Julia Laffranque;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Ksenija Turković

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She was represented before the ORG by PERSON , an advocate practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant sustained an injury at work .

On DATE the applicant brought a civil action in ORG ( PERSON ) against her employer , company ORG , seeking compensation for pecuniary and non - pecuniary damage sustained .

On DATE the applicant ’s statement of claim was forwarded to the defendant , which responded to it on DATE by arguing that the injury had been exclusively her fault and by objecting to the level of compensation sought . The applicant made further submissions on DATE .

On DATE , CARDINAL May , DATE and DATE the applicant urged the court to schedule a hearing

The first hearing in the case was held on DATE at which the applicant asked the court to obtain an opinion of a medical expert and opposed the defendant ’s proposal to examine certain witnesses .

On CARDINAL DATE the court decided to obtain an opinion of a forensic expert in medicine and invited the applicant to advance the costs thereof . The applicant did so on DATE .

On DATE the expert submitted his opinion suggesting that a further expert opinion of an expert in psychiatry be obtained .

On DATE the defendant submitted its comments on the expert opinion whereas the applicant did so on DATE . In her submissions she endorsed the proposal to obtain a further expert opinion of an expert in psychiatry and amended her action in accordance with the opinion of a medical expert already obtained .

On DATE the court decided to obtain an opinion of a forensic expert in psychiatry .

On DATE the expert in psychiatry submitted her opinion .

On DATE the applicant commented on the expert opinion and amended her action accordingly whereas , on DATE , the defendant contested that opinion .

On DATE the court held a hearing at which it heard the parties and the CARDINAL experts and examined CARDINAL witnesses .

Further hearings were held on DATE and DATE . At the latter hearing the court closed the main hearing and scheduled a hearing for pronouncement of the judgment for DATE .

By a judgment pronounced on DATE ORG ruled for the applicant and awarded her CARDINAL NORP kunas ( HRK ) in compensation together with the accrued statutory default interest and HRK CARDINAL in costs .

On DATE the defendant appealed against that judgment .

By a decision of DATE ORG dismissed the appeal by the defendant and upheld the first - instance judgment which thereby became final .

Meanwhile , on DATE the applicant lodged a request for protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time with the President of ORG . She relied on CARDINAL of the CARDINAL Courts Act ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the President issued a decision holding that the applicant ’s request was well - founded and ordering the judge hearing the case to give a decision in the above civil proceedings within DATE .

Section CARDINAL of LAW on LAW ( PERSON o PERSON , ORG no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL with subsequent amendments– “ LAW ” ) , reads as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) Anyone may lodge a constitutional complaint with ORG if he or she deems that the decision of a ORG authority , local or regional government , or a legal person vested with public authority , on his or her rights or obligations , or as regards suspicion or accusation of a criminal offence , has violated his or her human rights or fundamental freedoms , or the right to local or regional government , guaranteed by LAW ( ‘ constitutional rights’ ) ...

( CARDINAL ) If another legal remedy is available in respect of the violation of the constitutional rights [ complained of ] , the constitutional complaint may be lodged only after this remedy has been exhausted .

( CARDINAL ) In matters in which an administrative action or , in civil and non - contentious proceedings , an appeal on points of law [ revizija ] is available , remedies shall be considered exhausted only after a decision on these legal remedies has been given . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) The Constitutional Court shall examine a constitutional complaint even before all legal remedies have been exhausted if the relevant court has failed to decide within a reasonable time on the rights or obligations of a party [ to the proceedings ] or as regards a suspicion or accusation of a criminal offence ...

( CARDINAL ) If it finds the constitutional complaint for failure to decide within a reasonable time referred to in paragraph CARDINAL of this section well - founded , the Constitutional Court shall set a time - limit within which the relevant court must decide the case on the merits ...

( CARDINAL ) In a decision issued under paragraph CARDINAL of this section , the Constitutional Court shall award appropriate compensation to the complainant for the violation of his or her constitutional right ... to a hearing within a reasonable time . The compensation shall be paid from the ORG budget within DATE on which a request for payment is lodged . ”

The relevant provisions of LAW of DATE ( Zakon o sudovima , ORG no . CARDINAL ) , which entered into force on DATE , read as follows :

“ A party to judicial proceedings which considers that the competent court did not decide within a reasonable time on its rights or obligations , or on a suspicion or accusation of a criminal offence , shall have the right to judicial protection in accordance with this LAW . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) The legal remedies for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time are :

The request for protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time ,

NORP The request for payment of appropriate compensation for the violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time .

( CARDINAL ) In the proceedings for deciding the requests referred to in paragraph CARDINAL of this section the rules of non - contentious procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis , and , in principle , no hearing shall be held . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) The request for protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time shall be lodged with the court before which the proceedings are pending .

( CARDINAL ) The request shall be decided by the President of the court unless he or she is the judge hearing the case , in which situation the request shall be decided by the Vice - President of the court .

( CARDINAL ) NORP The President of the court shall , within DATE of the receipt of the request , demand the judge hearing the case [ to submit ] a report on the length of the proceedings and the reasons why [ they ] have not been completed , as well as an opinion on the period within which the case could be decided . The President of the court may himself or herself inspect the case - file .

( CARDINAL ) The judge hearing the case shall submit the report immediately , but DATE from the time the President of the court demanded him or her to do so .

( CARDINAL ) In deciding on the request the President of the court shall in particular take into account the type of the case , [ its ] factual and legal complexity , the conduct of the parties and of the court .

( CARDINAL ) The President of the court shall decide on the request within DATE of its receipt . ”

( CARDINAL ) If the judge does not decide the case within the specified time - limit , he or she must within DATE of its expiry , submit a written report to the President of the court giving reasons for having failed to do so . The President of the ORG shall without delay forward the judge ’s report and his or her [ own ] observations to President of the immediately higher court and to ORG . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) If the President of the court finds the request unfounded , he or she shall dismiss it by a decision against which the [ requesting ] party shall have the right to appeal within DATE of the receipt of the decision .

( CARDINAL ) The [ requesting ] party shall have the right to appeal also when the President of the court , within DATE from receiving it , does not decide on the request .

( CARDINAL ) The appeal shall be decided by the President of the immediately higher court . If the request concerns the proceedings pending before ORG , the appeal shall be decided by a panel of CARDINAL judges of that court . The President of the immediately higher court or the panel may dismiss the appeal as unfounded and uphold the first - instance decision or reverse [ that ] decision . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) If the court does not decide on the case referred to in LAW of this LAW within the specified time - limit , the [ requesting ] party may within a further period of DATE lodge a request for payment of appropriate compensation for the violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time with the immediately higher court .

