Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life);No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Angelika Nußberger;Erik Møse;Mārtiņš Mits;Síofra O’Leary;Yonko Grozev

The first and second applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively , and live in GPE .

The first applicant married PERSON in DATE and their son , the second applicant , was born in DATE . According to the first applicant , her husband started abusing her psychologically after the marriage , which grew worse after the child was born .

The first applicant filed for divorce in DATE . She applied for interim measures in the same proceedings , seeking custody of the child while the proceedings were ongoing . ORG granted her application for interim measures on DATE , giving her custody of the child .

In the meantime , in DATE , the second applicant visited his father for DATE . PERSON then took the child back to the first applicant and insisted that they both return to live with him . When the first applicant refused , he put the child back in the car and drove away , saying that she could only see her son at his apartment .

PERSON has kept the second applicant with him ever since .

On DATE the first - instance court granted the couple a divorce , finding that the husband was responsible for the marriage ’s failure . It granted custody of the child to the first applicant and limited PERSON ’s contact rights to TIME twice a month in the presence of the first applicant and another adult designated by her . The decision was upheld in ordinary appeal on DATE and in cassation appeal on DATE .

On DATE the first applicant obtained a writ of enforcement on the basis of the decision on interim measures . She brought enforcement proceedings DATE .

NORP The bailiff scheduled handovers of the child to the first applicant on the following dates : DATE , DATE , QUANTITY DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE . PERSON did not come to any of those appointments or cooperate with the bailiff .

On DATE the bailiff fined PERSON QUANTITY ( ORG ) for failing to comply with a judicial decision .

Subsequently , PERSON went to the bailiff ’s office and challenged her for having fined him . As a police officer , he threatened to fine her for wrongfully crossing the street as soon as she left her office . PERSON was dismissed from the police on DATE as a result of that conduct . The order for his dismissal referred to his systematic obstruction of the enforcement of a final judicial decision and to conduct damaging to the image of the police .

On DATE the Sofia ORG ordered that the child be removed from PERSON ’s home and handed over to the first applicant on the basis of LAW of DATE . On DATE the first applicant , accompanied by a lawyer and several police officers , went to the village where PERSON was living with the child and spoke to both PERSON and PERSON ’s father . PERSON categorically refused to hand the child over , thus failing to comply either with the court order of CARDINAL DATE or the decision on interim measures of DATE .

The first applicant obtained a writ of enforcement in DATE in respect of the final judgment on the divorce and on granting custody to her .

On DATE , CARDINAL DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE the bailiff unsuccessfully attempted to hand the child over to the first applicant . On those occasions PERSON either failed to arrive for the appointments or did not take the child to them . When the bailiff and the first applicant visited his house on DATE , PERSON had left a note on his front door addressed to the first applicant and all accompanying individuals . The note stated that he was firmly opposed to handing the child over to her .

The bailiff fined ORG in DATE and in DATE for failure to cooperate in the enforcement proceedings . In DATE the first applicant did not attend CARDINAL of the scheduled meetings for handing over of the child , indicating in a letter to the bailiff that prior work commitments prevented her from attending CARDINAL of those meetings . It would appear that those meetings had been scheduled by the bailiff without prior consultation with the applicant as to her availability .

On DATE the ORG suspended the enforcement proceedings brought by the first applicant in relation to the final judgment of DATE . It acted in response to an application from PERSON for interim measures ( обезпечителни мерки ) in the context of proceedings which he had brought to seek the limitation of the first applicant ’s parental rights and the granting of custody to him .

The first applicant asked ORG to quash the suspension order . The court rejected her application in a final decision of DATE .

Following a change of jurisdiction , the case was sent to ORG . The proceedings for a change of custody were terminated by ORG in a final decision of DATE after PERSON withdrew his application .

In the meantime , DATE and DATE , representatives of the social services , accompanied by the police , the mayor and the first applicant , repeatedly visited the house where PERSON lived with the second applicant . They met the child ’s teachers and his paternal grandparents . On DATE the social services sent a report to the police in which they concluded that while PERSON was caring for the second applicant appropriately , the child needed to have contact with his mother to ensure his healthy development .

NORP The social services renewed their involvement in the case in DATE . After PERSON had expressed an intention to cooperate , the social services met him and the second applicant a number of times DATE and DATE . During the meetings the second applicant consistently expressed the wish to continue to live with his father .

The first applicant brought criminal proceedings against PERSON for obstructing the enforcement of the DATE and DATE decisions on the exercise of parental rights .

On DATE the first - instance court found PERSON guilty of obstructing the implementation of final judicial decisions . The court observed that PERSON had demonstrated a belief that he was beyond the reach of the justice system and could act with impunity . The court also held that the particularly long period in which PERSON had kept the child , namely CARDINAL birthday , was an aggravating circumstance . The court nevertheless absolved PERSON of criminal responsibility and , instead , imposed on him a fine of LAW as an administrative punishment under LAW . The decision was upheld on appeal by ORG on DATE in a final judgment .

On DATE ORG quashed an earlier decision by the police to refuse to provide assistance for the transfer of the second applicant and ordered it to determine the best way to arrange it . The social services cooperated with the police towards organising such a transfer , which was due to take place on DATE . That procedure was not carried out because the child refused to go with the first applicant .

The third applicant was born on DATE and lives in GPE .

The third applicant gave birth to a child , P.P. , in DATE while she was living with the child ’s father , PERSON . P. The parents split up in DATE and the third applicant moved out with the child and his CARDINAL elder siblings , who were not Kh . P. ’s children .

On DATE , during judicial proceedings on custody , the GPE ORG determined interim measures , giving custody to the third applicant . She started living with her child alone thereafter .

An expert report of DATE drawn up in the context of the proceedings concluded that the child was strongly attached to both parents and had expressed a wish to live with his mother while continuing to see his father .

In a final decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG gave custody of the child to the third applicant .

On DATE , after CARDINAL of his scheduled meetings with the child , Kh . P. did not return the latter to the third applicant ’s home . Since DATE the third applicant has only seen the child a few times and the meetings have always been in an institutional setting .

On DATE the third applicant visited Kh . P. ’s home in order to agree on the child ’s return , but PERSON . P. prevented the child from leaving with her . Instead , according to the third applicant , he assaulted her in the presence of the child by hitting her on the head , pushing her against the lift , and knocking her to the ground . The third applicant submitted that thereafter she had repeatedly attempted to reach an agreement with the child ’s father on the child ’s return to live with her , as well as that she had contacted CARDINAL private bailiffs over DATE but neither of them had taken any action because they considered that the case was too difficult .

On DATE the ORG issued a writ of enforcement to the third applicant on the basis of the court ’s decision on interim measures of DATE .

A first attempt by the bailiff to get the child handed over to the third applicant took place on DATE but it failed as Kh . P. did not take the child to the meeting . The bailiff voiced his intention to seek police assistance to summon PERSON . P. to the following meeting .

The third applicant met the child on DATE for the first time since he had been taken away by his other parent on DATE . The meeting took place in the presence of Kh . P. and a social worker . The child was reserved at the beginning but gradually warmed up to his mother , told her about his school and other activities , and allowed her to hug and kiss him .

A second meeting between the third applicant and her child took place on DATE . The child arrived in a negative frame of mind and acted coldly towards the third applicant , refused to take the presents she had brought for him and asked to leave with his father .

In CARDINAL reports issued on DATE and CARDINAL DATE the social services found that , while the child had developed a solid emotional connection with the father , he had not lost his bond to his mother . The father had to show approval and encouragement for the relationship between the child and the mother for it to develop healthily .

The bailiff attempted to have the third applicant meet with the child on CARDINAL more occasions DATE , DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE . Kh . P. did not attend the first CARDINAL meetings nor send the child , despite having been summoned to some of them by the police . On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the bailiff fined him for his failure to take the child to the appointments scheduled on DATE . CARDINAL of those fines was subsequently quashed in court .

When Kh . P. took the child to meet with the third applicant on DATE , the child became visibly upset and tearful at the sight of her . He refused to hug her or otherwise engage with her . A psychologist present at the meeting concluded that it was impossible to hand the child over at that point in time as he was in a state of psychological stress and had a clearly negative attitude to his mother . As a result the bailiff postponed the handover of the child and urged both parents to actively cooperate so that the child could gradually accept his mother . The bailiff noted that the other parent played a key role in that process and that his constructive attitude was crucial for restoring the mother - child relationship .

In DATE the social services recommended that the third applicant , PERSON . P. and the child have DATE of counselling . Kh . P. disapproved of psychologists working with his son , insisted that such sessions were a form of child exploitation and said that the mere mention of the child ’s mother gave his son headaches , which in turn impeded his ability to play football . Kh . P. did not allow the child to see his mother . He informed the psychologists that he and the child slept in the same bed at night and avoided their attempts to discuss the child ’s psychological development . Kh . P. instead emphasised his own financial resources and stability .

