Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Nebojša Vučinić;Robert Spano;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant lived in GPE DATE , when he met his wife and got married . The applicant and his wife have CARDINAL children . In DATE the applicant was deported to GPE by the NORP authorities . DATE he was imprisoned in GPE , where he alleges he was subjected to various forms of ill - treatment .

The applicant and several other individuals founded ORG in GPE , a political organisation which opposes that country ’s government through non - violent means . After the protest movement known as the NORP Spring began in DATE , he was taken into police custody in GPE and he alleges he was subjected to ill - treatment there .

On an unspecified date he fled from GPE to GPE , where he worked as a teacher . Subsequently , in DATE , he arrived in GPE , GPE , where his wife and children lived .

On DATE he was taken into police custody as he did not have a passport . On DATE , the applicant was placed in a detention room at the NORP police headquarters , where he was detained DATE and DATE .

The applicant submitted that the detention room in which he had been kept was in an ordinary police detention facility where arrestees were held for short periods ( generally DATE ) . During his detention , many people were detained in the room , at times CARDINAL people . The room was QUANTITY m and there was no heating or ventilation , and no bed . Nor did it receive any natural light . He was confined in that room and was exceptionally allowed to use the other parts of the detention facility . He could use the hall in the centre of the facility only when his family members visited him . The applicant was provided with a mattress and a blanket and he slept on the floor . He was never taken out of the detention facility and did not have access to exercise in the open air . The facility had no shower and he therefore had to wash himself in the toilets . As he suffered from asthma , anaemia and back problems , he needed medical assistance . However , he was taken to hospital on CARDINAL occasion .

The applicant submitted a number of photographs in support of his submissions . In CARDINAL of those photographs he is seen sitting on the bench in a small detention room behind bars .

NORP In their submissions dated DATE , the Government submitted that the applicant had been detained in the “ custody cell ” of the public security branch of the NORP police headquarters . The custody cell in question was used as a ORG detention centre because there was no separate ORG detention centre in GPE at that time . The Government stated that the custody facility measured MONEY . m and consisted of CARDINAL detention rooms of QUANTITY m and QUANTITY m , CARDINAL toilets ( QUANTITY . m respectively ) , a room for the taking of police statements of QUANTITY . m , a room used for interviews between arrestees and their lawyers of QUANTITY m , and an identification parade room of QUANTITY m. There was also a hall in the centre of the facility , which measured QUANTITY . m , onto which the detention rooms opened . The hall had an air conditioner and CARDINAL windows measuring QUANTITY and QUANTITY which provided natural light for the detention rooms .

In their additional observations dated DATE , the Government submitted that foreign nationals and NORP nationals detained in the context of criminal investigations were kept separately in CARDINAL detention rooms in the facility in question . They stated that at the material time the NORP nationals had been kept locked in one of the detention rooms and that the applicant and other foreign nationals had had access at all times to the hall in the centre of the facility − where there were chairs and a table – and to the toilets . When there were no NORP national detainees , the foreign nationals also had access to both detention rooms .

NORP In support of their submissions the Government submitted a sketch map of the detention facility and a total of CARDINAL photographs . CARDINAL of these photographs were taken outside and show the police station building . CARDINAL photographs were taken in the toilets , which appeared clean . There is a shower head installed in each of the toilets . CARDINAL other photographs show the room for the taking of police statements , the room used for interviews between arrestees and their lawyers , and the identification parade room . Lastly , CARDINAL further photographs show the detention rooms and the hall . It is apparent that the detention rooms are separated from the hall by bars . There are no beds in the detention rooms but along their CARDINAL walls there are concrete benches topped with a cushion . On the benches there are blankets , apparently used both for covering and as pillows . The detention rooms do not have windows but appear to receive light from the hall . The photographs of the hall show that there are CARDINAL windows , a table and chairs on which towels were put in that area .

The Government also submitted custody registers showing the occupation rates at the detention facility for the period DATE and DATE . According to those documents , the applicant was detained alone for DATE and for DATE he was detained together with between CARDINAL and CARDINAL foreign nationals . On DATE there were CARDINAL foreign nationals , including the applicant , detained at the facility . On CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE the applicant was detained together with CARDINAL other foreign nationals .

For DATE between DATE and DATE , there had been no NORP nationals detained at the facility . In particular , on CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE no NORP national had been held in custody . During the remaining DATE , a minimum of CARDINAL and a maximum of CARDINAL NORP nationals had been in detention , except for DATE , when CARDINAL NORP nationals had been held in police custody . In particular , on QUANTITY DATE CARDINAL NORP national had been detained at the facility in question .

On DATE the applicant lodged an individual application with ORG . The applicant alleged , inter alia , that the conditions of his detention at the NORP police headquarters described above had amounted to illtreatment ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the Constitutional Court delivered its decision on the admissibility and merits of the applicant ’s case . As regards the applicant ’s complaint that the conditions of his detention at the NORP police headquarters had amounted to ill - treatment , ORG noted that he had complained that his health had worsened as a result of the conditions in which he had been detained . Since the applicant had been provided with medical assistance when he had fallen ill in detention , ORG found that the administrative authorities had taken the necessary measures to protect the applicant ’s physical and psychological health . As a result , the court concluded that the treatment of the applicant had not attained the minimum level of severity required to be described as inhuman or degrading treatment .

On DATE ORG decision was served on the applicant ’s representative .


András Sajó;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in PERSON .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON , of ORG . ORG , who had been informed of their right to intervene in the proceedings , under LAW , gave no indication that they wished to do so .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant was charged , together with CARDINAL NORP citizens , with fraud , initiating and belonging to an organised crime group , forgery and money laundering . The prosecutor ’s decision stated that the applicant had imported car tyres into GPE , and through several offshore companies and using falsified customs documents had avoided paying customs duties .

On DATE the applicant was placed in pre - trial detention for DATE . The prosecutor requested an extension , but this was rejected by ORG on DATE . The court held that after the applicant ’s placement in pre - trial detention , the prosecutor had not produced any new evidence to prove he was guilty of the crimes he had been charged with .

On DATE ORG of ORG and ORG imposed a preventive measure on the applicant , banning him from leaving GPE for DATE so that the investigation into the above - mentioned crimes could continue . This preventive measure was extended on a DATE basis by decisions of the case prosecutor .

On DATE the applicant complained to ORG about the prosecutor ’s decision to extend the ban on him leaving GPE from DATE until DATE . He applied to have the measure revoked , arguing that no new investigative steps had been taken by the prosecutors in the meantime , and that the measure taken against him had been extended automatically without taking into consideration his specific situation , namely that he was not a NORP citizen and that his wife , CARDINAL young children and parents all resided in GPE and needed a visa to travel to GPE . The applicant also argued that extending the measure for DATE would be contrary to LAW .

In the meantime , before a decision was taken on his complaint , the applicant was allowed by the prosecutor to leave GPE for DATE to visit his sick father in GPE .

On DATE ORG allowed the applicant’CARDINAL of LAW . The court held that the prosecutor ’s decision had not provided any new reasons to extend the preventive measure taken against the applicant . In addition , it held that the prosecutor had not proved there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the crimes he had been charged with . The judgment became final on DATE , when an appeal by the prosecutor on points of law ( recurs ) was rejected by ORG .

On DATE the applicant was free to leave GPE and he returned to GPE .

The relevant provisions of LAW in force at the time are as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) In cases concerning offences punishable with imprisonment , to ensure the proper conduct of the criminal trial or to prevent the suspect or defendant from fleeing during the criminal investigation , trial or ... execution of the sentence , CARDINAL of the following preventive measures may be imposed : ...

( b ) a ban on leaving town ;

( c ) a ban on leaving the country ; ...

( CARDINAL) The measure to be taken shall be chosen taking into account its purpose , the severity of the crime , the health , age , [ and any ] previous convictions or other circumstances [ of ] the person on whom the measure is to be imposed . ”

“ A person charged with an offence or a defendant may complain about a ... ban on leaving town or the country within DATE of its adoption by the prosecutor ...

“ ( CARDINAL ) ... A measure not to leave town may be extended in the course of the criminal investigation if necessary and only by a reasoned decision . The extension may be ordered by the prosecutor conducting or supervising the investigation , each not exceeding DATE . The maximum duration of the measure provided for in paragraph ( CARDINAL ) in the course of a criminal investigation is DATE . Exceptionally , where the punishment is life imprisonment or detention of DATE or more , the maximum duration of the ban on leaving town may be DATE . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) The provisions of Article CARDINAL also apply to bans on leaving the country . ”

NORP The relevant provisions of LAW in force at the relevant time are as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) ORG which had very serious consequences shall be punished with CARDINAL years’ imprisonment and the interdiction of certain rights . ”


Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Georges Ravarani

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a LOC national , who was born in DATE and lives in ORG . She is represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in ORG .