( CARDINAL ) If the request concerns the proceedings pending before ORG , ORG or ORG , the request shall be decided by ORG .

( CARDINAL ) The request referred to in paragraph CARDINAL of this section shall be decided by a decision of a single judge .

( CARDINAL ) If the request concerns the proceedings pending before ORG , the request shall be decided by a panel of CARDINAL judges of that court .

( CARDINAL ) The immediately higher court shall decide on the request within DATE . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) The immediately higher court or the panel of ORG shall specify the time - limit within which the court before which the proceedings are pending must decide the case , and shall award [ the requesting party ] appropriate compensation for the violation of his or her right to a hearing within a reasonable time .

( CARDINAL ) The total amount of appropriate compensation awarded in CARDINAL case may not exceed CARDINAL NORP kunas .

( CARDINAL ) An appeal , to be lodged within DATE with ORG , lies against the decision on the request for payment of adequate compensation for the violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable . The appeal shall be decided by a panel of CARDINAL judges of that court , and , if the decision was rendered by the panel of ORG referred to in section CARDINAL paragraph CARDINAL of this Act , the appeal shall be decided by a panel of CARDINAL judges of that court .

( CARDINAL ) The decision awarding appropriate compensation for the violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time shall immediately after becoming final be forwarded to the President of the court before which the violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time occurred , to the President of ORG and to ORG .

( CARDINAL ) The compensation referred to in paragraph CARDINAL of this section shall be paid out of the ORG budget .

( CARDINAL ) If the case referred to in paragraph CARDINAL of this section is not decided within the specified time - limit , the court president must within DATE of its expiry , submit a written report to the President of the immediately higher court and ORG giving reasons for having failed to do so . ”

“ If before ORG proceedings have been instituted for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time and the Government ’s representative before ORG has requested information on the case from the [ domestic ] court before which the proceedings [ complained of ] are pending , that court shall inform the President of the immediately higher court , the President of ORG and ORG of the Government representative ’s request and of the reasons for the delay . ”

“ Requests for protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time received before the entry into force of this Act shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of LAW . ”

On DATE ORG issued a decision no . ORG , where it held that complainants wishing to lodge constitutional complaints under LAW of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) to complain about the excessive length of ongoing judicial proceedings were first required to make full use of remedies available under LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . It therefore declared inadmissible a constitutional complaint lodged under LAW of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) by the complainant who did not attempt to avail herself of those remedies before lodging her constitutional complaint . ORG decision was published in ORG no . CARDINAL of DATE . The relevant part of that decision reads as follows :

“ CARDINAL . It follows from the foregoing that since the introduction in DATE in the domestic legal system of a new remedy ( a request for protection of the right to hearing within a reasonable under sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the DATE LAW ) , a constitutional complaint under section CARDINAL of LAW was no longer the only remedy in GPE for protection of the constitutional right to a hearing within a reasonable time . In other words , ORG was no longer competent for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time in the first instance ...


CASE OF OSMANOĞLU AND KOCABAŞ v. SWITZERLAND

No violation of Article 9 - Freedom of thought conscience and religion (Article 9-1 - Freedom of religion;Manifest religion or belief)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE .

The first applicant , who was born in GPE , moved to GPE at DATE . On completing a business - studies course in GPE , he returned temporarily to GPE to attend classes in NORP studies ; while there , he met the second applicant , who became his wife . She moved to GPE in DATE under the provisions for family reunion . When the present application was lodged she was on a training course to become a playgroup leader ( Spielgruppenleiterin ) . The first applicant speaks fluent PERSON .

Three daughters were born to the applicants , on DATE , DATE and DATE respectively . The present application concerns only the first CARDINAL daughters . They were initially enrolled in the GPE primary school in GPE . The eldest daughter subsequently attended an “ orientation school ” ( PERSON , between the primary and secondary levels ) .

Swimming lessons are part of the compulsory school curriculum ; under the applicable legislation in the canton of ORG , pupils can not be exempted until they reach puberty ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . This fact was brought to the applicants’ attention on CARDINAL DATE through a recommendation entitled “ Guidelines on dealing with religious matters in schools ” ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The applicants , who are devout NORP , refused to send their daughters to the swimming lessons on the grounds that their beliefs prohibited them from allowing their children to take part in mixed swimming lessons . They stated that although the Koran did not instruct women to cover their bodies until puberty , their beliefs required them to prepare their daughters for the precepts that would be applied to them from that point onwards . As the holders of parental responsibility for their daughters , the applicants alleged that there been a violation of their own rights .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE , ORG of the GPE of ORG ( ORG Basel - Stadt ) advised the applicants that under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW of the GPE of ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , they were liable to a maximum fine of MONEY ( CHF ) ( around QUANTITY ( ORG ) ) each if their daughters did not comply with the obligation to attend school .

On DATE the head teacher of the school held a meeting with the applicants in order to resolve the situation . The applicants continued to refuse to send their daughters to the swimming lessons . By letters of CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE , the applicants were again invited to send their daughters to the swimming lessons . In spite of these attempts by the school , the NORP daughters continued to be absent from the swimming lessons .

On DATE and DATE the school authorities asked the Head of ORG to open fixed - penalty proceedings against the applicants . On DATE the applicants were invited to comment again as part of those proceedings .

By a letter of DATE , the education authorities ordered the applicants to pay a fine of CHF CARDINAL ( about ORG CARDINAL ) per parent and per child ( a total of MONEY – about LAW ) for acting in breach of their parental duties ( see section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW of the GPE of ORG , paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

An appeal by the applicants against that decision was dismissed by ORG of the GPE of ORG ( ORG Basel - Stadt ) on DATE .

Drawing on its leading decision of DATE ( see ORG judgment CARDINAL I CARDINAL ; paragraph CARDINAL below ) , ORG , by a judgment of DATE , dismissed an appeal by the applicants , holding that the authorities’ refusal to exempt their daughters from mixed swimming lessons in primary school had not breached the applicants’ right to freedom of conscience and belief .