A psychologist met the child once during the DATE counselling period . The child refused to speak CARDINAL applicant and only referred to her as “ M ” . The psychologist concluded that the child ’s speech was full of inconsistent statements which showed that his attitude to her was being manipulated . The father was categorically opposed to contact between the child and the mother , which meant the child was afraid to express his need and wish to maintain a relationship with her . The child missed having contact with his mother , but could not express that openly for fear of his father ’s disapproval . The child suffered from parental alienation syndrome and there was a risk to his emotional and psychological development . On DATE the social centre put an end to the counselling because of Kh . P. ’s lack of cooperation , in not taking the child to the appointments .

A psychological assessment of the child and the situation with his parents was drawn up in DATE . It concluded that the child was experiencing a chronic emotional crisis . His categorical rejection of the third applicant was at the origin of parental alienation syndrome .

A new attempt to voluntarily hand the child over to the third applicant took place on DATE but failed because the other parent did not take the child to the meeting . The bailiff postponed any further enforcement measures . The following day , DATE , the child , PERSON . P. and the third applicant met at the social centre . Kh . PERSON stated that he would not allow any meetings in the future and the third applicant has not met her child since .

An expert report drawn up on DATE found that PERSON . P. exhibited a tendency to verbal aggression , that he continuously demeaned the mother and criticised her personality and that this had turned the child into “ a child at risk ” . The obsessive and controlling love demonstrated by him towards the child risked making him rebel in the future ; the permanent pitching of the child against the third applicant had led to psychosomatic disorders , as evidenced by the child ’s frequent headaches .

On DATE the third applicant asked the bailiff to schedule a new date for implementing the court ’s decision and to not suspend enforcement . She also asked the bailiff to direct the child to attend mandatory sessions with a psychologist and psychiatrist before his actual handing over to her , given that he needed specialist assistance to overcome his feelings of alienation towards her .

On DATE the third applicant asked the social services to provide her child with psychological counselling and support . On DATE she complained to the Minister of ORG about the bailiff ’s inability to enforce the court decision granting custody to her . The Ministry replied on DATE that the bailiff had done nothing wrong in the exercise of her functions .

On DATE she asked the bailiff to order DATE meetings between her and the child on the premises of the social services , emphasising that that was something to which Kh . P. had agreed but with which he had not complied . The third applicant also stressed that the child ’s health and well - being were the most important aspects of the process and asked the bailiff to coordinate all the actions related to the child ’s attendance at counselling sessions . On DATE the third applicant sent documents to the bailiff issued by the social services directing the child to attend psychological counselling and support with a view to reestablishing contact with his mother . On DATE the social services reported to the bailiff that the support work which was to be carried out with the child had not started as the father had repeatedly failed to take the child to the social centre .

DATE . On DATE the third applicant again asked the social services to provide counselling for her child . The social services replied on DATE that they had organised new sessions for the child and had apprised the other parent accordingly . They also informed the third applicant that the bailiff had ordered the child to report to the social centre every DATE at TIME in order to meet with the third applicant . The first meeting was set for DATE but did not take place as Kh . P. did not take the child to it .

The third applicant subsequently received a letter from ORG for ORG , which directed her to seek counselling from the social services . The report drawn up in that connection indicated that the negative attitude displayed by the father towards the mother had been adopted by the child , who refused to meet his mother . It was necessary to work with the child for him to overcome his negative attitude to his mother .

On DATE the third applicant wrote to the bailiff , copying in the social services , and expressed her concern about the child ’s well - being . She asked for the judicial decision granting custody to her to be enforced , pointing out that the child ’s well - being was of paramount importance and had to be considered in any related actions .

A report , dated DATE and drawn up by the municipal social services , stated that specialists had met with the third applicant on QUANTITY occasions . She was found to be cooperative and willing to do whatever was necessary in order to facilitate contact with her child . The report concluded that it was not in the child ’s interests to continue to live with his father given that he manipulated him emotionally . The child did not dare to oppose the father as he was entirely dependent on him . The child ’s alienation from the mother was damaging for him as he needed her close involvement in his life . It was necessary to impose mandatory psychological counselling on the father in order for him to cooperate , otherwise the child had to be taken out of his home and either entrusted to the third applicant or placed in a “ neutral environment ” . The placing of the child into a foster home had to be only considered as a last resort , if the father continued to obstruct contact with the mother .

NORP The bailiff scheduled another meeting , for DATE , to hand the child over to the third applicant but PERSON . P. again failed to appear . The bailiff postponed further enforcement to an unspecified date . The third applicant signed the report drawn up by the bailiff , expressing her discontent at the bailiff ’s inability to enforce the judicial decision .

On DATE the third applicant complained to the prosecutor under LAW of LAW about Kh . P. ’s active obstruction of the enforcement of the judicial decision granting custody to her . The prosecutor opened criminal proceedings and informed the third applicant of his decision on DATE .

A full psychological expert report on the child was drawn up on DATE in the context of those proceedings . The report ’s conclusion was that the child should not be forced to see his mother at that point in time . What was needed was systematic good - faith efforts by the father aimed at improving the child ’s attitude to his mother . Pressure from public institutions for the child to see his mother was likely to have a negative impact on him and so developing a relationship with his mother had to happen gradually . The report emphasised that if the child were to receive his father ’s support he would in all likelihood open up to his mother and develop a close relationship with her .

Kh . P. was acquitted at the end of the proceedings in a final judgment of DATE by ORG .

On DATE , the child , represented by Kh . P. , brought court proceedings against the third applicant , alleging acts of domestic violence by her . The child alleged , through his father , that he had been put under constant psychological pressure by his mother , which had led to sleep disturbances and restlessness and a fear that she could appear at any time in the street and kidnap him . He claimed that he had developed a headache , felt sick and had even vomited during the latest attempt to reunite him with his mother on DATE . Experts questioned in the proceedings found that the child tended to identify himself with the father and his active denial of his mother was damaging for him . The experts concluded that it was imperative for the child ’s well - being to provide him with urgent psychological therapy .

On DATE the first - instance court rejected an application for a restraining order on the third applicant . In particular , the court found the complaint about psychological violence ill - founded as it had been based on the mother ’s repeated attempts to have the bailiff hand the child over to her in accordance with the court ’s decision . The court held that the third applicant had been right to seek effective enforcement of the decision granting custody to her , just as Kh . P. had been obliged to comply with that decision . The court concluded that the child ’s well - being was at risk as a result of the ongoing , open animosity between the parents and ruled that a copy of the judgment should be sent to the social services with a view to them taking appropriate measures . There is no information on file about whether that court ’s decision was appealed against .

Kh . P. brought proceedings in DATE to be given custody of the child . ORG rejected his application on DATE .

The fourth applicant was born on DATE and lives in PERSON region .

On DATE the fourth applicant ’s marriage to PERSON was dissolved by a court decision which also determined his contact rights with his child , who had been born in DATE . According to the decision , the fourth applicant was to see the child DATE between TIME on DATE and TIME on DATE , and for DATE during DATE . Immediately after an argument between him and the child ’s mother on DATE , the mother started preventing him from having contact with his child .

The fourth applicant brought forced enforcement proceedings in DATE , seeking the effective implementation of his contact rights . According to him , the bailiff informed him that as the meetings with the child were scheduled to take place at DATE , when the bailiff was off work , the fourth applicant would be better being accompanied to the meetings by witnesses . Those individuals were to testify about what they saw by signing a declaration every time he encountered difficulties in seeing the child . The fourth applicant attempted to see the child on numerous occasions but his former wife continued to place obstacles in his way . He submitted CARDINAL declarations about such incidents , all drawn up in the course of DATE . The bailiff fined the mother once , setting the sum at about EUR CARDINAL .

The fourth applicant turned to ORG a number of times and the agency urged the mother to allow contact between the child and the fourth applicant , as set out in the court decision of CARDINAL DATE .

Notwithstanding those efforts , the fourth applicant submitted that he was still unable to see the child owing to the obstacles created by the mother .

In DATE the fourth applicant complained to the prosecutor . In DATE the prosecutor refused to open criminal proceedings , finding in particular that the child ’s mother had earlier been fined for impeding contact between the child and the fourth applicant , and that it would be unlawful to sanction her twice for the same offence . On appeal , the higher prosecutor returned the case for further examination . In DATE the district prosecutor opened criminal proceedings against the child ’s mother for obstructing the implementation of a judicial decision . The prosecutor terminated those proceedings on the basis of the fact that the child systematically refused to spend time alone with her father , but the firstinstance court later quashed that decision and returned the case for further consideration .

On DATE a different district prosecutor again terminated the proceedings , a decision that was upheld by courts at CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction , on DATE and CARDINAL DATE respectively . The highest court involved , ORG , found more specifically that instead of pursuing a constructive dialogue with the child ’s mother with a view to seeing the child , the fourth applicant had resorted to forced enforcement proceedings , which had been unsuitable in the circumstances and had meant the child had been scared to go with him as he had always been accompanied by strangers .

