CASE OF INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS (IRELAND) LIMITED v. IRELAND

Violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression-{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Carlo Ranzoni;Erik Møse;Síofra O’Leary;Yonko Grozev

The applicant company is the publisher of an NORP DATE newspaper , the LOC . At the time of the events giving rise to this case , the title of the newspaper was ORG .

DATE and DATE , ORG , published a series of articles about the awarding of Government contracts to a public relations consultant , PERSON The articles pointed out that she was a supporter of , and well acquainted with , a prominent political figure , Mr C. , both of them coming from the same city . She had been hired as a consultant by ORG beginning in DATE , when Mr C. was the minister with responsibility for this department of Government . When he was appointed in DATE to the more senior political post of Minister for the Environment , ORG , PERSON was then hired as a consultant by that ORG , and was still working for it at the time the articles appeared .

The Evening Herald called into question the manner in which the tendering procedure had been conducted , the qualifications of PERSON for the work involved , the high level of remuneration she received , as well as the amount of work that was in fact done by PERSON It referred to CARDINAL trips abroad on which PERSON had been part of the ministerial entourage , in particular a trip to GPE to attend a ORG conference . The newspaper stated several times that the relevant ORG department could find no trace of Mr C. having taken part in the conference , even though his ORG maintained that he had attended it . A later article stated that ORG did in fact have a record of the Minister ’s attendance .

The story was developed in CARDINAL articles published over DATE in CARDINAL editions of the newspaper . It became headline news and formed the subject - matter of an editorial decrying apparent favouritism in the award of Government contracts and calling for an inquiry .

The articles referred to rumours of an intimate relationship between Mr C. , who was at that time separated from his wife , and PERSON , who was married with CARDINAL teenage children . There were also references to PERSON attractive appearance and her lifestyle . Various photographs were included , including one that showed the CARDINAL standing side by side in TIME wear as if a couple . This image was obtained by altering the original photo , which contained CARDINAL people . CARDINAL of the front page articles was accompanied by a large photomontage containing the same image of PERSON in evening wear , but modified to suggest that the skirt had a slit that reached almost to her hip . The montage showed her standing very close to the Minister , whose image had been taken from another photo , with the GPE skyline behind them . The headline read “ The Minister , PERSON

ORG found that the articles complained of amounted to a serious and sustained attack on Ms. PERSON ’s business and personal integrity and were part of a sustained campaign building up over a period of DATE . She had been accused of engaging in an adulterous relationship for the sake of obtaining lucrative contracts and at DATE , she had gone from a person who would not have been known to the general public at all to someone who was notorious ( see further paragraphs CARDINAL below ) .

NORP The issue of the contracts awarded to PERSON was taken up by other parts of the NORP media , and led to questions in the NORP parliament ( ORG ) . A report issued in DATE at the request of the then Prime Minister ( Taoiseach ) found that while there had been certain shortcomings in the way that the contracts had been awarded and in the monitoring and recording of the work done , there had not been any specific infringement of the relevant norms , guidelines or practices .

Ms L. sued the applicant company for defamation . The case was heard before a jury in ORG over DATE in DATE . The CARDINAL issues put to the jury were whether the articles , as a whole , including the accompanying photographs , meant that PERSON had an extra - marital affair with PERSON , and whether the last article in the series meant that PERSON had travelled to GPE at Government expense in the company of Mr C. for a ORG conference , but that she had not in fact attended it .

In accordance with NORP law ( see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL below for further details ) , the jury was directed that if it found in favour of PERSON on either issue , or both , it should assess damages .

In his charge to the jury , the trial judge explained that in an action for defamation , damages serve CARDINAL functions : to afford consolation for the distress caused by the defamatory statement ; to repair the harm to reputation , including business reputation ; and to vindicate the person ’s reputation . He stated that the jurors could take account of PERSON standing in society and in the business community , the nature of the libel ( the insinuations that she had betrayed husband and family and that she had misused public funds ) , the mode and extent of publication ( carried repeatedly in a widely - read DATE newspaper ) , the absence of an apology , and the fact that the applicant company pleaded the defences of justification and fair comment throughout the trial . If the jury were to make an award , it must be appropriate and fair to both parties . The rules governing the trial judge ’s directions to the jury are known as the PERSON rules , laid down by ORG in DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

The trial judge did not give any specific guideline to the jury regarding the appropriate level of compensation , stressed the limited nature of the guidelines he could provide and indicated , in broad terms , that , when assessing damages the jury must bear in mind reality , the current times , the cost of living and the value of money . He added a cautionary note :

“ On CARDINAL famous occasion I told a jury that the plaintiff , if he won , had n’t won the [ national lottery ] and they immediately awarded a MONEY . Now , that was n’t what I meant when I was saying that to them . ”

He explained that the law did not permit him to suggest a figure or a range of figures to the jury :

“ The amount of damages , ladies and gentlemen , is a matter for you , should you choose to award them . I ca n’t suggest a figure to you , I am not permitted to suggest a figure to you . I ca n’t give you a range of figures , I am not permitted to give you a range of figures . I can give you what help I can , and I will , in coming to an appropriate figure for damages . But , ultimately , the figure is yours . ”

He warned the jurors not to be “ overcome by feelings of generosity and give PERSON a ridiculously large amount of money ” . Any award must be of an appropriate amount . He continued his charge to the jury as follows :

“ ... [ T]hat appropriate figure must also take into consideration the Defendant . You must also be fair to the Defendant too ... [ Y]ou must consider the Defendant as well because your decision must be a fair decision and must be fair to both parties . ... You must come to a figure that is an appropriate figure and that is , I fully realise , ... not an easy thing to do . I would like to be able to tell you what other figures have been given in the recent past in similar cases , but I ca n’t do that and I must n’t do that . If any of you think you remember newspaper headlines over DATE or so of damages awarded in cases , every case is different . Put those out of your mind completely ... It is this case and what is appropriate in this case that is important and you have to reach that decision yourself and without as much help as I would like to be able to give you , but I am not permitted to give you . ”

After the jury had retired , the plaintiff ’s counsel requested the trial judge to retract the reference to the lottery , as he feared it would be understood by the jury as a warning to keep any award significantly lower than QUANTITY . He contended that no figure should have been suggested . Counsel for the applicant company disagreed , taking the view that the jury would have clearly understood the trial judge ’s remark was not to make any suggestion about the appropriate level of damages in the instant case . The trial judge declined to revisit this aspect of his charge to the jury as it could cause confusion in ORG minds , who might think that in withdrawing the reference the trial judge might have been suggesting less or more than that figure . He observed to counsel :

“ I do find myself in difficulties because of ORG ruling [ in the De Rossa case ] in that I ca n’t even indicate to a jury upper and lower in the most general terms , which I would like to be able to do because I think it would save a lot of trouble and I ca n’t do it because of the decision of ORG . ”

He concluded the exchange with counsel on this matter as follows :

“ I did think that I had traversed the question of damages and , each successive case I do , I get more long - winded about it because I started with very short charges and I used to be very surprised , CARDINAL way or another , at the amounts juries brought in . ”

On the first issue the jury found that the newspaper had alleged an extra - marital affair between the plaintiff and PERSON On the second issue , it found that the meaning of the article was not defamatory .

The jury assessed damages at ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL and the trial judge gave judgment in this amount . He granted a stay on payment pending appeal , with the proviso that the applicant company make an interim payment of LAW to PERSON , with an additional LAW in legal costs . These payments were made , ORG having refused on DATE to set aside ORG order on interim payment .

NORP The applicant company accepted the jury ’s decision that it had defamed PERSON Evening Herald published an apology to her in its edition of DATE . It appealed the amount of damages , arguing that no reasonable jury could have made such an award , that it was disproportionate to the damage caused and amounted to an unlawful interference with the applicant company ’s rights under LAW and the Convention . In its subsequent submissions to this Court on just satisfaction , it considered that a much lower sum – EUR DATE would have been sufficient compensation in the circumstances .

In the event that ORG set aside the award of damages on appeal , PERSON sought to have the matter remitted to ORG for a fresh assessment by a new jury . In its notice of appeal , the applicant company also sought an order directing a retrial on the issue of damages . It appears from the case file that , in its subsequent submissions before ORG , in the event that the latter set aside the High Court award , it argued that ORG should itself decide the amount of compensation .

ORG gave its ruling on DATE . All CARDINAL judges found that the award to PERSON was excessive and must be set aside . The majority decided to substitute its own assessment of damages ( EUR CARDINAL ) , while the other judge took the view that the case should be re - tried before a different jury . As this would not happen , he indicated that he would have assessed damages at MONEY .

