No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention)

George Nicolaou;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in Puck .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking and of membership in an organised criminal group . The investigation against him and several other persons was conducted by ORG ) .

On DATE ORG ( Sąd Rejonowy ) remanded the applicant in custody , relying on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question . It considered that keeping the applicant in detention was necessary to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings , given the risk that he might induce witnesses to give false testimony . It also stressed the severity of the anticipated sentence and the complex nature of the case .

The applicant ’s pretrial detention was later extended by ORG ( PERSON ) on DATE and on DATE and DATE . On DATE the ORG ( ORG ) further extended the applicant ’s detention . The courts repeatedly relied on the original grounds given for the applicant ’s detention . They also emphasised the need to secure the process of obtaining evidence as the case concerned activities of an organised criminal group .

On an unspecified date in DATE the investigation was taken over by ORG ( Prokurator PERSON ) .

On DATE a bill of indictment against the applicant and CARDINAL other persons was lodged with ORG . The applicant was charged with numerous counts of drug trafficking and with membership in an organised criminal group . The bill of indictment stated that CARDINAL accused had pleaded guilty and they agreed to the sentences indicated by the prosecution authorities under LAW ( wniosek o skazanie ) . It was accompanied by CARDINAL volumes of the case file . The prosecutor requested the court to hear CARDINAL witnesses .

During the court proceedings the applicant ’s detention pending trial was further extended by decisions of the ORG delivered on DATE and DATE and DATE ; and by ORG decisions of CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL May , CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE .

The applicant ’s appeals against decisions prolonging his detention and all his subsequent applications for release were unsuccessful .

The courts continually justified their decisions by the existence of a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences . They also referred to the likelihood of a heavy prison sentence being imposed on the applicant after conviction . They further relied on the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings , emphasising that the accused and subsequently the key witnesses in the case had to testify before the trial court . They considered that the risk that the applicant might tamper with evidence or otherwise obstruct the proceedings resulted , in particular , from the fact that he had been charged with membership in an organised criminal group . Finally , they found that the trial court conducted the proceedings in a correct and timely manner . They noted in this regard the complex character of the case and the voluminous documentation gathered ( on DATE the case file comprised CARDINAL volumes ) . They also referred to multiple procedural motions of the accused and their lawyers .

DATE and DATE the applicant served a prison sentence imposed in another set of criminal proceedings against him . On DATE he started serving another prison sentence .

Meanwhile , on DATE the trial court decided to examine the charges against CARDINAL coaccused in separate proceedings .

On DATE the court scheduled the first hearing for CARDINAL DATE . It also scheduled CARDINAL further hearings .

The hearings scheduled for CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE were adjourned due to the absence of CARDINAL of the accused .

The trial was eventually started on DATE . Subsequently , the trial court held CARDINAL further hearings by DATE .

In DATE the court held CARDINAL hearings altogether . CARDINAL of the scheduled hearings were adjourned due to absences or sickleaves of the accused or their lawyers .

In DATE TIME hearings were held by CARDINAL DATE . On DATE the ORG lifted the applicant ’s detention on remand .

The proceedings are still pending before the firstinstance court .


Aleš Pejchal;André Potocki;Ann Power-Forde;Ganna Yudkivska;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applications were lodged by CARDINAL NORP nationals , PERSON ( “ the first applicant ” ) , PERSON ( “ the second applicant ” ) and PERSON ( “ the third applicant ” , collectively “ the applicants ” ) . The applicants were born in DATE , DATE and DATE , respectively , and live in GPE , GPE and GPE , GPE .

The applicants , who had been granted legal aid , were represented by PERSON , a lawyer practising in the town of ORG , GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , most recently , PERSON of ORG of GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the first applicant gave birth to a child . She took DATE of maternity leave , ending on DATE .

On DATE the first applicant applied to the relevant ORG authorities for a DATE allowance , to be paid to her in accordance with section DATE of the Law of GPE on ORG in Case of Temporary Loss of Ability to Work and Childbirth and Funeral Expenses ( ORG Про загальнообов’язкове державне соціальне страхування у зв’язку з тимчасовою втратою працездатності та витратами , зумовленими народженням та похованням ” – hereafter “ ORG ” - see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The allowance was awarded to her with effect from DATE ( DATE after DATE initial period of maternity leave ) . DATE the first applicant received the following amounts : CARDINAL NORP hryvnias ( ORG ) in DATE ; UAH CARDINAL in DATE ; UAH CARDINAL in DATE ; UAH CARDINAL.CARDINAL in DATE ; ORG CARDINAL in DATE ; and UAH MONEY in DATE . DATE and DATE the first applicant was receiving UAH CARDINAL ( around QUANTITY ( EUR ) ) DATE .

NORP In DATE the laws which set the amount of the allowance in question were modified by ORG . On DATE and CARDINAL DATE ORG of GPE found that ORG for DATE could not validly amend the scope of rights and obligations set up in other legislation ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

NORP In DATE the first applicant asked for her allowance to be recalculated in the light of the Constitutional Court decisions of DATE and CARDINAL DATE . In reply ORG informed the first applicant that since “ the Cabinet of Ministers of GPE had not adopted a mechanism for recalculation of the child allowance , to make it compatible with the decision of ORG of GPE ” , the recalculation could not be carried out . At the same time it noted that , according to the decision no . CARDINAL of the Cabinet of Ministers of GPE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , the DATE child allowance was UAH CARDINAL for the period DATE and DATE .

On DATE ORG of GPE informed the first applicant that she was entitled to a child allowance in accordance with ORG ( ORG державну допомогу ORG з дітьми GPE ) ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) to be paid DATE and DATE . ORG noted that as of DATE the amount of allowance was UAH CARDINAL whilst , " pursuant to the decision of ORG of DATE the applicant would have received DATE payments of UAH CARDINAL in DATE and ORG CARDINAL in DATE which corresponds to the amount of the minimum subsistence level ( прожитковий мінімум ) for a child aged DATE " . However , for DATE the necessary financial provisions for these payments had not been not made , with the result that the applicant would continue to receive the sums provided by ORG ) act , as amended by the respective ORG .

NORP In DATE the first applicant instituted proceedings in the ORG against ORG of the Yalta Town Council claiming , inter alia , ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL in allegedly unpaid child allowance due to her for the period DATE and DATE and requesting that an allowance in an amount not lower than the minimum subsistence level established by law for an able - bodied person ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) be paid to her until DATE . The first applicant indicated that she was insured under the obligatory social insurance scheme and was entitled to child allowance under sections DATE and CARDINAL of ORG . However , decision no . DATE of the Cabinet of Ministers of GPE which had been applied in her case , contradicted the above LAW , even though the latter had higher legal force . The first applicant further noted that she had learned about the allegedly erroneous calculation of the amount of her child allowance from the media only in DATE .

On DATE the court found that the first applicant was insured under LAW . Under LAW of the LAW the amount of child allowance paid could not be less than the amount of the minimum subsistence level established by law . The changes introduced by ORG in DATE and DATE , which provided for a reduction in the amount of the benefit , had been declared unconstitutional by ORG on DATE and CARDINAL DATE . Therefore , these changes were not applicable in the first applicant ’s case .

The court further held that the first applicant had lodged before the court her claim for payment of the child allowance due to her in DATE only in DATE , while the decision of ORG of DATE had been published on DATE . The first applicant should have learned about the breach of her rights on DATE . As the first applicant requested recalculation of her child allowance in DATE only , she had missed the DATE time - limit provided for by LAW . The court allowed the first applicant ’s claims related to the period DATE and DATE and awarded her UAH MONEY .

On DATE ORG amended the decision of DATE . It found that the first applicant had had good reasons for missing the time - limit for lodging her claim . In particular , she had correctly tried to settle the dispute out of court by lodging her request for recalculation directly with the defendant first .

The court held that the relevant provisions of ORG for DATE , which suspended ( for DATE ) and then revoked ( with effect from DATE ) section CARDINAL of ORG , had been found to be unconstitutional on DATE and CARDINAL DATE . The first applicant was insured and thus was entitled to a DATE child allowance in accordance with LAW , which provided that the amount of the child allowance should not be lowers than the minimum subsistence level . The court found that LAW for DATE set the minimum subsistence level for children aged DATE as UAH CARDINAL ( DATE ) and ORG CARDINAL ( DATE ) . In DATE the first applicant was paid ORG CARDINAL.CARDINAL . Consequently , the first applicant was to be paid “ the remaining UAH CARDINAL ” in child allowance for the period DATE and DATE .

As for DATE the court found that the first applicant ’s claims for the period DATE ( i.e. after the ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE ) should be also granted . LAW for DATE set for the minimum subsistence level for children aged DATE as UAH CARDINAL ( DATE ) , UAH CARDINAL ( DATE ) and UAH CARDINAL ( DATE ) . The first applicant received UAH DATE CARDINAL x DATE . The court awarded her the remaining ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL for the period between CARDINAL May and DATE ( CARDINAL x CARDINAL + CARDINAL x CARDINAL + CARDINAL x DATE ) .