The fourth applicant applied for a divorce on DATE . The court granted it on CARDINAL DATE , granting custody to the mother , PERSON , and giving contact rights to the applicant . PERSON did not participate in those proceedings ; she was represented by a court - appointed lawyer as the fourth applicant had stated that he did not know where his wife could be contacted to be summoned . The fourth applicant continued to live with PERSON and the child at their family home until DATE .

DATE . On DATE an argument erupted between the fourth applicant and PERSON , following which he left the family home . On DATE PERSON instructed a lawyer to file for divorce on her behalf . The lawyer informed her that she was already divorced and had been so since DATE . Her former husband had also married another woman DATE after that judgment had become final , in DATE .

On DATE PERSON sought a change in the arrangements for contact between the fourth applicant and the child . She expressed serious concerns about the child ’s well - being and , in particular , voiced a fear that the father , having acted deceitfully in the past , might emigrate to GPE with his new wife , taking the child without PERSON ’s agreement or knowledge . She specified that the fourth applicant had proposed that she give up the child so that his new wife could adopt her . She also stated that he had not sought to have contact with the child since DATE and had arrived at her dwelling on DATE for the first time with several strangers ; that had scared the child and she had refused to go with her father .

The fourth applicant submitted during those proceedings that he had had a hernia operation in DATE and had been put on sick leave until DATE . As a result , he had been unwell and had not been in a position to collect the child , whom he had only seen at her kindergarten . He had been on bad terms with PERSON and that was the reason he had not called to enquire about the child ’s well - being . In DATE he had attempted to meet his daughter but PERSON had kept the child away from him and had refused to let them have any contact with each other .

NORP The social services submitted a report concluding that as the fourth applicant had not seen the child for DATE the relationship between the CARDINAL of them had broken down . They recommended that contact between him and the child take place , at least temporarily , in the presence of the mother .

On DATE the first - instance court granted PERSON ’s application for limiting the father ’s contact rights with the child to visits without sleepovers . It concluded on the basis of a number of reports by social services that the relationship between the fourth applicant and the child had broken down . That decision was upheld on appeal on DATE .

On DATE the fourth applicant complained to social services that PERSON had been preventing him from seeing his daughter since DATE and that the mother was not caring for the child appropriately . He stated that it was the latter ’s grandmother , who suffered from a psychiatric condition , who was the child ’s main care - giver . The social services carried out an inquiry and established in a report of CARDINAL September CARDINAL that the child was not being brought up by her grand - mother but enjoyed the DATE care and support of her mother . They also found that PERSON had not been preventing contact between the child and the applicant , but that the fourth applicant himself had not been seeking contact with his child . They had informed him that he had to meet his daughter regularly and that she needed the support and care of both of her parents .

On DATE the fourth applicant asked the bailiff to start enforcement proceedings on the basis of a writ of enforcement obtained on DATE . On DATE the bailiff asked PERSON to hand the child over to the fourth applicant in line with his contact rights . PERSON replied on DATE that the father had not sought any contact with the child since DATE , when he had left the family home , and had not telephoned to ask about the child ’s physical or emotional state . PERSON pointed out that she was aware of the arrangements for contact between him and the child , and had not opposed any meetings between them .

The applicant complained to the bailiff on CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE that PERSON had not taken the child to meet him in a café located QUANTITY from PERSON ’s home . The bailiff replied that the fourth applicant was expected to collect the child from the house and not from cafés or other locations of his own choosing .

DATE . The bailiff scheduled a handover of the child to the fourth applicant for CARDINAL DATE and PERSON took the child to that appointment . However , the bailiff did not enforce it as the child refused to go with her father . The bailiff scheduled a new appointment , DATE , for a handover for a contact meeting and PERSON took the child along to it . In the meantime , on DATE the fourth applicant withdrew his request to use his right to spend DATE with the child during DATE . Despite that withdrawal , the bailiff fined PERSON on DATE for not complying with the contact arrangements in favour of the fourth applicant .

The bailiff further fined ORG respectively on CARDINAL DATE , DATE and DATE , referring to her continued failure to hand the child over to the father , beginning from CARDINAL DATE . PERSON brought judicial review proceedings in respect of the last fine , submitting that she had systematically prepared the child for her DATE stays with her father , but that the child had regularly refused to go with him after he had arrived at meetings in the company of strangers . On DATE ORG quashed the fine of DATE . The court held that the bailiff should have attempted different means for enforcing the judgment before resorting to repeated fines . It set out his prerogatives under the law and emphasised that the bailiff was expected to be present when the child was handed over and to draw up reports on the particular circumstances , instead of relying on declarations signed by the parties or by individuals selected by them .

Subsequently , the fourth applicant requested that further fines be imposed on PERSON for not being at home when he had gone to take the child . The bailiff refused on CARDINAL occasions , finding that the dates in question had not been part of the applicant ’s visiting schedule . PERSON informed the bailiff that the fourth applicant had also arrived at her home in order to collect the child on DATE which had not been in the visiting schedule .

The fourth applicant informed the bailiff on DATE that he would not be in a position to meet his child for the foreseeable future owing to health problems . Thereafter , on DATE , without prior notice and on DATE which was not part of the schedule for visits , he complained to the bailiff that PERSON and the child had not been at home when he had attempted to collect her . Subsequently , on DATE and DATE he failed to collect the child as scheduled . After being asked by the bailiff to state whether he wanted to resume contact with the child , the fourth applicant confirmed on DATE that he did .

NORP The bailiff fined PERSON on CARDINAL DATE because she had failed since DATE to hand the child over to the fourth applicant . ORG quashed the fine on DATE in a final decision , finding that PERSON had not impeded enforcement . PERSON informed the bailiff that the fourth applicant had failed to collect the child on DATE as scheduled .

In a final decision of CARDINAL DATE , ORG dismissed the complaint made by the fourth applicant in criminal proceedings he had brought against PERSON in DATE . The court established that he had divorced PERSON without her knowledge in DATE and had continued living with her and the child until DATE . Immediately after learning DATE about the divorce and the contact regime , PERSON had sought to meet the fourth applicant in order to discuss and arrange his meetings with the child . He had not gone to a scheduled appointment at DATE and had told PERSON over the telephone , something he had himself admitted to the prosecutor , that there was nothing to discuss with her . The court concluded that that demonstrated , on the one hand , PERSON ’s willingness and readiness to comply with the contact regime and , on the other hand , the fourth applicant ’s categorical refusal to have a dialogue with the child ’s mother .

It was likewise established that after he had left the family home in DATE the applicant had not sought contact with the child for DATE . He had also not called to ask about her well - being although that would have been fully compatible with his state of health at the time . That had led to the breakdown of his relationship with the child . Further , he had thereafter only sought contact with the child via forced enforcement proceedings in which he had gone to collect the child in the company of strangers . He had also at times sought meetings on DATE that had not been part of his visiting schedule while omitting to seek contact on DATE that had been set as part of the schedule .


CASE OF CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF ST PETERSBURG AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA

Violation of Article 9 - Freedom of thought conscience and religion (Article 9-1 - Freedom of religion) read in the light of Article 11 - (Art. 11) Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11-1 - Freedom of association)

Dmitry Dedov;Erik Møse;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Ksenija Turković

The applicants are :

ORG GPE , an unincorporated group of NORP citizens formed for the collective study of ORG ( “ the applicant group ” ) ;

PERSON , born in DATE , the president of the applicant group and a member since DATE ;

PERSON , born in DATE , a member of the applicant group since DATE ;

Mr PERSON Matsitskiy , born in DATE , a member of the applicant group since DATE ;

PERSON , born in DATE , a member of the applicant group since DATE .

In DATE , a first group of NORP appeared in GPE under the leadership of Mr PERSON . By DATE it had split into CARDINAL smaller groups , CARDINAL of which was led by the second applicant .

On DATE the second applicant , together with CARDINAL other founder members of ORG in GPE ” , applied for registration of their group . Having received no response for DATE , the second applicant pressed the authorities for an explanation . GPE Justice Department replied that their application had been sent to ORG for an opinion by an expert in legal and religious studies but had received no response , and it had been decided to “ leave the application unconsidered ” .

On DATE the individual applicants , together with other fellow believers , submitted a new application for registration of the applicant group as a local religious organisation . The municipal council of municipal circuit no . CARDINAL of GPE provided the applicants with a letter which stated :

“ In accordance with LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW and on the basis of the application and documents provided , the municipal council ... confirms that the religious group of NORP has existed in GPE since DATE . ”

On DATE the GPE ORG refused the application , citing CARDINAL technical grounds relating to the application documentation . On DATE the applicants corrected these defects and resubmitted the application .

On DATE ORG notified the applicants that it had extended the period for consideration of the application because of the “ necessity of conducting a ORG expert religious study ” .

On DATE ORG issued a formal refusal of the resubmitted application . The refusal made no reference to any religious study but instead cited CARDINAL different technical grounds and asserted that the confirmation of the applicant group ’s existence in GPE for DATE was “ unreliable ” , without giving further details .

