilities , the lack of privacy and the climate of violence among the occupants .

On DATE the applicants left the ORG in PERSON without permission . They subsequently travelled to GPE , where on DATE they were again registered in the ORG system . They lodged an application for asylum in GPE which was rejected . On DATE GPE submitted a request to take charge of the applicants to the NORP authorities , which on CARDINAL DATE formally accepted the request . On an unspecified date the applicants travelled to GPE . On DATE the NORP authorities informed their NORP counterparts that the transfer had been cancelled because the applicants had gone missing .

On DATE the applicants applied for asylum in GPE .

On DATE the first and second applicants were interviewed by ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) and stated that living conditions in GPE were difficult and that it would be impossible for the first applicant to find work there .

On DATE the ORG requested the NORP authorities to take charge of the applicants . In their respective observations the NORP and ORG agreed that the request had been tacitly accepted by GPE .

In a decision of CARDINAL DATE the ORG rejected the applicants’ asylum application and made an order for their removal to GPE . The administrative authority considered that “ the difficult living conditions in GPE [ did ] not render the removal order unenforceable ” , that “ it [ was ] therefore for the NORP authorities to provide support to the applicants ” and that “ the NORP authorities [ did ] not have competence to take the place of the NORP authorities . ” On the basis of these considerations it concluded that “ the file [ did ] not contain any specific element disclosing a risk to the applicants’ lives in the event of their return to GPE . ”

On DATE the applicants appealed to ORG . In support of their appeal they submitted that the reception conditions for asylum seekers in GPE were in breach of LAW and that the federal authorities had not given sufficient consideration to their complaint in that regard .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the appeal , upholding the ORG ’s decision in its entirety . The court considered that “ while there [ were ] shortcomings in the reception and social welfare arrangements , and asylum seekers [ could ] not always be taken care of by the authorities or private charities ” , there was no evidence in the file capable of “ rebutting the presumption that GPE complie[d ] with its obligations under public international law . ” With more particular reference to the applicants’ conduct it held that “ in deciding to travel to GPE , they [ had ] not given the NORP authorities the opportunity to assume their obligations with regard to [ the applicants’ ] situation . ”

On DATE the applicants requested the ORG to have the proceedings reopened and to grant them asylum in GPE . They submitted that their individual situation had not been examined in detail . The ORG forwarded the request to ORG , which reclassified it as a “ request for revision ” of the judgment of CARDINAL DATE and rejected it in a judgment dated DATE , on the ground that the applicants had not submitted any new grounds which they could not have relied on during the ordinary proceedings . The applicants had based their request mainly on a more detailed account of their stay in GPE and the fact that their children were now attending school in GPE .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE which reached ORG CARDINAL May , the applicants applied to this ORG and sought an interim measure requesting ORG not to deport them to GPE for the duration of the proceedings .

In a fax dated CARDINAL DATE the Registry informed ORG Agent that the acting President of the Section to which the case had been assigned had decided to indicate to ORG under Rule CARDINAL of ORG that the applicants should not be deported to GPE for the duration of the proceedings before the ORG .


Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Positive obligations;Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - award

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Nebojša Vučinić

The applicants were born in DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE and GPE .

Murat ORG was the first applicant ’s son and the other applicants’ brother .

At TIME on DATE , PERSON ORG and his friend PERSON were riding on a motorcycle in the GPE district . When they realised that QUANTITY police officers wanted them to stop , they panicked because they did not have driving licences . They started driving away and the QUANTITY officers , I.H.Y. and PERSON , gave chase until PERSON GPE and GPE crashed into a wall .

NORP Immediately after the accident , PERSON arrested PERSON but PERSON ORG started to run away , followed by the officer I.H.Y.

Meanwhile , ORG made an attempt to escape . In order to stop him from running away , the officer who stayed with him fired CARDINAL shots in the air . PERSON told the officer that there was no need to open fire , and explained that PERSON ORG was running away because he had panicked . If he were to be allowed to telephone him , his friend would give himself up . He also stated that he knew where PERSON Kasap lived .

I.H.Y. heard the shots fired by his colleague and thought that PERSON Kasap might have a gun . According to his statement , he ordered PERSON Kasap to stop and fired QUANTITY shots in the air . While he was running after PERSON Kasap , he lost his balance and his pistol went off . The bullet hit the ground , ricocheted , and entered the back of the body of PERSON Kasap , who died on the way to hospital .