The judgment of the majority was given by PERSON J. , with whom PERSON concurred . She noted that the case did not come within the current law on defamation ( the Defamation Act DATE , see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) , but had to be decided in accordance with the previous law . Under that regime , the trial judge was limited in the directions that could be given to a jury regarding the appropriate level of damages . It had not been suggested that the trial judge had committed any error in his charge to the jury on the question of damages . Rather , the complaint was that the award was so disproportionately high that it should be set aside . She referred to the relevant ORG case - law , which held that it was the duty of the trial judge to direct the jury that damages must be confined to an amount that will fairly and reasonably compensate the plaintiff for injured feelings and loss of standing . Furthermore , as a fundamental principle of the law of compensatory damages , the award must be reasonable and fair and bear a due correspondence with the injury suffered ; a disproportionately high award would be set aside . She rejected the applicant ’s argument that larger libel awards should be subjected to more searching scrutiny on appeal than had been customary in the past . Nor did she accept that the relevant legal test should be whether a reasonable jury would have thought such an award necessary to compensate the plaintiff and to re - establish her reputation . She stated :

“ If such were the test to be applied , it would remove from the jury award the “ very unusual and emphatic sanctity ” referred to [ in previous case - law ] .

Consequently , while awards made by jury must , on appeal , be subject to scrutiny by the appellate court , that court is only entitled to set aside an award if it is satisfied that in all the circumstances , the award is so disproportionate to the injury suffered and wrong done that no reasonable jury would have made such an award . ”

She further recalled the need for the law to reflect a due balancing of the constitutional right to freedom of expression against the constitutional protection of every citizen ’s good name , which , as stated in case - law , brought the concept of proportionality into constitutional jurisprudence . Referring to this ORG ’s judgment in ORG and ORG v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , ORG CARDINALV ( extracts ) ) , she observed that it did not alter or reconfigure NORP law in respect of awards of damages in defamation . She stated :

She reviewed the terms used by the trial judge in his charge to the jury . He had told them they could consider the plaintiff ’s position in the business community . They could also consider the nature of the libel , which contained the suggestion that she was immoral , had been unfaithful to her husband and had betrayed her family . The mode and extent of publication were relevant , as were the absence of an apology and the company ’s decision to stand over the articles to the end .

Dunne J. then considered the applicant company ’s argument that the amount of damages awarded against it should be compared to awards that had been set aside as excessive in previous defamation cases . She agreed that the comparison might provide some assistance in assessing the gravity of the libel . But she also underlined the need for caution , given the wide variety of factual circumstances of such cases and also the passage of time since previous appellate decisions . As for comparison with personal injury awards , she recalled the different function of damages in the CARDINAL types of case . In defamation , the function of damages was both to compensate the injury to reputation and to vindicate the person ’s good name , a consideration which was not relevant in personal injuries cases .

The judge then set out the relevant factors for considering the proportionality of the damages awarded to PERSON The first was the gravity of the libel . The more closely the libel touched the plaintiff ’s personal integrity , professional reputation , honour , courage , loyalty and the core attributes of their personality – as was the case here DATE the more serious it was likely to be . She described the libel as a serious and sustained attack on the business and personal integrity of PERSON It could be fairly compared with a previous case involving the defamatory allegation against a prominent businessman of bribing a Government minister in order to obtain a licence to operate a radio station ( the O’Brien case , summarised in ORG and ORG judgment at § § DATE ) . It could not , however , be regarded as being in the category of the gravest and most serious libels to come before the courts , as was the libel in the LOC case ( the case that led to ORG and ORG case , it having been alleged that PERSON PERSON personally supported anti - Semitism and violent communist oppression ) . But the libel of PERSON was nonetheless a very serious one . The allegation of adultery must have been a course of real hurt and distress to her .

The next factor was the extent of publication . PERSON had cited CARDINAL articles concerning her . There had been some more articles focussing on the role of the Minister . It was a sustained campaign over DATE . The newspaper had a DATE circulation throughout the ORG of CARDINAL copies ; its readership would be higher still . PERSON had gone from being unknown to the public to being notorious . The publication had therefore been particularly widespread and extensive .

The third factor was the conduct of the defendant . It had run a defence of justification that the jury had rejected . It had not offered any apology to PERSON before the verdict , which was a point the jury could have taken into account . The articles had been accompanied by photographs that had been cropped and manipulated to lend force to the implication that PERSON got her contracts by virtue of the fact that she was having an affair with the Minister . That too could have been taken into consideration by the jury .

The fourth factor was the impact of the defamation on PERSON The articles had attacked her moral character and her professional reputation . They had implied that she was unfaithful to her husband and had played a part in the break - up of PERSON marriage . They had conveyed the impression that she was prepared to engage in an adulterous relationship in order to advance her professional standing and career . Her ability to do the work she was hired for had been called into question . A new business initiative she was involved in ended when the partner had withdrawn following the publication of the articles , and her consultancy work for the Government had come to an end . PERSON had given evidence of her own personal hurt and distress at the articles , and described the impact on her husband and sons , one of whom had had to change school in his final year while he was preparing to sit important public examinations . PERSON had received personal abuse in her hometown . Overall , the articles had had a profound effect on her in every aspect of her family and professional life , which was a consideration that was also relevant to the jury ’s award .

She then assessed the sum awarded in damages :

“ The award of damages in this case in the sum of € CARDINAL is a very large award by any standard . ... Overall , I am satisfied that the defamation in this case was a very serious defamation . Undoubtedly , if CARDINAL was to place the defamation in this case on a scale of seriousness , it would certainly be towards the higher end of the scale . A somewhat unusual feature of this case was the sustained campaign in the Evening Herald in respect of Ms. PERSON The consequences of it affected her in DATE to day life , personally and in her business life . Her newly launched business was destroyed before it could become established . I have no doubt that from her point of view it was a very serious matter . Nevertheless , I do not think it could be classed as CARDINAL of the most serious libels to come before the Courts ... [ T]he award made to Ms. PERSON in this case was CARDINAL of the highest ever awards made in a case of this kind in this country . Even accepting that this case is CARDINAL that comes towards the higher end of the scale , I am satisfied that the award made by the jury in this case was excessive and must be set aside . ”

She continued :

“ I am conscious of the firm instructions of Ms. PERSON to her legal representatives that in the event that this ORG came to the conclusion that the amount of the award was excessive that the ORG should in those circumstances remit the matter to ORG for assessment by a jury again . Whilst I understand those to be her instructions I am satisfied that in the context of this case it would be desirable for all parties to bring an end to the litigation between the parties and in those circumstances it seems to me that the approach to be taken by the ORG should be to set aside the verdict of the jury on damages and to substitute a sum in the figure of € CARDINAL for damages . ”

The other , partly - dissenting judgment was given by PERSON J. He stated that the issue was whether the award was reasonable and fair and bore a due correspondence with the injury suffered , which was essentially a matter of proportionality . He rejected the suggestion that the jury should be informed of awards made in personal injury actions . The nature and purpose of the CARDINAL types of damages were inherently different . As for comparison with previous defamation awards , he opposed this for practical reasons . Even with the greatest of care , he did not see how cross referencing to a previous award could aid in determining the compensation to be paid to a particular plaintiff in respect of a particular publication for a particular injury . At most , he could accept that some benefit could be obtained if the comparison was applied within the same or similar class of defamatory remarks .

He observed that since the jury represented the community , and defamation was rooted in community values , jury awards in defamation cases enjoyed an eminence and distinction significantly higher than other types of award , including jury awards in non - defamation cases . This point was supported by numerous dicta of ORG . He said :

“ ... Appeal judges , when conducting such a review , are not the jury and can not assume the jury ’s role . Intervention will be justified only where the award obviously falls outside permitted parameters which , in determining , the court must have due regard , inter alia , to the uniqueness of the jury ’s representative function in this particular judicial process . ... Therefore , an award will not be disturbed easily or second guessed purely to fine tune it . ”

He analysed the libel in detail and also concluded that the award was not proportionate , failing to reflect the necessary objective relationship between wrongdoing and harm . Although he considered that the issue of damages should be submitted for consideration by a fresh jury , in the light of the majority ’s decision to set aside the jury verdict and substitute its own award , he offered his own view on the appropriate level of damages , placing it at MONEY .

The applicant company duly paid an additional ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL in compensation to PERSON On DATE , ORG ordered that the applicant company should bear the legal costs incurred by PERSON in the appellate proceedings . According to the applicant company , this came to ORG CARDINAL .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Alena Poláčková;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

The applicant is the founder , sole owner and director of a limited liability company , Akvilon ( общество с ограниченной ответственностью « Аквилон ORG ) . Prior to the events described below , the company had been engaged in the grocery retail trade .

On DATE Akvilon purchased QUANTITY of granulated sugar in CARDINAL sacks on condition of delayed payment with a view to reselling it to PERSON and PERSON . The CARDINAL men made an oral agreement with the company to pay MONEY ( RUB – MONEY ( ORG ) ) in cash immediately upon receipt of the sugar .

On DATE PERSON , the applicant ’s husband and a deputy director of ORG , transferred the sugar to PERSON and PERSON . , who then left under the pretext that they had to fetch more cash in order to be able to pay . Shortly thereafter , PERSON complained to ORG of the ORG ( ORG внутренних дел г. PERSON ) of the misappropriation by PERSON and PERSON . of the sugar belonging to Akvilon .

On DATE criminal proceedings were instituted on suspicion of aggravated fraud in connection with the incident . The case was assigned to an investigator , PERSON , who granted the status of victim of a crime to the Akvilon company .

