No violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court)

Carlo Ranzoni;Egidijus Kūris;Ganna Yudkivska;Iulia Motoc;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Georges Ravarani

NORP The applicant company is a legal entity registered in GPE .

In DATE the Government adopted a resolution establishing ORG for LAW ( hereafter “ the development plan ” ) . The main objectives of the development plan were published in ORG ( PERSON žinios ) ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The development plan explicitly indicated that the buildings with a former military objective , situated in the adjacent dunes , had to be removed ( nukeliami ) and the natural environment fully restored .

In DATE the Government decided to privatise the former NORP ( DATE GPE ) military buildings , without the land , in Juodkrantė , GPE , within LAW . There were CARDINAL military barracks , a canteen , a store house and CARDINAL sheds .

In DATE ORG carried out a public auction , at which the applicant company was the only participant and purchased the buildings for CARDINAL NORP litai ( ORG , MONEY ( ORG ) ) . The purchase agreement , which was concluded in DATE , indicated that the applicant company had to lease the land assigned to the buildings ( įsipareigoja išsinuomoti šiam objektui priskirtą žemės sklypą ) .

In DATE GPE decided to prepare a detailed plan of the area where the buildings were sited . The purpose of the plan was to designate a plot of land near the existing buildings , providing an opportunity to renovate the buildings or to build new recreational buildings .

In DATE the authorities in charge of ORG decided that renovation of the buildings had to meet the requirements applicable to the whole area . The buildings had to be integrated in the landscape ; as they were sited in the forest , the purpose of the use of the land had to be changed .

In DATE the LOC department of environmental protection decided that the purpose of the use of the land , on account of its specific location , could only be changed if the projects were approved by those managing protected areas or with the approval of ORG . In DATE the same department rejected a detailed plan submitted by the applicant company , seeking to amend the purpose of the land so that it became a recreational area .

NORP The applicant company instituted court proceedings , urging the court to declare unlawful the authorities’ rejection of the detailed plan proposed by the applicant company ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) and to oblige them to accept it .

The applicant company ’s claim was dismissed on DATE by ORG and on DATE by ORG . The courts held that in accordance with domestic law there was no possibility to build new recreational buildings in GPE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The courts thus held that the applicant company ’s detailed plan was contrary to the development plan .

NORP In DATE the applicant company asked the authorities to conclude a lease agreement in respect of the land assigned to the buildings . The authorities replied that the applicant company had to provide a plan of the land . However , as there was no detailed plan of the area , the land could not be leased . The applicant company was also obliged to pay the land tax .

The applicant company instituted court proceedings and complained that it had to pay the land tax but ORG on DATE and ORG on DATE held that it had to pay the land tax because it had been using the land in question .

In DATE the applicant company asked the authorities to include the land in question in the landscape management recreational zone . In DATE , ORG replied that the development plan of DATE indicated that the buildings had to be demolished . It said that it would formulate provisions in the explanatory report regarding the possibility to compensate the applicant company for the buildings . In this case , the applicant company would be able to acquire other buildings owned by the authorities .

In DATE the applicant company proposed that the land under its buildings be included in the recreational zone and that a compensation mechanism be determined for the buildings if the area had to be redeveloped . In DATE the authorities replied that the redevelopment of the area had been determined in DATE and that they could not agree with the applicant company ’s proposals . The authorities indicated that any decision regarding the applicant company ’s buildings had to be taken by the Government .

In DATE the applicant company complained about the refusal of its proposal ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) to ORG . It claimed that it had legitimate expectations that it would be able to use its possessions in an appropriate manner , namely that it would be allowed to reconstruct the buildings without increasing their height . In DATE the ORG replied that when approving ORG ( hereafter “ the ORG ” ) , a decision on a compensation mechanism and time - limits would also have to be taken .

In DATE the applicant company examined a draft of ORG and found that its buildings were indicated as objects to be redeveloped ( rekultivuojami objektai ) but that that decision had not been explained . The applicant company asked the authorities to amend the draft so that it included the issue of compensation for the buildings or included the buildings in the landscape management recreational zone .

In DATE ORG and ORG replied that they had set up a working group to determine a compensation mechanism for the property that had to be expropriated .

In DATE the applicant company asked the authorities to inform it about the conclusions of the working group . In DATE the authorities replied that the working group had to be set up before DATE .

The working group was set on DATE and had to provide its proposals before DATE .

In DATE the applicant company asked the authorities for planning permission to carry out major renovation work on CARDINAL of the buildings , namely the canteen . The authorities replied that they could not issue planning permission and that the applicant company had to provide them with the lease agreement in respect of the land assigned to the buildings . Only after such agreement was provided , the authorities would examine the applicant company ’s request .

NORP The applicant company lodged a complaint with the domestic courts against the authorities’ refusal to issue planning permission for renovation of the canteen . On DATE ORG allowed the claim , holding that the applicant company had been paying the land tax , which was evidence that it had been using the plot of land .

On DATE ORG allowed an appeal lodged by the authorities . It held that the applicant company had not provided any information proving that it was the owner of the plot of land , so the authorities had not been obliged to issue planning permission for renovation of the canteen . The applicant company applied for the reopening of the proceedings . Its request was refused by ORG in DATE .

On DATE the ORG approved ORG . CARDINAL ( see paragraph DATE below ) and asked ORG to set up a working group to assess the legal grounds for expropriating property for public needs ( dėl darbo grupės teisinėms prielaidoms paimti turtą visuomenės poreikiams sudarymo ) . The working group was set up on DATE and its proposals were to be submitted by DATE . ORG included the reserve land in DATE , indicating that its purpose was to compensate for the possible losses incurred by lawful owners of buildings that had been earmarked for demolition .

On DATE the applicant company lodged a complaint with ORG , urging it to revoke the part of ORG where it had been decided that the buildings at CARDINAL GPE street ( the location of the applicant company ’s buildings ) would be demolished and to order the authorities to amend ORG . The applicant company argued that the issue of compensation and the time - limits for the demolition of property had not even been mentioned in ORG . It also argued that clear indications on compensation for the buildings and for the land tax were needed .

On DATE ORG refused to examine the claim . The reasons were provided in CARDINAL short paragraphs , which mainly reiterated the provisions of domestic law ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The applicant company had complained about the lawfulness of ORG . The court considered that issues as to whether acts adopted by the Government were in accordance with the LAW or laws fell within the jurisdiction of ORG . It stated that it was not within the area of competence of the administrative courts to examine the lawfulness of the activities of , inter alia , the Government ( as a collegial institution ) . As regards an amendment to ORG , the court stated that that was linked to the first part of the claim and thus would not have any legal consequences on the applicant company .

In DATE the applicant company lodged a separate complaint and asked ORG to examine the case on the merits . It claimed that the first - instance court had misinterpreted the provisions of ORG , and thus limited the applicant company ’s right of access to a court . The applicant company thought that when the Government had approved ORG , it had been implementing the function of public administration , and that that document had had a direct influence on the applicant company ’s rights and obligations , and was thus an individual legal act that had to be examined before the administrative courts . On DATE ORG upheld the decision of ORG of DATE . It held that the applicant company had questioned the lawfulness of both ORG and the development plan . ORG held that when the Government had approved ORG , it had been carrying out the function of State power . Moreover , the court had already ruled on the issue of the attribution of ORG to the jurisdiction of the administrative courts and had decided that it had not been attributable to those courts ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The court indicated that a legal act could consist of textual and graphic information ( tables , drawings , schemes , plans , symbols , emblems ) . ORG had already held that all parts of a legal act were interrelated and were of equal legal effect ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The court further held that the present case was in substance identical to cases already examined by it , and that there were no grounds to reach a different conclusion on the nature of ORG . The court explained that the applicant company could only raise the issue of the lawfulness of ORG in the context of an individual case regarding violation of its specific rights ( by complaining against an individual legal act , by which ORG and the decisions of ORG would be implemented ) . It could then ask the court examining that case to refer the issue to ORG . The applicant company ’s request to organise the procedure to amend LAW so that it included the land in question in the landscape management recreational zone was dismissed because the applicant company had failed to address the authorities or the courts after the approval of ORG .

The applicant company then applied for the reopening of the proceedings . On DATE ORG rejected its application on the grounds that the applicant company ’s claims had been dismissed for being outside the administrative court ’s jurisdiction and the proceedings could only be reopened if an administrative case had been examined on the merits .

In DATE the applicant company asked the authorities which documents were necessary for the proposed renovation work . In DATE the authorities replied that it was not clear from the applicant company ’s request which building ( “ specific , not complex or nonspecific ” ( ypatingas , nesudėtingas ar neypatingas ) , as defined in the domestic law ) it was aiming to renovate . The applicant company had indicated major repair work . The authorities stated that a detailed plan was not necessary , the location of the building to be renovated was not important and a document proving ownership of the land ( see paragraph DATE above ) was not necessary either .