As for the first applicant ’s claims related to the DATE payments , the court held that section CARDINAL of LAW DATE provided that the amount of child allowance provided for by ORG and by ORG had to be fixed by ORG . As the relevant provisions of LAW DATE had not been declared unconstitutional and the allowance in question had paid to the first applicant in the amount determined by the ORG of ORG decision no . CARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , the court dismissed the first applicant ’s claim relating to the DATE payments . The court held that the first applicant ’s claim for payment of an allowance up to DATE could not be allowed , since it concerned future payments .

The first applicant appealed in cassation , stating that she was insured and thus entitled to child allowance in an amount no lower than the minimum subsistence level for an able - bodied person as of DATE . She also noted that ORG had already declared on numerous occasions that LAW could not introduce changes to other legal acts .

On DATE ORG of GPE found that there were no grounds to grant the first applicant leave to appeal on points of law .

On DATE the second applicant gave birth to a child . From DATE she received ORG CARDINAL a month in child allowance .

On DATE the second applicant lodged a claim before FAC . Relying on section CARDINAL of ORG , the second applicant claimed that child allowance in an amount not less than the minimum subsistence level established by law was due to her for the period DATE and DATE . The second applicant also referred to LAW and the ORG decisions of CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE , and argued that it was unconstitutional to amend an existing provision of ORG by virtue of LAW .

On DATE the GPE ORG found that the second applicant was insured , and therefore FAC was applicable to her . Despite this conclusion , the court relied on section CARDINAL of ORG , which was modified by LAW DATE , and also , referring to LAW DATE , held that resources for financing child allowance payments had to be allocated by ORG . On these grounds , it dismissed the applicant ’s claims .

On DATE ORG upheld that decision . It held , however , that in the second applicant ’s case it was not FAC , which applied “ to temporarily disabled persons or in cases of birth or death ” , but ORG which was applicable , and that therefore the amount of child allowance had been calculated correctly .

On DATE the second applicant appealed in cassation .

NORP By letter of CARDINAL DATE ORG informed the second applicant that since CARDINAL September CARDINAL it had had no jurisdiction to examine administrative cases and that her appeal would be considered after the introduction of the necessary changes to the law .

NORP By letter of CARDINAL DATE ORG of GPE informed the second applicant that her case ( no . ORG ) was pending before that court .

The second applicant ’s lawyer informed the ORG that ORG of GPE had rejected the second applicant ’s appeal in cassation on DATE . He submitted a copy of the decision , which was published in the ORG of GPE ( ORG державний реєстр судових рішень GPE ) . The copy contains no mention of the second applicant ’s name ( all personal information was replaced by the reference “ Person CARDINAL ” ) but makes reference to her case number ( no . K/CARDINAL/CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

ORG of GPE found , without any particular specification , that the second applicant was entitled to a child allowance under FAC and had been paid it in accordance with decision no . CARDINAL of the Cabinet of Ministers of GPE .

On CARDINAL DATE the third applicant gave birth to a child . From DATE she received ORG CARDINAL a month in child allowance , payable until the child reached the age of CARDINAL .

On DATE the Kirovsky District Court of Donetsk rejected the third applicant ’s claim against ORG of ORG of Donetsk for payment of child allowance in an amount equal to the minimum subsistence level . It held that the amount of the allowance paid to her had been calculated correctly in accordance with ORG .

On DATE ORG upheld that decision . It held that although section CARDINAL of ORG was in force and applicable in the present case , ORG of DATE and DATE provided that the amount of the allowance in question had to be agreed by ORG . The amount of the child allowance due to the third applicant had been calculated correctly , in accordance with the relevant decision of ORG . This court decision was not subject to appeal .

The relevant provisions of the LAW read as follows :

Section CARDINAL . Right to a child allowance payable until the child attains the age of CARDINAL

“ An insured person ( a parent , an adoptive parent , a grandmother , a grandfather , another relative or a guardian ) who has a child under his or her care has the right to child allowance payable until the child attains the age of CARDINAL .

Child allowance payable until the child attains the age of CARDINAL is provided to an insured person in the form of an allowance during their DATE period of maternity leave and partially compensates the loss of salary ( income ) during this time . ”

Section CARDINAL . Amount of allowance payable until the child attains the age of CARDINAL

“ Child allowance shall be paid to an insured person in the amount set by the board of the [ ORG but it shall be not lower than the amount of the minimum subsistence level established by law . ”

The Transitional Provisions of this LAW , adopted in DATE , stipulated that until the economic situation had stabilised the amount of the allowance would be determined DATE by PERSON of GPE until it gradually reached the minimum subsistence level .

Section CARDINAL . Right [ to receive ] child allowance until the child attains the age of CARDINAL

“ A person who is not insured under the obligatory ORG social insurance scheme , who has a child under his or her care has the right [ to receive ] child allowance until the child attains DATE . ”

“ Child allowance shall be paid in an amount which shall be equal to the minimum subsistence level for a child aged DATE . ”

The Transitional Provisions of this LAW , amended in DATE , provided that the allowance in question should amount to PERCENT ( from DATE ) , PERCENT ( from DATE ) and PERCENT ( from DATE ) of the difference between the minimum subsistence level for an able - bodied person and the average DATE family income for CARDINAL person for DATE .

NORP This decision established the amounts and methods of payments under ORG and , in particular , of child allowance payable to children DATE .

NORP The DATE subsistence level for children aged DATE was gradually increased by the relevant laws from UAH CARDINAL ( around FAC ) in DATE to UAH CARDINAL ( around EUR CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) in DATE .

The DATE minimum subsistence level for an able - bodied person changed from FAC ( around EUR CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) in DATE to ORG CARDINAL ( around ORG CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) in DATE .

By LAW CARDINAL section CARDINAL of ORG and section CARDINAL of ORG were suspended . Part CARDINAL of LAW of LAW DATE provided that the allowance in question should not be less than UAH CARDINAL for non - insured persons and not PERCENT of the minimum subsistence level for insured persons .

On DATE ORG declared that part CARDINAL of LAW of LAW and the suspension of section CARDINAL of ORG and of CARDINAL of ORG were unconstitutional .

By the PERSON “ On the State Budget CARDINAL and on LAW ( “ LAW CARDINAL ” ) sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of ORG were revoked . The LAW also introduced changes to ORG . These changes provided that a person raising a child had the right to child allowance until the child attained DATE . This allowance was paid in an amount equal to the difference between the minimum subsistence level and the average family income for DATE , but not less than UAH CARDINAL .

At the same time LAW CARDINAL also provided that child allowance should amount to PERCENT ( from DATE ) , PERCENT ( from DATE ) and PERCENT ( from DATE ) of the difference between the minimum subsistence level and the DATE average family income for CARDINAL person for DATE , but should not be MONEY .

On DATE decision no . CARDINAL of the Cabinet of Ministers of GPE was amended by decision no . CARDINAL . The latter decision provided that the allowance in question had to amount to the difference PERCENT ( from DATE ) and PERCENT ( from DATE ) of the minimum subsistence level and the DATE average family income for CARDINAL person for DATE , but should not be MONEY .

On DATE the revocation of sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of ORG was found unconstitutional by LAW . The question of the constitutionality of amendments to ORG made by LAW DATE was not raised before ORG .

The State Budget Acts DATE and DATE provided that the amount of the allowance in question should be established by ORG .

The decision of DATE concerned limitations on some social security payments introduced by LAW DATE . ORG held that :

“ ... since for a considerable number of citizens of GPE privileges , compensation and safeguards , the right to which is provided by laws in force , are an addition to their main sources of support and a necessary component of the constitutional right to maintain a standard of living ( LAW ) no lower than the minimum subsistence level established by law ( part CARDINAL of LAW ) , any limitation of the content and ambit of this right by adoption of new laws or amendment of current laws is forbidden by LAW . ”

The Constitutional Court of GPE reiterated this position in its decision of DATE “ On discontinuing or limiting privileges , compensation and guarantees ” .

By its decisions of CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE ORG stated as follows :

Decision of DATE ( ORG social protection case )

The analysis of the legislative activity of the Verkhovna Rada of GPE confirms that laws of GPE on granting privileges , compensation and guarantees , which form part of the constitutional right of citizens to social protection and to maintain a sufficient standard of living ( LAW ) , are systematically suspended following the adoption of ORG .

The suspension of laws [ ... ] is to be done in accordance with LAW . [ ... ] Therefore , LAW suspends , for a certain period of time , the functioning of the mechanism for implementing constitutional socio - economic rights , which leads to a limitation of the right to social protection . Systematic suspension by LAW of the laws of GPE on granting privileges , compensations and guarantees in practice invalidates them .