DATE , the investigator in charge found the QUANTITY of sugar in garages belonging to PERSON and PERSON . , in the amounts of CARDINAL tonnes and QUANTITY respectively . The CARDINAL men admitted that they had no documents confirming that they had obtained the sugar legitimately , but insisted that they had paid the necessary amount in cash to a certain PERSON . , who had promised to deliver the money to Akvilon and had then disappeared . The investigator acknowledged PERSON and PERSON . as witnesses in the case and , without formally attaching the sugar , left it with them for safe storage . Both men gave written undertakings to store the sugar until a court decision was given on the matter .

On DATE , following a complaint by ORG , the PERSON prosecutor ’s office ordered the investigator , PERSON , to formally attach the sugar , to seize it from PERSON and PERSON . and to deposit it with a neutral person for safe storage .

On DATE the investigator ordered the attachment and seizure of the sugar from the garages belonging to PERSON and PERSON . , and its transfer to a third party for safe storage . On DATE the order was executed and the attached sugar was included in the list of exhibits in the case .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE the investigator , PERSON , declared Mr ORG , who acted as a representative of the Akvilon company , a civil claimant in the criminal case .

On DATE , on the instructions of the prosecutor ’s office of GPE , the investigating authorities transferred the sugar to the Akvilon company for safe storage .

In DATE the criminal case was transferred to another investigator .

By CARDINAL decisions of DATE the investigator in charge lifted the attachment order on the sugar and ordered that it be excluded from the list of exhibits in the case . The decisions stated that the investigation had established that , despite their written undertakings to store the sugar , Mr P. and PERSON . had sold it to third persons in DATE . They had then , on DATE , purchased another lot of sugar in the amount of CARDINAL tonnes respectively , which had subsequently been attached and included in the list of exhibits by Mr S. The decisions concluded that the sugar in question was not the object of the crime in the present case , and therefore its attachment should be lifted . It is unclear what happened to the sugar thereafter .

On DATE ORG of the ORG decided not to institute criminal proceedings against PERSON and PERSON . in connection with the fact that they had sold the sugar in breach of their written undertakings given to PERSON The decision stated that the undertakings had not been legally binding , since when they had been given , the sugar had not been formally attached and included in the list of exhibits , and therefore there had been no legal grounds for PERSON and PERSON . to refrain from selling it .

By a decision of DATE the investigator in charge ordered the withdrawal of ORG ’s victim status . The decision stated that it had been established during the investigation that on DATE the Akvilon company had dispatched the sugar to the garages belonging to PERSON and PERSON Pr . The CARDINAL men had then delivered the stipulated amount in cash to a certain PERSON . , who had negotiated the deal between them and Akvilon and had disappeared once in receipt of the money . The decision concluded that in view of the fact that it was PERSON and PERSON . ’s money which had been stolen in the present case , rather than ORG ’s sugar , it was the former and not the company who were victims of the crime .

On DATE a deputy prosecutor of ORG ordered that Akvilon again be granted the status of victim of a crime .

On DATE the criminal proceedings instituted in connection with misappropriation of ORG ’s property were suspended owing to the absence of those responsible .

In DATE PERSON and PERSON . lodged a civil claim against the Akvilon company , seeking to have their title to , respectively , CARDINAL and QUANTITY of sugar attached by the investigating authorities acknowledged , the attachment order lifted and the sugar returned to them .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE the ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) discontinued the proceedings in so far as they had been brought by Mr Pr . on the grounds that he was officially registered as a businessman , and that therefore his dispute with Akvilon fell within the competence of a commercial court . It does not appear that this decision was appealed against or that Mr Pr . attempted to pursue the proceedings any further .

As regards PERSON claim , after several rounds of proceedings , ORG granted it in a judgment of CARDINAL DATE . The court confirmed Mr P. ’s title to QUANTITY of sugar , referring to the fact that he had purchased it on DATE . The court further established that the sugar belonging to PERSON had been attached by the investigator , PERSON , and transferred to CARDINAL party and then to Akvilon for safe storage and that by the investigating authorities’ decision of CARDINAL DATE the attachment order had been lifted . The court thus concluded that Akvilon was under an obligation to return QUANTITY of sugar to PERSON , who was its rightful owner . The judgment was not appealed against , and no enforcement proceedings were ever instituted .

NORP Throughout the investigation into the incident of DATE the applicant lodged numerous complaints with the supervising prosecutors alleging negligence on the part of the investigator , PERSON In particular , she complained of his failure timeously to attach the sugar belonging to Akvilon and his decision to transfer it for safe storage to PERSON and PERSON . , individuals whom PERSON had accused of fraud , with the result that the sugar had been lost and Akvilon had suffered pecuniary damage .

NORP In letters sent to the applicant in the period of DATE , the PERSON prosecutor ’s office and the main investigating division of ORG stated , inter alia , that the investigator , PERSON , had indeed breached certain requirements of the criminal procedure legislation . They went on to say that he had been subjected to disciplinary sanctions in that connection , but that there were no grounds to bring criminal proceedings against him .

DATE the PERSON prosecutor ’s office took a number of similar decisions to dispense with criminal proceedings against Mr S. They stated , in essence , that although formally there were elements of an offence punishable under LAW ( professional negligence ) in Mr S. ’s actions , that Article provided for criminal liability only if the damage caused by such negligence attained a minimum of RUB MONEY , whereas the pecuniary damage alleged by Akvilon had been lower than that amount .

In DATE Akvilon initiated proceedings before ORG of GPE against ORG of the ORG , ORG of LOC and ORG of the Interior . The company complained that the negligent actions on the part of the investigator , PERSON , during the investigation into the incident of DATE had resulted in the loss of QUANTITY of sugar belonging to the company . His actions had caused pecuniary damage to the company and had been detrimental to its business reputation , given that it had purchased the sugar on condition of delayed payment , which it had then been unable to fulfil . The company indicated that the pecuniary damage it had suffered to that date amounted to RUB CARDINAL , taking into account the current price of sugar . It also sought compensation for damage to its business reputation .

After several rounds of proceedings , in a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG of GPE dismissed the company ’s claims in their entirety . It noted that it had not been proven that the investigator , PERSON , had been negligent in performing his duties , given that it had been decided to dispense with criminal proceedings against him in that connection , and that therefore there was no causal link between his actions and the pecuniary damage alleged by the claimant company . The court also stated that since PERSON had not disseminated any defamatory statements concerning Akvilon , there were no grounds to grant its claim for compensation for damage to its business reputation .

On DATE the Appellate Instance of ORG of GPE quashed the first - instance judgment in so far as the applicant ’s claim for pecuniary damage was concerned , stating that the lower court finding as to the absence of a causal link between the pecuniary damage sustained by Akvilon and Mr S. ’s actions had been incorrect . The appellate court noted that the first - instance court had not taken into account that criminal proceedings against Mr S. in connection with the negligent performance of his duties had not been instituted only on the formal ground that the pecuniary damage inflicted on the claimant company by his actions had been below the statutory limit established in LAW . The appellate court further found it established that “ it was on account of the unlawful actions of investigator MONEY , who had transferred QUANTITY of sugar belonging to the Akvilon company to other persons , that [ the company ] had been deprived not only of its property but also of the right to claim compensation for damage in the context of the criminal proceedings , as the investigator in charge had withdrawn the status of victim [ from the company ] ” . The appellate court considered it established that the company had proven the circumstances in which it had sustained pecuniary losses in the amount of RUB MONEY , and awarded the company the full amount claimed in respect of pecuniary damage , as well as RUB CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL for costs and expenses to be recovered from ORG of the Interior at the expense of ORG . The appellate court further upheld the judgment of DATE in so far as it rejected the company ’s claim concerning compensation for damage to its business reputation .

On DATE ORG of ORG , acting as a cassation instance , upheld the appeal decision of DATE . The court , however , reduced the award to RUB CARDINAL , noting that that sum represented the pecuniary losses sustained by Akvilon in DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE ORG of GPE refused leave to apply for a supervisory review of the case .

On DATE , following the decision of ORG of GPE of DATE , Akvilon was issued with a writ of execution and the enforcement proceedings were commenced .

In a decision of CARDINAL DATE the Appellate Instance of ORG of GPE noted that on DATE ORG of ORG had reduced the award in respect of non - pecuniary damage from RUB MONEY to RUB CARDINAL and ordered that the recovery of the amount of RUB CARDINAL be discontinued .

That decision was sent to ORG , which then returned the writ of execution and the decision remained unenforced .

On DATE , at the request of Akvilon , ORG of LOC issued it with another writ of execution for the amount of RUB CARDINAL awarded in respect of pecuniary damage and RUB MONEY awarded in respect of costs and expenses .

On DATE the new writ was sent to ORG for enforcement .

On DATE ORG transferred the full amount due to ORG ’s bank account .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)

The relevant details of the CARDINAL applications are set out in the appended table .

NORP In both applications , the applicant complained of inadequate conditions of detention .


CASE OF ALBERGAS AND ARLAUSKAS v. LITHUANIA

Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens

The first applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE . The second applicant was born in DATE and according to the most recently available data , also lives in GPE .

