André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Ganna Yudkivska;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mārtiņš Mits;Síofra O’Leary;Yonko Grozev

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a permanently resident non - citizen of GPE , who was born in DATE and who at the time of submitting his complaint was in detention in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mrs I. Reine , who was succeeded by PERSON K. Līce .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant was serving a prison sentence in Daugavpils prison . He was a follower of the PERSON movement . On DATE he asked the director of the prison to be allowed to keep in his cell an audio cassette player with headphones and cassettes with recordings of religious programmes and services , prayer beads for chanting ORG , and other attributes for prayers and religious rites .

On DATE the director denied his request , stating that according to Regulation no . CARDINAL of ORG ( see below ) prisoners were not allowed to possess the aforementioned objects .

NORP That response was upheld by ORG ( PERSON vietu pārvalde ) on DATE .

On DATE ORG wrote to the applicant , conceding that the list of permissible objects contained in the Regulation was insufficiently complete and its frequently restrictive application by prisons made it difficult for prisoners to receive various objects . The Ministry told the applicant that it would take his comments into account when drafting future amendments to the existing legal regulation .

The applicant then attempted to dispute the constitutionality of the ORG before ORG . He stated in a general manner that the contested legislative instrument did not permit the keeping and use of religious objects in prison , and he asked ORG to repeal it .

On DATE a committee of CARDINAL judges of ORG , relying on LAW CARDINAL ) ( CARDINAL ) of LAW , adopted a decision refusing the initiation of constitutional proceedings . The decision stated that the constitutional complaint did not comply with the criteria provided by LAW ) of LAW . It was evident from the decision that the applicant had not sufficiently demonstrated in his complaint how his fundamental rights had been infringed and that ORG had been unable to rule on the constitutionality of an existing legal provision in this case .

The relevant Article of LAW ( PERSON ) provides :

Article CARDINAL

“ Everyone has the right to freedom of thought , conscience and religion . The church shall be separate from the ORG ” .

Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers no . CARDINAL ( DATE ) , entitled “ LAW ” ( Brīvības atņemšanas iestādes iekšējās kārtības noteikumi ) , provides in the relevant parts that detainees may keep only a limited range of objects in their cells , these objects being exhaustively listed in Annex no . CARDINAL of that Regulation . The list in the amendment does not include any objects of a religious character such as those requested by the applicant .

Pursuant to Section CARDINAL²(CARDINAL ) , an individual constitutional complaint must include justification as to how the applicant ’s fundamental rights as defined in the LAW have been infringed .

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ( CARDINAL ) provides that in examining applications , the panel dealing with the application may refuse to initiate a matter if the application does not comply with the requirements specified in Sections CARDINAL or CARDINAL of LAW . For a more detailed review see PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE , “ Relevant domestic law and practice ” part .

In DATE , R.N. ‒ a person who was serving a prison sentence at the material time ‒ lodged a constitutional complaint in which he asked ORG to assess ORG no . CARDINAL of Regulation no . CARDINAL of ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , insofar as it failed to regulate the keeping of religious objects . The claimant argued that the prohibition on the keeping by prisoners of religious objects such as icons , crosses , or rosaries contradicted the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed in LAW . He also argued that the prohibition on keeping religious objects prevented him from practising religious rituals and restricted his right to freedom of religion , and that such prohibition was not proportional . The claimant considered that the above restriction could not be justified on grounds of safety because it was possible to harm others using objects that were authorised . Moreover , in many prison establishments , the keeping of religious objects was permitted and this caused a feeling of inequality amongst the prisoners .

On DATE the Constitutional Court instituted constitutional proceedings ( case no . DATE ) in connection with ORG no . CARDINAL of Regulation no . CARDINAL of ORG ) , insofar as it failed to regulate the keeping of religious objects . On DATE it ruled in favour of the claimant and recognised that the contested norm , i.e. Annex no . CARDINAL of the contested Regulation did not comply with LAW . The annex was repealed with effect from DATE .


Angelika Nußberger;Carlo Ranzoni;Erik Møse;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mārtiņš Mits;Yonko Grozev

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE . He was represented before ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON , of ORG .

NORP The applicant complained , in particular , about having been unlawfully detained in GPE pending extradition to GPE .

On DATE the application was communicated to the Government . DATE ORG was informed of their right to intervene in the proceedings in accordance with LAW CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Rules of Court . They chose not to avail themselves of this right .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

In DATE the NORP investigating authorities came upon information leading them to suspect that in DATE the applicant had been involved in a car theft . However , they were unable to question him as he had left GPE DATE to work in GPE . In DATE they issued an international warrant for his arrest through ORG .

On DATE , when crossing into GPE from GPE , the applicant was arrested by the NORP border police on the basis of the warrant issued by the NORP authorities . He was informed in the presence of an interpreter that he was being arrested in connection with that warrant . The same day the police ordered that he be held under arrest for TIME under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of the DATE ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The applicant was given a copy of the order . He surrendered his car to the border police .

On DATE , DATE , the NORP authorities confirmed their intention to their NORP counterparts to submit an official request for the applicant ’s extradition to GPE . DATE ORG within ORG of the ORG informed the GPE city prosecutor about the applicant ’s arrest .

The prosecutor then issued an order for the applicant ’s detention for TIME , counting from the expiry of the QUANTITY police arrest . The order referred to LAW ( “ the LAW ” ) , as well as LAW ( “ the DATE Code ” ) in conjunction with LAW of LAW . The order also stated that the regional prosecutor of ORG should be immediately put on notice in order to ask ORG to authorise the applicant ’s further detention .

On DATE the ORG ordered the applicant ’s detention for DATE , pending receipt of the NORP extradition request . On DATE he was transferred to FAC on the basis of that court ’s decision . On DATE ORG informed the NORP authorities that the applicant had been detained pending the official GPE request for his extradition . Such a request had to reach GPE by DATE when the applicant ’s DATE detention would expire .

On DATE ORG received the extradition request . The next day that ORG extended the applicant ’s detention for TIME following the end of the DATE detention period ordered by the court . The prosecutor relied on ORG CARDINAL and CARDINALa of LAW ( see paragraphs QUANTITY below ) and LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . ORG additionally instructed the ORG regional prosecutor ’s office immediately to seek a court order extending the applicant ’s detention and to submit the extradition request to the court for examination .

On DATE ORG , in proceedings in which the applicant was assisted by an interpreter and a court - appointed lawyer , refused to authorise the applicant ’s extradition to GPE or his detention for that purpose . The court found in particular that there had been no order in GPE for the applicant ’s detention with a view to his serving a sentence , CARDINAL of the conditions of LAW . On DATE the applicant was released from FAC on the basis of that decision .

NORP On DATE , seeing that the proceedings for the applicant ’s extradition were still pending , the regional prosecutor of ORG imposed a ban on the applicant leaving the country . The ban was valid until the end of the extradition proceedings and was based on a provision in the CARDINAL Code which stated that individuals could be banned from leaving the country if criminal proceedings were pending against them ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the applicant registered with the authorities in ORG where he took up his residence on a provisional basis . On DATE the border police returned the applicant ’s car to him . He signed a form confirming that the car was not damaged and that nothing was missing from it .

The NORP border police placed the applicant under arrest for TIME at TIME on DATE when he tried to leave GPE by crossing the border with GPE . The order for his arrest was based on section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of the DATE ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and referred to the arrest warrant issued by the GPE authorities in connection with the applicant ’s extradition . The applicant was informed of the essence of the order in the presence of a NORP interpreter . He surrendered his car to the border police and signed a form where he wrote in NORP that he objected to his arrest .

Having verified that a valid ban on the applicant ’s leaving the country was in force and that there were no grounds for his detention , the police released him at TIME on DATE , which was TIME before the expiry of the order for his arrest . It is unclear what happened to the applicant ’s car . He did not ask for its return .

In a decision delivered on DATE , following a public hearing that had been held DATE in response to an appeal by the prosecutor against the ruling of ORG of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , ORG allowed the applicant ’s extradition to GPE . It found that the lower court had wrongly assessed the GPE request . In particular , the applicant had not been wanted in GPE to serve a sentence , as the firstinstance court had found , but to be tried in connection with an offence . That meant that a different provision of LAW had applied and all the material and procedural requirements to grant that request had been met .

The Sofia Court of Appeal held in a separate decision of CARDINAL DATE , issued following a closed hearing the same day , that it could not rule on the applicant ’s detention pending extradition . It said that it had already adopted a final and enforceable decision allowing the applicant ’s extradition and that that decision had put an end to the extradition proceedings . Given that those proceedings had been concluded , the applicant could thereafter only be detained for the purposes of being handed over to the requesting authorities .

In a letter of DATE , the ORG regional prosecutor ’s office advised ORG that the applicant was not in detention but that there was a valid ban on his leaving the country . It noted that he was also registered at the address of his court - appointed lawyer and that his passport and car had been returned to him .

On DATE ORG ordered the applicant ’s detention for the purposes of his extradition to GPE . The prosecutor ’s order , written over CARDINAL pages , comprised an overview of the procedural steps carried out up to that point . The order specified that the extradition proceedings were in their final phase and that the applicant was not in detention . Given that his extradition had been agreed with the NORP authorities and a concrete date and time for it had been set DATE at TIME local time – it was necessary to apprehend him for the purposes of his actual transfer into the custody of the NORP authorities .