On DATE the applicants resubmitted a corrected application which was refused on DATE , referring to the CARDINAL new technical grounds and the “ unreliability ” of the group ’s existence for DATE . It also stated that an unspecified expert religious study had concluded that the applicant group was non - religious in nature .

On DATE the second applicant asked ORG to explain the basis for its claim regarding the “ unreliability ” of the group ’s existence and to provide her with a copy of the religious study . In a letter of DATE , ORG declined to give any clarification , referring to its discretionary power to refuse applications .

The third applicant complained to the ORG about ORG actions . In response to a subsequent enquiry from the ORG ’s office , ORG supplied a copy of the religious study , dated DATE and authored by Mr I. , an academic secretary at ORG in GPE .

On DATE the ORG notified the head of ORG that the religious study had breached the established procedure for conducting religious studies , as approved by Government Regulation no . CARDINAL . The study had not been approved by majority vote of the panel of experts duly appointed under the terms of the Regulation and therefore reflected nothing more than PERSON personal opinion .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the applicants submitted a fifth and a sixth registration application , which were refused on DATE and CARDINAL DATE respectively . On each occasion , ORG cited a number of new technical grounds that it had not relied upon in the previous refusal : it also referred to the expert religious study and the assertion that the confirmation of the applicant group ’s existence for DATE had been “ unreliable ” .

Responding to a further request for clarification by the applicant PERSON , on DATE ORG stated that she did not have a right of access to the documents supporting the conclusion that the information purportedly confirming the existence of the religious group for DATE was unreliable , and that the law did not require it to provide any explanation as to the reasons for refusing ORG registration .

On DATE the applicants challenged the ORG refusals in court . The first hearing on the merits was held on DATE , and further hearings were held on DATE and DATE .

On DATE ORG of GPE gave judgment , holding that the refusal had been lawful . In respect of ORG rejection of the confirmation letter , it stated :

“ Having examined the letter of DATE and the reply from the municipal council to the enquiry from the [ ORG ] concerning the documents that served as the basis for the letter , the court concludes that the applicants have not supplied evidence that there was CARDINAL religious group of NORP in GPE that included the applicants and that the letter was given to their particular group . One can not exclude the possibility that there were many groups practising this creed in GPE and that the letter confirms the existence of CARDINAL of the [ other ] groups of NORP , and not the religious group of NORP that decided to create the local religious organisation ORG ...

Even if any of the participants in the religious group that currently includes the applicants had studied Scientology in GPE since DATE and had participated in NORP rituals and ceremonies and in auditing , that does not prove that he or she did so within one and the same continuously operating , stable religious group that currently includes the applicants , as opposed to some other group that currently does or does not exist , and [ later ] ended up forming part of the ORG group .

In addition , the court takes into consideration the following .

GPE no . CARDINAL of DATE on ORG , which establishes an exhaustive list of matters that come within the competence of municipal councils in GPE ( section CARDINAL) , did not place the registration of religious organisation or the issuing of letters confirming the existence of a religious group in GPE within the competence of municipal bodies .

There is GPE law that confers such powers upon municipal bodies .

On the basis of the above , it follows that the [ municipal council ] was not competent to issue such letters .

Furthermore , as can be seen from the municipal council ’s reply ... to the court ’s enquiry , the [ municipal council ] was formed on DATE and registered by order no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE of ORG of GPE , so it can not reliably confirm the existence of any religious group before its formation in DATE ... ”

As to ORG reliance on PERSON religious study , the court noted that at the time of the study ’s preparation no expert panel had been appointed in GPE under the terms of the ORG , even though ORG had “ undertaken all possible measures ” to comply with the Regulation . The court did not make any assessment of the legal significance of PERSON religious study .

The applicants appealed .

On DATE GPE rejected their appeal , endorsing the first - instance court ’s findings that the municipal council was not authorised by law to provide confirmation of the religious group ’s existence or the claim that it had been one and the same group of NORP who had existed for DATE .


Preliminary objection partially allowed (Article 34 - Victim);Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression)

George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Päivi Hirvelä;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The first applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE . The applicant company has its seat in GPE .

The applicants , a publisher and a publishing company , wrote and published , together with the former girlfriend of the Prime Minister at the time , an autobiographical book about her relationship with the Prime Minister . The book described a period of DATE in their lives from the point of view of the girlfriend , a single mother . The Prime Minister had earlier divorced his wife . The book described the dating couple ’s life and their intimate interaction . The book was published on DATE . The Prime Minister held office from DATE to DATE when he stepped down .

On DATE the public prosecutor brought charges under LAW , section CARDINAL , of LAW against the first applicant and the girlfriend for having disclosed information about the Prime Minister ’s private life ( yksityiselämää loukkaavan tiedon levittäminen , spridande av information som kränker privatlivet ) . He also requested that the proceeds of the crime received by the applicant company be ordered forfeit to the ORG in accordance with LAW , LAW , of LAW . The Prime Minister concurred with the charges brought by the public prosecutor against the first applicant . He also pursued a compensation claim against the first applicant which was joined to the criminal charges . The girlfriend has lodged a separate application with ORG ( see PERSON , no . MONEY ) .

On DATE the book was withdrawn from sale .

On DATE the GPE ORG ( käräjäoikeus , tingsrätten ) , after having voted , dismissed the charges against the first applicant and rejected the request that the proceeds of the crime received by the applicant company be ordered forfeit to the ORG . It found that the book disclosed a lot of information about the Prime Minister ’s private life but that he had already widely disclosed information about his family and habits as well as about his relationship with the girlfriend . Even though he himself had published an autobiography in DATE , had given several interviews , ran a blog and even permitted photographs to be taken at his home , he was known as a politician who strictly controlled his public image . The book also contained some information which had not previously been disclosed to the public . In this respect the court found that these new details only completed the information the Prime Minister had disclosed earlier . It was never suggested that the facts disclosed were not true . The book covered a period of DATE in the girlfriend ’s and the Prime Minister ’s private life . The court found that the girlfriend had the right to recount her private life . She also described the Prime Minister , his actions and family in a compassionate manner . The court found that , even though the information disclosed in the book had no direct relevance to the Prime Minister ’s political functions or his hierarchical position in the ORG , it had relevance as far as the Prime Minister ’s person was concerned . The LAW required that ministers were “ known to be honest and competent ” . Moreover , the book described a situation in which CARDINAL different realities of DATE NORP society met : a wealthy party leader and Prime Minister on the one hand , and a single mother with everyday money problems on the other hand . The court found that the fact that the girlfriend was writing about her life and her relationship with one of the highest authorities in the country did not restrict but in fact widened her freedom of expression . When weighing the freedom of expression against the protection of private life , the court found that the need to resort to criminal liability decreased when the disclosed information became more widely known . Criminal liability was the last resort in guiding human behaviour and its use had to be proportionate . The court could therefore not hold that the publication of the applicants’ book was a criminal act . Moreover , as the first applicant had obtained an opinion from a lawyer before publishing the book , he could not be regarded as having acted with intent and could not therefore be considered as a perpetrator .

By letter dated DATE the public prosecutor appealed to ORG ( hovioikeus , hovrätten ) . The Prime Minister also appealed .

On DATE the ORG convicted the first applicant for disseminating information violating personal privacy and sentenced him to DATE - fines , in total QUANTITY . He was ordered to pay the Prime Minister CARDINAL plus interest for non - pecuniary damage and CARDINAL plus interest for his costs and expenses before ORG and ORG . The proceeds of the crime , CARDINAL euros , were ordered forfeit to the ORG . The applicant company was to receive MONEY as compensation for its costs and expenses before ORG . The court found that the passages in the book concerning the Prime Minister ’s intimate dating and his children ’s feelings and behaviour unnecessarily violated the core areas of his protected private life . He had not previously disclosed these details of his private life in the media . The fact that he had disclosed some parts of his private life , the protection of which was , due to his status , much narrower than a private person ’s , did not mean that he could not benefit at all from any protection of his private life . He had thus not waived his right to the protection of private life , nor implicitly consented to the disclosure of information concerning details of his private life . Even though the girlfriend had the right to write about her private life , disclosure of intimate details of another person ’s private life always required his or her consent . The aim of the applicants’ book had been to discuss matters of private life and it had no relevance to the Prime Minister ’s political functions or his hierarchical position in the ORG . Nor had it any relevance to the assessment of his personal qualities , such as any lack of honesty and judgment , as the relationship fell within the core areas of his private life and had no relevance to his position as Prime Minister . Moreover , the first applicant could be held as a perpetrator even though he had obtained a legal opinion about the book before its publication . His acts had been intentional .

NORP By letter dated DATE the applicants appealed to ORG ( korkein oikeus , högsta domstolen ) , requesting that the court establish a precedent in the case as the court had not yet in its case - law assessed freedom of expression in the context of an autobiography .

On DATE ORG granted the applicants leave to appeal .

