Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Ksenija Turković

The applicants were born in DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE respectively . At the time of the application they were being held in detention in PERSON prison in GPE .

On DATE ORG decided to restrict access to the investigation file , LAW ( the “ ORG ” ) , PERSON no . DATE .

On DATE the applicants were arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of being members of a criminal organisation .

On DATE the applicants were questioned by the investigating judge , in the presence of their lawyer . According to their statements to the judge , the applicants denied being involved with the criminal organisation . They did not deny that they had had telephone conversations that had been intercepted , or that they had accepted the transfer of parcels and had possessed firearms , all of which were deemed to be evidence of making threats , of fraud and of smuggling , the offences that they were suspected of having committed .

On DATE the ORG representative objected to the order for the pretrial detention in respect of the first CARDINAL applicants . The representative also applied for their release pending trial on DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE respectively . Those applications were dismissed by ORG on DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE respectively based the nature of the criminal charges and the state of the evidence . No hearing was held .

On DATE the public prosecutor at the ORG filed an indictment , charging the first applicant with establishing a criminal organisation and the other applicants with being members of a criminal organisation . The applicants were further charged with committing fraud , making threats , and carrying out raids and smuggling , under LAW and other related articles of LAW .

On DATE the trial court held an interlocutory session and , in the absence of the applicants , decided to extend their pre - trial detention . The first hearing was scheduled for DATE .

On CARDINAL DATE the ORG representative objected to that decision in respect of the first CARDINAL applicants and applied for them to be released . On DATE ORG dismissed the objection . The applicants’ representative appealed . On DATE the appeal court dismissed the appeal without holding an oral hearing .

On DATE ORG held the first hearing as planned and the applicants appeared before the court . The trial court decided to release the applicants from pre - trial detention on DATE .


CASE OF ÖCALAN v. TURKEY (No. 2) [Extracts]

Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life);No violation of Article 7 - No punishment without law (Article 7-1 - Nulla poena sine lege);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading punishment;Inhuman punishment) (Substantive aspect);Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficent

András Sajó;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Peer Lorenzen

The applicant , a NORP national , was born in DATE and is currently being held in LOC .

The facts of the case DATE were presented by ORG in the Öcalan v. GPE judgment ( [ ORG ] , no . CARDINAL , ECHR CARDINALIV ) . They may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant was arrested by members of the NORP security forces in an aircraft in the international area of GPE airport . The applicant was returned to GPE from GPE and taken into custody at FAC on DATE . The inmates at this prison had meanwhile been transferred to other prisons .

On DATE the applicant appeared before a judge of ORG , who ordered that he should be detained pending trial .

By a judgment of DATE , ORG found the applicant guilty of carrying out acts designed to bring about the secession of part of GPE ’s territory and of training and leading a gang of armed terrorists for that purpose , and sentenced him to death under LAW . It found that the applicant was the founder and principal leader of an illegal organisation , namely the ORG ( ORG hereafter “ the NORP ” ) . ORG found that it had been established that , following decisions taken by the applicant and on his orders and instructions , the ORG had carried out several armed attacks , bomb attacks , acts of sabotage and armed robberies , and that in the course of those acts of violence CARDINAL of civilians , soldiers , police officers , village guards and public servants had been killed . The court reiterated that the applicant had acknowledged that ORG estimate of the number of those killed ( CARDINAL ) or wounded as a result of the ORG ’s activities was fairly accurate , that the actual number might even be higher , and that he had ordered the attacks as part of the armed struggle being waged by the ORG . The court did not accept that there were mitigating circumstances allowing the death penalty to be commuted to life imprisonment , having regard , among other things , to the very large number and the seriousness of the acts of violence and the major , pressing threat to the country that those acts posed .

By a judgment adopted on CARDINAL DATE and delivered on DATE , ORG upheld the judgment of DATE in its entirety .

NORP In DATE Article CARDINAL of the LAW was amended so that the death penalty could no longer be ordered or implemented other than in time of war or of imminent threat of war , or for acts of terrorism .

By PERSON no . CARDINAL , published on DATE , ORG resolved , inter alia , to abolish the death penalty in peacetime ( that is to say except in time of war or of imminent threat of war ) and to make the necessary amendments to the relevant legislation , including LAW . As a result of the amendments , a prisoner whose death sentence for an act of terrorism has been commuted to life imprisonment must spend the rest of his life in prison .

By a judgment of DATE , ORG commuted the applicant ’s death sentence to life imprisonment .

On DATE GPE ratified LAW No . CARDINAL concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances .

The applicant ’s conditions of detention in ORG before CARDINAL DATE are described in the judgment of the same date ( see PERSON , cited above , § § CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) .

Furthermore , the applicant was the sole inmate of ORG until DATE , when CARDINAL further individuals were transferred to it ; all the prisoners , including the applicant , were then housed in a new block which had just been built .

In DATE and DATE , that is to say after the ORG ’s judgment of CARDINAL DATE , delegations from ORG for ORG Treatment or Punishment ( “ CPT ” ) visited PERSON .

Before CARDINAL DATE the cell which the applicant occupied alone measured QUANTITY m , and was equipped with a bed , a table , a chair and a shelf . The cell was air - conditioned and had a partially partitioned sanitary annex . There was a window overlooking an enclosed yard and the cell had adequate access to natural light and adequate artificial lighting . In DATE the walls had been reinforced with chipboard panels to protect them against the damp .

The time granted to the applicant to leave his cell and use the exercise yard ( measuring QUANTITY . m ) , which is walled in and covered with mesh , was limited to TIME DATE ( divided into CARDINAL QUANTITY periods , CARDINAL in the morning and the other in the TIME ) .

The applicant was not in sensory isolation or solitary confinement . As he was the only inmate of the prison , his only contacts were with the members of staff working there , who were only allowed to talk to him about subjects falling within the scope of their duties and relating to everyday life in the prison .

The applicant had access to books and a radio which could only receive ORG broadcasts . He was not allowed to have a television set in his cell on the grounds that he was a dangerous prisoner and a member of an illegal organisation , and was prone to commit recurrent disciplinary offences . Nor was he given access to a telephone , for the same reasons .

NORP The applicant , who had restricted access to daily and DATE newspapers , was allowed a maximum of CARDINAL papers in his cell at any CARDINAL time . The newspapers were often DATE . In fact , he received them once DATE , from his family or his lawyers . In the absence of visits from family members and lawyers ( owing to the inaccessibility of the island ) , the applicant often spent long periods without access to recent newspapers . Those papers which he did receive had always been extensively censored .

The applicant was allowed to correspond with the outside world under the supervision of the prison authorities . The mail which he received was verified and censored . Correspondence with the outside was occasionally interrupted .

The applicant remained in the same cell from the date of his transfer to PERSON DATE after his arrest on DATE – until DATE , that is to say for DATE .

NORP In order to comply with the requests put forward by the ORG and put an end to the applicant ’s relative social isolation , the governmental authorities built a number of new blocks inside the grounds of FAC . On CARDINAL DATE the applicant and CARDINAL other inmates transferred from other prisons were moved to these new facilities .

NORP Since that date the applicant has been on his own in a cell with an area of QUANTITY m ( living space ) , with a further QUANTITY . m of sanitary facilities , comprising a bed , a small table , CARDINAL chairs , a metal cupboard and a kitchenette with a washbasin . The building containing the cells is properly damp - proofed . According to the ORG , although the applicant ’s cell has a MONEY QUANTITY window and a partly glazed door , both opening on to an enclosed yard , it has insufficient direct sunlight because of the CARDINAL-m - high wall surrounding the yard . The ORG ’s proposal to lower the wall has not yet been accepted by the Government , whose experts have certified that the cell receives enough natural light .

The prison is equipped with a sports room with a pingpong table and CARDINAL other rooms with chairs and tables , all CARDINAL rooms enjoying plentiful natural daylight . Every inmate , including the applicant , has TIME of outdoors exercise DATE alone in the exercise yard reserved for each cell . Moreover , all the prisoners can spend TIME alone in a recreation room ( where no specific activities are on offer ) and TIME per month alone in the prison library . Furthermore , every prisoner takes part in collective activities , including TIME conversation per week with the other prisoners .

Following its visit in DATE the ORG observed that the prison regime applied to the applicant was only a very modest step in the right direction , particularly as compared to the regime applied in the other F - type prisons for the same category of convicted prisoners , who could engage in outdoor activities DATE , with non - supervised collective activities with the other prisoners for DATE .

In the light of these observations , the authorities responsible for ORG undertook to relax the regime in question , so that the NORP inmates , including the applicant , can now engage alone in out - of - cell activities for TIME per day , receive newspapers twice ( instead of once ) DATE and spend TIME ( instead of CARDINAL ) per week together to talk to each other . All the ORG inmates can engage , for TIME , in any of the following collective activities : painting and handicraft activities , table tennis , chess , volleyball and basketball . According to the prison registers , the applicant in fact plays volleyball and basketball but does not take part in the other activities . The prison authorities also informed the ORG that they were considering providing inmates with TIME of additional collective activities ( painting / handicraft , board games and sport ) . The applicant therefore apparently spends a great deal of time outside his cell , that is to say , depending on his choice of collective activity , up to a maximum of TIME per week , including a maximum of TIME in the company of the other prisoners .