The prosecutor then instructed the police to place the applicant under arrest on DATE for TIME in order to extradite him . In the same order the prosecutor authorised keeping the applicant in detention for the same purpose for TIME , starting from DATE . The order referred to section ORG ) of the Judicial Power Act DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below , last sentence ) , as well as to LAW of the CARDINAL Code of Criminal procedure ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) . It also stated that personal possessions taken from the applicant by the NORP authorities when he had been arrested should be handed over to the NORP authorities at the same time as his transfer .

NORP The applicant was detained on DATE and handed over to the NORP authorities on DATE as agreed . The report on his transfer stated that personal possessions held by the NORP authorities were handed over to the NORP authorities at the same time .

On DATE the NORP authorities discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant . On DATE the applicant asked the NORP authorities to take him off their database of wanted persons so that he could transit GPE without fearing arrest . On DATE ORG allowed that request and informed him accordingly . The border police recorded on DATE that the applicant left GPE with his car on DATE .

LAW entered into force in respect of GPE on DATE and in respect of GPE on DATE . LAW , which governs provisional arrest , provides as follows :

“ CARDINAL . In case of urgency the competent authorities of the requesting ORG may request the provisional arrest of the person sought . The competent authorities of the requested ORG shall decide the matter in accordance with its law .

NORP The request for provisional arrest shall state that CARDINAL of the documents mentioned in LAW , paragraph CARDINAL.a , exists and that it is intended to send a request for extradition . It shall also state for what offence extradition will be requested and when and where such offence was committed and shall so far as possible give a description of the person sought .

A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the competent authorities of the requested ORG either through the diplomatic channel or direct by post or telegraph or through ORG ( ORG ) or by any other means affording evidence in writing or accepted by the requested ORG . The requesting authority shall be informed without delay of the result of its request .

Provisional arrest may be terminated if , within DATE after arrest , the requested ORG has not received the request for extradition and the documents mentioned in LAW . It shall not , in any event , exceed DATE from the date of such arrest . The possibility of provisional release at any time is not excluded , but the requested ORG shall take any measures which it considers necessary to prevent the escape of the person sought .

Release shall not prejudice rearrest and extradition if a request for extradition is received subsequently . ”

Article CARDINAL governs the surrender of the person to be extradited and provides that :

“ CARDINAL . The requested ORG shall inform the requesting ORG by the means mentioned in LAW , paragraph CARDINAL , of its decision with regard to the extradition .

Reasons shall be given for any complete or partial rejection .

NORP If the request is agreed to , the requesting Party shall be informed of the place and date of surrender and of the length of time for which the person claimed was detained with a view to surrender .

Subject to the provisions of paragraph CARDINAL of this article , if the person claimed has not been taken over on the appointed date , he may be released after the expiry of DATE and shall in any case be released after the expiry of DATE . The requested ORG may refuse to extradite him for the same offence .

If circumstances beyond its control prevent a ORG from surrendering or taking over the person to be extradited , it shall notify the other ORG . The CARDINAL Parties shall agree a new date for surrender and the provisions of paragraph CARDINAL of this article shall apply . ”

Article CARDINAL , which governs the handing over of property , provides as follows :

“ CARDINAL . The requested ORG shall , in so far as its law permits and at the request of the requesting ORG , seize and hand over property :

a ) which may be required as evidence , or

b ) DATE which has been acquired as a result of the offence and which , at the time of the arrest , is found in the possession of the person claimed or is discovered subsequently .

NORP The property mentioned in paragraph CARDINAL of this article shall be handed over even if extradition , having been agreed to , can not be carried out owing to the death or escape of the person claimed .

When the said property is liable to seizure or confiscation in the territory of the requested ORG , the latter may , in connection with pending criminal proceedings , temporarily retain it or hand it over on condition that it is returned . ”

Article CARDINAL , which specifies the applicable procedure , provides as follows :

“ Except where this Convention otherwise provides , the procedure with regard to extradition and provisional arrest shall be governed solely by the law of the requested ORG . ”

The Explanatory Report defines the scope of application of LAW No . CARDINAL and clarifies the notion of “ expulsion ” as follows :

“ CARDINAL . The word “ resident ” is intended to exclude from the application of the article any alien who has arrived at a port or other point of entry but has not yet passed through the immigration control or who has been admitted to the territory for the purpose only of transit or for a limited period for a non - residential purpose ...

The word lawfully refers to the domestic law of the ORG concerned . It is therefore for domestic law to determine the conditions which must be fulfilled for a person ’s presence in the territory to be considered “ lawful ” .

[ A]n alien whose admission and stay were subject to certain conditions , for example a fixed period , and who no longer complies with these conditions can not be regarded as being still “ lawfully ” present .

The concept of expulsion is used in a generic sense as meaning any measure compelling the departure of an alien from the territory but does not include extradition . Expulsion in this sense is an autonomous concept which is independent of any definition contained in domestic legislation . ”

At the relevant time the extradition of persons accused of criminal offences was governed by Articles QUANTITY of LAW . Articles CARDINAL - CARDINALc governed the procedure for processing an extradition request made by another ORG .

Once received , the extradition request had to be sent to the competent regional prosecutor ( LAW and CARDINAL ) . That prosecutor then had to take the statement of the person whose extradition was being sought , implement any measure taken to secure his or her appearance , and transmit the extradition request to the competent regional court ( LAW ) . The request was then to be examined by CARDINAL judges at a public hearing . The person whose extradition was being sought had to be provided with counsel and an interpreter ( Article CARDINALa § CARDINAL ) . The court had to hear the public prosecutor , the person and his or her counsel , and then either allow or refuse the extradition . In its ruling it additionally had to specify whether personal items , documents and money found on the individual and having a connection with his or her offence should be handed over to the requesting ORG as well ( LAW ) . The court ’s ruling was subject to appeal before the court of appeal whose decision was final ( LAW ) . The prosecutor was responsible for implementing judicial decisions authorising extradition ( LAW and LAW ) .

At present the procedure for detention in the context of extradition proceedings requested by CARDINAL ORG is laid down in considerable detail in the DATE Extradition and LAW ( section CARDINAL ) , which entered into force on DATE and repealed ORG CARDINAL of the DATE Code .

Article CARDINALa of the DATE Code of Criminal Procedure , which governs the procedure for imposing pre - trial detention , was changed entirely DATE with effect from DATE in a bid to bring NORP law into line with LAW ( тълк. реш. № CARDINAL от CARDINAL юни DATE г. по н.д. № CARDINAL/CARDINAL г. , ORG на ORG ) .

The amended paragraph CARDINAL of Article CARDINALa provided at the time of the facts that the investigation and prosecution authorities had to ensure the prompt appearance of the accused before the competent first - instance court and , if necessary , detain him or her for that purpose before bringing him or her before the court . Such detention could not exceed TIME if ordered by an investigator or TIME if ordered by a prosecutor . No judicial review was available in respect of such detention .

At the relevant time the bodies responsible for the investigation at the pre - trial stage were investigators ( Article CARDINAL of the DATE Code ) and the prosecutors who supervised the activities of the former ( LAW ) . The prerogatives of the prosecutor included the issuing of mandatory instructions to the police ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of the LAW DATE ) .

Under LAW § CARDINAL of LAW , as applicable at the relevant time , the prosecutor could prohibit an individual accused of a criminal offence from leaving GPE without permission . The prohibition order was subject to judicial review ( LAW ) . The court had to rule immediately by means of a final decision ( LAW ) .

At the relevant time and until DATE , individuals could seek damages for unlawful detention under the ORG provided that such detention had been set aside in prior proceedings for lack of lawful grounds . Following amendments introduced in the ORG in DATE , in particular in section CARDINAL ) , individuals can seek damages for all cases of detention in breach of LAW Civil courts examine the issue of lawfulness and compensation in the same set of proceedings .

Under LAW , as in force at the relevant time , the police could , on the basis of a written order , arrest individuals who were on international wanted lists owing to extradition requests from other GPE ( section DATE ) ) . An individual taken into police custody was entitled to be assisted by counsel and seek judicial review of his detention ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) ) . The application had to be examined immediately ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) in fine ) . Police detention under section CARDINAL could not exceed TIME ( section CARDINAL in fine ) .

Arrest orders under section CARDINAL were administrative decisions and any subsequent judicial review of them was carried out in accordance with the standard rules of administrative procedure , meaning that such an order could be appealed against within DATE of the arrestee ’s being apprised of the order . According to the case - law of ORG ( опр. № DATE от CARDINAL февруари DATE г. по адм. д. № DATE , ORG , V отд. ; реш. № CARDINAL от CARDINAL януари DATE г. по адм. д. № DATE г. , PERSON , V отд. ) , persons affected by police arrests could challenge their lawfulness before a court and , if the orders were set aside , the individuals concerned could seek damages under LAW ORG .