The incident was notified to the GPE public prosecutor , who immediately gave instructions for security precautions to be taken . A crime scene examination team arrived at the site of the incident and encircled the crime scene with barrier tape .

At TIME on TIME , a prosecutor went to the site of the incident . The prosecutor questioned the eyewitness and prepared an incident report .

On TIME , PERSON was questioned by QUANTITY police officers at ORG . He described the incident but was not aware of the death of PERSON ORG .

On TIME , the guns of the police officers were seized as evidence .

At TIME on TIME , a post - mortem examination was carried out on the body of PERSON Kasap . The public prosecutor and the doctor observed a bullet entry wound on his back . The doctor was of the opinion that a full autopsy was needed to establish the cause of death . After the examination , PERSON ORG ’s clothes were seized in order to be able to determine the exact shooting range .

At CARDINAL TIME on TIME , the public prosecutor questioned the officer PERSON at a police station .

According to a crime scene investigation report which was drawn up by CARDINAL other police officers under the supervision of the public prosecutor , CARDINAL bullet cases and a bullet jacket were found at the site of the incident .

On DATE at CARDINAL TIME a complete examination of the motorcycle was carried out .

On DATE a full autopsy was carried out on PERSON ORG ’s body . The public prosecutor and the experts observed that the cause of death was internal bleeding caused by the entry of a deformed bullet .

On DATE , the officer I.H.Y. was questioned by the GPE public prosecutor . According to his statement , the death of PERSON ORG was the result of an accident . He maintained that he had not shot PERSON ORG intentionally but that his pistol had gone off accidentally when he lost his balance .

Also DATE , and after having been questioned by the GPE public prosecutor , the officer I.H.Y. was brought before ORG ( Sulh Ceza Mahkemesi ) , where he pleaded not guilty and reiterated the statement he had made before the public prosecutor earlier in DATE .

Also on DATE , ORG ordered I.H.Y. ’s detention .

On DATE , the applicants found another bullet case at the site of the incident and handed it to the public prosecutor .

On DATE the parents of PERSON ORG made an official complaint to the PERSON public prosecutor and asked for those responsible for the death of their son to be punished .

On DATE the GPE public prosecutor filed an indictment with ORG and charged the officer I.H.Y. with the offence of causing death by negligence .

On an unspecified date , PERSON ORG ’s parents joined the criminal proceedings against the officers as civil parties ( müdahil ) .

On DATE the ORG of First Instance considered the possibility that the officer I.H.Y. might have acted with intent to kill and decided that that would necessitate a reclassification of the offence attributed to him . It therefore decided to forward the case file to ORG , which has jurisdiction to deal with such offences .

Following an objection by the officer I.H.Y. , on DATE ORG ordered ORG ’s release pending trial .

On DATE the ORG declined jurisdiction to examine the case on the grounds that the offence attributed to the officer I.H.Y. was causing death by negligence . It decided that ORG had jurisdiction over this offence . ORG also decided to transfer the case file to the governor ’s office for authorisation to be granted in order to prosecute the officer .

The parents of PERSON ORG lodged an objection against the decision of non - jurisdiction and on DATE their objection was accepted by ORG .

On DATE the GPE governor ’s office decided not to grant authorisation for the prosecution of I.H.Y.

On DATE PERSON parents lodged an objection against the governor ’s decision .

On DATE ORG quashed the governor ’s decision and forwarded the case file to the GPE public prosecutor .

On DATE , the GPE public prosecutor filed an indictment with ORG and charged the officer I.H.Y. with the offence of murder with dolus eventualis ( “ olası kast ” ) .

On an unspecified date , ORG concluded that further ballistic examinations were necessary to establish how the trigger had been pulled . On DATE ORG issued a report , in which the experts noted that the pistol could only have been fired if pressure of CARDINAL kilograms had been applied to the trigger .

According to ORG report dated DATE , both the bullet cases and the bullet jacket found at the crime scene came from the accused police officer ’s pistol .

On DATE the ORG found that , although the officer I.H.Y. had not attempted to kill PERSON ORG , he had used disproportionate force and caused his death by negligence . ORG sentenced the officer to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment but then reduced the sentence to DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment . Moreover , having regard to LAW , it suspended the pronouncement of the judgment .

On an unspecified date , the first applicant submitted a petition to ORG asking for the officer I.H.Y. to be dismissed from his job as a civil servant .