Since DATE , in the wake of new technical arrangements , the applicant , like the other ORG inmates , has been allowed QUANTITY minutes’ telephone calls to the outside DATE .

In its report of CARDINAL DATE the ORG recommended that the Government should ensure that the applicant could accompany the other inmates for outdoor activities , and that he and the other prisoners could spend a reasonable part of DATE ( TIME or more ) outside their cells , engaged in purposeful activities of a varied nature . The ORG also recommended allowing the applicant to have a television set in his cell , like all other persons held in high - security prisons . The prison authorities did not act on these latter recommendations on the grounds that the applicant still held dangerous prisoner status and failed to comply with the prison rules , particularly during visits by his lawyers . On DATE the applicant was supplied with a television set .

The applicant has received many visits from his lawyers and relatives , but not as many as he and his visitors would have liked , mainly because of “ poor weather conditions ” , “ maintenance work on the ferry boats between the island and the mainland ” and “ the inability of the boats to cope with prevailing weather conditions ” .

In fact , the old ferry boat PERSON was still in service but could only sail when there was little wind . The larger ferry boat , ORG , which the ORG had promised when the previous Öcalan case was pending before FAC of the ORG , began operating in DATE . The ORG , being better suited than the İmralı CARDINAL to difficult weather conditions , provides more frequent crossings between LOC and the mainland . It sometimes suffers technical breakdowns , entailing repairs which sometimes take DATE .

As regards visits , DATE , for example , CARDINAL out of CARDINAL requests for visits were refused . These refusals continued into DATE , with CARDINAL out of CARDINAL requests being refused , and DATE , with CARDINAL out of CARDINAL requests refused . After a brief improvement in DATE ( CARDINAL out of CARDINAL requests refused ) , DATE ( CARDINAL out of CARDINAL requests refused ) and DATE ( all CARDINAL requests granted ) , visit frequency once again dropped off in DATE ( CARDINAL out of CARDINAL requests refused ) and DATE ( CARDINAL out of CARDINAL requests refused ) , picking up again in DATE ( CARDINAL out of CARDINAL requests refused ) and DATE ( CARDINAL out of CARDINAL requests refused ) . The number of family visits totalled CARDINAL in DATE , CARDINAL in DATE and CARDINAL in DATE . In fact , between DATE and DATE , the applicant received CARDINAL visits from his brothers and sisters and CARDINAL from his lawyers or advisers .

For the remainder of DATE and in DATE , DATE and , broadly speaking , DATE , the frequency of visits by lawyers and members of the applicant ’s family regularly increased . In DATE , for example , CARDINAL visits out of the CARDINAL requested took place on the scheduled date or DATE after ( because of unfavourable weather conditions ) .

NORP In DATE and DATE the ratio of refusals to requests increased significantly . In DATE , for example , the applicant only received CARDINAL family visits out of the CARDINAL requested . Again in DATE , he only received CARDINAL of the CARDINAL requested visits by his lawyers . CARDINAL lawyers’ visits took place in DATE , CARDINAL in DATE , CARDINAL in DATE , CARDINAL in DATE , CARDINAL in DATE , CARDINAL in DATE and CARDINAL in DATE . DATE the applicant received no visits apart from CARDINAL family visit on DATE , with CARDINAL refusals . The prison authorities explained their refusals by poor weather conditions and ferry breakdowns .

In DATE the applicant received a few visits from his brother , and none from his lawyers .

As a general rule , persons in prison in GPE can talk to their lawyers on DATE , during TIME , without any restrictions as regards frequency over any given period . Since LOC is only accessible by means of the shuttle boat provided by the ORG administration , the applicant ’s lawyers’ visits , in practice , always took place on a DATE , DATE of the crossing .

As a general rule , prisoners can communicate with their lawyers completely confidentially , without supervision . On DATE , however , PERSON no . DATE on the enforcement of sentences and preventive measures came into force , replacing the previous legislation on this matter . Under LAW of the new PERSON , if it emerges from documents and other evidence that visits by lawyers to a person convicted of organised crime are serving as a means of communication within the criminal organisation in question , the post - sentencing judge may , at the request of the prosecution , impose the following measures : presence of an official when the convicted prisoner is talking to his lawyers , verification of documents exchanged between the prisoner and his lawyers during such visits , and/or confiscation of all or some of these documents by the judge .

On DATE the applicant was visited by his lawyers . Just before the interview the prison authorities communicated to the applicant and his lawyers a decision by the ORG post - sentencing judge applying section CARDINAL of Law no . DATE to that visit . An officer was therefore present during the interview , the conversation between the applicant and his lawyers was tape - recorded and the documents supplied by the lawyers were submitted to the judge for examination .

In order to protest against the new procedure , the applicant interrupted the interview after CARDINAL of an hour and asked his lawyers to pay no further visits to him until the said procedure had been revoked . He informed the prison authorities that the procedure infringed the confidentiality of the interview between the lawyers and their client and “ rendered the visit and the interview pointless in terms of preparing his defence ” .

NORP During subsequent visits an official was in attendance during interviews . Moreover , the conversation between the applicant and his lawyers was again tape - recorded and submitted to the post - sentencing judge for examination .

The applicant ’s lawyers also lodged an appeal with ORG against the ORG post - sentencing judge ’s decision ordering attendance by an officer during interviews and the recording of the conversations . By decisions of DATE and DATE , ORG dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the impugned measures were geared to preventing the transmission of orders within a terrorist organisation , that they did not affect the applicant ’s defence rights and that in any case the transcription of the conversations showed that they had not concerned the applicant ’s defence in any set of proceedings but the internal functioning of the ORG and the strategy to be adopted by this illegal organisation .

During the lawyers’ visit on DATE , CARDINAL of the officers present in the room in which the interview was taking place interrupted the conversation on the ground that it was not confined to preparing the applicant ’s defence before a judicial authority . The applicant ’s lawyers filed a complaint against the officer in question for abuse of office . On DATE the ORG public prosecutor ’s office issued a decision not to prosecute .

It appears from the records of the lawyers’ visits that the conversations very often began with a statement by the lawyers on recent developments concerning the ORG . The applicant consulted his lawyers on changes of persons at the different structural levels of the organisation , the various activities and meetings organised by the ORG bodies ( at regional and national levels , and also abroad ) , the political line adopted by the party leaders , competition among the leaders and losses sustained by armed militants in combating the security forces . The applicant , who presented himself as “ the leader of the NORP people ” , commentated all the information provided by his lawyers and mandated them to transmit his ideas and instructions with a view to reshaping the ORG ’s policies in GPE ( he broadly advocated recognising the rights of the NORP minority in a completely democratic GPE ) or in other countries . Moreover , he approved or rejected executive appointments to the various NORP bodies and advised on the party ’s internal organisation . He also recommended that the ORG lay down its weapons when the Government had ended hostilities and the ORG ’s demands had been met .

At the request of the ORG public prosecutor , the ORG post - sentencing judge several times refused to hand over copies of the records to the applicant and his lawyers on the grounds that they contained direct or indirect instructions by the applicant to the ORG , which used them to reshape its strategy and tactics .

Since DATE the applicant had remained actively involved in the political debate in GPE on the ORG armed separatist movement , which identified him as its main representative , and his instructions as transmitted through his lawyers had been closely monitored by the general public , prompting a variety of reactions , some of which had been very extreme . A section of the NORP population considered him as the most dangerous terrorist in the country , who was still active even in prison . His supporters saw him as their leader and the ultimate head of the separatist movement .

The applicant also stated that he had taken part in negotiations with certain ORG officials with an eye to resolving the problems posed by the armed separatist movement , but that most of his calls for the discontinuation of the armed conflict had been heard neither by the Government nor by his armed movement .

The applicant was placed in solitary confinement on the ground that he had transmitted instructions to the organisation of which he was the leader during his lawyers’ visits on the following dates : CARDINAL DATE , DATE and DATE , CARDINAL DATE , DATE and DATE , DATE and DATE , and DATE and CARDINAL DATE .

Therefore , according to the tape recording of the conversation of CARDINAL DATE between the applicant and his lawyers , the applicant told his legal representatives how he considered that ORG members could invite citizens of NORP origin to demonstrate in order to demand the right to education in the NORP language .

On DATE the ORG disciplinary board , considering that the applicant ’s words corresponded to “ training and propaganda activities within a criminal organisation ” , sentenced the applicant to CARDINAL days’ solitary confinement . Pursuant to this sanction , the prison administration removed all the applicant ’s books and newspapers for DATE .

The applicant ’s appeal against this disciplinary measure was dismissed on DATE by the ORG post - sentencing judge on the grounds that the applicant had incited women and children to organise illegal demonstrations , thus carrying out what might be described as training and propaganda activities within a criminal organisation .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal lodged by the applicant ’s lawyers against the decision of DATE . ORG considered that the impugned decision was in conformity with the law .

The applicant was subjected to a further sanction of CARDINAL days’ solitary confinement on the ground of a conversation with his lawyers which had taken place on DATE . His appeals against this decision having been dismissed , he served this sentence from CARDINAL DATE to DATE . The applicant ’s lawyers were not apprised of this sanction until DATE , when a request for a visit to the applicant was rejected .