In DATE GPE inspected the applicant company ’s buildings and held that they were in a state of disrepair . It requested that the applicant company appoint a person responsible for the maintenance of the buildings before DATE , remove the damaged parts of the buildings before DATE and renovate the buildings before CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the applicant company asked the authority in charge of ORG to issue planning permission to carry out major repair work in order to renovate the buildings . DATE the applicant company received a response that permission could not be issued because it would be contrary to ORG DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

The applicant company instituted court proceedings before ORG against the decision of the authority in charge of ORG of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . It urged the court to order the authority to issue the planning permission required for it to carry out major repair work and to award it EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL in respect of pecuniary damage for the land tax and property tax it had paid DATE .

In the course of proceedings the applicant company submitted a draft friendly settlement agreement to be concluded by the ORG , proposing that the ORG compensate it for the removal of the buildings by providing the applicant company with lease rights to ORG - owned land measuring CARDINAL hectares in GPE with construction rights . The ORG representative refused to agree to the proposal because it was in breach of domestic law ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE ORG held that the refusal of the authority in charge of GPE to issue the planning permission required to carry out major repair work was in accordance with the relevant domestic law . The applicant company also asked the court to refer the question of whether ORG was in accordance with LAW to ORG . The court acknowledged that the authority ’s decision had lacked a seal of approval but held that that shortcoming could not be regarded as grounds to overrule the decision . The court also held that the authority had not acted unlawfully , so there were no grounds for awarding the applicant company pecuniary damages . Moreover , domestic law did not require that ORG contain a compensation mechanism for the buildings to be “ removed ” . However , ORG in question indicated that an area in DATE had been designated to compensate for the losses incurred by the lawful owners of the buildings to be removed . Thus ORG provided for the opportunity to compensate for possible losses . As regards the referral to ORG , the court held that the applicant company had mistakenly stated that the decision to remove the buildings had only been indicated in ORG . The court stated that it was a commonly known fact that the applicant company ’s buildings had been earmarked for removal at the time the purchase agreement had been concluded , and the applicant company , as a diligent legal entity , should have assessed the legal status of the buildings and the restrictions on their use . The legitimate expectations of the applicant company had not been breached as it had not proved the need to refer the issue to ORG . The court also pointed out that the buildings had not been taken from the applicant company for the needs of society ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . However , when using them the applicant company had to follow the legal regulations , which established that construction in the area in question was not allowed and that it was attempting to protect its rights in the wrong way . The decision that had had legal consequences for the applicant company had been the decision to privatise the buildings and to sell them to the applicant company .

In DATE the applicant company appealed and asked ORG to refer the matter to ORG ; to overrule the decision of the authority in charge of LAW of DATE ; to order the authority to issue the applicant company with the planning permission required to carry out major repair work and to award it EUR CARDINAL in respect of pecuniary damage . The proceedings are still ongoing .

On DATE the Government adopted Resolution No . CARDINAL approving the start of the amendment of ORG . CARDINAL of the purposes set out in the resolution was to combine the interests of the ORG and municipalities with those of the relevant natural and legal persons .

In DATE the applicant company submitted its proposals , namely that the area in which its buildings were located be included in the landscape management zone and that the buildings there should not exceed CARDINAL storey with an attic . If the proposal to redevelop the land were maintained , the applicant company wanted a clear decision on time - limits for redevelopment and a compensation mechanism .

On DATE ORG indicated that the land on which the applicant company ’s buildings were sited was not affected by the amendment of ORG . It also indicated that the reply could be appealed against to ORG ( “ the commission ” ) or to ORG in DATE from its reception .

In DATE the applicant company lodged a complaint with the commission about the reply of ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The applicant company stated that it had paid ORG CARDINAL in land tax and ORG CARDINAL in property tax between CARDINAL and DATE . It also stated that although ORG had entered into force in DATE , it had not been proven that removing the buildings was necessary in the interests of society . There had also been no indications about the exact time - limits and procedure for the removal of the buildings . The applicant company thus asked the commission to overrule the decision of ORG of DATE and to order it to amend ORG in accordance with the applicant company ’s proposals .

In DATE the commission closed the case , stating that the issue was not within its competence . The applicant company appealed against that decision , claiming that it had been formal and lacked reasoning , and that the commission had ignored the fact that ORG reply of DATE had indicated that it was amenable to appeal before the administrative courts or the commission ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant company ’s appeal . It held that the applicant company had been represented by professional lawyers and the mere fact that ORG had erroneously indicated that its decisions were amenable to appeal did not discharge the applicant company of the obligation to follow the appeal procedure as laid down in domestic law ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The court held that the applicant company had to address ORG with its complaint .

In DATE the applicant company appealed before ORG . The proceedings are still ongoing .


Remainder inadmissible (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria;(Art. 35-1) Exhaustion of domestic remedies;No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

Carlo Ranzoni;Ganna Yudkivska;Iulia Motoc;Marko Bošnjak;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

After going missing on CARDINAL DATE , PERSON was found dead near the local ORG road , close to the town of PERSON , on TIME CARDINAL DATE . He had been repeatedly stabbed and cut with a knife and then run over by a car . The police were called to the scene , as were the district state prosecutor and the duty investigating judge .

NORP On examining the crime scene , X ’s mobile telephone was found in his car . The incoming and outgoing calls and the text messages sent to and from GPE ’s telephone number were checked by police officers at the scene . It appeared from the telephone records that on CARDINAL November CARDINAL X had communicated only with a person using a certain telephone number , from which a message of an explicitly sexual nature had also been sent to X. After the telephone directory was checked it was established , presumably by the police , that the telephone in question belonged to a woman who happened to be the applicant ’s grandmother , with whom , as established on the basis of the official records , the applicant lived . Furthermore , having been informed that ORG ’s mobile telephone had been found , the district state prosecutor requested the duty investigating judge to order the S company – the mobile network operator in question – to produce records of telephone calls made and text messages sent from the telephone .

On DATE ( DATE ) the investigating judge of ORG issued an order for a search of PERSON ’s home and ordered the S company to provide data concerning communication undertaken via X ’s mobile telephone . The S company on DATE submitted to ORG a disk containing X ’s telephone records .

On TIME CARDINAL DATE the police stopped the applicant ’s car and subjected him to a so - called “ security check ” ( varnostni pregled ) , finding a knife ( allegedly bearing traces of what could be blood ) and a mobile telephone in the applicant ’s pocket . After examining his telephone they established that he had used the aforementioned telephone number from which the aforementioned calls had been made and the aforementioned message sent to X. They seized these objects and arrested the applicant .

On DATE ( DATE ) , relying mostly on information found in X ’s and the applicant ’s telephones pointing to a link between X and the applicant , the investigating judge issued a search order in respect of the applicant ’s home and the cars he was using . The state prosecutor furthermore requested that a court order for the obtaining of the applicant ’s comprehensive telephone records be issued .

On DATE the investigating judge issued an order that the M company – a mobile network operator – provide data concerning the applicant ’s mobile telephone record . The M company provided a disk containing the requested data on DATE .

NORP In the course of the preliminary inquiry , the investigating judge ordered a post - mortem examination of X , a DNA analysis and a comparison of biological traces found on the applicant ’s clothes and other objects seized during the home search with those found on X ’s body . She also ordered a medical examination of the applicant with a view to establishing any injuries .

The applicant , represented by counsel , was heard on DATE and was subsequently detained on remand .

On DATE the investigating judge opened a judicial criminal investigation against the applicant in respect of the criminal offence of aggravated murder . She , inter alia : ordered that a reconstruction be carried out at the crime scene ; appointed a psychiatrist and a psychologist to examine the applicant and prepare opinions ; ordered forensic experts in vehicle science and car crash investigations to prepare reports on specific aspects of the case ; and again ordered that the M company and the S company provide traffic data relating to X ’s and the applicant ’s telephones . She also examined a number of witnesses .

On DATE the applicant was , at his request , heard by the investigating judge , to whom he admitted to running over X , but submitted that this had merely been an accident .

On DATE the state prosecutor filed an indictment for aggravated murder against the applicant , alleging that he had killed X by stabbing him CARDINAL times and cutting him CARDINAL times on his head , neck , chest and other parts of the body and running over him in his car .

Following his unsuccessful objection to the indictment , the applicant was put on trial for aggravated murder . A number of hearings were held at which witnesses , experts and evidentiary material were examined and various expert reports ordered and subsequently read out .

On DATE the ORG found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to DATE in prison .