Suspension of laws which establish the rights and freedoms of citizens [ ... ] is a limitation of those rights and freedoms and can take place only in cases provided for by LAW . [ ... ]

As a result of the temporary suspension of the valid laws of GPE on granting privileges , compensation and other forms of social guarantee , ORG income , which should not be lower than the minimum subsistence level established by law ( part CARDINAL of LAW ) , falls and thus the right of everybody to a decent standard of living under LAW is breached .

Therefore , in accordance with part CARDINAL of LAW and LAW , the right of citizens to social protection and other socio - economic rights can be limited , including by way of suspension of laws or their parts , only in a military state or state of emergency for a limited period of time .

This legal position has already been expressed by ORG in its decision of DATE .

CARDINAL [ ... ] Failure of the ORG to comply with its social obligations with respect to certain persons puts those citizens in an unequal position and undermines the principle of an individual ’s trust in the ORG , which leads to a violation of the principles of ORG and the rule of law ... .

ORG has on numerous occasions [ ... ] found that certain provisions of ORG which suspend or limit privileges , compensation and guarantees contradicted LAW ( decision of DATE ( case about privileges , compensation and guarantees ) ; decision of DATE ( case about social protection of military personnel and employees of law enforcement bodies ) ; decision of DATE ( case about suspension or limitation of privileges , compensation and guarantees ) ; decision of CARDINAL DATE ( case about amount of pension and DATE living allowance ) . However , despite the above - mentioned decisions of ORG , the revision of privileges , compensation and guarantees by ORG , which started in DATE , has become systematic .

It follows from the above - mentioned provisions of LAW and LAW of GPE that LAW [ ... ] has a specific subject matter – the determination of the State revenues and expenditure for society - wide needs , in particular , expenditure for social protection and social security – therefore , this LAW can not introduce changes to or suspend the laws of GPE , or set up different ( additional ) statutory regulation of areas which are subject to regulation by other laws . This is also confirmed by part CARDINAL of section CARDINAL of the [ Budget ] Code .

Since the subject - matter of LAW is clearly determined by LAW , and in the [ Budget ] Code , this LAW can not repeal or change the scope of rights and obligations , privileges , compensation and guarantees provided for by other laws of GPE . ”

Decision of DATE ( case on subject - matter and content of LAW )

“ LAW does not give LAW higher legal force in comparison to other laws .

For this reason , ORG has concluded that LAW can not introduce changes to other laws , suspend their effect or revoke them , since for objective reasons it creates contradictions in legislation , and as a result , abrogation and limitation of human and ORG rights and freedoms .

In the event that operation of laws is to be ceased , it is for separate laws to introduce changes or amend them , or declare them void . ”

Following a request by ORG for the interpretation of part CARDINAL of LAW , which provides that any ORG expenditure must be determined exclusively by LAW , in its decision of DATE no . CARDINAL - CARDINAL/CARDINAL “ On budget balancing ” ORG referred to its previous decisions of DATE and CARDINAL DATE and decided that there was “ no practical necessity ” for such an interpretation since the above - mentioned decisions had already addressed the issue .

The Constitutional Court was not seized of a complaint in respect of LAW DATE .

In its decision of CARDINAL DATE no . QUANTITY “ On the constitutionality of certain provisions of LAW DATE ” the Court held :

“ DATE ORG has on many occasions [ ... ] examined cases and taken decisions on the compliance of ORG or specific provisions thereof with LAW ( constitutionality ) .

In particular , in decision no . CARDINAL-рп/CARDINAL of DATE ( ORG social protection case ) ORG of GPE established that the subject matter of LAW was foreseen in part CARDINAL of LAW [ ... ] , the list of legal matters which formed the subject matter of LAW was exhaustive ; according to LAW [ ... ] it follows that LAW , as a legal act , was to be interpreted through the notion of a budget as a plan for the gathering and distribution of financial resources ; it had a special subject matter , different from other laws of GPE – it concerned exclusively the determination of the income and expenditure of the ORG , and therefore this LAW could not introduce changes , suspend the effect of other laws , or set up a different ( additional ) legal regulation of areas covered by other laws of GPE [ ... ] .

By declaring certain provisions of LAW DATE unconstitutional , ORG of GPE drew the attention of LOC , the President of GPE and ORG to the necessity to comply with provisions [ ... ] , CARDINAL , CARDINAL [ ... ] of LAW [ ... ] in the preparation , adoption and implementation of LAW .

The same provisions of LAW [ ... ] and the above - mentioned legal position served as the basis for the decision of ORG of DATE in the case on the subject matter and content of LAW [ ... ] .

CARDINAL Despite the constitutional requirements as to the subject matter of LAW and the legal positions expressed by LAW in the decisions of DATE and CARDINAL DATE , LAW DATE introduced changes and amendments to a number of laws [ ... ] .

In its decision of CARDINAL DATE no . CARDINAL - CARDINAL/CARDINAL “ On the constitutionality of certain provisions of LAW CARDINAL ” the ORG stated :

The amounts of social payments depend on the social situation and financial capacity of the ORG , but they should secure the constitutional right of every person to a decent standard of living for himself and for his family , granted by LAW .

In addition , in its decision of DATE on insurance payments ORG pointed out that the mechanisms and amounts of social services and payments to victims [ ... ] were set by the ORG according to its financial capacity .

When examining this issue ORG also took into account the provisions of international law . Thus , according to LAW , the amounts of social payments and assistance are determined in accordance with the financial capacity of the ORG . ORG in its decision of DATE in PERSON v. GPE considered that social and economic rights are largely dependent on the situation - notably financial - reigning in the ORG . This conclusion also concerns the reduction of social payments , which is noted in the decision of DATE in the case of PERSON v. GPE .

Therefore , one of the main elements in the regulation of relations in the social sphere is the principle of proportionality between the social protection of citizens and the financial capacity of the ORG , as well as guaranteeing the right of everybody to a sufficient standard of living .

... the social and economic rights provided for by laws are not absolute . The mechanism of implementation of these rights can be changed by the ORG , in particular , in the event that they can not be guaranteed financially , by way of redistribution of costs with the aim of protecting the interests of society in whole . Moreover , these [ changes ] can be made in response to the need to prevent or remove a real threat to the economic security of GPE , which , according to LAW , is the most important function of the ORG . [ ... ] It is unacceptable to establish a legal mechanism which would lead to the amount of a person ’s pension , other social payments or allowance falling below the amount indicated in part CARDINAL of LAW and [ thus failing to ] guarantee an appropriate standard of living and preserve his or her human dignity , which would be contrary to LAW .

Therefore , a change to the method of calculation of certain types of social payment will be compatible with the LAW until it reaches a point at which the very essence of the right to social protection is compromised . ”


CASE OF YAROSHOVETS AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE

Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5+5-3 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention) (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention;Reasonableness of pre-trial detention;Article 5 - Right to liberty and security);Violation of Article 5+5-3 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention) (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention;Reasonableness of pre-trial detention;Article 5 - Right to liberty and security);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-5 - Compensation);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Carlo Ranzoni;Ganna Yudkivska;Mārtiņš Mits;Síofra O’Leary

The first applicant was born in DATE ; the second , third and fourth in DATE ; and the fifth in DATE . With the exception of the second applicant who died on DATE , the applicants currently live in GPE . Ms O.P. Vorona , the second applicant ’s mother , informed ORG her wish to pursue the application on his behalf .

The applicants , along with CARDINAL other persons , were co - defendants in criminal proceedings instituted against them in DATE . The charges against them included a number of counts of ill - treatment , theft , extortion and abuse of power , which the applicants allegedly committed during their service in the police .

At TIME on DATE the applicants , then police officers , were arrested by a special police unit and taken to ORG to be questioned by the prosecutors responsible for the investigation . DATE the prosecutors ordered the ORG detention under LAW . During TIME DATE they were taken to police stations in the NORP and PERSON Districts of GPE .

On DATE the applicants were taken back to ORG for questioning .

The applicants were detained on different police premises until DATE , when they were placed in ORG ( слідчий ізолятор – “ GPE ” ) .

From DATE until the pre - trial investigations were completed and the case was referred to ORG of GPE for trial on DATE , the courts at CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction ordered the ORG continued detention . The courts based their decisions mainly on the grounds that the case was complex and the investigations were pending , that the applicants were accused of serious crimes , that they might evade investigation and trial and obstruct the establishment of the truth in the case , and that they might continue committing crimes . No further details were given by the courts . Some of the decisions also contained a statement that the applicants’ state of health and family situation had been duly noted . CARDINAL the applicants continued to be detained as the case was awaiting examination by the trial court . There was no decision authorising the ORG detention during that period .