Visits by relatives of the applicant ( in practice , his brothers and sisters ) are limited to TIME every fortnight . These visits originally took place in a visiting room comprising a barrier to separate the prisoner from his visitors , as the visiting areas where the prisoner and his visitors could sit together at a table were reserved for relatives of the first degree under LAW on visits to prisoners and detainees . On DATE ORG annulled this provision . Without waiting for this decision to become final , ORG granted the applicant the right to see his brothers and sisters unseparated by any barrier . On DATE , therefore , the applicant was able to meet his brother “ around a table ” for the first time .

Where a visit is cancelled owing to weather conditions , the authorities can organise another visit DATE , at the family ’s request . In practice , DATE visits which are cancelled are not replaced because the visitors have never requested such replacement .

Furthermore , visits by family members have not been as frequent as the applicant and his relatives would have wished because of the inadequacy of the available means of transport under unfavourable weather conditions . CARDINAL of all the visits requested have been rejected owing to shuttle boat breakdowns or poor weather conditions .

Article CARDINAL of the new version of LAW , which came into force on DATE , provides that lawyers who have been prosecuted for crimes linked to terrorism may be banned from representing persons convicted of terrorist activities . This provision is intended to prevent leaders of terrorist organisations who have been convicted from continuing to lead their organisations from their place of incarceration through the intermediary of their lawyers .

By a decision of DATE , the GPE prosecutor ’s office invited ORG to apply this measure to some of the applicant ’s lawyers .

By a decision of DATE , the CARDINALth ORG deprived CARDINAL lawyers of their status as counsel to the applicant for DATE .

On DATE , the CARDINALth ORG of GPE dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against that decision .

On DATE , on instructions from the GPE public prosecutor ’s office , the law enforcement agencies arrested and took into custody CARDINAL lawyers representing the applicant in CARDINAL NORP departments ( including CARDINAL lawyers representing the applicant before ORG ) , searched their offices and seized all the documents relating to the applicant . The prosecution suspected the lawyers in question of having acted as messengers between the applicant and the other NORP leaders .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE the applicant ’s representatives informed the ORG that they had asked a GPE medical laboratory to analyse CARDINAL hairs which they considered to be from the applicant and that the analyses carried out on DATE demonstrated the presence of abnormally high doses of chromium and strontium .

NORP However , analyses of samples taken directly from the applicant at the prison failed to disclose any trace of toxic elements or elements endangering health .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE Mr ORG informed the local office of ORG ( “ ORG ” ) that he had purchased heroin from the applicant . The ORG officers then decided to organise a covert operation of the test purchase of the drug .

At TIME on DATE the ORG officers arrived at the applicant ’s block of flats and rang at the door of a flat located next to that of the applicant in which CARDINAL sisters , Ms FAC and Ms T.N , resided . The ORG officers asked the CARDINAL women to ring at the applicant ’s door so that he would open it unaware of the DCS officers’ presence . PERSON and ORG refused to cooperate .

The ORG officers then waited on the stairway for the applicant to leave the flat . At some point the applicant stepped out of his flat .

According to the applicant , CARDINAL ORG officers forcibly dragged him out of the flat , pushed him to the floor and beat him on the stairway . According to the Government , the applicant showed active resistance by beating and kicking the ORG officers . They had to resort to physical force in order to overcome his resistance , and handcuffed the applicant .

PERSON and PERSON observed through the open door that QUANTITY men were beating and kicking the applicant .

According to the Government , the applicant voluntarily allowed a visual inspection of his flat . According to the applicant , he was forced to make a written statement agreeing to the inspection . It is common ground between the parties that the ORG officers then proceeded to carry out the inspection in the presence of CARDINAL attesting witnesses and discovered syringes with traces of heroin and pieces of aluminium foil .

NORP The officers took the handcuffs off the applicant so that he could sign an inspection report . At some point the applicant rose to his feet suddenly and ran at a cupboard with glass doors , ramming it with his head . The cupboard fell on the applicant .

The applicant was then brought to the ORG premises . At MONEY a.m. on DATE he was formally detained as a suspect in a temporary detention cell .

CARDINAL of the ORG officers presented their hierarchical superior with reports dated DATE on the use of physical force in the course of the applicant ’s arrest , claiming that the force had been used legitimately to overcome the violent resistance offered by the applicant .

On DATE the applicant was brought to a trauma centre and then to hospital . He was diagnosed with a closed cerebral injury .

On DATE the ORG of GPE authorised the applicant ’s detention .

On DATE the applicant was transferred to a remand prison . On arrival he was examined by a doctor and diagnosed with a closed cerebral injury as well as injuries to his face and head .

On DATE the applicant complained to the ORG district prosecutor ’s office of GPE ( “ the district prosecutor ’s office ) about the alleged ill - treatment .

On DATE , having conducted a pre - investigation inquiry , the district prosecutor ’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the ORG officers who had allegedly beaten the applicant on DATE . They referred to statements made by the ORG officers and CARDINAL of the attesting witnesses who had been present during the inspection in the flat and concluded that the applicant had resisted lawful arrest and that the use of force and handcuffing had thus been lawful and justified in the circumstances . The district prosecutor ’s office also established that the applicant had thrown himself against the cupboard , which had collapsed on the applicant causing him injuries .

On DATE ORG of GPE convicted the applicant of drug - related crimes and sentenced him to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment . The applicant admitted the unlawful procurement and possession of heroin but pleaded not guilty to the charges of supplying the drug to others , inter alia on CARDINAL and DATE .

DATE and DATE the pre - investigation inquiry into the allegation of ill - treatment was resumed on CARDINAL occasions as the decisions refusing to open a criminal investigation were quashed by either the district prosecutor ’s office or the GPE regional prosecutor ’s office .

On DATE the district prosecutor ’s office issued another decision refusing to open a criminal investigation .

On DATE the GPE regional prosecutor ’s office quashed the decision of CARDINAL DATE on the grounds that the applicant ’s neighbours , the ORG sisters , had consistently alleged that the applicant had been beaten by the officers ; another neighbour had not been questioned at all ; and the forensic expert report had not been completed .

On DATE ORG upheld the conviction of DATE on appeal .

On DATE the district prosecutor ’s office ordered a forensic expert examination of the applicant in order to establish the origin of the injuries that he had sustained on DATE .

On DATE a forensic expert drew up a report based on medical certificates and X - rays dated DATE and the explanations given by the applicant on DATE . According to the report , the initial diagnosis of a closed cerebral injury had not been confirmed and the bruises could have “ resulted either from a beating with a hard blunt object(s ) or from falling and hitting the said object(s ) ” .

On DATE the district prosecutor ’s office again refused to open a criminal investigation into the alleged ill - treatment . They argued , in particular , that the statements by PERSON and PERSON could not be regarded as reliable evidence owing to the fact that “ according to the information received , both the ORG sisters [ were ] prostitutes and acquaintances of PERSON , with whom they [ maintained ] a friendly relationship , and thus [ were ] interested in the outcome of PERSON arrest ” . They concluded that the ORG officers had used legitimate force to effect the applicant ’s arrest .

On DATE the ORG of GPE upheld the above decision on judicial review . On DATE ORG upheld the first - instance decision .

On DATE ORG of GPE for GPE ( “ the regional investigative committee ” ) quashed the decision of DATE .

On DATE ORG of GPE for LOC of GPE ( “ the district investigative committee ” ) again refused to open a criminal case . Again it was argued that the statements by PERSON and PERSON were to be disregarded since “ according to the information received , both the ORG sisters [ were ] prostitutes and acquaintances of PERSON , with whom they [ maintained ] a friendly relationship , and thus [ were ] interested in the outcome of PERSON ORG ’s arrest ” .

On DATE the ORG of GPE upheld the decision of CARDINAL DATE on judicial review . On DATE ORG upheld the first - instance ruling .

On DATE the applicant was released on probation .


András Sajó;Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant , PERSON GPE , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She was represented before the Court by Mr J. J. Ferreira Alves , a lawyer practising in LOC .

NORP The applicant is a pensioner eligible to receive social - security benefits under the public - sector pension scheme . In DATE she was granted a retirement pension which amounted to MONEY ( ORG ) gross per month .

NORP In DATE GPE requested financial assistance from ORG ( ORG ) , the euro area Member GPE and ORG ( IMF ) . An ORG was negotiated in DATE between the NORP authorities and officials from ORG , ORG ( ORG ) and the ORG including a joint financing package of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( ORG CARDINAL from ORG , ORG CARDINAL from ORG and ORG CARDINAL from the IMF ) . The programme was agreed and formally adopted on CARDINAL DATE at a Eurogroup / ECOFIN meeting in GPE , where ORG signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality ( the “ M.o . U. ” ) with the ORG , the ORG and the ORG and thereafter CARDINAL related documents : the Technical Memorandum of Understanding and LAW .

The M.o . U. set out the economic and social policies , including tax and social - security measures , that GPE should implement for the duration of the programme ( DATE ) in order to improve its financial situation and receive financial support from the ORG . It stipulated , inter alia , that GPE would :

“ ... CARDINAL LOC pensions above ORG CARDINAL according to the progressive rates applied to the wages of the public sector as of DATE , with the aim of yielding savings of at least ORG CARDINAL . ”

NORP On DATE ORG PERSON ) published PERSON no . CARDINAL on the ORG budget ( NORP do PERSON para DATE , hereinafter “ the DATE LAW ” ) , which was designed to continue the implementation of the M.o . U. initiated by Law no . CARDINAL of DATE on the DATE ORG . Pursuant to section CARDINAL of the DATE LAW , the scope of application of the existing extraordinary solidarity contribution ( contribuição extraordinária de solidariedade , hereinafter “ the CES ” ) was extended in order to include pensioners receiving a gross amount of LAW . This provision was to apply in DATE and only during DATE .