By a letter dated CARDINAL DATE the first applicant was informed that ORG had been suspended from his job for a period of DATE .

On DATE the applicants lodged an objection against the ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE .

The objection was dismissed by ORG on DATE .

Meanwhile , on DATE PERSON parents had brought a case before ORG against ORG , requesting MONEY ( TRY ) in compensation for the death of their son .

On DATE the ORG allowed the claim in part and awarded PERSON ORG ’s parents TRY CARDINAL ( MONEY ( ORG ) at the time ) for pecuniary damage . The administrative court also awarded them TRY CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL at the time ) in respect of non - pecuniary damage .

On an unspecified date , PERSON parents lodged an appeal against ORG decision . The examination of the appeal is still continuing before ORG .

After the Government had been notified of the present case , on DATE ORG of ORG applied to ORG requesting that a written order be issued pursuant to LAW to quash the judgment of ORG dated DATE . As is apparent from the documents submitted to the ORG , no such order was issued by the Ministry .

The suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment is regulated by Article CARDINAL of the Code of Criminal Procedure , the relevant paragraphs of which read as follows :

( CARDINAL ) If the accused , after being tried on the charges against him , is sentenced to a judicial fine or to imprisonment for DATE , the court may decide to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment ... The suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment means that the judgment does not have any legal consequences for the offender .

( CARDINAL ) Suspension of the pronouncement of the judgment may be decided provided that ;

a ) the offender has never been found guilty of a wilful offence ;

b ) the court is convinced , taking into account the offender ’s personality traits and his behaviour during the proceedings , that there is little risk of any further offence being committed ; and

c ) the damage caused to the victim or to society has been repaired by way of restitution or compensation .

( CARDINAL) If the pronouncement of the judgment is suspended , the offender will be kept under supervision for DATE .

( CARDINAL ) If the offender does not commit another wilful offence and abides by the obligations set out in the supervision order , the judgment of which the pronouncement has been suspended shall be annulled and the case discontinued .

( CARDINAL ) If the offender commits another wilful offence or acts in violation of the obligations of the supervision order , the court shall impose the sentence . Nevertheless , the court may assess the offender ’s situation and may decide that a certain part of the sentence , up to the CARDINAL of the total sentence , will not be executed . If the conditions so permit , the court may also suspend the execution of a sentence of imprisonment or commute it to other optional measures .

( CARDINAL ) An objection may be lodged against the decision to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment

Article CARDINAL of the Code of Criminal Procedure , concerning references to ORG by written order of ORG ( Kanun yararına bozma ) , provides :

“ Where ORG has been informed that a judge or court has delivered a judgment that has become final without coming under the scrutiny of ORG , it may issue a formal order to ORG requiring him to ask ORG to set aside the judgment concerned ... ”


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13+6-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Right to a fair trial;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Alena Poláčková;Helen Keller;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

On DATE the applicant lodged a civil action with ORG ( file no . CARDINAL C CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) seeking an order for the defendant ( a municipality ) to enter into a contract with her concerning the transfer of a flat , in which she resided .

ORG scheduled CARDINAL hearings for DATE and DATE ; it ruled on the merits of the action and granted the action on DATE .

The applicant lodged an appeal ; the judgment was quashed by a court of appeal on DATE and the matter was remitted on DATE to ORG .

The applicant lodged a complaint under LAW with ORG contesting the length of the proceedings in so far as those had been held before ORG .

On DATE ORG ( file no . II . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) rejected her complaint on the ground that , prior to lodging her constitutional complaint , the applicant had failed to exhaust ordinary remedies , in particular lodging a complaint with the President of ORG under LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

ORG noted that the court of appeal had transferred the case file to ORG on DATE and that the applicant had lodged her constitutional complaint on DATE . It found that , within that period , ORG had failed actively to proceed with the matter for DATE .

ORG observed that the ORG ’s previous case - law – such as GPE and PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , DATE ) , which concerned a delay of DATE dealt with unjustified delays imputable to the courts that were substantially longer than those in the present case ( DATE ) . ORG considered that , because the unjustified delays in the present case had been shorter ( compared to those in respect of Ištván and Ištvánová and other similar cases ) , it was justified in requiring DATE before turning for protection to ORG – that the applicant lodge a complaint with the President of ORG with a view to accelerating her proceedings .

Following the Constitutional Court ’s decision , ORG scheduled a hearing for DATE . At the time of communication of the application the proceedings were still pending .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment)

Kristina Pardalos;Pauliine Koskelo;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and at the time of introduction of the application to the ORG he was detained in FAC .