On DATE ORG , after an appeal by the applicant , quashed the first - instance judgment , finding that the lower court had failed to clarify the facts surrounding a possible shoe imprint on the victim ’s back , which could have indicated the presence of a third person at the scene of the crime . The case was remitted to ORG for fresh examination .

In the retrial proceedings , several hearings were held and the applicant lodged an application for the exclusion of all evidence from ( i ) the records of the crime - scene investigation until ( ii ) the records of the last hearing in the first set of proceedings , on the grounds that that evidence had allegedly been tainted by the unlawful examinations of his and X ’s telephones . He argued that the examinations of his and X ’s telephones had violated his and PERSON ’s rights under LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) and that the relevant court orders had been issued DATE too late . He also requested that the police officers who had subjected him to a security check ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) and arrested him be examined in this connection . Both requests were refused by the court .

On DATE the ORG convicted the applicant for the aggravated murder of X and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment . In view of ( i ) the expert opinions regarding the shoe traces on X ’s back which had led to the conclusion that the presence of another person at the crime scene prior to X ’s death could not be excluded , and ( ii ) the fact that the knife with which X had been stabbed and cut had not been found , ORG held that there was insufficient proof that the applicant had stabbed and cut X. However , the court found on the basis of the forensic medical evidence that X had still been alive before he had been run over by the car and that the injuries to X ’s chest , spine and aorta , which had been the direct cause of his death , had been caused by the applicant having intentionally run him over with his car . It further found it proven on the basis of the evidence at the scene – such as ( i ) a piece of rubber tube belonging to the applicant ’s car , ( ii ) the applicant ’s biological traces found on PERSON ’s body , ( iii ) X ’s biological traces found on , inter alia , the applicant ’s clothing ( which was blood - stained ) and on the outside of the applicant ’s car – that the applicant had been beyond doubt at the crime scene and had had contact with X. Referring , in particular , to the findings of the experts in vehicle science , who had performed reconstructions at the scene testing the applicant ’s versions of events , the court discounted the possibility that the applicant had run over X by accident . The court furthermore found that the applicant and PERSON had known each other , which was confirmed by the applicant ’s statements as well as by telephone records and witness testimony . Lastly , the court referred to the telephone records , together with other evidence such as medical evidence and X ’s petrol bill , when elaborating on the time of death , finding that it had undoubtedly occurred on DATE probably sometime after TIME , when the last ( missed ) call from X ’s telephone had been recorded on the applicant ’s telephone .

As regards the procedural decisions taken during the proceedings the court gave the following explanation :

- It refused a request lodged by the applicant for access to the police notes on the examination of his telephone because it would have been unlawful to include in the file evidence obtained without a court order .

- In view of the foregoing conclusion that the examination of the applicant ’s telephone could have not been admitted to the file , the court refused as unnecessary a request by the applicant for the examination of the officers who had seized the applicant ’s telephone ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

- As regards the exclusion of evidence ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) the court explained that the applicant had become a subject of investigation following the examination of the data in GPE ’s telephone , which had not interfered with the applicant ’s rights under LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . It further noted that the examination of the applicant ’s telephone had amounted to a violation of the said provision but carried no evidentiary weight , as at that point the police had already obtained the necessary information from ORG telephone . In addition , the court noted that the results of this examination had not been included in the file and had not been relied on by the court .

On DATE the applicant appealed , complaining , inter alia , that the judgment had violated his defence rights . In particular , he alleged that the district court should have excluded all evidence from the file because it had been based on the police ’s examinations of ORG and his own mobile telephone without the necessary court order . He further stated as follows :

“ It is irrelevant that the police , by [ their ] unlawful interference with [ X ] ’s mobile telephone , did not directly violate the appellant ’s right under LAW [ “ Privacy of correspondence and other means of communication ” ] , because the fact remains that the police obtained that evidence ( data from [ X ] ’s mobile telephone ) without a court order – that is to say unlawfully . ”

NORP The applicant moreover argued that the examination of X ’s telephone alone had not adduced enough evidence to arrest the applicant and that that had been possible only after the applicant ’s telephone had been examined . Thus , in his view , the impugned judgment should not have concluded that the examination of his telephone had had insignificant evidentiary value .

On DATE ORG allowed the applicant ’s appeal in part and reduced his sentence to DATE in prison . The court agreed with the applicant that the act of which he had been convicted – that is to say running over X with his car – did not in itself constitute murder with aggravating factors ( that is to say aggravated murder ) , as the firstinstance court had not proved that X had sustained severe physical pain or psychological suffering . However , all the other applicant ’s complaints , including the CARDINAL regarding the unlawful examinations of his and GPE ’s mobile telephones , were dismissed .

As regards the examination of PERSON ’s telephone the higher court found that , regardless of whether the police officers had examined X ’s telephone before the issuance of the court order , what was crucial was that they had received the court order for the telephone records to be produced before they had identified and located the applicant . Therefore , the examination of X ’s mobile telephone , which had constituted an urgent step in the police inquiry , had not been conducted in violation of his constitutionally guaranteed right to protection of the privacy of communication . As regards the examination of the applicant ’s mobile telephone , the higher court agreed with the lower court that “ the examination of the applicant ’s telephone [ had been ] ... unconstitutional , but this violation had not been important in the evidentiary sense ” . The higher court also upheld the lower court ’s decision not to obtain from the police their notes on the examination of the applicant ’s telephone .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law , complaining of , inter alia , the allegedly unlawful examinations of ORG and the applicant ’s telephones and reiterating the arguments he had put forward in his appeal ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) . In particular , he argued that the police had obtained crucial evidence – that is to say the message with explicitly sexual content – when examining PERSON ’s telephone without having a court order to do so , and that his arrest had been based on a subsequent unlawful examination of his telephone .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal on points of law . Firstly , as regards the police examination of X ’s mobile telephone , ORG pointed out that the applicant had not even argued that the examination of PERSON ’s telephone had directly violated his own right to privacy . While not excluding the possibility that the examination of a deceased ’s person ’s telephone might impinge upon the most intimate spheres of his or her dignity , it considered that in the case at hand it had not interfered with X ’s right to privacy , as personality rights ceased at death . Neither had , in ORG view , the applicant ’s own constitutionally guaranteed privacy rights been interfered with , as the examination had not revealed his identity . Moreover , the district state prosecutor and the duty investigating judge had been present at the scene of the crime when the police had discovered the telephone in GPE ’s car , and the applicant had been arrested only after the court order for the examination of PERSON ’s telephone had been issued . ORG concluded that the police ’s examination of X ’s mobile telephone had not interfered with the applicant ’s right to privacy and that the impugned examination had not been causally related to the incriminating evidence .

Secondly , with regard to the police ’s examination of the applicant ’s mobile telephone , ORG noted that it had been undertaken without a court order and referred to ORG finding that the examination had been unconstitutional . However , in ORG view , the information on whether the text message with sexual content had been sent from the applicant ’s telephone would have inevitably been discovered , either ( i ) by means of a simple call to the number from which the message had been sent , ( ii ) by checking the applicant ’s telephone ’s ORG card ( for which , in ORG view , no court order would have been necessary ) , or ( iii ) on the basis of a court order , which had in point of fact later been issued . In view of this conclusion , ORG considered that , regardless of the fact that the police had examined the applicant ’s telephone without a court order , the identification of the applicant ’s mobile telephone number as the one from which the text message in question had been sent did not constitute inadmissible evidence that should have been excluded from the case file .

The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint , reiterating the allegations made in his previous appeals . Relying on LAW ( see paragraph QUANTITY below ) the applicant argued that the examinations of his and X ’s telephone had been unlawful and that the examination of his telephone had violated the aforementioned provision , as well as LAW . Relying on LAW ( again , see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , the applicant argued that the lower courts should have excluded the evidence obtained unlawfully . In particular , as regards the examination of PERSON ’s telephone , the applicant argued that he “ had not sought redress for the violation of X ’s right to privacy ( mental integrity ) and freedom of communication as he had not been entitled to do so [ ... but rather ] had exclusively pointed out that the violation had occurred and the [ trial ] court had based its decision [ to convict the applicant ] on the consequences of that violation ... ” In this connection he , referring to X ’s “ right to piety ” ( pravica do pietete ) , disputed ORG view that PERSON ’s right to privacy had ceased with his death and pointed out that a court order had been nevertheless subsequently issued . With regard to ORG finding that the evidence in question would have been inevitably discovered , the applicant argued that the domestic law contained a strict rule requiring the exclusion of all evidence obtained by means violating human rights ( “ the domestic exclusionary rule ” ) . He furthermore argued that there had been a violation of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) of the LAW because the first - instance court refused to obtain from the police their notes on the examination of his telephone .

On DATE ORG decided not to accept the applicant ’s constitutional complaint for consideration , pursuant to section DATE ) of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .


No violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression;Freedom to impart information)

András Sajó;Angelika Nußberger;Dean Spielmann;Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Guido Raimondi;Helena Jäderblom;Ineta Ziemele;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Josep Casadevall;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Ledi Bianku;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Nona Tsotsoria;Robert Spano;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Ksenija Turković

The applicant company is a public limited liability company ( aktsiaselts ) , registered in GPE .

The applicant company is the owner of ORG , an Internet news portal that published up to CARDINAL news articles a day at the time of the lodging of the application . Delfi is CARDINAL of the largest news portals on the Internet in GPE . It publishes news in NORP and NORP in GPE and also operates in GPE and GPE .

At the material time , at the end of the body of the news articles there were the words “ add your comment ” and fields for comments , the commenter ’s name and his or her e - mail address ( optional ) . Below these fields there were buttons labelled “ publish the comment ” and “ read comments ” . The part for reading comments left by others was a separate area which could be accessed by clicking on the “ read comments ” button . The comments were uploaded automatically and were , as such , not edited or moderated by the applicant company . The articles received CARDINAL ORG comments daily , the majority posted under pseudonyms .

Nevertheless , there was a system of notice - and - take - down in place : any reader could mark a comment as leim ( an NORP word for an insulting or mocking message or a message inciting hatred on the Internet ) and the comment was removed expeditiously . Furthermore , there was a system of automatic deletion of comments that included certain stems of obscene words . In addition , a victim of a defamatory comment could directly notify the applicant company , in which case the comment was removed immediately .

The applicant company had made efforts to advise users that the comments did not reflect its own opinion and that the authors of comments were responsible for their content . On ORG ’s Internet site there were “ Rules of comment ” which included the following :

“ The ORG message board is a technical medium allowing users to publish comments . Delfi does not edit comments . An author of a comment is liable for his or her comment . It is worth noting that there have been cases in the NORP courts where authors have been punished for the contents of a comment ...

Delfi prohibits comments whose content does not comply with good practice .

These are comments that :

– contain threats ;

– contain insults ;

– incite hostility and violence ;

– incite illegal activities ...

– contain off - topic links , spam or advertisements ;

– are without substance and/or off - topic ;

– contain obscene expressions and vulgarities ...

Delfi has the right to remove such comments and restrict their ORG access to the writing of comments ... ”

The functioning of the notice - and - take - down system was also explained in the “ Rules of comment ” .

The Government submitted that in ORG had a notorious history of publishing defamatory and degrading comments . Thus , on DATE the DATE newspaper ORG had published an open letter from its editorial board to the Minister of ORG , ORG and the Chancellor of ORG in which concern was expressed about incessant taunting of people on public websites in GPE . Delfi was named as a source of brutal and arrogant mockery . The addressees of the public letter responded to it in DATE edition of ORG . The Minister of ORG emphasised that the insulted persons had the right to defend their honour and reputation in court by bringing a suit against Delfi and claiming damages . ORG referred to the legal grounds which made threats , incitement to social hatred , and sexual abuse of minors punishable under criminal law , and noted that liability for defamation and insults was dealt with under civil procedure . The Chancellor of ORG referred to the legal provisions designed to ensure the freedom of expression as well as the protection of everyone ’s honour and good name , including sections DATE and CARDINAL of LAW ( ORG ) .

On DATE the applicant company published an article on the Delfi portal under the heading “ FAC ” . Ice roads are public roads over the frozen sea which are open between the NORP mainland and some islands in DATE . The abbreviation “ ORG ” stands for AS PERSON ( ORG , a public limited liability company ) . ORG provides a public ferry transport service between the mainland and certain islands . L. was a member of the supervisory board of ORG and the company ’s sole or majority shareholder at the material time .

On DATE and DATE the article attracted CARDINAL comments . CARDINAL of them contained personal threats and offensive language directed against L.

On DATE L. ’s lawyers requested the applicant company to remove the offensive comments and claimed CARDINAL NORP kroons ( EEK ) ( MONEY ( ORG ) ) in compensation for non - pecuniary damage . The request concerned the following CARDINAL comments :

“ CARDINAL . ( CARDINAL ) there are currents in [ V]äinameri

( CARDINAL ) open water is closer to the places you referred to , and the ice is thinner .

Proposal – let ’s do as in DATE , let ’s go to [ K]uressaare with sticks and put [ L. ] and [ Le . ] in a bag

NORP bloody shitheads ...

they bathe in money anyway thanks to that monopoly and ORG subsidies and have now started to fear that cars may drive to the islands for DATE without anything filling their purses . burn in your own ship , sick NORP !

NORP good that [ GPE ’s ] initiative has not broken down the lines of the web flamers . go ahead , guys , [ L. ] into the oven !

NORP [ little L. ] go and drown yourself

aha ... [ I ] hardly believe that that happened by accident ... assholes fck

rascal ! ! ! [ in NORP ]

What are you whining for , knock this bastard down once and for all [ . ] In future the other ones ... will know what they risk , even they will only have CARDINAL little life .

NORP ... is goddamn right . Lynching , to warn the other [ islanders ] and would - be men . Then nothing like that will be done again ! In any event , [ L. ] very much deserves that , does n’t he .

“ a good man lives a long time , a shitty man a DATE or CARDINAL ”

If there was an iceroad , [ one ] could easily save CARDINAL for a full car , fckng [ L. ] pay for that economy , why does it take TIME ] for your ferries if they are such good icebreakers , go and break ice in NORP port ... instead , fcking monkey , I will cross [ the strait ] anyway and if I drown , it ’s your fault

NORP and ca n’t anyone defy these shits ?

NORP inhabitants of GPE and GPE islands , do CARDINAL to this dope .

NORP wonder whether [ L. ] wo n’t be knocked down in GPE ? screwing one ’s own folk like that .

The people will chatter for DATE on the Internet , but the crooks ( and also those who are backed and whom we ourselves have elected to represent us ) pocket the money and pay no attention to this flaming – no one gives a shit about this .

Once [ M. ] and other big crooks also used to boss around , but their greed struck back ( RIP ) . Will also strike back for these crooks sooner or later . As they sow , so shall they reap , but they should nevertheless be contained ( by lynching as the state is powerless towards them – it is really them who govern the state ) , because they only live for DATE . DATE , the flood .

NORP this [ V. ] will one day get hit with a cake by me .

damn , as soon as you put a cauldron on the fire and there is smoke rising from the chimney of the sauna , the crows from GPE are there – thinking that ... a pig is going to be slaughtered . no way

bastards ! ! ! ! PERSON also has an ice class , so this is no excuse why PERSON was required ! ! !

NORP state , led by scum [ and ] financed by scum , of course does not prevent or punish antisocial acts by scum . But well , every [ L. ] has his Michaelmas ... and this can not at all be compared to a ram ’s FAC . Actually sorry for [ L. ] – a human , after all ... PERSON

... if after such acts [ L. ] should all of a sudden happen to be on sick leave and also next time the ice road is destroyed ... will he [ then ] dare to act like a pig for the third time ? :)

fucking bastard , that [ L. ] ... could have gone home with my baby soon ... anyway his company can not guarantee a normal ferry service and the prices are such that ... real creep ... a question arises whose pockets and mouths he has filled up with money so that he ’s acting like a pig from DATE

NORP you ca n’t make bread from shit ; and paper and internet can stand everything ; and just for my own fun ( really the state and [ L. ] do not care about the people ’s opinion ) ... just for fun , with no greed for money – I pee into [ L. ’s ] ear and then I also shit onto his head . :) ”

On DATE , that is DATE after their publication , the offensive comments were removed by the applicant company .

On DATE the applicant company responded to the request from ORG ’s lawyers . It informed PERSON that the comments had been removed under the notice - and - take - down obligation , and refused the claim for damages .

On DATE L. brought a civil suit in ORG against the applicant company .

At the hearing of CARDINAL DATE the representatives of the applicant company submitted , inter alia , that in cases like that of the “ Bronze Night ” ( disturbances of public order related to the relocation of the PERSON monument in DATE ) Delfi had removed CARDINAL comments per day , also on its own initiative .

By a judgment of DATE L. ’s claim was dismissed . ORG found that the applicant company ’s liability was excluded under LAW ( NORP teenuse seadus ) , which was based on ORG ( Directive CARDINAL/CARDINAL/EC of ORG and of ORG on certain legal aspects of information society services , in particular electronic commerce , in FAC ) . The court considered that the comment environment in the applicant company ’s news portal was to be distinguished from the portal ’s journalistic area . The administration of the former by the applicant company was essentially of a mechanical and passive nature . The applicant company could not be considered the publisher of the comments , nor did it have any obligation to monitor them .