NORP The applicant ’s pension was subsequently taxed at PERCENT on a part corresponding to ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL and PERCENT on the part exceeding it . The excess was ORG CARDINAL.CARDINAL . The total amount deducted because of the ORG thus amounted to ORG .

With the entry into force of the DATE LAW , the applicant ’s pension was reduced accordingly , resulting in a cumulative loss of GPE GPE in DATE . This loss amounted to PERCENT of the applicant ’s total DATE social security benefits .

On DATE , ORG published the DATE LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL-C/CARDINAL ) , which reintroduced the FAC for DATE with the same threshold and rates as the ones applied under the CARDINAL LAW . Consequently , the ORG was again applied to the applicant ’s pension as provided for in section CARDINAL of the DATE LAW .

On DATE a law amending the DATE LAW entered into force ( Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . Pursuant to the amendments to section DATE , the scope of application of the ORG was extended to pensions of a gross amount of LAW , while the rates applied to larger pensions were increased . The rates applied to the applicant ’s pension remained unchanged .

NORP In DATE the applicant sustained a cumulative loss of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL , amounting to PERCENT of her total DATE pension payment .

NORP In DATE GPE exited the DATE ORG and is currently under post - programme surveillance until PERCENT of the financial assistance received has been repaid .

“ CARDINAL . All citizens have the same social dignity and are equal before the law . ”

“ CARDINAL . Everyone is entitled to social security . ”

The extraordinary solidarity contribution , introduced in GPE by section CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL of DATE on the DATE State Budget ( Lei do PERSON para DATE ) , reads as follows :

“ Pensions , grants and any other benefits of a similar nature paid to a single person , whose DATE amount is above ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL , are subject to an extraordinary contribution at a PERCENT rate applicable to the amount exceeding that value . ”

When the CARDINAL LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL of DATE ) entered into force , the ORG was increased to PERCENT on the part of pensions which exceeded ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL and PERCENT on the part that exceeded ORG MONEY .

With the entry into force of the DATE LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL of DATE ) the ORG was again reconfigured . Accordingly , section CARDINAL of the DATE LAW was to be applied to pensions between ORG CARDINAL and ORG CARDINAL at a PERCENT rate . With regard to pensions between ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL and ORG CARDINAL , the ORG was set at PERCENT on the first ORG CARDINAL , and at PERCENT on the part exceeding that amount . As to pensions exceeding ORG CARDINAL , the ORG was payable at PERCENT . As a budgetary measure provided for in DATE LAW , the ORG was only to be applied in DATE .

On DATE the ORG was reintroduced in GPE through the enactment of the DATE LAW ( Law no . DATE ) . Pursuant to section DATE , its scope of application remained the same as the CARDINAL provided for in the CARDINAL LAW . According to LAW , the ORG was an exceptional and temporary measure applicable in DATE .

Following the tenth ORG / ORG / IMF review mission to GPE in DATE , ORG amended the DATE LAW including , inter alia , the scope of application of the ORG through the adoption of PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE . Pursuant to the amendment , the ORG became applicable to pensions of LAW and above .

The DATE LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL-B/CARDINAL of DATE ) provided for a new reconfiguration of the ORG by raising the threshold at which it applies , which is currently set at ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL at a PERCENT rate . Pensions exceeding EUR CARDINAL are currently taxed at a PERCENT rate ( section CARDINAL ) .

On DATE the President of GPE challenged the constitutionality of section CARDINAL of the DATE LAW before ORG on the grounds that its provisions were in breach of the principle of equality , the principle of proportionality and the principle of protection of legitimate expectations ( princípio da confiança ) .

In a ruling of CARDINAL DATE ORG considered that section CARDINAL of the DATE LAW was not disproportionate or excessive , bearing in mind its exceptional and transitory nature . In the court ’s opinion , the ORG was , therefore , not unconstitutional .

The Constitutional Court ’s decision contained in particular the following considerations :

“ CARDINAL . ... Imposing an obligation on pensioners to contribute to the financing of the social - security system in order to reduce the need for public financial allocation , within a framework of distinct and articulated fiscal consolidation measures which also include tax increases and other cuts in public expenditure , is based on a coherent reasoning in line with a strategy still within the margin of the “ free policy prerogative ” of the legislature .

... The ORG was solely designed , in conjunction with other measures , to overcome the situation of economic and financial crisis which has temporarily also required , within the framework of the basic options open to the executive and legislature , an urgent strengthening of the financing of the social - security system at the expense of its beneficiaries .

[ Background factors are as follows : ] ... a decrease in revenues accruing to the social - security system ; the dramatic increase in unemployment ; the reduction of wages ; new migration trends ; an increase in expenditure on support given to those in unemployment and poverty , and the consequent need for the ORG to finance the social - security system thereby aggravating the public deficit . As a result , the legislature , exceptionally and in an emergency situation , chose to extend to pensioners the payment of contributions into the social - security system from which they are directly or indirectly beneficiaries for the present tax year only .

Compliance with the underlying principles of the democratic rule of law must be evaluated , therefore , in light of the exceptional and temporary nature of this measure and its purpose of meeting the public deficit targets demanded by ORG .

... However , given the constraints that surrounded the implementation of the ORG , not only do the expectations of continued financial stability appear to be diminished , there is also a particular , relevant and defensible public interest that justifies an exceptional and temporary discontinuation of the ORG ’s normal conduct .

The public interest needs to be safeguarded , as has already been stated in the course of the balancing exercise carried out in earlier cases with regard to the principle of legitimate expectations , is of crucial importance and urgent which gives it a clear prevalence , even though the depth of the sacrifice caused to the private sector by the new contribution should not be ignored .

There is not , therefore , any evidence in this whole context of an infringement of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations .

Neither does it seem that the principle of proportionality could be considered to have been breached in any of the aspects of adequacy or necessity or due measure .

In the current case , it is clear that the imposition of this extraordinary tax on pensioners as a means of reducing , exceptionally and temporarily , expenditure on payment of pensions in order to obtain additional financing for the social - security system , is an appropriate measure for the purposes set out by the legislature .

As to whether , in order to achieve this goal , the means chosen are actually necessary or required owing to the possible existence of other more suitable or effective means which could achieve the same result in a less burdensome way for those affected , analysis of the evidence shows that there are no other alternatives which could maintain a consistency with the system in which these measures are established , and which could attain public interest objectives to the same degree , and which could affect the holders of the these legal expectations to a lesser degree .

Accordingly , the measure complies with the principle of necessity .

... In the light of the above , the court holds that section CARDINAL is not unconstitutional . ”

In DATE , Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL amending section QUANTITY of the DATE LAW was challenged before ORG by a group of members of ORG within the framework of an ex post facto review , on the grounds , inter alia , that the ORG was no longer temporary and exceptional on account of its re - introduction in DATE . In particular , the group of members of ORG challenged the amendments made to section CARDINAL of the DATE LAW . On DATE ORG found that the relevant provision was not unconstitutional . In its ruling the court took into account that it had already weighed up the constitutionality of the ORG in previous rulings and considered that the reconfiguration of the measure remained within the limits outlined by the constitutional - law principle of legal certainty . ORG further considered that the ORG was an exceptional and transitory measure imposed through a budgetary law and had been designed to respond to an economic and financial emergency in GPE . As to the proportionality of the reconfigured ORG , the court ruled that there had been no breach of this principle and that there were no reasons to depart from its previous ruling on the appropriateness of and need for a ORG .

“ CARDINAL . ... The court is aware that ... considerations with regard to the generic nature of the ORG have been raised , and also considerations in relation to its scope and extension ; thus the measure must be analysed in the light of the fundamental right to social security , from which a constitutional right to a pension results . However , according to the applicants , it is the differences vis - à - vis the solution previously analysed by this court in DATE , in particular the extension of the measure , that justify a separate ruling to the one then adopted .

... Thus , one can not fail to recognise that , in the way in which it was normatively brought DATE that is , a budgetary measure designed to be in force for DATE the ORG has , indeed , an exceptional and temporary nature which is directly related to the immediate objectives pursued by the legislature of achieving a balanced budget and sustainability of public finances . Therefore , it is with regard to the ORG in and of itself , as normatively set , and with regard to its own nature without taking into account the different nature of any potential subsequent and functionally substitute measure , that the ruling about its temporariness should be made .

We can thus conclude that it is permissible for ORG , following its previous case - law , to consider that section DATE of Law no . CARDINAL /CARDINAL , as amended by LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , still establishes a transitory or temporary measure , which should be taken into account in the weighting underlying the assessment of constitutionality .

NORP ... In fact , as recognised in Ruling no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , legitimate expectations of the State are not as consistently present with regard to an extraordinary and transitory measure , thus justifying an exceptional and temporary discontinuation of the ORG ’s conduct . Given the exceptionality of the facts that increased the need for assistance – the financial and economic emergency that has reduced transfers from the ORG budget to the social protection system – the lower the expectations of those who were affected by it appear to be .