It accepted that this refusal represented a breach of freedom of religion . Nonetheless , it considered that the swimming lessons formed part of the compulsory school curriculum in the GPE of ORG and that this obligation had a sufficiently solid legal basis . It cited , firstly , section CARDINAL of LAW of the GPE of ORG , which stated that gymnastics was CARDINAL of the compulsory lessons in primary school , and CARDINAL of the same LAW , stating that TIME of the ORG DATE timetable was to be spent in physical education . It also held that , under section CARDINAL of the Act , boys and girls at primary - school level were , in principle , to attend classes together . It further stated that , in accordance with section CARDINAL of the Act , the precise organisation of this subject , especially the various lessons and the number of hours allocated to them , was set out in the curriculum , point CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL of which provided that swimming formed part of compulsory gymnastics and sports lessons .

ORG then pointed out that pupils could be exempted from lessons or from certain subjects , and any such decision was to be taken by the school authorities at the request of teachers or of persons responsible for the children ’s education ( section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW ; see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . It noted that detailed information on exemptions was set out in point CARDINAL of ORG Schulordnung ) of the GPE of ORG , and that the arrangements for dealing with religious issues in schools were included in a ORG ) that had been issued by ORG of the GPE of ORG in DATE . It added that , under point CARDINAL of that recommendation , exemption from swimming classes could only be granted to pupils who had reached the age of puberty . It also indicated that from DATE of school ( that is , generally when pupils had reached DATE ) , girls and boys attended physical education and swimming lessons separately ( point CARDINAL of the recommendation ) .

ORG further held that the ORG argument that the recommendation had no legal validity was irrelevant in this case , in so far as , in its view , the recommendation was in any event merely a tool to assist in balancing the competing interests involved in reaching a decision on an exemption request . It also considered the fact that swimming was not taught in all the GPE ’s schools and that ice - skating , which also appeared as a lesson in the curriculum , was not taught at all in practice , to be irrelevant in assessing the legal basis .

ORG accordingly concluded that the measure had a valid legal basis .

As to the public interest and the proportionality of the interference , ORG upheld the lower court ’s judgment to the effect that it was of paramount importance to ensure that children were integrated , irrespective of their origin , culture or religion . It further considered that the interference was lessened by the fact that the swimming lessons were mixed only until DATE , and that the impact of the measure was attenuated by the accompanying measures ( separate changing rooms and showers , and the option of wearing a burkini ) .

ORG also found irrelevant the applicants’ argument that their children were receiving private swimming lessons , holding that what was at stake for the children was not simply learning to swim , but also submitting to the conditions surrounding the teaching itself ( äussere PERSON des Unterrichts ) . It held that the school ’s function of social integration , valid in respect of all pupils , required that exemptions for swimming classes be granted only sparingly . The refusal to grant an exemption in the present case thus corresponded to its new practice , according to which educational obligations were , in principle , to be recognised as prevailing over compliance with the religious precepts ( religiöse Gebote ) of CARDINAL part of the population . For that reason , the comparison with exemptions granted for medical reasons was also irrelevant .

Having regard to the foregoing factors , ORG concluded that the refusal to grant an exemption from the mixed swimming classes had not breached the applicants’ right to freedom of religion .


Aleš Pejchal;André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Ganna Yudkivska;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicants , Mr PERSON , PERSON ORG , Mr PERSON are NORP nationals and PERSON is a NORP national . They all live in GPE and they were born respectively in DATE , DATE , DATE , and DATE . They were represented by PERSON , a lawyer practising in ORG .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON , Attorney General .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

Following a project launched by the ORG in DATE asking the public to identify features of the NORP cultural and natural heritage which deserved to be included in ORG for the protection of the environment , a villager suggested protecting the picturesque view , across open sloping fields leading down to the sea , which was visible from north of GPE , GPE , in the area at issue in the present case .

NORP Some time later – the Government having accepted the proposal –procedures for the execution of the project commenced . In DATE the Commissioner of Land ( CoL ) expropriated a plot of land in the above - mentioned area – it is not clear whether this land belonged exclusively to the applicants or in part also to ORG DATE in order to widen an existing road and develop an open panoramic view , known locally as a “ belvedere ” . In the development phase of the belvedere , the Government demolished a rubble wall on the boundary between expropriated land and the applicants’ property and installed iron railings to permit an unobstructed view . In due course the area became a designated belvedere , with an unobstructed view overlooking the fields sloping down to the sea . No dispute arose in relation to this ( first ) expropriation . The applicants’ property abuts immediately onto and is slightly below the site of the belvedere and is , in effect , part of the view from the said belvedere and part of the sloping fields .

On an unspecified date the applicants sought planning permission to develop the remaining part of the land owned by them , but ORG refused the application on the grounds that the site , although within a development zone , was a protected green area .

Subsequently , on DATE , the applicants brought an action against the ORG , asking the court to declare that they had the right to erect a wall on the boundary between their land and the expropriated plot ( see Relevant domestic law ) . The ORG did not submit any pleas countering the claim , although he was served with the claim on DATE .

Since the applicants did not own all the land expropriated in conjunction with the belvedere , the wall in question would not have been built along the entire length of the belvedere . It would only have been built on the CARDINAL plots owned by the applicants , these being QUANTITY and QUANTITY wide respectively . Although not specified , from the photos and plans provided it would appear that the entire belvedere is QUANTITY long .

The case was set down for hearing for DATE . On DATE ORG ( ORG ) in its superior jurisdiction gave judgment in default , upholding the ORG claim , finding that they had the right to build such a “ boundary ” wall and authorising them to build such a wall “ up to the height required by law ” under the supervision of a court - appointed architect .

Since no appeal was lodged , the judgment became final .

In the ensuing DATE , numerous applications were made to the court by both parties to the suit in respect of technical issues connected with the execution of the above - mentioned judgment , that is , the erection of the proposed wall ( these included the removal of items installed on the belvedere so that the wall could be constructed , the question of distances , given the sloping terrain , and the manner in which the boundary wall should be built – over which the ORG disagreed with the interpretation of the architect ) . A decision in the form of a decree of CARDINAL DATE , given pursuant to CARDINAL of the applications , held that the wall had to be built along the boundaries of the land expropriated for the purposes of the belvedere ( where a retaining wall already existed ) and that it had to be QUANTITY high measured “ from the belvedere ” . A request by the ORG to have the height of the wall measured from the boundaries ( the level where the properties met ) and not from the surface level of the belvedere was rejected on DATE . The court therefore rejected the ORG ’s interpretation as to how the wall had to be built .

NORP The execution of the judgment of DATE was to take place on DATE .