VERLAGSGRUPPE HANDELSBLATT GMBH & CO. KG v. GERMANY

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Carlo Ranzoni;Ganna Yudkivska;Khanlar Hajiyev;Yonko Grozev

NORP The applicant , PERSON & Co. KG , was formerly known as PERSON , a NORP private limited company whose registered office was in GPE . It published the DATE business news magazine Wirtschaftswoche . In DATE it was converted into a private limited partnership and the company seized to exist . The applicant was represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

NORP In its edition of DATE , ORG published an article about the CEO of ORG ) , PERSON . It was entitled “ Almighty PERSON ” ( ORG ) and critically reviewed his management style and the consequences for NORP Telecom .

The article was accompanied by a photomontage , which was shown in different sizes CARDINAL times throughout the entire magazine . The photomontage was a crumbling magenta - coloured “ T ” , the logo of ORG , with a person sitting on top of it with PERSON face . The picture was put together using the body of a model in a sitting position and a photograph of PERSON head . The applicant retrieved the photograph of the head from the image database of ORG . To fit the body and head together , the photograph of the head was vertically stretched and horizontally shrunk .

Dr PERSON applied for an interim injunction to stop any further publication of the photomontage . He argued that by planting his head on a different body and by the fact that his head appeared more corpulent in the photomontage than in real life , his reputation was being damaged . He stated , in particular , that his cheeks appeared longer , his chin plumper and his neck shorter .

On DATE ORG granted the interim injunction , without hearing the applicant ’s arguments .

On DATE , on an objection by the applicant , ORG set the interim injunction aside . It found that the photomontage constituted a value judgment in the form of a satirical illustration , which conveyed the criticism expressed in the attached article . The minor discrepancies and the “ wrong ” body had not infringed Dr PERSON ’s personality rights to such a degree as to justify an interference with the applicant ’s freedom of expression . The court also stated that it was not its task to assess whether the applicant could have created a “ better ” , less infringing photomontage , since the form of expression was the prerogative of the author or artist . Furthermore , the satirical nature of the illustration was apparent , as the average reader would not consider that Dr PERSON sitting on a crumbling “ T ” replicated real life .

On DATE ORG reinstated the interim injunction . It held that the illustration had to be divided between the “ T ” and the depicted person . While it was apparent that the “ T ” part was a satirical illustration , the manipulation of the head , namely the stretching and shrinking , was not so obvious . Consequently , the average reader would expect the picture of PERSON to depict reality . Owing to this “ untrue ” illustration , the personality rights of PERSON overrode the applicant ’s freedom of expression .

On DATE ORG upheld the interim injunction preventing any further publication of the photomontage .

On DATE ORG dismissed an appeal brought by the applicant . It reiterated that the manipulated photograph of PERSON showed him in an untrue , unfavourable and disadvantageous light . Nevertheless , since the manipulation was so slight , the average reader would not realise the distortion . The court found that PERSON PERSON did not have to accept this untrue and manipulated depiction of himself in the press .

On DATE ORG overturned ORG judgment . It found that the satirical illustration could not be broken down into individual components , but had to be assessed as a whole . Therefore , the satirical nature of the illustration was apparent and a typical reader would not expect to see a depiction of reality . Given that the extent of the alteration had been so slight , the applicant ’s freedom of expression overrode the personality rights of PERSON , who had to accept the satirical illustration of himself . Furthermore , the court found that the publication of the photograph had not infringed PERSON right to protection of his image because , as the CEO of a well - known former ORG company with a monopoly , he was actually a “ relative figure of contemporary society ” ( relative Person der GPE ) . Given that the shares of the company were intensely advertised as “ people ’s shares ” ( GPE ) and that the company still had a leading market share the management style of Dr PERSON and the consequences for the company were an issue of general interest . Consequently , the satirical illustration , including the publication of his photograph attached to an article that contributed to a debate of general interest , was legitimate .

On DATE ORG repealed ORG judgment and remitted the case ( CARDINAL BvR CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . The court held that personality rights generally also included protection from the publication of technically manipulated photographs . In the context of satirical illustrations , it had to be established whether the manipulation had its own satirical nature or was technically necessary for the composition of the illustration , or whether the alterations were negligible . Applying these principles to the photomontage in question , the court found that the applicants had used a photograph of PERSON to depict reality and make the person identifiable , and that the illustration of the person had no satirical value in itself . Therefore , the untrue photograph could only be justified if the alterations had been technically necessary or negligible . This however had to be ascertained by the lower courts .

On DATE ORG remitted the case to ORG , as the latter had not established whether the alterations had been technical necessary or negligible .

On DATE ORG appointed an expert to analyse the manipulations of the original photograph of PERSON and establish to what extent it had been altered . The expert established that the head had been vertically stretched by PERCENT and horizontally shrunk by PERCENT . He furthermore compiled his own photomontage that showed that the head could have been fitted to the body without the above - mentioned distortion being made . Consequently , he came to the conclusion that the manipulation had not been technically necessary .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal by the applicant and upheld the original interim injunction , preventing any further publication of the photomontage . The court found that the unnecessary alterations of the photograph conveyed an untrue message regarding the appearance of PERSON . Because the manipulation had not been negligible and had led to an unfavourable and negative presentation of PERSON PERSON , his general personality rights had been infringed . This infraction could not be justified by the applicant ’s freedom of expression .

On DATE ORG dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the refusal of leave to appeal on points of law .

On DATE ORG refused to admit for adjudication a constitutional complaint brought by the applicant , without providing reasons ( CARDINAL BvR CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .


Remainder inadmissible (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria;(Art. 35-3-a) Manifestly ill-founded;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-c - Bringing before competent legal authority);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-c - Bringing before competent legal authority);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-c - Bringing before competent legal authority);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-c - Bringing before competent legal authority);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-a - After conviction);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-5 - Compensation);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-5 - Compensation);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6-2 - Presumption of innocence);Violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 - Right of appeal in criminal matters (Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 - Review of sentence);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom

At TIME on DATE Officer PERSON escorted the applicant to the police station , in accordance with LAW ( “ the ORG ” ) ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , on suspicion of shoplifting .

Officer PERSON compiled an arrest record under LAW ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The administrative arrest record reads as follows :

“ I , Officer PERSON , ... compiled the present administrative arrest record in respect of : [ the applicant ’s name , date of birth , address ] ... who has been escorted to ... on DATE at TIME , on account of an administrative offence under Article [ blank ] of the ORG .

Reasons for the arrest ( LAW ORG ) : [ blank ] ... ”

According to the applicant , after she had been taken away by the police , her minor son ( who had apparently been with her in the shop ) had been left unattended in the cold . The applicant was then subjected to a humiliating body - search procedure and was asked to take off her clothes , remaining in her underwear . She was then kept with drunk people in a small cell with no seats and no toilet .

In her application to the ORG , the applicant specified that she had been released at TIME on DATE . In her observations before the ORG , she specified that she had been released “ after TIME ” . According to the Government , the applicant was released at TIME

The applicant was not subsequently prosecuted for an administrative offence or a criminal offence .

Considering that the police actions in respect of her and the degrading treatment to which she had been subjected were sufficiently serious so as to amount to a criminal offence , on DATE the applicant sought the institution of criminal proceedings against officer PERSON , referring , inter alia , to the unlawful deprivation of liberty .

On DATE an investigator refused to open a criminal case , finding that the officer had not committed any abuse of power , which was a criminal offence punishable under LAW of LAW . The investigator referred to a statement from B. affirming that the applicant had been taken to the police station on suspicion of theft .

On DATE a superior officer overruled the refusal to open a case . A new refusal was issued on DATE by the same investigator . That was also then overruled .

A further refusal was issued on DATE and the applicant sought a judicial review . On DATE the ORG confirmed the refusal . On DATE ORG set aside the judgment , considering that the applicant ’s allegations concerning the unlawfulness of her arrest had not been examined .

ORG then declined jurisdiction in favour of another court , but that was declared unlawful on appeal .

On DATE ORG discontinued the case because on DATE the impugned refusal to prosecute had been overruled by a superior officer . However , a new refusal was issued on CARDINAL DATE as regards offences under LAW , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW . This refusal was then upheld by a final judgment of ORG on DATE .

This application was lodged on DATE by PERSON , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . The applicant was represented before the Court by Ms Y. Lepilina , a lawyer practising in LOC .

On DATE the applicant ’s superior , PERSON , called the police to report that the applicant had used ( unspecified ) foul language at his work place . Officer PERSON ordered the applicant to accompany him to the police station . The applicant refused and said that nothing prevented the officer from compiling an administrative - offence record on the spot . The officer insisted , stating that it would be more convenient for him to do it at the police station . The applicant obeyed and was escorted to the police station at TIME ( in accordance with LAW . At TIME he was subjected to the arrest procedure ( LAW ORG ) . The arrest record reads as follows :

“ [ The applicant ] was escorted to the police station at : TIME

On account of : an administrative offence under : LAW

For the purpose(s ) of LAW ORG : for taking a decision . ”

Officer PERSON compiled the administrative - offence record , which reads as follows :

“ [ The applicant ] used foul language in the presence of PERSON and continued his unruly behaviour , despite being asked to stop . Thus , [ the applicant ] committed an offence under LAW .