At trial , which started with a preliminary examination of the case on DATE , the courts refused the ORG and their ORG repeated requests for release . Some of the decisions made reference to the seriousness of the crimes of which the applicants were accused and stated that there were no grounds for changing the preventive measures imposed , while other decisions provided no explanation for the refusal to release the applicants .

On DATE ORG ordered the second applicant ’s release on an undertaking not to abscond .

On DATE ORG convicted the applicants and sentenced them to MONEY imprisonment with a ban on holding office in a law - enforcement capacity for DATE and with confiscation of property . The second applicant ’s sentence was suspended for DATE . The other applicants were ordered to remain in detention pending the entry into force of the judgment .

On DATE the ORG quashed the first - instance court ’s judgment and adopted a new judgment , convicting the applicants and sentencing them to longer periods of imprisonment . It also ordered the second applicant ’s detention .

On DATE ORG quashed the judgment of ORG , mainly because of the lower court ’s incomplete examination of the facts and non - compliance with the rules of procedure , and remitted the appeal against the judgment of DATE to ORG for reconsideration . ORG did not examine the applicants’ and their ORG requests for release .

On DATE the ORG quashed the judgment of DATE , finding that the first - instance court had failed to duly examine the applicants’ arguments and evidence , and that the criminal classification of their actions had been incorrect . The case was remitted to ORG for retrial . The applicants were ordered to remain in detention .

In the course of the new examination of the case at first instance the applicants requested ORG to release them arguing that there was no reason for their further detention and that their state of health was declining . On DATE ORG refused the requests as unsubstantiated .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG delivered a new judgment , finding the applicants guilty of a number of counts of torture , extortion , knowingly unlawful searches , and abuse of power . With the exception of the fourth applicant , they were also convicted of theft and forgery . The applicants were sentenced to DATE imprisonment and banned from holding office in a law - enforcement capacity for DATE . The court also ordered the confiscation of the property of some of the applicants . The second applicant was dispensed from serving his sentence and released from detention . The others were ordered to remain in detention pending the entry into force of the judgment . The starting date for the calculation of the duration of their imprisonment was DATE .

The third and fourth applicants and the prosecutor appealed against the judgment . The prosecutor challenged , in particular , the first - instance court ’s refusal to find that the applicants had committed the crimes as members of an organised group , resulting in the wrong classification of their actions . The prosecutor also argued that the sentence was too lenient .

On DATE the case was transferred to ORG . On DATE ORG allowed in part the prosecutor ’s procedural request and decided to examine afresh the evidence concerning the part of the case challenged by the prosecutor .

The first , third , fourth and fifth applicants requested ORG to release them , arguing that by DATE they had had served their sentences and that there were no grounds to suggest that they would avoid further proceedings in their case . The first and fifth applicants also argued that during their detention in the GPE their state of health was declining .

On DATE ORG refused the ORG requests for release , holding that they were accused of serious crimes and sentenced to DATE imprisonment , that the judgment of CARDINAL DATE did not enter into force and that it was being challenged by the prosecutor and by CARDINAL of the applicants . On DATE ORG refused the ORG repeated requests for release principally for the same reasons , having further noted that the verdict was being challenged inter alia for the reason of lenient sentence and that it was being reviewed by that court .

In the course of the proceedings before ORG , CARDINAL hearings took place . On DATE ORG allowed the prosecutor ’s appeal and quashed the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . The appeals of the third and fourth applicants were dismissed as unsubstantiated . ORG adopted another new judgment , convicting the applicants and sentencing them to longer periods of imprisonment . In particular , the first applicant was sentenced to DATE imprisonment , the second applicant to DATE , the third and fifth applicants to DATE , and the fourth applicant to DATE . It ordered the second applicant ’s detention . The other applicants were also ordered to remain in detention . The starting date for the calculation of the duration of the first , third , fourth and fifth ORG imprisonment was DATE . ORG further ruled that the second applicant ’s detention between DATE and CARDINAL DATE and DATE and CARDINAL DATE counted towards the duration of his imprisonment , the calculation of which had to start from the date on which the enforcement of the judgment of DATE would begin .

On DATE ORG quashed the judgment of DATE for various procedural violations , including the failure of ORG to question the applicants concerning the charges , the unreasoned refusal to examine the material concerning the allegations of police ill - treatment ( see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) and for the court ’s failure to comply with the instructions contained in the decision of ORG of DATE . The case was remitted to ORG for fresh examination . The applicants were released from detention on an undertaking not to abscond .

On DATE ORG quashed most of the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . It found the applicants guilty of CARDINAL counts of ill - treatment , extortion and abuse of power . The applicants , excluding the second applicant , were sentenced to CARDINAL and a half years’ imprisonment . The second applicant was not sentenced because he had died in the meantime .

In its decision of DATE , ORG held that , in view of the case - file material on which the ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE was based , there had been no violation of the applicants’ rights at the initial stage of the investigation . While injuries had been discovered on the first applicant ’s body in DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , the “ possible use of force in the course of his arrest had had no impact on his [ defence ] position in the case ” , as he had not confessed to having committed the crimes of which he had been suspected at the pre - trial stage . ORG further found that the alleged psychological pressure – allegations made by the applicants at trial though not supported by any evidence – “ had had no impact on the [ defence ] position ” of the applicants .

According to the fourth applicant , on DATE ORG quashed the judgment of ORG of DATE and delivered a new judgment . The parties have not provided a copy of that judgment .

According to the first applicant , TIME on DATE and TIME on DATE he was beaten up and threatened with physical violence by police officer PERSON for refusing to answer questions relating to the crimes of which he was suspected . In particular , officer PERSON hit the first applicant in the face , the body and the legs , and also tightened the handcuffs on his wrists , causing him considerable pain . During the same period several other police officers insulted and threatened the first applicant and his close family members in an attempt to force him to confess to having committed the crimes of which he was eventually charged . Because of the ill - treatment , the first applicant refused to be questioned on DATE . His refusal was recorded in the case file .

On DATE the applicant was taken to a police detention unit ( ізолятор тимчасового тримання – “ ORG ” ) in which he was examined by a paramedic who noted that he had bruises on his face and the legs .

Further to instructions issued by the prosecutors , on DATE and DATE the first applicant was examined by doctors , who noted a number of bruises on his face and legs . They stated that the injuries could have been inflicted by “ blunt objects ” during the period referred to by the applicant ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On an unspecified date an official inquiry was launched into the first applicant ’s allegations of ill - treatment . During the inquiry , the first applicant and his close relatives made detailed submissions , giving the names of some of the alleged offenders and specifying the time - frame and the place of the relevant events .

The inquiry initially resulted in a decision of DATE , by which the prosecutors rejected the complaints as unfounded . Following an appeal lodged by the first applicant , in DATE a district court quashed that decision , finding that the inquiry had been incomplete . In particular , the court noted that the prosecutors had not questioned the first applicant and his co - accused , that not all the police officers involved in the events had been questioned , and that the origin of the first applicant ’s injuries had not been established . In DATE the courts found a further inquiry also incomplete , inter alia , because the prosecutors had failed to establish the origin of the first applicant ’s injuries . The matter was again remitted to the prosecutors .

On DATE the prosecutors rejected the complaints as unsubstantiated , finding that there was no evidence that the first applicant ’s bruises had been inflicted by police officers . The ORG decision was principally based on the statements of the police officers who had taken part in the first applicant ’s arrest and those who had been in contact with him afterwards . Those police officers stated that the first applicant had not been subjected to “ physical or psychological coercion ” and that he had not raised any complaints in that regard on DATE . They also argued that after his arrest on DATE and until his placement in a cell at the LOC police station on DATE , the first applicant had been under the constant supervision of several police officers . At the police station , he had been detained alone in a cell and “ without constant supervision ” of the police . In his statements , officer PERSON also suggested that the first applicant had complained about him because the first applicant had been dissatisfied with the fact that officer PERSON had recorded all the items found in the car which he and his fellow suspects had used . During the search of that car the first applicant had insulted officer PERSON The incident had been witnessed by other people .

In their decision , the prosecutors also referred to the statements of the doctor who had examined the first applicant on DATE , obtained during the inquiry . In particular , the doctor stated that , given the location of the first applicant ’s injuries , it could not be ruled out that they had been inflicted by the first applicant himself or “ by a traumatic impact with a blunt object ” .

NORP The ORG decision was eventually upheld by the courts of first and appeal instances on CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE respectively .

Relying on the ORG findings , ORG and ORG dealing with the applicants’ criminal case also rejected identical complaints lodged by the first applicant , finding that the “ possible use of force in the course of his arrest had had no impact on [ his defence ] position in the case ” , as the first applicant had not confessed to having committed the crimes of which he had been suspected at the pre - trial stage ( see , in particular , paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

In DATE the fourth applicant was examined by a doctor from the GPE medical unit and was diagnosed with chronic prostatitis . In DATE he was further examined by a doctor and an urologist from the GPE medical unit , who prescribed specific medication for the treatment of his chronic prostatitis . Subsequently , the fourth applicant underwent a number of medical checks by GPE doctors in DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE , DATE , and DATE , in the course of which it was confirmed that he had a serious urological dysfunction , often diagnosed as chronic prostatitis . He was prescribed specific medication .