The applicant is serving a life sentence for drug dealing . He was initially placed in FAC from DATE until DATE . On DATE he was transferred to FAC , from where he was transferred back to FAC on CARDINAL DATE . Lastly , on DATE he was transferred back to FAC .

The applicant alleged that he had been detained initially in cell no . B DATE , which had measured QUANTITY and had held CARDINAL detainees in total . On DATE he had been placed in cell no . GR CARDINAL on the ground floor , which had measured QUANTITY . m and had held CARDINAL detainees . In both cases , therefore , the living space afforded to him had been CARDINAL sq . m. Overcrowding had exposed him to infectious diseases and he had suffered from passive smoking . In addition , detainees had had barely any space to move within their cell and their bunk beds had been low , not allowing them to sit up comfortably .

Apart from the overcrowding , the applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention had been very poor . Access to natural light and ventilation had been inadequate . Sanitary facilities and supplies had been old , broken and insufficient to ensure the detainees’ wellbeing and personal hygiene . Heating had been provided only for TIME per day from TIME , while hot water during DATE had been provided for TIME per day and had not sufficed for all detainees . They had been forced to wash themselves using buckets of water , as the water pressure in showers had been insufficient . In each CARDINAL - person cell there had been CARDINAL bunk beds , CARDINAL stools , a small table and CARDINAL side tables but no lockable space for personal belongings . In the CARDINAL - person cell there had been CARDINAL bunk beds and CARDINAL stools . The mattresses had been old , mouldy and smelly , and sheets and towels had not been provided .

NORP In general , detainees had lacked access to cultural , recreational and sports activities . They had had to rely on visits from friends and family in order to obtain any newspapers or magazines , which had intensified their feeling of isolation . TIME that they had been allowed to spend in the corridors had been insufficient , taking into account that they had coincided with the meal times as well as with the times they had been allowed to receive visits or make phone calls . The yard had included a football field but no balls had been provided to the detainees and the yard had not offered any opportunities for spending time creatively . The applicant further complained of the quantity and the quality of the food , claiming that it had been repetitive and lacking any nutritional value .

Lastly , the applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention had led him having several cardiac arrests .

The Government , referring to a document provided by the prison authorities , submitted that ORG had a capacity of CARDINAL detainees on the basis of allocation of QUANTITY m per detainee according to the minimum standards set by the ORG . At the time the applicant had been detained , the prison facility had exceeded its capacity by accommodating FAC to CARDINAL detainees . The applicant had been detained in cell no . CARDINAL on the first floor , which had measured QUANTITY . m , including a toilet measuring QUANTITY m. The cell had had a capacity of QUANTITY detainees ; however , following a new law in DATE aimed at relieving overcrowding in prisons , many detainees had been released and that had resulted in the applicant sharing the cell with CARDINAL to CARDINAL detainees . Therefore , the living space afforded to the applicant had ranged from CARDINAL to QUANTITY m.

As regards the rest of the applicant ’s complaints , the ORG argued that the prison had had a central heating system , in addition to the electric heating devices that had been provided to each cell . The cell in which the applicant had been detained had had large windows . Detainees had had access to hot water and had been provided regularly with personal hygiene products . The cells had been regularly disinfected . As regards ORG meals , the ORG submitted the menu of various random DATE to demonstrate that they had been comprised of a variety of food .

The Government submitted the applicant ’s medical file in order to prove that the applicant had already suffered from cardiac conditions when his incarceration had started . The applicant ’s medical needs had been fully fulfilled during the time he had spent in FAC either by visits to the prison doctor or by his transfer to nearby hospitals . Lastly , the applicant had been granted DATE of leave in order to take matriculation exams .


Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;George Nicolaou;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Johannes Silvis;Luis López Guerra

NORP The applicant , Mr TIME , is a NORP national of NORP origin , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . The President granted the applicant ’s request for his identity not to be disclosed to the public ( Rule CARDINAL § CARDINAL of ORG ) . The applicant was represented before the ORG by Mr B. Wijkstrom , a lawyer practising in GPE .

NORP The applicant arrived in GPE on an unknown date . His fingerprints were recorded in the ORG system on DATE . On CARDINAL DATE the applicant entered GPE from GPE and sought asylum DATE . Soon after reaching GPE , the applicant started to suffer from mental illness .