On DATE ORG allowed an appeal by L. It considered that ORG had erred in finding that the applicant company ’s liability was excluded under LAW . ORG judgment was quashed and the case was referred back to the first - instance court for fresh consideration .

On DATE ORG declined to hear an appeal by the applicant company .

On DATE ORG , having re - examined the case , found for L. In accordance with ORG instructions , it relied on LAW and deemed LAW inapplicable . It observed that the applicant company had placed a note on its Internet site to the effect that comments were not edited , that the posting of comments that were contrary to good practice was prohibited , and that the applicant company reserved the right to remove such comments . A system was put in place whereby users could notify the applicant company of any inappropriate comments . However , ORG considered that this was insufficient and did not allow adequate protection for the personality rights of others . The court found that the applicant company itself was to be considered the publisher of the comments , and it could not avoid responsibility by publishing a disclaimer stating that it was not liable for the content of the comments .

ORG found that the news article itself published in the Delfi news portal was a balanced one . A number of comments , however , were vulgar in form ; they were humiliating and defamatory and impaired PERSON ’s honour , dignity and reputation . The comments went beyond justified criticism and amounted to simple insults . The court concluded that freedom of expression did not extend to protection of the comments concerned and that PERSON ’s personality rights had been violated . PERSON was awarded EEK MONEY ( ORG CARDINAL ) in compensation for non - pecuniary damage .

On DATE ORG upheld ORG judgment . It emphasised that the applicant company had not been required to exercise prior control over comments posted on its news portal . However , having chosen not to do so , it should have created some other effective system which would have ensured rapid removal of unlawful comments from the portal . ORG considered that the measures taken by the applicant company were insufficient and that it was contrary to the principle of good faith to place the burden of monitoring the comments on their potential victims .

ORG rejected the applicant company ’s argument that its liability was excluded under ORG . It noted that the applicant company was not a technical intermediary in respect of the comments , and that its activity was not of a merely technical , automatic and passive nature ; instead , it invited users to add comments . Thus , the applicant company was a provider of content services rather than of technical services .

On DATE ORG dismissed an appeal by the applicant company . It upheld ORG judgment in substance , but partly modified its reasoning .

ORG held as follows :

“ CARDINAL . The ORG finds that the allegations set out in the appeal do not serve as a basis for reversing the judgment of ORG . The conclusion reached in ORG ’s judgment is correct , but the legal reasoning of the judgment must be amended and supplemented on the basis of LAW .

The parties do not dispute the following circumstances :

• on DATE the defendant ’s Internet portal ‘ GPE published an article entitled ‘ SLK Destroyed Planned Ice Road’ ;

• the defendant provided visitors to the Internet portal with the opportunity to comment on articles ;

• of the comments published [ avaldatud ] on the aforementioned article , CARDINAL have contents that are derogatory towards the plaintiff [ L. ] ;

• the defendant removed the derogatory comments after the plaintiff ’s letter of DATE .

NORP The legal dispute between the parties relates to whether the defendant as an entrepreneur is the publisher within the meaning of LAW , whether what was published ( the contents of comments ) is unlawful , and whether the defendant is liable for the publication of comments with unlawful contents .

The ORG agrees with the conclusion of ORG that the defendant does not fall within the circumstances precluding liability as specified in section CARDINAL of the ISSA [ Information LAW ] .

According to section DATE ) of LAW , an information society service is a service specified in section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the PERSON . According to the provision of the PERSON referred to , ‘ information society services’ are services provided in the form of economic or professional activities at the direct request of a recipient of the services , without the parties being simultaneously present at the same location , and such services involve the processing , storage or transmission of data by electronic means intended for the digital processing and storage of data . Hence , important conditions for the provision of information society services are that the services are provided without the physical presence of the parties , the data are transmitted by electronic means , and the service is provided for a fee on the basis of a request by the user of the service .

Sections CARDINAL to CARDINAL of the PERSON establish the liability of providers of different information society services . Section CARDINAL of the PERSON states that where a service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service , the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service , on condition that : ( CARDINAL ) the provider does not have actual knowledge of the contents of the information and , as regards claims for damages , is not aware of any facts or circumstances indicating any illegal activity or information ; ( CARDINAL ) the provider , upon having knowledge or becoming aware of the aforementioned facts , acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information . Hence , the provision in question is applied in the event that the service provided consists in storing data on [ the service provider ’s ] server and enabling users to have access to these data . Subject to the conditions specified in LAW , the provider of such a service is exempted from liability for the contents of information stored by it , because the provider of the service merely fulfils the role of an intermediary within the meaning of the provision referred to , and does not initiate or modify the information .

Since ORG is based on Directive CARDINAL of ORG and of the ORG on certain legal aspects of information society services , in particular electronic commerce , in ORG ( Directive on Electronic Commerce ) , the principles and objectives of that Directive must also be taken into account in the interpretation of the provisions of the LAW in question . Articles CARDINAL of the Directive , which form the basis for sections CARDINAL of the PERSON , are complemented by recital CARDINAL of the preamble to the Directive . According to this recital , the exemptions from liability established in ORG CARDINAL cover only cases where the activity of the information society service provider is limited to the technical process of operating and giving access to a communication network over which information made available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily stored , for the sole purpose of making the transmission more efficient ; this activity is of a mere technical , automatic and passive nature , which implies that the information society service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored . Hence , the providers of so - called ‘ content services’ who have control over the contents of the information stored can not rely on the exemptions specified in ORG CARDINAL of the Directive .

The ORG shares the opinion of ORG that the activities of the defendant in publishing the comments are not merely of a technical , automatic and passive nature . The objective of the defendant is not merely the provision of an intermediary service . The defendant has integrated the comment environment into its news portal , inviting visitors to the website to complement the news with their own judgments [ hinnangud ] and opinions ( comments ) . In the comment environment , the defendant actively calls for comments on the news items appearing on the portal . The number of visits to the defendant ’s portal depends on the number of comments ; the revenue earned from advertisements published on the portal , in turn , depends on the [ number of visits ] . Thus , the defendant has an economic interest in the posting of comments . The fact that the defendant is not the writer of the comments does not mean that the defendant has no control over the comment environment . The defendant enacts the rules for the comment environment and makes changes to it ( removes a comment ) if those rules are breached . By contrast , a user of the defendant ’s service can not change or delete a comment he or she has posted . He or she can only report an inappropriate comment . Thus , the defendant can determine which of the comments added will be published and which will not be published . The fact that the defendant does not make use of this possibility does not prompt the conclusion that the publishing of comments is not under the defendant ’s control . The ORG agrees with the opinion of ORG that the defendant , which governs the information stored in the comment environment , provides a content service , for which reason the circumstances precluding liability , as specified in section CARDINAL of the PERSON , do not apply in the present case .

There is no legal dispute over the fact that the defendant is the publisher of an article entitled ‘ SLK Destroyed Planned Ice Road’ , published on the Delfi Internet portal on DATE . ORG found that the defendant too must be regarded as the publisher of the comments . ORG , agreeing with that opinion , noted that the fact that the defendant relied on a violation of its right to freedom of expression showed that it considered itself – and not the writers of the comments – to be the publisher of the comments . In the opinion of the ORG , in the present case both the defendant and the writers of the comments are the publishers of the comments within the meaning of LAW . The plaintiff has the right to choose against whom to bring the suit . The suit has only been brought against the defendant .

The ORG has explained the definitions of disclosure and discloser in paragraph CARDINAL of its judgment of DATE in civil case no . CARDINAL - CARDINAL - CARDINAL - CARDINAL - CARDINAL , finding that for the purposes of LAW , disclosure [ avaldamine ] means communication of information to third parties and the discloser is a person who communicates the information to third parties . In addition , the ORG explained that in the case of publication [ avaldamine ] of information in the media , the discloser / publisher [ avaldaja ] can be a media company as well as the person who transmitted the information to the media publication . Publishing of news and comments on an Internet portal is also a journalistic activity [ ajakirjanduslik tegevus ] . At the same time , because of the nature of Internet media [ internetiajakirjandus ] , it can not reasonably be required of a portal operator to edit comments before publishing them in the same manner as applies for a printed media publication [ trükiajakirjanduse väljaanne ] . While the publisher [ väljaandja ] [ of a printed media publication ] is , through editing , the initiator of the publication of a comment , on the Internet portal the initiator of publication is the writer of the comment , who makes it accessible to the general public through the portal . Therefore , the portal operator is not the person to whom information is disclosed . Because of [ their ] economic interest in the publication of comments , both a publisher [ väljaandja ] of printed media and an Internet portal operator are publishers / disclosers [ avaldajad ] as entrepreneurs .