On DATE ORG , after having held an oral hearing , upheld ORG conviction but quashed the forfeiture in respect of the first applicant and reduced the costs and expenses to be paid to the Prime Minister for the proceedings before ORG and ORG to CARDINAL plus interest . The first applicant was ordered to pay the Prime Minister CARDINAL plus interest for his costs and expenses before ORG . The applicant company was to receive MONEY as compensation for its costs and expenses before that court . In particular , by referring extensively to the ORG ’s case - law , ORG gave a more narrow scope to the Prime Minister ’s private life than ORG . The court found that information about the Prime Minister ’s sex life and intimate events and his children ’s feelings and behaviour had not been disclosed to the public before . The fact that some details of his private life had been disclosed before did not mean that they could not fall within the scope of criminal liability under LAW , section CARDINAL , of LAW . The Prime Minister had not waived his right to protection of private life in these respects , nor had he given his consent to their publication by consenting to the use of his photograph on the cover of the book . The court considered , contrary to ORG , that the information about how and when the Prime Minister had met the girlfriend and how quickly their relationship had developed had had relevance to general public discussion as these issues had raised the question of whether in this respect he had been dishonest and lacked judgment . Also the information concerning the great differences in the standard of living between the girlfriend and the Prime Minister , his lifestyle , the data protection concerns and the protection of the highest political authorities in general had had relevance to general public discussion . The court found also that disclosure of information about the Prime Minister ’s children was not conducive to causing him damage , suffering and contempt as the girlfriend had only given her own interpretation of the children ’s attitudes . However , the only references which , according to the court , had illegally disclosed information about the Prime Minister ’s private life were the information and hints about the sex life and intimate events between the girlfriend and the Prime Minister . The court enumerated in particular CARDINAL parts of the book which contained information about the start of the sex life in the beginning of their relationship , descriptions of their brief and passionate intimate moments as well as giving massages to each other , and accounts of their sexual intercourse . The court found that such information and hints fell within the core area of private life and their unauthorised publication was conducive of causing the Prime Minister suffering and contempt . It was thus necessary to restrict the applicants’ freedom of expression in this respect in order to protect the Prime Minister ’s private life .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing;Adversarial trial;Equality of arms;Impartial tribunal);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - award

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Guido Raimondi;Nebojša Vučinić;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Peer Lorenzen

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in LOC ( ORG ) .

In DATE the applicant , aged DATE at the time , was called up to undertake compulsory military service . For the purposes of his conscription he had a combined psychological evaluation and physical examination on DATE , as a result of which he was found to be fit for military service . The detailed report , which was not disclosed to the applicant ( until DATE in the course of pension proceedings ) , considered that the applicant was slow in understanding and executing a task but logical in its exercise , although prone to giving up . In an evaluation covering language and cultural skills , motivation , mental performance and behaviour , he obtained a grade of CARDINAL out of CARDINAL in each area .

Upon his conscription , the applicant underwent another medical examination on DATE , as a result of which he was again found to be fit for military service on the basis that he was not suffering from any illness . He was assigned to Battalion no . CARDINAL in ORG , where he was subject to intensive physical and mental training , including in the use of firearms .

On DATE the applicant was transferred to the provincial command unit in GPE , where he remained until DATE . During this time , from DATE to CARDINAL DATE he temporarily formed part of its logistical battalion . While in GPE the applicant was subjected to multiple punishments . According to the documentation presented , he was subjected to CARDINAL punishments DATE , amounting to DATE of confinement , including periods of solitary confinement , for reasons ranging from negligent care of his camp - bed area to failure to report to his supervisor , or informal behaviour towards his superior . During the time he spent with the logistical battalion he was hospitalised CARDINAL times for medical care unrelated to his mental problems ( see below ) .

On DATE the applicant was transferred to GPE , where a commander noted that the applicant suffered from nervous tics and twitches , difficulty in socialising and learning , and absent - minded behaviour . The commander ordered the applicant to undergo a specialised medical assessment to test his fitness to perform military service .

On DATE he was admitted to hospital , where he was diagnosed with anxiety disorder and considered to be in a fragile state of mind .

A medical report by the ORG of ORG of DATE considered that in his youth the applicant had suffered from affection - relational problems and learning difficulties . He was physically weak and insecure , had a low aptitude for learning and was prone to isolation , was dysfunctional and incapable of taking up responsibilities . Tests revealed that he was unable to perform assigned tasks , had difficulty orienting himself and impaired cognitive functions ( a deficit in logic and memory ) . He was considered to have a slight intellectual deficit ( an IQ of CARDINAL ) and to be incapable of creating positive relationships with people . This inadequacy caused him to live military life with anxiety and fear of his fellow soldiers , who he considered were aggressive towards him , even if they had only been joking . The report considered that the longer he remained in military service , the more severe his anxiety would become , and his defensive attitude arising from his fears would intensify .

The applicant remained on medical leave for recovery purposes until DATE , when , following a specialised assessment to determine his suitability for military service , on DATE the applicant was found to suffer from “ dysphoria and borderline personality [ disorder ] ” and was discharged due to unfitness .

NORP Following his discharge , the applicant underwent further medical examinations . A report by the NHS of Tricase of DATE considered that the applicant no longer had a defensive attitude , nor was he suffering from dysphoria and nervous tics . He was still , however , insecure , prone to isolation , unstable and unwilling to take up responsibilities . Following the tests performed , the report concluded that the stressful situation , namely his military service , having ended , the applicant had slightly improved . However , he still displayed signs of intellectual deficit .

At the time a report by the applicant ’s doctor ( PERSON ) considered that the applicant had fallen sick because of military service or that there was at least a causal link between the CARDINAL . In consequence , on DATE the applicant asked ORG to pay damages under PERSON no . CARDINAL of DATE and presidential decree no . CARDINAL of DATE .

In the course of the examination of his request for damages , on DATE ORG of ORG diagnosed the applicant with “ obsessive - compulsive disorder ” ( “ ORG ” ) , which it considered was not a result of his military service . It opined that the mental infirmity at issue was a pre - existing condition . It did not appear that during his military service the applicant had been involved in any events or had to carry out any duties which , given their importance , duration and nature , could have seriously influenced the onset or progression of this mental health problem . It further considered the request to have been made out of time .

In the meantime the applicant had repeatedly asked the relevant authorities to provide him with a copy of the pertinent documents regarding the period in which he had served in the military to enable him to substantiate his claims . On DATE he further asked ORG to provide him with the administrative and health documents related to his case together with TIME of ORG meeting in his respect . This request was repeated CARDINAL times in DATE and remained unanswered .

On DATE the second instance ORG of ORG confirmed the findings of ORG dated DATE .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s request for damages , noting that ORG ( second instance ) of the Command of ORG had , on DATE , determined that the ORG from which the applicant suffered had not been caused by his military service .

According to a medical certificate submitted by the applicant to this ORG , issued by ORG ( mental health department ) on DATE , the applicant , who had been treated by the department since DATE for a fragile state of mind , a low IQ , and ORG which had become chronic , had developed behavioural problems to the extent of violent outbursts towards his family following his military service .

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings before ORG ( “ TAR ” ) for the recognition of the causal link between his mental health problems and his compulsory military service , and in the event that the court considered his condition to be preexisting he asked it to ascertain the military ’s liability for recruiting him and in consequence to make an award of damages in his favour .

On DATE the applicant lodged an urgent request with the relevant authorities to access medical documents relating to the fitness - for - service examination prior to conscription , details about his time in the military – training , work , and so on , his disciplinary record , i.e. of the punishments endured , and a record of his hospital stays , an assessment by his commander of his personality and professionalism and all other relevant material held by ORG . On DATE he was informed that the unit in GPE had been disbanded . He was further informed that he had spent DATE in “ consegna semplice ” ( a punishment prohibiting an individual from leaving the base ) and DATE of “ consegna di rigore ” ( a punishment confining the individual to a specified area on the base ) and that any further information had to be requested from ORG . The applicant lodged a request with ORG on DATE and on DATE the office replied , sending the applicant an excerpt containing his disciplinary record and noting that he had spent CARDINAL , rather than QUANTITY , days in “ consegna semplice ” . No other documentation was sent to the applicant . Following further requests on DATE , ORG sent the applicant the psycho - physical training file .

On DATE the TAR appointed PERSON as a court expert to ascertain the nature of the applicant ’s infirmity and submit a report within DATE .

Following an examination of the applicant , PERSON failed to deliver the requisite report . Thus , on DATE , the applicant asked the TAR to replace the expert .

By a judgment filed in the relevant registry on DATE the TAR , considering the applicant ’s interlocutory request as an application for renewal ( “ rinnovo ” ) , rejected the request , noting that for DATE the applicant had failed to solicit any action whatsoever . Considering that no more evidence was necessary , it proceeded to give judgment . It held that the CARDINAL ORG had agreed about the source of the applicant ’s infirmity and that it had resulted from a pre - existing condition . Indeed the first - instance ORG had referred to a diagnosis of the applicant made in DATE ( when he had been admitted to hospital ) which evidenced a fragile and vulnerable mental state . The court went on to note that it transpired that the medical examination of DATE to determine the applicant ’s fitness for service had not been accurate , since it should already have transpired that the applicant was not entirely fit to take up military service .