Witnesses to the offence : PERSON ; Mr M. ”

The applicant spent TIME at the police station .

On DATE the applicant was taken before a justice of the peace , who held a hearing at which he examined the applicant , as well as NORP , PERSON and QUANTITY On DATE , the justice of the peace convicted the applicant of minor hooliganism ( Article CARDINAL of the ORG ) and sentenced him to DATE of detention .

NORP The applicant started to serve the sentence on DATE , in the police station . DATE and DATE he was locked in cells measuring QUANTITY and accommodating , on average , CARDINAL detainees . Each cell was equipped with CARDINAL benches QUANTITY in width . There was no window and no ventilation system . The other detainees smoked cigarettes , which caused discomfort to the applicant , who was not a smoker . There was no bed or bedding . The applicant was not provided with food or allowed outdoors . Access to a toilet ( which was apparently outside the cell ) was available TIME ( or sometimes TIME ) . The applicant submitted written statements from CARDINAL co - detainees in support of his allegations .

The applicant was released at TIME on DATE .

On DATE ORG held an appeal hearing and examined the applicant , I. , PERSON Officer O. The appellate court upheld the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . On DATE ORG upheld the judgments following a review .

This application was lodged on DATE by PERSON , who was born in DATE and lives in LOC . The applicant was represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in LOC .

On DATE the applicant distributed leaflets in various police stations , urging the police not to use force to disperse public gatherings which were to be held on DATE , after the contested elections to ORG DATE .

At TIME the traffic police took the applicant to the police station on suspicion of evading military service . At TIME the applicant was charged with an administrative offence under LAW ORG on account of an unpaid fine of MONEY ( RUB ) ( equivalent to QUANTITY ( ORG ) ) for a traffic offence . The charge concerning evasion of military service was not pursued .

The arrest record reads as follows :

“ [ The applicant ] was escorted to the police station : at TIME

On account of an administrative offence : under LAW ORG .

For the purposes of LAW ORG : for compiling an administrative record . ”

The applicant was not released after the administrative - offence record had been drawn up , but was instead placed in a detention centre at TIME , for reasons which were not specified .

At TIME on DATE the applicant was taken before a justice of the peace , who then sentenced him to DATE of detention for the offence under LAW . The applicant was then taken back to the detention centre and was released at TIME

The applicant appealed . On DATE ORG upheld the conviction .

The applicant brought proceedings , under LAW of LAW ( “ the ORG ” ) , to challenge the deprivation of his liberty from CARDINAL a.m. on DATE to TIME the next day . By a decision of CARDINAL DATE , ORG discontinued the proceedings . On DATE ORG of GPE upheld the decision . On DATE the cassation instance of the same court confirmed it . The courts considered that while neither the ORG nor the ORG set out a separate procedure for challenging the measures of being escorted to the police station or of administrative arrest , arguments concerning those measures could be raised during an examination of the related ORG charges against the applicant , as well as in an appeal against a decision that had been taken on such charges .

In separate proceedings , the applicant lodged a claim for compensation , arguing that Article CARDINAL required that a record of administrative arrest was to specify reasons for the arrest ; the record of his arrest referred to the need to compile the administrative - offence record ; such record had been compiled TIME on DATE ; thereby the justification for his arrest had been exhausted and could no longer justify his continued deprivation of liberty on CARDINAL and DATE . The applicant concluded from the above that the unlawful deprivation of liberty on those dates served as a legal basis for obtaining compensation on account of the non - pecuniary damage suffered .

By a judgment of DATE , ORG dismissed the applicant ’s claim . The court considered that the matters relating to his being taken to the police station and the ensuing administrative arrest had been examined in the ORG case and there were therefore no reasons to award compensation . On DATE ORG of GPE upheld that judgment . On DATE the same court dismissed a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant , stating as follows :

“ ... [ The applicant ] was escorted to the police station for the compiling of a record of administrative offence ... With a view to the correct and expedient examination of the case , he was subjected to the measure of administrative arrest ... The actions of the police officers relating to the escorting and the arrest procedures were assessed by the courts dealing with the administrative charge and were , in substance , declared lawful ... The claimant ’s argument that the courts in a civil case should assess the lawfulness of the police actions is based on a wrong interpretation of the law ... It is not appropriate to challenge the procedure of administrative arrest within the procedure under LAW of LAW , where there is a decision to engage the liability of a person for an administrative offence ... ”

This application was lodged on CARDINAL DATE by PERSON , who was born in DATE and lives in ORG in GPE , GPE .

On various dates DATE , including from DATE ( see below ) , the applicant was kept in a temporary detention centre . According to him , the cells had no toilet ; he had had to relieve himself in a bucket ; there was no running water available in the cells , and no access to shower facilities .

According to a written report by Officer PERSON , at TIME on DATE he arrested the applicant for being drunk and looking untidy in a public place , and took him to the police station where he then remained until he sobered up . It appears , however , that the applicant was actually arrested ( apparently , by another officer ) and then tested for alcohol intoxication TIME and TIME respectively ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . On DATE before a justice of the peace the applicant admitted that he had consumed vodka with a friend in the morning DATE before but denied that he had appeared untidy at CARDINAL . TIME or had been drunk or otherwise behaving in a manner offending public morals or human dignity . On DATE , referring to S. ’s report , a medical report ( the contents of which are not clear ) and an arrest record , the justice of the peace convicted the applicant of an administrative offence under LAW on account of being drunk in a public place at TIME on DATE while having an untidy appearance , thus offending human dignity and public morals . The justice of the peace sentenced him to DATE of administrative detention .

The applicant started to serve his sentence on DATE .

The applicant appealed . On DATE ORG quashed the conviction and discontinued the case for lack of any evidence to confirm the facts as imputed to the applicant . The appeal court considered that there had been nothing to suggest that the applicant had had an untidy appearance which offended human dignity or public morals ; around the same time the applicant had had an appointment at the prosecutor ’s office and no complaint had been made concerning his appearance or any state of drunkenness . The appeal decision reads as follows :

“ The defendant was convicted of being drunk and looking untidy in a public place at TIME on DATE ...

[ The applicant ] stated that he had consumed vodka with a friend in TIME of DATE ; had then attended a sauna , had put clean clothes , had had lunch and had then gone to attend a meeting in the district prosecutor ’s office ; he had not seen any police officer at TIME ...

Mr Se . stated before the appeal court that he had had a meeting with [ the applicant ] at TIME While he could see that [ the applicant ] had consumed alcohol , he conducted himself , looked and spoke properly ...

Officer PERSON stated that he had been told on DATE of [ the applicant ] being drunk but he had actually not seen him at TIME and had actually not effected his arrest at that time ...

The file contains a medical report compiled at TIME and the arrest record indicating that the defendant had been arrested at TIME

There is no other evidence in the file . The trial court relied on S. ’s report , the medical report and the arrest record . However , it has now been established that the defendant was examined and arrested much later than at TIME on DATE ... PERSON ’s presentation of facts is not truthful and contradicts his earlier report . Shortly after that time the defendant was at the district prosecutor ’s office and testified before an investigator [ Se . ] . His appearance and conduct did not offend human dignity and public morals ... So it has not been established that the defendant committed any offence under LAW ... The proceedings should be discontinued for lack of a corpus delicti ... ”

The applicant was released on DATE .

NORP The applicant brought civil proceedings , seeking compensation in the amount of RUB CARDINAL ( equivalent to EUR CARDINAL ) in respect of nonpecuniary damage owing to the conditions of his detention and the unlawful penalty of administrative detention . By a judgment of DATE , ORG awarded the applicant RUB MONEY ( ORG CARDINAL according to ORG rate on the relevant date ) on the basis of the fact that the prosecution had been discontinued . On DATE ORG upheld that judgment .

This application was lodged on DATE by PERSON , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . The applicant was represented before the Court by Ms I. Buryukova , a lawyer practising in LOC .

Section CARDINAL of LAW of CARDINAL banned public gatherings “ in the immediate vicinity of court buildings ” . Relying on that provision of the LAW , in DATE the NORP town administration decided to ban the holding of public events within a radius of QUANTITY of any court , to be measured from the entrance to each court building in the town .

At TIME on DATE , as part of a series of solo demonstrations held in DATE , the applicant placed himself within a fenced - off area around the building housing the prosecutor ’s office . He was holding a poster that read “ The prosecutor ’s office should return FAC to demonstrators ! ” .

After TIME the police ordered the applicant to stop the demonstration because it was being held in the vicinity of the ORG building . He was handcuffed and , allegedly , physical force was used against him . He was then taken to the police station and subjected to the measure of administrative arrest . The relevant record reads as follows :

“ [ The applicant ] arrived at the police station at ‘ CARDINAL.CARDINAL’ in connection with offences under : ‘ LAW , LAW

For ( among the grounds listed in LAW ) : for compiling a record of administrative offence ... ”

The applicant was released at TIME He was later admitted to hospital .

By a judgment of DATE , a justice of the peace convicted the applicant under LAW ORG and sentenced him to a fine of RUB CARDINAL ( equivalent to ORG CARDINAL at the time ) . On DATE ORG upheld the judgment . However , on DATE ORG of GPE set aside the above judgments and discontinued the case . The court considered that there had been no evidence that the place where the applicant had stood was assigned to the territory of ORG under the applicable laws and regulations .