NORP The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the President of the Municipality of ORG issued a decision appointing a ORG ( ORG za povraćaj i obeštećenje , hereinafter “ the Commission ” ) . This decision was not confirmed by ORG and the remuneration of the members of the Commission was never specified . ORG functioned until DATE , when it was replaced by a new one . The applicant was a member of both Commissions .

On an unspecified date in DATE the applicant instituted proceedings against the GPE seeking compensation in the amount of ORG CARDINAL in respect of remuneration for her work in the ORG DATE and DATE , as she had not been paid during the said period .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) in ORG ruled against the applicant on the ground that the ORG had had no legitimacy during the specified time , given that the decision on its appointment had not been confirmed by ORG , and as the remuneration for the said period had never been defined .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) in GPE upheld the first - instance judgment , essentially endorsing the reasons contained therein .

On DATE ORG in GPE overturned a firstinstance judgment issued in respect of CARDINAL of the applicant ’s colleagues , and awarded him compensation in the amount of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL in respect of remuneration for his work in the same Commission in the same period , plus accompanying interest and the costs of the proceedings . In doing so the court held , in particular , that the Commission had had a temporary character by virtue of the law itself and that therefore the firstinstance court ’s conclusion that it had lacked legitimacy was wrong . Also section CARDINAL of ORG DATE specifically provided that if the ORG did not confirm a certain decision or the President of the Municipality did not submit it for confirmation , the decision would cease to be in force as of DATE when the ORG terminated its session . Therefore , it had to be considered that the ORG had ceased to operate when the decision on its appointment was not confirmed , that is on DATE in the given case . The court noted that ORG had also taken into account that no act defined remuneration of the members of the Commission . However , ORG held that , pursuant to CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of ORG , members of ORG had the status of civil servants , and were therefore entitled to remuneration . In any event claimants should not suffer any detriment on account of the legislature ’s failure to define the exact amount of their remuneration .

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) provided that ORG would establish ORG within DATE as of the date when this Act entered into force . LAW ( CARDINAL ) further provided , inter alia , that members of the ORG had the status of civil servants .

This Act entered into force on DATE .

The said amendments introduced section ORG , which specified that the President of the Municipality could temporarily issue decisions falling within the ORG ’s competence , if the ORG could not convene or for some other reason it was impossible for it to work and the said decisions were of interest for exercising ORG rights and freedoms . The President of the GPE had to submit such a decision to the ORG for its confirmation as soon as the ORG could convene .

Section QUANTITY provides that the president of the GPE can temporarily issue decisions falling within the ORG ’s competence , if the ORG can not convene or for some other reason it is impossible for it to work , and the absence of these decisions would endanger lives or property of great value . The President of the GPE shall submit such a decision to the ORG for its confirmation at its first session . If the ORG does not confirm such a decision or the President does not submit it for confirmation , the decision shall cease to be in force ( prestaje da važi ) on DATE when the session of the ORG terminates .

This Act entered into force on DATE except for LAW V , including section DATE , which was to enter into force as of the next local elections , which took place in ORG on DATE . Until then the relevant provisions of the earlier Act , including section ORG , continued in force .

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) in force at the time provided , inter alia , that an appeal on points of law against a second - instance decision would not be admissible in pecuniary matters unless the value of the claim exceeded ORG CARDINAL . Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ( CARDINAL ) provided that exceptionally to the previous provision , an appeal on points of law was always admissible in disputes “ for loss of earnings or other work - related income when these compensations were established or quashed for the first time ” ( zbog izgubljene zarade ili drugih prihoda po osnovu rada kada su te odštete prvi put određene ili ukinute ) .

Sections CARDINAL - CARDINAL set out details as to employment - related disputes . Section CARDINAL provided in particular that an appeal on points of law was allowed only in disputes relating to employment , as well as continuation and termination thereof .

Sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL , taken together , provided that ORG , when deciding upon an appeal on points of law , could either overturn the second - instance decision in cases when the substantive law was misapplied , or quash it and order a re - trial when the facts were incompletely established due to a misapplication of substantive law .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Torture;Positive obligations) (Procedural aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Pavlina Panova;Yonko Grozev

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in the village of PERSON .

In TIME DATE PERSON and PERSON , officers of the PERSON police force , went to the applicant ’s house in connection with a complaint that a burglary had taken place DATE , on DATE . They were making inquiries into the matter but a formal criminal investigation had not yet been opened . The applicant was not home but the officers obtained his mobile telephone number from his wife and called him , telling him to appear at the police station for inquiries .

The applicant went to the police station at TIME According to the findings of the criminal courts which later examined the events ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and DATE below ) , he was taken to a room where there were Mr N.K. , Mr PERSON and a third officer . PERSON asked the applicant whether he had anything to tell them . After the third officer had gone out of the room , Mr PERSON took out a wooden bat and hit the applicant ’s left shoulder . He hit him again and the applicant fell to the ground . After that PERSON kicked him with his knee and repeatedly hit him with a rubber truncheon . Some time after that another officer , PERSON , came into the room carrying an electroshock prod . He administered an electric shock to the applicant ’s left leg . The applicant curled up on the floor , while PERSON and Mr PERSON kept beating him . The beating continued intermittently for some time , and the applicant was able to stand up on his feet . Another officer came into the room for a while . After he left , PERSON , Mr PERSON and Mr PERSON again administered electric shocks to the applicant and carried on hitting and kicking him . At CARDINAL point , when the applicant ’s head was low down , he was kicked on the nose and started bleeding , and the beating stopped .

The blows sustained by the applicant caused a haematoma on his nose and haematomas and bruises on the upper left back , the left side of the torso and the left shoulder .

At TIME Mr PERSON drew up a written statement on behalf of the applicant that said that he knew nothing of the reported burglary , and presented it to the applicant for signature . The applicant was released at TIME

DATE , DATE , the applicant was examined by a forensic doctor who noted the numerous haematomas and bruises on his face and upper body , which he believed to have been caused by “ hard blunt objects and objects with cylindrical form ” .

On DATE the applicant complained about the incident to a member of ORG , who forwarded his complaint to the prosecuting authorities . As a result , ORG opened criminal proceedings against the CARDINAL officers who had ill - treated the applicant , and on DATE charged them with causing him minor bodily harm while carrying out their duties , an offence under LAW ) read in conjunction with LAW of LAW DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the prosecutor in charge of the case informed the applicant that , since the penalty for this offence was up to one DATE ’s imprisonment , the ORG criminal liability would be waived and replaced with administrative penalties , as required under LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the applicant asked ORG to consider bringing charges against the officers under LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . He pointed out that under this ORG ’s case - law a mere fine , which was all that the charges under LAW ( CARDINAL ) read in conjunction with LAW could lead to , was not an adequate penalty for the ill - treatment suffered by him . On DATE that office replied that it had no competence to investigate and prosecute offences under that provision .

On DATE the applicant asked ORG to consider bringing charges against the officers under LAW of the LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , pointing out that that office was competent to investigate and prosecute such offences . It does not appear that he received a reply .

NORP The prosecuting authorities maintained the original charges and on CARDINAL DATE proposed to ORG to waive the ORG criminal liability and replace it with administrative penalties , as possible under LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE , when setting the case down for trial , ORG noted that although the applicant had expressed the intention of bringing a civil claim when the case came for trial , under the applicable rules of criminal procedure that was not possible in proceedings under LAW of the LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) ; the applicant was to be notified accordingly .

On DATE the applicant asked the court to refer the case back to the prosecuting authorities for them to consider whether the officers had committed an offence under LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The same day the judge rapporteur advised the applicant that his request could not be allowed because he was not party to the proceedings : under the relevant rules of criminal procedure the alleged victim of the offence could not take part as a civil claimant or private prosecutor in proceedings under LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . It was moreover up to the prosecuting authorities to decide what charges to press . In any event , LAW did not apply to the facts as recited in the indictment . According to them , the applicant had been ill - treated before the institution of criminal proceedings in relation to the burglary in which he would have a capacity as a person charged with a criminal offence or a witness , which was a required element of the offence . Criminal law provisions could not be interpreted broadly .

The ORG trial took place on DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE .

On DATE ORG , based on the findings of fact made by it ( see paragraphs CARDINAL above ) , held that PERSON , PERSON PERSON and Mr PERSON , acting in concert , had wilfully caused the applicant light bodily harm , contrary to LAW ) read in conjunction with LAW of LAW DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) . The court went on to hold that the case fell under LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and that the LAW criminal liability was therefore to be waived and replaced by administrative fines ranging from MONEY ( ORG ) . In fixing the quantum of the fines , the court found that the ORG good character and their having caused the applicant the least serious type of bodily harm under the Code were mitigating factors , whereas their having acted jointly and having infringed the applicant ’s rights under the Convention were aggravating ones . It also took into account the ORG family and financial situation , noting in particular that the DATE salary of the first was BGN CARDINAL and those of the other CARDINAL BGN CARDINAL each . Based on all that , it held that the aims of the punishment could be attained by giving each of the officers a fine of ORG CARDINAL ( the equivalent of QUANTITY ( ORG ) ) . There was no need additionally to disqualify them from working as police officers under LAW ( see paragraph DATE in fine below ) . The fines were sufficient to make them rethink their conduct and refrain from resorting to violence in the future .