During that period of time the fourth applicant , his lawyer and members of his family asked the authorities to allow the fourth applicant to be examined at a specialised clinic , but to no avail . Requests for the fourth applicant ’s release in view of his state of health were also refused . By a letter dated DATE , the GPE governor informed the fourth applicant ’s lawyer that the GPE medical unit did not have the equipment necessary to make an accurate diagnosis of the fourth applicant ’s condition .

During a court hearing in the applicants’ criminal case on CARDINAL DATE an ambulance was called for the fourth applicant because he was suffering from acute bladder pain . Doctors noted that he needed urgent catheterisation of the bladder . The judge of ORG dealing with the applicants’ criminal case asked the PERSON governor to provide the fourth applicant with adequate medical assistance , transferring him to a civilian hospital if necessary . On DATE , the fourth applicant was examined on the premises of the GPE by a doctor from a civilian hospital . The doctor diagnosed him with acute chronic prostatitis and chronic cystitis , prescribed an antispasmodic drug and instructed him to undergo a urine test . He found no reason to prescribe urgent hospitalisation . DATE the fourth applicant underwent a urine test , which did not reveal any pathology .

On DATE , following a complaint by the fourth applicant ’s mother that he had not received the required medical treatment , the judge of ORG sent a letter to the GPE governor requesting him , for the second time , to provide the fourth applicant with adequate medical assistance , transferring him to a civilian hospital if necessary .

On DATE the fourth applicant was taken to a civilian hospital where he was examined by a urologist , who diagnosed him with chronic prostatitis and chronic cystitis without a urinary disorder . The urologist found that the fourth applicant did not need a catheter or inpatient treatment . He was prescribed special medication .

Subsequently , in DATE and DATE the fourth applicant was further examined and treated with medication by a dermatologist from the GPE medical unit , who eventually noted a certain improvement in his urological problem .

On DATE , following the fourth applicant ’s request for interim measures under LAW , the ORG asked the ORG to provide information concerning the fourth applicant ’s state of health .

On DATE the fourth applicant was examined by a panel of GPE doctors and diagnosed with chronic prostatitis at the remission stage .

On DATE a urologist from a civilian hospital examined the fourth applicant . He was diagnosed with urethroprostatitis at the exacerbation stage . Urine and prostatic fluid tests were recommended . Following the tests , the urologist prescribed specific medication .

On DATE , having received updated information concerning the fourth applicant ’s medical situation from the Government and the fourth applicant himself , the ORG decided to refuse his request under Rule DATE .

Urologists carried out further medical examinations in DATE and DATE . They noted that the fourth applicant was suffering from acute chronic prostatitis and chronic cystitis and prescribed him medication , which he received in a parcel from his relatives in DATE .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE , the deputy head doctor of a civilian hospital at which the fourth applicant had been examined informed the applicant ’s lawyer that the treatment initially prescribed had been ineffective and that the fourth applicant needed “ physiotherapeutic treatment along with ethiopathogenetic medication , which could not be made available in the GPE ” .

DATE . On DATE the ORG indicated , under Rule DATE , that the Government should ensure that the applicant was urgently provided with medical treatment for his health problems in accordance with the ORG instructions , including those contained in the aforementioned letter of CARDINAL DATE . The interim measure was eventually lifted on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the fourth applicant was examined by a urologist at a civilian hospital . He was diagnosed with chronic prostatitis beyond the stage of active inflammation and it was concluded that he did not require inpatient treatment . There is no information about his medical situation while in detention after that date .

After his release from detention on CARDINAL DATE , the fourth applicant was further examined by various doctors . In particular , on CARDINAL DATE he was examined at a private urological clinic ; the doctor discovered “ congestive inflammatory modification ” of his prostate , chronic calculous prostatitis , double - sided vesiculitis ( inflammation and infection of the seminal vesicles ) and intra - pelvic venous ( інтрапельвікальна ) congestion . In DATE the fourth applicant underwent surgery on his urethra . In DATE he underwent similar surgery .

According to the applicants , excluding the second applicant , when they were transported to and from court hearings they were kept for TIME in overcrowded prison vans , with insufficient access to fresh air and no heating . They were thus exposed to high temperatures in DATE and freezing temperatures in DATE . It took the vans TIME to get to ORG and there were instances where , on returning to the GPE , the applicants concerned had to wait in the vans for TIME while security checks were carried out .

The applicants concerned stated that they had been transported in the above conditions on CARDINAL occasions .

They further submitted that on court DATE they had been routinely taken out of their cells at TIME and before being taken to a prison van , had been placed in special transit boxes measuring QUANTITY with no ventilation for durations ranging from TIME . Upon their return from court hearings , often at TIME , the applicants concerned had also had to wait for TIME in the same transit boxes before being escorted to their regular cells .

According to the ORG , prison vans measured QUANTITY inside and were designed to accommodate CARDINAL people in CARDINAL compartments ( CARDINAL larger ones , measuring QUANTITY and designed for CARDINAL passengers each , and CARDINAL small compartment for CARDINAL passengers ) . The vans had no windows , but they were equipped with ventilation grills and benches for sitting on . The Government further submitted that on average it took TIME to transport prisoners between the GPE and ORG .

During their detention , the applicants , excluding the second applicant , received a certain number of TIME visits by their close relatives , during which the applicants concerned and their visitors had to communicate via glass partition . No dates of those visits were specified . Nor did the applicants concerned claim that they or their relatives had requested any other visits . The applicants concerned stated that their relatives had had to consent to be questioned as witnesses in order to meet with the applicants concerned in detention .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

On DATE ORG on ORG ( “ the Commission ” ) recognised the applicant ’s and other heirs’ inherited title to a number of plots of land measuring CARDINAL sq . m , of which QUANTITY . m were restored to them . As the remaining plot of land was occupied , the Commission decided that the applicant and the other heirs would be compensated in CARDINAL of the ways provided for by law in respect of CARDINAL sq . m. The Commission could not determine the boundaries of a plot of land measuring QUANTITY m and did not decide on the recognition of the applicant ’s inherited property rights .

On DATE the ORG delivered its judgment in the case of ORG v. GPE , no . CARDINAL as regards the authorities’ failure to pay compensation in respect of a plot measuring QUANTITY . m , which was part of the Commission decision .

To date , no compensation has been paid .

On DATE ORG recognised the applicants’ inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring CARDINAL sq . m. Since the plot of land was occupied , the applicants would be compensated in CARDINAL of the ways provided by law . The applicants submitted that they were the remaining heirs of the above plot of land in respect of which the ORG had already delivered the judgment in the case of ORG v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL ) ( no . CARDINAL , DATE ) .

To date , no compensation has been paid to the applicants .

On DATE ORG recognised the applicants’ inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring QUANTITY m. It ordered that the plot of land should be entirely restored to the applicants . On DATE and DATE ORG and ORG amended the ORG decision and ordered that the applicants would be compensated in CARDINAL of the ways provided for by law of which QUANTITY . m were restored to them . Since the remaining plot of land measuring QUANTITY . m was occupied , the applicants would be compensated in CARDINAL of the ways provided by law .

On DATE ORG recognised , amongst others , the ORG inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring QUANTITY Since the plot of land was occupied , the applicants would be compensated in CARDINAL of the ways provided by law .

On DATE ORG ( “ the Commission ” ) recognised , amongst others , the applicants’ inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring CARDINAL sq . m of which QUANTITY . m were restored to them . Since the remaining plot land measuring QUANTITY m was occupied , the applicants would be compensated in CARDINAL of the ways provided by law .

On DATE ORG recognised the applicants’ inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring CARDINAL sq . m of which QUANTITY . m were to be compensated in CARDINAL of the ways provided by law .

On DATE and DATE ORG recognised the applicant ’s inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring QUANTITY Since the plot of land was occupied , the applicants would be compensated in CARDINAL of the ways provided by law .

On DATE ORG recognised the applicants’ inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring QUANTITY Since the plot of land was occupied , the applicants would be compensated in CARDINAL of the ways provided by law .

On DATE ORG recognised the applicant ’s inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring QUANTITY . m of which QUANTITY . m were restored to him . Since the remaining plot land measuring CARDINAL sq . m was occupied , the applicant would be compensated in CARDINAL of the ways provided by law .

On DATE ORG recognised the applicants’ inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring QUANTITY m of which QUANTITY m were restored to them . Since the remaining plot land measuring QUANTITY . m was occupied , the applicants would be compensated in CARDINAL of the ways provided by law .