In DATE the GPE municipality assigned a plot of land measuring CARDINAL hectares to the first applicant for the construction of an individual house . At the same time similar plots were assigned to other private persons . In accordance with the provisions of the domestic law in force and because of his status as a deportee ’s family member , the first applicant was entitled to acquire the plot of land .

On DATE the first applicant and ORG signed a contract by which he purchased the plot of land from the ORG . He paid CARDINAL NORP litai ( ORG ; MONEY ( ORG ) ) and CARDINAL “ single - use investment vouchers ” ( investiciniai čekiai ) .

Subsequently , the first applicant registered the plot of land in his name in the land registry .

In DATE the first applicant sold the plot for LTL CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( about ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) to the second applicant , who then registered the plot of land in his own name .

On an unspecified date the second applicant brought a claim before the courts against a private person , PERSON , alleging that his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possession had been breached . The second applicant claimed that he had been unable to use his land because PERSON , who lived next to the plot of land , had unlawfully put a fence around it .

R.A. lodged a counterclaim against both applicants , requesting the annulment of the land sale contracts of DATE and DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) , together with the decisions of the authorities . PERSON claimed restoration in natura of her ownership rights to the disputed plot of land , as it was part of her father ’s land which had been nationalised by the NORP authorities . PERSON had requested the restoration of her property rights in DATE , and in DATE her rights had been restored in natura , but only to a part of her father ’s plot of land .

The courts at CARDINAL instances granted the second applicant ’s claim and dismissed PERSON ’s counterclaim , noting that under LAW on the Procedure and Conditions of the Restoration of the Rights of Ownership to ORG ( įstatymas “ Dėl piliečių nuosavybės teisių į išlikusį nekilnojamąjį turtą atstatymo tvarkos ir sąlygų ” ; hereinafter “ Law on Restitution I ” ) in DATE , PERSON had been entitled to restitution in natura of not more than QUANTITY hectares of land . The local authorities had taken this circumstance into consideration when assigning the plot of land to the first applicant . The fact that under the new PERSON on the Restoration of the Rights of Ownership of Citizens to ORG ( PERSON nuosavybės teisių į išlikusį nekilnojamąjį turtą atkūrimo įstatymas ; hereinafter “ PERSON on LAW ” ) in force after DATE PERSON was entitled to restoration in natura of QUANTITY of land was not considered as meaning that the decisions adopted by the local authorities in DATE were automatically invalid .

R.A. appealed against those court decisions to the cassation court . By a final decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG overturned the decisions of the lower courts . By applying the principle of priority for former ORG rights that had been developed in the civil case P. PERSON valdyba and others , no . CARDINALK-CARDINAL - CARDINAL/CARDINAL , ORG concluded that the local authorities in DATE had not been allowed to sell plots of land to third persons before ownership rights had been restored . The court also indicated that the applicants had acted in “ bad faith ” ( nesąžiningai ) when purchasing the disputed plot of land ; however , the court decision did not substantiate the first applicant ’s “ bad faith ” . As concerns the second applicant ’s “ bad faith ” , ORG assumed that he had known about the third ORG rights to the land .

By the above - mentioned decision of ORG the contracts of DATE and DATE , together with the decision of DATE to assign the disputed plot , were annulled and the plot was returned to the ORG . The first applicant had to return LTL CARDINAL to the second applicant , the amount which he had received from the latter for the plot . The ORG had to return LTL CARDINAL to the first applicant ; none of the “ single - use investment vouchers ” were returned to him , as they no longer had any pecuniary value at the time of ORG decision .

Alleging that they had incurred a loss following the decision of ORG , the applicants applied to ORG ( PERSON žemės tarnyba ) in DATE with requests to be assigned a new plot of land of the same size and value . Their requests were dismissed .

The applicants applied to the administrative courts . They argued that they had acquired the plot of land in good faith . The applicants had been deprived of the property by a decision of ORG , and the sums that had been awarded had not adequately compensated for the damage sustained . In particular , the first applicant alleged that the court had not awarded the full value of the property , given that part of the price had been paid in “ single - use investment vouchers ” . To compensate for their loss , the applicants asked to be assigned a new plot of land .

On DATE ORG dismissed the claim . On DATE ORG upheld that decision . The courts noted that the provisions of the domestic law under which the first applicant had been assigned the plot of land were no longer in force . As concerned the second applicant , he was not eligible under the domestic law to be assigned a plot of land either .

On DATE the first applicant complied with ORG decision of DATE and paid the second applicant LTL CARDINAL .

The applicants subsequently applied to the civil courts with a claim for damages against the GPE municipality .

On DATE the Vilnius City ORG dismissed the ORG claim having reiterated that the applicants had purchased the plot of land in “ bad faith ” . It appears that the applicants did not appeal against that decision .


Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life);Pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Yonko Grozev

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant is a NORP national . He married PERSON , another NORP national , in DATE . Shortly afterwards they moved to GPE where the applicant works as a software specialist . In DATE their son PERSON was born and in DATE their daughter J.

In DATE the applicant began an affair with H.

NORP In DATE the applicant and PERSON decided to separate and he moved to another flat . However , the applicant ’s flat was located opposite the flat of his family and he kept regular contacts with his children .

On DATE PERSON filed a petition for divorce with ORG . PERSON applied for an interim order granting her temporary custody over P. and J. for the duration of the divorce proceedings . She had also informed the court that she would be in GPE DATE .

On DATE PERSON took the children to GPE for school holidays . She promised to return on DATE . The applicant was informed about the trip and consented to the travelling dates .

On DATE ORG granted the request of PERSON for an interim custody order . The applicant was neither informed of nor summoned to the court session concerning this order .

Subsequently , on DATE the applicant lodged a request for return of his children under LAW on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ( “ LAW ) ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the applicant requested ORG to stay the execution of the interim custody order of DATE . He also appealed against that order .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request for stay of the execution of the interim order and instead stayed the divorce proceedings . The court referred to the pending proceedings under LAW ( see below ) . The applicant ’s appeal against this decision and against the interim custody order was dismissed by ORG on DATE .

On DATE the ORG gave an interim order and determined the applicant ’s contacts with P. and J. for the duration of the divorce proceedings .

On DATE the Kraków Family Consultation Centre ( Rodzinny Ośrodek Diagnostyczno - Konsultacyjny ) submitted an expert report to ORG . According to the report , PERSON should continue to exercise custody of the children as she had always been more involved in their upbringing . Moreover , the experts considered that another separation from a parent and another change of environment would be detrimental to the children . They further noted that the applicant should be allowed to have contacts with his children outside the territory of GPE as long as there was no risk of destabilisation of their situation . He should have the right to spend with them CARDINAL of summer vacation , holidays and DATE and to visit them CARDINAL - CARDINAL times a month .

On DATE ORG dissolved the applicant ’s marriage . It found that the applicant had been at fault in the breakdown of the marital relationship . It further held that full parental authority was to be exercised by PERSON , whereas the parental rights of the applicant were limited to decisions regarding the children ’s upbringing , health and education . He was authorised to have contacts with P. and PERSON per week and CARDINAL weekends per month . He was further ordered to pay child maintenance and alimony .

The applicant appealed . He argued , in particular , that , due to the fact that he resided in GPE , his visiting rights during holidays and DATE vacation should have been regulated by the court .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal and upheld the first instance ’s judgment .

On DATE the applicant lodged with ORG a request concerning the return of the children to GPE under LAW . It was transmitted to ORG of ORG on DATE .

Subsequently , in a letter of CARDINAL DATE ORG confirmed that the applicant and PERSON had exercised joint custody over PERSON and J. The authority expressed the view that since the NORP authorities had not been aware of any decision of NORP courts or authorities limiting the applicant ’s custody rights , the fact that the children stayed in GPE after DATE without their father ’s consent constituted a wrongful removal under LAW .

Meanwhile in GPE , on DATE a local assessment ( wywiad środowiskowy ) was conducted at the home of GPE by a courtappointed guardian with a view to establishing the children ’s situation . The report confirmed that the children ’s living conditions with their mother were very good and that they continued their education in private schools .

On DATE ORG held the first hearing in the proceedings under LAW . The court also gave an interim order and allowed the applicant to visit the children on DATE in the afternoon .

On DATE the court requested a psychologist to prepare a report concerning the children ’s mental and emotional maturity and their capacity to express views on the matter of their return to GPE .

On DATE another hearing took place .

On DATE the expert submitted his report to the court .

On DATE ORG allowed the applicant another exceptional contact with his children . They were to stay with him from DATE until DATE . However , the applicant was not allowed to leave GPE with the children .

On DATE the ORG gave a decision and refused to grant the applicant ’s request for the children ’s return to GPE . The court referred to the applicant ’s and PERSON ’s consistent testimonies and the information included in the divorce file .

The court established that on DATE PERSON had come to GPE together with P. and PERSON and the applicant had consented to this trip . On DATE PERSON had not returned to GPE and stayed in GPE together with the children . The applicant had not accepted this decision .