NORP The officers appealed against that judgment , but on DATE it was fully upheld by ORG , whose judgment was final . That court reviewed of its own motion the penalties imposed on the officers and fully agreed with the reasons given by the lower court on that point .

Following a complaint by the applicant , on DATE ORG opened an internal inquiry into the allegations that he had been ill - treated . On DATE it informed the applicant that it had recommended the opening of disciplinary proceedings against the CARDINAL officers . As a result of those proceedings , on DATE and CARDINAL DATE , respectively , PERSON and Mr PERSON were punished with non - admission to promotion competitions for DATE for having unlawfully detained the applicant , whereas Mr T.A. was not given a disciplinary penalty . The disciplinary commission found that none of the CARDINAL officers had ill - treated the applicant .

In DATE the applicant brought a claim for damages under LAW DATE against ORG . ORG heard the case on DATE , and in a judgment of DATE found the PERSON Regional Police Directorate liable for the ill - treatment suffered by the applicant at the hands of the CARDINAL officers , and awarded him ORG CARDINAL ( the equivalent of ORG CARDINAL ) , plus interest , in non - pecuniary damages . The court noted , in particular , that the ill - treatment to which the applicant had been subjected had not been provoked by him in any way , and that it had caused him physical pain for DATE . It had also caused him to feel apprehensive and uneasy when going out of his home because of fear that he might be illtreated again .

It appears that that judgment has not yet become final .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant was employed by “ PERSON đubriva ” DATE , a socially / ORG - owned company based in GPE ( hereinafter – “ the debtor ” ) .

On DATE ORG , by a court order , gave effect to a settlement made by the applicant and the debtor . According to that settlement the debtor had to pay the applicant certain sums in respect of salary arrears and costs of proceedings .

On DATE the applicant lodged an application for the enforcement of the above court decision with ORG .

On DATE the court allowed the application and issued an enforcement order .

On DATE the enforcement proceedings were stayed because the debtor was undergoing restructuring .

On DATE the applicant requested the court to continue the enforcement proceedings .

On DATE the court continued the enforcement proceedings .

On DATE the enforcement proceedings were stayed again because the debtor was undergoing restructuring .

On DATE the applicant requested the court once again to continue the enforcement proceedings .

On DATE the court considered the request of CARDINAL DATE to be a fresh application for the enforcement of the decision of QUANTITY DATE and ordered the applicant to submit again a copy of that decision .

As the applicant failed to comply with this this request on DATE the court terminated the enforcement .

On DATE ORG ruled in the favour of the applicant and ordered the debtor to pay him certain sums in respect of salary arrears and costs of proceedings . This judgment became final on the same date .

On DATE ORG ordered the restructuring of the debtor as part of privatisation process . The restructuring of the debtor is still ongoing .


Alvina Gyulumyan;Ján Šikuta;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra

The applicants are PERSON , her husband PERSON , and their son PERSON They are all NORP nationals , born in DATE , DATE and DATE respectively ; they all live in GPE and were represented before the Court by Mr P. Pop , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG were represented by their Agent , Ms C. Brumar , from ORG .

NORP The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarized as follows .

PERSON , mother of a DATE child from a previous marriage , had been informed by doctors that she could no longer conceive naturally ; together with her husband , PERSON , she decided to have recourse to artificial insemination procedures in order to have a child .

The applicants contacted doctor PERSON , an obstetrician at the “ Prof . Dr Panait Sârbu ” Obstetrics and ORG in GPE ( hereafter “ the hospital ” ) to that end . They informed the doctor that PERSON first child had been born with a congenital malformation ( tibial agenesis , or hemimelia ) and asked for further information concerning the risk that the future child could be born with the same condition . They explained to the doctor that if such a risk existed they would not proceed with the insemination .

Doctor PERSON assured them that the first child ’s situation was exceptional and that there was no risk of another child being born with the same disability .

They were then referred to doctor ORG in order to have the standard procedural tests carried out . They enquired again about the risk of having another baby with the same malformation and about the possibility of running genetic tests in order to rule out this issue . The doctor assured them that the chances of it happening were minimal ( CARDINAL ) ; therefore no other tests were performed .

The artificial insemination was scheduled for DATE and it resulted in the first applicant ’s pregnancy .

In the first trimester of the pregnancy the first applicant underwent several tests recommended by doctor PERSON , who also referred her to doctor D.A. for further ultrasound scans . She allegedly told the latter about her fears concerning the risk of the baby developing the same malformation as her first child . However , she was reassured each time that everything concerning the development of the unborn child was normal .

During CARDINAL of the ultrasound scans , performed in DATE of pregnancy , doctor ORG , an echographer , informed the applicants that he had noticed a difference between the CARDINAL legs of the foetus , but reassured them that it was likely that that was an error , as the difference was minor and the foetus did present both a tibia and a femoral bone .

This information was conveyed to doctor PERSON , who concluded that no special issue arose .

The first applicant decided to seek further tests , however . To that aim , she contacted a private clinic , GPE , where on DATE she underwent a CARDINAL - dimensional ultrasound scan , performed by doctor D.A. At the relevant time the applicant was in DATE of pregnancy .

The doctor detected a peculiar position of the toes in relation to the leg ( planta în poziţie valg faţă de planul frontal al gambei ) , reassuring PERSON nevertheless that the legs of the foetus were normally developed . He further detected foetal distress in the brain ( suferinţă fetală la nivel cerebral ) and recommended that the applicant contact her obstetrician .

After consulting with her obstetrician , on DATE the first applicant was hospitalized ; PERSON and the foetus were monitored until DATE , when she was released from hospital as there were no further indications of foetal distress .

On DATE the applicant was admitted to hospital for the birth ; she was immediately referred to doctor C. , who later assisted the applicant during the birth . On CARDINAL DATE the applicant gave birth to a baby boy ( the third applicant ) ; he presented a malformation of one of his legs that was identical to that of his older brother .

Doctor PERSON visited DATE ; referring to the child ’s disability , the doctor offered his support in finding an association which could help the applicants financially .

DATE after giving birth to M .- D.P. , and despite the ORG conclusion that she could not become pregnant naturally , PERSON GPE discovered that she was expecting a third baby . Together with her husband , she decided to have an abortion , fearing that the third child would be born with the same disability .

NORP On DATE the applicants brought an action against doctors ORG , ORG and GPE , as well as against the hospital , the private clinic GPE , ORG and ORG , represented by ORG .

On behalf of their younger son , they requested a DATE lifetime allowance of CARDINAL old NORP lei ( ROL ) ; in their own name , they asked for ROL CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL in compensation for pecuniary and non - pecuniary damage incurred on account of the birth of a disabled child , who needed frequent medical interventions due to his disability .

The applicants claimed that the defendants were liable for negligence in performing their medical duties , namely , that the doctors had failed to adequately inform them prior to the artificial insemination of the potential risk that the new baby could be born with the same disability as his older brother ; and that they subsequently failed to adequately monitor the development of the foetus and also misinterpreted the results of the ultrasound examinations , telling them that the baby was developing normally and thus misleading them . The applicants reiterated that if they had been aware of the risks involved , they would have not undergone the artificial insemination to begin with , and in any event , they would have decided on an abortion , so as to spare the child of a life of pain and suffering on account of his disability .

Referring to “ the LOC superficiality ” in dealing with their case , the applicants highlighted that in spite of the diagnosis according to which PERSON could no longer become pregnant naturally , she had become pregnant unexpectedly and found herself compelled to have an abortion for fear of having another disabled child .

On DATE a report containing the conclusions of doctor PERSON , an expert in genetics from ORG , was adduced as evidence .

In reply to the CARDINAL questions put by the court , the expert gave her opinion , which its relevant parts held as follows :

“ The [ peculiar ] position of the toes in relation to the leg indicate a congenital malformation [ question no . CARDINAL ] ...

“ The recommended measure [ for diagnosing a genetic anomaly of the specified type ] is a foetal morphological ultrasound scan , performed in DATE of pregnancy . The lower limbs are visible from DATE of pregnancy , but the toes only from DATE . The period of DATE is optimal for visualising the foetal structures and for making the choice of whether to continue or to terminate the pregnancy . [ question no . CARDINAL ] ...