On DATE the President of GPE declared that as from DATE the Minister for ORG was to assume the additional duties of Prime Minister during the Prime Minister ’s absence from GPE . By virtue of a declaration made by the acting President of GPE on DATE , a piece of land QUANTITY ) owned by the applicants DATE which included part of the strip of land on which they were to build the boundary wall – was expropriated by the ORG for the price of MONEY ( ORG ) .

On DATE the ORG asked the court to suspend execution of the judgment in the applicants’ favour in view of the above - mentioned expropriation , which included part of the applicants’ land adjacent to the existing retaining wall . According to the ORG there was a public interest in the expropriation for the purposes of safeguarding the environment and particularly the belvedere ( and the view therefrom ) , built at the expense of the taxpayer , from the actions proposed by the applicants .

On DATE the court rejected the request as it could not suspend the execution of a judgment which had become final and in respect of which there had been no appeal or retrial .

On DATE the ORG lodged a further application asking the court to prohibit the applicants from undertaking any works on the aforementioned plot by reason of the expropriation of DATE . Given the circumstances , the applicants agreed not to proceed with the building of the wall until the competent court had decided on the validity of the second expropriation . That being so , the court did not consider it necessary to issue the relevant prohibitory injunction .

On DATE the applicants lodged a judicial protest noting that they were not accepting the compensation offered and declaring their intention to institute constitutional redress proceedings in relation to the expropriation .

On DATE the ORG instituted fresh ordinary civil proceedings , asking the court to declare that the land where the wall was to be built was Government land , to declare the decision of DATE null and void – given that the land on which the wall was to be built had now been expropriated for a public purpose DATE and to revoke any other court decision issued after the DATE intended to establish the boundaries between the property of the ORG and that of the applicants .

The hearing of the case was suspended in view of the constitutional redress proceedings lodged by the applicants ( see below ) . It does not transpire that they have been resumed .

On DATE the applicants instituted constitutional redress proceedings claiming a violation of LAW in so far as they had been denied execution of a judgment in their favour – and LAW No . CARDINAL to the Convention in that the expropriation of DATE had not been in the public interest . They further invoked LAW .

By a judgment of DATE ORG ( FAC ) in its constitutional competence rejected the ORG claims . It considered that under domestic law an owner had no right to be exempted from an expropriation of property which was carried out in the public interest and in exchange for adequate compensation . That being so , no fair - trial rights arose in relation to the expropriation itself , the right of the individual being limited to contesting the public interest and the compensation at issue in any given expropriation . It held that in the present case the expropriation in DATE had been made in the public interest to ensure the effectiveness of the DATE expropriation , the public interest of which ( the creation of a belvedere ) was not disputed . The fact that certain third parties ( people living in the area of GPE ) had more to gain than others did not deprive the expropriation of its public interest , given that the entire NORP and GPE population would benefit from the view . There was nothing wrong in the ORG ensuring that a plan it had embarked on DATE before was not frustrated . The court considered that , while the ORG ’s negligence in the proceedings before ORG in GPE was grave , they had been entitled to take action to correct their mistakes . It further considered that there had not been any discriminatory treatment . The project in DATE had been started by a socialist Government and then continued by a nationalist Government , and neither the initiation nor the continuation thereof appeared to have been politically motivated . Both administrations were taking action solely for the preservation of the environment . Moreover , while it was true that the DATE expropriation had been made at a time when the Minister for GPE was acting Prime Minister and that such an action probably brought most benefit to the residents of GPE – who were , in the main , of the same political persuasion as the Minister for GPE – it did not appear that the expropriation ( which had been decided on DATE , that is to say prior to the Minister ’s being assigned the duties of acting Prime Minister ) was a result of any intervention on her part . Neither had it been proved that the applicants were treated differently from others in their position or that the expropriation had been politically motivated .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG rejected an appeal lodged by the applicants . It confirmed in full the first - instance judgment in respect of the claim under LAW No . CARDINAL , as the expropriation was indeed necessary to protect the view which was in the general interest and which would have been frustrated by the building of a wall . It further considered that the applicants had not been denied access to a court as they could still contest the merits of the expropriation in relation to the public interest and the amount of compensation . The fact that the applicants had a judicially recognised right over that land ( in the instant case , the right to build a dividing wall when CARDINAL properties belong to different owners ) did not mean that that land could not be expropriated in accordance with the existing legal procedures , subject always to the judicial review of the administrative act of expropriation . Lastly , in relation to the complaint under LAW it considered that – even if the Minister had been involved in the expropriation – it had already been found that the expropriation was legitimate , and it was self - evident that a minister had to act , even if it happened that the beneficiaries shared the same political opinion . In the court ’s view , the argument that – unlike the applicants – the neighbours had direct access to the Minister , enabling them to influence decision - making , did not mean that there had been discriminatory treatment . Similarly , the fact that other people ’s property had not been expropriated did not mean that the expropriation was discriminatory , as not everyone ’s property was relevant for the purpose sought to be achieved by the expropriation . Moreover , the applicants were entitled to compensation for the taking of their property .

Pending the proceedings before this ORG and after the parties had submitted their observations , by means of a publication in ORG of DATE , the President of GPE revoked the President ’s Declaration of DATE which had expropriated the applicants’ land .

According to information submitted by the parties , the applicants became aware of the revocation on an unspecified DATE , DATE after it happened . Subsequently , the applicants informed ORG , who according to the applicants was unaware that the measure had been lifted . The parties met and agreed that the Government agent would inform the ORG about the matter .

The ORG was eventually informed of the matter on DATE , both parties having claimed that the delay in informing the ORG was due to an oversight and a lack of co - ordination , for which they apologised to the ORG .

Article CARDINAL of LAW , LAW of LAW reads :

“ Every person may construct any wall or building on the boundary - line of his tenement , saving the right of the neighbour to acquire co - ownership of the wall ( ... ) ”

LAW , in so far as relevant reads :

“ A party - wall between CARDINAL courtyards , gardens or fields , may be built of loose stones , but must be -

( c ) CARDINAL and QUANTITY high , if it is between CARDINAL fields . ”


Violation of Article 14+8 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for private life;Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Georges Ravarani;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a request for a residence permit in GPE on the grounds of family reunification with her partner , PERSON , who was living in NORP . She submitted that she had been educated in GPE and that she had lived in GPE for DATE . She also explained that she wanted to live with PERSON , with whom she had been in a relationship for DATE , and with whom she wanted to establish a household and start a business .