The court subsequently stressed that in the proceedings under LAW it should be firstly established whether wrongful removal or retention took place . It further held that in the case at issue there had been no wrongful removal since the applicant had agreed to P and J ’s trip to GPE on DATE . With reference to the fact that PERSON failed to return on DATE ( the date agreed with the applicant ) , the court noted that she had been granted temporary custody over her children for the duration of the divorce proceedings . When the interim order was delivered , that is DATE , the children remained in GPE with their father ’s consent . Consequently , GPE could have decided to stay in GPE also after DATE and there had been no wrongful retention in the case .

The court also considered that the interim custody order was not contrary to LAW , since the applicant ’s request for return of his children had been received by ORG only on DATE while the custody order had been delivered on DATE .

Lastly , the court held that the refusal to grant the request for return was not contrary to LAW , since that provision concerned custody decisions delivered after the removal of a child .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against the firstinstance decision . He argued that the contested decision was in breach of LAW . He further argued that LAW of that ORG was also breached as the first - instance court had relied on a decision which was merely of a temporary character , whereas this provision expressly prohibited to refuse an application for return on the basis that a decision on custody was given in the country to which children were abducted .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . The court first refused to accept as evidence the document from ORG since that document failed to refer to the interim custody order of DATE . It its decision , ORG referred in particular to the events leading to the breakdown of the applicant ’s marriage . It also noted that when PERSON had discovered that the applicant ’s new partner had been pregnant , she had decided to institute divorce proceedings . However , she had been informed by a NORP lawyer that in view of the applicant ’s lack of consent to a divorce , she could only have filed a petition in GPE after DATE of separation . For these reasons she had decided to file a petition for divorce with the NORP courts . The court further noted that on CARDINAL October CARDINAL PERSON had arrived in PERSON with her children in order to spend DATE of school holidays there , after having obtained the applicant ’s consent for their trip . The court further stressed that GPE decided to stay in GPE permanently only when she was granted temporary custody . Consequently , in the court ’s opinion the removal of the children was not a wrongful removal within the meaning of LAW .

The decision was served on the applicant on DATE . It is final .


CASE OF SHERSTNEVA AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE

Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13+6-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Egidijus Kūris;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the excessive length of criminal proceedings and of the lack of any effective remedy in domestic law . In application no . CARDINAL , the applicant also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for home);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for home);Violation of Article 13+8-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life;Article 8-1 - Respect for home)

Egidijus Kūris;Ganna Yudkivska;Iulia Motoc;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Georges Ravarani

The first applicant was born in DATE . At the time of the events he was a district police officer in the LOC police in NORP . As of DATE , he has been serving a prison sentence in GPE prison no . CARDINAL . The second applicant is his wife who was born in DATE . She lives in Horlivka with her mother , the third applicant , who was born in DATE . The fourth applicant , the mother of the first applicant , was born in DATE and died on DATE . The first applicant expressed wish to pursue his mother ’s complaints on her behalf .

At TIME DATE , shortly after TIME , the second applicant had a conflict with a police officer , PERSON , who was a colleague of her husband .

The second applicant ’s account of the events was as follows . When walking in the street with a friend , PERSON , she heard somebody running after them . That person pushed her on the shoulder . Having turned , she saw PERSON , whom she knew . He was wearing plain clothes and appeared to be heavily drunk . When she asked him what the matter was , PERSON shouted that he would subject her to a body search , without explanation . He snatched her bag from her . Having searched its contents , he threw it on the ground . Then PERSON grabbed the second applicant by the neck and started strangling her . In reply to her protests , he noted that the local prosecutor was there next to him and that it was pointless to complain . He hit the second applicant twice in the head with something heavy , which , in her opinion , could have been a mobile phone . At that moment the first applicant telephoned his wife ’s friend PERSON , who was then with her , to find out whether everything was fine ( as his wife had not returned home at the expected time and was not answering his telephone calls ) . Having found out about the incident , the first applicant went there . PERSON threatened him in a rude manner with dismissal . He let the second applicant go only after CARDINAL other police officers in plain clothes , who happened to be there , approached them .

The second applicant ’s friend PERSON supported the above version of events . However , eventually she specified that PERSON had not been strangling the second applicant , but had simply held her and not let her leave .

M. ’s version of the events was as follows . He was walking in the street with an acquaintance , ORG , a businessman , after the celebration of the professional holiday of police inspectors . They met CARDINAL colleagues of PERSON and stopped to talk with them . CARDINAL women passed by . PERSON thought that one of them was a certain PERSON , who was under administrative supervision and was not supposed to be out of her home so late . He went to ask her what she was doing there . However , having approached her , he realised that he had been mistaken . He recognised the second applicant and apologised for his mistake . The second applicant , who appeared to be heavily drunk , started insulting and pushing him . PERSON submitted that he had not touched her . As regards the possible origin of her injuries , he noted that she had had serious incidents in the past with her husband and that those injuries might have been inflicted by him . As regards the fact that the plastic bag that she had had in her hands had been torn , he explained it by her intense gesticulating .

M. ’s version was supported by the statements of his friend PERSON and the CARDINAL police officers , who had been there .

Having come home , the second applicant called an ambulance . She was diagnosed with several bruises on her neck and situational neurosis . She explained that she had been strangled by a police officer . In the presence of an ambulance paramedic , the second applicant called the police . According to the Government , she did not mention that PERSON was a law - enforcement official . The second applicant contested that submission .

In TIME on DATE the second applicant was examined by a neuropathologist who diagnosed her with concussion and bruises on her neck , and prescribed outpatient medical treatment .

On DATE the NORP police issued a ruling refusing to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the second applicant ’s complaint . It noted that she had complained to the police at CARDINAL a.m. on DATE of having been hit by an acquaintance . As further stated in the ruling , it had been impossible to question her , as she had never been at home when visited by the police .

On DATE the second applicant complained about the incident to the NORP town prosecutor ’s office ( “ the NORP prosecutor ’s office ” ) . She requested that the investigation not be entrusted to the NORP district prosecutor ’s office ( “ the ORG prosecutor ’s office ” ) , given that CARDINAL of its officials had allegedly been with PERSON at the time of the events and that PERSON had referred to that fact as a guarantee of his impunity ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The second applicant submitted that there had been no attempts by the authorities to contact them with a view to hearing their version of the events .

On DATE the NORP prosecutor ’s office forwarded her complaint to the PERSON prosecutor .

On DATE the second applicant gave a written account of the incident to the ORG prosecutor ’s office . On DATE that authority quashed the refusal of DATE . It noted that the investigation had wrongly been entrusted to the NORP police despite the fact that the second applicant ’s complaint concerned her alleged ill - treatment by CARDINAL of its officers .

On DATE the police officer who had been on duty during the night from DATE was disciplined for not having followed up the second applicant ’s call ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the ORG prosecutor ’s office refused to initiate criminal proceedings against ORG under LAW ( exceeding individual power by engaging in violent or degrading treatment of a victim ) , having held that there were no constituent elements of a crime discernible in his actions . The prosecutor noted that the second applicant ’s allegation was supported by the statements of her husband and her friend . However , there were also statements of PERSON and the witnesses from his side , who denied any ill - treatment of the second applicant . The prosecutor therefore found her allegation to be unsubstantiated . It was also noted in the ruling that at the time of the events PERSON had been wearing civilian clothes and had not been acting as a law - enforcement official . Lastly , it was observed that the second applicant had ignored numerous summonses for questioning .

On DATE the ORG prosecutor ’s office annulled its refusal of DATE as premature . It noted , in particular , that not all the relevant facts had been established . Furthermore , there had been no forensic medical expert examination of the second applicant .

On DATE the second applicant underwent such an examination , which documented no visible injuries . Having analysed her medical file , the expert concluded that she had sustained a bruise on her neck and a craniocerebral injury which led to concussion . Those injuries , assessed as insignificant , had resulted from “ contact with blunt objects ” at the time indicated by the second applicant .

On DATE the ORG prosecutor ’s office once again refused to open a criminal case against PERSON for lack of the constituent elements of a crime in his actions . It relied , in particular , on the ORG statements , according to which ORG had not ill - treated the second applicant . Furthermore , the prosecutor noted that PERSON had not acted in his official capacity and that the injuries sustained by the second applicant had been insignificant .

On DATE a senior official of the same prosecutor ’s office annulled the above ruling as premature . He noted , in particular , that an additional forensic medical examination was required with a view to verifying the second applicant ’s allegation that she had been hit in the head with a mobile phone .

On DATE the prosecutor ordered such an examination of the second applicant with a view to answering the following questions : ( CARDINAL ) how exactly could her injuries have been inflicted ; ( CARDINAL ) whether there were marks on her head possibly resulting from blows with a mobile phone ; ( CARDINAL ) whether she could have sustained the injuries in question in the circumstances as she alleged ; and ( CARDINAL ) when exactly she had sustained the injuries in question .

On DATE a forensic medical expert examination report was issued . It answered the above questions as follows : ( CARDINAL ) the craniocerebral injury and the bruise on the neck had resulted from contact with blunt objects ; ( CARDINAL ) neither the examination of the second applicant nor the evaluation of the medical file had established any injuries to her head ( apparently , implying visible injuries ) ; ( CARDINAL ) the second applicant ’s injuries could have been inflicted on her in the circumstances described ; and ( CARDINAL ) according to the medical documents , the second applicant could have sustained the injuries on DATE .