Pre - conception diagnosis can not be performed in the case of tibial agenesis ( tibial hemimelia ) .... The gene responsible for this condition is not known and the genetic defect potentially responsible for tibial agenesis is beneath the resolution threshold of cytogenetic testing ( karyotyping ) .

A prenatal diagnosis can be made by performing an ultrasound scan ( foetal morphological ultrasound ) in DATE of pregnancy . [ question no . CARDINAL ] ...

Conclusions

In a case where the parents of a child with tibial agenesis have given birth to a second child with the same congenital malformation following a pregnancy resulting from artificial insemination , it would have been advisable for a genetic consultation to be carried out before conception of a second child , together with rigorous ultrasound monitoring of the second pregnancy in order for the specific ultrasound warning signs to be identified in time .

It would also have been essential to inform the parents about this anomaly ( tibial agenesis ) and about the possibilities for treatment , given that surgical orthopaedic treatment is possible . ”

On DATE ORG rendered its judgment . The court held that due to medical negligence , PERSON had suffered damage , namely , “ the birth of a child with a congenital anomaly ” . The court stated that her right to be correctly informed about the state of health of her unborn child had been infringed ; implicitly , her right to choose whether or not to give birth to a child suffering from a congenital malformation was equally infringed .

The court found doctor GPE responsible in her capacity as a geneticist for not discharging her duty of care in assessing the applicant ’s condition before the artificial insemination , despite having been informed that her first child had been born with a malformation . It concluded that the doctor had failed to proceed to further testing of the applicant in order to clarify her situation and thus inform her about the existing risks associated with a pregnancy , which would have given the parents the opportunity to assess their options .

Regarding the responsibility of doctor ORG , the court concluded that he had failed to correctly interpret the results of the ultrasound scan performed during DATE of pregnancy , which had revealed a problem with the foetus ’s legs . It further stated that in such circumstances the doctor had been under an obligation to refer the applicant for further testing and to recommend a CARDINAL - dimensional ultrasound scan .

Doctor PERSON was cleared of responsibility on account of the fact that he had been the only doctor to correctly interpret the results of the threedimensional ultrasound scan performed during DATE of pregnancy , on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

As regards doctor PERSON , the applicant ’s obstetrician , the court found that he was responsible for not recommending the CARDINAL - dimensional ultrasound scan in time for the malformation to be promptly discovered DATE DATE ) and also for misinterpreting and ignoring the results of the scan when it was performed in DATE of pregnancy , in spite of the fact that it had revealed an anomaly in the foetus ’s legs .

The hospital was held jointly liable with the doctors in respect of the payment of damages .

The court referred only to the first applicant in its reasoning ; however , it stated in its conclusion that the damages awarded consisted of the payment of a DATE allowance for the third applicant as requested , as well as of compensation for pecuniary damage ( in the amount of CARDINAL new NORP lei ( PERSON ) ) and non - pecuniary damage ( in the amount of PERSON CARDINAL ) for both parents .

The parties held responsible appealed against the judgment .

In its decision of DATE , ORG reassessed the merits of the case and dismissed the applicants’ action . The court concluded that doctor PERSON had performed her duties in accordance with her professional obligations ; the fact that she had not recommended further tests to the applicant did not make her responsible for any damage , in so far as , according to the expert ’s conclusions , the only way to detect the malformation was by means of a CARDINAL - dimensional ultrasound scan performed up to DATE of pregnancy , and that preinsemination tests would not have revealed with certainty the risk of such a condition .

As to the responsibility of doctor PERSON , the court stated that he could not be held liable in so far as the applicants had been informed that there was a risk of CARDINAL of having a second child with the same malformation .

Regarding doctor ORG , the court noted that the problem he had discovered during the ultrasound scan performed on DATE concerned the femoral bone , whereas the malformation the third applicant was born with affected the tibia .

The court further stated that in any case , a termination of pregnancy could only be carried out up to DATE , at which stage it was impossible to detect that kind of malformation .

The applicants appealed against that decision .

On DATE ORG gave its final judgment , partly allowing the appeal .

The court examined each of the applicants’ complaints , namely , that the doctors had not informed them of the risk of giving birth to a child with a malformation ; that they had not prescribed all the necessary genetic tests and examinations to detect the risk of a genetic malformation ; that they had wrongly interpreted the results of the few ultrasound scans the applicant underwent during her pregnancy .

NORP The court rejected the first complaint as ill - founded , in so far as the patients had been informed that the risk of having a child with a genetic anomaly was CARDINAL .

The second complaint was also dismissed in view of the fact that , as revealed by the medical report adduced in the case , no genetic tests or examinations that could have revealed the above - mentioned risk existed .

In relation to the third complaint , the court held that according to the evidence in the case , the patient had been closely monitored during her pregnancy , with ultrasound examinations performed DATE . However , the medical report concluded that the lower limbs were visible from DATE , while the toes could be seen from DATE , an optimal interval therefore being DATE . In such circumstances , the court considered that the interpretation of the ultrasound scans performed was problematic , in so far as more attention should have been paid to the particularities of the case and , potentially , more in - depth ultrasound tests should have been prescribed .

The damage therefore consisted of the birth of a child with a genetic malformation .

From this perspective , the court held that concerning the minor child , there was no causal link between the medical wrongdoing and the alleged damage , in so far as the result of a faultless medical procedure would have been an abortion . Thus , and in view of the importance of the right to life , it could not be considered that it would have been better for the child not to have been born , having regard also to the fact that the malformation in question was not capable of substantially affecting the quality of the child ’s life . It transpired from the file that the malformation could be corrected in the future by surgery .

The parents , however , had incurred concrete damage , in so far as had they known about the disease , they would have been able to decide whether to keep the child or to opt for an abortion .

The court dismissed the claims concerning the pecuniary damage , in so far as the applicants had failed to substantiate it by means of relevant medical bills and documents . Moreover , the state social security system fully covered the costs of the necessary prosthesis for the patient .

The court of appeal further awarded PERSON and PERSON RON CARDINAL,CARDINAL for non - pecuniary damage , to be paid by doctor PERSON , ecographer , jointly with the hospital ; the doctor was held liable for negligence as he was the only one who could have detected the malformation in time for the applicants to be able to make a decision about terminating the pregnancy . In awarding this amount , the court also took into consideration the fact that the applicants had been informed that the risk of their child being born with a disability was CARDINAL/CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL , and that they had decided to take that risk .

According to the information submitted by the parties , since DATE the third applicant has received various prostheses at a general rate of DATE , meaning that by DATE , he had undergone QUANTITY changes of prosthesis . In DATE he had major surgery , involving an amputation below the knee , which enabled him to be fitted with a more advanced prosthesis in DATE .

Article CARDINAL of LAW on the illegal causing of abortion read at the relevant time as follows :

“ CARDINAL . The act of interrupting the course of pregnancy , by any means , committed in CARDINAL of the following circumstances : [ ... ]

( c ) if the age of the embryo has exceeded DATE ;

is punishable by imprisonment from DATE . ...

Interruption to the course of pregnancy by a physician is not punishable in the following situations :

( a ) NORP if interruption to the course of pregnancy was necessary in order to save the pregnant woman ’s life , [ or protect her ] health or bodily integrity from a serious and imminent danger that could not have otherwise been removed ;

( b ) in the case in para ( CARDINAL ) c ) , when interruption to the course of pregnancy was necessary for therapeutic reasons , in accordance with legal provisions ;

( c ) in the case in para ( CARDINAL ) when the pregnant woman was unable to express her will , and the interruption was necessary for therapeutic reasons , in accordance with legal provisions . ”

The relevant domestic provisions regarding the civil liability of medical staff are described in PERSON v. GPE , no . GPE , § § CARDINAL , DATE .

A draft law on healthy procreation and medically assisted human procreation ( no . LCARDINAL/CARDINAL ) was rejected by the ORG on DATE following a decision of ORG finding several sections of the draft law to be in breach of the provisions of LAW .

Law no . CARDINAL on the healthcare reform indicates in its articles CARDINAL - CARDINAL that the health insurance system is the main provider of healthcare , prosthetics included .

Law no . DATE on the protection of persons with disabilities provides in its articles CARDINAL that these persons are entitled to have a personal care giver , remunerated with approximately ORG CARDINAL DATE ; article CARDINAL further provides that the families having a disabled child are entitled to a fixed DATE allowance of approximately ORG CARDINAL ; the disabled child would receive twice the amount of a normal child allowance , reaching about ORG DATE .

“ An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to it .

This person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks .

The person concerned may freely withdraw consent at any time . ”

“ CARDINAL . Everyone has the right to respect for private life in relation to information about his or her health . ”

“ The person who has suffered undue damage resulting from an intervention is entitled to fair compensation according to the conditions and procedures prescribed by law . ”

“ CARDINAL . The techniques of artificial procreation may be used only if the persons concerned have given their free , informed consent , explicitly and in writing , in accordance with national requirements .