NORP The applicant ’s sister had arrived in GPE on DATE , had applied for asylum and had received a temporary permit which entitled her to remain on NORP territory for the duration of her own asylum application . She was married to a man who had been granted temporary refugee status .

On DATE , ORG ( “ FMO ” ) requested that its NORP counterparts take charge of the applicant ’s asylum request , pursuant to LAW no . MONEY ( the “ FAC ” ) . On DATE , the NORP immigration authorities explicitly accepted the ORG ’s request . On DATE , the applicant ’s asylum request was rejected by the ORG on the basis of the fact that he had entered GPE from another “ GPE ” State . The ORG refused the application of the humanitarian clause provided for in LAW of ORG .

On DATE , the applicant was diagnosed with post - traumatic stress disorder , depression and back pain . He was put on a course of DATE psychiatric sessions and was given an anti - depressant ( ORG , DATE ) . According to the medical report , the stabilization of his psychological and social environment was a precondition for the successful outcome of the applicant ’s therapy . According to a subsequent medical report , dated DATE , the applicant showed some risk of self - harm , which could go as far as suicide if he were returned to GPE , where he had been allegedly abused by the police . The report clearly stated , however , that the applicant ’s death thoughts were passive and did not disclose any concrete plan ( “ sans projet concret ” ) .

The applicant appealed against the decision of the ORG to ORG . The appeal was rejected on DATE .

The relevant domestic law is set out in the ORG ’s judgment in the case of LOC v. GPE ( [ ORG ] , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE and DATE , CARDINAL DATE ) .

The relevant instruments and principles of ORG law are set out in the same judgment ( § § DATE ) .

NORP In particular , the ORG recalls that ORG is applicable to GPE under the terms of the association agreement of CARDINAL DATE between ORG and ORG regarding criteria and mechanisms for establishing the ORG responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in a Member ORG or in GPE ( ORG CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ) . ORG was recently replaced by Regulation ( ORG ) No . CARDINAL of ORG and of ORG ( the “ GPE III Regulation ” ) , which is designed to make the GPE system more effective and to strengthen the legal safeguards for persons subject to the GPE procedure .

The Dublin III Regulation entered into force on DATE and was passed into law by ORG on DATE .

A detailed description of the asylum procedure and the legal framework and organisation of the reception system for asylum seekers in GPE is also set out in the LOC judgment ( § § DATE ) .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Extradition) (Conditional) (Kyrgyzstan);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Dmitry Dedov;Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in DATE in the town of GPE , GPE , and lives in GPE .

The applicant is an ethnic NORP . In DATE ethnic violence erupted in the town of ORG , where the applicant lived at the material time , during which CARDINAL people were killed .

On DATE the applicant came to GPE , and has not returned to GPE since .

On DATE the police of the town of ORG charged the applicant in absentia with participation in the mass riots and several other offences .

On DATE the ORG issued an arrest warrant against the applicant , and on DATE his name was put on the crossborder wanted list .

On DATE the applicant was arrested in GPE and remanded in custody DATE by a court order . His detention was extended several times .

On DATE the St GPE transport prosecutor noted the interim measure indicated by the ORG and ordered the applicant ’s release from detention under the personal guarantee of his lawyer .

On DATE ORG requested the applicant ’s extradition for prosecution for participation in mass riots in DATE , intentional infliction of grievous bodily injury and use of violence against a police officer , car - jacking , and intentional destruction of property .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer submitted to ORG a letter referring to reports of international organisations and the ORG ’s case - law evidencing that there was a high risk that the applicant would be subjected to inhuman treatment if he were extradited .

On DATE a deputy Prosecutor General of GPE granted the request of ORG for the applicant ’s extradition . He held that there were no grounds in NORP or international law for refusing to extradite the applicant .

The applicant appealed , maintaining that , as a member of the ethnic NORP community which was being persecuted and discriminated against , he ran a serious and real risk of being subjected to torture in detention .

On DATE GPE rejected that appeal , finding as follows :

“ Taking into account the materials submitted , there are no grounds under LAW of GPE that exclude the possibility of extraditing an individual ...

The applicant ’s argument that the extradition is unlawful because he has refugee proceedings pending is untenable , and the arguments about his possible persecution by the law - enforcement authorities of GPE because of his ethnic origin are unsubstantiated and do not constitute a ground to refuse the extradition . The information of [ ORG of GPE ] according to which the examination of the criminal case against [ the applicant ] by the authorities of GPE might be biased , is conjecture and is not based on any proof ...