On DATE and DATE ORG recognised the applicant ’s inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring QUANTITY m of which QUANTITY m were restored to him . Since the remaining plot land measuring QUANTITY was occupied , the applicant would be compensated in CARDINAL of the ways provided by law .

On DATE the Agency for ORG and Compensation of Property ( “ the NORP ” ) , which had replaced the Commission , recognised the applicant ’s inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring QUANTITY . m located in LOC . Since the plot of land was occupied , the applicant would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law .


CASE OF MUTAYEVA AND ISMAILOVA v. RUSSIA

No violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Johannes Silvis;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in ORG , GPE district , ORG , GPE . They are the wife and the sister of PERSON who was born in DATE .

DATE the applicants’ relative Mr PERSON had been detained on CARDINAL occasions by representatives of lawenforcement agencies on suspicion of illegal activities and subsequently released . In particular , in DATE he had been detained pending trial for DATE on suspicion of illegal possession of firearms and assault of a representative of the ORG and had then been subsequently sentenced to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment . The sentence was suspended .

At TIME on CARDINAL DATE Mr PERSON and his twelveyear old son GPE were driving in their VAZ-CARDINAL car in LOC in the centre of the town of GPE , PERSON , when they were blocked by CARDINAL silver - coloured PERSON cars with heavily tinted windows , CARDINAL of which had an official registration number containing the digits “ CARDINAL ” . CARDINAL masked men in black uniforms and armed with pistols and machine guns got out of the Priora cars , knocked Mr PERSON off his feet and forced him into CARDINAL of their vehicles . They threatened his son with firearms and ordered him to stay in the car . The abduction took place QUANTITY from the district police station ( the department of the interior ) and the public prosecutor ’s office . After the abduction the perpetrators drove away through the local traffic police checkpoint .

The applicants submitted to the ORG the witness statements of Ms Ya . NORP dated DATE and of Ms As . PERSON dated DATE . According to both women , they did not see the abduction but both saw CARDINAL ORG cars speeding away from the vicinity of where the incident took place around the time of the abduction . It does not appear that either of the witnesses provided a statement to the investigation .

The Government did not dispute the facts as presented by the applicants . At the same time they denied any involvement of ORG agents in the abduction .

In reply to the ORG ’s first request for a copy of the contents of the investigation file , the Government provided documents from the file , amounting to CARDINAL pages , which showed the steps taken by the investigators from DATE to DATE .

NORP In reply to the ORG ’s second and third requests for a copy of the contents of the investigation file , the Government submitted copies of its contents , CARDINAL pages long , which showed the steps taken by the investigators from the beginning of the proceedings to CARDINAL DATE . From the documents submitted , the investigation can be summarised as follows .

NORP Immediately after the abduction , on DATE the applicants complained to the PERSON police station ( PERSON внутренних дел по г .Кизилюрт ) ( hereinafter “ the ORG ” ) .

On DATE the police questioned the second applicant who provided a detailed account of the events similar to the one submitted to the ORG and stated that she had learnt of Mr PERSON abduction from her nephew GPE .

On CARDINAL DATE the police examined the crime scene . No evidence was collected .

On CARDINAL and then on DATE the police questioned Mr PERSON son GPE , whose account of the events was similar to that submitted by the applicants to the ORG . In addition , the witness stated that the abductors had scared him by threatening to shoot him if he disobeyed their orders not to move .

On DATE the police examined Mr PERSON VAZCARDINAL car . Fingerprints taken from the vehicle on that date were submitted for expert examination on DATE .

On DATE the applicants lodged an abduction complaint with the PERSON town prosecutor ’s office .

On DATE the investigations department of the PERSON town prosecutor ’s office opened criminal case no . DATE . The applicants were informed thereof on DATE .

On DATE the investigators questioned Mr PERSON son GPE who reiterated his previous statements and added that he would not be able to identify any of the abductors as he had been scared .

On DATE the investigators questioned the first applicant whose statement was similar to the applicants’ account submitted to the ORG . In particular , the applicant pointed out that when driving away the ORG vehicle had gone through the traffic police checkpoint .

On DATE the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned again . She reiterated her previous statements .

On DATE the Dagestan Forensic Expert Examinations Bureau informed the investigators that they did not have matches in their database for the fingerprints found on Mr PERSON car .

On DATE the investigators again questioned the second applicant whose statement was similar to the applicants’ account submitted to the ORG .

On DATE the investigators again examined the crime scene .

On DATE the investigators again questioned the first applicant who stated that her husband Mr PERSON did not have financial debts or enemies . At the same time she stated that on several occasions he had received threats from unidentified persons on account of his religious beliefs . Those persons had visited their house and had thrown hand - written threats inside . The applicant did not specify whether she had had any suspisions or theories concerning the identities of those persons .

On DATE the local police informed the investigators that Mr PERSON was a member of an illegal armed group , belonged to an extremist religious movement and had , therefore , most probably , staged his own abduction .

On DATE the investigators questioned CARDINAL local residents , all of whom stated that they had not witnessed the abduction and found out about it from others .

On DATE the investigators examined the registration log of detainees of the ORG . No records concerning PERSON were found therein .

On DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE the investigators questioned police officers from the ORG : PERSON , Mr GPE , PERSON , Mr DATE and Mr D.D. All of them stated that on the date of the abduction they had been on duty at the police station and neither Mr PERSON nor his car had been brought in .

On various dates DATE the investigators received the list of calls made from and to Mr PERSON mobile telephone as well as replies to their numerous information requests concerning Mr PERSON from hospitals , morgues , retirement homes , mosques and detention centres in various regions of GPE . No information pertatining to his whereabouts or the ORG identities was obtained .

On DATE the investigation was suspended . It is unclear whether the applicants were informed thereof .

On DATE the investigation was resumed in order to take further steps .

On DATE the investigators questioned the head of the ORG officer GPE who stated that according to their information Mr PERSON was an avid follower of the extremist religious movement PERSON and that he had staged his abduction to join an illegal armed group .

On an unspecified date in DATE the investigation was resumed .

DATE and DATE the investigators questioned a number of Mr PERSON relatives and neighbours , whose statements did not provide new information . They also questioned again his son GPE and the first applicant who reiterated their earlier statements .

From the documents submitted it follows that DATE the investigation was suspended and resumed on several occasions . The last resumption of the investigation took place on DATE . The proceedings are still pending .

The applicants alleged that ORG agents were responsible for PERSON PERSON disappearance . They stressed that the authorities had suspected him of membership of illegal armed groups and , therefore , had motives for his abduction . The abductors had used Priora cars with heavily tinted windows ; only law - enforcement agencies could use such vehicles . Moreover , after the abduction the perperators had passed through a permanent road traffic police checkpoint . The applicants referred to statements of local residents who had not witnessed the abduction but had seen vehicles similar to those of the abductors driving to that police station . Lastly , the applicants referred to a number of cases of abduction perpetrated in ORG in which some of the abducted persons had been later found in ORG custody .

The Government submitted that the applicants’ relative Mr PERSON had been abducted by unidentified men or could have staged his own abduction . The only witness to the events was Mr PERSON son GPE , who was a minor , and the other persons , including the applicants , learnt of the events from him . In such circumstances the applicants’ allegations concerning involvement of ORG agents in the incident were groundless .

A summary of the principles concerning the assessment of evidence and establishment of facts in disappearance cases and the life - threatening nature of such incidents may be found in ORG v. GPE , nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , ORG , ORG , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , QUANTITY , § § CARDINAL - CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE ) .

The ORG notes that in reply to its request for a copy of the investigation file into the abduction the Government produced the relevant documents from the file ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) .

The ORG has already found the NORP authorities responsible for disappearances of civilians perpetrated in PERSON ( see , for example , GPE v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE , and PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE ) . In doing so , it has taken into account the length of time during which the applicants had not had any news of their missing relatives and witness statements and other documents attesting to the presence of security or law - enforcement personnel in the area concerned at the relevant time . It has relied on witness accounts and other information on security operations .

However , in the present case the circumstances in which the events occurred can not warrant an unequivocal conclusion that ORG agents were responsible for the abduction of the applicants’ relative for the following reasons . As regards the general background , the events complained of took place in DATE and there was neither a curfew in place nor any restrictions on driving in civilian vehicles . Furthermore , from the documents submitted it appears that the applicants’ version of the events was based on the statements of the only witness , Mr PERSON son , who according to his own statement had been scared during the incident ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , and of persons who had not witnessed the actual abduction and whose statements were not included in the investigation file ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . In addition , the ORG notes that the first applicant stated to the investigation that Mr PERSON had received threats but did not specify whom she had suspected or the nature of the threats received ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . In such a situation the ORG has little evidence on which to draw such conclusions as the factual circumstances of the incident as presented by the applicants do not include any evidence corroborating their account to a decisive extent .