NORP Before obtaining such consent , the physician and the establishment using the techniques of artificial procreation must ensure that the persons concerned are given appropriate information and counselling about the possible medical , legal , social and , where relevant , genetic implications of this treatment , particularly , those which might affect the interests of the child to be born . ”

“ The information given during the counselling prior to prenatal genetic screening and prenatal genetic diagnosis must be adapted to the person ’s circumstances and be sufficient to reach a fully informed decision . This information should in particular cover the purpose of the tests and their nature as well as any risks which these tests present . ”

“ Where there is an increased risk of passing on a serious genetic disorder , access to preconception counselling and , if necessary , premarital and preconception screening and diagnostic services should be readily available and widely known . ”

“ ( a ) Any preventive , diagnostic and therapeutic medical intervention is only to be carried out with the prior , free and informed consent of the person concerned , based on adequate information . The consent should , where appropriate , be express and may be withdrawn by the person concerned at any time and for any reason without disadvantage or prejudice . ”

“ Appropriate assessment and adequate management of risk related to medicine , life sciences and associated technologies should be promoted . ”


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Helena Jäderblom

The relevant details of the application are set out in the appended table .

NORP The applicant complained of the excessive length of their pre - trial detention . He also raised a complaint under LAW .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading punishment;Inhuman punishment) (Substantive aspect)

Ineta Ziemele;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicant was born in DATE .

On an unspecified date in DATE the applicant was arrested and detained in investigation detention facilities in GPE and GPE in the framework of a criminal investigation against him . On DATE he was transferred to ORG .

On DATE ORG found the applicant guilty of a number of violent offences committed DATE and DATE and sentenced him to death . On DATE ORG upheld the applicant ’s conviction but , following the abolition of the death penalty with effect from DATE and the concomitant introduction of the sentence of life imprisonment without commutation ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , replaced his sentence with life imprisonment without commutation .

On DATE the applicant was transferred from ORG to FAC , where he has been serving his sentence ever since . By order of the prison governor , he was placed alone in a constantly locked cell , as required under the legal provisions governing the regime of life prisoners ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

In a decision of DATE , which became final on DATE , ORG decided that the applicant was to serve his sentence under the “ special regime ” applicable to life prisoners at that time ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE a special commission in charge of deciding on changes in a prisoner ’s regime decided to place the applicant under the “ enhanced regime ” ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE , when the Execution of Punishments and Pre - Trial Detention Act DATE superseded LAW DATE , the applicant was placed under the “ severe ” regime ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . His continued to be kept isolated from the rest of the prison population , as normally required under the relevant provisions of the CARDINAL Act and the regulations for its application ( ibid . ) . The above - mentioned commission has apparently not decided to place the applicant together with the main prison population , as permitted under those provisions under certain conditions ( ibid . ) .

In FAC , the applicant was kept in an individual cell measuring QUANTITY . The Government submitted that not later than DATE significant improvements had been made to that cell . In particular , central heating was installed and the old wooden window frames were replaced by modern ones measuring QUANTITY by QUANTITY and providing enough temperature isolation and access to sunlight . According to evidence put before ORG and its judgment of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , those works were completed in DATE .

At all relevant times the applicant ’s cell contained an in - cell toilet and a water tap .

The applicant ’s assertions in respect of the material conditions of his detention are voluminous and lack clarity in that grievances apparently relating to different periods of time are not clearly distinguished . The applicant alleged that during unspecified periods of his incarceration in GPE he had encountered the following problems : food had been substandard and insufficient in quantity , with some meals containing pieces of plastic , hairs and fur , and the meat meals often containing meat substitutes or no meat at all ; the plates in which the food was being served had been dirty and greasy ; tap water had been muddy ; there had been iron pieces bulging from the bed - spring which had made his bed very uncomfortable , and the bedding provided had been unclean ; the taking of a shower ( TIME ) and applicant ’s visits to the doctor had been counted as part of his DATE outdoor activities ; the yard in which he took his DATE outdoor exercise had not had toilet facilities , which had prevented him from relieving his needs before the end of the exercise period , and inmates had not been provided with waterproof clothing when spending time outdoors ; guard dogs had been placed QUANTITY from the window of the applicant ’s cell and with their constant barking at night had prevented him from sleeping ; other inmates and the applicant himself had found and killed rats in the cells ; the temperature in the applicant ’s cell had not risen QUANTITY in DATE and the heating coal provided in DATE had been insufficient ; there had been no heating in the bathroom and inmates had been freezing when taking showers in DATE ; the applicant ’s cell lacked sufficient sunlight ; for a long time the cell ’s floor had been left riddled with holes and not covered with linoleum ; and the cleaning products provided for the in - cell toilet had been insufficient , consisting of CARDINAL spoonfuls of chlorine a month , which had made the smell unbearable as the main part of the cell was only separated from the toilet area by a screen .

The evidence submitted by the applicant in support of those allegations consisted of his own statements , a statement written in the same handwriting as in all other letters sent by the applicant but co - signed by CARDINAL other inmates on an unspecified date , and copies of CARDINAL complaints that the applicant had sent to the prison administration and various other authorities DATE and of some of the replies received . The vast majority of those complaints concerned the food served in prison : concrete instances in which the applicant had allegedly not received a full portion , yoghurt had been missing , the food had had a bad taste or smell , or meat had not been provided or had been of low quality . Some of those complaints had been acknowledged as well - founded by the prison administration and the applicant had been assured that measures would be taken .

In some of those complaints the applicant raised concerns in relation to the poor quality of coal given to inmates before the installation of a central heating system in DATE , the fact that bed linen or clothes had not been properly washed , the choice of products available for purchase at the prison canteen , and the fact that a refrigerator in the canteen used to store personal food items had not functioned for a certain period of time .

For their part , the Government denied the applicant ’s allegations concerning the material conditions of his detention . They said that the quality and quantity of food served to inmates had been fully adequate , and that hygienic conditions in the prison canteen , including in relation to cutlery , had been maintained in line with the applicable standards . Water in the prison had not been muddy ; it came from the same pipeline as the water supplied to the town of GPE . Inmates could also buy bottled mineral water from the prison canteen . The allegation that iron pieces had protruded from the applicant ’s bed was not true , and his bed sheets had been changed and washed DATE . Bathing time had not been counted as part of the outdoor walk time ; unlike other inmates , who had only had TIME of DATE outdoor walk time , life prisoners had been allowed DATE . The only reasons for interrupting that walk had been rowdy conduct or bad weather ; in the latter case , more outdoor time had been made available later on . The yard designated for the DATE outdoor walk did not have a toilet for security and hygiene reasons . Such a toilet was in any event not needed because that yard was adjacent to the applicant ’s cell , which was equipped with a toilet . If the applicant had felt an urgent need to go to the toilet during his DATE walk , he could have always used that one , and would have never been prevented from doing so . The prison administration was not under a duty to provide inmates with waterproof clothing ; when such clothing had been provided as a matter of courtesy , the inmates had very quickly damaged it . It was not true that guard dogs had been kept near the applicant ’s cell ; such dogs had not been used at all in the zone at issue . Nor had there been rats inside the applicant ’s cell ; its door , windows and piping had been built in a way not permitting rats to come in , and the prison administration was under a duty regularly to carry out pest control . The applicant ’s cell had had central heating since DATE , and the temperature inside the cell and the bathroom had been around QUANTITY . The cell ’s window , which , like all windows in FAC , had had its old wooden frame replaced with a new PVC one , did not have any covers preventing sunlight from coming in and could be freely opened , and the cell ’s floor was covered with linoleum which was in a good condition . Cleaning products were distributed DATE . Cable television was available in the cell . Lastly , works were under way for enlargement of the area for outdoor walks .

Apparently in view of the fact that the applicant is serving a sentence of life imprisonment without commutation , he is always handcuffed when taken out of his cell , including inside the prison . The handcuffs are removed once the destination has been reached , if security conditions permit . In particular , the applicant is handcuffed when taken out of his cell for his DATE outdoor walk , but the handcuffs are removed during the walk .

It does not appear that the applicant has ever been involved in violent incidents in prison or disciplined for violent or aggressive conduct . There is no indication that he has ever tried to abscond from prison either .

The facts summarised in this subsection were set out by the applicant in CARDINAL separate applications to this ORG lodged by him in DATE ( application no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) and DATE ( application no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . In those applications he complained about various issues , such as an alleged lack of access to a court , the outcome of proceedings for damages , the impossibility to vote in the DATE presidential elections in GPE , and an alleged interference with his right to correspondence .