There are no reasons to depart in the present case from the ruling delivered by the court on the adequacy and necessity of the ORG as part of a balanced budget programme . Indeed , this is highlighted by the conflict – established on the basis of the principle of proportionality – between the measure under scrutiny and the objective pursued . It is clear that , in general , the extension of the threshold of the ORG is not an inappropriate means of achieving a balanced budget ...

And the same can be said with regard to the necessity or enforceability of the option chosen – the second test of proportionality – since , in the light of the aim pursued and of the potential alternative solutions , it can not be considered that the extension of the scope of application of the ORG is not the least burdensome measure for those adversely affected by the achievement of that goal .

NORP ... And with regard to the contribution affecting pensions between ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL and ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL , the previous regime remains unchanged .

... Indeed , various reasons indicate that the reconfiguration of the ORG by PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE is still within the limits of reasonableness .

Firstly , the ORG still maintains the characteristics of exceptionality and transience that in DATE marked its entry into the tax universe . ... In an absolutely exceptional financial situation including a fiscal imbalance that led to international and NORP commitments , the ORG constitutes an exceptional measure which , in conjunction with other measures , aims to overcome the seriousness of that situation .

For all these reasons , it is acceptable that the DATE contribution required of the beneficiaries of social security affected by the expansion of the scope of application of the ORG , owing to its temporariness of the norms supporting it and the objectives it seeks to pursue , does not amount to a particularly excessive and unreasonable sacrifice which would involve a violation of the principle of proportionality , constitutionally objectionable . ”

NORP In a series of rulings , ORG established the legal principles applicable to cases in which restrictions on social rights could be allowed within a constitutional framework with a particular reference to the concept of “ proviso of the possible ” ( reserva do possível , known in NORP as the Vorbehalt des Möglichen ) .


No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Hungary)

The applicant was born in DATE and currently lives in PERSON .

He entered GPE on DATE and lodged an asylum application . It remained undisputed by the NORP authorities that at that time he was still a minor , even though his exact date of birth is unknown . He was not accompanied by any family members , nor were any of his relatives present in another member ORG of ORG .

The applicant stated that he had left his village in GPE DATE , crossed the border to GPE and then the border to GPE by QUANTITY . With the aid of a trafficker he reached GPE , where he stayed for DATE . Together with a group of other refugees , he crossed into GPE by boat , where he was arrested and processed . He was released shortly after with an order to leave the country . He travelled to GPE , where he stayed for DATE . He then left GPE together with CARDINAL other refugees via the Former GPE , from where he crossed the border to GPE by foot .

NORP In GPE , the applicant was arrested and processed . He claimed that he was forced to lodge an asylum request and placed in an open camp . Allegedly , the NORP authorities did not give any consideration to the fact that he was a minor . Because he had never planned to stay in GPE , but wanted to lodge an asylum application in GPE , he left the camp DATE and took a train to GPE .

When the applicant was interviewed by the NORP authorities on CARDINAL DATE , he stated that he did not want to return to GPE . He claimed not to know the status of his asylum proceedings there because he was illiterate . In a second interview on DATE , he stated that he was arrested and detained for DATE in GPE . He was not given enough to eat and suffered from hunger in detention . He claimed that the conduct of the police towards him was rough . Officers were armed at all times , and he was woken up during TIME for interviews . He further stated that he was afraid of being sent back to GPE .

When the applicant was asked why he had left GPE , he stated that his family had sent him away so he could live a safer life . His father had died in GPE DATE . His mother lived with the applicant and his CARDINAL young siblings in the ORG district in GPE . The precarious security situation and the lack of access to subsistence and education in the region prompted him to leave the country .

On DATE ORG ( Bundesasylamt – hereinafter " ORG " ) rejected the applicant ’s asylum request and established GPE ’s jurisdiction in this regard in accordance with LAW ( c ) of ORG ( ORG ) No . MONEY ( " the Dublin II Regulation " ) . On DATE ORG ( Asylgerichtshof ) quashed that decision pursuant to LAW ) on the grounds that the facts had not been established exhaustively . It stated that ORG had failed to update its country information regarding the risk of refoulement of asylumseekers from GPE to GPE . Furthermore , the decision had not established the legal framework under which minors could be detained in GPE and what the conditions of detention were .

On DATE ORG again rejected the applicant ’s asylum request and ordered his expulsion to GPE under GPE . In addition to general information on the situation of asylum - seekers in GPE , ORG referred to information obtained from ORG in GPE dated DATE and DATE . According to that information , the detention of minors could not be ordered in GPE . If a detained refugee claimed to be a minor , an age assessment was ordered and the minor was released if his or her age was confirmed . As regards the evaluation of GPE by GPE as a safe third country , the NORP authorities stated that they did not have a list of safe third countries and evaluated each case individually . However , in most cases GPE was considered to be a safe third country . GPE expelled asylum - seekers to GPE , if their first asylum proceedings were terminated and there was no obstacle under the non - refoulement rule . A person lodging a subsequent asylum request was not allowed to remain in GPE . The same applied for GPE returnees if their first asylum proceedings were terminated . If asylum proceedings were discontinued after an asylum - seeker left GPE , an asylum request after his or her return under the GPE regulation was considered a subsequent asylum request . It was further established that appeals against asylum decisions at first instance and during the first proceedings had automatic suspensive effect . However , appeals against decisions in subsequent asylum proceedings did not . It was in any event possible to lodge an appeal against the expulsion order itself . It was then up to the judge ’s discretion to award the proceedings suspensive effect .

When it came to the personal credibility of the applicant , ORG stated that it found his allegations of having been detained in GPE for DATE unconvincing , as the country information had shown that the detention of minors could not be ordered in GPE . It further held that the information had shown that GPE did not practise refoulement to GPE . Finally , the NORP authorities had assumed jurisdiction over the applicant ’s asylum request under LAW ( c ) of LAW , which proved that the applicant still had access to asylum proceedings on the merits in GPE . ORG concluded that it hence did not consider itself legally obliged to make use of the sovereignty clause and rejected the asylum request .

On DATE ORG awarded suspensive effect to the applicant ’s appeal against that decision , but on DATE dismissed it as unfounded . It pointed out that the NORP authorities had informed ORG that they had planned an age assessment , but could not carry it out because the applicant had left the country . Thereupon , on DATE the NORP authorities had discontinued his proceedings . However , ORG assumed that because of GPE ’s acceptance of jurisdiction under LAW ( c ) of LAW the applicant would have access to asylum proceedings on the merits in GPE . In its reasoning ORG took note of a letter from ORG in GPE dated DATE , seemingly citing problems with the techniques of age assessment in GPE , detention and the detention conditions for asylum - seekers , refoulement to GPE and the fact that a GPE - returner ’s asylum request was considered a subsequent asylum request if the proceedings had been discontinued in GPE . However , ORG noted a lack of sources in the ORG ’s letter and referred to the recently updated country information obtained by the NORP asylum authorities , which did not indicate systematic deficiencies in the NORP asylum proceedings and reception conditions that would have warranted an extensive use of the sovereignty clause of LAW of the Dublin II Regulation .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG , which was rejected on DATE . This decision was served on the applicant ’s counsel on DATE . An arrest order stated that a transfer of the applicant to the NORP authorities was planned for CARDINAL DATE . At that time , the applicant was still a minor .

On DATE the ORG applied an interim measure under Rule CARDINAL of the Rules of Court and requested ORG to stay the applicant ’s transfer to GPE until further notice . ORG complied with this request .

On DATE ORG informed the ORG that the applicant ’s asylum proceedings in GPE had been discontinued on DATE . The decision had become final on DATE . The first asylum proceedings would not be reopened upon his return to GPE . If he was returned to GPE , an asylum request would be considered a subsequent request which would not have automatic suspensive effect if there were no new circumstances supporting his application but there was a safe third country which he could be returned to . Regarding the issue of appointing a guardian for the minor applicant , the NORP authorities stated that unaccompanied minor asylum - seekers were usually immediately assigned a guardian , except when the applicant would reach the age of majority before the decision on the merits was taken . Unaccompanied minors were placed in a children ’s home in GPE , where care and education were provided to them according to their age . Having regard to the fact that the applicant would turn CARDINAL on DATE , it was very unlikely that a guardian would be appointed for him upon his return .


CASE OF A.P., GARÇON AND NICOT v. FRANCE

Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Carlo Ranzoni;Mārtiņš Mits;Yonko Grozev

On the date of lodging of the applications , the applicants were regarded for civil - law purposes as belonging to the male sex . For that reason , the masculine form is used in referring to them ; however , this can not be construed as excluding them from the gender with which they identify .

The first applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The first applicant stated that , although he had been entered in the register of births as being male , he had always behaved like a girl and his physical appearance had always been very feminine . As an adolescent and young adult he had struggled considerably with his gender identity , since the male identity assigned to him at birth did not match his female psychological and social identity . In DATE , after several doctors had diagnosed a gender identity disorder known as “ PERSON syndrome ” , he had begun a transitional phase , living in society as a woman and undertaking a course of hormone treatment under the supervision of an endocrinologist , PERSON , and a neuropsychiatrist , PERSON .