On DATE the applicant appealed to ORG ( “ FAC ” ) . He complained , inter alia , that : the outcome of the case had been illogical – even though the TAR had considered that his fitness - for - service examination had not been accurate it had failed to pronounce itself on any liability and to award damages ; the TAR had considered the applicant ’s interlocutory request for the replacement of the expert as an application for renewal , even though replacement of the expert was clearly due given the delay in performing his functions , leading to the court taking a decision to dismiss the action without the relevant information .

By a partial judgment of DATE , the ORG considered that a specialised medical examination was indeed necessary to determine the connection , if any , between the applicant ’s infirmity and his military service . It ordered that such an examination be carried out by ORG ( Collegio Medico Legale della PERSON – the “ ORG ” ) , by means of a medical assessment in the presence of the applicant ’s general practitioner , and that a report be submitted within DATE . It appears from the documents that ORG appointed for the applicant ’s case was made up of CARDINAL full members , CARDINAL from the military and CARDINAL from ORG , and an external expert in neurology .

In DATE ORG report was filed . Its findings took into consideration a report produced DATE by an expert engaged by the applicant which he had been allowed to submit to ORG ( before being submitted to the ORG ) . ORG report noted that when the applicant was discharged he had been suffering from dysphoria , anxiety disorder and borderline personality disorder and had been considered to suffer from slight intellectual disability . It confirmed the reports submitted by ORG and highlighted the relevance of the preexisting nature of the applicant ’s condition , also noting that upon examination by ORG on DATE and at the date of the report in DATE the applicant had been suffering from “ chronic ORG , a slight degree of intellectual disability , displayed personality changes and was prone to have marginal traits ” . It concluded that at the date of review , according to the information available , the infirmity could not be considered to have been the direct result of or aggravated by ordinary military service .

On an unspecified date the report of CARDINAL DATE prepared by the applicant ’s expert ( PERSON ) was filed with the court . It noted that the applicant , a mentally healthy subject upon undergoing medical assessments prior to being drafted , had never shown any symptoms of mental illness before conscription into the military service and it was only after repeated punishment that such traits had emerged . Therefore , even assuming that he was predisposed to mental health problems , it was evident that it was the treatment he had been subjected to during military service that had caused the emergence of the illness . The implications of military service were generally of great emotional impact and a source of stress , which for a person who was in a fragile state of mental health or predisposed to mental health problems , unlike in the case of a healthy person , could trigger mental illness . The applicant ’s being away from his family and his inability to relate to colleagues and superiors , in the absence of the necessary psychological support and in view of the repeated punishments imposed on him , had caused him to develop dysphoria which had later evolved into chronic ORG . Thus , in the applicant ’s case there had been a causal link between his mental health problems and his military service , or the latter had at least contributed to the development of his condition .

On DATE the applicant filed pleadings contesting the findings of ORG and arguing that its report could not be considered objective and impartial given its nature and composition , as it was an organ of the opposing party in the proceedings . He argued that there had been a lack of transparency in the production of the report , which was highlighted by the fact that he had recently become aware of other documents related to the case which had never been disclosed to him by the authorities , the substance of which had been reflected in the report . On DATE the applicant made further oral pleadings .

By a judgment filed in the relevant registry on CARDINAL DATE the ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal , holding that the applicant ’s infirmity was antecedent to his military service and that it had not been detectible during the examination in DATE , as had been established by ORG . As to the failure to disclose documentation , it considered that such documentation did not relate to the period during which the applicant had carried out military service . In any event the crux of the applicant ’s complaint had concerned the conclusions of ORG report which did not accord with his claim . However , the ORG considered that the report was not contradictory or illogical in itself and it had not ignored relevant facts . It followed that given that the ORG ( in its limited powers of judicial review of administrative acts ) ( in sede di legittimità ) was not allowed to assess the merits of that report , the applicant ’s challenge could not be upheld . In respect of the original medical examination to determine the applicant ’s fitness for military service , the ORG again adopted the findings of ORG , which had considered that it was possible that the applicant ’s health problems had not manifested themselves in the absence of particular stimuli .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court)

András Sajó;Iulia Motoc;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Marko Bošnjak;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant and GPE began living together in DATE . On DATE their daughter , GPE , was born . She was raised mainly by her maternal grandmother in GPE while both parents , whose relationship soon ended , left to work abroad .

On DATE GPE applied to ORG for her daughter to be officially registered as resident at her address . On DATE a summons was sent to the applicant at his registered address , informing him of GPE ’s action . According to the courier , the summons could not be served as the house was closed up and no one was living there . The summons was only sent once . On DATE the court of first instance , acting on the basis of LAW ( hereinafter , “ the ORG ” – see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , ordered information concerning the proceedings to be published in a DATE newspaper called TIME . On DATE the ORG granted GPE ’s application . The decision was taken in the absence of the applicant , whose whereabouts , according to the ruling , could not be established .

On DATE the ORG , acting upon another application by GPE , ruled again by default that GPE could be issued with an international passport and leave the territory of GPE without her father ’s consent . No specific time - limit for that restriction of the applicant ’s parental rights was given in the ruling . The court again stated that the applicant ’s whereabouts were unknown and ordered the information about the proceedings to be published in TIME . Unlike the first set of default proceedings , the summons was sent twice to the applicant at the address he had registered at . It was again not delivered . The courier noted that the house was closed up .

It appears from the case file that the custody and guardianship authority , which represented the interests of the child in the above proceedings , made its own attempts to contact the applicant . In conclusions submitted to ORG , the authority noted that during its visit to the applicant ’s registered address it had learnt from neighbours that he had sold the house in DATE and left for GPE . Both default decisions were sent to the applicant ’s registered address and , as they could not be served , were consequently published in TIME according to the procedure provided for in LAW see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG , seeking to have both default decisions set aside . He stated that he had learnt about the decisions only in DATE . He also explained that he had not been living in GPE at the material time , which his former partner had well known . The default proceedings had been unfair as he had not been properly summoned to the hearings .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s application . The court ruled , with reference to Articles QUANTITY and CARDINAL of the ORG ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) , that the applicant had been duly informed about the proceedings via public notifications in a newspaper and that there was therefore no legal basis to set the impugned decisions aside . It noted that the applicant had been registered at the address where the summonses had been sent and that for the purposes of the proceedings the courts had been justified in using that very address .

NORP That decision was upheld by ORG on DATE . It reasoned that the domestic courts had been right to send the summonses to the applicant ’s only available registered address . Furthermore , as it had not been possible to serve the summonses on the applicant , the procedure of delivering a summons via a public notification , as provided for in LAW , had been duly employed .

In his last communication with ORG on DATE , the applicant stated that he could still not have any contact with his daughter .


Angelika Nußberger;Erik Møse;Ganna Yudkivska;Mārtiņš Mits;Síofra O’Leary;Yonko Grozev

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She was represented before the Court by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented , most recently , by their Agent , Mr PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on several counts of fraud and incitement to bribery . The applicant remained at liberty , having paid a bail .

On DATE , during the trial , ORG of Poltava ( “ the ORG ” ) ordered that the applicant be placed in custody .

On DATE the applicant was put on the list of wanted persons .

On DATE she was arrested .

On DATE she was placed in the Poltava Pre - Trial Detention Centre ( “ the GPE ” ) . On admission to the GPE the applicant had a medical examination .

On DATE she was admitted to a medical unit at the GPE with a diagnosis of ischemic heart disease , stenocardia , atherosclerotic cardio sclerosis , impaired cardiac function and hypertensive disease . The applicant had an electrocardiogram and was provided with treatment . DATE she had a consultation with a cardiologist .

On DATE the applicant was examined by a neuropathologist .

On DATE the applicant had a stenocardia attack accompanied by a sharp drop in her arterial blood pressure . She was provided with urgent medical care by an ambulance team which had arrived at the request of the GPE . The applicant was given further treatment in a city hospital .

On DATE the applicant was taken to the gynaecological ward of a city hospital where she was treated for uterine fibroids and haemorrhagic syndrome . Further examinations showed that the applicant suffered from endometrial cancer ( adenocarcinoma corporis uteri ) . On DATE the applicant was returned to the GPE and placed in the medical unit for further treatment and observation .

On DATE the applicant was examined and prescribed further drug therapy .

On DATE the applicant was examined by an oncologist who recommended she have surgery . She was registered with the NORP regional oncologic clinic as a cancer patient with ORG cancer .

On DATE the applicant wrote a statement refusing to consent to surgical treatment , chemotherapy or any other complex treatment until she had been seen by the oncology panel at the GPE oncologic centre .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE , the governor of the GPE and the head of the GPE ’s medical unit informed the applicant ’s lawyer that the applicant had refused to have the necessary treatment because she wanted to be examined by doctors from the GPE oncology institution .

On DATE the applicant had her lungs X - rayed . No tuberculosis was found .