From the materials submitted by the applicant in those CARDINAL cases it transpires that in DATE he brought a number of claims for damages under section CARDINAL the ORG and ORG DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) before the territorially competent ORG . Those claims concerned CARDINAL of allegations concerning various aspects of the conditions of his detention and specific incidents allegedly breaching his rights .

The claims that directly relate to the subject matter of the present case concerned , inter alia : the allegedly poor quality of tap water in FAC ; the allegedly insufficient heating ; the allegedly insufficient surface of the area for outdoor walks ; the alleged failure of the prison authorities to transfer the applicant to a collective cell with a view to enabling him to have contacts with other inmates ; the alleged failure of the prison authorities to provide any educational courses for the applicant or to enable him to take part in artistic , cultural , sport , religious or other activities ; the fact that the applicant had been routinely handcuffed when taken out of his cell ; and allegedly frequent body searches by prison guards .

Other claims concerned matters such as an alleged refusal of the prison authorities in DATE to provide the applicant with copies of receipts showing that he had paid for mail sent by him ; alleged delays and obstacles in respect of mail that the applicant had wished to send ; an alleged refusal to allow the applicant to use a combined MPCARDINAL/radio device as opposed to separate radio and MPCARDINAL devices , which were allowed ; an alleged refusal of the prison administration to wash the applicant ’s underwear , etc .

In relation to several claims , ORG instructed the applicant to clarify the link between the facts described in his statement of claim and the alleged damage , and to submit a declaration of means . As the applicant did not comply with those instructions , the court discontinued the proceedings in respect of some of the claims .

CARDINAL cases proceeded to judgment on the merits .

In a case decided on the merits on DATE , ORG dismissed the applicant ’s claim for damages concerning the fact that tap water in LOC had on occasions been muddy and unfit for drinking . The court noted that although there was evidence that sometimes , especially after heavy rains , the quality of that water had been bad , the laboratory analysis had confirmed that it had been safe for drinking . The prison was connected to the general water supply system and got the same water as that supplied to households nearby . The applicant ’s allegations , for instance that he had endured acute stomach pain and had required medical assistance , had not been made out . Moreover , the applicant had had the possibility to buy bottled mineral water from the prison canteen or , if he did not have the necessary means for that , boil tap water using a device which he confirmed that he had in his cell , or filter it . The applicant ’s appeal on points of law against that judgment was not examined by ORG as he failed to pay the requisite fee of ORG CARDINAL for the processing of the appeal ( see опр. № CARDINAL от CARDINAL юни DATE г. по адм. д. № DATE г. , PERSON , ORG ) .

A case decided on the merits by ORG on DATE concerned a specific incident on DATE in which prison staff had entered the applicant ’s cell for a search accompanied by a dog trained to find narcotic drugs . The court dismissed the applicant ’s claim that he had endured stress because of his fear of dogs . There was no evidence that the dog , which had been kept on a leash , had been handled in an inappropriate manner . That case ended in a judgment of ORG of DATE ( реш. № DATE от CARDINAL ноември DATE г. по адм. д. № DATE г. , PERSON , ORG ) whereby the applicant ’s appeal on points of law against ORG judgment was dismissed .

Another case decided on the merits by ORG on DATE concerned CARDINAL separate allegations relating to various aspects of the conditions of the applicant ’s detention . It appears that in his statement of claim the applicant had made confused assertions about the periods of time to which those claims related and that he eventually only claimed non - pecuniary damages in respect of a limited period of time in DATE . The court dismissed all of the applicant ’s claims . With regard , in particular , to the surface of the area for DATE outdoor walks , it found that it was QUANTITY . It went on to note that the bodily searches to which the applicant had been subjected had not involved any undressing or inappropriate touching of his private parts but patting , through his clothes , with a view to determining whether or not he had had on him any unauthorised items . The systematic handcuffing of the applicant was not in breach of the Execution of Punishments and PreTrial Detention Act DATE or the regulations for its application , was not inconsistent with the applicant ’s prison regime , could be considered necessary in view of the seriousness of the offences in relation to which he had been sentenced to life imprisonment , and had not been intended to humiliate the applicant . With regard to the claim that the applicant had not been transferred to a multi - occupancy cell despite the possibility to do so for life prisoners serving their life sentence under the “ severe ” regime , the court found that those matters fell within the discretion of the special commission for the execution of sentences ; there had therefore not been a failure on the part of the prison authorities to observe a binding legal obligation . The same went for educational courses . The applicant ’s appeal on points of law against that judgment was not examined by ORG as he failed to pay the requisite fee of MONEY ( ORG ) ( the equivalent of MONEY ( ORG ) ) for the processing of the appeal ( see опр. № CARDINAL от CARDINAL юни DATE г. по адм. д. № DATE г. , PERSON , ORG ) .

The applicant ’s claim concerning the allegedly low temperatures in his cell related to CARDINAL winters : the periods DATE and DATE , and the period DATE and DATE . The court ordered an expert report , which showed that the amount of coal provided to inmates in FAC in DATE had been adequate and that central heating had been installed in the prison in DATE . In a judgment of DATE ORG found that the prison administration had provided the applicant with enough coal to secure a temperature of QUANTITY in his cell during the first period , and that central heating had been installed before the second period . The applicant ’s claim was therefore dismissed . That judgment was apparently not validly appealed against .

From other materials submitted by the applicant it appears that in DATE he tried to bring a number of further claims under LAW DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) in relation to various instances in which his rights had allegedly been breached by the prison authorities . None of those claims was accepted for examination by ORG as a result of apparent failures on the part of the applicant to formulate his claims properly and pay the requisite court fees . In a series of decisions given in DATE ORG upheld the lower court ’s decisions not to examine the claims on the merits .


Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Ksenija Turković

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She was represented before the Court by Mr I. Labura , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP The applicant ’s husband was an employee of the “ Slavonac ” company . On DATE the applicant and her husband , as guarantors of a loan to the company , entered into an agreement with the GPE bank of GPE to use their house as security for a loan of CARDINAL NORP kunas . It was stipulated that unless the debtor paid its outstanding debts within DATE , the creditor bank was entitled to institute enforcement proceedings for payment of the debt through the sale of the applicants’ house .

On DATE the applicant brought a civil action before ORG against the said bank and the “ Slavonac ” company , claiming that neither she nor her husband had ever signed the fiduciary agreement in respect of their house and that she had learned about it for the first time in the inheritance proceedings instituted after the death of her husband .

ORG commissioned an expert in graphology , who confirmed that the signatures on the said agreement were indeed those of the applicant and her husband , and on DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s claim . This judgment was upheld by ORG on DATE and ORG on DATE .

The applicant ’s subsequent constitutional complaint was dismissed on DATE .

In the meantime , on DATE the GPE bank of GPE applied to ORG for enforcement of the fiduciary agreement against the applicant . It sought her eviction on the basis of a report of DATE and its appendix , certified by a notary public on DATE ( PERSON o posvjedočenju činjenica s potvrdom kojeg je sastavio javni bilježnik i dopuna PERSON ) . Those documents had been issued in connection with the above - mentioned fiduciary agreement in respect of the applicant ’s and her husband ’s house .

On DATE an eviction order against the applicant was issued by ORG .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against the eviction order , referring to the above - mentioned civil proceedings , which were still pending . The appeal was dismissed by the Šibenik ORG on CARDINAL DATE . However , on CARDINAL DATE the eviction was postponed .

On DATE the creditor asked the court to postpone the applicant ’s eviction until further notice .


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Georges Ravarani;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the DATE newspaper GPE list published CARDINAL articles in which the applicant accused his neighbour , a certain Mr GPE , of “ stealing ” his house and orchard .

In the ensuing CARDINAL sets of criminal proceedings instituted by GPE by way of private prosecution , the applicant was found guilty of CARDINAL counts of defamation ( kleveta ) . By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( PERSON – hereinafter “ the ORG ” ) fined the applicant CARDINAL NORP kunas ( HRK ) and ordered him to pay GPE HRK CARDINAL,CARDINAL for the costs of the proceedings . By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , amended by ORG PERSON – hereinafter “ the GPE ” ) on DATE , ORG judicially admonished ( sudska opomena ) the applicant and ordered him to pay GPE HRK CARDINAL,CARDINAL in costs .

NORP In subsequent civil defamation proceedings which GPE instituted against the applicant , the civil courts also found in favour of the plaintiff and awarded him damages . By a judgment of DATE , amended by ORG on DATE , ORG ordered the applicant to pay ORG as compensation for non - pecuniary damage , together with statutory default interest and HRK CARDINAL in costs .

Meanwhile , another set of civil proceedings between the same parties had also ended unfavourably for the applicant . By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s action to declare an in - court settlement between him and GPE of DATE null and void , and ordered him to pay the defendant HRK CARDINAL in costs .