The first applicant submitted CARDINAL medical certificates issued by these doctors during the period in question . In the first CARDINAL certificates , dated CARDINAL DATE , PERSON . stated that the first applicant had been under his supervision since DATE “ for a syndrome typical of gender identity disorder ” . He stated that “ there [ was ] thus an observable difference between his current physique and the photograph on his identity card ” , and that “ there [ were ] no medical or psychological contraindications for [ an ] operation ... on the PERSON ’s apple ” . In the third certificate , dated DATE , PERSON stated that he had been overseeing the applicant ’s hormone treatment for “ typical primary gender identity disorder since DATE , together with Dr B. ” , and that “ following endocrinology and metabolic tests , including karyotyping , [ he was being ] treated with anti - androgens and oestrogen ” . The doctor concluded that “ the marked , plausible and genuine nature of his gender dysphoria , together with the ‘ real life test’ , [ made him ] eligible for reassignment surgery , of which [ he had ] a legitimate expectation ” .

The first applicant also produced a medical certificate issued on DATE by another psychiatrist , PERSON . , which certified that he had “ typical PERSON syndrome ” and that “ there [ were ] currently no contraindications for the medical and/or surgical treatment entailed in the gender reassignment sought by the patient ” .

The first applicant stressed that he had not originally intended to undergo mutilating gender reassignment surgery , but had resigned himself to it because the NORP ORG case - law made it a precondition for a change in civil status .

The first applicant decided to undergo surgery in GPE , performed by PERSON , whom he described as a “ world - renowned specialist ” . The operation was carried out on DATE . PERSON issued the following medical certificate :

“ ... following a period of diagnosis by psychosexual specialists and an appropriate period of living full - time with a female identity , the above - mentioned person was diagnosed with a gender identity disorder ( FCARDINAL.CARDINAL ) defined as ORG , ICD-CARDINAL . She was accepted for the appropriate surgical treatment , namely gender reassignment surgery .

... The surgery consisted of an orchidectomy , a vaginoplasty , a clitoroplasty and a labiaplasty , combined in a single operation . On completion of the operation the male sexual organs ... were replaced by organs that are female in appearance and function , with the exception of the reproductive organs . This involved removing the male reproductive organs , resulting in irremediable infertility .

In accordance with all established medical and legal definitions , the operation is irreversible and means that PERSON [ A.P. ] ’s male sexual identity has been permanently changed to a female sexual identity . ”

In a certificate signed on DATE PERSON confirmed that the first applicant “ [ had ] undergone irreversible male - to - female gender reassignment surgery ” , and stressed that “ the request for a change in civil status [ was ] compelling and admissible [ and was ] an integral part of the treatment ” .

The first applicant produced CARDINAL further certificates . The first , dated CARDINAL DATE , was signed by PERSON , a surgeon . It stated that the first applicant had undergone “ a cosmetic laryngoplasty as part of maletofemale transitioning , after irreversible reassignment surgery was performed on the external genitalia ” . In the second certificate , dated DATE , a speech therapist stated that she had “ worked with [ ORG ] for DATE on feminisation of her voice ” , and that “ her voice and appearance [ were ] now wholly feminine and consistent with each other ” . The third certificate , signed on DATE by PERSON , a psychiatrist , read as follows :

“ ... [ ORG ] is under supervision for typical PERSON syndrome , for which a gender reassignment process has been under way for DATE . She has had hormone treatment and the surgery required to make her appearance and behaviour female . It is therefore legitimate , in the interests of her social and professional integration , for her civil status to be brought into line with her appearance and her wishes . ... ”

In the fourth certificate , dated DATE , PERSON , a doctor specialising in fundamental psychopathology and psychoanalysis and a psychotherapist , stated that he had started psychotherapy sessions with the first applicant and , in particular , had “ noted ... the consistency between Ms [ ORG ] ’s statements and her preferred gender identity ” .

On DATE the first applicant brought proceedings against ORG in the GPE tribunal de grande instance seeking a declaration that he was now female and that his first name was PERSON ( a female forename ) . He submitted , in particular , the medical certificates of CARDINAL DATE and DATE and DATE , and the certificate issued by PERSON On DATE ORG requested a multi - disciplinary expert assessment , on the grounds that the applicant ’s surgery had been performed abroad .

On DATE , in an interlocutory judgment , the GPE tribunal de grande instance stressed as follows :

“ Where a diagnosis of gender identity disorder has been made following a thorough assessment and the person concerned has undergone irreversible physical changes for therapeutic purposes , it is appropriate to consider that , although the person ’s new gender status is imperfect in that the chromosomal make - up is unchanged , he or she is closer , in terms of physical appearance , mindset and social integration , to the preferred gender than to the gender assigned at birth . ”

However , the court further found :

“ Irrespective of the status of the authors of the medical certificates produced in support of the application , the need for a firm diagnosis means that a multidisciplinary expert assessment should be carried out in order to establish the applicant ’s current state from a physiological , biological and psychological perspective and to investigate the persistence of the alleged disorder in his past . ”

The court appointed CARDINAL experts – a psychiatrist , an endocrinologist and a gynaecologist DATE and requested them , after interviewing and examining the first applicant and consulting the medical certificates and operation reports submitted , to :

“ ( a ) describe the applicant ’s current physical state ... and the presence or absence of any external or internal genitalia of either sex ; order , with the applicant ’s consent , any samples and laboratory tests capable of establishing the biological and genetic characteristics of the applicant ’s sex ; state whether a mistake could have been made in the sex recorded on the birth certificate , or an organic or biological change could have occurred later ; look for traces of possible surgery aimed at bringing about or completing a transformation of the genitalia or secondary sexual characteristics ; state whether the patient has been treated with either medication or hormones ; state whether the surgery or hormone treatment was carried out on account of pre - existing physical anomalies or because of the patient ’s psychological state , leaving aside his deliberate intentions ;

( b ) describe [ the first applicant ’s ] mental state and behaviour as regards his gender and , in so far as possible , indicate their origins and trace their development ; report on any course of psychotherapy followed , specifying its duration and outcome ; state whether the patient suffers from any mental disorder and , if so , specify the nature of that disorder ;

( c ) express a view on the possible existence of gender identity disorder , giving reasons for making or ruling out such a diagnosis ; state whether , in the light of all the available individual medical data ( physiological , biological and physical ) , the person concerned should be regarded as male or female . ”

The court ruled that the costs of the expert assessment should be met by the first applicant , and ordered him to deposit a sum of MONEY ( ORG ) for that purpose .

The first applicant refused to submit to an expert assessment on the grounds that this type of assessment , as well as being very costly , also failed to respect the physical and mental integrity of the person concerned . In his view the documents he had submitted , which had been written by specialist doctors and noted the genuine nature of his change of gender , were more than sufficient and it was not necessary to make him undergo a further battery of traumatic tests .

In an order of CARDINAL DATE the Deputy President of ORG refused the first applicant leave to appeal against this interlocutory judgment .

On DATE the GPE tribunal de grande instance rejected the first applicant ’s request . It stressed that the certificates produced by the first applicant , however informative , did not answer the court ’s questions regarding the origin , nature , persistence and consequences of the disorder in question , and that the doctors who had been consulted could not , in the space of a few lines intended to allow the operation to go ahead , carry out the work of CARDINAL experts instructed on the basis of a very wide - ranging and detailed mandate . The court noted in particular that the certificates did not mention the applicant ’s mental state and attitude with regard to his gender , or express a view as to the origin of the disorder and its development . Likewise , they did not specify whether the first applicant suffered from mental - health problems and whether he had followed a course of psychotherapy , nor did they provide any information on his current state , having been written prior to his gender reassignment . The court added that patients who underwent surgery in GPE submitted a comprehensive file covering all the disciplines concerned as a precondition of reassignment surgery , something which the doctor who had operated on the first applicant in GPE had apparently not required . In order to have their costs covered by the social - security scheme , patients in GPE had to undergo a whole series of rigorous examinations . The court found that , in the light of the evidence in the file , the applicant should submit willingly to the expert assessment . In accordance with LAW , which authorised the courts to draw all the appropriate inferences from a party ’s refusal to cooperate with an investigative measure , the court found that , in the absence of a multi - disciplinary expert assessment , the first applicant ’s request had not been sufficiently substantiated .

Following an appeal by the first applicant ORG , in a judgment of DATE , upheld the judgment of CARDINAL DATE in so far as it had rejected the first applicant ’s request for the indication of gender on his birth certificate to be corrected .

First of all , ORG inferred from LAW that “ where , following medical and surgical treatment undergone for therapeutic purposes ” , a person with a gender identity disorder no longer possessed all the characteristics of his or her original sex and had taken on a physical appearance closer to that of the opposite sex , which matched his or her social behaviour , the principle of respect for private life warranted amending the civil - status records to indicate the sex corresponding to the person ’s appearance .

NORP However , ORG found that , in the light of the documents submitted by the first applicant , it was “ not established that he no longer possesse[d ] all the characteristics of the male sex ” . It stressed in that regard that , although the psychiatrists PERSON . and Ba . had given a diagnosis of gender identity disorder in their certificates of DATE and DATE , they had not noted the “ absence of mental - health problems ” . ORG further noted that the hormone treatment referred to in the certificates issued by PERSON on DATE and DATE dated back a long time . It also found that the certificate drawn up by PERSON , the doctor who had operated on the first applicant in GPE on DATE , was “ extremely brief ” and consisted merely in a list of items of medical information that did not make clear whether the gender reassignment surgery had been effective . Furthermore , the documentation produced by the first applicant concerning the clinic , which had been taken from the Internet , was not sufficient to establish either the scientific and surgical reputation of the surgeon who had performed the operation or whether the surgery had complied with standard medical practice . Nor was this demonstrated by Dr W. ’s certificate of CARDINAL DATE , “ owing to the lack of any detail ” .