On DATE the applicant was diagnosed with cervical osteochondrosis and prescribed medical treatment and further observation .

On DATE the applicant was taken by ambulance to the gynaecological ward of the city hospital because of a uterine haemorrhage . The doctor who treated her confirmed her diagnosis and the need for surgery . The applicant returned to the GPE DATE .

On DATE the applicant was examined by an oncologist from the NORP regional oncologic clinic who also recommended surgery .

On DATE the ORG indicated to the Government under Rule CARDINAL of ORG that they should secure immediately , by appropriate means , inpatient treatment for the applicant for her health condition .

On DATE the applicant was admitted to the NORP regional oncologic clinic for further examination and treatment .

On DATE a panel of doctors at the clinic made a plan for the applicant to have surgery and scheduled it for CARDINAL DATE . The applicant refused to give her consent to the proposed treatment .

On DATE the applicant again refused to consent to the medical intervention and treatment proposed by the doctors at the NORP regional oncologic clinic . The refusal was witnessed by CARDINAL witnesses , including the doctor in charge of her treatment . The applicant was returned to the GPE ’s medical unit for further supervision and non - surgical treatment , which included taking prescription pills .

On DATE the applicant was taken to the NORP regional psychiatric hospital for observation in connection with signs of a possible mental disorder . On DATE she was returned to the ORG after she was found to be of sound mind and that she had attempted to simulate a mental disorder . The applicant continued to accept the treatment provided to her in the GPE .

On DATE ORG found the applicant guilty of financial frauds and of incitement to bribery . It sentenced her to DATE imprisonment but released her from serving that sentence pending DATE probation period . ORG further changed the preventive measure against her from pre - trial detention to a written undertaking not to abscond . The applicant was released on DATE .

On DATE the Government informed ORG applicant ’s release , following which the ORG lifted the interim measure .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment)

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention . Some applicants also raised complaints under LAW .


George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Paul Mahoney

NORP The case originated in an application ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) against GPE and GPE lodged with ORG under LAW ( “ the LAW ) by a NORP national , Mr PERSON ( “ the applicant ” ) , on CARDINAL DATE .

NORP The applicant was represented by PERSON of Central Law Practice , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON of ORG . By letter dated DATE ORG were asked to notify the ORG by DATE if they intended to intervene . They did not reply to this letter .

On DATE the application was communicated to the Government .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant , a NORP national born in DATE , entered GPE in DATE . On DATE the Deputy Prosecutor General in GPE issued NORP Arrest Warrant ( “ EAW ” ) in which he was accused of having committed CARDINAL dangerous felonies .

The applicant was arrested pursuant to the ORG in DATE and detained in ORG .

On DATE ORG ordered the applicant ’s extradition to GPE . The applicant applied to ORG to have the order set aside on CARDINAL grounds : first , that the lapse of time since the commission of the alleged offences would render his extradition unjust and oppressive ; and secondly , that his extradition would violate Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Convention because , if returned to GPE , he would be at risk of reprisals by a notorious criminal organisation .

In DATE a doctor at ORG notified the applicant ’s representative that he was suffering from paranoid delusions and that he had been referred to ORG . A psychiatric report prepared on DATE recorded that he had been suffering from depression since DATE , that he was suffering from a delusional disorder and that he should be transferred to ORG for treatment .

NORP However , the authorities at ORG did not accept that he should be transferred there . The applicant ’s legal representatives subsequently obtained a report from another psychiatrist , who noted that the applicant appeared to be seriously depressed , that he was suffering from a delusional disorder , and that there was a risk of suicide . The psychiatrist expressed some surprise that the applicant ’s transfer to ORG had not been granted and suggested that the refusal decision from ORG should be appealed .

The High Court hearing was listed for DATE . The applicant sought an adjournment in order for a full psychiatric report to be obtained .

On DATE ORG refused the application for an adjournment . It also refused to set aside the order of ORG and refused to grant the applicant permission to appeal to ORG .

The High Court ’s consideration of how the applicant ’s mental health condition would be affected by extradition and the treatment that would be available to him in GPE was limited to the following paragraph :

“ As far as his mental state is concerned , there is evidence before us that the reports on his state , if not already forwarded , will be forwarded and any necessary treatment will be available to him either in hospital if that is necessary or perhaps as an outpatient if he is on bail . ”

A psychiatric report dated DATE recorded that the applicant was suffering from a serious mental illness which required treatment in hospital and which he could not explain by malingering . The applicant sought to re - open the appeal on the basis of this report . However , on DATE ORG refused to certify a point of law of general public importance and thus refused to re - open the appeal .

On DATE ORG stayed the applicant ’s extradition until TIME on DATE to enable him to apply to this ORG for an interim measure under LAW .

On DATE the applicant ’s legal representatives lodged an application before this ORG on behalf of the applicant and requested an interim measure to prevent his extradition to GPE .

On DATE the ORG asked the ORG to provide , by TIME on DATE , a transcript of ORG hearing of DATE and at the same time to confirm whether or not any assurances had been received from ORG regarding the availability of mental health treatment in detention centres in GPE . The Government duly submitted a copy of the transcript and confirmed that there was no record of any assurances on the applicant ’s file .

On DATE the Acting President of the Section decided to apply Rule CARDINAL of ORG and indicated to the Government of GPE that the applicant should not be extradited to GPE until further notice .

By letter dated CARDINAL DATE the ORG asked the ORG to respond to the following questions by CARDINAL DATE :

“ CARDINAL . Are your Government aware of the medical report by Dr PERSON of DATE ?

How do your Government respond to PERSON opinion that the applicant should be transferred to ORG ?

NORP In your Government ’s view , would the applicant have access to adequate mental health services upon extradition to GPE :

( a ) in detention pending trial ?

( b ) if he were found not fit to plead ?

( c ) if he were to be tried and convicted ?

Does the applicant have continuing family and/or personal ties to GPE ? ”

The Government replied on DATE . In their letter they informed the ORG that the only parties in extradition cases were the defendant and ORG . As a consequence , the Government had not been represented as a party in the present extradition proceedings and were not in a position to provide the additional information requested .

Following communication of the applicant ’s case on DATE , ORG re - referred the applicant to ORG as there had been no change in his mental health condition .

On DATE the applicant ’s representatives notified the ORG that he had been admitted to ORG .

NORP However , the applicant ’s mental health condition subsequently improved significantly and on DATE his transfer was ordered from ORG to ORG . ORG also obtained a number of assurances from ORG : first , given the length of time he had spent in remand in GPE , there was a very real prospect that upon his return to GPE the applicant would be released during the pre - trial investigation stage ; secondly , if he were to be remanded in custody and his health were to deteriorate , he would be hospitalised immediately in the psychiatric department of the central prison hospital ; thirdly , if he were to remain in an ordinary custodial facility , he would be held in a prison which had psychiatric services available ; fourthly , if his fitness to plead were to be in issue , he would be subject to forensic psychiatric examination ; fifthly , there would be provision for compulsory or voluntary hospitalisation for treatment of the applicant ’s mental health ; and finally , if the applicant were convicted and sentenced and continued to require specialist psychiatric care , he would be sent to a facility specifically adapted for convicted persons with special needs .

Part I of LAW DATE deals with extradition to Category CARDINAL territories which , by designation of the Secretary of ORG , include all the member states of ORG which operate the NORP Arrest Warrant system . GPE is therefore a Category CARDINAL territory .

Section CARDINAL of the LAW requires the judge at the extradition hearing to decide whether a person ’s extradition would be compatible with Convention rights within the meaning of LAW DATE . If the extradition would be incompatible , then the judge is required to order the person ’s discharge . LAW provides that if the physical or mental condition of the persons whose extradition is requested is such that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite them , then the judge must discharge them .

If the judge at the extradition hearing orders the person ’s extradition , section CARDINAL provides for a right of appeal to ORG . Section CARDINAL provides for a right of appeal to ORG against a decision of ORG , with the leave of either ORG or ORG , which leave shall only be granted if ORG has certified that the case involves a point of law of general public importance and the ORG granting leave considers that the point ought to be considered by ORG .


Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Positive obligations);Pecuniary damage - reserved (Article 41 - Just satisfaction)

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Ksenija Turković

The applicants are sisters who were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in P.

In DATE the applicants , represented by their mother PERSON , concluded a real estate agreement with ORG in which they expressed their intention of buying a villa of QUANTITY and the adjacent courtyard of QUANTITY in GPE , a seaside neighbourhood of P. ( hereinafter : the “ house ” ) . The agreement stated that the house was in poor condition as certain individuals had lived there for DATE without any legal basis and had ruined the furniture and installations .

The agreement was formalised in a real estate purchase contract of CARDINAL DATE by which the applicants acquired ownership of the house for an amount of CARDINAL NORP kunas ( HRK ) .

On DATE the applicants registered their ownership of the house and the plot of land in the land register in equal shares .