The applicant brought civil proceedings for compensation on account of the unlawful deprivation of his liberty on DATE . By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , ORG dismissed his claim . On DATE ORG of GPE upheld that judgment . The court observed as follows :

( a ) Having regard to Articles CARDINAL , DATE and CARDINAL of the Convention and the ruling of ORG of GPE dated DATE ( concerning the application of the Convention by courts of general jurisdiction ) , the police ’s action in taking the applicant to the police station had been proportionate and had pursued a legitimate aim ; it had been of short duration , and had not involved any recourse to physical force .

( b ) The measure of taking the applicant to the police station had been aimed at ensuring prosecution for an administrative offence , including the drawing up of an arrest record .

This application was lodged on DATE by PERSON , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE in LOC .

DATE . On DATE the applicant ’s car was stopped by the police . The applicant was accused of an administrative offence under Article CARDINAL of the ORG because he had no valid driving licence . The applicant was taken to the police station where he went through the procedure of being placed under administrative arrest . His mobile telephone was seized .

According to the applicant , he was not informed of his procedural rights , including the right to remain silent , when he was pulled up by the police , or at the police station .

On DATE ( a DATE ) the applicant was taken before a justice of the peace . At the hearing , the applicant asked for a lawyer . The judge adjourned the hearing for TIME to allow the applicant to contact a lawyer . According to the applicant , during the break in the hearing , a guard took him to a metal cage where defendants were kept ; the applicant had no access to a telephone . According to the Government , the applicant was not kept in a metal cage but in a room measuring QUANTITY .

According to the Government , after the adjournment the applicant waived his right to legal assistance and opted to defend himself . The applicant submitted that he had not made any such statement .

The justice of the peace convicted the applicant of the offence and sentenced him to DATE of administrative detention , to be counted from DATE . The justice of the peace stated that the applicant ’s guilt was confirmed by , inter alia , the record of administrative offence compiled by the police as well as by the applicant ’s guilty plea . The justice of the peace had dismissed as unsubstantiated his argument that as a military officer , he could not be sentenced to administrative detention .

The applicant began his sentence DATE .

On DATE the applicant appealed . In his statement of appeal he mentioned that he had had difficulties with legal assistance since no law firms would be open on a DATE . He was released on DATE .

On DATE the ORG examined the applicant and upheld the judgment against him . It stated , inter alia , that the justice of the peace had not been provided with any proof that the applicant was a military officer . It is unclear whether the applicant adduced the relevant evidence in the appeal proceedings .

The applicant also lodged a constitutional complaint . By decision no . CARDINAL-O of DATE , ORG held that the immediate execution of the sentence of administrative detention had not contravened LAW ( see “ Relevant domestic law and practice ” , paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE ORG dismissed an application by the applicant for review of the court decisions of CARDINAL and DATE .

On DATE ORG of GPE dismissed a further application for review lodged by the applicant .


CASE OF GROSSMANN AIR SERVICE BEDARFSLUFTFAHRTUNTERNEHMEN GMBH & CO KG v. AUSTRIA

Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Egidijus Kūris;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

NORP The applicant company is a limited liability company which is registered in GPE and has its seat in GPE .

In DATE the ORG Minister made a public call for tenders concerning flight services for delegations of ORG . The applicant company submitted an offer , but simultaneously complained that the public tender was tailored towards CARDINAL specific tenderer , namely the L. company . It was therefore revoked .

On DATE an amended public call for tenders was issued . The applicant company did not submit an offer .

Upon request , the applicant company was informed that ORG decided on DATE to award the contract to the L. company . The respective contract was concluded on DATE .

On DATE , received by ORG ( Bundesvergabeamt ) on DATE , the applicant company requested to initiate review proceedings concerning the public call for tenders and to declare the awarding of the contract to the L. company null and void .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant company ’s request , holding that it had failed to show its legal interest in the public tender .

On DATE the applicant company filed a complaint with ORG and asked it to seek a preliminary ruling from ORG of ORG ( CJEU ) on the question of the existence of a legal interest .

On DATE ORG set aside ORG decision and held that it should have requested a preliminary ruling .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG therefore requested a preliminary ruling from the ORG .

On DATE the ORG issued a preliminary ruling , holding in essence that a person who did not participate in the public tendering proceedings due to an allegedly discriminatory call may still request their review .

On DATE ORG again rejected the applicant company ’s request .

On DATE the applicant company filed a complaint with ORG .

On DATE ORG declined to deal with the applicant company ’s complaint , holding that it did not raise any questions of constitutional law , and transferred the case to ORG .

On DATE the applicant company submitted its amended complaint to ORG .

On DATE ORG set aside ORG decision , holding that the applicant company had been eligible to file a request for review proceedings .

On DATE the applicant company filed a letter to the ORG ’s Department ( GPE ) , asking whether GPE would be interested in reaching a settlement in this case , referring to ORG inactivity after ORG last decision and the fact that the proceedings have already lasted for DATE .

On DATE the Auditor - General ’s Department replied and requested the applicant company to specify their claims for compensation . It further stated that the applicant company could file an application against ORG failure to decide .

On DATE the applicant company filed an application with ORG against ORG failure to decide ( PERSON ) .

On DATE ORG requested ORG to issue , within DATE , either a decision or to explain why it did not violate its duty to decide .

On DATE a meeting took place between the parties , but no settlement could be reached .

On DATE ORG issued its decision , finding that awarding the contract to the L. company in the public tender proceedings had not been unlawful .

On DATE ORG discontinued the proceedings concerning the applicant company ’s application filed against ORG failure to decide as the latter had issued its decision on DATE , but awarded the applicant company the legal costs .

On DATE ORG declined to deal with the complaint . It held that the impugned decision had not deviated from ORG case - law and that the complaint did not raise any legal questions of fundamental significance .

NORP This decision was served on the applicant company ’s counsel on DATE .


Violation of Article 14+8 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - award

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Guido Raimondi;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Nebojša Vučinić;Robert Spano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in ORG .

On DATE the applicant sat an examination in order to become a public servant . She was successful in the examination and on an unspecified date she was informed by ORG attached to the Prime Minister ’s office that she had been appointed to the post of security officer in the Batman branch of ORG , the state - run ORG , the first of the CARDINAL choices that the applicant had made in the course of the examination procedure .

On DATE the human resources department of the ORG branch of ORG informed the applicant that she would not be appointed as she did not fulfil the requirements of “ being a man ” and “ having completed military service ” .

NORP In a letter dated CARDINAL DATE and addressed to ORG , the human resources department of ORG requested the ORG to provide a list of new persons to be appointed instead of a number of persons , including the applicant , who could not be recruited for various reasons . As regards the applicant and CARDINAL other persons , PERSON , PERSON and PERSON , the human resources department of ORG informed the ORG that they were women and therefore could not work as security officers . In the letter , it was stated that security officers had the task of protecting depots , switchyards and transformer stations in rural areas far from city centres , against attacks and in case of fire and sabotage . They were obliged to work day and night and to use weapons , including those with long barrels , and physical force in case of an attack . It was therefore considered that women were not suitable for the post of security officer .

On DATE the applicant lodged an action against the general directorate of ORG with ORG requesting the annulment of the decision of the Batman branch of ORG with all its financial consequences . In her deposition , the applicant noted that being a man was not a requirement for appointment to the post in question and that she fulfilled all the requirements for that post . The applicant also noted that she had been deprived of the opportunity to be appointed to CARDINAL of the other CARDINAL posts that she had indicated following the refusal in question and that she could not sit the examination again in DATE as she had succeeded in DATE .

On an unspecified date the general directorate of ORG submitted to the administrative court that CARDINAL of the requirements for the post in question had been declared by ORG as “ having completed military service ” and that therefore only men could be appointed to the post . The applicant , being a woman , could therefore not be recruited as a security officer .

On DATE ORG annulled the decision of the Batman branch of ORG . The court held that the requirement of “ having completed military service ” should be considered to apply only to male candidates and that there had been no restriction on women working as security officers in ORG . The court also noted that another woman , GPE , who had also brought a case against ORG for the same reasons as the applicant , had been appointed to the post of security officer after she had lodged the case .

Subsequent to the judgment of DATE , the applicant was offered a contract by the Batman branch of ORG . On DATE she took up her duties . On DATE she was transferred to the ORG branch of ORG as her husband lived and worked in that city .

On DATE ORG lodged an appeal against the judgment of CARDINAL DATE , requesting ORG to order a stay of execution of the judgment of ORG and to subsequently quash it . The representative of ORG submitted , inter alia , that the announcement of the post of security officers in the Batman branch contained the requirement of “ having completed military service ” and not “ in respect of male candidates , having completed military service ” , unlike the post in the Gaziantep branch of ORG , which first rejected PERSON According to the lawyer , this expression demonstrated that the post was reserved for male candidates only and that therefore the status of the applicant was different from that of GPE

On DATE ORG dismissed the request for a stay of execution .