Accordingly , the information in the ORG ’s possession does not suffice to establish that the perpetrators belonged to the security forces or that a security operation was carried out in respect of Mr PERSON .

To sum up , it has not been established to the required standard of proof that ORG agents were implicated in the disappearance of Mr PERSON ; nor does the ORG consider that the burden of proof can be entirely shifted to the ORG , having regard , in particular , to the fact that they submitted a copy of the relevant documents from the investigation file as requested by the ORG .


Aleš Pejchal;André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by Mr Z. Pokorný , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON , of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE , the applicant brought an action before ORG against his former employer , ORG , claiming compensation for wages and travel and subsistence allowances amounting to CZK CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( which at that time corresponded to approximately LAW ) . The substance of the dispute was whether the applicant ’s case concerned a business trip or only the employer ’s instruction designating a new place of reporting to work .

Upon the court ’s request , on DATE and DATE the applicant supplemented his action . In his submission of DATE he reduced his claim to CZK CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( which by this time , owing to currency fluctuations , was worth about LAW ) .

On DATE , ORG delivered a judgment in which it granted the action to a large extent .

Upon the applicant ’s and defendant ’s appeals , on DATE ORG quashed the judgment and sent the case back to the court of first instance for further proceedings .

On DATE , ORG delivered a judgment granting the action .

Upon the defendant ’s appeal , on DATE ORG reversed the judgment and dismissed the action .

On DATE , the applicant filed a constitutional appeal , which was dismissed on DATE .

On DATE , the applicant applied to ORG , claiming compensation for non - pecuniary damage caused by an unreasonable length of the above court proceedings .

On DATE , ORG noted that there had been delays in the court proceedings but did not award compensation to the applicant , considering that the finding of a violation was sufficient in this case .

In the meantime , on DATE the applicant brought an action for compensation before ORG , claiming MONEY ( approximately ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL at that time ) .

On DATE , ORG delivered a judgment awarding the applicant an amount of CZK CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( approximately ORG CARDINAL at that time ) for non - pecuniary damage caused by the unreasonable length of the proceedings .

Upon the applicant ’s appeal , on DATE ORG delivered a judgment upholding the judgment of the court of first instance .

The relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the allegedly excessive length of judicial proceedings are set out in the ORG ’s decision in the case of PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL ( dec . ) , § § DATE , DATE ) .


CASE OF CUMHURİYET HALK PARTİSİ v. TURKEY

Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11-1 - Freedom of association);Pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Nebojša Vučinić;Ksenija Turković

NORP The applicant party is a NORP political party based in GPE .

Supervision of the finances of political parties in GPE is entrusted to ORG ( “ the Constitutional Court ” ) under LAW . Accordingly , all political parties are obliged to submit their consolidated final accounts annually to ORG , which reviews the compliance of the political parties’ incomes and expenditure with the principles set out in LAW and sections CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL on Political Parties ( “ LAW ” ) . Failure to comply with the relevant laws is subject to sanctions set out in LAW . The decisions delivered by ORG in this regard are final .

In keeping with the requirement under LAW and sections CARDINAL of LAW , the applicant party submitted the consolidated final accounts of its headquarters and local branches for DATE , DATE and DATE to ORG for inspection . While the exact dates are unknown , it appears that the accounts were submitted within DATE of the end of each respective DATE ( that is , before DATE ) in accordance with section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW .

The Constitutional Court carried out a preliminary inspection on CARDINAL DATE for the DATE accounts and on DATE for DATE and DATE accounts . At the end of each preliminary inspection , it found the information submitted by the applicant party to be complete and decided to proceed with an examination on the merits .

On DATE , CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE ORG sent the applicant party “ questionnaires ” in relation to its accounts for DATE , DATE and DATE respectively , whereby it requested the party to provide further information and documents regarding some of the expenses that it deemed problematic . It also requested the applicant party to provide the original invoices or other supporting documentation as required under PERSON no . CARDINAL on Tax Procedure ( “ LAW ” ) for all items of expenditure that had not been submitted previously .

It appears that the applicant party responded to ORG requests within DATE of their receipt ; its responses are summarised in the appendix below . It was , however , unable to provide original invoices or the like for all the items of expenditure as requested .

On DATE the ORG delivered its decision regarding the final accounts of the applicant party for DATE , which was followed by decisions pertaining to DATE and DATE accounts , both delivered on DATE . The decision concerning the DATE accounts was published in ORG on DATE and the decisions for DATE and DATE accounts were published on DATE .

In all CARDINAL decisions ORG found at the outset that the income and expenses presented in the final accounts were financially accurate . It also held that the income obtained in the period under review had been mostly in compliance with the rules on funding as set out in LAW . As for the expenses , ORG made the following preliminary remarks to explain the basis for its examination :

“ CARDINAL of the main tenets of accounting is the principle of ‘ documentation’ . Section CARDINAL of LAW explains that ‘ an invoice is a commercial certificate given to a customer by a vendor or a merchant to indicate the amount owed by the customer in return for the goods sold or service provided’ , and LAW , entitled ‘ LAW to use an invoice’ , specifies under what circumstances and by whom an invoice must be received and provided . In this connection , it has been made obligatory to document purchases of goods and services with invoices and to use invoices as supporting documents in bookkeeping .

Section CARDINAL of the same LAW , entitled ‘ LAW , states that ‘ self - employed persons are under an obligation to issue a freelance receipt in duplicate for all payments received in relation to their professional activities and to give CARDINAL copy to the customer ; and the customer is under an obligation to request and receive such receipt’ . The contents of a receipt have been set out in section CARDINAL .

Section CARDINAL of the same Act , entitled ‘ Expense note’ , states that ... those [ tradespersons exempt from taxation ] who are under no obligation to furnish an invoice should issue expense notes .

Since section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of PERSON no . PERSON [ LAW ] provides that expenses below MONEY do not need to be substantiated with documents such as a receipt or an invoice , any expenses exceeding that amount must be based on a relevant supporting document .

Under section CARDINAL of LAW , ‘ all expenses of a political party shall be incurred on behalf of the legal personality of that political party’ and pursuant to section CARDINAL of the same Act , ‘ at the end of its inspection , the Constitutional Court shall determine the accuracy and the lawfulness of the political party ’s income and expenses , and shall order the registration of unlawful income and expenses as revenue with ORG .

Law no . DATE ... , which was published in ORG dated DATE [ and which introduced some amendments to section CARDINAL of LAW ] , came into force on the date of its publication and it does not envisage ... the [ retroactive ] application of the amended provisions ... ; therefore , the unamended provisions are to be applied to inspections and proceedings predating the amendments . ”

On the basis of the principles outlined above , ORG found that certain expenses incurred in the respective periods under review had been in violation of LAW . The violations in question fell under CARDINAL heads : the first head consisted of expenses that could not be considered to have been made “ in pursuance of the objectives of the political party ” and “ in the name of the party ’s legal personality ” on the basis of a decision of the competent party organ , in accordance with section CARDINAL of LAW ; and the second head concerned the expenses that had not been substantiated with the necessary documents as required under section DATE , regardless of whether they were otherwise lawful . ORG accordingly ordered the “ confiscation of the party ’s assets ” in the amounts corresponding to its unlawful expenditure for each respective DATE under review , as per sections DATE of the Act .

The details of ORG findings are presented in the table below ( the amounts indicated are in NORP liras ( TRY ) ) :

Further details regarding the individual expenses that were deemed unlawful by ORG may be found in the appendix below .

The Constitutional Court treated all expenses that were not supported by original invoices , freelance receipts or expense notes as “ undocumented ” , referring to the strict requirements of documentation set out under LAW as referred to in paragraph CARDINAL above . The applicant party informed ORG that in view of the sheer volume of documents circulating in the party , the originals of some invoices had been lost and submitted other documents as proof of payment . However , where the expense concerned an invoiceable transaction , ORG did not accept as proof of payment vouchers , receipts , payment orders or even duplicates or notarycertified copies of invoices , and ordered the confiscation of the applicant party ’s assets in the amounts corresponding to the undocumented expenses .

The expenses that were found not to have been incurred “ in pursuance of the party ’s objectives ” and “ in the name of the legal personality of the party ” following a decision of the competent party organ , and those that were considered to “ fall outside the party ’s political activities ” , covered a wide array of financial activities .

They included food , pharmaceutical and accommodation expenses , including those incurred by members of the party and employees of the party headquarters or its youth branches . Although the applicant party argued that the expenses in question had been incurred by the relevant individuals while on official duty , ORG did not accept them as lawful expenses since the invoices had been drawn up in the individual ORG or employees’ names , rather than in the name of the party . Moreover , the applicant party had not submitted any other tangible evidence to demonstrate the professional nature of those expenses . In this connection , ORG refused to accept that the food expenses of the driver assigned to the party leader and of other drivers working for the party could be lawfully met by the applicant party , in spite of the latter ’s explanation that the relevant expenses had been incurred while the drivers were on duty .