On an unspecified date PERSON requested from the relevant ORG ( hereinafter : the “ LOC ) the authorisation to sell the house owned by the applicants , such authorisation being required under the relevant domestic law in cases where a parent wishes to dispose of a child ’s property ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

As a result of that request , on DATE PERSON and her husband PERSON ( the father of the second applicant ) were interviewed at FAC . They stated that they had bought the house in DATE for HRK CARDINAL and that they had already spent MONEY ( ORG ) renovating it . However , the house required some further investment for which they lacked the necessary means and thus they intended to sell it and to live with CARDINAL of their parents . They further explained that they owned a retail business and that they had no problems with their children , who both had excellent marks at school . PERSON and PERSON also promised that they would open a bank account on behalf of their children , into which they would deposit the money from the sale of the house . They pointed out that they had contacted a real estate agency , which was looking for a potential buyer . They also agreed that PERSON would conclude the sale contract once they had managed to find a buyer .

In DATE PERSON was arrested and held in detention in connection with a suspected attempted murder and the unlawful possession of firearms . He was later indicted on the same charges in ORG PERSON , which on DATE found him guilty and sentenced him to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment . During the criminal proceedings his defence lawyer was ORG , a lawyer practising in P.

On DATE ORG submitted a request to the FAC seeking authorisation for a real estate swap agreement between the applicants and a certain FAC , who was in fact ORG mother - in - law . He provided powers of attorney signed by PERSON , GPE and PERSON ( the father of the first applicant ) authorising him to obtain the ORG ’s consent to a swap real estate agreement .

Together with his request , ORG provided a draft swap agreement stipulating that ORG would transfer to the applicants her CARDINAL - room flat of QUANTITY , situated on the fourth floor of a residential building in P. ( hereinafter : the “ flat ” ) , while the applicants would transfer their ownership of the house to FAC The draft swap agreement also stated that the values of the properties to be exchanged were the same and that the parties waived their right to object that they had sustained damage as a result of giving the exchanged property away at CARDINAL of its real value . ORG also submitted another document , a supplement to the swap agreement , in which the parties to that agreement acknowledged that GPE and PERSON had invested significant sums of money in the house and that , on the basis of the amounts shown on certain available invoices , ORG would compensate them for those investments .

V.L. was invited to ORG an interview on DATE in connection with ORG ’s request . She stated that her husband had meanwhile been imprisoned and that their retail business had started to go badly , leading her to close it in DATE . She also explained that she was unemployed and that this situation had affected the applicants , who were no longer doing so well at school . She further stated that she had been obliged to borrow money to pay the bills for the house and that the overall situation had prompted her and PERSON to exchange the house for a flat in P. with the additional obligation on the part of the flat - owner to pay them the difference in value between the CARDINAL properties , amounting to CARDINAL ORG according to her estimate . Lastly , PERSON pointed out that PERSON , the father of the first applicant , had given his consent to the swap agreement . She also undertook to register the ownership of the flat in the applicants’ names .

On DATE the ORG gave its authorisation for the swap agreement , whereby the applicants would transfer their ownership of the house to FAC while the latter would transfer her ownership of the flat and a garage to the applicants . The decision drafted by the Centre specified that PERSON was obliged to provide the ORG with a copy of the swap agreement .

In its statement of reasons behind the decision , the ORG pointed out that it had taken note of the powers of attorney provided to ORG by the applicants’ parents , ORG statement of DATE , birth certificates for the applicants and land registry certificates for the properties , and the draft swap agreement . It had also noted the fact that ORG had been convicted at first - instance of the offence of attempted murder and unlawful possession of firearms . Based on this information , the ORG concluded that the swap agreement was not contrary to the best interests of the applicants since their property rights would not be extinguished or reduced as they would become the owners of a flat which would provide fully suitable living accommodation .

On DATE , the ORG gave its authorisation for the supplementary document to the swap agreement by virtue of which ORG would pay the applicants CARDINAL ORG each on account of the difference in value between the exchanged properties . As a condition of this decision , PERSON was obliged to provide the ORG with a bank statement attesting that the payment had been made . In its statement of reasons , the FAC referred to a request made by PERSON for the conclusion of a supplement to the swap agreement and the statement she had given to the ORG . The ORG also found that this would not be contrary to the interests of the applicants .

The above CARDINAL decisions issued by ORG DATE were forwarded to the lawyer PERSON

On DATE the applicants , represented by ORG , concluded the real estate swap agreement with ORG before a Public Notary in P. , and the applicants thereby transferred their ownership of the house to ORG while the latter transferred her ownership of the flat and the garage to the applicants . The swap agreement contained a clause under which the parties agreed that there was no difference in the value of the exchanged properties , and that they had no further claims on that account . It also set down the value of the properties at some HRK CARDINAL,CARDINAL .

Based on this contract , the applicants and ORG duly registered their ownership of the properties with the land registry .

On DATE lawyer PERSON submitted to the Centre a certificate from the land registry showing that the applicants had registered their ownership of the flat and bank statements showing that they had received the amount of CARDINAL ORG each .

On DATE ORG ( ORG financija , PERSON uprava ) declared a tax obligation of HRK CARDINAL for each of the parties ‒ based on the declared value of the transaction involved in the swap agreement ‒ which was divided by CARDINAL in respect of the applicants , who were thus obliged to pay HRK CARDINAL each .

On DATE the applicants , represented by ORG as their legal guardian , brought an action against D.M.in ORG ( PERSON ) , asking the court to declare the swap agreement null and void ( ništav ) .

During the proceedings the applicants argued that the swap agreement had effected the exchange of the ownership of the house ‒ which comprised CARDINAL flats , each measuring QUANTITY , was CARDINAL minutes’ walk from the sea and was worth MONEY ( ORG ) ‒ for a flat and a garage worth in total no more than LAW . Given that at the time when the contract was concluded they were DATE , the ORG should have defended their rights and should not have given its consent to a swap agreement of that kind . In this respect they pointed out that section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW listed specific instances in which the property of a minor could be disposed of , and that no such instance had existed in their case . Moreover , the ORG had failed to carry out an on - site inspection or to commission an expert report which would have allowed it to estimate the value of the house and adopt a proper decision concerning the request for authorisation of the swap agreement . The applicants therefore considered that , by failing to take such vital measures , the ORG had allowed an unlawful and immoral property exchange to be executed . In their view , this had resulted in ab initio invalidity of the exchange . The applicants also pointed out that their legal guardian PERSON had not been party to the discussions concerning the swap agreement . They therefore proposed that the trial court examine several witnesses , including the participants to the swap agreement , the employees of the ORG , the first applicant ‒ who was by that time already DATE ‒ , and commission an expert report establishing the value of the properties .

On DATE ORG dismissed the ORG request to take any of the proposed evidence on the grounds that the case could be decided on the basis of the documents from the case file .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicants’ civil action . It argued that it was not in a position to re - examine the ORG ’s decision to authorise the swap agreement , since that was an administrative decision which could only have been challenged in administrative proceedings . Thus , given that such a decision existed , ORG could not find the swap agreement to be unlawful or contrary to the morals of society . It also pointed out that the swap agreement could possibly be only a voidable contract ( pobojan ) but no claim to that effect had been made by the applicants .

The applicants challenged that judgment by means of an appeal lodged before ORG , arguing that the first - instance court had failed to examine any of their arguments and had thus erred in its decision concerning the validity of the swap agreement .

On DATE ORG dismissed the ORG appeal as ill - founded , endorsing the reasoning of the first - instance court .

The applicants then lodged an appeal on points of law before ORG ( PERSON ) on DATE . The second applicant was represented by PERSON , and the first applicant , having in the meantime reached the age of majority , was able to conduct the legal action herself .

In their appeal on points of law the applicants argued , inter alia , that the P. had negligently allowed the swap agreement to be concluded without taking into account the value of the properties and the nature of their family circumstances at the time , namely the fact that LOC was in detention and that PERSON was known as a person with a problem of drug abuse .

On DATE ORG dismissed the ORG appeal on points of law as ill - founded and endorsed the decisions of the lower courts , which found that the civil courts were not in a position to re - examine the ORG ’s final administrative decision allowing the conclusion of the swap agreement . Moreover , it did not appear to ORG that the ORG had failed in its protection of the best interests of the applicants .

The applicants then lodged a constitutional complaint before ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) reiterating their previous arguments before the lower courts . The second applicant was represented by ORG

On DATE ORG declared the applicants’ constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill - founded .

A report by ORG and Youth ( ORG socijalne politike i ORG ) of DATE submitted to the ORG suggests that the ORG was not aware of PERSON ’s drug abuse problem nor had it been alerted concerning ORG ’s conflict of interest .

According to a report by ORG ( ORG zdravlja ) of DATE , PERSON started her drug addiction therapy on DATE and terminated it in DATE . She then started again in DATE and she was still undergoing therapy at the present time .

The information available from the e - land registry concerning property in GPE shows that the house and the land on which it is located measure QUANTITY with an adjacent courtyard of QUANTITY , all of which is registered in the name of ORG as owner .