ORG went on to observe that the first applicant had refused persistently on principle to submit to an expert assessment and had not cooperated in the assessment ordered by the lower court , “ on the irrelevant pretext of protection of his private life , even though the aim [ had been ] to establish that a person presenting with a gender identity disorder no longer possessed all the characteristics of the sex assigned at birth ” . The court stressed that “ the possible interference with private life [ had been ] proportionate to the requirement to establish the person ’s gender identity , which [ was ] a component of civil status that [ was ] subject to the publicorder principle of inalienability ” .

ORG found , however , that the fact that the first applicant was known by a female forename – as was clear from numerous statements from those close to him – allied to his conviction that he was female , the fact that he had had various medical treatments and operations , and the “ reality of his social life ” , meant that he had a legitimate interest in changing his male forenames to female ones . The court therefore ordered that his forenames be corrected on his birth certificate .

The first applicant appealed on points of law against the judgment of DATE .

He argued , firstly , that the right to respect for private life meant that gender reassignment should be authorised for persons whose physical appearance was closer to that of the opposite gender , to which their social behaviour corresponded . He criticised ORG refusal of his request to have the indication of his gender amended because he had refused to cooperate in an expert assessment aimed at determining the origins of his gender identity disorder and its development , and at ascertaining that he no longer had all the characteristics of the male sex . In his view , in ruling in this way after noting that he was known by a female forename , that he was convinced that he belonged to the female sex , and that he had had various medical and surgical treatments and lived in society as a woman , ORG had breached LAW . The first applicant referred , in particular , to the position of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe as set out in his issue paper of DATE entitled “ Human rights and gender identity ” , and to LAW ( DATE ) of ORG of ORG on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) .

Secondly , he argued that it had been fully established by the medical certificates he had submitted that he was transgender , that he had undergone surgery which made him a woman , and that his physical appearance and social behaviour were female . In ruling that these documents were insufficient to establish the existence of the conditions required for gender reassignment , and criticising him for not cooperating with the expert assessment , ORG had therefore distorted the evidence .

Thirdly , he alleged a violation of LAW taken in conjunction with LAW , taking the view that ORG , in finding that he should have submitted to the expert assessment and in dismissing his appeal , had based its assessment on discriminatory grounds .

On DATE ORG ( ORG , Bulletin CARDINAL , I , no . CARDINAL ) dismissed the appeal in the following terms :

“ ... In order to substantiate a request to have the gender markers on a birth certificate corrected , the person concerned must demonstrate , in view of the widely accepted position within the scientific community , that he or she actually suffers from the gender identity disorder in question and that the change in his or her appearance is irreversible . After examining the documents submitted , without distorting them , and having noted , firstly , that the certificate describing surgery performed in GPE was very brief ( being confined to a list of items of medical information and saying nothing about the effectiveness of the operation ) and , secondly , that [ the first applicant ] refused in principle to undergo the expert assessment ordered by the first - instance court , ORG was entitled to refuse the application for correction of the gender markers on the appellant ’s birth certificate ... ”

The second applicant was born in DATE and lives in FAC .

He submitted that , although he had been entered in the register of births as male , he had been aware from a very young age of belonging to the female gender .

Owing to social pressure he had tried to hide his true nature and had married twice while living with the male identity entered on his birth certificate . However the marriages , from which he had children , had ended in divorce .

He dressed as a woman and was perceived by others as a woman . Since DATE he had been undergoing treatment with feminising hormones and had undergone genital reconstruction surgery .

On DATE the second applicant brought proceedings against ORG in the NORP tribunal de grande instance seeking an order for his birth certificate to be corrected by replacing the word “ male ” with “ female ” and replacing his male forenames with the name “ Émilie ” . He referred in particular to a certificate issued in DATE by PERSON , a psychiatrist and specialist in transgender issues , stating that the second applicant was a transgender person .

The court gave judgment on DATE . It noted that the second applicant had merely filed a few invoices dated DATE and issued in the name of “ Émilie ” Garçon , CARDINAL statements made by witnesses in DATE saying that they had known the second applicant for DATE , knew that he was a “ transgender ” person ( or “ transsexual ” , as CARDINAL of them put it ) and had seen him “ evolve as a woman without any apparent difficulty ” , and a certificate dated DATE signed by the endocrinologist PERSON , according to which the second applicant had been receiving treatment for gender dysphoria since DATE and taking feminising hormones since DATE , a treatment that was well tolerated and effective . Noting also that the second applicant had not submitted the certificate from PERSON , the court found that he had not “ [ demonstrated ] that he was actually transgender as claimed ” . As he had not demonstrated that he actually suffered from the alleged disorder , his request had to be refused , since a change to the indication of gender in civil - status documents “ was possible only in order to make a proven de facto situation official ” . The court held that it had to refuse the request for a change of forename on the same grounds , as that request was merely secondary to the request for a change in civil status .

On DATE , following an appeal by the second applicant , ORG upheld the judgment of DATE giving the following reasons :

“ ... While the principle of the inalienability of civil status precludes the law from recognising a change wilfully sought by an individual , it does not imply that civil status can not be changed .

Where a genuine gender identity disorder that is medically recognised and untreatable has been diagnosed following a rigorous assessment , and the transgender person has undergone irreversible physical changes for therapeutic purposes , it is appropriate to consider that , although the person ’s new gender status is imperfect in that the chromosomal make - up is unchanged , he or she is closer , in terms of physical appearance , mindset and social integration , to the preferred gender than to the gender assigned at birth . In these circumstances , and since LAW the birth certificate must mention the sex of the individual concerned , the principle of change should be accepted .

In the present case PERSON ... was entered in the civilstatus registers as male .

It is up to the appellant to give reasons , in particular on the basis of medical evidence , why he should be regarded as female as he requests .

The appellant claims to be a transgender person who has lived with a female gender identity for DATE . He argues that the disparity between his preferred gender and the gender assigned to him at birth is sufficient to warrant a change in civil status without his first having to demonstrate that he has undergone gender reassignment surgery .

Regarding the medical aspect he has simply submitted , as he did before the firstinstance court , a certificate issued by Dr [ T. ] dated DATE , written on the headed paper of Dr [ NORP S .- B. ] , in which that doctor ‘ certifies that the endocrinologist Dr [ S .- B. ] has been treating PERSON ( Émilie ) Garçon for gender dysphoria ... since DATE , and specifies that the appellant has been receiving treatment with feminising hormones since DATE and that the treatment is well tolerated and effective .

This medical certificate stating that the appellant followed a course of feminising hormone treatment from DATE to DATE does not in itself demonstrate the existence of a permanent physical or physiological change and hence the irreversible nature of the gender reassignment process .

An expert assessment appears pointless since the appellant , who rejects the idea of having to undergo genital surgery , does not mention any plastic surgery performed in connection with the current course of hormone treatment , and has not produced any opinion by a psychiatrist capable of demonstrating the existence and persistence of the alleged disorder , although PERSON birth certificate states that he has been married twice ... and divorced twice ... ”

The second applicant appealed on points of law against the judgment of DATE . He argued in particular that , in refusing his requests on the pretext that he had not demonstrated either the existence of “ permanent physical or physiological change and hence the irreversible nature of the gender reassignment process ” , or “ the existence and persistence of the alleged disorder ” , ORG had breached LAW , since the right to respect for private life implied the right for individuals to define their sexual identity and to have their civil - status documents amended to reflect their preferred gender identity , without having to demonstrate the existence of a gender identity disorder or gender dysphoria , or to undergo a prior process of irreversible gender reassignment . Making the right to amendment of civil - status documents subject to proof of having undergone an irreversible process of gender reassignment amounted to requiring the holders of that right to be sterilised in order to exercise it , thereby interfering with their dignity and with due respect for their bodies and the intimacy of their private lives . The second applicant inferred from this that there had been a violation of LAW of the fact that ORG had required him to furnish proof of having undergone that process . He added that it was discriminatory and contrary to LAW to make this right subject to such proof and to proof of a gender identity disorder or gender dysphoria .

On DATE ORG ( ORG ) dismissed the appeal on points of law in the following terms :

“ ... In order to substantiate a request for correction of the gender markers on a birth certificate , the person concerned must demonstrate , in view of the widely accepted position within the scientific community , that he or she actually suffers from the gender identity disorder in question and that the change in his or her appearance is irreversible .

Furthermore , after noting that [ the second applicant ] had merely produced a certificate issued by a doctor on DATE on the headed paper of a different doctor , in which the former certified that the latter , an endocrinologist , was treating [ the second applicant ] for gender dysphoria , and which stated that the patient had been receiving treatment with feminising hormones since DATE , ORG found that this medical certificate alone did not demonstrate the existence or persistence of a gender identity disorder , or the irreversible nature of the gender reassignment process . These are not discriminatory conditions nor do they infringe the principles set out in DATE and CARDINAL of LAW or Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW , as they are based on a fair balance between the requirements of legal certainty and the inalienability of civil status on the one hand , and the protection of private life and respect for the human body on the other ... ”

The third applicant was born in DATE and lives in Essey - les - PERSON .