The Prosecutor General of GPE has provided assurances that , according to the standards of international law and the criminal law of GPE , [ the applicant ] would be afforded all means of defence , including legal assistance , would not be handed to a third country without the approval of ORG , or charged with and convicted of any offence committed before the extradition and for which he was not extradited . He would not be subjected to torture or to cruel , inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment ...

Furthermore , the requesting party provided assurances that , after [ the applicant ’s ] extradition to GPE , NORP diplomats would be allowed to visit [ the applicant ] in remand prisons to ensure respect for his rights ...

The evidence submitted by the defence , according to which persecution of ethnic NORP in connection with the events of DATE continues in GPE , concerns isolated cases and can not be regarded as evidence that [ the applicant ] will be subjected to cruel treatment , bearing in mind that he is accused of an offence which is not political in nature ; there are currently measures put in place by the authorities of GPE to remedy the violations of human rights disclosed by international organisations ... furthermore , the requesting party provided sufficient and real assurances that [ the applicant ’s ] right to a fair trial would be respected and that he would not be subjected to ill - treatment . The general situation in GPE was thoroughly analysed in the decision refusing [ the applicant ] refugee status by GPE of ORG . ”

The applicant ’s lawyers appealed against that decision , arguing that the first - instance court had failed to address their arguments concerning the risk that the applicant would be subjected to inhuman treatment if extradited .

By its final decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG of GPE , having endorsed the lower court ’s reasoning , rejected the appeal .

On DATE the applicant asked GPE of ORG to grant him refugee status . He pointed out that he feared returning to GPE , where he would face arbitrary prosecution and inhuman treatment .

On CARDINAL DATE GPE refused the above request for lack of reasons which would justify the applicant ’s allegations . In particular , it found that the latter had referred to the events of DATE as a pretext to avoid criminal prosecution . ORG further analysed the situation in GPE on the basis of several news items of mainly NORP and NORP newspapers and information agencies . Referring to these items , it stated that “ ... the situation in GPE had substantially changed , the inter - ethnic clashes had ceased , and the government was taking enhanced measures to protect citizens and to improve the social and economic situation in the country ” .

On DATE ORG of GPE upheld this decision . The applicant complained before ORG .

On DATE ORG dismissed the complaint . It endorsed the findings of the migration authorities and noted that the applicant was not a member of any political , religious , military or non - governmental organisations . Neither had he been persecuted or threatened by the authorities . Therefore , there was neither a threat to the applicant ’s life nor any medical indications indicating a need for urgent medical intervention .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of DATE on appeal .

On DATE the applicant asked GPE of ORG to provide him with temporary asylum in GPE .

On DATE his request was refused . According to the applicant , he was not informed of this decision .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant lodged a new application for temporary asylum , which was dismissed on DATE .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer lodged an appeal against the decision of CARDINAL DATE . However , the outcome of the appeal remains unknown .


Alvina Gyulumyan;Ján Šikuta;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She was represented before the Court by Mr B.O.S. Ujeniuc , a lawyer practising in GPE .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Carlo Ranzoni;Erik Møse;Ganna Yudkivska;Mārtiņš Mits;Yonko Grozev

The applicant was born in DATE and prior to her arrest had a permanent address in GPE .

NORP In DATE the applicant was diagnosed with HIV .

In DATE she was arrested on suspicion of drug dealing .

NORP In DATE the applicant started receiving anti - retroviral therapy ( “ ART ” ) .

On DATE the GPE Malynovsky District Court convicted the applicant of a number of drug - related offences and sentenced her to DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment .

On an unspecified date the applicant appealed on points of law to ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) .

On DATE the applicant arrived at FAC no . DATE ( “ the Colony ” ) to serve her sentence .

On DATE a cytology test revealed indications of cervical cancer .

On DATE the applicant was transferred to the oncology department of the hospital at ORG ( “ the Oncology Facility ” ) for medical examination .

On DATE ORG issued its conclusion concerning the applicant . In addition to stage PERSON , she was diagnosed with cervical cancer . The opinion stated that due to the state of the applicant ’s immune system , surgery was to be ruled out . It was recommended that the applicant be transferred to the hospital at ORG no . CARDINAL in GPE , which specialised in HIV treatment ( “ the HIV Treatment Facility ” ) for normalisation of T - cell levels , and then transferred back to ORG .