On DATE the ORG prosecutor ’s office delivered yet another ruling refusing to open a criminal case in respect of the second applicant ’s complaints . Having relied on the forensic medical examination reports and the ORG statements , the prosecutor stated that her allegation had not been sufficiently corroborated .

On DATE the GPE regional prosecutor ’s office ( “ the regional prosecutor ’s office ” ) annulled the above ruling as premature and based on an incomplete investigation .

On DATE the ORG prosecutor ’s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings against PERSON It was stated in the ruling that the forensic medical expert evaluations of DATE and DATE refuted the second applicant ’s allegations . Furthermore , the prosecutor noted that the second applicant had refused to give her account during the additional investigation .

The second applicant challenged the above refusal before ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) on CARDINAL occasions ( on DATE and CARDINAL DATE and on DATE ) . Her complaints were forwarded to the regional prosecutor ’s office .

On DATE the regional prosecutor ’s office wrote to her that it agreed with the lower prosecution authority ’s decision . As further stated in the letter , it was open for her to challenge that decision before the courts if she so wished .

In DATE the first applicant underwent knee surgery . From DATE to DATE he underwent a follow - up course of outpatient medical treatment in ORG .

On an unspecified date ( illegible in the available copy ) the ORG prosecutor ’s office sent a summons to the first applicant at his registered residence ( his mother ’s home ) , instructing him to come to the prosecutor ’s office on DATE . It is not clear whether it was issued in the context of the criminal investigation in respect of the complaints by the first applicant ’s wife ( see above ) or whether it was rather related to the subsequent criminal proceedings against him .

On DATE the ORG prosecutor ’s office opened a criminal case against the first applicant on suspicion of abuse of power and forgery committed in his capacity as a law - enforcement official in DATE . More specifically , on DATE the local court had informed the prosecutor of some factual inaccuracies in a report on an administrative ( minor ) offence , which had been drawn up by the first applicant . The latter was suspected of having forged that report .

On DATE the ORG prosecutor ’s office informed the first applicant of the above decision by a letter sent to the address where he was de facto living with his wife ( separately from their parents ) . It was also noted in the letter that he had to come to the prosecutor ’s office to receive a copy of the decision and for questioning .

Still on DATE , DATE , the prosecutor ordered the NORP police to ensure the first applicant ’s presence for investigative measures . On DATE the police informed the investigator that it was impossible to comply with the above order given that the first applicant had been found neither at the address of his usual residence nor at his mother ’s flat . When they had also gone to enquire about his whereabouts with his parents - in - law , the third applicant “ had attacked them hysterically ” , which made the police believe that the first applicant might be hiding there .

On DATE a judge of ORG ordered the first applicant ’s arrest with a view to bringing him before the court to examine the issue of a preventive measure in his regard .

On DATE the first applicant was declared wanted by the police .

On DATE he wrote to the regional prosecutor ’s office that , following the incident with his wife , the Kalyninskyy police had been threatening him and his family with his dismissal , criminal prosecution , or even a fatal accident . He therefore sought that the ORG prosecutor withdraw from the case . He also submitted that he was scared even to go to the hospital as some suspicious - looking persons had been loitering near his home . The first applicant indicated as his address that of his mother .

On DATE the investigator visited the first applicant ’s mother ( the fourth applicant ) at her home and asked her whether she knew where the first applicant was . She stated that he had been living separately from her for DATE and that she was not aware of his whereabouts .

On DATE she sent to the investigator the first applicant ’s request of DATE to admit her to the proceedings as his representative and to give her a copy of the ruling of DATE initiating the criminal investigation against him . In substantiation of that request , the first applicant stated that he was restricted in his movement following knee surgery .

On DATE the chief of medicine of ORG informed the investigator , in reply to the latter ’s enquiry , that the last time the first applicant had come to the hospital had been DATE and that the hospital administration did not know how he could be reached .

On DATE the internal security unit of the NORP police wrote to the prosecutor that it had information that the first applicant had been secretly visiting the flats of his parents and parents - in - law .

On DATE the ORG prosecutor wrote to the first applicant at his mother ’s address , indicating that the latter could not be admitted in the proceedings as his representative at such an early stage . The prosecutor indicated that the first applicant was on the wanted list and that he needed to show up to receive copies of the rulings in respect of the institution of the criminal proceedings against him and for his questioning .

On DATE the ORG prosecutor sent another letter to the first applicant , informing him that another criminal case had been opened against him on that date on suspicion of abuse of power by a law - enforcement official and forgery in office and that he had to come to the prosecutor ’s office to get a copy of that decision and for questioning .

During the period from DATE to DATE further QUANTITY criminal cases were opened against the first applicant on additional counts of abuse of office , as well as on suspicion of bribe - taking . He was suspected of having committed those offences in order to report better results to his superiors and thus be entitled to additional remuneration and promotions . The first applicant was informed of each such decision by a letter sent to his mother ’s address .

On DATE the first applicant complained to the ORG that his numerous requests for the ORG prosecutor to withdraw had been ignored . He further submitted that he required protection measures as “ a person who had reported a crime ” . Lastly , the first applicant requested that the prosecutor annul the decision on placing him on the wanted list “ so that [ he ] could defend himself against the criminal charges and continue [ his ] medical treatment ” .

On DATE and DATE the regional prosecutor ’s office wrote to the first applicant that his complaints had been dismissed as unsubstantiated .

On DATE the first applicant was arrested at the address where he lived with his wife . The investigator relied on Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( hereinafter “ the ORG ” , see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and substantiated the arrest as follows : the first applicant had been on the wanted list since DATE , had impeded the establishment of the truth and had committed serious criminal offences . It was also noted in the arrest report that the first applicant was suspected of offences under Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( abuse of power or office by a law - enforcement official ) , CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( forgery in office ) and CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( bribe - taking ) of LAW . The investigator drew up a report on the explanation to the first applicant of his procedural rights . The first applicant refused to sign it . He also refused to make any submissions as regards the charges against him .

DATE . On DATE ORG extended the term of the first applicant ’s arrest to DATE on the grounds that the case file lacked information about his character . That ruling was not amenable to appeal .

On DATE the same court ordered the first applicant ’s pre - trial detention as a preventive measure , “ having regard to the seriousness and circumstances of the crimes committed and the character of [ the first applicant ] ” , without further details .

On DATE the first applicant appealed . He submitted that his remand in custody was not based on sufficient and relevant reasons . He noted that he had been arrested at his home , where he had been living for DATE , and that he had not absconded . He noted that the reasoning in support of his pre - trial detention had been overly formalistic . Thus , although the court had referred to his character , it had failed to specify what exactly in his character had justified his detention as the most appropriate preventive measure .

On DATE the ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) quashed the ruling of CARDINAL DATE and released the first applicant subject to an undertaking not to leave the town . It found that the first - instance court had not given reasons as to the necessity to choose the strictest preventive measure .

On DATE the Kalyninskyy Court found the first applicant guilty of fraud , abuse of power in his capacity of a law - enforcement official , forgery causing grave consequences , and bribe - taking , and sentenced him to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment with a ban to occupy posts in law - enforcement authorities , and confiscation of his personal property .

On DATE ORG quashed the judgment in the part concerning the forgery charge and remitted it to the first - instance court for a fresh examination . It upheld the judgment in the remaining part , having slightly reclassified some of the charges and having reduced the term of the first applicant ’s imprisonment to DATE .

On DATE ORG again found the applicant guilty of forgery causing grave consequences and sentenced him to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment . The final sentence was DATE imprisonment , as the most severe of the applicant ’s punishments absorbed the more lenient one . In the absence of any appeals , the judgment became final .

On DATE ORG quashed the appellate court ’s ruling of DATE in the part concerning the first applicant ’s conviction ( the part concerning the remittal of the case to the first - instance court remained in force ) and remitted the case for fresh appellate examination .

On DATE the appellate court upheld the judgment of CARDINAL DATE in so far as it concerned the first applicant ’s conviction for abuse of power in his capacity as a law - enforcement official and his sentencing to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment . As regards the other charges ( with the exception of that dealt with by the judgment of CARDINAL DATE see paragraph DATE above ) , they were slightly reclassified and the first applicant had the penalty in respect of that part removed .

The case file does not contain any further information as regards the criminal proceedings against the first applicant .

On DATE the investigator applied to ORG for authorisation to search the first applicant ’s registered residence ( the flat of the fourth applicant ) . It was stated in the application that on DATE the first applicant had drawn up a report on an administrative ( minor ) offence in respect of unauthorised street trading by a private individual . As subsequently established , the information in that report had not been accurate , which had led to the institution of criminal proceedings against the first applicant on suspicion of abuse of power and forgery . The investigator considered that “ some items and documents relevant for establishing the truth ” in the case could be found in the first applicant ’s residence .