He submitted that , although he had been entered in the register of births as male , he had been aware from a very young age of belonging to the female gender . He had lived with a woman from DATE and they had had a child together in DATE .

The third applicant said that he had hidden his true nature for a long time as he had been afraid of being bullied and later of losing custody of his daughter . Once his daughter was grown up he had adapted his appearance and social conduct to match his female gender identity . While most of the documents he used in everyday life reflected his gender identity , this was not the case of his civil - status documents , passport , driving licence , vehicle registration papers or entry in the national identity register . As a result , he was constantly obliged to refer to his transgender identity , to the detriment of his private life .

On DATE the third applicant brought proceedings against ORG in the PERSON tribunal de grande instance seeking an order for his birth certificate to be corrected by replacing the word “ male ” with “ female ” and for his forenames to be replaced by the name “ PERSON ” .

The PERSON tribunal de grande instance delivered an initial judgment on DATE . It pointed out that it was “ now unanimously recognised by both domestic and NORP case - law that transgender persons [ had ] the right to respect for their private life ” and were therefore entitled to have their gender and forenames amended on their civil - status documents . However , the court stressed that a number of conditions had to be met , stating as follows :

“ [ T]he gender identity disorder [ must ] be established not only medically ( usually by a multi - disciplinary team of doctors , surgeons , an endocrinologist , a psychologist and a psychiatrist ) , but also judicially , either by means of an expert assessment ( although the court is not required to order one ) or on the basis of medical certificates produced by the person concerned establishing with certainty that he or she has undergone medical treatment and surgery in order to achieve gender reassignment . ”

The court went on to find as follows :

“ Persons wishing to have their gender changed in their civil - status documents must demonstrate that they have undergone medical and surgical treatment for therapeutic purposes and have had previous surgery to remove the external characteristics of their original sex .

Hence , only ‘ ORG transgender persons can have the gender markers in their civil - status documents changed , that is to say , persons who have already undergone an irreversible gender reassignment process .

In other words , a court may order ORG civil - status documents to be amended to reflect their preferred new gender only after they have genuinely altered their sexual anatomy to make it conform as closely as possible to their preferred gender .

These medical and surgical conditions are explained by the fact that a genuine gender identity disorder , which is characterised by ‘ a deeply held and unshakeable feeling of belonging to the opposite gender to one ’s genetically , anatomically and legally assigned gender , accompanied by an intense and consistent need to change one ’s gender and civil status’ , must be distinguished from other related but different concepts such as transvestism , which is based solely on reversible outward appearance and does not entail a change of anatomical sex .

In the present case , although PERSON is female in appearance and has provided documents and invoices issued to him by certain bodies in the name of PERSON , these factors do not enable the court to assess whether he has actually changed gender . At the hearing , when questioned by the President regarding any treatment he may have undergone , PERSON took a militant stance DATE as he is perfectly entitled to do – and invoked the confidential nature of his private life ... ”

The court therefore stayed the proceedings concerning the third applicant ’s requests and ordered him to “ produce in the proceedings any medical documents relating to the medical and surgical treatment undergone and capable of demonstrating that he [ had ] actually changed gender ” .

The third applicant refused to produce any medical documents , taking the view that he had demonstrated sufficiently that he was physically and psychologically female and was integrated socially as a woman . He simply stated that his general practitioner had prescribed hormone treatment for him which meant that he had female secondary sexual characteristics such as breasts . ORG concluded that it was not possible to amend his civil status without proof of gender reassignment surgery .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE the PERSON tribunal de grande instance noted that the third applicant had not produced medical and surgical evidence of gender reassignment , and therefore rejected his request . The judgment reiterated the reasoning of the judgment of DATE . The court stated as follows :

“ [ A change of gender in civil - status documents may be granted only to ] ‘ ORG transgender persons , that is , to persons who have already undergone irreversible gender reassignment , and not to persons who merely claim to be ‘ ORG on the grounds that they are regarded socially as belonging to the gender corresponding to their outward appearance , but who oppose any gender reassignment surgery or refuse to provide medical and surgical evidence of such reassignment having been carried out by means of medical treatment and surgery . ”

The court went on to find as follows :

“ Granting PERSON request would effectively amount to the creation by the courts of a ‘ third gender’ , namely persons of female appearance who nevertheless continue to have a male external sexual anatomy but can marry a man . In the opposite case , a person who is male in appearance would continue to have female genitalia and could thus give birth to a child ! ! ! As the case - law currently stands , such a situation is wholly prohibited . ”

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . It stressed in particular that “ the request for a change in civil status [ did ] not necessarily require proof of surgical change such as the removal or alteration of the genitalia , or plastic surgery ” , but implied that “ the irreversible nature of the gender reassignment process be established in advance ” . The court went on to find that the third applicant “ [ had ] not provided such intrinsic proof , which [ could ] on no account derive from the fact that he [ was ] regarded by others as female ” . It added that respect for private life could not result in the third applicant being exempted from this “ obligation to provide proof , which [ was ] not designed to confuse transgenderism and transsexualism but which , besides the inalienability of civil status , [ was ] aimed at ensuring the consistency and reliability of civil - status records ” . That requirement , which was legitimate and in no way discriminatory , was not in breach of LAW , and it was not the court ’s task to remedy the deficiencies in the evidence adduced by the third applicant .

The third applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of DATE . He argued that the right to respect for private life entailed the right to define one ’s gender identity and to have civil - status documents amended to reflect one ’s preferred gender , without a prior obligation to undergo an irreversible gender reassignment process and provide proof thereof . In finding that he should have furnished proof of this irreversible process , ORG had therefore breached LAW , especially since neither the principle of the inalienability of civil status nor the need for consistency and reliability of civil - status records made it necessary for individuals to undergo an irreversible process of gender reassignment , and provide proof thereof , in order to have their civilstatus documents amended . The third applicant added that it was discriminatory and contrary to LAW to make individuals’ right to have their civil - status documents amended to reflect their preferred gender conditional upon proof that they had undergone irreversible gender reassignment .

The third applicant ’s appeal was examined at the same time as the second applicant ’s .

On DATE ORG ( ORG ) dismissed the appeal on the following grounds :

Given that [ the third applicant ] has not furnished intrinsic evidence of the irreversible nature of the gender reassignment process in his case , which can not derive from the sole fact that he is seen by others as female , the dismissal of his claims by ORG did not infringe the principles laid down under ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Convention ... , but rather struck a fair balance between the requirements of legal certainty and the inalienability of civil status on the one hand , and the protection of private life on the other ... ”


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court;Fair hearing)

DATE the applicants took part in the clean - up operation at the GPE nuclear disaster site . They were subsequently registered disabled and became entitled to various social benefits and compensation paid on a regular basis .

Considering these benefits insufficient , the applicants together with other CARDINAL people , sued ORG for additional compensation corresponding to non - pecuniary damage suffered as a result of their participation in the operation .

NORP On different dates in DATE and DATE the ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) allowed their claims in part and awarded each claimant , including the applicants , compensation ranging MONEY ( RUB ) and RUB CARDINAL for nonpecuniary damage .

No appeals were lodged against these judgments within the statutory DATE time - limit . The judgments became final . Some judgments in respect of several applicants remained unenforced ( see “ Enforcement status ” in the Appendix ) .

NORP On different dates in DATE and DATE the domestic courts granted the defendant authority ’s request to extend the time - limit for appeal essentially on the ground that the defendant authority had not been served with the impugned judgments . Subsequently the regional ORG quashed the judgments delivered in the applicants’ favour on the grounds that they had been based on retrospective application of the law . The applicants were ordered to repay the sums received under the judgments .

The applicants lodged a supervisory review application . There is no indication that they requested the enforcement proceedings to be suspended pending the examination of their supervisory review application .

DATE and DATE the Presidium of the regional ORG partially quashed the appeal judgments as regards the applicants’ obligation to reimburse the sums paid .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)

Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos

The applicant was born in DATE and is detained in GPE .

DATE and DATE the applicant was held in the ORG remand prison in FAC in connection with the criminal proceedings against him . According to the applicant , his cell measuring QUANTITY was equipped with CARDINAL sleeping places and accommodated CARDINAL inmates . The applicant was allowed to take a TIME DATE walk in a recreation yard measuring QUANTITY . According to the floor plans provided by the Government , the applicant ’s cell measured QUANTITY and contained CARDINAL sleeping places .

After his conviction had become final , the applicant served his sentence in the IK-CARDINAL facility , a correctional colony located in LOC . CARDINAL the applicant was held in disciplinary cell no . CARDINAL . He submitted that this cell measured QUANTITY and offered CARDINAL sleeping places while actually accommodating up to CARDINAL inmates . During his detention in this cell , the applicant was taken , together with CARDINAL other inmates , for a TIME DATE walk to an outside recreation area which measured QUANTITY . According to the documents provided by the Government , disciplinary cell no . CARDINAL measured QUANTITY , contained CARDINAL sleeping places but accommodated CARDINAL inmates . The outside yard provided QUANTITY for each inmate .