Since the applicant did not pay the sums stipulated above ( hereinafter “ the debt ” ) on time , on DATE and CARDINAL DATE GPE instituted CARDINAL sets of enforcement proceedings in ORG , seeking enforcement against the applicant ’s immovable property , specifically his share in the house and surrounding land he owned with his wife . The property in question consisted of the house , a yard and arable land ( fields ) measuring CARDINAL , QUANTITY respectively ( hereinafter “ the property ” ) .

On DATE and DATE respectively the court issued CARDINAL writs of execution ( rješenja o ovrsi ) ordering the seizure and sale of the applicant ’s share in the property .

On DATE and DATE ORG dismissed appeals lodged by the applicant and upheld the writs .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG joined the CARDINAL sets of enforcement proceedings .

At a hearing on DATE the court , on the basis of information provided by the tax authorities , determined that the value of the applicant ’s share in the property was HRK CARDINAL . The applicant did not attend the hearing even though he had been duly notified .

By a ruling of DATE the court ordered the sale of the applicant ’s share in the property ( zaključak o prodaji , see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and scheduled a public auction for DATE at which , in accordance with the law , the property ( or share of it ) could not be sold for CARDINAL of its value ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

The auction was not attended by any interested buyers . The applicant , however , submitted a certificate confirming that on DATE he had paid HRK CARDINAL of the debt , and promised to pay the rest by New Year .

Since he did not do so , on DATE PERSON asked the court to schedule a second public auction .

On DATE the applicant submitted another certificate confirming that on DATE he had paid HRK CARDINAL of the debt , and asked the court not to schedule a second auction because he would gradually pay the rest of the debt .

On DATE PERSON reiterated his request for a second auction and stated that , by repeatedly promising to gradually pay the debt within self - imposed deadlines he did not observe , the applicant was merely protracting the enforcement proceedings which had thus far lasted DATE .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE the court scheduled the second public auction for CARDINAL DATE at which , in accordance with the law , the property ( or share of it ) could not be sold for CARDINAL of its value ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

At the second auction only GPE offered to buy the applicant ’s share in the property , for HRK CARDINAL,CARDINAL . This was the minimum price allowed by law and corresponded to CARDINAL of its value . The applicant ’s representative asked the court to postpone the auction and promised that the applicant would pay the rest of the debt within DATE . The court refused this request and issued a decision declaring that GPE had “ satisfied the conditions to be awarded [ the share in ] the property ” . It also specified that the decision actually awarding him the share in the property ( rješenje o dosudi , see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) would be delivered at DATE .

On DATE the applicant paid HRK CARDINAL of the debt .

On DATE he informed the court that earlier that day he had paid a further HRK CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL , and had thereby settled the debt of HRK CARDINAL in full ( consisting of the principal amount of HRK ORG and HRK CARDINAL of statutory default interest ) . What remained to be paid were the costs of the enforcement proceedings . He therefore asked the court to discontinue the enforcement and issue a decision specifying those costs , which he promised to pay immediately .

At a hearing on DATE GPE confirmed that on DATE the applicant had paid the debt in full , but had not covered the costs of the enforcement proceedings . He thus asked the court to issue a decision on costs , and the award decision .

On DATE the court delivered its award decision ( rješenje o dosudi , see paragraph CARDINAL above and paragraph CARDINAL below ) . It specified that the property would be surrendered ( transferred ) to GPE after he deposited the purchase price , within DATE of the decision becoming final . The court found the fact that the applicant had paid the debt in full on CARDINAL DATE irrelevant , since the decision on the sale of the applicant ’s share in the property to GPE had been adopted earlier , on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . It noted however that the fact that the applicant had paid off the debt would be taken into account when distributing the proceeds of sale ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . In particular , the court held as follows :

“ Given that the property was sold on DATE at the second public auction when it was established that the bidder GPE had made the best bid and had offered [ to pay ] HRK CARDINAL,CARDINAL , and thereby met the conditions to be awarded the property , the court adopted [ the present ] award decision ... regardless of the fact that the enforcement debtor on CARDINAL DATE settled the debt in respect of the principal amount and the interest . When settling the enforcement creditor ’s claim , the court will deliver a distribution decision whereby it will take into account the fact that the enforcement debtor had settled the debt in respect of the principal amount and the interest . ”

On DATE the applicant appealed against that decision . He argued that he had settled the debt in DATE before the court had issued the contested award decision . In that sense GPE “ had got it both ways ” as he had both been paid the debt and acquired the share in the property . There had been no reason to sell his share in the property to pay the same debt . He further stated that he would also have covered the costs of the enforcement proceedings that remained due if the court had issued a decision specifying the amount , which it had not done .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal and upheld the contested decision , which thereby became final . It held that the necessary conditions for selling the applicant ’s share in the property to GPE had already been met on DATE . The fact that he had later paid off the debt had no bearing on the validity of the sale . In particular , that court held as follows :

“ Having regard to the fact that on DATE the second public auction was held at which the enforcement creditor appeared as a bidder and made the best ( the only ) bid , and given that after the auction the court established that the enforcement creditor had offered the highest price and had met the conditions to be awarded the property in accordance with section CARDINAL ) of LAW , the first - instance court was , pursuant to section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of [ that ] Act , entitled ( and obliged to ) adopt the contested [ award ] decision ...

The fact that the enforcement debtor after the [ second public ] auction , on CARDINAL DATE settled the creditor ’s claim in full is of no relevance for the validity of the contested decision , regardless of the unjustified ( time ) gap between the auction and the adoption of the impugned decision . [ That is because ] at the auction of CARDINAL DATE , which was held in line with the [ relevant ] provisions of LAW , it was established that the enforcement creditor offered the highest price and that he met the conditions to be awarded the property . [ Therefore ] the events that occurred subsequently can not call into question the award of the property , nor can the said event constitute grounds for discontinuation of enforcement under LAW . ”

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against ORG decision , alleging a violation of his constitutional right to fair procedure .

On DATE GPE informed the court that he had deposited the purchase price , and submitted proof thereof .

By a ruling of DATE ( zaključak o predaji , see paragraph CARDINAL below ) ORG surrendered ( transferred ) the applicant ’s share in the property to GPE On DATE the court ’s land registry department recorded him in the land register as co - owner of the property instead of the applicant .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) declared the applicant ’s constitutional complaint of CARDINAL DATE inadmissible ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . It held that the contested decision was not open to constitutional review .

On DATE ORG issued a distribution decision ( rješenje o namirenju , see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , distributing the HRK CARDINAL,CARDINAL deposited with the court by GPE for the applicant ’s share in the property . The court specified the costs of the enforcement proceedings , which were incumbent on the applicant , as HRK CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL , and returned that amount to GPE The remaining HRK CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL was paid to the applicant .

On DATE ORG dismissed an appeal by the applicant against that decision . On DATE lodged a constitutional complaint against the decision of ORG .

By a decision of DATE ORG declared that constitutional complaint inadmissible , holding that the contested decision was not open to constitutional review .

By a decision of DATE ORG declared the enforcement completed . An appeal by the applicant against that decision was dismissed by ORG on DATE .

On DATE GPE instituted non - contentious proceedings in ORG against the applicant ’s wife by lodging a petition for partition of co - ownership . Since the property could not be physically divided , he sought a partition by sale , whereby the proceeds would be distributed to the co - owners .

As the applicant ’s wife opposed the partition , by a decision of DATE the court discontinued the non - contentious proceedings and instructed GPE to institute separate civil proceedings against her to that end .

On DATE GPE brought a civil action against the applicant ’s wife as instructed , in the same municipal court . He sought a partition of co - ownership in the same way as in his petition of CARDINAL DATE .

By a judgment of DATE ORG ruled for the plaintiff and ordered a partition by sale and distribution of the proceeds to the co - owners . It also ordered the applicant ’s wife to pay the plaintiff HRK CARDINAL in costs .

She appealed and the proceedings are currently pending before the second - instance court .

Meanwhile , on DATE GPE , had also instituted another set of civil proceedings before ORG against the applicant , seeking payment of rent for the use of the property . He explained that the applicant had remained living in the house even after he acquired the applicant ’s share . As a co - owner he was thus entitled to seek from the applicant CARDINAL of the rent under which the house could be rented out . These proceedings are still pending before the first - instance court .


No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-c - Reasonable suspicion);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention;Reasonableness of pre-trial detention);No violation of Article 14+5-1-c - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 5-1-c - Reasonable suspicion;Article 5 - Right to liberty and security);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Dmitry Dedov;Erik Møse;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE . At the material time , she was working as a NORP - NORP translator and was married to a NORP national .

On DATE criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant , her husband and others by a public prosecutor of ORG ( ORG Ação Penal ) in GPE on allegations of aiding illegal immigration , money laundering and forgery .