In cases concerning a value judgment [ väärtushinnang ] that prejudices and denigrates a person ’s honour and good name , in determining the definition of publication / disclosure and publisher / discloser it is irrelevant whether the value judgment is derived from the published / disclosed information or is derogatory because of its substantive meaning ... Hence , publication / disclosure is communication to third parties of a value judgment on a person ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ) and/or of information which allows a value judgment to be made , and a publisher / discloser is a person who communicates such judgments [ hinnangud ] and information to third parties . In the present case the comments have been made accessible to an unlimited number of persons ( the general public ) .

NORP In reply to the allegations in the defendant ’s appeal to the effect that ORG wrongly applied LAW since , in justifying the interference with freedom of expression , it relied on the principle of good faith , and not the law , and that the removal of a comment from the portal is an interference with the freedom of expression of the person posting the comment , the ORG explains the following .

The exercise of any fundamental right is restricted by LAW , which provides that everyone must honour and consider the rights and freedoms of others , and must observe the law in exercising his or her rights and freedoms and in fulfilling his or her duties . The first sentence of the first paragraph of LAW provides for everyone ’s right to freedom of expression , that is , the right to disseminate information of any content in any manner . That right is restricted by the prohibition on injuring a person ’s honour and good name , as laid down in LAW ( Article CARDINAL ) . The ORG is of the opinion that in handling the conflict between freedom of expression on the one hand , and honour and good name on the other , regard must be had to the fact that LAW , which is formulated as a prohibition , does not completely preclude any interference with a person ’s honour and good name , but only prohibits defamation thereof ( section CARDINAL of LAW ) . In other words , disregarding the aforementioned prohibition would not be in conformity with LAW ( LAW ) . The second sentence of the first paragraph of LAW includes the possibility of restricting the freedom of expression by law in order to protect a person ’s honour and good name .

In the interests of the protection of a person ’s honour and good name , the following provisions of LAW may be regarded as restricting the freedom of expression : sections CARDINAL ) , CARDINAL ) , ORG ) , ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) , GPE ) and ( CARDINAL ) , and CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) . ORG found that injuring the plaintiff ’s honour was not justified ; it was therefore unlawful as there was no discussion of the topic in the comments but the plaintiff was simply insulted in order to degrade him . ORG also agreed with that opinion . The ORG finds that if section CARDINAL of LAW is interpreted in conformity with the LAW , injuring a person ’s honour is unlawful . The legal assessment by the courts of the CARDINAL comments of a derogatory nature is substantiated . The courts have correctly found that those comments are defamatory since they are of a vulgar nature , degrade human dignity and contain threats .

The ORG does not agree with the opinion of ORG that the removal of comments of an unlawful nature interfering with the personality rights of the plaintiff is not an interference with the freedom of expression of the writers of the comments . The ORG considers that the application of any measure restricting a fundamental right in any manner may be regarded as an interference with the exercise of that fundamental right . Interference by an Internet portal operator with the freedom of expression of persons posting comments is , however , justified by the obligation of the portal operator - entrepreneur to respect the honour and good name of third parties , as arising from LAW ) , and to avoid causing them harm ( section CARDINAL ) of LAW ) .

According to the judgment of ORG , the contents of the comments were unlawful ; they were linguistically inappropriate . Value judgments ... are inappropriate if it is obvious to a sensible reader that their meaning is vulgar and intended to degrade human dignity and ridicule a person . The comments did not contain any information which would have required excessive verification on the initiative of the portal operator . Hence , the defendant ’s allegation that it was not and should not have been aware of the unlawfulness of the comments is groundless .

On account of the obligation arising from law to avoid causing harm , the defendant should have prevented the publication of comments with clearly unlawful contents . The defendant did not do so . In accordance with section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW , the disclosure of information or other matters is not deemed to be unlawful if the person who discloses the information or other matters or the person to whom such matters are disclosed has a legitimate interest in the disclosure , and if the person who discloses the information has verified the information or other matters with a thoroughness which corresponds to the gravity of the potential violation . The publication of linguistically inappropriate value judgments injuring another person ’s honour can not be justified by relying on the circumstances specified in section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW : such judgments are not derived from any information disclosed but are created and published for the purpose of damaging the honour and good name of the party concerned . Hence , the publication of comments of a clearly unlawful nature was also unlawful . After the disclosure , the defendant failed to remove the comments – the unlawful content of which it should have been aware of DATE from the portal on its own initiative . In such circumstances , the courts have reasonably found that the defendant ’s inactivity is unlawful . The defendant is liable for the damage caused to the plaintiff , since the courts have established that the defendant has not proved the absence of culpability [ süü ] ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ) . ”

On DATE Delfi announced on its Internet portal that persons who had posted offensive comments were not allowed to post a new comment until they had read and accepted the rules of commenting . Furthermore , it was announced that ORG had set up a team of moderators who carried out follow - up moderation of comments posted on the portal . First of all , the moderators reviewed all user notices of inappropriate comments . The compliance of comments with the rules of commenting was monitored as well . According to the information published , the number of comments posted by ORG ’s readers in DATE had been CARDINAL . ORG moderators had removed CARDINAL comments ( PERCENT ) , mainly consisting of spam or irrelevant comments . The share of defamatory comments had been PERCENT of the total number of comments .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Helena Jäderblom

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of unintentional manslaughter . On DATE he was committed to stand trial before ORG . On DATE ORG fixed the first trial hearing and ordered that the applicant should remain in custody .

On DATE ORG found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment . The judgment became final on DATE when ORG upheld it on appeal .

NORP In DATE the applicant lodged an action with ORG , arguing that his detention from CARDINAL to DATE had been unlawful as there had been no legal order authorizing his detention during that period . He sought compensation for non - pecuniary damage .

On DATE ORG , in the presence of a defendant ’s representative , dismissed the applicant ’s action , finding that the applicant ’s conviction precluded him from claiming compensation in respect of non - pecuniary damages . Its operative part reads as follows :

“ Given that PERSON was found guilty of the crime in relation to which he had been detained since DATE , he did not acquire the right to exoneration and to compensation in respect of non - pecuniary damage .

Therefore , there exist no grounds for satisfying PERSON claim for compensation in respect of his unlawful detention pending trial . ”

The applicant appealed , complaining , inter alia , that ORG had refused to secure his attendance and had not provided him with copies of materials presented by the defendants . He also maintained his initial claim for compensation .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of DATE in the applicant ’s absence .


George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Paul Mahoney;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a citizen of GPE , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She was represented before the Court by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Deputy Agent , PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

In DATE the applicant and her parents moved in a flat in GPE owned by GPE ’s father . In DATE the applicant ’s parents were given the occupancy right on that flat .

In DATE , following her mother ’s death , the occupancy right was transferred to the applicant in accordance with LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE GPE , who inherited the flat after his father ’s death , initiated proceedings before ORG of the Herzegovina - Neretva Canton ( ORG građenja i prostornog uređenja ORG Kantona ; “ the Cantonal Ministry ” ) for the applicant ’s eviction and offered her a replacement flat in the same building ( “ the replacement flat ” ) . The claim was based on LAW which authorised owners of privately owned flats allocated to occupancy right holders to seek their eviction under the condition that they provide them with a suitable replacement flat ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE ORG ordered the applicant to vacate the flat in question . It further ordered GPE to let her into the replacement flat .

On DATE ORG ( GPE ministarstvo prostornog uređenja i okoliša ; “ the ORG ” ) , quashed the decision of DATE and remitted the case for a re - hearing .

On DATE ORG rejected GPE ’s request . It held that in case of eviction , the applicant would lose her occupancy right on the flat in question , whereas she would not be able to acquire the same right on the replacement flat since from DATE it was no longer possible to acquire occupancy rights ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE and DATE , respectively , ORG and ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) upheld the decision of DATE .

On DATE ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) rejected GPE ’s request for extraordinary judicial review .

On DATE GPE lodged a constitutional appeal .

The applicant had been invited to submit her third - party comments in the proceedings before ORG ( “ the LAW ” ) . However , that court explicitly stated that its examination was limited to GPE ’s appeal .

On DATE ORG held that GPE ’s request for eviction was based on relevant domestic law ( section CARDINAL of LAW ; see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and that in rejecting it the administrative bodies and ORG violated his right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions under LAW No . CARDINAL to the Convention . It quashed ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) and remitted the case for a re - hearing ( having been given upon an extraordinary remedy , ORG judgment of DATE was not examined in these proceedings ) .

On DATE , in the re - hearing proceedings , ORG quashed the administrative decisions of DATE and DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) in line with ORG decision .

On DATE ORG accepted GPE ’s request and ordered the applicant to vacate the flat in question within DATE from the date of notification of that decision . Furthermore , it ordered GPE to enable the applicant to use the replacement flat .

On DATE and DATE , respectively , ORG and ORG upheld the decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s request for extraordinary judicial review of ORG judgment of DATE .