Among the food expenses declared unlawful were expenses incurred by the head of the applicant party ’s youth branch , ORG , who appears to have hosted CARDINAL dinners in DATE in connection with election work . ORG accepted CARDINAL of those meals as lawful expenses in relation to party work , but rejected the remaining CARDINAL without any explanation .

Reimbursement of food and commuting expenses of persons not on the applicant party ’s payroll and not party to the collective labour agreement between the applicant party and its salaried employees , such as freelance consultants , was not considered to be in keeping with the “ party ’s objectives ” . Similarly , meals offered to persons who provided various services to the applicant party , but who were legally employed by other public or private bodies , such as police officers , municipality employees , journalists or gardeners , could not qualify as legitimate expenses under LAW because any meal costs had to be met by the relevant person ’s respective employers and not by the applicant party . Some dinners hosted for the applicant party ’s guests , volunteers or personnel for special occasions were also considered to constitute personal expenditure not related to the party ’s legal personality , whereas some other dinners were accepted as relevant to party work . In this connection , ORG found that the expenses borne for the meals hosted for ORG and the Pir Sultan Abdal Association , as well as the meals organised for party personnel on the occasion of GPE and following the death of an employee ’s father , should not have been paid from the party ’s budget , whereas it deemed legitimate the expenses in relation to food offered to ORG workers during their industrial action .

ORG also refused to accept a great number of travel expenses as lawful , because the bus and plane tickets in question had been prepared in the name of the individuals travelling rather than in the party ’s name , and the official decisions of the relevant party organs authorising travel had not been submitted . In addition , reimbursement of passport fees to various employees was not considered relevant to the party ’s objectives , even when the passports had been obtained for travel in connection with party business , as passports could be used for personal travel as well . ORG also deemed costs for printing of business cards for employees to be unlawful , considering them to be personal expenses .

Payments made to employees apart from the entitlements specifically indicated in the collective labour agreement , including New Year bonuses ( MONEY ( ORG ) per person in DATE ) or bonuses to reward extra work during the general election period , were also deemed to fall outside the scope of the lawful expenditure provided for in LAW . Moreover , chocolates distributed to party personnel for DATE alFitr ( PERSON ) in DATE were found to be unlawful expenses , whereas no such finding was made in relation to the chocolates distributed during DATE , DATE ( PERSON ) . Blankets , umbrellas and raincoats purchased for use at the party headquarters were also found to be personal expenses , whereas no such finding was made for clothes and dishwashers purchased for the use of personnel .

In addition , payments made to security and cleaning personnel in excess of the amounts specifically indicated in the service agreements , where such excess amounts – no matter how meagre – could not be explained by increases in social security contributions or taxes , were considered unjustified and thus unlawful .

ORG also found that the severance packages given to employees whose contracts had been terminated , which included basic severance pay , unused vacation time and benefits corresponding to unused leave , were not in compliance with LAW and were therefore unlawful , as benefits corresponding to unused leave should not have been included in the severance packages .

The review of the financial accounts for DATE also revealed that the applicant party had paid court fees in various legal proceedings in which members of the party ’s senior management and/or its members of parliament , including its leader at the relevant time , had been involved . Although the applicant party stated that the legal proceedings in question had concerned the party ’s political activities , and not personal disputes , ORG nevertheless decided that the litigation expenses had to be met by the persons in question , regardless of their role or status in the party , as the political party itself was not a party to any of the relevant proceedings . In the decision of DATE concerning the review of the DATE accounts ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , CARDINAL of the judges dissented from the majority ’s approach to this matter , and argued that demanding that such costs be met by the individual members of the party involved directly in the litigation , regardless of the effects of that litigation on the political party , would unduly curtail the scope of the party ’s political activities in an unconstitutional manner .

Another payment that was considered unlawful by ORG was made to ORG , a nationwide television channel , for the live broadcasting of political rallies and activities attended by the applicant party ’s leader and coverage of the party ’s parliamentary group meetings , press conferences , and important statements made by the party ’s senior management , as well as the distribution of that material to other media outlets . ORG found that while the applicant party could lawfully pay for the live broadcast of the relevant events , additional payments to cover the costs of production and for the allocation of link bandwidth were unacceptable , as such costs had to be met by ORG itself . In addition , payments made in DATE for the lease of vehicles for broadcasting rallies organised by the party in various provinces were considered unlawful unless accompanied by the relevant lease agreements and detailed information on the exact nature of the services acquired . ORG also noted that an agreement had already been made with ORG for coverage of the applicant party ’s political rallies and other events .

Fuel and other expenses ( such as installation of sound systems , speakers and microphones ) for the vehicles owned or leased by the party and its local branches were accepted as having been made in the party ’s name and for its purposes only where the vehicle registration certificates or lease agreements had been submitted to ORG along with the invoices . As for fuel and other expenses for vehicles made available to the party by volunteers during the election campaigns , they were deemed entirely unlawful in the absence of any contracts with the volunteers for the use of the relevant vehicles .

ORG held that gold coins given as wedding gifts at wedding ceremonies attended by the applicant party ’s leader on behalf of the party could not be considered to have been made in the name of the party or in pursuance of its objectives . Similarly , the costs of flowers sent by the applicant party ’s treasurer for special events could not be classified as lawful expenses where the invoice had been drawn up not in the party ’s name but in the name of the treasurer .

ORG also held that fines for traffic violations by the party ’s drivers , as well as fines or interest on late payment of various financial obligations , such as social security contributions , court orders , rents or motor vehicle taxes for the party ’s vehicles , could not be lawfully covered from the party ’s budget , and had to be met by the individuals who had been responsible for defaulting on such payments .

NORP Moreover , ORG found that advance payments made to CARDINAL employees in DATE had only been partially repaid . In the light of the prohibition in section CARDINAL of LAW against lending money , the advance payments in question were unlawful and were thus confiscated in full ( including the amounts that had been repaid by the relevant employees ) .

ORG also issued a number of warnings in relation to certain expenditure in DATE and DATE .

One of those warnings concerned the payment of GPE salaries . Although the applicant party had submitted the relevant payment orders , it had not provided bank statements demonstrating that the amounts ordered had actually been paid . ORG warned the applicant party to submit such bank statements with its consolidated accounts to demonstrate that the payments in question had indeed been made .

Another warning was issued in relation to a payment made to a private company in return for installing a sound system for an election bus . ORG requested the applicant party to submit a technical report indicating when the work had been completed and a record stating that the bus had been duly delivered . The applicant party responded that there was no legal obligation to prepare such documents . ORG held that in the absence of such information , it could not know whether the service had been delivered on time and , if not , whether the service provider had paid the penalty envisaged in the service agreement for defaulting on its obligation .

Yet another warning was issued about the incompatibility between the party ’s expenses and its inventory , in that a number of items allegedly purchased for the party ( CARDINAL televisions and one computer ) had not been registered in the inventory .

ORG also issued a warning in connection with advance payments made to some employees in DATE , in addition to ordering the confiscation of the applicant party ’s assets in the full amount of the advance payments in question ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant party received a letter from the GPE governor ’s office ordering it to pay the amounts indicated in the ORG decision concerning the review of the DATE final accounts , which totalled TRY CARDINAL ( approximately ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL on DATE , the date of the delivery of the decision ) , within DATE of the receipt of the letter .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant party sent a letter to the GPE governor ’s office requesting postponement of the payment until DATE , in view of the financial difficulties it would suffer for the rest of DATE in the event of immediate payment of the amounts concerned .

On DATE ORG informed the applicant party that the payments due in relation to the DATE final accounts had been deducted from the ORG funding allocated to it on DATE for DATE , together with interest of TRY CARDINAL running from the date on which the payment had become due ( namely CARDINAL DATE ) . The amount deducted thus totalled approximately TRY CARDINAL ( approximately ORG CARDINAL on DATE ) .

On DATE the applicant party received a letter from the GPE governor ’s office ordering it to pay the amounts indicated in the ORG decisions concerning the review of DATE final accounts , plus interest , which totalled approximately TRY CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL as at DATE ) , within DATE of the receipt of the letter .

On DATE the applicant party sent a letter to the GPE governor ’s office , once again requesting the postponement of the payments due in relation to its DATE and DATE accounts until DATE .

On DATE the applicant party paid TRY CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL at the material time ) to ORG for its unlawful expenses , in compliance with ORG review decision for DATE , and TRY CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL ( approximately ORG CARDINAL at the material time ) for the decision regarding the accounts for DATE . It refused to pay the interest , which it contested before the relevant authorities .

On DATE the applicant party paid ORG the sum of TRY CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) as default interest on the amounts confiscated in relation to its DATE and DATE accounts .

On DATE local elections were held in GPE .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Marko Bošnjak;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Georges Ravarani

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the complaints are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the excessive length of civil proceedings .