NORP In DATE the applicant sent letters to the Attorney General ( Procurador - Geral da República ) and Director of ORG ( Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras ) , informing them that she knew she was being investigated , and that she was available to present herself to the judicial authorities to be questioned and considered as a defendant . The letters read , in so far as relevant , as follows :

“ [ The applicant ] is ready to be made a defendant and questioned . She hereby suggests the following dates for these procedural steps , for which she volunteers to attend when summoned :

DATE , at any time ;

DATE , at any time ;

CARDINAL , CARDINAL , DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE , at any time . ”

On DATE the public prosecutor issued an arrest warrant against the applicant on the basis of Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW ( hereinafter “ the ORG ” ) , as the case material provided sufficient grounds for believing that she might abscond , obstruct the investigation or continue the alleged criminal activity . The arrest warrant reads , in so far as relevant , as follows :

“ In view of the above , it is essential to question the suspect and thus assess the application of other preventive measures in addition to providing information on identity and residence [ termo de identidade e residência ] . Having regard to the strong grounds that exist regarding the commission of the acts described , which are crimes allowing for the application of pre - trial detention , and taking into account that , in the present case , there is a risk of absconding , a risk of continuing the criminal activity and obstructing the investigation ... I order PERSON arrest ... to bring her before the investigating judge ... ”

On DATE the applicant was arrested at her home DATE She was questioned by an investigating judge of ORG over DATE , CARDINAL and DATE .

The applicant challenged the arrest before the investigating judge and submitted observations with regard to the preventive measure she thought should be applied . She argued that there was no reason to believe that she would abscond and , as such , the arrest warrant had been issued by the public prosecutor unlawfully . She further stated that she did not have a criminal record ; she had CARDINAL young children who lived with her . She further claimed that she had a permanent residence in GPE , where she had been living for DATE . She also stated that she was ready to hand over her passport , and that prohibiting her from going to places attended by immigrants and contacting the other defendants in the proceedings would be adequate preventive measures .

On DATE the investigating judge dismissed her request , noting as follows :

“ In the present case it appears evident that there is a risk of the defendant absconding , given that she is a NORP national and once confronted with the seriousness of the facts attributed to her , she could flee from GPE to her home country .

... the crimes of aiding illegal immigration and money laundering allow the application of the preventive measure of pre - trial detention in respect of the defendant . The requirements established under LAW ORG have thus been met and the defendant ’s appeal is dismissed . ”

The investigating judge also remanded the applicant in custody for the duration of the investigation , noting as follows :

“ The acts committed by the defendants are objectively serious . [ They ] are NORP nationals , with the exception of defendant PERSON [ the applicant ’s husband ] , raising fears that when confronted with the seriousness of the facts attributed to them , they would evade justice and flee to their home country .

It is also evident that there is a risk the investigation will be obstructed with regard to the gathering of evidence , as there are numerous investigative steps to be carried out , namely the examination of witnesses .

... taking into account the profits obtained from the criminal activity , it is also evident that there is a risk that the criminal activity will continue .

The defendants PERSON and GPE are primarily responsible for the criminal organisation acting in GPE ... Thus , having regard to the severity and multiplicity of the crimes against them , the risk of absconding and ... obstructing the investigation and finally , it being predicted that a custodial sentence will be imposed after trial , only detention on remand would be adequate and proportionate to the severity of the facts and the preventive aims required in this particular case .

With regard to defendants PERSON , GPE [ the applicant ’s husband ] and PERSON , the application of other preventive measures which would not deprive them of liberty [ medidas não privativas de liberdade ] would be proportionate to the purpose of preventing the above - mentioned risks .

In view of the above :

- defendants PERSON , PERSON and PERSON should ... be held in pre - trial detention pursuant to LAW , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( a ) and CARDINAL ( a ) , ( b ) and ( c ) of the Code of Criminal Procedure .

- defendants ORG , GPE and GPE [ the applicant ’s husband ] are prohibited from leaving GPE and must surrender their passports , prohibited from contacting each other , and must attend their nearest police station on a DATE basis ... the prohibition on contact does not apply to GPE and defendant PERSON or to PERSON and defendant GPE , as they live together . ”

The applicant appealed against the decision of the investigating judge to ORG . She complained that there had not been any justification for her arrest or for the application of the custodial measure as her family situation , place of residence and other personal circumstances had not been taken into account when the court had ordered her detention . She also argued that she had voluntarily shown that she was available to be questioned by the authorities in DATE .

On DATE the public prosecutor in charge of the criminal case asked the investigating judge to classify the proceedings as particularly complex , noting that more time was needed to complete the investigation .

On DATE the investigating judge accepted the public prosecutor ’s request to classify the proceedings as particularly complex and extended the pre - trial detention to DATE , taking into account the number of applicants and crimes that were being investigated .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against the arrest warrant and upheld the court ’s decision of DATE to hold her in pre - trial detention . The court held , inter alia , the following in relation to the lawfulness of the arrest warrant :

The public prosecutor ’s reasoning that ‘ there were grounds for considering that [ the applicant ] would not present herself to the authorities on a scheduled date could not eventually be ORG ; however , one can not say that the arrest warrant was unlawful because of that . ”

In relation to the necessity of the detention on remand , it noted that :

It can be considered that there is ‘ no high risk of the defendant QUANTITY since on DATE , aware of the ongoing criminal proceedings against her , she nevertheless volunteered to be questioned [ by the authorities ] and even detained . Furthermore , she did not flee from her residence or the country . However , neither her family circumstances nor the measure of electronic surveillance are , at present , capable of safeguarding the risk [ relating to the ] gathering of evidence ...

Indeed , it would not be possible to safeguard the risk for the investigation , which is very high , especially given the nature of the NORP community in GPE .

And it does not avoid the risk of the criminal activity continuing especially since , as said by the public prosecutor at first instance , ‘ it was mainly done from home , and the contact was established with third parties.’ ”

The applicant filed a request for clarification with ORG regarding its decision of DATE . On DATE it was rejected .

DATE the applicant lodged CARDINAL requests with the investigating judge of ORG asking for her release and the remand in custody to be replaced with police supervision pending trial or house arrest with electronic surveillance , reiterating that there was no risk of her absconding or continuing criminal activity , that she had contacted the police voluntarily , that she had not committed the alleged crimes , that she was a mother of CARDINAL children living in GPE , and that she had a permanent place of residence there .

On DATE , CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE the investigating judge of ORG upheld the decision to maintain her in pre - trial detention , noting as follows :

“ ... the requirements for the order [ of pre - trial detention ] remain unchanged and strengthened . For that reason , [ the defendants ] should remain in pre - trial detention pending trial ( LAW a ) of the ORG ) . ”

“ The arguments submitted by the defendant [ the applicant ] do not interfere with the reasons on which the pre - trial detention was based . It is therefore our understanding that these reasons remain valid . ”

“ The defendant claims equal treatment in the judicial decisions . In her arguments she did not inform [ the court ] of any new circumstances which could affect the reasons that justified her detention on remand .

The reasons which were already analysed in an appeal remain unchanged and there are therefore no grounds capable of mitigating the preventive requirements which justified the detention on remand . I therefore dismiss the defendant ’s request and order that she remains in pre - trial detention pending trial . ”

DATE the applicant also lodged CARDINAL requests with ORG to have the criminal inquiry expedited ( pedido de aceleração processual ) .

On DATE and DATE ORG rejected the request . It substantiated its decisions by the fact that the requests were manifestly ill - founded , given the complexity of the proceedings and the fact that the investigation was under way .

On DATE , CARDINAL DATE , DATE and DATE the investigating judge reviewed the grounds for application of the applicant ’s pre - trial detention , in accordance with LAW ORG . He noted that they remained unchanged and , therefore , upheld the custodial measure applied in respect of the applicant .

On an unspecified date the applicant was indicted and her case sent to ORG for trial .

On DATE the investigating judge decided to release the applicant from pre - trial detention and place her under house arrest with electronic surveillance . The relevant parts of the decision read as follows :

“ From the analysis of the case file ... there are no new facts capable of affecting the strong grounds surrounding the acts attributable to the defendants ; nor does it seem that the risks mentioned [ in the DATE order ] have ceased to exist .

From the evidence provided to date , namely with regard to their personal and family circumstances , less severe preventive measures can be applied in respect of the defendants . The risk of absconding still exists ; however , it can be safeguarded through electronic surveillance . ”

On DATE the applicant was released from pre - trial detention .

On DATE ORG delivered its judgment . The applicant was acquitted of money laundering and forgery . She was convicted of aiding illegal immigration and sentenced to DATE imprisonment , although the sentence was suspended on the condition that she made an DATE payment of ORG CARDINAL . On DATE she was released from house arrest .

On an unspecified date she appealed against the judgment to ORG . According to the latest information received on DATE , the proceedings are still pending .