On DATE an eviction order was issued . The eviction was scheduled for DATE at TIME and was to be carried out with police assistance in view of the fact that the applicant had not left the flat on her own motion within the prescribed time - limit .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the eviction order was upheld by ORG and ORG , respectively .

After CARDINAL rescheduling at the applicant ’s request , the eviction took place on DATE when ORG commission , in the presence of police officers , GPE ’s representative , the applicant ’s representative and the representative of the competent social work centre , made a list of the applicant ’s personal belongings , transferred them to the replacement flat and sealed it . The keys to the flat were given to GPE

On DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE ORG invited the applicant ’s representative to collect the keys to the replacement flat . It would appear that until now she has failed to do so .

The applicant is currently staying with her relatives in GPE .

In the former ORG nearly all flats were under the regime of “ social ownership ” . They were generally built by socially - owned enterprises or other public bodies for allocation to their employees , who became “ occupancy right holders ” . The matter has been regulated by LAW ( Zakon o stambenim odnosima , ORG of GPE nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL ; ORG Herzegovina no . CARDINAL , ORG Herzegovina nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL/CARDINAL ; ORG of ORG nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) which is still in force in GPE . An occupancy right , once allocated , entitled the occupancy right holder to permanent , lifelong use of the flat against the payment of a nominal fee . When occupancy right holders died , their rights were transferred , as a matter of right , to their surviving spouses or registered members of their family households who were also using the flat ( sections DATE CARDINAL of LAW ) .

Until the entry into force of LAW , occupancy right could also be awarded in respect of privately owned flats . Those flats were also allocated by public bodies . With LAW DATE it was no longer possible to award occupancy right in respect of flats in private ownership . However , the pre - existing occupancy rights in respect of such flats were preserved ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of this Act ) . LAW , on the other hand , authorised owners of such flats to seek eviction of the occupancy right holders under the condition that they provide them with another suitable flat .

On DATE all occupancy rights ceased to exist ( section CARDINAL ) of ORG ; PERSON o prodaji stanova na kojima postoji stanarsko pravo , ORG and Herzegovina nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL ) . The occupancy right holders on socially - owned flats were entitled to purchase their flats under that LAW . If they did not purchase the flats , they became tenants . However , the occupancy right holders on privately owned flats could not purchase their flats ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of this LAW ) . It would appear that their situation continued to be regulated by the relevant provisions of LAW and that they became “ protected tenants ” ( zaštićeni stanari ) .

According to Rule CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of the Rules of ORG , the court shall transmit the appeal to the other party to the impugned proceedings for comments . Failure to submit such comments shall not affect the course of the proceedings before ORG .


George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The first applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national , born in DATE . The second and third applicants , PERSON and PERSON , are NORP nationals , born respectively in DATE and DATE . They were represented by PERSON and PERSON , lawyers practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON , of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The first applicant settled in GPE in DATE . He graduated and started practising as a doctor . In DATE the first and second applicants married . Their daughter , the third applicant , was born in DATE . On DATE the first applicant was granted permanent residence in GPE .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the authorities , who suspected the first applicant of participating in organised drug trafficking , conducted a search and seizure operation in his flat .

On DATE the head of the passports department at ORG issued an order depriving the first applicant of the right to reside in GPE . The order relied on the reasons set out in proposal no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL , namely that the first applicant had endangered national security and that there was information that he was a member of a criminal group and had committed crimes with intent . No factual grounds were given . The order further stated that it was not subject to judicial review .

On DATE the director of ORG in PERSON issued an order depriving the first applicant of the right to enter the country for DATE .

On DATE the first applicant was arrested pursuant to the orders for his expulsion and prohibition on entering the country . On DATE the head of the passports department at ORG ordered the first applicant ’s expulsion . The order stated that it was not subject to judicial review . Again , no factual grounds were given . The decision also ordered that the applicant ’s detention pending removal .

NORP In DATE the first applicant was deported to GPE .

The order of CARDINAL DATE depriving the first applicant of his right to reside in the country and the order of DATE for his expulsion were never officially served on the applicant . The second applicant obtained a copy of the expulsion order in DATE .

On DATE the first and second applicants sought judicial review in GPE of the orders depriving the first applicant of his right to reside in the country and for his expulsion , stating that the impugned measures were arbitrary and amounted to unjustified interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private and family life .

In a decision of DATE ORG discontinued the proceedings in respect of the second applicant finding that none of her rights had been at stake .

NORP In a decision of DATE the ORG discontinued the proceedings in respect of the first applicant , finding that the orders had not been subject to judicial review either at the time they had been issued or at the time the first applicant had sought judicial review . On appeal , in a decision of DATE ORG quashed the lower court ’s decision and remitted the case to ORG for a fresh examination . The court held that although LAW provided that expulsion orders issued on national security grounds were not subject to judicial review , following the ORG ’s judgment in LOC v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , DATE ) such appeals had to be examined by the courts .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE the Sofia ORG dismissed the appeal . It held that the application had been submitted in time because there was no indication whatsoever that the orders had been officially served on the first applicant and therefore the time - limit for seeking judicial review had not started to run . As to the merits of the application , the court found , on the basis of the facts established in proposal no . CARDINAL which stated that since DATE the first applicant had been involved in heroin trafficking from GPE to GPE , that the orders were lawful . The court also found the first applicant ’s statements regarding his marital status and links with the country irrelevant .

The first applicant appealed in cassation . In a final judgment of DATE ORG upheld ORG judgment .

On an unspecified date the applicants sought judicial review of the order of CARDINAL March CARDINAL , which prohibited the first applicant from entering the country for DATE . In a final judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG declared the order null and void , holding that at the time at which it was issued the administrative authority did not have power to issue such an order .

Following his expulsion in DATE , the first applicant settled in GPE . In DATE the second and third applicants briefly visited him . In DATE they moved to GPE in order to permanently settle there . In DATE the second and third applicants returned to GPE and in DATE they visited GPE on another occasion . In DATE the second applicant returned to GPE while the child remained in GPE with her father . On DATE the first applicant returned to GPE for DATE .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW DATE provides for the expulsion of aliens where their presence in the country poses a serious threat to national security or public order . Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) provides that expulsion orders are immediately enforceable .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) , as in force until DATE , provided that orders for the expulsion of aliens on national security grounds were not subject to judicial review . Following the ORG ’s judgment in LOC v. GPE ( cited above ) , in which the ORG found the above regulatory arrangements contrary to ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Convention , ORG departed from its previous case - law . In a number of judgments and decisions given DATE it held , with reference to PERSON , that the provision in section PERSON ) debarring applicants from seeking judicial review was to be disregarded as it contravened the ORG , and that expulsion orders relying on national security grounds were amenable to judicial review .

Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) was amended with effect from DATE and now provides that an expulsion order may be challenged before ORG , whose judgment is final .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy)

Egidijus Kūris;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

NORP The list of applicants , their representatives and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention and of the lack of any effective remedy in domestic law .


CASE OF ANTIMONOVA AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE

Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy)

Angelika Nußberger;Ganna Yudkivska;Vincent A. De Gaetano

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the excessive length of civil proceedings and of the lack of any effective remedy in domestic law .


Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in the town of PERSON , GPE .


CASE OF MEDŽLIS ISLAMSKE ZAJEDNICE BRČKO AND OTHERS v. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

No violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression)

George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä

In DATE the applicants wrote a letter to ORG , to the President of ORG and to the Governor of BD concerning the appointment of a director of the ORG public radio station . They referred , in particular , to PERSON candidacy for that position . PERSON was the entertainment editor at the BD public radio at the material time .

The relevant part of the letter reads as follows :

“ We acknowledge and appreciate your support and the effort you put in creating a multiethnic radio ... Unfortunately , it appears that there was a major oversight at the very beginning of this important venture . The panel for the selection of the director [ of the radio ] was created in contravention of the Statute of Brčko District . It is composed of CARDINAL NORP members , CARDINAL NORP and one PERSON . Thus , yet again , the LAW , which requires proportional representation of the CARDINAL constituent peoples in public institutions , was disregarded ... Unfortunately , nothing has been done to correct this . The unofficial information we received to the effect that PERSON was proposed for the position of the radio director by the NORP members of the Panel ... although the former director was PERSON , confirms the above . This proposal is unacceptable , all the more so because it concerns a person who lacks the professional and moral qualities for such a position .

According to the information we received ...

in an interview published in “ NIN ” , discussing the destruction of FAC in GPE , PERSON said that NORP were not people , that they did not possess culture and that , accordingly , destroying FAC could not be seen as a destruction of cultural monuments ,

... on the radio ’s premises ... she made a point of removing from the wall ( and tore to pieces ) the calendar with the schedule of religious services during DATE ,

... on the radio ’s premises she covered the coat of arms of GPE with the coat of arms of ORG ,

as the editor of the entertainment programme she banned broadcasting of sevdalinka arguing that that type of song had no cultural or musical value .