On DATE ORG in a final ruling , allowed the above application , having reiterated the investigator ’s reasoning and description of the search ’s scope . It relied on LAW ORG ( follow the references in paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the investigator applied to ORG for authorisation to search the second applicant ’s registered residence ( the flat of the third applicant ) . The text of the application was identical to that submitted on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the police knocked at the third applicant ’s door . She and her husband were at home , but did not let the police in .

The third applicant ’s account of the events of DATE is as follows . A group of CARDINAL to QUANTITY persons , including police officers and some suspicious - looking persons , came to her flat . They knocked at the entrance door in a violent manner , demanding to be let in . The third applicant ’s husband went out and asked them for a search warrant or another document authorising their actions , but no such document was produced . The police threatened the third applicant and her husband that they would break in and that they would find a pretext to criminally prosecute the entire family . They stayed on the stairs and in the yard and shouted for TIME .

According to the ORG ’s version , CARDINAL police officers went to the third applicant ’s flat . They informed her about the criminal proceedings against the first applicant and enquired as to his whereabouts . As she and her husband refused to cooperate , the police left .

On DATE ORG allowed the investigator ’s application of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . Its ruling was identical to that delivered on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the police carried out a search at the flat of the third applicant . According to her , they broke the entrance door using an electric saw . The third applicant further alleged that the police had not shown a search warrant to her . CARDINAL attesting witnesses were present . According to the third applicant , they were acquaintances of the police officers .

As indicated in the search report , it lasted from TIME to CARDINAL p.m. The police seized a number of documents related to the first applicant ’s work . Furthermore , they seized a mobile telephone , which did not have a ORG card , together with its box . Lastly , they found and seized a package appearing to contain cannabis . According to the third applicant , it had been planted by the police .

DATE . On DATE the police conducted a search of the flat of the fourth applicant . They discovered and seized some documents which were deemed to be related to the criminal investigation in respect of the first applicant . According to the first and fourth applicants , those documents had been brought there by the police themselves DATE . The fourth applicant submitted that the officers , whom she knew as colleagues of her son , had explained to her that , following an attack on their police station , they had not had a safe place to store the documents , which had been intended in any event for handing over to the first applicant .

On DATE an expert established that the package discovered in the third applicant ’s flat on DATE contained cannabis . On DATE the NORP police refused to institute criminal proceedings in that regard , having held that it had been impossible to establish to whom the cannabis might have belonged .

On DATE ORG allowed another application to search the first applicant ’s registered residence ( the flat of the fourth applicant ) given that the investigator had information that the first applicant might be hiding there .

On DATE the police conducted a search of the fourth applicant ’s flat on the basis of the court ruling of DATE . As indicated in the search report , the police were searching for “ items , valuables and documents related to the criminal activity of [ the first applicant ] ” . The search did not discover anything of interest for the investigation .

The third and fourth applicants requested many times that ORG provide them with copies of the rulings authorising the searches of their flats . The president of the court replied that the searches had been carried out in compliance with the ORG and that sending a copy of the respective court rulings was not provided for by the legislation .

The third and fourth applicants also complained many times to the prosecution authorities of the unlawfulness of the searches . They submitted , in particular , that the police had been rude and intrusive , that the attesting witnesses had not been independent , and that it was not clear what the police had actually been looking for .

On DATE the NORP prosecutor ’s office refused to open a criminal case in respect of the police officers involved in the operation of DATE and the searches of CARDINAL and DATE , with the generally couched reasoning that there had been no violations of law . It appears that the applicants were unaware of that decision .

On DATE , following complaints by the third and fourth applicants , the ORG prosecutor ’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the judge of ORG in respect of the rulings authorising the searches of their flats .

DATE . On DATE the third applicant got acquainted with the ruling of ORG of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . It is not known whether , and if so when , the fourth applicant got access to the respective rulings of DATE and DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and DATE above ) .

On DATE a local heating company initiated civil proceedings against the first and fourth applicants , who had their registered domicile at the same address , for debt recovery . The domestic courts found against the applicants . On DATE ORG refused to examine an appeal on points of law by the first and fourth applicants on the grounds that they had not paid the court fees .


Violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance)

Aleš Pejchal;Angelika Nußberger;Ann Power-Forde;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger;Myroslava Antonovych

The applicant is a NORP national who was born in DATE . He is currently serving a prison sentence in GPE .

On DATE the body of Ms V. was found on a deserted street in GPE . ORG had suffered numerous knife wounds .

On DATE the police obtained an expert opinion that a fingerprint found on the cover of ORG ’s notebook could possibly belong to the applicant ( whose fingerprints were stored in the police database ) . The police also discovered that some of ORG ’s belongings , including a mobile telephone and CARDINAL earring , were missing .

On DATE several officers from the Simferopol Kyivsky District Police arrived at the applicant ’s home ( QUANTITY away from PERSON ) , inspected it , seized some of the applicant ’s clothes and took him to the police station in PERSON .

No formal record of the applicant ’s arrest was drawn up .

On DATE and DATE the applicant was questioned as a witness about PERSON ’s murder and the theft of her belongings .

On DATE he confessed that on DATE he had come to PERSON from his village to enjoy himself and had decided to murder a passer - by in order to steal her belongings . He had stolen ORG ’s mobile telephone , which he had lost on his way back home , and had killed her with a kitchen knife he had been carrying with him .

On DATE the applicant was questioned as a suspect . Before the questioning session , the applicant was informed that he was suspected of having committed the murder of GPE within the meaning of LAW of CARDINAL and that as a suspect he had right to legal assistance , which he waived in writing .

On DATE the applicant underwent a medical expert assessment , according to which he had not sustained any injuries in the period from CARDINAL to DATE .

Again on the same date an undertaking not to abscond was selected as the preventive measure to be used in the applicant ’s respect .

According to the applicant , it was not until DATE that he was released from custody under the undertaking not to abscond .

During TIME the applicant was arrested in PERSON on charges of breaching the public order ( through swearing , spitting and vagrancy ) and detained for DATE as an administrative punishment , pursuant to a decision of the Simferopol Zaliznychnyy ORG .

On DATE , CARDINAL and DATE the applicant , held in administrative detention , was further questioned concerning the murder and robbery . Before each of the questioning sessions the applicant signed waivers of his right to legal representation .

On DATE the Simferopol Kyivsky District Court remanded the applicant in custody as a preventive measure in connection with the criminal proceedings against him .

On DATE lawyer PERSON was admitted to the proceedings to represent the applicant . However , according to the applicant , the lawyer did not visit him until DATE and no questioning of the applicant took place in his presence .

On DATE the charges against the applicant were reclassified in law from those of simple murder within the meaning of Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW of DATE to those of murder for profit ( an aggravated form of murder ) under LAW .

On DATE a new lawyer , NORP , was admitted to the proceedings to replace lawyer E.

On DATE the applicant was indicted with having robbed PERSON and having murdered her for profit within the meaning of LAW . On the same date he was questioned for the first time as an accused in the presence of lawyer NORP During the questioning session , the applicant retracted his initial confessions and pleaded innocent . He maintained that he had not left his village on DATE of ORG ’s murder and had previously confessed to the murder under pressure from the police , who had detained him unlawfully , threatened and ill - treated him .

On DATE the prosecutor ’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings into the alleged breaches of the applicant ’s rights , having found that there was no case to answer , and declared the case in respect of PERSON ’s murder and robbery ready for trial .

On DATE ORG of GPE ( hereafter “ the ARC Court ” ) , acting as a first - instance court , convicted the applicant of armed robbery and murder for profit and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment .

On an unspecified date ORG also issued a separate ruling noting that there was no record of the applicant ’s arrest on DATE .

The applicant appealed in cassation against his conviction . He alleged that his confessions given in DATE and DATE should have been excluded from the body of evidence for having been taken in breach of applicable procedural guarantees . In particular , those statements had been taken during the applicant ’s unlawful detention . He maintained that he had been held at the police station between DATE and DATE without any procedural records having been drawn up . On DATE the applicant had been released . However , almost immediately afterwards he had been arrested under the false pretext of breaching the public order and subsequently detained . This tactical move had enabled the police to question him at any time and , in the absence of a lawyer , apply pressure on him to obtain self - incriminating statements to best suit their purposes .

The applicant next stated that the above - mentioned confessions had been obtained in breach of his right to legal representation . In particular , while he had been brought to the police station specifically in connection with the suspicion that he had killed ORG , initially he had only been questioned as a witness . Furthermore , the applicant had been initially charged with simple murder under LAW , a charge which enabled a suspect to waive his right to a lawyer . In the meantime , the scope of the accusation had clearly been pointing to “ murder for profit ” . This charge fell within the ambit of LAW , which could result in a life sentence and so entailed mandatory legal representation of a defendant and allowed no waivers of this right . The investigation had purposefully delayed reclassifying the charges in order to exert unlawful pressure and extract confessions from the unrepresented applicant .

The applicant also maintained that without his initial confessions the prosecution would have collapsed , as the other evidence had been contradictory and patchy .