By a letter dated DATE PERSON stated that she owned a house in NORP where she wanted to live with the applicant . She explained that she had been in a relationship with the applicant for DATE and that they wanted to live together so as to avoid constant travelling and the distance between them .

During the proceedings ORG FAC uprava GPE - moslovačka ) found that the applicant and PERSON had been in a relationship since DATE and that in order to maintain their relationship they had been travelling to see each other . It was also established that the applicant had recently stayed with PERSON in the period between DATE and DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request with a summary reasoning indicating that all the relevant requirements under LAW had not been met .

The applicant appealed against that decision to ORG ( ORG unutarnjih poslova ; hereinafter : the “ Ministry ” ) , arguing that it could be inferred from the decision of ORG that her request had been dismissed because LAW did not allow family reunification for same - sex couples . She considered that there had been no grounds for a difference in treatment based on sexual orientation and that the relevant law should not be construed in a manner that allowed for such a possibility . She relied , inter alia , on LAW and the Prohibition of Discrimination Act , arguing that even if she was not to be considered as PERSON ’s “ immediate family member ” , within the meaning of LAW , she should in any case be considered as her “ other relative ” within the meaning of that LAW .

On DATE the ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal and upheld the decision of ORG . The relevant part of the ORG ’s decision reads :

“ Concerning the family reunification , based on which the request for the regularisation of the status of an alien in GPE has been submitted in the case at issue , [ it is to be noted that ] the case file shows that the appellant relies on the existence of a same - sex relationship with the NORP national PERSON , which has allegedly lasted for DATE ...

The impugned decision shows that the [ first - instance body ] , other than citing the [ relevant ] provisions of LAW , also cited CARDINAL of LAW , according to which the effects of an extramarital relationship , that is to say the rights and obligations following from its existence , relate to a union between an unmarried woman and man which has lasted for DATE , or less if a child was born of [ the union ] ; and section CARDINAL of the Same - Sex Union Act ... which defines a same - sex union as a union CARDINAL persons of the same sex ( partners ) who are not married , or in an extramarital relationship or other same - sex union , which has lasted for DATE and which is based on the principles of equality of partners , mutual respect and assistance as well as the emotional bonds of partners .

It follows that the [ Same - Sex Union ] Act does not define a same - sex union as a family and LAW does not cover same - sex unions . It should also be taken into account that the provisions of LAW concerning temporary residence for family reunification do not provide for a possibility of regularisation of the status of an alien on the grounds of [ the existence of ] a same - sex union , nor does such a union fall within the scope of [ the term ] ‘ immediate family member’ incorporated in that LAW , which makes it clear that there is no legal ground for granting the request of the appellant .

Therefore , the appellant wrongly considers that the first - instance body should have applied section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW in her case ... because that provision clearly provides that exceptionally to the provision defining immediate family members , ‘ other ORG could be so considered if there are specific personal or serious humanitarian reasons for a family reunification in GPE . ”

On DATE the applicant lodged an administrative action with ORG ( GPE ) , arguing that she had been discriminated against in comparison to different - sex couples who had a possibility to seek family reunification under LAW . She relied on the domestic anti - discrimination legislation , including LAW , as well as the LAW and the ORG ’s case - law .

ORG dismissed the applicant ’s action on DATE . The relevant part of the judgment provides :

“ The cited section DATE ) and ( CARDINAL ) of LAW provides that the immediate family members are spouses or persons who live in an extramarital relationship in accordance with NORP legislation . The cited sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW show that marriage and extramarital relationship are unions between a man and a woman . Thus , union between CARDINAL same - sex persons can not be considered under the relevant legal provisions as marriage or an extramarital relationship .

Union between CARDINAL same - sex persons can be considered under the legal term same - sex union under the conditions provided for in section QUANTITY of the Same - Sex Union Act . However , given the limited legal effects of a same - sex union , the possible existence of such a union does not represent a basis for family reunification . It should be noted that LAW of the [ Aliens ] Act explicitly enumerates persons who are to be considered immediate family members or who are to be exceptionally considered [ so ] , which leads to a conclusion that it can not be extended to cover persons living in a same - sex union .

Accordingly , the granting of a request for temporary residence of an alien on the grounds of family reunification depends on the satisfaction of the requirements under sections DATE and CARDINAL of LAW . In the case at issue the plaintiff is neither married nor in an extramarital relationship with the NORP national PERSON , which is not in dispute between the parties . It therefore follows that the plaintiff can not be considered an immediate family member within the meaning of section CARDINAL § CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of the [ Aliens ] Act and thus she did not justify the purpose ( in the concrete case : family reunification ) for which a temporary residence of an alien in GPE can be granted ...

In view of the cited legal provisions , and the facts of the case , this court finds that in the concrete case it was not possible to grant the plaintiff ’s request . ”

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) , contending that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her sexual orientation . She relied on the ORG and the relevant domestic anti - discrimination legislation , and she cited the ORG ’s case - law on the question of discrimination related to sexual orientation .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s constitutional complaint , endorsing the reasoning of the lower bodies . The relevant part of the decision reads :

“ CARDINAL . ORG reiterates that discrimination under LAW does not have an independent standing for a constitutional complaint but must be submitted in conjunction with another ( substantive ) constitutional right . Discrimination means difference in the treatment of persons in the same or relevantly similar situations without an objective and reasonable justification . LAW contains constitutional guarantee against discrimination on any ground in securing a concrete right .

Although the appellant relied in her constitutional complaint in LAW and the related LAW , the Constitutional Court finds that these provisions are not applicable in the case at issue .

In the proceedings before it , ORG did not find facts or circumstances which would suggest that in the proceedings before [ the lower bodies ] the appellant was discriminated against on any ground ... Thus her complaint of a violation of LAW , the Constitutional Court finds unfounded .

ORG also notes that the appellant , in the concrete case , did not show that she has used the legal avenue under LAW ...

There has therefore been no violation of her constitutional right under LAW CARDINAL of the LAW .

The case - law of ORG cited in the constitutional complaint is of no relevance for the case at issue since it relates to cases concerning health insurance and inheritance of tenancy rights by same - sex partners living in a stable ( de facto ) relationship . ”


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 6+6-3-d - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-d - Examination of witnesses)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Ledi Bianku;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

At the time of the events he was a lawyer practising in that city .