We firmly believe that the above - described acts absolutely disqualify PERSON as a candidate for the position of the director of the multiethnic ORG of GPE ...

We hope that you will act accordingly ...

In the absence of any action on your part , we will be forced to contact the media as well as the other competent national and international bodies . ”

Shortly thereafter the letter was published in CARDINAL different DATE newspapers .

On DATE GPE initiated civil defamation proceedings against the applicants and claimed compensation of MONEY ( BAM ) . M.S submitted that she had learned about the content of the letter shorlty after it had been sent by the defendants , but that she did not know who gave it to the media . After the letter was published , ORG annulled the proceedings for the appointment of a director of the public radio station .

On DATE ORG ( “ ORG ” ) rejected the claim . It held that the applicants could not be liable for the alleged defamation because they had not published the letter in the media . The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows :

“ From the GPE letter , it is clear that it was privately sent to the Governor , to the President of the ORG and to the Supervisor for GPE ... and it was not sent to the media ... [ T]he aim of the letter was not dissemination of unverified information to public , but bringing the attention of the competent authorities to certain issues and to enable them to draw certain conclusions on verification of that information .

Having examined the articles published in the media , the court concludes that none of them was published by the defendants in this case . ”

PERSON appealed against that judgment to ORG ( " ORG " ) . On DATE the ORG quashed the judgment of DATE and decided to hold a new hearing .

On DATE after having examined several witnesses ( including the CARDINAL employees of the ORG public radio from whom the applicants received the information presented in their letter ) , ORG found that the contested letter contained some value - judgments but also the statements of facts which had been untrue and damaging to M.S.ʼs reputation . It held that for the liability for defamation to be established under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW DATE it was irrelevant that the applicants did not publish the letter . ORG ordered the applicants to inform ORG , the President of ORG and the ORG ’s Governor about the retraction of their statements within DATE , in default of which they had to pay BAM CARDINAL,CARDINAL in damage to GPE , together with default interest at the statutory rate from DATE . They were further ordered to publish the judgment at their own expense .

On DATE PERSON filed a request for the enforcement of the above judgment to ORG . She proposed , inter alia , that the court send the judgment of DATE for publication at the ORG expense .

On DATE ORG issued a writ of execution .

On DATE the applicants paid BAM CARDINAL ( MONEY ( ORG ) ) by way of the enforcement of the judgment of DATE .

On DATE ORG closed the enforcement proceedings .

In the meantime , on DATE the applicants complained about the violation of their right to freedom of expression to ORG " LAW " ) .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG held that the interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression was “ necessary in a NORP society ” and concluded that there had been no violation of Article II/CARDINAL.h ) of the LAW of GPE and LAW . The relevant part of the decision reads as follows :

“ DATE . At the outset ORG notes that the appellants did not deny that their liability for defamation was based on LAW DATE and that , therefore , the interference with the right [ to freedom of expression ] protected by LAW was prescribed by law ...

The impugned judgment was delievered in a civil defamation proceedings initiated by the plaintiff against the appellants ... accordingly , the interference pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the “ reputation or rights of others ” .

What remains to be determined is whether the interference complained of was “ necessary in a democratic society ” ....

ORG considers that ORG established without doubt that the impugned factual statements about PERSON were false and that the appellants were liable for defamation . From the submissions of the CARDINAL witnesses , from whom the appellants received the information presented in the letter [ concerning the part of the letter in which it was stated that PERSON ‘ made a point of removing from the wall ( and tore to pieces ) the calendar with the schedule of religious services during DATE and as the editor of the entertainment programme she banned broadcasting of sevdalinka arguing that that type of song had no cultural or musical value’ ] , ORG established that there was an evident inconsistency between that what had been said to the appellants and that what they had reported in the letter . Furthermore , the statement from the impugned letter that PERSON gave an interview concerning the destruction of mosques was refuted by another witness who submitted that a subsequent verification had revealed that PERSON had not been the author of the said interview . Finally , the appellants failed to prove the veracity of the allegations that PERSON covered the coat of arms of GPE with the coat of arms of ORG . In view of the above , ORG considers that in the present case the right of the appellants to report irregularities in the conduct of an official to a body competent to deal with such complaints can not be premised on ascertaining manifestly untrue facts which go beyond the limit of acceptable criticism of civil servants . Accordingly , the court considers that ORG correctly concluded that there was ‘ a pressing social ORG in the present case [ for the interference with the appellants’ right to freedom of expression ] .

DATE . Furthermore , ORG notes that ORG awarded non - pecuniary damage to GPE because her reputation was affected by the untrue statements made in the impugned letter . ... ORG has already stated in its previous jurisprudence that a person ’s reputation forms part of her personal identity and psychological integrity ...

The appellants ... failed to verify the impugned statements beforehand as was their duty . ORG established that the appellants had damaged GPE ’s reputation by making untrue allegations , which caused her mental anguish ... When deciding on the claim in respect of non - pecuniary damage and its amount , ORG took into account the purpose of those damages , as well as that it should not favour aspirations that are incompatible with its nature and social purpose .

[ T]he ORG considers that a measure imposed on the appellants in the present case was proportionate to the aim pursued ... The court further considers that ORG did not go beyond its discretionary power in deciding on the claim in respect of non - pecuniary damage ... [T]he ORG finds that the reasons the ORG gave were ‘ ORG and ‘ LOC within the meaning of LAW .

In view of the above , ORG considers that the interference with the appellants’ right to freedom of expression was ‘ necessary in a democratic FAC and that , therefore , there has been no violation of Article II/CARDINAL.h ) of LAW and LAW . ”

On DATE the Constitutional Court ’s decision was served on the applicants .


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON , in LOC .

In DATE ORG of ORG recognised ORG ’s right to the restoration of title to QUANTITY of land in the GPE area . The plot of land in question had belonged to CARDINAL other individuals , TIME and ORG , and had been nationalised by the NORP regime .

DATE the applicant and ORG signed a notarised agreement by which ORG transferred ( perleido ) to the applicant the right to the restoration of title to CARDINAL hectares of the above - mentioned plot of land . The agreement did not indicate whether the applicant had given any money to ORG in exchange for this right . However , the applicant subsequently claimed ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) that she had paid CARDINAL NORP litai ( ORG ; MONEY ( ORG ) ) .

On DATE ORG estimated that the value of the plot of land transferred to the applicant was LTL CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) . ORG then awarded the applicant the right of title to QUANTITY of land of equivalent value . The applicant registered the plot in ORG under her own name .

NORP In DATE ORG began investigating allegations of fraud , forgery of documents and abuse of office ( under Articles CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ) relating to the restoration of property rights by ORG . In DATE the prosecutor of LOC ( hereinafter “ the prosecutor ” ) launched a similar investigation . Subsequently , the CARDINAL investigations were joined .

In DATE the prosecutor submitted a request to ORG for the annulment of the agreement between the applicant and ORG The prosecutor stated that ORG had not had the right to the restitution of TIME and ORG ’s land and thus could not legally have transferred that right to the applicant .

On DATE ORG granted the prosecutor ’s request . The court held that ORG had not been TIME and ORG ’s relative or heir and thus , under the applicable law , had not been entitled to the restoration of title to their land ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Therefore , the court declared the agreement between the applicant and ORG null and void ab initio , confiscated the plot of land from the applicant , and returned it to the ORG .

During the proceedings the applicant claimed that she had paid LTL CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) to ORG for the right of title to the land , and ORG acknowledged that she had received an unspecified sum of money . However , since no such payment had been mentioned in the text of their agreement , the court held that the right of title had been transferred to the applicant for free and did not award her any compensation .

On DATE the ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal and upheld the decision of the lower court . The court found that the applicant had not proved that she had paid for the transfer of the right of title . It also noted that under LAW , property which had been unlawfully obtained for free could be confiscated from an owner , irrespective of whether the owner had acquired such property in good faith ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE ORG refused to examine a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant on the ground that it did not raise any important legal issues .

On DATE the prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings before ORG against GPE , a former official in ORG . GPE was charged with several counts of forgery of documents and abuse of office under ORG and CARDINAL of LAW . She was accused of , inter alia , having acted together with ORG in forging documents which purported to prove ORG ’s right to the restoration of title to certain property , with the aim of selling that right to other individuals . The indictment noted that ORG had received approximately ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) from the applicant in exchange for the right to the restoration of title to the property in question . At the time of the parties’ final submissions to the ORG , the criminal case was still awaiting examination before the first - instance court .