On DATE ORG of GPE quashed the applicant ’s conviction and remitted the case for additional investigation . It noted , in particular , that the trial court should have verified more carefully whether the applicant ’s confessional statements had been admissible evidence . In particular , as appeared from the case file , these statements had been obtained during the applicant ’s detention DATE and DATE . Part of this detention was covered by an administrative detention decision and part was not covered by any records . In these circumstances , the applicant ’s allegations concerning the ulterior motives in detaining him should have been carefully investigated . ORG also found that the evidence of the applicant ’s involvement in the crime had been contradictory and needed to be reassessed , with various discrepancies being reconciled .

On DATE the ARC Court again found the applicant guilty of armed robbery and murder for profit under LAW . It relied on various pieces of physical , forensic , and witness evidence , as well as on the applicant ’s confessions given at the beginning of the investigation . The court concluded that there were no reasons to exclude these confessions from the body of evidence . In particular , according to the medical evidence , no injuries had been inflicted upon the applicant by the police and there was no other evidence of his ill - treatment . The court further found that on DATE the applicant had been taken to the police station in connection with the suspicion that he had committed a crime of violence and had duly been questioned first as a witness and then as a suspect . It also noted that the applicant , informed of his rights as a suspect , had voluntarily waived his right to legal representation . As at the material time the applicant had been suspected of simple murder , which could not lead to a life sentence , such a waiver had been compatible with applicable law . ORG then sentenced the applicant to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment .

On DATE ORG of GPE dismissed a further cassation appeal brought by the applicant and upheld ORG judgment of DATE .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Public hearing)

Ján Šikuta;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant brought an action before ORG súd ) on DATE arguing that an individual ( “ the defendant ” ) had unlawfully seized a lorry belonging to her and that he was retaining it without good title . Accordingly , she asked the court to order the defendant to return the vehicle to her .

On DATE the defendant filed his observations in reply , explaining in detail the history and legal status of the vehicle .

ORG heard the case on DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE . The applicant ’s lawyer was present at all of these hearings , as was the applicant herself , except for the first one . In addition , on DATE , the applicant consulted the court ’s case file on her own initiative .

At the conclusion of the last - mentioned hearing , ORG pronounced its judgment dismissing the action . In doing so , it found that the applicant had failed to show that she had lawfully acquired title to the vehicle and concluded that the defendant had lawfully acquired it by way of purchase from the receiver appointed to act in connection with the insolvency of the vehicle ’s previous owner , a legal entity with which the applicant had been involved .

The applicant lodged an appeal ( odvolanie ) contesting en bloc the ORG assessment of the facts and the interpretation and application of the relevant law .

NORP In response to a specific written request by ORG dated DATE , she objected to having her appeal decided without a public hearing .

On DATE the defendant filed his observations in reply to the appeal , contesting its procedural , substantive and factual grounds and again querying the legal status and history of the vehicle .

According to a written record and minutes submitted by the Government , on DATE a notice was displayed on the official noticeboard of ORG ( PERSON súd ) stating that the applicant ’s appeal would be decided in chambers on DATE and ORG judgment was publicly pronounced on DATE .

By that judgment , ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal , endorsing the findings of the first - instance court and finding that , in her appeal , the applicant had not submitted any relevant new information to refute those findings . No hearing of the appeal was held . In the written version of the judgment , no mention is made of the defendant ’s observations .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law ( dovolanie ) . She relied on Article CARDINAL ( f ) of LAW ( Law no . PERSON . , as amended ) ( “ the ORG ” ) , under which such an appeal was admissible if the courts had prevented a party to the proceedings from pursuing a case before them .

She also invoked LAW and argued , inter alia , ( i ) that ORG had ruled on her appeal without having held a public hearing , despite her objection to such a course of action ; ( ii ) that the defendant ’s observations in reply to her appeal had not been communicated to her ; and ( iii ) that ORG had not only failed to summon her to a public pronouncement of its judgment but had , indeed , failed to pronounce that judgment publicly at all .

On DATE ORG ( Najvyšší súd ) declared the applicant ’s appeal inadmissible without examining the merits of the case . It held no hearing and decided in chambers .

ORG referred to Article CARDINAL of the ORG under which ‒ as applicable at the relevant time ‒ an appeal could be decided without a hearing unless ( i ) evidence had to be re - examined or new evidence had to be taken , ( ii ) the first - instance court had not held a hearing ; or ( iii ) a hearing was called for in view of an issue of significant public interest .

ORG observed that none of these criteria had arisen , in view of which there had been no need for ORG to hold a hearing of the applicant ’s appeal .

ORG further observed that , under the case - law of ORG , a failure by a court to communicate to CARDINAL party a submission made by the other party would normally constitute a violation of the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings . However , there was no such consequence if the court concerned did not base its decision on the non - communicated submission .

ORG also noted that , although there was no statutory duty to communicate to an appellant observations made in reply to the appeal in question , if the appeal was to be determined without holding a hearing , then the observations normally “ should ” be communicated to the appellant . ORG added that , however , such observations “ should ” be communicated to the appellant only if they had a conclusive influence on the decision of ORG .

In that regard , referring to the contents of the case file , ORG held that the observations made by the defendant in reply to the applicant ’s appeal had had no impact at all on ORG decision and concluded that , consequently , the failure to communicate those observations to the applicant was irrelevant in legal terms .

ORG also referred to Article CARDINAL of the ORG , pursuant to which a judgment must always be pronounced publicly ( paragraph CARDINAL ) and , in matters decided without a hearing , the time and place of the pronouncement must be announced on the official notice board of the given court DATE before the pronouncement ( paragraph CARDINAL ) . ORG further referred to the contents of the case file and , in particular , to the TIME concerning the public pronouncement of the contested judgment , on the basis of which it concluded that , in the case at hand , the parties had properly been notified of the public delivery of the judgment , that the judgment had properly been pronounced , and that all of the applicable rules had been complied with .

In sum , ORG concluded that none of the applicant ’s arguments constituted any ground for admitting her appeal on points of law for examination on the merits .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint against the ordinary courts’ decisions with ORG ( Ústavný súd ) . She relied , inter alia , on LAW ( individual complaint ) and LAW , advancing essentially the same arguments as in her appeal on points of law .

On DATE ORG declared the complaint inadmissible . It held no hearing and decided in chambers , citing extensively from ORG decision and finding no constitutionally relevant flaw in it .

ORG decision was served on the applicant on DATE .


CASE OF COLLOREDO MANSFELDOVÁ v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing;Adversarial trial)

Kristina Pardalos;Pauliine Koskelo;Ksenija Turković

The applicant had a restitution claim concerning movable property located in FAC . The movable property was initially confiscated from a predecessor of the applicant during the NORP occupation of GPE in DATE on the orders of the NORP Secret State Police , which considered him to be an enemy of ORG . After the end of the Second World War , the property was once again confiscated , in DATE , by the NORP State under the ORG decrees . That expropriation was quashed on appeal by ORG in Prague ( zemský národní výbor ) on DATE after it had been established that the applicant ’s predecessor was of NORP nationality and had been loyal to ORG . What happened to the property afterwards is disputed and was discussed in the domestic decisions .

Due to the large number of items claimed , the domestic courts consecutively issued CARDINAL judgments , each concerning CARDINAL of the CARDINAL parts of the claim . They upheld the first part of the applicant ’s claim but rejected the second and the third , which are the subject of the present applications .

In the course of the second proceedings , the courts based their decisions , inter alia , on a decision by ORG DATE by which FAC had been declared State cultural property ( hereinafter “ the DATE decision ” ) . The DATE decision had not been raised with the parties in the course of the hearing and the parties had not received an opportunity to comment on it .

The situation of the applicant is structurally and contextually the same as that in PERSON v. the NORP Republic ( nos . CARDINAL/CARDINAL and MONEY , DATE ) .


The applicants were born in DATE , DATE and DATE , respectively , and live in ORG .

They were employed by ORG “ Raška Holding Kompanija ” DATE , a socially - owned company based in ORG ( hereinafter “ the debtor ” ) .

A. ORG proceedings brought by the first applicant ( PERSON )

On DATE , DATE and DATE respectively , ORG ordered the debtor to pay the first applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions , plus the costs of the civil proceedings . These judgments became final on DATE , DATE and DATE respectively .

On DATE , DATE and DATE respectively , upon the first applicant ’s request to that effect , ORG ordered the enforcement of the said judgments and further ordered the debtor to pay the first applicant the enforcement costs .

B. Civil proceedings brought by the second applicant ( PERSON )

On DATE , ORG ordered the debtor to pay the second applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions , plus the costs of the civil proceedings . This judgment became final on DATE .

On DATE , upon the second applicant ’s request to that effect , ORG ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the second applicant the enforcement costs .

C. Civil proceedings brought by the third applicant ( PERSON )

On DATE , ORG ordered the debtor to pay the third applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears , plus the costs of the civil proceedings . This judgment became final on DATE .

On DATE , upon the third applicant ’s request to that effect , ORG ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the third applicant the enforcement costs .

On DATE ORG ordered the restructuring of the debtor .

On DATE ORG opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor .

The applicants duly reported their respective claims based on the above - mentioned judgments to the insolvency administration .

The insolvency proceedings are still ongoing .