On DATE the applicant was questioned by the public prosecutor at ORG , on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation , namely ORG . The contents of a computer disk holding detailed information on the applicant ’s background , which had been obtained by the security forces in a house belonging to ORG , and police statements of CARDINAL people , all of whom were accused of being members of the same illegal organisation , were read out to him during the questioning . The applicant denied having any affiliation with the illegal organisation and contested the accuracy of the evidence presented to him . He maintained that he had assisted certain members of ORG as a lawyer and that he always acted within the limits of his profession , without directing those people ’s submissions as alleged . He further maintained that certain information in the illegal organisation ’s background report , such as the ages of his siblings , was wrong and that this in itself proved that he had not provided the information . He did not benefit from the assistance of a lawyer during questioning .

On DATE the applicant gave statements before the investigating judge of ORG , this time together with his business partner , who was accused of being a member of the same illegal organisation . He reiterated his submissions given to the public prosecutor and added that the fact that he had provided legal assistance to some members of the illegal organisation might have been perceived as a demonstration of support by certain people . The investigating judge refused the public prosecutor ’s request for the applicant ’s detention and decided that he should be released pending trial .

The following day , on DATE , the public prosecutor objected to the applicant ’s release . The applicant was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant issued by ORG .

On DATE the applicant was taken before the investigating judge , who decided that he should be detained on remand .

On DATE the public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with ORG , accusing the applicant of membership of an illegal organisation . He relied on the police statements of the CARDINAL witnesses as well as the background information obtained from the computer disk .

On an unspecified date the applicant ’s lawyers lodged a petition with the trial court . They argued that there was no evidence against the applicant in that all of the witnesses relied on by the prosecution had denied their statements later on . They further stated that the background information obtained from the computer disk was not reliable .

At the hearing on CARDINAL DATE the applicant ’s lawyers once again challenged the use of the background information obtained from the computer disk , arguing that it was unreliable in that the disk had been de - encrypted and the information extracted in their absence . During the same hearing , the court noted that the CARDINAL witnesses , who had mentioned the applicant in their police statements , had denied those submissions during the subsequent stages of the proceedings against them . The court held that the applicant should be released pending trial .

On DATE , following statements made by a certain ORG , the public prosecutor drew up another bill of indictment against the applicant , once again accusing him of membership of an illegal organisation . The allegations put forward by this latter indictment were joined with the case which was already pending before ORG .

At the hearing on DATE , during which the applicant was not present , ORG ’s police statements were read out . On DATE the court noted that ORG had denied those statements at a later point .

On an unspecified date the public prosecutor submitted his written observations to the court . He argued that the applicant ’s guilt was proven by various items of evidence , namely the background report prepared in respect of him , which contained detailed personal information , as well as the background reports and police statements of several other members of ORG . In that connection , he referred to the statements of a certain GPE , who had maintained before both the police and the public prosecutor that the applicant had been a recruiter for the illegal organisation , had given courses to new members and had been in charge of certain cells . The public prosecutor also noted that the applicant ’s name had been mentioned in the background reports of several members , including a certain Ş.A.

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer applied for the expansion of the investigation and the cross - examination of the witnesses who had confirmed the applicant ’s membership of ORG . He mentioned , in particular , the names of GPE and Ş.A. , who had given statements against the applicant . The applicant ’s lawyer further challenged the credibility of these two ORG statements . In that connection , he argued that ORG had not repeated his police statements against the applicant at a later point as alleged by the public prosecutor in his written opinion . The lawyer further noted that ORG had claimed to have taken courses run by the applicant until the latter started his military service and asked the trial court to obtain information as regards the dates the applicant had served in the army in order to prove that those allegations were not credible .

On DATE the court refused the application for the expansion of the investigation , without stating anything as regards the cross - examination of witnesses .

On DATE the applicant applied to benefit from the Reintegration of Offenders into LAW ( Law no . DATE ) .

During the course of the proceedings , ORG were abolished and the case was transferred to ORG .

At the hearing on DATE ORG read out the police statements of ORG , in which he had claimed that the applicant had acted as a mentor within the illegal organisation and had given courses to other members , including him , which had ended when the applicant had started his military service . The trial court stated that although ORG had reiterated his submissions in so far as they concerned himself before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge , he had not mentioned the applicant after his questioning by the police . The court nevertheless added the statements of ORG to the case file . The applicant ’s lawyers maintained that they did not accept the statements against the applicant .

On DATE ORG found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment . The court relied on certain information obtained from the computer disk , namely the background report on the applicant and reports concerning other members , as well as the statements of GPE and Ş.A. It also refused the applicant ’s application to benefit from PERSON no . DATE , finding that he had not disclosed any information about the structure of the illegal organisation .

The applicant appealed against the judgment . He argued that the trial court had failed to hear evidence from GPE and Ş.A. despite his requests to that effect and that he had been deprived of the possibility to put his questions to them .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of ORG .


Carlo Ranzoni;Ganna Yudkivska;Marko Bošnjak;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Georges Ravarani

A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON , ORG Attorney . ORG and ORG , who had been notified by the Registrar of their right to intervene in the proceedings ( LAW CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Rules of Court ) , did not indicate that they intended to do so .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicants each instituted separate civil proceedings with ORG against their employer , the company PERSON , claiming the repayment of a loan which they had previously given it in the form of bonds .

On DATE the court decided to join the proceedings .

On DATE the ORG adjourned the case and ordered the ORG representative to submit within DATE an original power of attorney for the second and third applicants and new addresses in respect of all CARDINAL applicants . The time - limit for the submission of the documents was subsequently prolonged .

NORP The applicants’ representative submitted a fresh power of attorney in respect of the first applicant and requested a further extension of the time - limit with respect to the second and third applicants , which was granted . However , he did not submit the requested documents .

On DATE the ORG rejected the second and third applicants’ claims on procedural grounds for failure to present a valid power of attorney . The CARDINAL applicants appealed . Their appeals were dismissed by ORG on DATE .

On DATE ORG held a hearing in respect of the first applicant ’s claim and dismissed it . The first applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG dismissed the first applicant ’s appeal and he then lodged a constitutional complaint .

On DATE ORG rejected the constitutional complaint .

On DATE , after rejecting offers made by ORG , the applicants , relying on LAW on ORG ( “ the DATE Act ” ) , each separately brought claims in respect of non - pecuniary damage incurred due to alleged unreasonable length of proceedings . The cases were then dealt with jointly by ORG .