On DATE the applicant was transferred back to the Colony .

On DATE the applicant was admitted to ORG . Upon conclusion of a course of ORG , on DATE ORG issued a certificate stating that the applicant had been receiving ART without interruption since DATE . Her diagnosis was recorded as stage LAW HIV with heavy immunosuppression , cervical cancer , chronic hepatitis in remission , ovarian cysts , fibroma of the vocal cords , and oral candidiasis . It was recommended in particular that the applicant continue ART and take hepatoprotectors . The applicant was referred to ORG .

On DATE the applicant left ORG under guard and on DATE arrived back at the Colony where she was put under the supervision of the prison doctor ( a general practitioner ) as an outpatient and continued with her ART .

On DATE the applicant left the ORG under guard and on DATE arrived at ORG ( “ the GPE LOC ” ) in order to be able to attend the appeal hearings in her case .

On DATE the applicant lodged a request with the Kyiv Shevchenkivsky ORG ( “ the Shevchenkivsky Court ” ) seeking release on health grounds .

NORP In an undated letter submitted to ORG on DATE the GPE governor and the head of its medical unit informed the court that the applicant was receiving ART at the GPE but her cancer could only be treated with radiation therapy , which could not be provided at the GPE .

On DATE a test revealed that the applicant had ( an apparently low ) viral load of CARDINAL copies per ml .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s request for release .

On DATE the Acting President of the Section decided , upon the applicant ’s request under Rule CARDINAL of ORG , to indicate to the Government that they should present the applicant urgently for medical examination by a specialist doctor ; secure immediately , by appropriate means , treatment of the applicant appropriate to her conditions , and inform the ORG by DATE about the applicant ’s state of health and the measures undertaken .

On DATE the Government Agent ’s office asked the prison authorities to take appropriate action to ensure the applicant ’s examination and treatment and to inform it of the applicant ’s situation .

On DATE the GPE governor asked ORG ( “ the GPE Oncology Centre ” ) , a specialist civilian institution , to arrange for the examination of the applicant by CARDINAL of the ORG ’s specialists .

On DATE the applicant was examined by a gynaecological oncologist from ORG . The doctor recommended that the applicant ( i ) have a further consultation with an infectious diseases specialist concerning the possibilities for cancer treatment in the light of her living with HIV and ( ii ) undergo radiation therapy at an institution specialising in gynaecological oncology .

On DATE the applicant was examined by an infectious diseases specialist . The specialist recommended a change in the ORG scheme and noted that there were no contraindications for treatment of her cervical cancer .

On DATE , the applicant refused to change the ORG scheme stating that “ no viral load has been found ” in her ( вирусная загрузка у меня не выявлена ) .

On DATE the applicant wrote a statement to the GPE governor informing him that she did not wish to start her radiation therapy at that moment because she feared she would not have enough time to complete it while at the GPE , where she would be held until ORG examined her appeal against her conviction .

On DATE the Government informed ORG of the steps taken by the authorities after ORG had indicated the interim measure and provided the relevant medical documentation .

On DATE the applicant was examined by a panel of specialists at FAC . Her diagnoses were confirmed and she was prescribed radiation therapy .

On DATE the ORG upheld the applicant ’s conviction but reduced her sentence to DATE .

On DATE the applicant wrote to the ORG , alleging that the ORG had failed to comply with the interim measure indicated by the ORG . In particular , she alleged that she was still not receiving the recommended radiation therapy . She also alleged that her transfer to ORG would be conducted by rail in conditions incompatible with her state of health .

On DATE the applicant left the GPE for ORG , travelling through LOC , where she was held from DATE , and ORG , where she was held from DATE . On DATE she arrived at ORG .

On DATE the ORG asked the ORG to provide factual information concerning the reasons for which the applicant had not been treated with radiation therapy and the specific plans for her future treatment .

From DATE the applicant started a course of examinations and treatment at ORG and at ORG .

On DATE the Government again informed ORG medical examinations the applicant had undergone during the period following the ORG ’s decision to indicate the interim measure .

DATE the applicant underwent radiation treatment at ORG ; she was recommended another course starting on DATE but on DATE she refused to undergo it citing the side effects of the previous treatment .

On DATE the Government informed ORG applicant ’s first radiation therapy course .

On DATE the applicant left ORG and on DATE she was admitted to ORG .

On DATE the applicant was released on health grounds .