On DATE ORG quashed the judgment of ORG , holding that the requirement regarding military service demonstrated that the post in question was reserved for male candidates and that this requirement was lawful having regard to the nature of the post and the public interest . The high court therefore found that the administration ’s decision had been in accordance with the law .

On DATE the applicant requested rectification of the decision of DATE . In her petition , she submitted that the post of security officer was not reserved for male candidates and that therefore the high court ’s decision was in breach of the principle of equality .

On DATE the applicant was dismissed from her post at the ORG branch of ORG . According to the letter sent by the deputy head of the human resources department of ORG to the ORG branch , the applicant ’s contract was to be terminated on account of the decision of ORG dated DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a petition with ORG . She maintained that she had lost her post and requested the high court to order a stay of execution of the decision of DATE . She noted , in her petition , that the post in question should not be reserved only for men , since certain acts , such as a body search on women , should be carried out by female officers .

On DATE her request was dismissed by ORG .

On DATE ORG further dismissed the applicant ’s request for rectification .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s case , taking into consideration the decision of ORG .

On DATE the applicant appealed . In her deposition she noted that there were CARDINAL other similar cases brought against ORG by female candidates for the same reasons as hers and that CARDINAL of these cases , brought by PERSON , who had also not been appointed to a post of security officer in the Batman branch of ORG on the same grounds as those applied to the applicant , was pending before ORG . She further noted that she would have lost the opportunity to apply for another public post , had the high court decided in favour of ORG .

On DATE ORG ( NORP PERSON ) issued a decision in favour of ORG held that the requirement of “ having completed military service ” should be considered to apply only to male candidates and that the refusal to appoint PERSON to the Batman branch of ORG had therefore been unlawful .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of CARDINAL DATE , holding that the latter was in accordance with the law . In its decision , the court noted the content of the decision of ORG but did not comment on it .

On DATE the applicant requested rectification of the decision of CARDINAL DATE , maintaining that the decision in question constituted a breach of the principle of equality and the right to a fair hearing since ORG had ruled in favour of PERSON She further claimed that there had been discrimination , since pursuant to the LAW no distinction could be made in public employment .

On DATE the Twelfth ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Luis López Guerra

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained that they had been denied an opportunity to appear in person before the court in the civil proceedings to which they were parties .


Violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression;Freedom to impart information);Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage - award

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in ORG .

The applicant is a television journalist . From DATE he was employed by the ORG television company ( ORG . ) . Following an amendment of his work contract on DATE , he was appointed for an indeterminate period . At the material time , he was chairman of ORG ( ORG ) , active within the television company .

The applicant was in charge , as editor and presenter , of a periodical cultural programme called Éjjeli menedék ( Night Shelter ) which involved interviews with various figures of cultural life .

According to point CARDINAL of his work contract , the applicant was bound by professional confidentiality . He was obliged not to reveal any information acquired in connection to his position the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to either his employer or any other person . According to the labour contract , he also took note of the fact that a breach of this obligation would lead to the immediate termination of his employment .

Following the appointment of a new cultural director the applicant had apparently contacted the television company ’s president , since he had perceived the new director ’s conduct in modifying and cutting certain contents of Éjjeli menedék as censorship . He had received no response to his complaint .

On DATE the editor - in - chief of ORG menedék addressed a letter to the board of ORG . stating , amongst other things , that the appointment of the new cultural director had led to censorship of the programme by his suggesting modifications to , and the deletion of , certain contents .

On DATE an article appeared in the online version of a NORP DATE ( ORG ) , containing the editor - in - chief ’s letter as well as a statement of ORG ) , inviting the board to end censorship in the television company .

In DATE the applicant published a book entitled “ GPE antifasiszta és a hungarista – Titkok a FAC ” ( The NORP and the NORP - Secrets from ORG ) . Each chapter of the book contained an extract from different interviews recorded in DATE , which had not been broadcast in the cultural programme , apparently on the basis of the instructions of the cultural director in question . Along with the extracts , the applicant included numerous in - house letter exchanges between the cultural director and the editor - in - chief concerning the suggested changes in the programme . Moreover , the chapters contained a short introduction or summary of the events , reflecting the applicant ’s personal opinion . The preface of the book said that it would contain documentary evidence of censorship exercised in the ORG television company . It called on the readers to decide whether the documents indicated the cultural director ’s legitimate exercise of his supervisory functions or an interference with the broadcaster ’s freedom of expression .

On DATE the television company dismissed from employment the applicant and the editor - in - chief of ORG menedék , with immediate effect . The reason for the applicant ’s summary dismissal was that , by publishing the book in question , he had breached the confidentiality clause contained in his labour contract .

The applicant challenged his dismissal in court . He argued , inter alia , that he had received the in - house letter - exchange in connection with his position as the chairman of the trade union , in order for him to take steps against the alleged censorship at the television company , and that he had published the impugned book in that capacity .

NORP In its judgment of DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s action , stating that he had breached his obligations under point CARDINAL of his work contract by publishing information about his employer without its consent . The court also found that the applicant ’s position as chairman of the trade union did not exempt him from the duty of confidentiality .

The applicant appealed , arguing that the publication of the book had not in any way prejudiced his employer or any other person and that he had not acquired the published information in connection with his position but in his capacity as trade union chairman . In that position , and in representation of the interests of his colleagues , he was obliged to act against the censorship within the television company . Thus , according to the applicant , the conditions of dismissal , as stipulated in point CARDINAL of his labour contract , had not been fulfilled .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal on the same grounds as ORG , adding that the publication of the book might have had a certain detrimental effect on the television company ’s reputation . Furthermore , in ORG opinion , the impugned measure had not constituted an abuse of rights on the employer ’s side , since the applicant had voluntarily agreed to the restriction of his freedom of expression by signing his labour contract .

The applicant pursued a petition for review before ORG . He argued that he had been unlawfully dismissed in that his conduct , namely to inform the public about censorship at the ORG television company in a book DATE which was a last - ditch option given that his efforts vis - à - vis the management to have the matter investigated had been to no avail – should have been regarded as an exercise of his freedom of expression rather than an unlawful breach of his labour contract , especially in view of the fact that the allegation of censorship had not been refuted .

On DATE ORG found against the applicant . Referring to the applicant ’s submission concerning freedom of expression , it held that the scope of the case did not extend beyond the examination of the applicant ’s breach of his labour obligations . In the court ’s view , the applicant had indeed breached the contract by means of the unauthorised publication of internal documents of his former employer . The court expressly excluded from its scrutiny the question whether or not the applicant ’s freedom of expression justified , in the circumstances , a formal breach of his labour contract .

This decision was served on DATE .


Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life)

Alvina Gyulumyan;Corneliu Bîrsan;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Luis López Guerra;Nona Tsotsoria

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant ( also referred to herein as prosecutor PERSON ) , in her capacity as a prosecutor at the prosecutor ’s office attached to ORG , initiated criminal proceedings against A.B. on CARDINAL occasions . She filed an indictment proposing PERSON ’s conviction in both sets of proceedings .

The first indictment , filed by the applicant on DATE , sought the conviction of A.B. for the offences of making false declarations and destruction . On DATE ORG found PERSON guilty as charged and sentenced her to CARDINAL months’ imprisonment in respect of each offence . The judgment was upheld by GPE , which dismissed an appeal lodged by ORG . On DATE the Ploiești Court of Appeal allowed an appeal on points of law lodged by A.B. in part , noting that the limitation period had expired in respect of the offence of destruction .

The second indictment of DATE was not approved by the chief prosecutor , who ordered the discontinuance of the criminal proceedings against A.B.

On DATE disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the applicant following a complaint being lodged by A.B. On DATE the prosecutor ’s office attached to ORG found that the applicant had not committed any disciplinary offence and closed the investigation .

A.S. , a journalist at the national newspaper GPE Liberă , wrote CARDINAL articles concerning the applicant ’s professional activity in connection with the criminal proceedings against A.B.

The first article published on DATE was entitled “ ORG corruption . Prosecutor PERSON falsified CARDINAL indictments ! An innocent person was sentenced to prison ” and had CARDINAL sections . The first section , entitled “ Professional dross , confirmed by her superiors ” ( “ Rebut professional , confirmat de șefi ” ) , referred to an allegedly “ falsified ” indictment filed by the applicant on DATE . It concerned PERSON , who according to the journalist had been innocent and a victim of the applicant ’s corrupt actions . In the journalist ’s opinion the fact that this indictment had been invalidated by the chief prosecutor proved that it had been the result of falsification and could be considered professional dross ( “ rebut professional ” ) .

NORP In the second section , entitled “ Exclusion from the magistracy ” ( “ Excludere din magistratură ” ) , the journalist referred to “ the cheating prosecutor PERSON ( “ procurorul măsluitor ” ) who “ did not manage to send PERSON before a court on the basis of her falsified indictment on this occasion . However she had already managed to send PERSON before a court of justice on the basis of another indictment , the product of scandalous falsification ” . It was stated that an examination of the applicant ’s conduct in connection with the first indictment “ could result , besides criminal charges against her for abuse of position , in her rapid exclusion from the magistracy by the disciplinary board of the public prosecutor ’s office . By misleading her superiors , cheating prosecutor PERSON managed to send the defendant A.B. before a court on DATE for criminal damage and making false declarations . The lies and the wilfully erroneous interpretation contained in the CARDINAL pages of the second falsified indictment could fill a whole chapter in ‘ a real handbook of judicial corruption’ ” .

The third and the fourth sections of the article concerned civil proceedings brought by PERSON , without making any reference to the applicant . The fifth section concerned a complaint of criminal damage lodged by “ the mafia of crooked businessmen ” against A.B. and allocated to “ cheating prosecutor PERSON In the last section , the journalist accused the applicant , “ the cheating prosecutor ” , of causing PERSON to be sentenced to prison by lying to the courts with her “ falsified indictment ” .

The second article , published on DATE , was entitled “ E.L. , the prosecutor who falsifies indictments ” . It referred to the conviction of PERSON on the basis of an indictment drafted by the applicant . The journalist claimed to have exposed the alleged influence exercised over the applicant by PERSON , directly interested in the affair , which had led to PERSON ’s conviction . According to the journalist , PERSON had repeatedly “ brought a variety of food products to [ the applicant ’s ] home in bags or in boot of her car ( ... ) . Once she brought a pig cut in CARDINAL to [ the applicant ’s ] home , leaving bloodstains in the building ’s corridors ” .

On DATE the applicant lodged a criminal complaint for defamation against FAC The applicant complained that GPE had damaged her reputation and dignity by publishing the CARDINAL above - mentioned articles in DATE . She sought MONEY ( ROL ) in compensation for non - pecuniary damage .

By a judgment of DATE , LOC ORG found the journalist guilty of defamation and sentenced him to a criminal fine of MONEY ( ROL ) , the equivalent of ORG CARDINAL . The journalist and the newspaper were jointly ordered to pay the applicant damages of ROL CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL , the equivalent of ORG CARDINAL . The court found that the expressions “ falsifier and cheater ” did not correspond to reality , as a disciplinary investigation had concluded that the applicant had conducted herself professionally and appropriately in connection with the charges she had brought against A.B. in her capacity as a prosecutor . The court noted that in DATE , when the articles had been published , the journalist had been aware that the prosecutor ’s indictment in the first set of proceedings had been upheld by the first CARDINAL levels of the domestic courts and the appeal on points of law was still pending . The court also noted that the journalist had been aware that the disciplinary investigation against the applicant was pending when he had written the articles . It therefore held that this should have caused the journalist to exercise a certain amount of caution in his approach and use of language , given that he could have exposed the applicant to disciplinary and even criminal sanctions .

NORP The district court examined the indictment of CARDINAL January CARDINAL , mentioned by GPE in his first article , and noted that it had been upheld by final decisions of the domestic courts .

As regards the second indictment , the court noted that it had not been approved by the chief prosecutor on DATE . The court also noted that at the time the articles were published the chief prosecutor ’s decision was not yet final , as a complaint had been lodged against it . The court considered that the refusal of the chief prosecutor to approve the applicant ’s indictment should not have led the journalist to the conclusion that the applicant had falsified the indictment .

The court concluded that in the CARDINAL articles the journalist had overstepped the limits of acceptable speech provided by LAW .

Journalist GPE and the newspaper appealed against this judgment . On DATE the ORG allowed the appeal , quashed the first - instance judgment and proceeded to rehear the case . It acquitted the journalist of the defamation charge and dismissed the applicant ’s request for damages . The county court held that the journalist had merely provided details of PERSON ’s situation as it emerged from the court records . It also held that the article published on DATE had simply been a reproduction of the administrative complaints lodged by PERSON with ORG and ORG . The county court classified the relevant statements of the journalists as value judgments and found that the expressions used were to be examined in connection with the function of the press in a NORP society to impart information and ideas on all matters of public interest , as was the case in respect of the matter before it , which concerned the administration of justice . It referred to the judgment ORG v. GPE ( [ ORG ] , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , ORG DATE , ORG ORG ) , noting that the journalist had had recourse to a certain degree of exaggeration and provocation .

The relevant domestic provisions of ORG concerning slander and defamation and liability for paying damages in force at the material time , as well as the subsequent developments in the legislation , are described in PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL - CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE ) .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 4 - Prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 4-2 - Compulsory labour;Forced labour);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE he was admitted to ORG ( medical section ) . He was paid a salary and was granted welfare benefits . He pursued academic studies free of charge at ORG , taking the DATE degree course for medical professionals in the national health system .

On DATE , on completion of his studies , he was appointed to the rank of second lieutenant in the army medical corps .

In accordance with LAW no . DATE on the status of officers of the armed forces , as applicable at the material time , the applicant had undertaken to serve in the armed forces for a period corresponding to CARDINAL times the duration of his studies at the military academy – that is , DATE . The relevant provision was later amended by LAW no . DATE and the period in question was reduced to twice the duration of his studies – that is , DATE .

On DATE the ORG organised a competitive examination for the recruitment of medical specialists . Officers in the medical corps , such as the applicant , were invited to apply in order to acquire a specialist qualification . The applicant was attached to the CARDINAL ORG in GPE , where he worked as an intern from DATE to DATE . Subsequently , from DATE , he occupied a paid supernumerary position ( by virtue of section CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL ) at ORG in GPE as a junior doctor specialising in anaesthesiology .

After completing his specialist training , which lasted DATE during which time he was paid his salary as an army officer – the applicant gave an undertaking , in accordance with LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , to serve in the army for a further DATE . He provided a sworn declaration to that effect as required by LAW .

The applicant served in the armed forces until DATE , when he resigned at DATE as an anaesthetist with the rank of colonel .

By a notice of CARDINAL September CARDINAL ORG informed the applicant that , pursuant to LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , he was required either to serve in the armed forces for a further DATE , DATE and DATE or to pay the ORG a fee calculated on the basis of the period remaining to be served .

In a decision of CARDINAL DATE the accounts department of ORG assessed the amount of the fee at MONEY ( ORG ) . The decision stated that the applicant could apply to ORG for judicial review , but that the application would not have suspensive effect as far as the payment procedure was concerned .

On DATE the applicant applied to ORG of ORG for judicial review of the notice of DATE . He argued that LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL was in breach of LAW ( prohibition of all forms of compulsory labour ) and LAW , read separately and in conjunction with LAW . On DATE the applicant also applied for a stay of execution of the decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE a division president of ORG made an interim order staying the execution of the decision of CARDINAL DATE . On CARDINAL DATE ORG of ORG confirmed the stay of execution sought by the applicant .

In judgment no . DATE of CARDINAL DATE ORG of ORG dismissed the applicant ’s application for judicial review as ill - founded . It held in particular that the fee to be paid by the applicant did not constitute a menace of a penalty , did not infringe the proportionality principle , had been calculated objectively and was designed to ensure that the ORG was refunded the expenses it had incurred in training regular members of the armed forces , who were also paid a salary throughout their basic and specialist training .

On DATE the applicant appealed on points of law to the plenary ORG . On DATE he applied to the same court for a stay of execution of the decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the president of the plenary ORG made an interim order staying the execution of the decision in question . On DATE and DATE , while those proceedings were ongoing , ORG ordered the applicant to pay the sum of ORG CARDINAL , plus ORG in stamp duty and ORG CARDINAL.CARDINAL to the agricultural insurance fund .

On DATE the plenary ORG confirmed the stay of execution sought by the applicant .

On DATE ORG of ORG informed the applicant that because the amount assessed in the decision of CARDINAL DATE had not been paid by DATE , interest of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL had been charged for late payment . It also informed him that if he paid the outstanding amount by CARDINAL DATE , he would be entitled to an PERCENT discount on the interest .

On DATE the applicant deposited the sum of EUR CARDINAL at ORG .

In judgment no . CARDINAL of DATE ( served on the applicant on DATE ) the plenary ORG partly allowed the appeal on points of law .

It found that the failure to include a period of DATE which had been essential for the applicant to complete his specialist training – as part of his total length of service was in breach of the proportionality principle enshrined in LAW .

It held that the period during which a medical officer worked towards obtaining a specialist qualification formed part of the officer ’s actual military service . Accordingly , it quashed ORG decision as regards the finding that the applicant ’s period of specialist training constituted years of study that should not be included in the calculation of his overall period of compulsory service .

It dismissed as ill - founded the ground of appeal alleging a violation of the LAW , reasoning as follows :

“ Paragraph CARDINAL of LAW ... is compatible with the provisions of LAW , LAW and the LAW , in view of the fact that during DATE the medical officer serves the armed forces that have trained him or her , and it achieves the aim pursued , namely providing supervisory personnel for the armed forces , without the officer being required to work . As to the fee to be calculated in accordance with paragraph CARDINAL of the same LAW , this is a means of offsetting the expenditure incurred by the ORG in training officers and on no account constitutes a penalty . ”

The plenary ORG remitted the case to a different bench of ORG . The only question referred was that of the reassessment of the fee by counting the applicant ’s DATE of specialist training as part of his overall length of service .

In judgment no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ( served on the applicant on DATE ) ORG of ORG varied the decision of CARDINAL DATE issued by the accounts department of ORG by reducing the amount payable by the applicant to ORG .

NORP In particular , ORG held firstly that the decision of CARDINAL DATE was lawful in that the applicant had left the army before completion of the period of CARDINAL years’ compulsory service . However , it found that the length of his remaining period of compulsory service was not DATE , DATE and DATE , as ORG had calculated , but DATE , DATE and DATE . It pointed out that the period already served by the applicant should have included his specialist training , which had begun on DATE and ended on DATE , since , as judgment no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL had made clear , the period of specialist training was to be counted as part of the actual service performed .

On DATE the ORG reimbursed the applicant the sum of EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL , corresponding to the difference between the payment he had already made and the amount determined in judgment no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL .

According to information supplied by the ORG , the applicant is now working in a large private hospital in GPE .


CASE OF ANTOVIĆ AND MIRKOVIĆ v. MONTENEGRO

Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE .

On DATE the ORG of ORG - matematički fakultet ) , at a session of the School ’s council , informed the professors teaching there , including the applicants , that “ video surveillance has been introduced ” ( da je uveden video nadzor ) and that it was in the auditoriums where classes were held .

On DATE the PERSON issued a decision introducing video surveillance in CARDINAL amphitheatres and in front of ORG ( ispred dekanata ) . The decision specified that the aim of the measure was to ensure the safety of property and people , including students , and the surveillance of teaching ( praćenje izvršavanja nastavnih aktivnosti ) . The decision stated that access to the data that was collected was protected by codes which were known only to the PERSON . The data were to be stored for DATE .

On DATE the applicants complained to ORG ( PERSON za zaštitu ličnih podataka , “ the NORP ” ) about the video surveillance and the collection of data on them without their consent . They relied on ORG ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below).The applicants submitted , in particular , that the amphitheatre where they taught was locked both before and after the classes , that the only property there was fixed desks and chairs and a blackboard , that they knew of no reason to fear for anybody ’s safety and that , in any event , there were other methods for protecting people and property and monitoring classes . They requested that the cameras be removed and the data erased .

On DATE CARDINAL Agency inspectors issued a report ( zapisnik ) after visiting ORG , stating that the video surveillance was in accordance with ORG . According to them , there had been cases of destruction of university property , the bringing in of animals , drink and tobacco , and the presence of people who were not students . They also noted that the cameras provided “ a picture from a distance without clear resolution , that is people ’s features [ could not ] be easily recognised ” , that they could not zoom in and out and did not record any audio ( ne reprodukuju audio zapis ) . While the decision on introducing video surveillance had provided that data would be stored for DATE , the servers’ capacity was such that the data was stored for DATE and then automatically erased by new recordings . The inspectors also noted that information on a “ plan to introduce video surveillance ” ( planiranje uvođenja video nadzora ) had been given at a session of ORG on DATE .

On DATE the applicants filed an objection to the report , submitting , inter alia , that they were not aware of any of the alleged incidents and that , in any event , it was unclear how such cameras could ensure the safety of people and property . They agreed that cameras over the entrances and exits from the university building might perhaps be an adequate form of ensuring such security . They also submitted that employees had not been “ notified in writing on the introduction of video surveillance before it started ” ( nijesu bili obavješteni o uvođenju video nadzora u pisanom obliku prije početka vršenja istog ) . Notably , the decision had been issued on CARDINAL DATE whereas surveillance had commenced DATE before . They did not specify when exactly but referred to TIME of the session of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE , after the applicants’ objection to the report , ORG ( PERSON zaštitu ličnih podataka ) issued a decision ( rješenje ) ordering ORG to remove the cameras from the auditoriums within DATE as the video surveillance was not in accordance with ORG , notably sections CARDINAL , DATE and DATE ( see paragraphs DATE , and CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) . In particular , the ORG held that the reasons for the introduction of video surveillance provided for by section CARDINAL had not been met , given that there was no evidence that there was any danger to the safety of people and property in the auditoriums , still less to confidential data , and that the surveillance of teaching was not among the legitimate grounds for video surveillance . None of the parties initiated an administrative dispute in court against that decision .

On DATE ORG was served with ORG decision of DATE . The cameras were removed by DATE at the latest . It appears that the data that had been collected was also erased on an unspecified date .

On DATE the applicants brought a compensation claim against ORG , ORG and GPE , for a violation of their right to a private life , notably by the unauthorised collection and processing of data on them . They submitted in particular that such an interference with their private lives , without any possibility to control that process , was not provided for by any piece of legislation and that therefore it had not been in accordance with the law , within the meaning of LAW . They also maintained that it had not pursued any legitimate aim and had not been necessary in a NORP society . They relied on the relevant provisions of ORG , LAW and the relevant case - law of the ORG .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) in GPE ruled against the applicants . The court found that the notion of private life certainly included activities in the business and professional spheres . It also held , however , that the university was a public institution performing activities of public interest , teaching being CARDINAL of them ( poziv redovnog profesora [ je ] takođe javan ) , and that it was thus not possible for video surveillance of the auditoriums as public places to violate the applicants’ right to respect for their private life . It was a working area , just like a courtroom or parliament , where professors were never alone , and therefore they could not invoke any right to privacy that could be violated . The data that had been collected could thereby also not be considered as personal data . The university ’s failure to remove the cameras immediately had been unauthorised , but it could not be classed as an interference with the applicants’ private life and was therefore irrelevant . The court further held that such a conclusion was in accordance with the ORG ’s case - law given that the monitoring of actions taking place in public was not an interference with a person ’s private life when those means just recorded ( bilježi ) what others could see if they happened to be in the same place at the same time . The court also held that the monitoring of the actions of an individual in a public place by the use of photographic equipment which just instantaneously recorded visual data did not give rise to an interference with that individual ’s private life , which could arise once any footage of such material became publicly available . It concluded that the installation and use of video surveillance and the collection of data thereby had not violated the applicants’ right to privacy ( pravo na privatnost ) and had therefore not caused them any mental anguish . During the proceedings CARDINAL of the witnesses stated that there had been cases of theft and of damage to the interior of the building and that on CARDINAL occasion CARDINAL laptops had disappeared from a laboratory . Those events had led to the hiring of a private security agency DATE . According to the witness , the police had suggested installing video surveillance equipment on the ORG ’s premises . The court , for its part , did not deal with those issues .

On DATE the applicants appealed . They relied , inter alia , on LAW . They maintained , in particular , that the interference with their right to respect for their private lives had not been in accordance with any law and had therefore been contrary to LAW . It had also not been necessary in a NORP society . Furthermore , ORG had not relied on any legal provision in ruling against them and had failed to assess their arguments .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) in GPE upheld the first - instance judgment , endorsing its reasons in substance . ORG held in particular that the applicants had not proved that their right to privacy had been violated and found that the first - instance court had “ sufficiently related the ORG ’s case - law to the case at issue ( dao jasan osvrt na odnos prakse PERSON za ljudska prava i konkretnog slučaja ) ... The court considered the [ applicants’ ] other arguments and found that they did not justify ruling otherwise in the present case ... ” .

The applicants did not file a constitutional appeal .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE , the applicant lost control over his motorcycle on a bend by , allegedly , failing to adjust his speed to the road conditions . Consequently , he was severely injured .

On DATE the police sent the applicant a penalty notice fining him QUANTITY ( ORG ) and CARDINAL penalty points for failing to adjust his speed according to the road conditions under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of FAC .

On DATE the applicant lodged a request for judicial review . He argued that he had not exceeded the speed limit since he had been driving together with his friends during a DATE trip and the bends on the relevant part of the road prevented a speed which exceeded the speed limit . In this regard , B. and PERSON , who were driving behind him with their motorcycles , could confirm that he had not exceeded the speed limit . Firstly , in his view , the road could have been covered with sand , as it was DATE . Secondly , he argued that the road could have been slippery . Whatever the nature of the obstacle on the road , it was that obstacle that caused the traffic accident . In his further submissions he stressed again that he had been driving within the speed limit . He further drew attention to the fact that a sign should have been installed earlier , considering that many accidents involving motorcycles had happened in the past on that road . According to the applicant , DATE after the accident a slippery road sign had been installed . Therefore , he requested the hearing of the responsible person of ORG . Finally , he pointed out that he was a careful and experienced driver who had followed several trainings on road security .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s request without holding a hearing . On the basis of the police record of the scene visit , the sketch of the road accident , the notice of the applicant ’s physical injury , the penalty notice and the request for judicial review it held that the applicant had been driving carelessly . According to the police findings of fact , the accident happened on a sharp bend with poor visibility due to a forest embankment . Moreover , the road was divided by a solid line . ORG held that the applicant should have expected a slippery road and the presence of sand but he failed to adjust his speed accordingly . It further considered that the applicant ’s complaints related only to exceeding the speed limit , an offence with which he was not charged . ORG did not comment on the applicant ’s request for a hearing .

On DATE the applicant proposed to ORG to file a request for the protection of legality .

On DATE ORG notified the applicant that it would not use this legal remedy , having found no violation of a legislative provision .

NORP The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal and a petition for a review of the constitutionality and legality of LAW ( hereinafter referred to as “ the ORG ” ) .

On DATE ORG rejected the constitutional appeal and the petition as inadmissible . On DATE this decision was served on the applicant .