On DATE ORG found that the applicants’ right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached . It ordered the ORG to pay MONEY ( ORG ) to the first applicant , ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL to the second and the third applicant and ordered that each party had to bear their own costs . The court dismissed the remainder of the claims . The applicants appealed .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicants’ appeal .

For relevant domestic law with respect to length of proceedings see PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , CARDINAL DATE ) . In particular , section CARDINAL ) of the CARDINAL Act states that the provisions of LAW concerning small claims apply in proceedings concerning compensation for non - pecuniary damage , irrespective of the type or amount of claim .

The following provisions of LAW ( Official Gazette no . CARDINAL , with relevant amendments ) are relevant to the present case :

“ ( CARDINAL ) Where there has been a violation of human rights or fundamental freedoms , a constitutional complaint may , under the conditions determined by this LAW , be lodged against individual acts by which ORG authorities , local authorities , or bearers of public authority have decided on the rights , obligations , or legal entitlements of individuals or legal entities ... ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) ORG decides as a panel of CARDINAL ORG judges ( hereinafter referred to as a panel ) at a closed session whether to initiate proceedings on the basis of a constitutional complaint . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) A constitutional complaint is not admissible if the violation of human rights or fundamental freedoms [ alleged ] did not have serious consequences for the complainant .

( CARDINAL ) It is deemed that there has been no violation of human rights or fundamental freedoms having significant consequences for a complainant with regard to individual decisions :

– issued in small claims disputes in accordance with the act which regulates civil procedure , or in other disputes if the value in dispute for the complainant does not exceed the amount which is determined by the definition of small claims disputes in the act which regulates civil procedure ;

– concerning costs of proceedings , where such a decision alone has been challenged in the constitutional complaint ;

– issued in property trespass disputes ;

– issued in minor offence cases .

( CARDINAL ) Irrespective of the preceding paragraph , ORG may in particularly justified cases decide exceptionally on a constitutional complaint against the individual decisions referred to in the preceding paragraph , notably where the decision appealed against concerns an important constitutional question which goes beyond the importance of the actual case . ”

The Government submitted a number of decisions taken in cases falling under section CARDINAL ) of LAW in which ORG had accepted constitutional complaints for consideration on their merits .

In particular , they submitted CARDINAL decisions issued in minor offence proceedings ( Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ; Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL and Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ; Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ; Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ; Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ; Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ; Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ; Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ; Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ; Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ; and DATE of DATE ) , and CARDINAL decisions given in costs - only proceedings ( Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL and U - I-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE and Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ) .

Furthermore , they submitted CARDINAL ORG decisions in which the constitutional complaint had been lodged against lower court decisions issued in a small claims dispute or in which the value in dispute for the complainant did not exceed the amount determined by the definition of a small claim ( LAW ) . In decision no . Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ORG accepted a constitutional complaint for consideration which raised questions of discrimination against people with disabilities in a case concerning severance pay which was below LAW . Decision no . Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE concerned a defamation claim amounting to ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL , whereas the constitutional complaint involved raised freedom of expression issues . In decision no . Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ORG accepted a constitutional complaint for consideration in a case in which the disputed amount was lower than LAW but which raised questions of equal protection of rights .

In all of the above cases ORG concluded that the complainants had succeeded in arguing that their case represented an important constitutional question and had thus fulfilled the conditions for consideration of the constitutional complaint under section CARDINALa(CARDINAL ) of LAW .

The Government also referred to CARDINAL cases in which ORG had rejected constitutional complaints lodged against decisions in small claims disputes ( Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ; Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ; Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE ; GPE of DATE ; Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ; Up-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE ; and GPE of DATE ) . In such cases ORG examined in some detail whether the complainants had complied with the criterion of there being an important constitutional question at stake .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Päivi Hirvelä;Yonko Grozev

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant and her husband married in DATE under the statutory regime of common marital property , provided for by the provisions of the DATE LAW . Under the applicable provisions of that Code they had equal shares in their common property .

By an administrative decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( PERSON ) held that the applicant ’s husband , PERSON PERSON , was determined a candidate to purchase CARDINAL plots of land , nos . DATE and ORG , owned at that time by ORG and managed on its behalf by ORG ( Państwowy ORG ) . ORG , representing ORG at that time , was obliged to sell the land to him on the basis of that decision . The administrative body established a DATE time - limit for the sale contract to be concluded .

J.S. , PERSON and PERSON , who had also applied to purchase the plots of land concerned , appealed against this decision . On DATE the Director of ORG in GPE ( ORG ) dismissed the appeal brought by PERSON It further confirmed the entitlement to purchase the land created by the contested decision , considering , inter alia , that the plots concerned were adjacent to a farm owned and run by the applicant and her husband and that therefore they were natural candidates for the purchase . The authority referred to LAW DATE ( ustawa o sprzedaży nieruchomości Państwowego Funduszu PERSON ) .

By letters of DATE and DATE the Mayor of ORG ) informed the applicant and her husband that the decision of DATE confirmed by the decision of CARDINAL DATE could not be executed because PERSON had also contested it . The proceedings had therefore been re - opened ex officio . It was further stated that after the finalization of the appellate proceedings , the documents would be forwarded to ORG in GPE in order for the contract to be concluded . The DATE time - limit for the conclusion of the contract would start to run only after the decision became final .

On DATE the ORG ( Wojewoda ) upheld the validity of the decision of DATE . On DATE the Minister of Agriculture dismissed the appeals referred to in paragraph CARDINAL above . On DATE ORG in GPE dismissed the appeal brought by PERSON

Accordingly , the contested decision became final on an unspecified date in DATE .

On DATE a new local land development plan ( plan zagospodarowania przestrzennego ) was adopted by the FAC municipality .

On DATE the FAC Wojewoda ) gave an administrative decision transferring ownership of the land concerned to ORG ( NORP PERSON Rolnej PERSON ) in order for the DATE decision to be executed . The ORG appealed . On DATE the Minister of Agriculture quashed this decision . He found that under the provisions of the FAC land development plan of DATE the lands situated within the administrative limits of the municipality and intended for agricultural purposes were not to be owned by ORG and therefore not subject to transfer to the resources of the ORG .

ORG , when subsequently called by the applicant and her husband to execute the DATE decision by selling the land to them , refused to do so . In letters dated DATE and DATE and DATE addressed to the applicant and her husband , the municipality ’s executive board ( Zarząd miasta ) refused to transfer ownership to them essentially because the land concerned , situated within the administrative limits of the LOC municipality , had been designated for non - agricultural purposes under the DATE land development plan .

NORP In DATE the applicant called on the PERSON Governor ( PERSON ) to issue an administrative decision transferring ownership rights from ORG to the GPE municipality , but to no avail .

On an unspecified date the Szczecin Mayor ( representing the municipality ) requested the Governor ( representing ORG ) to take over the ownership of the plots of land concerned . On DATE the Governor refused to do so , relying on the Act of DATE on the management of ORG - owned agricultural property ( ustawa o gospodarowaniu nieruchomościami rolnymi PERSON oraz o zmianie niektórych ustaw ) . It was noted that under the DATE land development plan adopted by the GPE municipality , the plots no longer constituted agricultural land either within the meaning of LAW nor under the local land development plan . It could therefore not be transferred to the ORG representing ORG in the management of agricultural properties it owned as the agency had jurisdiction only in respect of land designated for agricultural uses . The Mayor appealed . On DATE the Minister of Agriculture upheld the contested decision . No appeal to the administrative court against this decision was lodged .

As a result , the land remained municipal property .

On DATE the applicant and her husband lodged a civil action against the Szczecin municipality . They requested the court , relying on LAW , to oblige the defendant municipality to sell the property concerned to the applicant ’s husband on the basis of the DATE decision ( roszczenie o złożenie oświadczenia woli ) . In response to the claim the defendant municipality asked for the action to be dismissed . It submitted that it did not own the land concerned . It was at that time owned by ORG . As the Governor had refused to give a decision on the transfer of ownership of that land to the municipality ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , the latter could not sell it . The municipality further argued that the claim to have the property sold to the applicants had become prescribed .

ORG , by a judgment of DATE , dismissed the claim . The applicant and her husband appealed .

On DATE ORG allowed the appeal , amended the contested judgment and allowed the claim . It dismissed the prescription objection . The court was of the view that the DATE prescription period provided for pecuniary claims under the provisions of LAW had started to run only in DATE when the DATE decision had become final ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

The court further obliged the municipality to sell the land concerned to the applicant and her husband . It was of the view that the first - instance court had erred in finding that neither the provisions of the DATE Sale of ORG ( ustawa o sprzedaży nieruchomości TIME PERSON ) nor the decision given in DATE and DATE ( see paragraphs DATE and CARDINAL above ) on the basis of that Act provided for an obligation on the part of the municipality to sell the land to the addressee of that decision . That decision created on the claimants’ part a claim of a pecuniary nature to have the sale contract concluded with them . They were not therefore obliged to participate in a tender which was simply another procedure for buying the land owned by the ORG , not applicable to their situation . The fact that the proceedings lasted until DATE because other persons had contested that decision did not affect the validity of their claim . Nor did the fact that the applicable provisions changed in DATE and the ownership of the land had thereby been transferred ex lege from ORG to the municipality ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) affect the existence and validity of the claim to have the purchase contract concluded or the corresponding obligation on the part of the public authorities .

In the operative part of the judgment the court expressly formulated the essential provisions of the sale contract to be concluded by GPE with the applicants , including the price of ORG CARDINAL to be paid for the plots . The court further ordered the municipality to cover the legal costs borne by the applicant and her husband in the amount of ORG CARDINAL .

NORP The defendant municipality appealed . Its appeal was rejected on DATE by ORG for having been lodged out of time .

On DATE the applicant and her husband paid ORG CARDINAL to the municipality , the amount being the difference between the price of ORG CARDINAL as determined by the judgment and ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL , the amount of court costs they had borne in the connection with the civil proceedings .

In DATE and DATE the applicant and her husband , referring to this judgment , called the municipality to sell the property to them , but to no avail .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG held that the statutory conjugal property of the applicant and her husband created ex lege by their marriage on DATE had been replaced by a separate marital property regime as from DATE .

On DATE the applicant and her husband lodged a civil action against GPE with the civil court requesting that steps be taken by that court to put right the discrepancies between the entry in the land register and the actual ownership of the plot ( powództwo o uzgodnienie ksiçgi wieczystej z rzeczywistym stanem prawnym ) . They referred to the judgment of ORG , summarised in paragraphs DATE above and requested that ORG be listed as owner of the land concerned .

The applicants also submitted an alternative claim asking the court to order ORG represented by the Mayor of ORG to sell the property to them . The Mayor was invited to participate in the proceedings .

The municipality argued before the court that it did not own the land . As the land was owned by ORG , the municipality could not sell it .

On DATE ORG dismissed the claim . Subsequently , on DATE ORG quashed this judgment on formal grounds and ordered that the case should be re - examined .

On DATE the ORG dismissed the claim against ORG – the Mayor of ORG Prezydentowi Miasta Szczecina ) and against the municipality of GPE ( pko PERSON ) . It noted that the relevant land register listed ORG as the owner of the plot . The land register could only be amended on the basis of an administrative decision issued by the Governor on the basis of section CARDINAL ) of ORG of DATE ( " LAW " ) confirming the ex lege transfer of ownership from ORG to the local municipality on the basis of that LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The Governor had never given a relevant administrative decision . The civil court had no jurisdiction to order administrative bodies to issue administrative decisions . In the absence of such a decision the ex lege transfer of ownership to the municipality provided for by law could not become operative . In the absence of such a transfer certified by a decision , ORG remained the land ’s owner . It was therefore impossible for the court to order the municipality to sell the plot to the claimant or to amend the land register in such a manner as to list the municipality as the owner . The judgment given in DATE was not res iudicata towards ORG as it was the municipality who had been the defendant in these proceedings .

The claimants appealed . They argued that they had already specified before the first - instance court that the claim was directed against both ORG and the municipality of GPE .

During the hearing before the appeal court the lawyer representing the applicant and her husband stated that he had corrected the content of the alternative claim ( as regards the entity who was supposed to make a declaration of intent ) already during the proceedings before the court of first instance .

The applicant ’s appeal was dismissed on DATE by ORG . The court shared the conclusions of the lower court . It was of the view that the claimants had not made it sufficiently clear that the alternative claim had been directed against both ORG and the municipality . Despite the fact that the plaintiffs had pointed out the mistake in their statement of claim which had been addressed against ORG , the court could not rectify that mistake ex officio .

ORG refused to entertain the cassation appeal against this judgment by a decision of DATE .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants alleged that they did not receive adequate medical care in detention and that there was no effective remedy in that regard . Some applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .