Remainder inadmissible (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria;(Art. 35-3-a) Ratione personae;Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Positive obligations;Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 13+2 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 2 - Right to life;Article 2-1 - Life);Respondent State to take individual measures (Article 46-2 - Individual measures);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Respondent State to take measures of a general character (Article 46-2 - General measures)

Dmitry Dedov;Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicants raised various issues related to the terrorist attack , siege and storming of school no . CARDINAL in GPE , GPE , GPE , from CARDINAL to DATE . Some applicants were held hostage and/or injured , while others had family members among those taken hostage , killed or injured . Information in respect of each applicant is summarised in the Appendix .

While most events are relevant for all the applicants , their position in the domestic proceedings differed somewhat . However , given the number of applicants , the extent of the domestic procedures and the difficulties associated with establishing each applicant ’s procedural role , the present judgment refers to them collectively as “ the applicants ” . This is based on the assumption that their position in the domestic proceedings was relatively similar , whether or not each of them participated in a given procedural step , either directly or through their representatives ( see Abuyeva and Others v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § CARDINAL , DATE ) .

The anti - terrorist operation mounted from DATE involved a number of ORG agencies . The documents in the case file refer to the police , internal troops of ORG , army servicemen of ORG and officers of ORG ( ORG ( ORG ) – hereinafter “ the ORG ” ) . Unless otherwise specified , the terms “ security personnel ” or “ security forces ” used in the present judgment apply to any of those ORG agents . Equally , the terms “ anti - terrorist ” or “ security operation ” are used to describe the operation of DATE .

The voluminous material in the case files lodged by the applicants and submitted by the Government include documents from CARDINAL criminal investigations , CARDINAL criminal trials , CARDINAL sets of civil proceedings for compensation , CARDINAL reports by parliamentary groups and CARDINAL dissenting opinion thereon , books and articles written in the aftermath , copies of forensic and expert reports in respect of each applicant and/or their relatives , the ORG own statements to the ORG and independent expert reports . The statement of facts below is a succinct summary of the documents mentioned above and other publicly available information .

DATE saw a surge of terrorist acts in GPE involving numerous civilian victims . Mr PERSON , the underground leader of the NORP separatist movement , either claimed responsibility or was held responsible for these acts .

On DATE a suicide bomber killed over forty people and wounded CARDINAL on an underground train in GPE .

In DATE and DATE several explosions in LOC damaged gas pipelines , a heating station and electricity pylons .

NORP On DATE the President of GPE , Mr PERSON , and several senior officials were killed by a bomb in a stadium in Grozny .

On DATE and DATE a large group of armed rebel fighters attacked GPE , ORG largest town . They primarily targeted police stations and other security offices ; over CARDINAL people were killed and an ammunition warehouse was looted .

On DATE CARDINAL civilian aeroplanes which had departed from GPE FAC simultaneously exploded in mid - air ; CARDINAL people lost their lives .

On DATE a suicide bomber blew himself up at the entrance to an underground station in GPE , killing CARDINAL and wounding CARDINAL others .

On DATE ORG of the ORG issued the following telex ( no . DATE ) to all local departments of the interior :

“ [ ORG of the Interior ] has received information indicating the movement of participants of [ illegal armed groups ] from the plains of [ Ingushetia ] and [ GPE ] to the mountainous and forested area along the border of [ Ingushetia ] and [ LOC ] . A meeting of the fighters is presumably planned for DATE , following which they are intending to commit a terrorist act in [ LOC ] similar to that in ORG . According to the available information , the fighters plan to capture a civilian object with hostages in the territory of [ LOC ] , and then submit demands to the country ’s leadership for the withdrawal of troops from [ GPE ] . A large sum of money in [ a foreign ] currency has apparently been transferred from GPE . [ This information is being ] transmitted in order for preventive measures to be taken . ”

On DATE ORG of the Interior issued Decree no . CARDINAL on the protection of public order and security during the Day of Knowledge in the educational facilities of LOC , which was sent to all district police stations . The plan provided for heightened security awareness and an increase in the number of mobile posts and police officers near public gatherings , and contained a series of measures aimed at the prevention of terrorist acts and hostage - taking during public gatherings on ORG in the settlements situated along the administrative border with ORG . The plan further stipulated that each head of the district departments of the ORG should inform the administrations of educational facilities accordingly , put in place working plans for every such gathering and personally inform police staff of their functions , carry out TIME updates of the situation at public gatherings , give immediate feedback to ORG of the ORG and provide contingency staff in each police department .

On DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE ORG of the ORG issued CARDINAL other telexes to the local departments concerning security measures to be taken during DATE of Knowledge , heightened terrorist threats in the region and the prevention of possible attacks . The personnel of ORG were put on high alert ( усиленный режим несения службы ) .

As revealed by subsequent investigations , towards DATE a sizeable group of terrorists ( CARDINAL people ) were camping and training between the villages of Psedakh and PERSON in LOC . In TIME of CARDINAL September CARDINAL the group crossed the administrative border between PERSON and GPE , driving a ORG utility truck .

At TIME on DATE Major PERSON from LOC of the ORG stopped the vehicle for an inspection at the administrative border with GPE . The terrorists disarmed him , placed him in the back seat of his own white VAZ-CARDINAL and drove to GPE . Major PERSON escaped and later testified about these events .

At TIME on DATE school no . CARDINAL in GPE , GPE , held DATE of Knowledge ceremony to mark the opening of DATE . CARDINAL people gathered in the courtyard of the Eshaped CARDINAL - storey building located on FAC in the centre of the town , whose population was CARDINAL . The school was situated next door to the district police station of Pravoberezhny ( ORG районный отдел внутренних дел ( ORG ) DATE hereinafter “ LOC ) . The gathering included CARDINAL schoolchildren , CARDINAL teachers and staff of the school and members of their families . CARDINAL of children below DATE were in the crowd with their parents , since several kindergartens in GPE were closed on DATE for various reasons . CARDINAL unarmed police officer , PERSON , was at the ceremony .

According to some sources , on TIME the Beslan traffic police were called to secure the passage of PERSON , LOC , through the town . The applicants referred to the testimony of the traffic policemen and servicemen of LOC , saying that they had been instructed to take various positions along the route of PERSON convoy , and thus leave the school unprotected .

During TIME of the ceremony , at TIME , a group of CARDINAL people ( the number of terrorists is disputed DATE see below ) armed with various weapons , including machine guns , explosives and handguns , surrounded the people in the school courtyard and , shooting in the air , ordered them to enter the school through the main door and through smashed windows on the ground floor . A ORG vehicle entered the yard through the main gates and a group of terrorists jumped out . According to some witnesses , some other terrorists came from behind the school and another group was already in the building .

NORP The terrorists in the main courtyard fired into the air and there was an exchange of fire with local residents and the police . CARDINAL local residents were killed ( Mr PERSON and Mr PERSON ) and some were wounded during the shooting . It also appears that CARDINAL terrorists were wounded . CARDINAL people , mostly adults and senior students , managed to escape . Another QUANTITY people hid in the boiler building , from where they were rescued later in DATE .

Despite the initial chaos , the terrorists managed to round up the majority of those in the courtyard – CARDINAL people ( the exact figure is disputed by some sources ) , including CARDINAL children aged DATE . Several groups of hostages initially tried to hide inside the school or escape through fire exits , but the terrorists were in firm control of the building and escorted everyone to the gymnasium .

The hostages were assembled in a gymnasium located on the ground floor in the central part of the building and measuring QUANTITY . The terrorists informed them that it was a terrorist act and that they had to obey their orders . The GPE personal belongings , mobile telephones and cameras were confiscated , and they were ordered to sit on the floor .

The attackers then proceeded to arrange a system of improvised explosive devices ( IEDs ) around the gymnasium , using basketball hoops and gymnasium ladders for support . Male hostages were forced to assist them in this task , which was completed within TIME . A single chain connected several smaller IEDs hanging above the GPE heads , CARDINAL large GPE attached to basketball hoops on the opposite walls of the gymnasium and several heavier ones placed on the floor . Some GPE were filled with parts such as metal pellets , screws and bolts . They were connected by wire to pedal detonators ( “ dead man ’s switches ” ) , which CARDINAL of the terrorists took turns to hold . CARDINAL women wearing ample black clothes with explosive belts underneath – suicide bombers – remained in the gymnasium among the hostages .

The attackers smashed the windows of the gymnasium , to allow air and probably avoid the use of gas as a means of attack . Several rooms around the school building were turned into firing points , with windows smashed and stocks of food , water and ammunition set out . During the course of DATE the terrorists kept shooting out of the school windows in the direction of the security personnel and civilians gathered outside .

At TIME the Ministry of the Interior in ORG received information about the seizure of the school . It was immediately transmitted to PERSON and the ORG .

The hostages were forced to sit in very cramped conditions on the floor of the gymnasium . During TIME of captivity some families remained separated , but they were allowed to reunite later during DATE .

The hostages were ordered to keep quiet and not to speak in languages other than NORP . Mr PERSON , whose CARDINAL sons were in the gymnasium , repeated the ORG orders in DATE . CARDINAL of the terrorists walked up to him and executed him in full view of everyone in the gymnasium by shooting him from close range ; his body was not removed until TIME . PERSON sons PERSON ( born in DATE ) and PERSON ( born in DATE ) witnessed the execution ; both boys died on DATE during the storming . Another father of CARDINAL , Mr PERSON , was shot in the shoulder during TIME of the crisis for apparently refusing to obey the ORG orders . By DATE he had died in the gymnasium . His younger son ORG ( born in DATE ) survived the attack , but his CARDINAL daughters PERSON ( born in DATE ) and GPE ( born in DATE ) died during the storming .

During the course of DATE on DATE the attackers allowed groups of children , under their escort and accompanied by adults , to access the toilets outside the sports hall to drink tap water . They also ordered senior students to bring water into the hall in buckets and distribute it among the hostages in small quantities . The terrorists also took a large television into the gymnasium and on several occasions turned on the radio so that some of the hostages could hear about the events on the news .

On DATE the terrorists allowed the elderly and sick hostages and some mothers with nursing babies to stay in a smaller adjacent weights room , where they could stretch out on the floor . They were later taken into the sports hall .

From DATE the terrorists refused to allow the hostages water and ordered them to use buckets to relieve themselves and to drink their own urine . They announced to the hostages that the tap water had been poisoned and that they would be undergoing a “ dry hunger strike ” in support of their ORG demands . Some chewed the leaves of interior plants in order to relieve their thirst . Survivors later complained of severe thirst and heat on CARDINAL and especially DATE .

From the outset the terrorists separated most of the men and forced them to perform various tasks in order to fortify the building , or put in place GPE . They were told that their disobedience would lead to the execution of women and children in the hall .

On TIME were ordered to lift up floorboards from the library floor . Floorboards were also lifted from the corners of the gymnasium . Others were ordered to move furniture and blackboards to the windows of various classrooms and corridors .

On TIME several men were lined up in the corridor of the ground floor . An explosion occurred there at TIME , as a result of which several male hostages were killed or injured . CARDINAL ( or CARDINAL ) women suicide bombers and CARDINAL terrorist of NORP descent were killed by this blast . Several explanations for that explosion were put forward ; the criminal investigation accepted that the terrorist in charge of the operation , PERSON , “ PERSON ” ( Colonel ) , had executed the male hostages whom the terrorists had no longer needed and at the same time had activated the explosive belt of CARDINAL of the suicide bombers because she had objected to the treatment of the children . Some of the surviving hostages testified that there had been an attack from the outside , as a result of which the explosive belt had detonated killing the female bomber , the NORP terrorist and several hostages .

Men who survived the explosion in the corridor were finished off with automatic rifles . PERSON survived the explosion and the ensuing execution . When the terrorists discovered that he was still alive , he was allowed to return to the gymnasium , where he fainted . He later testified about these events . At TIME on DATE the terrorists forced CARDINAL men to throw bodies out of a window on the first floor . CARDINAL of them , PERSON , jumped out the window and was wounded but survived . His wife , one of the applicants , was released on DATE with their infant daughter ; their other daughter remained in the gymnasium and received injuries during the storming .

According to the investigation , CARDINAL men were killed by the terrorists on DATE . Another QUANTITY people were wounded DATE as a result of shots fired by the terrorists .

At TIME on DATE the terrorists fired several rounds from automatic weapons from the windows of the school , although it appears that no one was hurt and there was no return fire .

At TIME the terrorists passed a note to the authorities via CARDINAL of the hostages . PERSON , an ambulance doctor , walked to the school gates , handed the note to a man who approached her and walked back ; in the meantime her young son was being held at gunpoint inside the building . The note contained a mobile telephone number and the names of the people with whom the terrorists wanted to negotiate : the LOC President PERSON , the NORP President PERSON and a paediatrician , PERSON . The note also stated that the school building had been mined and would be blown up in the event of an attempt to storm it , and that the terrorists would shoot CARDINAL hostages for any CARDINAL of them killed . However , it appears that the mobile telephone number had either been wrongly noted or was switched off , as no telephone contact could be established at that time .

At TIME on DATE the NORP State television programme “ ORG ” announced that the attackers had transmitted a videotape to the authorities , containing their demands and images filmed inside the school . TIME it was announced that the videotape was empty . Later , the very existence of this videotape remained disputed .

Around TIME on DATE Mamitova took out a second note , containing a corrected mobile telephone number and the name of another possible negotiator , Mr PERSON , an aide to the NORP President . She also told the person who collected the note that there were CARDINAL hostages inside the building .

The authorities contacted the terrorists through a professional negotiator , the ORG officer Mr PERSON His attempts to discuss proposals aimed at alleviating the GPE conditions and the possibility of exiting or surrendering or removing bodies from the school courtyard remained futile .

PERSON arrived in PERSON on TIME . When he called the hostage takers , on CARDINAL and DATE , they were hostile and told him that they would only enter into negotiations if all CARDINAL people requested by them came to the school . They told him that if he attempted to enter alone , he would be killed . They also refused to accept food , water or medicine , and forbade him from entering the building to examine the sick and wounded .

On DATE the former President of PERSON , PERSON PERSON , arrived in PERSON at the request of the operative headquarters ( “ the OH ” ) . It appears that at TIME he , for the first time , telephoned Mr PERSON , the head of the self - proclaimed NORP separatist government who was living in GPE . He told PERSON PERSON about the siege and said that the number of hostages exceeded CARDINAL .

Following telephone contact with the terrorists , at TIME on DATE , Mr PERSON was allowed to enter the school . He was the only person whom the terrorists agreed to let inside during the siege . Mr PERSON was led to the gymnasium and had a meeting with the leader of the terrorists , PERSON ( “ PERSON ” ) .

Following negotiations , Mr PERSON was permitted to leave with twentysix ( other sources indicate CARDINAL ) people – nursing mothers and their babies . All the women had older children in the school and were forced to leave them behind .

Mr PERSON took out a message from Mr PERSON addressed to the NORP President , PERSON PERSON . It demanded that troops be pulled out of GPE and official recognition of GPE as an independent ORG . In return , it promised that terrorist activities in GPE would end “ for DATE ” . It made no mention of the school siege . It appears that the terrorists also gave PERSON PERSON a videotape depicting part of his visit , the gymnasium with the hostages , explosive devices and one terrorist holding his foot on a “ dead man ’s switch ” . It also contained a statement by PERSON PERSON that the negotiations should involve Mr PERSON , the President of the self - proclaimed independent ORG , who had been in hiding at the time .

On DATE and on the morning of DATE the attackers tried to contact the North Ossetian authorities of GPE with the assistance of the school director , PERSON . CARDINAL hostages – children of the head of ORG , Mr Mamsurov – were allowed to call their father on his mobile telephone and tell him that they were suffering without water and food . It appears that family members of other possible contacts among officials and public figures ( district prosecutor , a well - known sportsman ) were singled out by the terrorists but no contact was established .

In parallel to the negotiations carried out through Mr PERSON , on CARDINAL DATE direct contact with the terrorists was established through Mr PERSON , an influential businessman of PERSON origin . He supplied PERSON PERSON with the requisite telephone numbers , participated in conversations with Mr PERSON and eventually tried to liaise with Mr ORG .

As can be seen from various information sources , at TIME on DATE Mr PERSON , Mr PERSON and Mr PERSON had a telephone conversation during which Mr PERSON promised to involve Mr ORG in the negotiations ( see paragraphs CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL below ) . Some sources indicate that these talks apparently resulted in Mr ORG agreeing to go to PERSON .

At TIME on DATE the OH started to function on the premises of the NORP town administration . The exact composition , leadership and powers of this structure remain disputed . According to most sources , it was initially headed by PERSON , LOC President , and as of DATE by General PERSON ORG , the head of ORG . It was later established that the OH included the deputy head of the counter - terrorism commission of NORP Mr GPE , the Minister of ORG ( Emercom ) Mr PERSON , the North Ossetian Minister of Education PERSON Levitskaya , deputy head of the information programmes department of the ORG television company , GPE , Mr GPE and the commander - in - chief of ORG ( see CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) .

The detachments of the CARDINALth ORG started to arrive in PERSON during TIME . On DATE CARDINAL armoured personnel carriers ( APCs ) and several tanks of the CARDINALth ORG arrived . They were placed under the command of the ORG special purpose units and positioned around the school out of the ORG sight .

In TIME of CARDINAL September the ORG special purpose units went to ORG for joint training with ORG and ORG to prepare for a possible storming .

CARDINAL of people in GPE were directly affected by the crisis .

Despite the attempts of the authorities to clear the area , local residents and ethnic PERSON from outside GPE , some of whom were armed , remained around the school building throughout the siege .

On TIME the GPE relatives were invited to the town ’s FAC . Until the end of the siege FAC remained a hub for communicating with relatives and providing medical and psychological assistance to them .

At TIME on DATE the LOC President Mr PERSON , the deputy speaker of ORG Mr PERSON and the North Ossetian Deputy Minister of the Interior Mr PERSON met with relatives in FAC . During the meeting Mr PERSON informed them that the terrorists had not put forward any demands and had refused to accept food , water or medicine for the hostages .

At TIME on DATE PERSON participated in the meeting at FAC . He assured those present that the conditions in the school were “ acceptable ” and that the hostages could survive for DATE without food or water . He also stated that the terrorists had not put forward any demands to the authorities .

On DATE a psychological aid unit was set up at FAC .

Late in the evening of DATE PERSON held another meeting with the relatives at FAC .

At TIME on DATE he announced to the relatives that there would be no storming and that “ new public figures ” had appeared in the negotiation process .

Some of the applicants were among the relatives who had gathered outside the school building or stayed at FAC , and submitted written statements describing the events .

From the outset the information about the hostage - taking was strictly controlled by the authorities . PERSON , a member of the OH and a senior employee of ORG , was put in charge of contacting the journalists .

On TIME the media announced , referring to official sources , that CARDINAL people had been taken hostage . DATE the media reported a “ corrected ” number of hostages : CARDINAL people . According to some hostages , this news outraged the terrorists and prompted them to execute men or throw their bodies out of the window . It also transpires from the GPE statements that after the announcements the terrorists refused to allow them to drink or go to the toilet , saying that “ there should be CARDINAL of you left anyway ” ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On TIME held a press conference . He announced that he had talked on the telephone to a terrorist nicknamed “ Gorets ” ( highlander ) , who had put forward no demands .

DATE . At TIME on DATE State television showed some of the ORG relatives of Ingush origin asking them to release the hostages . CARDINAL woman , the wife of a presumed hostage taker , said that she and her children were being held somewhere “ against their will ” and asked her husband to do everything “ to avoid harming the children ” .

The hostages in the gymnasium were extremely exhausted and suffered from thirst and hunger . They had gone DATE without sleep in cramped conditions and the physical state of many had worsened : people started to lose consciousness and some children were hallucinating , having seizures and vomiting .

In TIME the terrorists lifted the IEDs in the gymnasium from the floor , hanging them along the walls .

At TIME the terrorists agreed to a request by Mr PERSON and PERSON PERSON to allow Emercom to collect the bodies from the school courtyard .

At TIME that he had reached some sort of agreement with Mr PERSON ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . According to some sources , that agreement could have extended to the possibility of PERSON ORG arriving in GPE .

At TIME an Emercom truck and CARDINAL officers entered the school courtyard . The men had Mr PERSON ’s mobile telephone to communicate with the terrorists . CARDINAL of the terrorists came out and supervised their work . The explosions inside the gymnasium at TIME came unexpectedly to the group . The ensuing exchange of gunfire resulted in CARDINAL officers being killed .

At TIME a powerful explosion occurred in the upper east part of the gymnasium . Part of the roof was destroyed , the insulation caught fire and fragments of the burning ceiling and roof fell into the gymnasium , killing and injuring those seated underneath . Many of the surviving hostages described the first explosion as a “ fireball ” or “ column of fire ” , followed by silvery white powder falling from the ceiling . It appears that the explosion caused a fire in the roof space of the gymnasium ( see paragraph FAC below ) . TIME later another explosion ripped through the lower part of the wall under the first window on the north - east side . The nature and origins of these explosions are disputed ( see documents referred to below ) .

The CARDINAL explosions killed both terrorists who had been holding the detonators , though most of the IEDs remained intact ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . CARDINAL of people were killed , others were wounded or received burns of varying degrees , and almost everyone was shell - shocked . Many applicants submitted witness statements about these events .

DATE . Those who could move and were able to reach the opening in the wall on the north side started to climb through it and run outside . The terrorists fired at them from the upper floor , prompting an exchange of gunfire between the terrorists and the security forces .

At this point General PERSON issued an order to storm the building and proceed with the rescue operation and neutralisation of the terrorists .

Several terrorists were killed or wounded during the first CARDINAL explosions but the majority of them survived , including “ PERSON ” . They rounded up the survivors in the gymnasium ( CARDINAL people ) and forced them to walk to other parts of the main building , mostly in the south wing : the canteen , the kitchen , a meeting room and craft classrooms . Some hostages remained in the rooms adjacent to the gymnasium , namely the weights room and changing rooms .

The dead , injured and shell - shocked remained in the gymnasium , where fire continued to spread in the roof space .

At TIME a third powerful explosion occurred in the south part of the gymnasium , which appears to have been caused by one of the large IEDs catching fire . Soon afterwards flames spread around the gymnasium , taking to the floor and walls . Some hostages continued to escape through the openings in the walls .

DATE servicemen of the security services and local residents broke the west wall of the gymnasium and entered the hall . They helped to evacuate survivors . Their movements were covered by an ORG which went close to the school . No terrorists were found there , but the gymnasium was under fire , probably from terrorist snipers on the first floor .

At CARDINAL part of the burning roof collapsed .

CARDINAL of wounded hostages and servicemen were taken to ORG in private cars and ambulances . A field hospital had been set up by Emercom in the hospital courtyard in order to sort the wounded and cope with the influx of casualties . Many of the injured were taken to hospitals in ORG . The GPE relatives were not allowed to enter the hospital . Over CARDINAL civilians and over CARDINAL servicemen received medical help on DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL et seq . below ) .

Over CARDINAL hostages who had survived the explosions and fire in the gymnasium were taken by the terrorists to the canteen and kitchen situated on the ground floor in the south wing . Other hostages were taken to the main meeting room situated above the canteen on the first floor . There they found stocks of water and food and could relieve their thirst for the first time in DATE .

The women and children in the canteen and meeting room were forced by the terrorists at gunpoint to stand in the windows as human shields and wave their clothes ; some were killed or wounded by gunfire and explosions .

As shown by many of the witness statements , but not corroborated by the results of the criminal investigation , after TIME a tank with hull number CARDINAL entered the schoolyard and fired several rounds at the canteen . It appears that another tank with hull number CARDINAL or CARDINAL also fired at the school from a distance of QUANTITY . Some of the rounds were fired with solid shots , while others were probably done with ammunition ( see paragraphs CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL below ) .

CARDINAL APCs entered the schoolyard and took part in the fighting with their large - calibre machine guns .

The army and the ORG assault troops were positioned on the roofs of CARDINAL , DATE and CARDINAL PERSON , QUANTITY apartment blocks located on the east side of the school . These servicemen fired at the school with portable grenade launchers and flame - throwers , although the exact timing of the attacks is disputed ( see paragraphs CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL below ) . CARDINAL ORG helicopters circled above the school . According to some sources , although not corroborated by the official investigation , CARDINAL rocket was launched from a helicopter on the school roof ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

At TIME the OH ordered fire brigades with water cannons to intervene , by which time the gymnasium was ablaze and other parts of the building were on fire ( see CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL below ) . At the same time the head of the OH ordered the servicemen of the ORG special forces units Alfa and Vympel to enter the building .

At TIME the entire roof of the gymnasium collapsed . After TIME the fire was contained ; the servicemen of the special forces and firefighters entered the gymnasium , but found no survivors .

It appears that the servicemen of the special forces entered the canteen at TIME through the openings in the walls and through the windows whose metal bars had fallen off as a result of the explosions or having been pulled out with an ORG . Amid fierce fighting they evacuated the surviving hostages .

Numerous bodies of terrorists and hostages were found in the canteen , meeting room and rooms and corridors of the south wing .

At TIME a strict security perimeter was established around the school . All civilians , ORG staff , firefighters and servicemen of the army were ordered to leave , leaving only the ORG special forces inside . At TIME the servicemen of the ORG special units held a TIME ’s silence in the corridor of the south wing in order to honour the memory of their comrades : CARDINAL members of the elite Vympel and Alfa units , including CARDINAL group commanders , had lost their lives and CARDINAL were wounded – the biggest losses ever sustained by the units in a single operation .

After TIME several shots were fired at the south wing of the building from anti - tank missiles and flame - throwers .

At TIME CARDINAL tanks fired at the school . Several powerful explosions followed , which completely destroyed the walls and roof of the craft classrooms in the south wing .

The gunfire and explosions at the school continued until TIME .

One terrorist , PERSON , was captured alive . The rest , it appears , were killed during the storming . Consistent rumours circulated that some terrorists had escaped or had been captured secretly .

On TIME President PERSON arrived in PERSON and stayed for TIME . He visited the town hospital and administration .

The school building had remained surrounded by soldiers throughout DATE .

At TIME staff started to collect the bodies and clear the debris . CARDINAL charred bodies were found in the gymnasium , and CARDINAL bodies in the adjacent changing rooms and weights room . It appears that DATE and QUANTITY bodies were found in the south wing of the school and on other LOC , although no exact information was recorded in this respect ( see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) . The bodies of CARDINAL men were collected from the courtyard . CARDINAL bodies ( including those of over CARDINAL children ) were placed in the schoolyard and taken to the NORP morgue .

Later during DATE on DATE bulldozers and trucks arrived at the school . The remaining debris was loaded onto trucks and taken to the town rubbish dump . The victims alleged that they and other locals had later found a number of important items of evidence among this rubbish , including the ORG personal belongings such as backpacks and razor blades , human remains , GPE clothes and parts of GPE .

At TIME on DATE the security cordons in GPE were lifted . After TIME the units of ORG withdrew from the town .

On DATE the first funerals took place . Over DATE that followed collective burials of over CARDINAL people took place . The local cemetery was too small and had to be extended . A special memorial was later erected there ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

ORG . Many of the bodies were charred beyond recognition . On CARDINAL September CARDINAL bodies were taken to a forensic laboratory in LAW for identification through DNA testing . The identification and burials continued throughout DATE ( see CARDINAL , CARDINAL below ) .

After declaring CARDINAL and DATE of national mourning , on DATE President PERSON delivered a televised address to the nation , announcing future measures to improve agency cooperation in counter - terrorism measures . He called the attack a “ direct intervention of international terrorism against GPE ” .

On DATE the website ORG published a message signed by “ the President of GPE ” Mr PERSON , condemning the hostage - taking and terrorist attacks against civilians , but blaming the NORP authorities for the radicalisation of NORP .

On DATE the website ORG circulated an email , allegedly from Mr PERSON , a leader of the radical wing of the NORP separatist movement who used the titles “ PERSON of Martyrs ” and “ the chief of the high military madjlisul shura of the united GPE mujahidin ” . PERSON , who at the time lived secretly in the NORP , claimed that his “ battalion of martyrs ” had carried out the attack in GPE , as well as the explosions in GPE and the aeroplane crashes in DATE .

The email alleged that the special forces had started the storming and that the IEDs set up by the attackers in the gymnasium had not exploded . PERSON also claimed that the following demands had been put to the authorities : that military action in GPE be stopped , that troops be pulled out and that President PERSON step down from his post . The note stated that all the hostages , including children , had declared a “ dry hunger strike ” until these demands were granted . The letter contained details of the number and types of GPE used , indicated the ethnic origin of thirtythree “ mujahedin ” who had taken part in “ ORG ” ( as they had named the attack at the school ) and alleged that the group had gathered and trained for DATE under PERSON personal leadership near the village of ORG [ near Psedakh in Ingushetia ] . The letter also mentioned the message to President PERSON , which had been transmitted through Mr PERSON , and contained its full text . PERSON alleged that the only surviving terrorist , PERSON , had been taken into the group TIME preceding the operation . The document further stated that the leader of the operation , “ PERSON ” , had called him after the storming had started to say that they had counterattacked , and that the last call from him had been received at TIME [ on DATE ] . Lastly , the letter cited the alleged costs of the terrorist attacks of DATE and DATE : MONEY ( ORG ) for “ ORG ” , MONEY ( ORG ) for the explosions in GPE and CARDINAL for the aeroplanes .

In DATE the same website published another message signed by PERSON containing passages suggesting that a member of the group which had seized the school , Mr PERSON , had been a double agent of the ORG and PERSON and had ensured the group ’s “ cover ” during the preparation for the attack and their unhindered passage to LOC .

On DATE Mr PERSON was killed by an explosion in PERSON . It was announced that his death had been a result of a special operation by the NORP security services . It was also reported that the blast had resulted from the mishandling of explosives .

On DATE the North Ossetian Prosecutor opened criminal investigation no . CARDINAL concerning a terrorist attack at the school by an armed group and the murder of CARDINAL male hostages .

On DATE Mr Fridinskiy , Deputy Prosecutor General , ordered the transfer of the investigation concerning the hostage - taking of over CARDINAL people to ORG in LOC . On DATE Mr Fridinskiy appointed a group of over CARDINAL investigators from the ORG offices of ORG to take over the investigation , under the command of a special investigator of ORG in the LOC .

NORP The investigation was extended on several occasions and is still pending ( adjourned ) .

Many important investigative steps aimed at establishing the exact circumstances of the preparations for and carrying out of the terrorist act , as well as the explosions in the gymnasium and the ensuing storming , were taken in the course of these proceedings . The applicants claimed that in the course of the proceedings they had not been allowed full access to the documents of the file and challenged this aspect of the proceedings . At the ORG ’s request , the ORG submitted the list of documents in the criminal case . According to this list , by DATE the case file contained CARDINAL volumes , each ranging on average CARDINAL pages . The available information may be summarised as follows .

The investigation found out that the group which had committed the terrorist act had been organised by PERSON , PERSON , “ a mercenary of NORP descent ” called PERSON ( PERSON ) , and their entourage . The aim of the group had been “ to disturb the public peace and scare the population to put pressure on the ORG authorities in order to achieve the withdrawal of troops from GPE ” . In DATE and DATE the men had put together a plan to take hostage a large number of pupils and parents of school no . CARDINAL in GPE and murder civilians , police officers and military servicemen .

NORP In DATE the men had put together an organised criminal group ( gang ) comprising over CARDINAL people . Its members had included residents of GPE , PERSON , other regions of GPE and foreign mercenaries . The organisers of the terrorist act had entrusted the command of the operation to an active member of the gang , PERSON PERSON from ORG , who had used the nickname “ PERSON and the radio callname “ PERSON ” ( colonel ) . CARDINAL terrorists were identified by name , while CARDINAL remained unidentified .

On DATE the gang had gathered in the vicinity of Psedakh in GPE . They had had the following arms and ammunition ( partly originating from the attacks in GPE on DATE and DATE ) : CARDINAL PERSON assault rifles , CARDINAL PERSON machine guns ( RPK-CARDINAL and ORG ) , CARDINAL tank machine gun ( ORG ) , CARDINAL portable anti - tank missile launchers ( RPG-CARDINALV ) , CARDINAL hand pistols and corresponding ammunition , including cartridges of different calibres and grenades of various modifications . In addition , the group had had CARDINAL identical IEDs comprised of plastic explosives and hexogen and filled with metal pellets and electro detonators ( with a minimum impact radius of QUANTITY ) , QUANTITY IEDs made of OZM-CARDINAL anti - personnel circular fragmentation mines and so - called “ suicide bomber belts ” – IEDs containing plastic explosives and projectiles made of cut metal wires and metal sheets . The gang had also used mobile telephones and portable radio transmitters . The members had been supplied with camouflage clothes , balaclavas and gas masks . They used a ORG truck .

On DATE Mr PERSON had informed the members of the gang about the forthcoming attack and distributed roles amongst them . In TIME of DATE they had travelled towards GPE . As they had passed through the village of GPE they had captured a local policeman , PERSON , seizing his handgun and vehicle .

Between TIME on DATE a group of investigators and experts , in the presence of CARDINAL attesting witnesses , compiled a report of the school building and courtyard . The examination of the site was conducted while the clearing of the debris and rescue operation were taking place . It ran to CARDINAL pages and was accompanied by video and photographic material ( CARDINAL pages ) .

The report mostly concentrated on descriptions of the items found in the school , including personal belongings and documents of the hostages , the ORG equipment and ammunition , damage to the structure of the building and the ORG bodies . Very little information was given about the location and state of the GPE bodies . Most notably , page CARDINAL of the report contained the following passage : “ [ in the gymnasium ] from the floor up to QUANTITY high there are CARDINAL of burnt bodies of women , children and men , occupying CARDINAL of the gymnasium floor space ” . CARDINAL individual descriptions of GPE bodies were made . On DATE it was noted that the body of CARDINAL boy had been found next to the corpse of a terrorist in a classroom located on the ground floor and on page CARDINAL that the bodies of an elderly man and woman had been found in a storage room adjacent to the gymnasium . The report noted that the bodies had been carried out by ORG staff into the courtyard . Among relevant items noted as “ found among the rubble in the gymnasium ” and taken by the sappers and ORG staff into the courtyard were parts of explosive charges from grenade launchers , launching tubes of grenade launchers , a security cap from an ORG LOC flame - thrower , parts of hand grenades , anti - personnel mines , automatic firearms , pistols , cartridges and ammunition and parts of GPE . Other similar items were listed simply as “ collected at the site ” , without specifying in which part of the school they had been found .

The description of the canteen on page CARDINAL failed to mention the state of its CARDINAL windows facing the railway line or to give any details about the nature and extent of damage to its walls other than “ signs of damage from firearms ... [ resulting in ] whitewash falling off ” . Page CARDINAL described the damage to the main meeting hall , including a partially destroyed external brick wall and CARDINAL openings measuring CARDINAL by QUANTITY in the wall facing the railway line . The adjacent corridor bore signs of numerous impact traces and was scattered with parts of a destroyed wall and furniture .

NORP The description of the south wing on page CARDINAL was limited to the following : “ the wing is almost destroyed and the ORG servicemen are clearing the debris , as a result of which no examination of this wing is being carried out ” .

Subsequent expert reports cited additional examinations of the site . Several reports cited examinations which had taken place on DATE , DATE and DATE . The reports of these examinations contained much more detailed descriptions of the structure , findings and traces of impact . They were accompanied by a collection of samples , such as scrapes and swabs , in order for chemical examinations to be carried out . The documents indicated that most of the samples had been unable to yield any relevant results .

Following requests by the investigation in DATE and DATE , on DATE “ comprehensive forensic expert examination no . CARDINAL ” ( комплексная судебная экспертиза hereinafter “ expert report no . CARDINAL ” ) was produced . The request was to evaluate the conduct of the GPE and various military and security agencies from DATE . The experts visited the site in GPE and examined numerous items of evidence , including the testimony of servicemen and other witnesses , photographs , graphs and tapes of telephone and radio conversations . The report ran to over seventy pages . It concluded that the actions of the officials had been lawful and reasonable in the circumstances . In particular , it found that the members of the OH and servicemen of ORG , the internal troops , the ORG and ORG “ had not committed any offences which could bear a causal relationship with the negative consequences resulting from the terrorist act of DATE ” .

This document was extensively cited and relied upon in the subsequent proceedings , although it was later declared invalid ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

The report focused on several questions .

Firstly , the report found that the actions of the OH had been focused on negotiations with the terrorists in order to obtain the release of and ensure safety for a maximum number of people . The ORG demands transmitted through Mr PERSON could not serve as the subject of negotiations , since they had threatened the basis of the constitutional order and GPE ’s territorial integrity .

NORP The involvement of Mr PERSON and Mr PERSON as negotiators , as suggested to the GPE by the ORG , and the success of Mr PERSON ’s mission when he had taken out QUANTITY people , had served as an antidote to the escalation of the ethnic Ossetian - Ingush conflict .

With respect to Mr ORG ’s involvement in the negotiations , the report found that PERSON and PERSON PERSON had talked to PERSON PERSON on TIME DATE . He had told them that his connection with Mr ORG had remained on a CARDINAL - way level . They had suggested to PERSON that he contact Mr PERSON , but he had refused in view of their past differences .

The report also covered the question of PERSON involvement in the DATE . It stated that on TIME had taken an active part in the work of the OH . Under his command the officials had ensured a security perimeter around the school , informed the public about the measures taken , supplied the local population with the necessary provisions in FAC , and set up a field hospital . Information to the inhabitants had been provided TIME through Mr ORG , the North Ossetian President ’s press secretary . Mr PERSON had taken care of the immediate needs of DATE of the siege , coordinating various agencies involved and increasing the security of other vital objects in the Republic . When the terrorists had named him as a negotiator , PERSON had been prepared to go ahead , but the OH had formally forbidden him from doing so .

Having scrutinised the taped conversations between the hostage takers and the GPE and between the terrorists inside the building and their collaborators outside ( namely several conversations with someone using the call - name “ PERSON ” recorded after the start of the storming ) , the experts found that the terrorists had unconditionally refused to discuss any measures aimed at alleviating the GPE situation or any other arrangements except for political demands relating to the situation in GPE , and had insisted that the hostages had voluntarily joined them in declaring a “ dry hunger strike ” . The telephone conversations had often been ended by them in an aggressive manner and without apparent reason . Furthermore , they had anticipated and planned their own deaths , as well as numerous deaths among the hostages , as attested by the cheers and support received by them from “ PERSON ” once the storming had started . These later conversations had contained references to “ meeting in heaven ” , “ fulfilling the duty ” and becoming martyrs ( shahid ) , and had welcomed the killing of infidels and referred to the storming as “ going normally ” .

The report relied on numerous telexes , orders and decrees issued by ORG and the ORG in DATE and DATE indicating a heightened terrorist threat in the NORP and ordering various measures to be taken by the local police and security forces . As of CARDINAL DATE all forces of ORG in ORG had been put on alert ( усиленный вариант несения службы ) . On DATE the local police stations had been requested to take special measures to prevent terrorist acts from taking place during DATE of Knowledge on DATE .

With respect to PERSON ( situated next to the school building ) , the report concluded that the commanding officers had failed to take certain preventive steps . In particular , the personnel of the ROVD had not been told what action to take in case of an emergency , and no plan had been put in place to ensure additional security during ceremonies in the schools . The only police officer at school no . CARDINAL had been unarmed , namely PERSON The CARDINAL other police officers who had been scheduled to guard the school during the ceremony had been absent . CARDINAL patrol officers of the transport police had been transferred elsewhere to secure the passage of PERSON convoy along the “ GPE ” federal highway . As a result , the terrorists had had unhindered access to the school and had been able to force a large number of hostages inside . No reaction from the local law - enforcement bodies had been forthcoming during TIME of the attack .

NORP The servicemen of the Pravoberezhny ROVD , having received no instructions beforehand and having no preliminary plan of action in the event of a terrorist act , had received arms and ammunition at the ROVD and by TIME had set up a security cordon around the school . Information about the school siege had been immediately transmitted to ORG of the ORG . The report found that the actions of the senior staff of ORG had amounted to professional negligence .

With respect to the situation in LOC , the report concluded that the local police had failed to prevent the members of the gang from assembling and training there at DATE . Reference was made to the pending criminal case against the senior officers of ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

NORP The report concluded that the servicemen of the internal troops had been deployed only in the outer security perimeter around the school , the ORG special forces being deployed in the inner one . They had taken no part in the fighting , and their actions and equipment had fully complied with the relevant legal regulations and with their mission .

Servicemen of the ORG special forces had taken part in the operation . They had been armed with customary weapons and special equipment such as RPG-CARDINAL portable grenade launchers and ORG portable flame - throwers .

Turning to the events of DATE , the report gave the following chronology . By TIME no plan had been in place to start the storming operation . CARDINAL special forces groups had been training outside GPE , snipers and intelligence groups had kept monitoring the object from their designated positions , an emergency group of thirtytwo people had been positioned behind the housing blocks and the remaining servicemen had stayed at the assembly point .

NORP The explosions which had occurred at TIME had been caused by CARDINAL GPE . No shots had been fired at that time , as ORG staff had been working in the front yard of the school . In any event , the place of the explosion had been invisible from the ORG positions .

No flames could be seen in the gymnasium after the CARDINAL explosions . The hostages had started to run out through the openings in the walls . The terrorists had opened fire on the escaping people using automatic rifles and machine guns . On the instruction of the head of the GPE , the servicemen of the special forces had been ordered to save the hostages . The terrorists had been aimed at by the fire - support group and DATE .

A group of servicemen had entered the weights room and evacuated from it several women with small children . This group had then entered the gymnasium and started to take out the hostages . The terrorists had opened fire at them . CARDINAL servicemen had taken position on the floor and returned fire , while the rest had continued to lead the hostages out . CARDINAL TIME the terrorists had fired several shots from portable grenade launchers ( PERSON ) at the gymnasium , killing and injuring several hostages , wounding CARDINAL officers of the special forces and starting a fire in the gymnasium .

The rescue operation had lasted until TIME , at which time all available ORG forces had been regrouped pursuant to a previously adopted plan . At TIME , upon an order from the commander , they had stormed the building . Their movements inside the building had been slowed down by low visibility from smoke and whitewash powder and the presence of hostages whom the terrorists had been using as human shields . The terrorists had used automatic weapons , hand grenades and portable grenade launchers , while the ORG forces had been constrained to fire single shots , to avoid excessive harm to the hostages . By TIME no hostages had remained in the building . Only once this had been ensured had the forces of the ORG used heavy weapons against the terrorists who had refused to surrender . Hand grenades , RPGCARDINAL portable grenade launchers and ORG flamethrowers had been used for the first time after TIME At TIME a ORG tank had been used to make openings in the walls and suppress enemy firing points , since further movement in the building had been impossible because of mines laid by the terrorists . The records of the site examinations and video material showed that no bodies of hostages had been found in places where the terrorists had been killed by heavy arms and indiscriminate weapons .

CARDINAL servicemen of the special forces had been killed during the operation , and QUANTITY had received injuries . The fatalities had included CARDINAL lieutenant - colonels [ group commanders ] , CARDINAL of whom had died during TIME of the storming as he had rushed to the school shielding the escaping hostages ; the second had died in the main meeting room while trying to release the hostages detained there .

The report also analysed the circumstances of the deaths and injuries of each serviceman of the special forces which occurred TIME and TIME on DATE and concluded that their actions had been lawful and adequate and had demonstrated high professionalism , courage and selfsacrifice .

The commander of ORG , ORG , had been informed of the hostage - taking at TIME on DATE . By TIME the third ring of the security perimeter had been set up around the school by the CARDINALth ORG servicemen . The servicemen had been armed with various automatic weapons and portable grenade and mine launchers , but they had not used any of them since their task had been limited to maintaining the security cordon .

As to the use of military vehicles , the report found , on the basis of various descriptions , plans , logbooks and servicemen ’s testimony , that on CARDINAL DATE ORG tanks with hull numbers CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL had been transferred under the command of the ORG officers . Tanks with hull numbers CARDINAL and CARDINAL had manoeuvred around the school following the commands of the ORG officers but had not opened fire . A tank with hull number CARDINAL had fired CARDINAL high - fragmentation shots ( QUANTITY calibre ) at the canteen situated in the right wing of the school , following the instructions of the ORG officer in charge . The shots had been fired DATE . The report concluded that the tank had been used after the end of the rescue operation at TIME , when no harm could have been caused to the hostages and it had been guided by the need to suppress enemy fire in the most efficient way .

NORP Several other military vehicles had been used during the operation , also under the command of the ORG officers . MONEY had been stationed at various points around the school from CARDINAL or DATE . CARDINAL of them , with hull numbers CARDINAL and CARDINAL , had taken part in the storming operation . ORG number CARDINAL had used a heavy machine gun ( calibre QUANTITY ) CARDINAL to suppress the ORG firing positions on the school roof . At the same time an ORG with hull number CARDINAL had fired several rounds from a heavy machine gun at the windows of the first floor , covering the Alpha servicemen who had entered the building . The remaining military vehicles had taken no active part in the fighting . The experts concluded that the use of machine guns had been fully appropriate in the circumstances and could not have resulted in injuries or deaths among the hostages .

From TIME on DATE , various services of ORG from LOC and neighbouring regions had begun to arrive at school no . CARDINAL . They had included brigades specialising in extinguishing major fires and fire engines with water tanks or cisterns . Rescue workers had arrived with special equipment and search dogs . At TIME on DATE CARDINAL psychologists had started working with the relatives , and by DATE fiftyone psychologists had been working in GPE . The hub of psychological assistance had been in FAC , to which ambulance doctors had been called when necessary . In total , DATE , CARDINAL people and CARDINAL Emercom vehicles had been deployed in GPE .

At TIME on DATE CARDINAL servicemen of the Emercom rescue team had been instructed to retrieve bodies from the school courtyard . They had received safety guarantees and a mobile telephone to communicate with the terrorists in the school . Following the explosions in the gymnasium , chaotic firing from the upper floor and roof by the terrorists had left CARDINAL servicemen dead and CARDINAL injured .

The report then focused on the actions of the fire brigades on DATE . At TIME a fire alert had been given to the fire service . At CARDINAL to TIME fire brigades had arrived at the scene . The delay in their arrival had been caused by the order of General PERSON , who had considered that the firemen and their engines could have been attacked by the terrorists , rendering the rescue operation more complex . At TIME CARDINAL brigades had rolled out fire hoses and proceeded to extinguish the fire . Each cistern had been full and had contained QUANTITY of water , which had been used within TIME . The fire hydrant in the school could not be used as it had been located in the military engagement area . At QUANTITY other fire units had arrived and had been stationed on the north and east sides of the gymnasium . The LOC Deputy Minister of Emercom Colonel PERSON had assumed the role of incident commander . CARDINAL fire hoses had been deployed . A supply of water from a water hydrant situated within QUANTITY had been ensured , and the firemen had also used water from newly arrived tanks .

The fire had been contained and extinguished by TIME The operation had been protracted since on CARDINAL occasions the firemen had been removed from the school at the request of the special forces .

NORP In the meantime , Emercom rescue workers had evacuated hostages from the school building . By TIME they had taken out CARDINAL people , including CARDINAL children . After the fire had been extinguished , rescue teams had started to search the debris in the gymnasium . They had had to stop at TIME when unexploded IEDs had been discovered and sappers had been called in .

NORP Immediately after TIME on DATE a fire had started in the south wing of the school building where the canteen , craft classrooms , library and meeting room had been situated . CARDINAL fire brigades had arrived on the spot and the fire had been extinguished by CARDINAL a.m.

At TIME on DATE rescue workers and military servicemen had started to clear the debris and search for the bodies . In total , CARDINAL dead bodies had been collected and sent to the forensic unit in ORG . By TIME the search and rescue operation in the school had been completed .

The report concluded , with reference to the evidence contained in the case file , that the deaths of CARDINAL people whose bodies had been found in the gymnasium had been caused by the explosions of the IEDs . The bodies found there had had been PERCENT carbonised ; the carbonisation had occurred post mortem . The firefighters had had to act in extreme and life - threatening conditions . The organisation and equipment supplied had been sufficient to enable them to carry out their tasks .

On DATE ORG , following an application by the applicants , declared expert report no . CARDINAL invalid owing to a number of serious breaches of the procedural legislation governing the appointment of experts and the carrying out of expert evaluations .

The investigation established the following time frame concerning the action taken by the OH ( as set out in expert report no . CARDINAL and other documents ) :

At TIME was set up , in accordance with the plan of action in the event of a terrorist threat issued on DATE . Initially it was headed by the President of NORP Mr PERSON , the head of ORG General PERSON and the LOC Minister of the Interior Mr Dzantiyev . Prior to his appointment on DATE as head of the OH , General PERSON had been in charge of coordinating the actions of various law - enforcement and military structures , including the ORG units arriving in GPE . CARDINAL deputy heads of the ORG , Mr PERSON and Mr PERSON , who had arrived in GPE on DATE , acted as consultants and did not interfere with the command of the operation .

TIME the operative headquarters ensured the evacuation of residents from adjacent LOC and cordoned off the school . The police and security forces searched basements and attics of the nearby buildings , cleared the adjacent streets of parked vehicles and closed them to traffic , closed the local railway line and took other necessary measures . In order to avoid harm to the hostages and other civilians , they were also ordered not to respond to the random shots fired by the terrorists . Scanning of radio frequencies in the vicinity of the school had been put in place by ORG , the ORG and the army .

At TIME the terrorists sent out the first note , containing a telephone number and naming possible negotiators . However , the telephone number had been noted down incorrectly and no contact could be established .

TIME safety perimeters were put in place around the school , composed of police and army servicemen using CARDINAL APCs . At TIME the APCs were moved out of the ORG view , in order to avoid provocation .

At TIME the OH started compiling a list of the hostages .

At TIME the OH invited the LOC mufti to take part in the talks , but the terrorists opened fire on him when he tried to approach the seized building .

At TIME all reserve forces of the LOC police were placed on high alert , including local policemen in towns and villages along the administrative border with PERSON and police academy students .

At TIME hostage PERSON took out a second note with the correct telephone number .

CARDINAL and TIME a series of gunshots and explosions were heard inside the school . The OH instructed PERSON , a professional negotiator from LOC , to contact the terrorists by telephone . The hostage taker presented himself as “ Shahid ” and said that he had executed CARDINAL people and blown up CARDINAL others because the authorities had been slow in contacting them . He then insisted that the men indicated in their note ( Mr PERSON , PERSON , Mr PERSON and PERSON ) should come to the school together . Mr PERSON pleaded for some time to bring the CARDINAL men to GPE . The terrorist said that the gymnasium had been mined and would be blown up in the event of a storming .

At TIME Mr Kudzayev escaped from the school by jumping out of a first floor window . He identified a photograph of CARDINAL terrorist from ORG ; on DATE his relatives were brought from ORG by the ORG . However it transpired that the identification was incorrect . This man was later killed in ORG while actively resisting the authorities .

During DATE the OH collected information about possible hostage takers and their relatives , so as to involve the latter in the negotiations .

At TIME the terrorists fired several random shots from automatic weapons and portable grenade launchers . CARDINAL bodies were thrown out of the window . The GPE took steps to prepare for the evacuation of the injured to the local health establishments , and psychological support had been called in for the GPE relatives .

At TIME , in order to prevent the dissemination of incorrect information , it was decided that all contact with the media should be carried out by General PERSON , Mr PERSON and Mr PERSON . Mr PERSON from the NORP President ’s administration was given the task of liaising with journalists .

At TIME FAC designated hospitals to be on stand - by , and CARDINAL ambulance vehicles were deployed .

At TIME special forces of the ORG ( подразделения центра Специального назначения ( ORG ) PERSON ) arrived in PERSON and set up their headquarters . They started contemplating various ways of liberating the hostages and neutralising the attackers .

At CARDINAL of bottles of water , juice and food rations were stocked by the headquarters for the GPE eventual needs .

At TIME PERSON arrived in GPE . The terrorists refused to accept water or food from him . They continued to insist that all CARDINAL men indicated by them should come to the school . PERSON was permitted to talk on the telephone with the school director , who described the situation inside .

At TIME the OH continued talks with the attackers . They tried to involve journalists of an NORP television company in the negotiation process , but this was rejected by the terrorists . At the same time , they contacted the former President of PERSON and an influential businessman , PERSON PERSON .

At TIME the OH tried to arrange the release of hostages in exchange for money and unhindered passage to GPE or PERSON . CARDINAL buses were requested in the event that the terrorists agreed .

By DATE , CARDINAL hostages who had escaped from the school had been questioned in order to obtain information about the number and location of the terrorists and hostages inside the school , as well as to draw a plan of the IEDs .

At TIME some hostages were allowed to call their relatives in order to put pressure on the authorities .

At TIME the OH authorised Mr PERSON ’s participation in the negotiations . His offers of money and guarantees of unhindered passage were rejected by the hostage takers .

At TIME General PERSON spoke to the GPE relatives and assured them that no storming would take place . This was done in view of rumours circulating among the local population and the idea by civilians of forming a “ life ring ” around the school .

At TIME religious NORP leaders of GPE , PERSON and GPE delivered a televised address calling for peace and the end of further ethnic clashes .

At TIME Mr PERSON spoke to the attackers on the telephone ; he assured them that their demands would be passed on personally to the NORP President . The terrorists insisted that he come to PERSON with Mr PERSON .

At TIME the ORG of GPE appointed General PERSON the head of the OH and appointed its members by coded message . Report no . CARDINAL listed CARDINAL members , including CARDINAL deputy heads of the OH : General PERSON , the commander of ORG , and PERSON PERSON , the North Ossetian Minister of the ORG . It also listed the following members : the LOC President PERSON , the head of ORG GPE , the commander of the CARDINALth ORG , the deputy commander of the internal troops of ORG ORG , the head of the operational management group at ORG of the Interior Lieutenant - Colonel PERSON , the NORP Ossetian Minister of Health Mr GPE , the North Ossetian Minister of Education PERSON , the LOC Minister of Emercom Mr PERSON , the director of ORG at ORG ( “ the LOC ” ) Mr PERSON and the deputy head of the information programmes department of GPE . All members of the OH were informed of their positions .

At TIME Mr PERSON was permitted to enter the school . MONEY TIME he negotiated with the terrorists ; as a result of his mission QUANTITY people were released : babies aged under CARDINAL and their mothers . Mr PERSON also took out a letter signed by Mr PERSON with a demand for troops to be withdrawn from GPE .

At TIME an additional debriefing of former hostages took place in order to obtain more information about the positions of the hostages and terrorists and the location of the IEDs .

At TIME the OH ordered measures aimed at identifying and neutralising possible accomplices of the terrorists outside the school .

At TIME Mr PERSON proposed to the terrorists that the bodies be collected . They agreed to consider this proposal .

At TIME the attackers told PERSON , PERSON and PERSON Z. that the hostages had refused to accept food , water or medicine .

At TIME the terrorists fired random shots from automatic rifles and portable grenade launchers out of the school windows . The OH ordered that the surrounding territory be cleared of parked vehicles .

In TIME an agreement was reached through Mr PERSON and Mr PERSON to clear the bodies from the schoolyard .

At TIME Emercom officers were appointed and transport was arranged . They received instructions and means of communication . At CARDINAL p.m. the officers started to collect the bodies . CARDINAL terrorist went down to the courtyard to supervise their work .

At TIME CARDINAL powerful explosions occurred in the gymnasium . Part of the wall collapsed and the hostages started to panic and exit through the opening . The terrorists opened fire on them from automatic rifles and RPGCARDINAL portable grenade launchers from the windows of the first floor . CARDINAL people were killed as a result of gunshot wounds .

At TIME the head of the OH , General PERSON , gave written orders to the units of the ORG special forces to commence the operation aimed at saving the hostages and neutralising the terrorists .

At TIME the first hostages were taken to hospitals in GPE and NORP .

At TIME one terrorist , Mr PERSON , was detained and handed over to the investigators .

As a result of the explosions and the ensuing fire CARDINAL hostages died ; the rest were forced by the terrorists to move to the meeting room and other LOC of the school .

At TIME a fire broke out in the gymnasium . The expert report on fire and explosions established that the source of the fire had been located in the roof of the gymnasium , above the exit .

Mr GPE ordered the firemen not to intervene immediately , in view of the continuing fighting , the risk to the firemen ’s lives and the danger of delaying the rescue operation , which would result in more victims .

The OH ordered the firefighters to intervene at TIME They arrived at TIME and proceeded to extinguish the fire .

At TIME the rescue operation was over . The OH ordered the deployment of heavy weaponry to neutralise the terrorists .

At TIME on DATE the sweeping of the school building was over and a security cordon was set up . At TIME the demining started .

CARDINAL deputy heads of the ORG , Mr PERSON and Mr PERSON , were in GPE during the crisis .

A number of high - ranking ORG servicemen were questioned in the course of the investigation , including General PERSON ( on CARDINAL DATE ) , General PERSON ( on DATE ) and Generals PERSON and PERSON ( DATE ) . The documents of the criminal investigation submitted by the Government do not contain the record of questioning of General PERSON , the commander of ORG , who was in charge of the storming operation . His name is not listed among the witnesses / members of the OH in volume CARDINAL of file no . CARDINAL . The list of documents examined by the experts who had produced expert report no . CARDINAL does not mention his testimony either .

NORP In DATE the applicants wrote to the head of the ORG and referred to the meeting they had had with ORG in charge of the case , who had told them that the relevant video and audio material could not be found . In DATE State television aired a film entitled “ The Final Assignment ” containing video and audio material made by the special forces in GPE from DATE . They sought to ensure that the footage would be given to ORG . They also asked that the members of the special forces be questioned during the investigation . In DATE the ORG informed the applicants that any such action would be done in response to the relevant requests by the prosecutor ’s service and in line with the legislation .

The investigation file contains a number of documents concerning the use of arms and ammunition by various ORG bodies ; some are cited in other documents ( see below ) . CARDINAL of various individual experts’ reports were ordered by the investigation on firearms ( hand pistols , guns and automatic weapons ) , ammunition and IEDs supposedly used by the terrorists , as well as weapons and ammunition used by the security forces . Some of the cartridges were marked by experts as suitable for identification of the weapons ( for example , expert report no . CARDINAL of DATE marked CARDINAL spent cartridges from a PERSON automatic rifle as suitable for weapon identification ) . These reports were submitted to ORG , and the most relevant ones are summarised below . The victims challenged certain procedural steps related to the commissioning of some of the reports , complaining that they had not been allowed to take copies of them but had been able to view them in the prosecutor ’s office for a limited amount of time .

According to a document dated DATE ( act no . CARDINAL ) , CARDINAL military unit of ORG deployed in GPE used CARDINAL cartridges for automatic weapons and machine guns ( CARDINAL and CARDINAL PERSON calibre ) , CARDINAL tracer bullets ( QUANTITY T ) , CARDINAL armour - piercing incendiary cartridges for large - calibre machine guns ( PERSON and GPE ) and QUANTITY hand grenades ( PERSON ) .

CARDINAL of witness statements were collected by the investigation DATE and DATE from the military and police servicemen , officers of ORG , firefighters and members of the OH . These statements , consistently and in detail , denied the use of grenade launchers , flame - throwers and a tank cannon prior to TIME on DATE .

The investigation ordered individual expert reports on parts of explosive charges and launch tubes of explosive , thermobaric and armour - piercing weapons found at the school and in the nearby areas . These included launch tubes of CARDINAL LOC flame - throwers with batch and individual serial numbers , parts of artillery shells , hand grenades , smoke grenades , spent cartridges of different calibres , tubes and charges for grenade launchers . The reports contain the following relevant descriptions of the weapons used .

CARDINAL reports examined launch tubes of CARDINAL ORG tubes with different batch and serial numbers ( expert report ORG : batch CARDINAL - CARDINAL , nos . CARDINAL , CARDINAL ; batch CARDINAL , no . CARDINAL ; batch CARDINAL , CARDINAL . CARDINAL and DATE ) and CARDINAL ORG tubes ( expert report PERSON of DATE : batch CARDINAL - CARDINAL , ORG . CARDINAL and CARDINAL ; batch CARDINAL , no . CARDINAL ) . The reports describe the RPOA Shmel as follows :

“ [ A ] portable anti - personnel flame - thrower ORG is designed to impact fortified firing points of the enemy ... destroy light armoured vehicles and other vehicles , sheltered and exposed manpower ...

Technical characteristics :

- range of direct fire QUANTITY ;

- effective range CARDINAL m ;

- maximum range CARDINAL,CARDINAL m ;

- temperature of burning of the combustible mixture CARDINAL,CARDINAL˚C ;

- destruction caused in a closed structure CARDINAL m² ;

- destruction of manpower CARDINAL m² ”

The fire experts’ report of DATE mentioned an additional expert report , SI–CARDINAL of DATE , which had examined several parts of ORG spent charges .

In addition to the above - mentioned CARDINAL tubes of GPE with identified batch and serial numbers , the file contained a document dated DATE and signed by ORG from ORG . This document stated that the ORG units had received CARDINAL GPE flame - throwers ( batch CARDINAL , ORG . CARDINAL - CARDINAL , MONEY ) from military storage . After the operation CARDINAL flame - throwers with the indicated numbers , plus CARDINAL with a different batch and number ( batch CARDINAL - CARDINAL , no . CARDINAL ) , had been returned to storage . It does not appear that the remaining CARDINAL ORG devices from batch CARDINAL were spotted and examined by experts .

CARDINAL expert reports concerned over DATE used capsules with readable serial numbers , which the experts were first unable to identify or describe otherwise than “ special purposes ammunition ” , for which no descriptions or technical characteristics were available to the experts of ORG ( expert reports SICARDINAL of DATE , ORG of DATE , SICARDINAL of DATE ) . In DATE these spent capsules were identified as charges for a light infantry flame - thrower PERSON ( expert report nos . DATE , CARDINAL of DATE ) . This latest report also contained detailed information about the thermobaric charge for an LPO-CARDINAL . Upon an explosion , impact is created by a “ sphere of fire ” with temperatures ranging from about CARDINAL,CARDINAL˚C in the centre to about CARDINAL˚C at QUANTITY and CARDINAL˚C at QUANTITY distance , and secondary effects . Due to the very short “ time span of the sphere of fire ” ( CARDINAL ) , the explosion can not lead to the combustion of wooden structures . People located within QUANTITY of the explosion can receive thermal burns on exposed body parts and within QUANTITY various injuries , including a perforated eardrum .

On DATE Colonel PERSON from a unit of ORG issued a note stating : “ [ the ] use of rocket propelled infantry flame - throwers ORG and light infantry flame - throwers GPE is not prohibited by international conventions . They have been widely used during combat operations in GPE and GPE . ”

On DATE a military unit located in ORG forwarded detailed technical characteristics of GPE and GPE flamethrowers to the military prosecutor ’s office . The functionality of an ORG was described as : “ [ the ] destruction of manpower in fortified firing points , buildings , vehicles , [ and ] the creation of islands of fire in the abovementioned objects and on the ground . ” The functionality of an GPE ( introduced into service in DATE ) was described as “ [ the ] destruction of manpower inside buildings by means of high - temperature field and a field of extensive pressure ... ”

Expert report no . SI-CARDINAL of DATE examined CARDINAL launch tubes from RPGCARDINAL ORG disposable anti - tank grenade launchers , bearing identifiable batch and serial numbers .

Expert report no . SICARDINAL of CARDINAL September CARDINAL examined the following items that were found in the gymnasium : CARDINAL grenade type VOGCARDINAL M for an AGSCARDINAL automatic mounted grenade launcher with an identifiable batch number ; CARDINAL grenade type VOGCARDINAL for an under - barrel grenade launcher GPCARDINAL with a batch number ; an GPE hand grenade ; an FCARDINAL hand grenade ; an ORG hand grenade ; an RDGCARDINALB smoke grenade ; a shell of a ORG - F stun grenade , and CARDINAL security cap from an ORG .

Expert report no . SICARDINAL of DATE examined CARDINAL used antitank grenade type PGCARDINALL with an identifiable batch and serial number , used by reloadable portable grenade launcher type RPGCARDINAL and its modifications ; CARDINAL spent parts from ORG disposable anti - tank rocket launchers , with identifiable batch numbers ; and one spent part of an anti - tank grenade ( RPGCARDINAL disposable grenade launcher ) , with a batch number .

On DATE the military unit in ORG responded to a question from the military prosecutor ’s office and submitted a table containing the technical characteristics of CARDINAL types of grenade launchers : the reloadable RPGCARDINAL and GPCARDINAL , and the disposable GPE and GPE .

NORP On DATE the NORP Federal forensic expert centre produced fire expert ’s report ( заключение пожаро-технической судебной экспертизы ) no . CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL . The voluminous report consisted of CARDINAL pages , accompanied by CARDINAL pages of tables and photographs . The report started by reviewing a number of relevant pieces of evidence , including extracts from witness statements , expert reports , information about the arms and ammunition used , an examination of the building materials and a review of available photo and video material .

NORP In particular , the report cited a “ joint record ” dated DATE of the arms and ammunition used by the military servicemen , which included CARDINAL cartridges for automatic weapons and machine guns ( TIME , CARDINAL PERSON ) , CARDINAL tracer bullets ( QUANTITY T ) , CARDINAL disposable anti - tank rocket launchers ( RPGCARDINAL ORG ) , CARDINAL armour - piercing charges for reloadable anti - tank grenade launchers ( PGCARDINALVL ) , CARDINAL highfragmentation warheads for a QUANTITY calibre tank gun ( QUANTITY OF ) and CARDINAL smoke grenades ( CARDINAL mm ZDCARDINAL ) ( page CARDINAL of the report ) . The same report contained references to expert examinations of a number of parts of used ORG flame - throwers ( report SI CARDINAL of DATE ) and a list of CARDINAL empty tubes from an ORG collected by the members of the parliamentary commission citing their serial numbers ( batch CARDINAL , ORG . DATE and CARDINAL ) ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . It also mentioned a document dated DATE and signed by ORG from ORG about the use of CARDINAL ORG flamethrowers with batch number CARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . On DATE LieutenantColonel Vasilyev from ORG was questioned and stated that he had received back CARDINAL flame - throwers from batch CARDINAL , plus CARDINAL from another batch , which had not been issued from that storage ( batch CARDINAL , no . CARDINAL ) ; Major PERSON . from the ORG unit explained that the others had been used ( pages DATE of the report ) .

NORP The report further mentioned a witness statement of Colonel PERSON , who explained that he had led a group of officers who had taken part in the storming of the school building . The group had used RPGCARDINAL grenade launchers and GPE flame - throwers , but not at the LOC where the hostages had been present ( page CARDINAL of the report ) . CARDINAL witness , GPE , a member of a storming group , stated on DATE that he had used RPGCARDINAL grenade launchers and ORG flame - throwers upon “ enemy firing points which had been designated in advance and identified during the storming ” . The firing points identified in advance had been located in the window of the attic area and the third window on the first floor of the main building . No hostages had been there at the time . For the second time the flame - thrower had been used at TIME , at TIME , upon a group of terrorists in the craft classrooms on the ground floor . At that time the rest of the building had been in the firm control of the security forces and ORG staff had been finishing carrying the bodies out of the gymnasium ( page CARDINAL of the report ) . The report listed the main characteristics of an ORG : a thermobaric charge of QUANTITY upon explosion creates a powerful combustion zone ( a sphere of fire CARDINAL to QUANTITY in diameter ) burning at temperature of CARDINAL ; accompanied by an extremely powerful shock wave caused by a complete burning of oxygen in the detonation zone . An expert described the effects of this charge upon people , which would include severe fractures caused by the shock wave and lung collapse ; and upon buildings as a “ blowing out ” of the external walls and collapse of the structure . The report referred to the records of CARDINAL experiments carried out on DATE wherein disused buildings had been fired at with ORG flamethrowers , as a result of which the buildings had been demolished but no fire had started ( page CARDINAL of the report ) . Relying on the testimonies of security personnel , the pattern of destruction of the roof in the main part of the building , parts of ORG charge found in the attic of the “ left wing ” of the school and the absence of any such parts in the gymnasium , the conclusion was that there had been no explosions of a thermobaric charge from an ORG there . The report concluded as follows on the use of flamethrowers ( pages CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the report ) :

“ ORG were used during the special operation aiming to free the hostages . Criminal case file no GPE contains no material to conclude that ORG flame - throwers had been used on the roof and the structure of the gymnasium of school no CARDINAL . The use of an FAC flame - thrower on the roof of the gymnasium could not have led to a fire in its wooden parts . ”

In so far as the first explosions were concerned , the report concluded that the explosions in the gymnasium which had occurred within TIME at TIME on DATE had resulted from the IEDs attached to a basketball hoop near the west wall ( equivalent to QUANTITY of ORG ) and located on a chair placed QUANTITY away from the north wall under the window ( and equivalent to QUANTITY of ORG ) . Both IEDs had been filled with numerous small metal objects . The third explosion had resulted from the IED placed under a basketball hoop at the north wall catching fire , its metal filling falling on the floor and the explosion of a small amount of explosives ( equivalent to QUANTITY of ORG ) , as a result of exposure to heat ( pages CARDINAL of the report ) .

NORP The experts considered and accepted as “ probable ” the hypothesis that the fire in the gymnasium had started as a result of use of armourpiercing and incendiary charges , which could have been used by the terrorists ( page CARDINAL of the report ) . As to the place where the fire had started , having analysed the extent and degree of damage to various constructions of the gymnasium , the experts concluded that it had most probably been located in the attic area located more or less above the basketball hoop in the north part of the room ; the fire on the floor had started only after the burning parts of the ceiling and roof had fallen down . The extent of damage caused by the fire and explosions prevented any detailed analysis of the number of places where the fire had started and its exact cause and spreading in the building ( pages CARDINAL of the report ) .

On DATE the ORG ’s ORG ( PERSON ) produced expert report no . CARDINAL . The report focused on the examination of the IEDs used by the terrorists in the gymnasium . It concluded that the terrorists had placed CARDINAL GPE in the gymnasium , joined into a single chain by electric cables and detonators . On DATE CARDINAL GPE had exploded in the north - west part of the gymnasium : CARDINAL at the basketball hoop on the west wall ( made of an CARDINAL anti - personnel mine , equivalent to QUANTITY of ORG ) , the second on the right - hand side of the door leading into the gymnasium on the west wall ( a sphereshaped IED equivalent to QUANTITY of ORG ) and the third on the windowpane of the first window on the north - west wall ( an IED in a plastic bottle equivalent to QUANTITY of ORG ) . The total force of the explosions had been equivalent to QUANTITY of ORG ; however it was impossible to confirm their exact timing and sequence . The most likely cause of the explosions was intentional or non - intentional impact upon the detonator pedal ; the reasons why the whole chain had failed to react were unclear , but it could be that the first explosions had damaged the electric cables connecting the rest of the IEDs ( pages CARDINAL of the report ) .

On DATE a comprehensive forensic report on the explosions ( комплексная криминалистическая экспертиза математического моделирования взрывов ) was ordered from experts of the NORP scientific and production company ORG PERSON ” ) and ORG and ORG , named after PERSON of ORG Научно-исследовательский испытательный институт им. Карбышева PERSON ) . The applicants submitted that the document in its entirety had been unavailable to them prior to the exchange of the parties’ observations in DATE .

In DATE PERSON applied to the prosecutor ’s office to have the experts of PERSON dismissed , as they had been administratively dependent on ORG . Her application was rejected on DATE because no subjective bias of the experts could be discerned and , objectively , ORG had not been a party to the criminal proceedings .

Expert report no . CARDINAL was produced on DATE and ran to CARDINAL pages , accompanied by detailed charts and photographs . It appeared to dismiss the doubts expressed , notably , by a member of the ORG investigative committee and a renowned expert in the field of explosions , PERSON , about the external origins of the first CARDINAL explosions in the gymnasium ( see paragraphs CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL below ) . The conclusions of report no . CARDINAL are found on pages CARDINAL to CARDINAL . They can be summarised as follows : the first explosion was the result of the detonation of a large IED , equivalent to CARDINAL QUANTITY kilograms of ORG . The origin of this explosion was not linked to the electric wires and detonator , but resulted , most probably , from mishandling of the device by the terrorists guarding it . This IED exploded in the north - east part of the gymnasium , at a spot about a metre away from the north wall and QUANTITY away from the east wall . The second explosion occurred TIME and consisted of the simultaneous detonation of several ( CARDINAL ) smaller IEDs in the north - west part of the hall ; this explosion most probably resulted from CARDINAL of the terrorists intentionally or unintentionally using the detonator pedal . It could not have been caused by a cumulative charge launched from the outside . The report also concluded that out of all the recorded damage to the gymnasium walls , MONEY could have been caused by either a thermobaric charge or a cumulative charge projected from outside . These projectiles could not have been launched from the roofs of houses at CARDINAL , DATE or CARDINAL PERSON ( as alleged by some experts ) . The damage caused to the south wing of the school could have been caused by the use of various weapons and explosives , including a tank cannon , flame - throwers and grenade launchers ; however , the extent of the destruction excluded the possibility of any detailed reconstruction of the events . The report dismissed as improbable the launching of a thermobaric charge from a helicopter , pointing out that it could lead to the destruction of the helicopter and death of the crew . Lastly , the report listed the following types of weapons used by the members of the counter - terrorist operation , reconstructed on the basis of video material and the documents contained in criminal case file no . CARDINAL :

“ - portable grenade launchers RPG-CARDINALV and their modifications with anti - tank charges PG-CARDINALVL , PG-CARDINALVM , PG-CARDINALVS , fragmentary warhead PERSON ;

- disposable anti - tank rocket launchers RPG-CARDINAL , ORG ;

- propelled attack grenades RShGCARDINAL with a thermobaric warhead ;

- flame - throwers FAC with a thermobaric warhead ;

- light infantry flame - throwers LPOCARDINAL with a thermobaric charge ( probably ) ;

- firearms and portable grenade launchers . ”

Based on the same sources , the report concluded that the terrorists had used an RPG-CARDINALV portable grenade launcher with anti - tank charges type ORG ; PERSON disposable anti - tank rocket launchers , possibly a grenade launcher with a thermobaric charge ; CARDINAL “ bottle ” type IEDs , CARDINAL IEDs made out of MONCARDINAL anti - personnel mines and CARDINAL IEDs made out of OZM-CARDINAL anti - personnel mines ; and firearms and portable grenade launchers ( pages CARDINAL of the report ) .

As a follow up to that report , on DATE ORG of the ORG ’s expert laboratory examined the explosion marks on the south walls of the gymnasium and confirmed the above conclusions about the possible trajectory of the charges having been fired from the first floor of the south wing of the school and that these shots could not have been fired from houses at CARDINAL , DATE , CARDINAL PERSON or the garage roof ( report no . GPE , page CARDINAL ) .

Expert report no . CARDINAL was ordered by the investigation in DATE in order to dispel PERSON allegations about the origins of the second explosion in the gymnasium which had resulted in the destruction of a section of the wall under the window on the north side . It was completed on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Like report CARDINAL , it was carried out by experts of PERSON . The experts tested all the possibilities suggested by PERSON , including the use of various types of grenade launchers and flame - throwers upon a similar construction and concluded that their impact had been incompatible with the damage in the gymnasium . The report ran to CARDINAL pages and concluded that the “ origin of the hole in the north - west wall of the gymnasium ... was the detonation of an IED with the equivalent of QUANTITY of ORG , placed at a height of QUANTITY from the floor , near the radiator ... The power of this explosion ’s impact upon the wall was exacerbated by an almost simultaneous explosion of several other IEDs located in the north - west part of the gymnasium , further away from the first explosion ” ( pages CARDINAL of the report ) .

On DATE the ORG deputy military prosecutor issued an order not to prosecute unnamed military servicemen of the CARDINALth ORG of ORG and internal troops of ORG . The document stated that the investigation had established that the personnel of the army and ORG had used automatic weapons , RPGCARDINAL grenade launchers , ORG flamethrowers and TCARDINAL tanks . The document then proceeded to describe the events of the siege and storming , in line with witness statements of ORG of the CARDINALth ORG . In particular , the document stated that on DATE , during the first meeting of the OH , it had been decided that PERSON involvement in the negotiations was “ devoid of purpose ” ( нецелесообразно ) since there was a threat of his being taken hostage as well . It further stated that although the decision to clear the area around the school of civilians and armed “ volunteers ” had been taken at TIME , it had not been implemented until DATE . Furthermore , on DATE the terrorists had demanded that Mr PERSON , PERSON PERSON , Mr PERSON and PERSON arrive for negotiations , but the GPE had decided that such talks were also “ devoid of purpose ” . After the first explosions at TIME the terrorists had opened fire at the hostages running out of the gymnasium , following which the servicemen of the second security perimeter had returned fire . At TIME a group of sappers under the command of Colonel PERSON had started to demine the gymnasium ; at the same time he had called for firemen to extinguish the fire . The first fire vehicle had arrived at TIME and contained QUANTITY of water ; the second vehicle had arrived at TIME and proceeded to extinguish the fire . By TIME the storming of the building had been over , while the search for and elimination of terrorists had continued until TIME on DATE .

The document then summarised the witness statement of ORG Tsyban , who explained that the OH had officially been created on DATE at TIME under the command of General PERSON . The OH had decided that Mr PERSON ’s involvement in the negotiations could not be authorised in view of the threat of his being taken hostage .

The document then related the witness statements of CARDINAL servicemen from the CARDINALth ORG – sappers , tank and ORG commanders . They stated that the tanks had fired CARDINAL shots in TIME of DATE and that none of them had fired at the school during the daytime .

The document referred to CARDINAL names of military servicemen who had been deployed within the security perimeter . Their statements were summarised in the following manner :

“ ... while securing the area no instances of any loss or stealing of arms or ammunition were noted , and there were no attempts by the terrorists to break through or to get away . Since the commanders had issued an order not to open fire unless there was an open breakthrough of the terrorists , no fire was opened and the use of firearms was regulated by LAW of the [ ORG ] . There were no noted instances of breaches of order or unauthorised use of firearms . No ammunition was used . ”

The document concluded that the servicemen of ORG had used “ personal , authorised , smallarms weapons , engineering hardware and chemical weapons , destined to cause harm to manpower , but this ammunition was used in line with the [ applicable ] regulations and on account of the inability to prevent the ORG actions by any other means ; the use of the above weapons resulted in the ORG elimination or detention ” . The document further stated that the investigation had obtained no evidence that the use of the above - listed weapons had resulted in harm to any of the hostages . Accordingly , there was no evidence of an offence having been committed .

NORP The decision of DATE was quashed on CARDINAL DATE due to certain technical deficiencies . It is unclear what happened next in this respect .

On DATE a commission from the North Ossetian Emercom carried out an internal investigation into the actions of the ORG staff during the crisis . According to its findings , the firefighters were aware in advance of the locations of the fire hydrants in the vicinity of the school , but could not use them because they could have been shot at by the terrorists . Hence , they first used mobile cisterns . The staff in charge had drawn up a plan of access for the fire engines to the school , but it was not within the NORP powers to ensure that these routes were accessible – that should have been coordinated by the OH on the basis of that plan . Failure to intervene during the initial stage had been based on the instructions of the OH . Lastly , the use of more powerful hydraulic cannons was deemed impractical by the commission , in view of the limited choice of locations where they could be placed , the distance to the source of the fire of QUANTITY , narrow access to the fire and the danger from the “ hot vapour ” to those who might still be alive in the burning building . The commission concluded that the actions of the ORG staff had been correct and justified .

On DATE an investigator from ORG in the LOC decided not to charge the LOC Minister of Emercom Mr PERSON and his deputy and head of the fire service , Colonel PERSON , with crimes under LAW ( criminal negligence ) . The decision referred to witness statements made by Colonel PERSON , Mr PERSON and a number of other firefighters and officials of the service . They confirmed that the information about the fire had first come in after the first explosions , soon after TIME , but that the OH had only allowed the firefighters to intervene after TIME They said that CARDINAL fire engines had been ready to take part in the operation , but that the access routes to the school had remained busy with cars and people . The CARDINAL closest fire hydrants had not been accessible ; at first the engines had used cisterns to extinguish the fire from CARDINAL water cannons ; later a line to the next hydrant had been made . The decision discussed the question whether the firefighters could have used a more powerful hydraulic water cannon , but the firefighters argued that it could only have produced the desired effects if the distance to the source of fire had been QUANTITY – that could not have been ensured in view of the ongoing fighting . The decision concluded that at the time of the NORP intervention , the general management of the operation had been taken by the OH headed by the ORG , without whose permission no action could have been taken . The ORG had not allowed the firefighters to intervene for TIME , in view of a lack of special equipment for them , and thus their members could have been injured or died . In such circumstances , the actions of the ORG officials contained no elements which could lead to the conclusion that a crime had been committed . It is unclear when the applicants were informed of this decision and whether they had appealed against it .

In DATE the victims lodged an application to have the competent officials , including PERSON , General PERSON , Mr PERSON and Colonel PERSON , charged with criminal negligence and withholding information entailing danger to people ’s lives and health , with serious consequences ( Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL and CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW ) . In particular , they argued that no necessary preventive measures had been taken prior to the terrorist act ; that the GPE had remained passive and failed to ensure meaningful negotiations with the hostage takers ; that as a result of the inaction of the OH the GPE conditions had deteriorated from DATE , thus rendering them weak by the time of the storming ; that the failure of PERSON , PERSON and Mr PERSON to appear for negotiations had excluded the possibility of a dialogue ; that the security perimeter around the school had not been properly ensured ; and that the storming operation had not been thoroughly prepared . The victims also alleged that the military and security forces had acted without a plan and used excessive and indiscriminate weapons after TIME on DATE . In support of that assertion they referred to CARDINAL witness statements collected during the trial of ORG attesting to the use of flame - throwers , grenade launchers , tanks and APCs . They further alleged that there had been a CARDINAL - and - a - half hour delay between the start of the fire in the gymnasium and the commencement of the extinguishing operation , and that the firefighters had been unprepared since they had lacked water supplies . As a result , CARDINAL of hostages including children in the gymnasium had been burnt alive , since they were injured , shellshocked , disoriented or too weak to leave on their own .

On DATE the Deputy Prosecutor General rejected the application , finding that the decisions of the investigating officers had been lawful and that the actions sought by the victims were not necessary as the relevant facts had been established through other steps . On DATE ORG allowed an appeal by the victims against the decision and ordered ORG to examine the GPE applications in detail and provide them with reasoned answers to each of their arguments . On DATE ORG quashed and remitted ORG decision . On DATE ORG confirmed the validity of the decision of DATE . It was then approved by ORG on DATE . Subsequent requests by the victims for a supervisory review were unsuccessful .

In the meantime , and in parallel to the above - mentioned proceedings , on DATE the head of the investigation team , an investigator of ORG in ORG , decided not to open a criminal investigation , under the same provisions of LAW , in respect of the head and members of the GPE . The investigator found that there were no constituent elements of an offence in the officials’ actions . He relied heavily on the conclusions of expert report no . CARDINAL , saying that the actions of the OH had been in conformity with the relevant rules and regulations . The victims appealed , and on DATE a judge of ORG quashed the investigator ’s decision , since expert report no . CARDINAL had been found to be unlawful . On DATE ORG quashed and remitted ORG decision , finding that it was not based on all the material available . On DATE , in a new set of proceedings , ORG rejected all the applications and found that even though expert report no . CARDINAL had been invalidated , the evidence on which it had relied remained valid and supported similar conclusions . On DATE ORG upheld this decision .

In a separate decision , also dated DATE , the same investigator decided not to open criminal proceedings against the LOC Deputy Minister of Emercom and head of the fire service Colonel PERSON and the head of the fire service of LOC GPE . The decision referred to LAW , which concerned criminal negligence , and to witness statements confirming that the first information about the explosions and fire in the gymnasium had been received soon after TIME on DATE , as well as to the fact that Colonel PERSON had , on several occasions between CARDINAL.CARDINAL and TIME , ordered the firefighters to intervene and then cancelled his orders due to a lack of authorisation by the head of the OH . At TIME CARDINAL fire engines had arrived at the school with a full load of water , which could last for TIME . Once it had been used , CARDINAL other fire engines had been called in ; later , water had been obtained from a fire hydrant because the closest hydrants could not be used . The decision referred to expert report no . CARDINAL and to the fire expert ’s report no . CARDINAL , CARDINAL - CARDINAL ( see paragraphs CARDINAL et seq . ) .

On DATE ORG informed ORG of the results of its internal inquiry into the actions of its staff from DATE . ORG conceded that the scale and circumstances of the events had been unprecedented even for its most experienced staff , and that the situation had been “ exacerbated by a lack of verifiable information about the number of hostages , the unpredictability of the events and the difficulty in predicting the types of injuries ” . The report noted that the situation at the site of the paediatric field hospital set up in GPE on DATE had been made difficult by the presence of a large number of local residents , who had “ sometimes turned into a mob displaying signs of emotional / psychological instability ” . The work of a mobile group of psychologists had helped to dispel the pressure and create the conditions necessary to administer medical aid . The overall input of ORG was described as vital .

The Government , in their submissions made in DATE , summarised the documents contained in file QUANTITY relating to the work of the medical staff as follows .

On DATE ORG set up a coordination cell , joining the forces of the local and federal ministries of health , Emercom , ORG and the ORG forensic bureau ( PERSON экспертизы ( ORG ) – “ the forensic bureau ” ) . From the TIME of DATE , special psychological aid units were put in place for the relatives . A number of other urgent steps were taken , such as putting medical personnel in a number of local hospitals on standby , preparing supplies of necessary equipment and material , including blood for transfusion , ensuring the preparedness of the intensive care and surgery units .

On DATE an emergency paediatric field hospital was set up in GPE . The “ federal and local headquarters ” worked out access to the school and evacuation routes and instructed the drivers and medical and paramedical personnel involved .

On DATE an additional hospital was set up in GPE , equipped to perform urgent surgical operations and other types of emergency care . Measures were taken in order to assist a large number of the injured . A total of CARDINAL places were reserved at various hospitals in the region . Both before and after the storming medical teams were brought in from other regions , including highly qualified doctors from GPE .

By the time of the first explosions , CARDINAL doctors , CARDINAL medical staff and CARDINAL ambulances were in GPE . This made CARDINAL mobile medical teams , including CARDINAL reserve ones .

DATE on DATE , CARDINAL injured people , including CARDINAL children , were transferred to the local hospitals . By TIME all patients had been placed in hospitals in GPE and NORP and CARDINAL urgent operations had been performed .

Over CARDINAL people were provided with psychological aid .

From DATE special medical teams visited families , assisting those hostages and their family members who had gone home . Between CARDINAL and DATE over CARDINAL patients ( including CARDINAL children ) were transferred for treatment to GPE by special flights .

DATE and DATE CARDINAL patients received medical aid . A total of CARDINAL died at the school , while CARDINAL people died in hospital . By DATE CARDINAL patients ( including CARDINAL children ) continued to receive medical aid in hospitals ; others had been discharged . PERSON received QUANTITY of medical equipment and supplies in relation to the crisis .

In DATE the applicants applied to ORG in ORG to have Mr PERSON , the LOC Minister of the ORG , charged with criminal negligence . On DATE that application was dismissed . Following an appeal by the victims , on CARDINAL DATE and DATE ORG and ORG upheld that decision .

In DATE the applicants requested that the prosecutor ’s office “ evaluate ” the actions of the LOC senior officials who had failed to prevent the terrorist act and inform the population of the imminent threat or ensure a proper security perimeter around the school . They also asked it to verify the lawfulness of the actions of the members of the OH who had authorised the use of indiscriminate weapons and had failed to ensure that the fire was promptly extinguished . They referred to the information contained in the ORG report ( see paragraphs CARDINAL et seq . ) , also seeking to have the officials concerned and the victims questioned . On DATE this application was dismissed in part by the investigator , who found that the questions raised by the victims were the subject of the pending criminal investigation .

On the basis of the medical documents and forensic reports , the causes of death were established for CARDINAL people ; the exact cause of death of CARDINAL people could not be established owing to extensive post mortem burns . As to the injured , QUANTITY people received gunshot wounds , CARDINAL shrapnel wounds , CARDINAL people suffered from the consequences of the explosions , CARDINAL people received concussion , CARDINAL people suffered from fractured bones and contusions , CARDINAL people received thermal injuries and CARDINAL people suffered psychological and neurological problems .

The investigation concluded that the deaths and injuries of the victims were not connected with any actions or omissions on the part of ORG agents , including the use of firearms .

The applicants in their numerous complaints stressed that the forensic expert reports had been carried out without the extraction of bullets , shrapnel and other objects from the bodies . They also stressed that the forensic reports for many people had failed to establish the cause of death altogether , owing to extensive burns .

In the course of the domestic proceedings the victims lodged CARDINAL applications with the prosecutor ’s office requesting various procedural steps to be taken . They appealed against the results of most of these decisions in the district courts . Copies of most of the applications and complaints , as well as the authorities’ reactions , were submitted to the ORG or described by the applicants in their submissions .

In DATE the victims asked the investigator in charge of the case to find out who had decided against presenting the CARDINAL men sought by the terrorists for negotiations ; to hold confrontations between civilian and police witnesses on the CARDINAL hand and army servicemen on the other ; and to investigate the use of tanks and flame - throwers in TIME DATE . On DATE the investigator rejected the application , stating that the decision to use the appropriate weapons had been taken by the OH and that witness confrontations were not considered useful by the investigation .

NORP In DATE the applicants asked the investigator to determine who had decided that the CARDINAL men requested by the terrorists should not participate in the talks and who had authorised the use of tanks and flamethrowers during the storming . On DATE the investigator in charge granted the application and informed the applicants that they would be kept up to date with the investigation results .

In DATE the applicants asked the investigation to find out the number of hostages that had been communicated by the OH to the ORG , ORG and the NORP President on DATE of the crisis and to question the relevant officials . On DATE this application was granted .

In DATE , referring to the results of the forensic reports and witness statements obtained during the trial of PERSON ( see paragraphs CARDINAL et seq . ) , the victims argued that the bodies of CARDINAL people had been severely burned , rendering it impossible in most cases for the cause of death to be established . However several forensic reports indicated extensive burns as the cause of death . The victims sought to find out who had ordered the delay in the NORP intervention in the gymnasium and whether they had been properly equipped upon arrival . On DATE the investigator dismissed the application to bring charges against several officials , referring to the pending investigation .

At the GPE request , on DATE the investigator appended to the file the records of the trials of the officers of the PERSON and PERSON ROVDs .

NORP In DATE the investigator granted the GPE applications , based on information obtained during the trial of PERSON ORG , to have a number of senior officials questioned about the steps taken in DATE with the aim of preventing the terrorist act , in order to clarify the extent of the local police ’s involvement in securing Mr PERSON ’s passage on TIME and to find out how the OH had come up with the figure of CARDINAL hostages that was aired during the crisis . The investigator also granted the GPE application to have the commander of ORG ( ORG PERSON ) General PERSON questioned , in order to ascertain the details of the use of indiscriminate weapons on the school .

On DATE ORG reviewed , at the applicants’ request , CARDINAL applications lodged by them with the investigator DATE , the results of which they found unsatisfactory . The complaints mostly concerned the following points : the ORG attempts to obtain additional evidence about the exact cause of their relatives’ deaths and injuries ; information about the reasons for the first CARDINAL explosions in the gymnasium ; the details of the involvement of various military and security units in the storming ; information about the types and results of examinations of the weapons found in the school , evidence related to the actions of the OH ; information about the actions of firefighters immediately after the first explosions ; the extent of the officials’ responsibility for the outcome of the crisis ; and the ORG requests to acquaint themselves with various documents in the file . The ORG complaint was dismissed in full , ORG finding that the investigators had acted lawfully and within the limits of their professional discretion . The court also noted that the proceedings were still pending . The applicants appealed , but on DATE ORG upheld the decision .

On DATE ORG rejected a complaint by the victims about the NORP decisions in response to CARDINAL applications they had lodged to ascertain the reasons for the first explosions and the origins of the firearms which had caused the GPE deaths and injuries , to find out more about the communications with the terrorists , to identify the person who ordered the deployment of tanks , APCs , flamethrowers and grenade launchers , and to establish the reason for the carbonisation of FAC bodies . The court also rejected the GPE complaint of inefficiency and delays on the part of the prosecutor ’s office . On DATE ORG upheld this decision .

On DATE ORG rejected another complaint in relation to CARDINAL complaints lodged by the victims with the investigator . They concerned the ORG access to the expert report on the explosions , ballistics reports and documents relating to the existence of a real threat of a terrorist act prior to DATE . The court , referring to LAW , concluded that the restrictions on the ORG access to the documents had been justified . The remaining actions of the investigation were also found to be lawful . This decision was upheld on appeal on DATE .

According to the decision of ORG of DATE , CARDINAL victims and their representatives complained to ORG and then to the court about the NORP decisions to reject CARDINAL complaints lodged DATE . They included the following demands : to find out the exact reasons for the ORG deaths where the conclusions of the post - mortem reports had been incomplete ; to ascertain whether the carbonisation of the bodies had been caused prior to or after death ; to seek an explanation for CARDINAL victims as to why the conclusions about the reasons for their relatives’ deaths had been based on external inspection without autopsy reports ; to establish the causal relationships between the use of flame - throwers , grenade launchers , tanks and APCs during the storming and the GPE deaths ; to obtain additional questioning of the servicemen of the Malgobek ROVD and of a military unit stationed in LOC about the prevention of the terrorist act ; to clarify the reasons for the appointment of General PERSON as the head of the OH on DATE ; and to obtain full access to the material of the case file and copies of the complex expert report ( including mathematical computations of the explosions , ballistics and explosion examinations ) . The victims also alleged that they had received no timely responses to their applications and requests , that the investigation had been protracted and lacked objectivity and , in particular , that they had not had access to the most important case documents . ORG dismissed all the appeals , finding that the ORG demands had been satisfied by the investigation wherever possible , or had not been based on the pertinent legislation . On DATE ORG upheld that decision on appeal .

On DATE ORG dismissed another complaint lodged by a group of victims against the decisions taken in response to their complaints to the investigators . CARDINAL complaints , lodged DATE , concerned the ORG access to the ballistics reports and the records of negotiations with the terrorists , obtaining copies of certain documents in the case file and the decisions ordering expert reports . The victims also alleged that the investigation had been unnecessarily protracted , with important steps being delayed , which in turn could have led to a loss of evidence and make the judicial examination of the matters less effective . They asked for the actions of the investigators to be declared unlawful in so far as they had not conducted an effective investigation , had refused to allow victims access to the case file and had failed to establish the extent of the officials’ responsibility . The court found that some documents requested by the victims were confidential , while access to others was regulated by LAW . On DATE ORG upheld ORG decision .

The GPE subsequent attempts to seek a supervisory review of these decisions were unsuccessful . In DATE a group of applicants sought the latest information about the developments in the investigation from the head of the investigation team . They reiterated that they had received no information about the state of proceedings since DATE , particularly in respect of the actions concerning the military and the GPE .

The applicants submitted voluminous documents related to the criminal investigation and trial concerning Mr Nurpashi Kulayev , the only terrorist captured alive . In particular , they submitted CARDINAL volumes of trial records ( CARDINAL pages ) , copies of the trial court judgment ( CARDINAL pages ) and cassation court decision and their appeals to the cassation and supervising courts . The most relevant documents and the applicants’ submissions can be summarised as follows .

On DATE the criminal investigation in respect of the only surviving terrorist , Mr PERSON , was separated from criminal case no . CARDINAL and assigned the number CARDINAL .

On DATE ORG opened the trial of PERSON ORG . He was charged with aggravated murder , terrorism , hostage - taking , membership of a criminal gang , illegal firearms handling and attempts on the life of law - enforcement personnel ( Articles CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ) . DATE the trial court held CARDINAL hearings .

NORP In court Mr PERSON stated that he had joined the group on CARDINAL DATE . His brother , PERSON , had been a clandestine fighter since DATE , but had lost an arm and had lately been living in Psedakh , their home village . On DATE a group of armed men had arrived in a ORG and accused his brother of working for the ORG . Both brothers and CARDINAL of their friends had gone with the armed men to a camp situated QUANTITY away from the road . TIME on DATE the man in charge of the camp , “ PERSON ” , had told all those present to get into a ORG truck . There had been CARDINAL people , including QUANTITY women wearing masks . Explosives and arms in backpacks had been placed under the benches and the men had taken seats on the floor of the truck . Responding to the GPE questions , Mr PERSON stated that he had not seen any wooden boxes for cartridges ( which had later been found in the school canteen ) .

They had spent TIME in the valley and in TIME had continued their journey . The body of the truck had been covered with canvas and they could not see out . At CARDINAL point the vehicle had stopped and Mr PERSON had heard someone asking for the driver ’s documents . They had then been told that a policeman had been captured and they had travelled on . The policeman had later been released because he had been a relative of CARDINAL of the fighters . The ride had lasted DATE . During the capturing of the school one fighter had been fatally injured and “ PERSON ” had ordered the killing of CARDINAL male hostages . In the school Mr PERSON had been assigned to the canteen . On DATE there had been a dispute among the fighters and “ Polkovnik ” had detonated the explosive device carried by a female suicide bomber . This explosion had fatally wounded the other woman and another fighter of NORP origin . According to Mr PERSON , many members of the group , including himself and his brother , had been unaware of the nature of their mission , but “ PERSON ” had referred to PERSON ’s orders and executed anyone attempting to object . The terrorists had talked between themselves in PERSON and “ PERSON ” had called someone to receive instructions in NORP .

Referring to the conversations among the terrorists , Mr ORG said that “ PERSON ” had told Mr PERSON that if the CARDINAL men indicated by them came to the school , they would release CARDINAL hostages for each of them . He also understood that some hostages and fighters would have been able to move in buses to GPE if the NORP troops had pulled out of the mountainous districts .

Speaking about the first explosions in the gymnasium , Mr ORG testified that “ PERSON ” had said that a sniper had “ killed the man [ holding the switch]”and had then cried to someone over the telephone “ What have you done ? ! ” before breaking it ; after that he had encouraged the terrorists to fight until the bitter end . Mr PERSON had jumped out of the canteen window and shouted to the soldiers that they should not shoot there because there were women and children . He denied that he had used his machine gun and had walked into the gymnasium while the hostages were detained there .

CARDINAL people convicted earlier for terrorist activities testified that they had known Mr PERSON , the accused ’s brother , as an active member of the underground terrorist movement and that in DATE both brothers and several other members of the armed group , together with their families , had lived in a rented house in ORG ( PERSON vol . CARDINAL , page CARDINAL of the trial records , PERSON . DATE , p. DATE ) .

Some local residents stated in court that they had seen unknown men and suspicious boxes at the school prior to DATE ( PERSON . CARDINAL , pp . CARDINAL - CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . During DATE the school building had been partially renovated , but the teachers and director denied that anyone other than the school staff and their families had been involved ( PERSON , vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . Some teachers testified that they had inspected the school in TIME of CARDINAL September and there had been no one there ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; KomayevaGadzhinova R. vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) .

The police officer who had been captured by the terrorists on the administrative border on TIME testified that he had stopped the GACARDINAL vehicle TIME The armed men had taken his service pistol , ORG vehicle and police cap and had driven to PERSON . He had escaped as soon as the shooting started . He denied having known any of the terrorists and confirmed that the terrorists had spoken PERSON between themselves and to him ( PERSON , vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) .

As to the prevention of the terrorist act , a senior police officer of ORG testified in court in DATE that at QUANTITY on DATE the school had been inspected , possibly with a service dog . He admitted that , unlike in DATE , no patrol police had been deployed at the school ( PERSON . vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . Mr PERSON , the former head of ORG , had been aware that the school had been inspected with service dogs on TIME , but no appropriate records had been provided ( vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) .

The trial court noted that criminal proceedings in respect of the organisers of the terrorist act were the subject of a separate criminal investigation ( no . CARDINAL , see above ) . The court cited statements and documents from investigation file no . CARDINAL . It identified CARDINAL terrorists ( including Mr PERSON ) and referred to CARDINAL unidentified individuals ( including “ LOC ” and “ GPE ” ) .

It transpires that DATE numerous hostages and the ORG relatives were questioned and granted victim status . By the opening of the trial CARDINAL people had been granted victim status in the proceedings . CARDINAL victims were questioned during the trial ; statements by others given during the investigation were read out .

NORP The victims questioned in court mostly denied having seen Mr GPE in the gymnasium , although several hostages had seen him in the gymnasium , in the corridor DATE and in the canteen during the final stage of the assault . Most of the hostages had not seen Mr PERSON ’s brother PERSON , who had lost his right arm . Several of them also referred to CARDINAL particular terrorist : a shaven man with a large scar on his neck , who had been particularly cruel to the hostages and whom they had not identified after the siege was over ( witness PERSON . DATE , p. CARDINAL ) . Most hostages had seen CARDINAL women suicide bombers , although some hostages said they had seen another woman of NORP appearance on the first floor of the school on DATE and possibly a fourth one also on DATE ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . CARDINAL woman told the court that on DATE terrorist “ PERSON ” had asked her if she was PERSON and suggested that they would let her family members go free if she agreed to act as a suicide bomber , since “ their CARDINAL girls had been killed by an ammunition round ” fired from the outside ( Kudziyeva L. vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . The hostages estimated the number of terrorists at CARDINAL .

With respect to the taking of the school , many hostages testified that as soon as the fighters had surrounded the gathering in the courtyard and started to shoot in the air , another group of fighters had fired from the top of the building . Some witnesses stated that when the shooting had started some children had tried to escape through PERSON , but there had been fighters there who had forced them to return . Many had seen fighters running to the school from the railway line ( PERSON v. PERSON ; PERSON . v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON CARDINAL p.CARDINAL ) . Others said that when they had entered the school there had already been armed fighters guarding the stairs to the first floor . CARDINAL boy aged QUANTITY at the time testified that on DATE he and CARDINAL older boys had been forced to take boxes with grenades and mines from an opening under the stage in the meeting hall ( GPE CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ) , but no one else from this group could be identified . CARDINAL witness testified that when the fighters had broken the floors in the gymnasium on DATE they had taken out a long tube which she supposed had been a grenade launcher ( PERSON v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ) .

Police officer PERSON gave detailed submissions about the hostage - taking and subsequent events . According to her , a second police officer had failed to arrive at the school . At TIME one mother told her that a strange truck had been parked nearby . When she went out to check , she heard a suspicious noise . She ran to the staffroom on the first floor to alert the police but as soon as she took the telephone , she was surrounded by several fighters wearing camouflage uniforms . They told her that “ everything would be serious this time ” and led her to the gymnasium . She estimated that there were CARDINAL fighters ( vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) .

On DATE the teachers , on the ORG orders , drew up lists of the children aged below CARDINAL , although they were never used ( PERSON v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . Numerous hostages told the court that the terrorists had been extremely annoyed by the information about the number of people being held in the school and that their attitude had become harsher after the figure of CARDINAL people had been announced . They testified that the terrorists had refused to allow them to drink or go to the toilet since “ nobody needed them anyway and there would only be CARDINAL of them left ” ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . The hostages complained of mocking , insults and ill - treatment and explained how the terrorists had hit the elderly and children , subjected them to false executions , held parents and grandparents at gunpoint in the children ’s view , and had fired into the air in order to keep them quiet .

The hostages saw the ORG attitude deteriorating further on DATE after Mr PERSON had left the school . Several of them said that on CARDINAL and DATE the terrorists had attempted in vain to liaise with the authorities through those who had had relatives among officials or public figures .

The school director PERSON was a hostage , together with members of her family . She stated that she had inspected the school on TIME , denying allegations that anyone except staff and their relatives had been involved in the renovation . She had been called by the fighters to negotiate and testified that they had been annoyed by the absence of contact with the authorities . On DATE she had attempted to involve the children of Mr PERSON and a prosecutor ’s mother in the negotiations , but to no avail ( PERSON , v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ) .

Many hostages testified about the explosions in the gymnasium . They said that prior to the explosions the fighters had been behaving in a relaxed manner and preparing lunch . Others mentioned some agitation probably caused by electricity failure in the gymnasium . Some hostages testified that they had seen an IED fixed to a basketball hoop explode ( PERSON v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON v. CARDINAL p.CARDINAL ) . Others insisted that when they had been leaving the gymnasium they could still see large IEDs intact on the basketball hoops ( PERSON v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ) or that CARDINAL explosion had come from that IED ( PERSON CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ) . Some described the first blast as a “ fireball ” ( PERSON CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ) . Many testified about the fire and heat emanating from the explosions , enflaming their clothes and hair and causing burns ( PERSON CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON , v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON , v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ) . Many testified that the fire could have killed , injured and shellshocked people who had been unable to leave the gymnasium on their own ( PERSON v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON , v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON , v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ) . Some hostages described how they had been saved by local civilians from the gymnasium and adjacent LOC after the explosions ( PERSON v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ) . Numerous witnesses also gave evidence that when the hostages had started to run from the gymnasium through the opening in the wall they had been shot at from the first floor of the school , and many had been wounded .

Those hostages who had been taken by the fighters to the canteen and the meeting room testified about the fierce fighting which had taken place there . They stated that the fighters had tried to force the hostages – women and children DATE to stand in the windows and wave their clothes , and some had been killed by shots fired from outside and by powerful explosions ( PERSON , v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON , v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; ORG CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON , v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON ORG v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ) .

Many also stated that they had not been satisfied with the results of the criminal investigation and that they did not intend to seek damages from the accused , since they considered that the ORG officials had to bear responsibility for the deaths and injuries .

Mr PERSON , former head of ORG , was questioned in court ( vol . CARDINAL , pp . CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) while under investigation in criminal case no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL for criminal negligence ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . He explained that he had only been appointed in DATE . The administrative border with ORG in the district was QUANTITY long and had been mostly unguarded . Many small roads through the fields had been closed off and rendered impassable in view of the heightened terrorist threat ; however , this had not suited the locals , who very often had removed the barriers . In DATE information had been received about a gathering of armed groups near Psedakh in ORG and a number of steps had been taken on both sides of the administrative border , but at the time the measures had produced no known results .

He also explained that out of the CARDINAL officers of the ROVD who had been present on DATE , over DATE had been women . It had been difficult to maintain the staff on alert for a long time . As soon as shooting could be heard from the school , at TIME on DATE , he had ordered his staff to maintain security around the building . CARDINAL servicemen of the ROVD had witnessed the hostage - taking and exchanged fire with the terrorists .

Mr PERSON , deputy head of LOC , was also under investigation for criminal negligence at the time of questioning . He gave detailed submissions about the use of ORG flamethrowers on the school from CARDINAL snipers positioned on the roofs of a technical building on FAC , a QUANTITY housing block on the corner of PERSON and ORG and the caretaker ’s house ( vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . He did not know where the snipers had come from . CARDINAL he had witnessed a tank shooting at the school and the use of grenade launchers by the military . The officer remarked that not a single bullet had been extracted from the bodies of the deceased hostages which could have led to the identification of the servicemen of ORG ( v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ) .

Mr Dryayev , another senior ROVD officer , testified that immediately after the first explosions on DATE he had seen soldiers ( of the army or internal troops ) firing automatic weapons at the school in response to enemy fire . Soon after TIME he had seen a tank stationed on FAC firing about CARDINAL shots at the corner of the school from a distance of QUANTITY . These rounds , possibly non - explosive , had damaged the wall and the roof ( vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) .

Police officers of ORG testified that by TIME CARDINAL September they had carried out a house - to - house inspection in the district and compiled a list of CARDINAL GPE names , which they had submitted to the officer on duty ( PERSON . v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON S. v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ) .

The policemen also explained that CARDINAL men had been assaulted by the crowd on DATE and detained at the ROVD on suspicion of aiding the terrorists . They turned out to be civilians from a nearby town ; both men had been identified and testified in court about this incident .

The court questioned several civilians who had helped to evacuate hostages from the gymnasium . Mr PERSON testified that he had entered the gymnasium after the first explosions , together with the special forces units , to search for his wife and CARDINAL children . He had taken out his wounded wife and the body of his daughter , while his brother had evacuated his injured son ; his eldest child had also been killed ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . Other witnesses , both civilian and police , told the court that they had entered the burning gymnasium several times , taking out injured women and children before the roof had collapsed ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL , PERSON , vol . DATE , p. CARDINAL ) . CARDINAL policeman witnessed the fire spreading very quickly on the roof of the school , saying that the firemen had failed to intervene ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) .

Some witnesses saw tanks shooting at the school soon after the explosions ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) ; CARDINAL man was injured by an explosion while taking a child out of the gymnasium ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . CARDINAL witness , PERSON , explained that he had served in the army as a tank crew member and was well acquainted with tanks and the ammunition used by them . Shortly after TIME on DATE he had counted QUANTITY non - explosive rounds fired from a tank gun . He was also of the opinion that the first explosions and the fire had been started from the outside , by either a flame - thrower or a tracer bullet ( vol . CARDINAL pp . DATE ) . CARDINAL civilian witness stated that he had served in the army as a grenade launcher operator and had identified CARDINAL shots fired from grenade launchers or flame - throwers between the second and third major explosions in the gymnasium ( PERSON , vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) .

Several police officers testified that the storming of the building had started unexpectedly and that this explained the casualties . Some of them had had no time to put on protective gear and rushed to the school as soon as they had heard the shooting . Some servicemen described the situation after the first explosions as “ chaotic ” , when various forces had been shooting at the school building using automatic weapons and other arms ( PERSON MONEY , vol . CARDINAL , p. MONEY ) . They referred to the ORG high level of training and preparedness , which had allowed them to mount resistance in the face of the elite NORP units ( Akulov O. , vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) .

An officer of ORG testified that at TIME , while he had been ensuring the security cordon around the school , he had seen CARDINAL full carloads of portable grenade launchers ( ORG ) and flame - throwers ( ORG ) being delivered by servicemen of ORG driving a white PERSON vehicle . He estimated that CARDINAL flame - throwers had been unloaded and taken to the ORG positions , located QUANTITY from the school . The snipers and the forces of ORG had used these flame - throwers soon after the explosions at the school , responding to enemy fire from grenade launchers and machine guns ( PERSON . vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . Another policeman counted up to QUANTITY shots from flamethrowers in the direction of the gymnasium roof at TIME ( PERSON , vol . CARDINAL , p. MONEY ) . Other policemen testified that QUANTITY they had seen a tank firing at the school ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. ORG ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) and that shots had been fired from grenade launchers ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) .

NORP The hostage - taking and subsequent events were witnessed by numerous local residents ; some of them were questioned in court . Several passengers of vehicles who had found themselves on the street in front of the school on TIME had seen a FAC truck arriving in the schoolyard . Some said that they had seen CARDINAL women jumping out of the vehicle . Mr PERSON had been a teacher at school no . CARDINAL and a former investigator of the prosecutor ’s office ; he lived in the house opposite the school and had watched the ceremony from his window , from a distance of QUANTITY . He gave detailed explanations about the hostage - taking . In particular , he had counted the men who jumped out of the FAC vehicle and said that there had been CARDINAL . He had also seen CARDINAL other fighters in the schoolyard and CARDINAL who had run from the railway lines ; at the same time there had been shots fired from the roof and the first floor of the school ; he thus estimated the number of fighters at CARDINAL or CARDINAL . Mr PERSON also stated that from DATE there had been no soldiers or police lined up along the backyard of the school and that it had been possible to walk there from his house and back ( vol . CARDINAL , pp . CARDINAL ) .

Numerous local residents whose relatives had been held in the school stated that they had been appalled by the announcement of the number of hostages . They said that the school had had CARDINAL students – lists could have been obtained from the local department of education DATE and that numerous parents and relatives had also been captured . Officials from the local department of education testified that on TIME the number of students ( CARDINAL ) had been transmitted to the administration with an indication that many relatives could be present at the ceremony ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . Moreover , on DATE volunteers and police had drawn up lists of CARDINAL hostages . In view of this , they could not explain how the officials had arrived at a figure of CARDINAL ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) .

Many local residents testified that they had seen or heard a tank shooting at the school after the explosions ( Duarov O. vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON ORG vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. DATE ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . PERSON had remained outside the school , where CARDINAL members of her family were being held hostage . She testified that a tank positioned on FAC had fired several rounds between TIME and TIME ( vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . CARDINAL local resident saw a tank enter a courtyard on FAC and heard it shooting at the school before TIME on DATE . The witness was QUANTITY away from the tank ( Khabayeva A. vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . All those witnesses described the tank cannon shots as being particularly strong and clearly identifiable despite the overwhelming noise of fierce fighting .

Several residents testified about the firemen ’s actions . They alleged , in particular , that the firemen had lost time before intervening in the gymnasium and that once the fire engines had arrived , they had been of little use since the water supplies in the cisterns had been quickly exhausted . Moreover , the pressure in the water hoses had been weak and they could not reach the gymnasium from where the machines were stationed . Some witnesses deplored the lack of preparedness by the firemen , who had failed to find out beforehand where to find water locally around the school rather than bringing it in cisterns ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . Other witnesses told the court that they had seen a fire engine stuck in the courtyard and trying to find water for the cistern ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) .

Colonel PERSON , brigade commander of the internal troops deployed in GPE on DATE , testified in DATE that servicemen under his command had ensured the security cordon . Their task had been to prevent the terrorists from breaking through . QUANTITY APCs from his brigade had been transferred to the ORG forces on DATE ( v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ) .

Officers of the CARDINALth ORG testified that their task had been to ensure the “ third ring ” of security around the school . CARDINAL officer explained that ORG , the commander of ORG , had instructed him to follow the orders of the ORG officers . Each army vehicle deployed in PERSON had been reinforced by an officer of the ORG who had given orders and coordinated the PERSON actions ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ; PERSON . DATE , p. CARDINAL ) . They denied having heard or seen grenade launchers , flamethrowers or tanks being used prior to late on the evening of DATE . The tank unit commander stated that between CARDINAL p.m. and TIME one tank had fired CARDINAL high - fragmentation shells at the school ( although the seventh had failed to explode ) , following orders of the ORG officer in charge . No shots had been fired from the tank guns before or after that ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) .

One officer , a sapper , testified that he had entered the gymnasium at TIME on DATE and had deactivated an IED attached to a basketball hoop . Most IEDs had not exploded and had been deactivated the following day . The officer testified that he had entered the gymnasium with a group of CARDINAL servicemen and CARDINAL QUANTITY civilians who had evacuated the hostages for TIME . Initially there had been no fire there , but the LOC had been under attack from the north wing of the school . Soon afterwards he had noticed a fire starting in the roof , above the entrance to the gymnasium from the side of the weights room ( PERSON . CARDINAL , pp . DATE and DATE ) .

Mr Z. , a professional negotiator from LOC , was called to PERSON at TIME on DATE . He had a meeting with General PERSON and then informed him of the talks and received instructions from him . He was placed in a separate room , with a psychologist , and maintained telephone contact with the terrorists CARDINAL TIME . His efforts to establish psychological contact with his interlocutor ( who called himself “ Shahid ” ) were unsuccessful and he failed to obtain any concessions aimed at alleviating the GPE situation . The conversations were conducted in a rude manner ; the gangsters insulted him and PERSON . The terrorists repeatedly said that they would talk to the QUANTITY men named by them and did not present any other demands . They did not specify the number of hostages they were holding , saying only that they had “ enough ” . They spoke of CARDINAL people shot dead on DATE and said that they had DATE to wait for the authorities to bring the CARDINAL men together . When asked if PERSON could come alone , the terrorists refused . The first telephone conversation took place at TIME on DATE , DATE after TIME on DATE immediately following the first explosion . The witness remembered saying “ What have you done ? ! ” and “ Shahid ” responding “ We have fulfilled our duty ” . Responding to the GPE questions , PERSON admitted that the negotiations involving PERSON PERSON and Mr PERSON had been carried out without him and that he had only been informed of these developments after they had occurred ( vol . CARDINAL , pp . DATE ) .

The head of the ORG in GPE at the relevant time stated in court in DATE that he had not been aware of the information and telexes sent by ORG in DATE about the heightened terrorist threat during DATE of Knowledge . The ORG had not been involved in the protection of the administrative border , but their services had cooperated with ORG in examining the area around the border ( Gaydenko O. v. CARDINAL pp . DATE ) . He did not have any information about the possible escape of terrorists after the storming .

The former head of the ORG department in ORG , General GPE , confirmed that there had been sufficiently precise information about the activities of terrorist groups in ORG in DATE as a number of successful special operations had been carried out , but there had been no information about the armed group in LOC . He testified that he had arrived in GPE on TIME and had remained there for DATE , working in close cooperation with General PERSON . He was not certain if he had been a member of the OH , but he had been fully aware of its work . On TIME General PERSON had called the NORP President PERSON PERSON and informed him of the terrorist act ; at that time no demand to involve Mr PERSON in the negotiations had been made . He could not reach Mr PERSON later since his mobile telephone had been switched off . By questioning the escaped hostages , they had tried to identify terrorists from Ingushetia and involve their relatives in the negotiations . They had therefore brought in the wife and children of a presumed terrorist , but her appeal had had no effect . The witness had not been aware of the note taken out by Mr PERSON ( v. CARDINAL pp . DATE ) .

Most of the army and internal troops servicemen failed to testify in court , and their witness statements collected during the investigation of criminal case no . CARDINAL were read out ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the court questioned Lieutenant - Colonel PERSON ( v. CARDINAL pp . CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) , who at the relevant time headed the operational management group at ORG of the Interior ( начальник группы оперативного управления по ORG при МВД PERSON ) . The group was created on DATE by an order of the Minister of the ORG with the mission of preventing terrorist acts , planning and carrying out special operations and controlling and managing resources allocated for counterterrorism activities . When asked about the meetings , functions and actions of the commission prior to DATE , he could not recall any details .

Lieutenant - Colonel PERSON learnt of the hostage - taking at TIME on DATE and went to PERSON . By TIME , he had organised the security perimeter around the school . As of TIME on DATE he reported to the deputy commander of the internal troops of ORG , General PERSON . Although he was a member of the GPE , he stated that his participation had been limited to ensuring the second security perimeter . He had not been aware of the number of hostages , the nature of the ORG demands or the negotiation attempts . He had not taken part in any meetings or discussions of the GPE . As to the rescue operation , he stated that the servicemen of the internal troops had not used weapons , approached the school or taken part in the rescue operation . He had not been at the school on DATE . He refused to answer when asked whether any terrorists could have passed through the security perimeter .

General Sobolev , the commander of ORG , was questioned in DATE ( vol . CARDINAL , pp . DATE ) . He was the most senior officer from ORG in the OH . He described the ORG ’s principal strategy of negotiation with the hostage takers , but said that the attempts had been futile because the terrorists had only been prepared to talk if the CARDINAL people named by them came . PERSON had attempted to contact the terrorists , but they had refused to talk to him ; PERSON PERSON had been prevented by the OH from going to the school , and no contact had been established with PERSON PERSON . The danger to the lives of the CARDINAL men had been too high in the absence of any goodwill shown by the terrorists . In General PERSON ’s view , no negotiations were possible in the circumstances ; the storming of the school should have taken place immediately , before the IEDs had been assembled . He believed that the terrorists had been supported and funded by foreign services , including ORG ( of GPE ) . His task had been mostly limited to ensuring the security perimeter around the school and providing the necessary equipment ; he was not aware of the number of hostages , negotiation strategies or the rest of the plan drawn up by the OH .

He named the forces and equipment brought in by the army . CARDINAL APCs and CARDINAL tanks had been transferred under the command of the ORG to be used as cover in the event of a storming . A group of sappers had demined the gymnasium on TIME ; they had found CARDINAL mines and CARDINAL smaller IEDs connected by a “ double chain ” which had allowed them to be activated all at once or CARDINAL by CARDINAL . CARDINAL IEDs had exploded prior to demining ; in CARDINAL of them only the detonator had exploded but not the main charge .

Turning to the storming , General PERSON explained that it had started unexpectedly . Officers of the ORG ’s ORG unit had been training in Vladikavkaz and had to be brought in urgently ; many of them had had no time to prepare . This had led to an extremely high number of casualties : CARDINAL of the elite troops who had stormed the building had been injured or killed . He had not been aware that flame - throwers or grenade launchers had been used . The tank cannon had fired CARDINAL shots after TIME He was of the opinion that the army had successfully concluded its mission .

Mr PERSON testified in DATE that at the relevant time he had been the LOC Minister of the Interior . He had arrived in GPE at TIME on DATE and followed PERSON orders . As of CARDINAL p.m. on DATE General PERSON , the head of ORG , had taken over the command of the operation . Mr PERSON ’s tasks had been to ensure security around the school and evacuate civilians from the area . The victims referred to the decree of the NORP Prime Minister of DATE by which Mr PERSON had been appointed deputy head of the GPE ; however , the witness insisted that he had not been informed of this , had not assumed such responsibilities and had been excluded from the GPE meetings . Mr PERSON had received orders from the NORP Minister of the ORG and his deputy PERSON , who had arrived in PERSON , and on two occasions the deputy head of the FSB Mr PERSON had asked him to check the situation in CARDINAL villages . Mr PERSON had been aware by TIME CARDINAL September , from the lists drawn up by the local police , that the number of hostages had been CARDINAL . He did not know where the figure of CARDINAL had come from . He had no information about the use of heavy weapons during the storming but knew that later a number of empty tubes from ORG flamethrowers had been found on the nearby roofs ( vol . CARDINAL , pp . DATE ) .

In DATE the court questioned PERSON ( v. CARDINAL pp . CARDINAL ) . At the relevant time Mr PERSON was the head of the information and analytical department of LOC President ’s administration . He testified that he had arrived in PERSON on DATE at TIME He had been instructed by PERSON and General PERSON to liaise with the press , but had not been aware of the DATE ’s work , composition and strategy . He was asked a number of questions about the figure of CARDINAL hostages which he had consistently announced to the press DATE . He explained that he had been told the figure by General PERSON , who had referred to the absence of any exact lists . He had always stressed the preliminary nature of this information .

General PERSON , who at the relevant time was the head of LOC and head of the OH , was questioned in court in DATE ( vol . DATE , pp . CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) . He gave a detailed account of his actions and the work of the OH during the crisis . According to him , no formal leadership over the operation had been assumed prior to TIME on DATE , but informally all the people with responsibility – members of the operational management group DATE had carried out their tasks under his and PERSON guidance . According to General PERSON , as of CARDINAL DATE the GPE included CARDINAL officials : himself as the head , Lieutenant - Colonel Tsyban as his deputy , PERSON , Mr PERSON , PERSON PERSON , the North Ossetian Minister of Education PERSON , and Mr PERSON from the ORG television company .

PERSON , deputy head of the ORG , had assisted the OH in a personal capacity but had assumed no formal role . General PERSON referred to LAW , which stipulated the plan of action in the event that the hostage takers put forward political demands . The same law excluded political questions from the possible subjects of negotiations . He believed that the ORG primary aim had been to achieve a resumption of the Ossetian - Ingush ethnic conflict , of which there was a real threat . From TIME of the crisis , work had been carried out in close cooperation with the head of the ORG in ORG .

General PERSON detailed the LOC unsuccessful attempts to negotiate with the terrorists : their mobile telephone had initially been switched off , and the school telephone had been disconnected . The terrorists had often interrupted the contact , saying that they would call back . The GPE had involved a professional negotiator , who was a staff member of the ORG . The terrorists had behaved in an aggressive and hostile manner and refused to discuss any proposals unless the CARDINAL men indicated by them came to GPE . General PERSON insisted that Mr PERSON , the NORP President , could not be found , while the CARDINAL other men had been in contact with the GPE ( Mr PERSON had talked to the terrorists over the telephone and had arrived in GPE on TIME DATE ) . The OH had invited CARDINAL influential men of PERSON origin , PERSON PERSON and Mr PERSON , to take part in the negotiations . The terrorists had been inflexible and refused to consider any proposals aimed at aiding the hostages or the possibilities of a ransom and exit . No written demands had been issued and a number of political demands had been made verbally through Mr PERSON . Responding to the questions about the number of hostages , General PERSON insisted that there had been no exact lists beyond the CARDINAL names and the OH had not wanted to release unreliable information . Responding to the GPE questions , he reiterated that in the course of the negotiations the terrorists had not referred to the number of hostages and that in his opinion they had not been particularly interested in the figure announced . He testified that on TIME CARDINAL September Mr PERSON had talked to PERSON PERSON in GPE and the latter had promised to establish contact with Mr ORG . However , no direct line of communication with Mr ORG had been established .

The DATE ’s strategy had been to negotiate , and no plan consisting of resolving the situation by force had been considered . General PERSON explained that the involvement of the special forces had only been foreseen in the event of a mass killing of the hostages .

Turning to the special forces of the ORG , General PERSON specified that ORG , under the command of General PERSON , had their own temporary headquarters located on the third floor of ORG building , at the local department of the ORG . Questions concerning the types and use of special weapons , such as flame - throwers , lay within the competence of that ORG . General ORG had issued an order to start the operation aimed at liberating the hostages and at neutralising the terrorists as soon as the latter had started to shoot at escaping hostages . He conceded that at the beginning of the operation there had been shots fired by other servicemen , and the ORG forces had been in danger of friendly fire . He insisted that the tanks and flame - throwers had been used only after TIME on DATE , when there had been no hostages still alive in the school . General PERSON stated that CARDINAL terrorists had been captured alive , but CARDINAL of them had been lynched by the locals .

During questioning , the victims openly accused General PERSON of incompetence , concealing the truth and being responsible for the fatalities . They were reprimanded by the presiding judge .

The court heard a statement by the LOC Minister of Emercom Mr PERSON ( v. CARDINAL pp . DATE ) . He explained that he had been informed that he was a member of the OH on the evening of DATE ; however , both before and after that time he had functioned semi - autonomously . He had estimated the number of hostages at around CARDINAL and on QUANTITY DATE Mr PERSON had informed him personally that there were over CARDINAL ; this information had been sufficient to prepare the rescue operation .

Mr PERSON answered numerous questions about the extinguishing of the fire in the gymnasium . He stated that the information about a fire at the school ( but not in the gymnasium ) had been noted by their service at CARDINAL p.m. on DATE . The message that the roof of the gymnasium was starting to collapse had been noted at TIME General PERSON , the commander of ORG , had authorised the firemen to move in at TIME and at TIME they had arrived at the scene . Mr PERSON was told that by that time there had been no hostages still alive in the gymnasium ; this information had later been confirmed by the forensic reports . CARDINAL fire brigades had been involved . By TIME the fire had been contained . Later the fire brigades had been ordered by the ORG to leave the gymnasium . They had then entered again and left the building at TIME

The witness explained that another fire vehicle had been brought in by a relative of a hostage from a nearby factory ; it had been seen by many witnesses but had not been an Emercom car . He also insisted that the vehicles and cisterns had been fully prepared , that hoses had been laid from the nearest water hydrants and that the fire equipment had been sufficient .

At TIME on DATE teams had started the clearance operation . They had worked in parallel with the staff of the ORG , army sappers and the prosecutor ’s office . They had collected the remains of CARDINAL hostages , of which CARDINAL had been found in the gymnasium and adjacent LOC . The bodies of CARDINAL terrorists had also been found . During DATE the ORG staff had cleared the debris with the use of cranes , bulldozers and excavators ; the debris had first been shifted manually to collect human remains and other relevant items . Only after sifting had the rubble been loaded onto the trucks supplied by the local administration . PERSON PERSON had personally inspected the destroyed wing of the school , where CARDINAL floors had collapsed onto the cellar . He had seen the ORG bodies but no GPE remains . Emercom had finished the clearance work by TIME on DATE , after which the building had been handed over to the local administration .

Mr PERSON was questioned on DATE ( v. CARDINAL pp . CARDINAL ) . Then the North Ossetian President , he stated that at TIME on DATE General PERSON had received a verbal instruction from the ORG , with reference to ORG , to head the GPE . Mr PERSON had not been a member of the OH , which he considered had been a mistake . However , he had done whatever he had thought was right and within his powers . He had been prepared to go and negotiate with the terrorists , but he had been told that he would be placed under arrest if he did so . He had not talked to the terrorists over the telephone , since this had been done by a professional negotiator . He had participated in the meeting with the relatives at FAC on DATE . He had also had several talks with General PERSON , the commander of ORG , who had shared his concerns about the use of force .

Mr PERSON believed that too much operative information of low quality had been circulated prior to the terrorist act , which had made it difficult to react . In particular , there had been insufficient clarity about the ORG plans in DATE , although the heightened security threat had been evident .

Turning to the negotiations , PERSON testified that he had seen the handwritten note allegedly signed by PERSON which PERSON PERSON had taken out of the school . He also explained that on DATE he had talked to PERSON in GPE . At TIME on DATE Mr PERSON had confirmed that the request to take part in the negotiations had been transmitted to Mr PERSON . PERSON had informed the GPE accordingly .

Mr PERSON , a former member of the counter - terrorism commission of GPE and secretary of its security council testified that the GPE appointed on DATE had excluded all other people from its meetings . He had had no access to the OH , and PERSON and PERSON had only been invited to its meetings on CARDINAL occasions ( PERSON . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . He could not recall the work of LOC terrorism commission created on DATE , of which he had been a member .

PERSON was the LOC Minister of Education at the relevant time . She testified that she had gone to GPE on DATE , CARDINAL and DATE . She had been at the town administration and had had a number of discussions with Mr PERSON and several other Ossetian officials . She had not participated in any GPE sessions or other meetings . She had learnt that she had been a member of the OH on DATE during a meeting of ORG ( vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) . She had been informed on DATE by the local department of education about the number of pupils at the school ; she had also been told that this information had already been transferred to the district authorities .

The LOC Deputy Minister of the ORG admitted that their resources had been insufficient to monitor the border crossing points with Ingushetia . He had also been aware of the attempts to block small roads in LOC and the problems that had been encountered in DATE a lack of staff , sabotage by the locals and the absence of funds to pay for the works ( PERSON , vol . CARDINAL , p. DATE ) .

NORP The director of the Zashchita Centre Mr PERSON ( vol . CARDINAL , pp . DATE ) testified that on DATE he had been told that CARDINAL people were being held hostage and that medical assistance had been planned accordingly . Only after he had met with Mr PERSON on DATE had he realised that the number of hostages had actually been much higher . That TIME he had set up emergency paediatric teams , called in ambulances from the region , carried out training and prepared for the arrival of patients . They had mostly expected victims of injuries ; the probability of gas poisoning had been considered low . He testified that although he had been a member of the OH as an official of ORG , he had not taken part in any meetings or discussions . He had not received any information from the OH , as , in his view , the number of hostages had been the only relevant factor and that had been communicated to him personally by PERSON PERSON . His own experience and available resources had been sufficient . Being highly experienced in providing emergency treatment to a large number of victims , his work had been relatively independent from the rest of the OH . Besides , his previous experience had shown that the “ security structures ” would not share their plans with the medics , out of a need to keep such considerations secret .

Turning to the organisation of medical assistance , Mr PERSON explained that by TIME they had had CARDINAL people on standby in GPE , including QUANTITY doctors , over CARDINAL ambulances , CARDINAL field paediatrician hospital and several intensive care units . “ Carriers ” with stretchers had been grouped QUANTITY from the school , with ambulances and medical vehicles placed in several spots around the building . The idea had been to take the injured to ORG where the sorting would take place , urgent operations and life – saving measures would be carried out in the paediatric field hospital and , for adults , in FAC and then those who could be transported to Vladikavkaz would be taken there ( QUANTITY away ) .

NORP Immediately after the explosions at TIME on DATE he had received a call from the OH to bring in the medical rescue team . For TIME on DATE the sorting centre at ORG had treated CARDINAL patients and carried out CARDINAL urgent operations . CARDINAL people had been taken to the hospital in agony and had died within TIME ; CARDINAL other patients had died within TIME . In total , CARDINAL adults had been evacuated to other hospitals after urgent medical assistance ; CARDINAL children had been in a lifethreatening condition and had had to be treated on the spot , CARDINAL children had had emergency surgery . On TIME CARDINAL children in a critical condition had been taken to GPE in a specially equipped aeroplane . There had been difficulties in maintaining the necessary security around the school , and later around the hospital , to avoid disruption of services by the relatives .

Mr Soplevenko , then LOC Minister of ORG , was questioned in court on DATE ( vol . CARDINAL , pp . CARDINAL - CARDINAL ) . He also testified that DATE he had not received any particular instructions , but rather general indications by PERSON that “ adequate medical aid ” should be provided . He had not been part of the GPE or any other body during the crisis . He had learnt from the nursing mothers who had walked out with Mr PERSON on DATE that CARDINAL people were being held in the school . In cooperation with Mr PERSON he had alerted the hospitals in NORP that they would have to admit patients : beds had been freed at CARDINAL hospitals , surgery and intensive care teams had been put on standby , and stocks of medical and dressing material had been set aside .

PERSON , director of ORG , was questioned in DATE . He stated that he had been informed by journalists on DATE about the hostage - taking and had immediately gone to PERSON . He had been taken to the town administration where the GPE and other officials had been stationed . He had been taken to a room with Mr Z. where he had received brief instructions from him . On several occasions he had called the terrorists ; each time they had reacted in a hostile manner and refused to discuss anything unless all CARDINAL men requested by them came . His attempts to convince them to accept water , food , medicine or to allow him to examine and treat the wounded and sick had been flatly rejected ; moreover , the terrorists had said that all the hostages had declared a “ dry hunger strike ” in support of their demands . On DATE at TIME the terrorists had called him and let him talk to the school director , who had pleaded with him to intervene since their situation was dire . On DATE Dr Roshal had personally telephoned Mr PERSON in GPE and let Mr PERSON talk to him ( v. CARDINAL pp . DATE ) .

In DATE the court , following an application by the victims , questioned a senior expert of the forensic laboratory in LAW , who on DATE had been appointed the chief of the team in charge of identifying the remains by DNA testing . The expert explained that their laboratory was the best equipped in GPE and that the genetic testing would take DATE and DATE , depending on the quality of the material under examination . All work in the PERSON cases had been completed within DATE . PERSON stated that the results obtained through genetic pairing had been final and could not be challenged on grounds of possible misidentification . He admitted that many relatives had refused to believe that their loved ones had died and that on some occasions they had carried out second rounds of tests with other relatives’ DNA , primarily out of respect . The expert cited difficulties in identifying the remains which had been burnt “ to ashes ” and in identifying body fragments , a process which had lasted until DATE . The same expert group had worked with the ORG remains : CARDINAL had been identified , while CARDINAL remained unidentified ( v. CARDINAL p. CARDINAL ) .

CARDINAL of forensic reports on the victims were examined by the court . They included examinations of bodies , results of the identification of remains through DNA testing , conclusions of experts regarding damage to the health of the surviving hostages and other documents . Over CARDINAL forensic reports concluded that the cause of death could not be established in view of many of the remains being extensively charred and burned and the absence of other injuries . Other reports named extensive burns , gunshot wounds , traumatic amputation of the extremities and injuries to the head and body as the causes of death . Injuries from gunshots and explosions , burns and psychological trauma were recorded for the surviving hostages .

In the course of the proceedings the victims lodged CARDINAL applications . Some of them were lodged with the district courts in NORP , where the investigation was being conducted , while others were lodged directly with ORG . Some of them were submitted to the ORG , while others were mentioned in the statement of facts or in the trial records .

On DATE the victims sought the withdrawal of the head of the investigation team , Deputy Prosecutor General Mr PERSON . They argued that the investigation had been incomplete and failed to take into account all the relevant information about the crime . They indicated that copies of many expert reports had been unavailable to them , that the prosecutor ’s office had ignored numerous facts and statements which had differed from the facts “ selected ” to form the basis of Mr PERSON ’s indictment , and that the role of various officials in the GPE deaths had not been clarified . This complaint was dismissed .

In DATE the victims sought the withdrawal of the prosecution and the judge presiding in the case , referring to the incomplete nature of the investigation and the repeated dismissal of their complaints by the judge . They also questioned the logic behind separating the investigation concerning the terrorist act and its consequences into several sets of criminal proceedings . These complaints were also dismissed ( vol . CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) .

In DATE and DATE and in DATE the victims applied to the trial court for permission to have a number of additional witnesses called and questioned : members of the GPE , senior civilian and ORG officers who had been present in PERSON during the operation , members of LOC investigative commission on PERSON , and people who had negotiated with the terrorists , including PERSON , PERSON , PERSON Z. and Mr PERSON . The court agreed to question several Ossetian officials who were members of the OH , but refused to call other officials , negotiators and members of ORG . It also refused to include the results of the investigation of the LOC parliamentary commission in the case file ( v. CARDINAL pp . CARDINAL - CARDINAL , v. CARDINAL pp . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , DATE , DATE - CARDINAL , DATE , DATE ) . In DATE the court granted the GPE application to question PERSON , PERSON and some senior ORG officials .

NORP In DATE the victims again sought the withdrawal of the prosecutor in the trial . They argued , with reference to LAW , that the investigation had been ineffective and incomplete in ascertaining the most important elements of the crime . They sought to have independent experts appointed in order to clarify key questions concerning the preparation of the terrorist act , the composition and powers of the GPE , the reasons for the first explosions , the use of flame - throwers , grenade launchers and tank guns , and the belated arrival of the firefighters . The request was dismissed ( v. CARDINAL p. DATE ) .

In DATE the victims sought to acquaint themselves with the entire set of documents in the criminal case and to be allowed to take copies . Similar requests were lodged in DATE and DATE , but apparently to no avail .

In his final submissions of DATE the prosecutor asked the court to apply the death penalty to the accused . The victims argued that the investigation and the trial had failed to elucidate many key elements of the events and that the officials responsible should be prosecuted for their actions which had led to the tragedy .

On DATE ORG found Mr Nurpashi Kulayev guilty of a number of crimes , including membership of a criminal gang , handling of unlawful arms and explosives , aggravated hostage - taking , murder , and attempts on the life of law – enforcement personnel . The CARDINAL-page judgment summarised witness and victim statements and referred to forensic reports , death certificates , expert reports and other evidence . The court found that CARDINAL hostages , CARDINAL PERSON civilian and QUANTITY Emercom workers had been killed ; CARDINAL hostages had received injuries of varying degrees ( CARDINAL received serious injuries , CARDINAL received moderately serious injuries and CARDINAL received minor injuries ) . CARDINAL servicemen of the ORG had been killed and CARDINAL servicemen of the army and law - enforcement bodies wounded . The actions of the criminal group had caused significant damage to the school and private properties in GPE . Mr PERSON was sentenced to life imprisonment .

The victims appealed against the court ’s decision . In detailed complaints of CARDINAL DATE and DATE they claimed that the court had failed to undertake a thorough and effective investigation and that its conclusions had not been corroborated by the facts . They argued that the court had failed to investigate the authorities’ failure to prevent the terrorist attack , apportion responsibility for the decisions taken by the GPE , establish the exact places and circumstances of the first explosions in the gymnasium and assess the lawfulness of the use of indiscriminate weapons by the security forces . They also complained that the court had not allowed them full access to the case material . Their complaints were supplemented by reference to relevant statements and documents .

On DATE ORG held a cassation appeal hearing . CARDINAL victims , the GPE lawyer and the prosecutor made oral submissions . ORG slightly amended the characterisation of one offence imputed to Mr PERSON , while the remaining parts of the parties’ complaints were dismissed . In particular , ORG found that the questions raised by the victims had no bearing on the characterisation of Mr PERSON ’s actions and that the victims had been allowed full access to the case documents after the completion of the investigation .

On DATE ORG issued a separate ruling ( частное определение ) in respect of Deputy Prosecutor General Mr PERSON , who had acted as the ORG prosecutor in the trial . The court noted that his request to the trial court to apply the death penalty to PERSON ORG had been contrary to the applicable legislation and as such incited the court to adopt a manifestly unlawful decision .

The applicants in application no . ORG submitted that during the trial they had heard testimony and examined other evidence . It had allowed them to draw conclusions about the actions of the GPE and other officials , most of which could not be elucidated within the course of the trial . Referring to the case material and other evidence , the applicants made the following inferences :

( i ) from DATE the hostages had been detained in inhuman conditions and subjected to intense physical and emotional stress including deprivation of food and water , humiliation , witnessing the suffering and death of family members , and a feeling of helplessness in the absence of any meaningful negotiation attempts from the outside world ;

( ii ) the conclusion that the IEDs had caused the first explosions was not supported by the GPE statements and the state of the gymnasium ;

( iii ) after the first explosions the servicemen of the army and ORG had used heavy indiscriminate weapons including a tank gun , ORG machine guns , flame - throwers and grenade launchers ;

( iv ) the OH had not made the saving of hostages its primary aim and had authorised the use of heavy weapons during the storming ;

( v ) the NORP intervention had been significantly delayed , resulting in additional victims in the gymnasium .

NORP In parallel to the proceedings in criminal case no . CARDINAL and that concerning the actions of Mr GPE , CARDINAL additional criminal investigations were conducted against police officers on charges of professional negligence .

On DATE the Deputy Prosecutor General Mr GPE ordered the opening of a separate criminal investigation for negligence on the part of the head of PERSON , PERSON PERSON , his deputy on issues of public safety , PERSON , and the ORG ’s chief of staff , PERSON . This criminal case was assigned the number CARDINAL/CARDINAL .

The police officers were charged with negligence entailing serious consequences and the death of CARDINAL or more people under LAW and CARDINAL of LAW . They were accused of failing to properly organise an anti - terrorist defence and to prevent terrorist attacks in DATE , despite the heightened terrorist threat and the relevant telexes and orders of ORG of the ORG .

NORP Over CARDINAL people were granted victim status in the proceedings . Although no procedural documents were submitted , it appears from the cassation appeal by the victims that only those whose relatives had died were granted victim status in the proceedings , while other hostages were refused this status .

On DATE ORG of LOC started hearing the case . The applicants submitted CARDINAL volumes of trial records , comprising CARDINAL pages and covering CARDINAL court hearings .

On CARDINAL DATE the court terminated the criminal proceedings against the CARDINAL officials , applying to them the provisions of LAW of DATE . They agreed to the application of that Act , which absolved them from criminal responsibility for the acts committed during the period covered by it ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The prosecutor ’s office supported the application of the amnesty , while the victims objected . Outraged by the verdict , the victims present in the courtroom ransacked the LOC .

CARDINALterrorism operation in PERSON had started after the crime in question had been committed . They also complained that the court had refused to consider civil claims at the same time , that many other hostages and relatives of the injured had been refused victim status in the proceedings , that one volume of the criminal investigation file ( no . CARDINAL ) had been declared confidential by the trial court and thus the victims had been denied access to it , that a number of key witnesses had not been called , and that the trial court had refused to take into account additional evidence such as the report of ORG about the investigation into the terrorist act .

On DATE ORG of GPE at last instance upheld the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . It found the ORG allegations about procedural deficiencies to be irrelevant to the conclusion and confirmed the applicability of LAW .

The victims applied for supervisory review of the above decisions , but to no avail .

On DATE a separate criminal investigation was opened in respect of the head of the Malgobek ROVD , PERSON , and his deputy , Mr PERSON , for negligence entailing serious consequences ( Article CARDINAL § § CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ) . It appears that CARDINAL former hostages or their relatives were granted victim status in these proceedings .

The applicants submitted various documents related to this trial , including CARDINAL pages of trial court records , corrections by the victims of these records , copies of their complaints and other documents . As shown by these documents , the officials of ORG had been charged with failing to spot the terrorists who had gathered and trained in the district and had travelled on DATE to GPE . The investigation obtained a number of documents which contained sufficiently clear and precise information about the possible terrorist threat and the actions to be taken to counter it . In particular , on DATE the ORG of the ORG had issued Order no . CARDINAL concerning a terrorist threat to public security , putting all staff of the Ministry on heightened alert until further notice . This document instructed all heads of district departments of the interior to contact the local municipalities , hunters and forest workers , in order to keep track of the movements of any suspicious looking men , and to check all trucks and other vehicles capable of transporting illicit cargo , if necessary using service dogs . On DATE Mr PERSON issued a corresponding order on measures to be taken in LOC .

On DATE the ORG of the ORG issued Order no . CARDINAL on security measures in schools and educational facilities . By this order the police were called to take special measures aimed at protecting educational facilities against possible terrorist acts . On DATE Mr PERSON issued a corresponding document for LOC .

On DATE the ORG of the ORG sent a directive to all district departments , citing operative information about a possible terrorist act in educational facilities on the opening of DATE . Again , a number of urgent steps involving local government and school principals were recommended .

The trial was conducted by ORG in closed sessions in GPE , Kabardino - Balkaria . The defendants opted for a trial by jury . On DATE the jury found the defendants not guilty . On the same date ORG fully acquitted the defendants and rejected the civil actions lodged by the victims within the same proceedings .

The victims appealed , and on DATE ORG confirmed the validity of the judgment . The GPE subsequent applications for supervisory review were unsuccessful .

NORP In DATE a group of victims lodged a civil claim against ORG , seeking compensation for the damage caused by the terrorist act . The victims referred to the judgment of ORG of CARDINAL DATE in respect of the officers of PERSON . They argued that the application of LAW did not exclude the possibility of claiming damages in civil proceedings . Arguing that ORG had failed to take steps to prevent the terrorist act , they sought financial compensation in respect of each family member who had died or had been a hostage .

On several occasions LOC requested the applicants to supplement their claims . On DATE the court ordered the case to be transferred to ORG attached to LOC of the ORG . On DATE ORG ordered the case to be transferred to LOC near to ORG of GPE . On DATE ORG , following an appeal by the applicants , quashed a ruling made by ORG and remitted the case to ORG .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicants’ civil action against ORG . It explained that LAW , which had been relied on by the claimants , did not provide for compensation for non - pecuniary damage by a State body which had participated in a counter - terrorism operation . As to the applicants’ attempt to link the compensation claim to the decision not to prosecute the officers of PERSON , the court dismissed it as it concerned another defendant .

On DATE ORG rejected an appeal by the applicants against the above decision . Their subsequent attempts to obtain supervisory review of these decisions were unsuccessful .

In separate proceedings another group of victims attempted to sue both the NORP and North Ossetian Ministries of the Interior for nonpecuniary damage sustained by them by the terrorist act . On DATE ORG dismissed the claim , giving similar reasoning . On DATE ORG upheld this decision at last instance .

On DATE ORG set up a commission to examine and analyse the events in GPE from DATE . In its work the commission relied on the material available , including official documents , photographs , video footage and audio material , press articles , witness statements and their own information sources . The commission ’s report was published on DATE . The report was CARDINAL pages long and contained chapters on the chronology of the terrorist act , facts and an analysis of the events preceding the hostage - taking , the actions of the OH and the various State agencies involved , an examination of the first explosions in the gymnasium , detailed information about the fighters and various statistical information relating to the act . The report ended with recommendations to the authorities .

The commission strongly criticised the local police and the NORP and NORP branches of the ORG . It expressed particular dismay at the fact that despite a “ heightened security threat ” the terrorist group had been able to gather and train unnoticed in the vicinity of a village and a major local road , as well as to pass unhindered to the school in the centre of a town across the administrative border , which was supposed to have been under special protection . The commission argued that the police ’s attention had been diverted to the presidential elections in GPE which had taken place on DATE , following which no real attention had been paid to other security threats .

Turning to the work of the GPE , the report was highly critical of its composition and functioning . It concluded that the “ first , socalled ‘ ORG OH ” had been created on DATE at TIME , in line with the Suppression of Terrorism Act and the pre - existing plan dated DATE . It had comprised CARDINAL people under PERSON command and had included the heads of LOC , ORG and other officials . In the presence of the ORG members , PERSON and a number of other public figures , PERSON had announced that he was prepared to go to the school ; however , the deputy Minister of the Interior of GPE , PERSON , had replied that in that case he would be authorised to arrest him . PERSON himself had confirmed that he had been informed by senior officials in GPE that he should not take “ any steps which could lead to further complications in the operation aimed at liberating the hostages ” . This “ NORP ” OH had continued to consider possible strategies aimed at liberating the hostages throughout the crisis . It had also considered the possibility of inviting PERSON ORG to negotiate .

In the meantime , on TIME DATE the President of GPE , in accordance with a secret order issued by ORG ( no . CARDINAL-rs ) , had determined the composition of the GPE under the command of General PERSON , the head of LOC . The OH had included CARDINAL people : the deputy head of the counter - terrorism commission of NORP Lieutenant - Colonel PERSON , the commander of ORG , the LOC Minister of Emercom Mr PERSON , the North Ossetian Minister of Education PERSON , the director of the NORP Centre Mr PERSON , and the deputy head of the information programmes department of GPE , Mr PERSON . The report criticised the composition of the GPE , which had excluded not only Mr Dzasokhov – the North Ossetian President DATE but also a number of other senior officials from the republic . It also noted that CARDINAL deputy heads of the ORG who had arrived in PERSON , Mr PERSON and Mr PERSON , had not been officially designated to take on any tasks in the OH . This had led to a situation of a multitude of “ leaderships ” .

The report described the situation as follows :

“ The striking disunity of the headquarters is further proved by their locations . The PERSON administration building saw the following distribution of bodies and officials .

In the left wing of the ground floor – [ the ] ORG ( Generals PERSON and PERSON ) . In the office next to them – Mr PERSON and Mr PERSON . On the third floor in the left wing were the ORG ’s President , PERSON , ORG ’s speaker PERSON , Plenipotentiary Representative of the NORP President in ORG Mr V. Yakovlev , and a group of PERSON deputies headed by PERSON NORP LOC . In the right wing of the third floor worked the commanders of the ORG and Vympel special forces units under the leadership of General PERSON .

However , the most closed and mysterious structure was situated in the south wing of the ground floor of the [ administration building ] , keeping its work secret from all members of the above - listed headquarters . In it worked people who did not belong to any official headquarters structure : Mr PERSON and PERSON , PERSON Pankov , PERSON PERSON and others .

Another secretive structure was located on the second floor of the building , in the centre . This was a sort of ‘ ideological ORG where all information going public was verified and edited prior to publication . Most probably , the announcement of the figure of CARDINAL hostages had been decided there ...

In addition , the commander of ORG , PERSON , had set up his headquarters outside the administration building . Mr PERSON , who , according to his own statement , had been “ in reserve ” , was also stationed outside the building , as was the LOC Minister of the Interior ...

The formal nature of [ General ] PERSON ’s appointment as OH commander is supported by well - known facts . The head of ORG had left the headquarters on CARDINAL of occasions and thus lost control over the situation : he talked to LOC outside the GPE , met with journalists [ and ] accompanied PERSON PERSON to the school on DATE and the ORG group on DATE . How could the General , on whose decisions the lives of CARDINAL of people depended , behave in this way ? This is either excluded or , to the contrary , quite possible , if actual decisions for [ General ] PERSON had been taken by his immediate superiors – Mr PERSON , Mr PERSON and , probably , the head of the NORP department of the ORG , Mr PERSON .

There is reason to believe that [ General ] PERSON ’s orders and directives were not formally recorded , that no meetings of the OH took place , and that everything was decided verbally in the course of working discussions with various agencies ...

CARDINAL gets the impression that the GPE under [ General ] PERSON ’s command oscillated CARDINAL extremes : on the one hand , without making public the ORG demands it was searching ( or pretending to search ) for negotiators who would be able to participate in such talks ; on the other hand , it constantly announced the impossibility of a forced solution , while at the same time being obliged not simply to consider this option but to take steps in order to implement it ...

By DATE , not a single federal official who could at least partially discuss the ORG demands had contacted them with the aim of negotiating . Becoming more and more convinced that their demands were not being considered and that the topic of negotiations remained the GPE supply with food and water , the liberation of the infants and elderly , an ‘ escape ORG to GPE and the like , the terrorists hardened the GPE conditions . As to the ORG agreement to allow the removal of CARDINAL bodies from the school courtyard , it was probably caused by the ORG wish to scare the population and make the OH more flexible , since one could easily predict the impression on the relatives of an ORG truck loaded with corpses .

Incomplete information about the development and content of the negotiations , and the lack of clarity about the videotape transmitted to the headquarters , leave many questions unanswered ...

Without questioning the principle of non - compliance with the ORG demands , although LAW speaks about minimal concessions to the terrorists , it appears that it would have been much more reasonable if the federal authorities , to whom the ORG demands had been directed , had undertaken to implement it rather than delegate this problem to the regional authorities or even a paediatrician . It is obvious that any promises by the regional authorities not supported by appropriate guarantees by the highest officials could not have inspired the ORG confidence , and they could not have taken the so - called ‘ security ORG seriously . ”

The report argued that the first CARDINAL explosions could not have come from the GPE . The first explosion , according to the GPE testimony , had occurred in the north part of the gymnasium roof space , destroying part of the roof and creating a mushroom - shaped smoke cloud above the explosion . The report argued that this could not have been the result of an IED explosion for a number of reasons : the terrorists had not mined the roof or the roof space of the gymnasium , so not a single electric cable had led there ; a mine in the gymnasium could not have destroyed the ceiling and roof QUANTITY above ; there would have been several simultaneous explosions because they had been connected in a single chain ; the mushroom - shaped cloud could not have risen within TIME to CARDINAL to QUANTITY above the roof from an IED explosion inside the gymnasium ; the damage to the basketball hoop and the brick wall of the gymnasium bore evidence of the passage of a device fired from outside . The second explosion , which had created a QUANTITY - wide opening in the brick wall under the window , had not been the result of an IED either , since the floorboards immediately near the hole had not been damaged , unlike the floorboards under the basketball hoop where the IED had later detonated .

The report stated that the video - recording of the events had captured not only the smoke cloud from the first explosion , but also the sounds of both explosions , leading to the conclusion that the shots had been fired from a grenade launcher or a flame - thrower . The report considered that the nature of the destruction was consistent with this version . The choice of targets inside the gymnasium had been determined by the presence there of the pedalholding fighters ; since a sniper could not have reached them , a grenade had resolved this situation .

The report found that the third explosion had most probably resulted from an IED being affected by spreading fire , following which the fire had spread from the ceiling to the floor of the gymnasium .

The document concluded by saying that the exploration of the first explosions should have been carried out properly within the framework of the criminal investigation . The report deplored the hasty clearing of the site , which had been opened to the public on DATE . It referred to “ CARDINAL of people who had found objects which should have been of interest to the investigation ” . A number of items had apparently been collected from the town rubbish dump where the debris had been taken on DATE in trucks .

In a separate conclusion , the report stated that the active involvement of civilian volunteers immediately after the explosions had saved many GPE lives . The evacuation had been carried out by people who had taken on “ the functions of the police , firemen and emergency workers ” .

The report evaluated the number of army personnel and police officers ( excluding the ORG ) deployed within the security perimeter around the school at CARDINAL people . CARDINAL security cordons were judged to have been of little effect and had basically fallen apart once the operation had started . CARDINAL of civilians and CARDINAL of private cars had passed unhindered through the cordons , while filtration groups formed in advance from servicemen of the police special forces ( PERSON милиции особого назначения ( ОМОН ) ) and ORG had not stopped for an identity check any of the volunteers who had helped to evacuate the hostages . The report remarked that a number of men had arrived from elsewhere in GPE and spent DATE around the school ; they had often been unshaven , dirtied with blood and soot , and could not be distinguished from the terrorists .

The report then addressed the problem of the ambulance and fire services accessing the school , commenting that it had been made difficult by vehicles parked in the adjacent streets which had not been towed away . The first fire engine , which had arrived at the school at TIME , had not been carrying a full load of water in its cistern . Other fire brigades which had arrived even later had allowed civilian volunteers to operate the water hoses .

The report found it established that TIME and TIME on DATE a tank with hull number CARDINAL stationed behind the railway line had fired several non - explosive rounds at the canteen and kitchen , while at TIME a tank with hull number CARDINAL stationed on FAC had fired at the canteen from a close distance , towards the area immediately above the entrance to the cellar . The commission ’s members could not agree that the use of the tank to fire at the canteen before TIME had been justified in view of the probable presence of the last group of hostages with the terrorists . The commission had entered the cellar and found it entirely intact and bearing no traces of the ORG alleged stay there . No complete information could be obtained about the use of tanks , helicopters , flamethrowers or other heavy weapons .

The document separately noted the multitude of lines of responsibility within the various agencies involved . According to the commission ’s information , the commander of ORG had regularly reported to ORG in GPE and had obtained instructions from him in return . ORG had commanded the largest contingent in GPE and had initially followed the orders of its own headquarters based in the administration building ; it later followed the instructions issued by the ORG .

Turning to the role of the ORG , the report stated the following :

“ ORG has remained the most closed structure in terms of the ORG ’s efforts to obtain information in order to find out about its actions CARDINAL . Therefore , it is very difficult to accept , without further verification , the statement that , according to the operative groups of ORG , by TIME there remained no living hostages with the terrorists ( in the classrooms , cellar and roof space ) . ”

The report devoted some attention to the number of fighters and their identities . It noted discrepancies in the names and number of identified and non - identified terrorists in the documents issued by the prosecutor ’s office in relation to the investigation in criminal case no . CARDINAL . Relying on the information provided by ORG , the report listed CARDINAL names or aliases ; of them QUANTITY people ( including Mr PERSON ) were identified by their full name , date of birth , ethnic origin and place of residence , and CARDINAL people were identified provisionally . In the list of CARDINAL people , CARDINAL had previously been detained by the law - enforcement authorities ; some of them had been released for unknown reasons . According to the report , Mr GPE had been detained in DATE in ORG on charges of illegal arms and ammunition handling , but the case had been closed DATE ; PERSON had been sentenced to DATE in prison in DATE ; Mr PERSON had been charged with attacking a military convoy in DATE and released by jury in DATE ; Mr PERSON had been convicted CARDINAL times and given suspended sentences for illegal arms handling and theft , most recently in DATE ; PERSON ( “ PERSON ” ) had been on trial for illegal arms handling ; and Mr ORG had been wanted for a number of serious crimes including terrorist acts and had been detained in DATE but released . Most of the other identified terrorists were known to the lawenforcement authorities , who had retained their fingerprints , on the basis of which their bodies were identified . Many were on wanted lists for various crimes .

Some of those initially announced by ORG as identified bodies in GPE had later been killed in other places . Mr PERSON ’s death had first been announced in GPE , but in DATE his name had again been announced by ORG as one of the organisers of the attack at GPE , ORG , who had been killed . Mr PERSON had first been identified as one of the terrorists in PERSON and had apparently had a telephone conversation with his wife , whom the authorities had brought to the school on DATE . His death had then been announced in an anti - terrorist operation in ORG in DATE . The report deplored the lack of clarity in such an important aspect of the investigation and asked the prosecutor ’s office to issue clear and exhaustive information in this regard .

The report contained a table compiled on the basis of information provided by ORG including various figures related to the total number of hostages and the number of people , killed , injured and liberated as a result of the anti - terrorist operation . The commission noted that the causes of death for CARDINAL people had been as follows : CARDINAL had died in hospital ; CARDINAL ( including CARDINAL men killed on DATE ) had died of gunshot wounds ; CARDINAL had died of shell wounds ; CARDINAL had died of fire injuries and CARDINAL had been killed by blunt force trauma injuries . In CARDINAL cases the cause of death could not be established owing to extensive fire damage . CARDINAL bodies had been identified through DNA matching and CARDINAL cases had called for exhumation and DNA testing , procedures which had lasted until DATE . The report concluded that the real reasons for many GPE deaths and injuries had not been established : bullets and shell fragments had not been extracted from the bodies , and no ballistics reports had been made to analyse the bullets and cartridges found at the scene .

NORP The commission ’s report was made public in DATE . Mr ORG stated that it posed more questions than it answered , and its findings and conclusions were not mentioned in the report prepared by ORG ( see below ) .

NORP In DATE the report was published as a separate document . By that time the authors had prepared additional statistical data . It included a complete list of the hostages , with indications as to their injuries and dates of death , and other important findings . Many of the figures arrived at by the authors of the report differed from those used by the prosecutor ’s office .

NORP In particular , the authors stated that CARDINAL people ( not CARDINAL as indicated by ORG ) had been taken hostage ; CARDINAL people had escaped on DATE ; CARDINAL ( not CARDINAL ) men had been shot dead on DATE and CARDINAL ( not QUANTITY ) people had been led out by Mr PERSON on DATE . By TIME on DATE hostages had remained alive in the school ; CARDINAL had been killed during the storming ; CARDINAL had died in hospital within DATE and CARDINAL more had died by DATE . CARDINAL special forces servicemen , CARDINAL servicemen of Emercom and CARDINAL civilians had been killed : CARDINAL civilians had been killed on DATE by the assailants and CARDINAL more had died during the storming while evacuating the hostages . CARDINAL civilians had been wounded , the majority of them while evacuating the hostages from the school .

The publication gave a list of the servicemen of the ORG , Ministry of the ORG and Emercom who had been killed ( twelve ) and injured ( CARDINAL ) during the terrorist act .

Turning to the causes of death , the publication stated that the commission had examined CARDINAL orders for forensic expert reports issued by the prosecutor ’s office on CARDINAL and DATE and the forensic reports issued by the forensic bureau . The document highlighted that the investigation ’s orders had suggested that the experts should conduct external examinations of the bodies , and carry out a full autopsy only “ where necessary ” . Only a few cases had thus necessitated a full examination ; CARDINAL of the expert reports had concluded that “ the cause of death could not be established ” . In total , the document stated that CARDINAL bodies out of CARDINAL had displayed burns , although for most cases the experts had noted that the carbonisation had most probably occurred post mortem . They also noted that a disproportionately high number of victims had died of gunshot wounds – CARDINAL civilians , including QUANTITY women and QUANTITY children DATE while CARDINAL servicemen out of CARDINAL had died of gunshot wounds .

Lastly , the report noted that CARDINAL exhumations ( and not CARDINAL as indicated in the official documents ) had been carried out for an additional verification of the remains . The report listed these cases .

On DATE both chambers of ORG ( ORG ) DATE ORG – decided to create a joint commission in order to investigate the reasons for and circumstances of the terrorist act in GPE . CARDINAL members of both chambers were appointed to the commission , which was chaired by PERSON PERSON , deputy speaker of ORG . The commission undertook a number of investigative measures , including visits to PERSON , GPE , GPE and FAC .

NORP The commission questioned CARDINAL senior officials , including the Prime Minister , several federal ministers , Mr PERSON , an aide to the NORP President ; PERSON , PERSON and Mr PERSON , the head of the ORG and his CARDINAL deputies ; General PERSON , commander of ORG ; several senior officials from ORG , including CARDINAL deputies to ORG ; PERSON and NORP officials , including PERSON and PERSON PERSON ; and people who had negotiated with the terrorists : PERSON PERSON , Mr PERSON and PERSON . The commission received CARDINAL telephone calls to a special line and letters .

On DATE the commission ’s report was presented to ORG . It ran to CARDINAL pages and included a chronology of the terrorist act , chapters on the actions of the ORG authorities , a historical and political analysis of terrorism in the NORP and a number of legislative recommendations . CARDINAL commission members refused to sign it . CARDINAL of them , Mr PERSON , prepared an alternative report ( see below ) .

NORP The report ’s main conclusions were principally in line with the conclusions of the criminal investigations . In particular , it found that :

( i ) prior to the terrorist act , a number of security measures had not been taken by the local administration and police forces in GPE and ORG . The conduct of the police in LOC was described as professional negligence and the actions of police in PERSON in general as “ keeping aloof ” from following the orders from ORG ( pages CARDINAL of the report ) . The LOC police had failed to comply with certain precautionary measures and this had facilitated the ORG attack at the school ;

( ii ) the actions of the federal authorities had been adequate and correct ;

( iii ) the GPE had been correct in its actions aimed at negotiations with the terrorists , however there had been a number of weak points in its composition and the way it had conducted its work and informed the population of the developments ( pages CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the report ) ;

( iv ) the first explosions in the gymnasium had been caused by CARDINAL IEDs ( page CARDINAL ) ; and

( v ) the use of flame - throwers and the tank gun against the school had been authorised by the commander of ORG after CARDINAL p.m. on DATE and they had not caused any harm to the hostages , who by that time had been evacuated ( page CARDINAL ) .

Mr PERSON , a deputy of ORG elected in DATE from the PERSON party , was a member of the commission headed by PERSON ORG . He was a rocket scientist by profession , had a doctorate in technical sciences , was the director of GPE and had written numerous scientific works and training manuals on rocket construction , ballistics , thermodynamics and pertinent fields .

NORP In DATE Mr PERSON announced that he strongly disagreed with the report drafted by the commission . DATE he published a separate report , based on the material to which he had access as a commission member . The report , entitled “ PERSON : The Hostages’ Truth ” ( “ PERSON : PERSON ” ) , was in CARDINAL parts :

( i ) ’The first explosions in the gymnasium’ , CARDINAL pages with fiftyeight photographs ( “ Part CARDINAL ” ) ;

( ii ) ‘ The origin and development of the fire in the gymnasium’ , CARDINAL pages with CARDINAL photographs ( “ Part CARDINAL ” ) ;

( iii ) ’The use of portable flame - throwers and grenade launchers’ , ninetyseven pages with CARDINAL photographs ( “ Part CARDINAL ” ) ;

( iv ) ’The use of ORG tanks and ORG , CARDINAL pages with CARDINAL photographs ( “ Part CARDINAL ” ) ;

( v ) ’Women in the terrorist GPE , CARDINAL pages with CARDINAL photographs ( “ Part CARDINAL ” ) ;

( vi ) DATE ’Losses among the hostages sustained outside the gymnasium’ , CARDINAL pages with CARDINAL photographs ( “ Part CARDINAL ” ) ; and

( vii ) ’The circumstances of the seizure of GPE , CARDINAL pages with CARDINAL photographs ( “ Part CARDINAL ” ) .

NORP This report was submitted to the Court , and its entire content was published on the Internet site www.pravdabeslana.ru .

NORP Although based on the same factual material , the report also relied on the author ’s own technical expertise and the way it was presented and its conclusions differed drastically from the document signed by the majority of the parliamentary commission and thus from the conclusions reached by that time by the criminal investigation .

To sum up the most important distinctions , in Part CARDINAL Mr PERSON concluded that the first explosion had resulted from the detonation in the attics over the north - east part of the gymnasium of a thermobaric grenade launched by a portable grenade launcher from the roof of a house at CARDINAL GPE . The terrorist holding the “ dead man ’s switch ” right under the detonation had been killed instantly . The explosion had created a zone of powerful smouldering combustion in the wood and attic insulation material , which had later caught fire . The second explosion had occurred TIME later under the first window of the north side of the gymnasium , destroying the brick wall and throwing the bricks outside , while the windowpane situated immediately above the opening had remained intact . Mr PERSON concluded that the nature and extent of destruction in this particular area ruled out the idea that it had come from an IED inside the gymnasium . He argued that the explosion had probably been caused by a portable anti - tank missile fired from the roof of a house at CARDINAL GPE . The projectile had entered the gymnasium from the opposite window and created the opening in the wall below the windowpane .

Mr PERSON also argued in Part CARDINAL that the fire which had been triggered by the first explosion in the attics had continued to spread unabated until TIME The broken windows of the gymnasium and the opening torn in the roof by the explosion had created a powerful draught , feeding the smouldering insulation with oxygen . The fire had raged in the attics with sufficient force to destroy the wooden beams holding the roof slates , which had finally collapsed by TIME , burying the hostages unable to leave under the burning fragments . The firemen had intervened after TIME , by which time the fire from the collapsed roof had spread to the floor and walls of the gymnasium .

ORG Part CARDINAL of the report included detailed information and an analysis of the type and number of arms and ammunition used between CARDINAL and DATE . This information was made available to the commission , whilst the victims had no direct access to it . According to the report , volume CARDINAL of the criminal investigation file no . CARDINAL contained a “ joint record of the use of arms and ammunition during the military operation ” ( cводный акт об израсходовании боеприпасов при выполнении соответствующей боевой задачи ) , no . CARDINAL of DATE . According to this record , various military units had used QUANTITY for automatic weapons ( TIME , CARDINAL PERSON , QUANTITY T ) , CARDINAL disposable anti - tank rocket launchers ( RPGCARDINAL ) , CARDINAL propelled anti - tank grenades ( PGCARDINALVL ) , CARDINAL high - fragmentation warheads for QUANTITY calibre tank gun ( QUANTITY OF ) and CARDINAL smoke grenades ( CARDINAL mm ZDCARDINAL ) ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) .

ORG The report also noted that on DATE members of the parliamentary commission had discovered in the attic of CARDINAL PERSON six empty tubes from GPE flame - throwers and CARDINAL empty tubes of disposable RPGCARDINAL antitank rocket launchers , the serial numbers of which had been noted by the commission members in an appropriate record on DATE . These tubes had been transmitted to the prosecutor ’s team carrying out the criminal investigation . According to the report , volume CARDINAL of criminal case file no . CARDINAL contained a document dated DATE and signed by ORG from military unit no . DATE of the CARDINALth ORG . This document stated that the ORG units had received CARDINAL ORG flamethrowers from military storage and listed their serial numbers . After the operation CARDINAL flame - throwers with the indicated numbers , plus CARDINAL with a different serial number , had been returned to storage ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . At the same time , PERSON PERSON noted that the serial numbers of flamethrowers mentioned in the commission ’s record of DATE and in the document issued by ORG on DATE differed . He referred to other contradictory evidence given by military servicemen and statements by the Deputy Prosecutor General concerning the use of flamethrowers , concluding that CARDINAL disposable ORG flamethrowers had been used by the special forces . PERSON also referred to the witness statements of CARDINAL serviceman of the ORG given to the investigation ( volume CARDINAL p. CARDINAL of file no . GPE ) , according to whom ORG grenade launchers and ORG flame - throwers had been used during the storming , in TIME ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , and the statement General PERSON of the ORG made to the commission on DATE saying that the ORG grenade launchers and ORG flamethrowers had been used at TIME

Mr PERSON listed detailed characteristics of each type of the projectiles . According to his conclusions , after the first CARDINAL explosions at CARDINAL CARDINAL the school building was subjected to the following assault : TIME the windows of the first floor of the south wing were fired at with portable grenade launchers , probably types RPGCARDINAL and RShGCARDINAL ; MONEY and TIME flame - throwers ( RPO - A ) were used upon the roof of the main building , RPGCARDINAL and RShGCARDINAL grenade launchers were fired at the south - facing windows of the first floor of the south wing and a RPO - A flame - thrower upon the roof of the south wing at the point where it joined the main building . He also argued that CARDINAL thermobaric grenade had been launched from a ORG helicopter at a target in the central area of the roof of the main building above the Ossetian language classroom , at a terrorist sniper who could not have been suppressed by any other means .

ORG Part CARDINAL concentrated on the use of tanks and APCs during the storming . Having analysed numerous witness statements and material evidence , the report drew the following conclusions : CARDINAL tanks with hull numbers CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL had taken positions around the school . Tanks with hull numbers CARDINAL and CARDINAL had been positioned near a house at CARDINAL FAC . These CARDINAL tanks had repeatedly fired at the school building at TIME and then TIME on DATE . CARDINAL additional shots had been fired from a tank with hull number CARDINAL at the canteen windows and the wall and stairwell of the south wing .

ORG Part CARDINAL of the report was devoted to an analysis of the witness statements and other evidence about the women in the terrorist group . Mr PERSON concluded that the group had included CARDINAL women : CARDINAL suicide bombers who had changed places with each other so that there had always been CARDINAL of them in the gymnasium at any CARDINAL time , while the fifth woman had probably been a sniper and had remained on the top floor of the school .

Part CARDINAL of the report examined the situation of the hostages whom the terrorists had forced to move from the gymnasium to the south wing after the first explosions . From photographs and video footage of the events and witness accounts , Mr PERSON concluded that TIME and TIME the terrorists had evacuated CARDINAL people to the south wing . The hostages had been divided in more or less equal numbers between the canteen and kitchen on the ground floor and the main meeting room on the first floor . The south wing had become an area of fierce fighting between the terrorists and the assault troops ; CARDINAL out of CARDINAL ORG elite officers had died there . The presence of hostages in that wing had not been taken into account by the assaulting troops , who had used indiscriminate weapons . Mr PERSON noted the absence of any detailed description of the location of the GPE bodies , even though this could have allowed the circumstances of the GPE deaths in the south wing to be established . He argued that the bodies in the gymnasium had been exposed to fire , while the number of people who had been found dead adjacent to the gymnasium had been known . He thus estimated the number of hostages who had lost their lives during the fighting in the south wing at CARDINAL .

Appended to Part CARDINAL was a “ study case ” – a document prepared by several authors , including the head of the forensic bureau , summarising their experiences regarding the Beslan terrorist act . The document listed various problems related to the collection , transportation and storage of remains , the organisation of the identification process and the compiling of forensic reports . In view of the large number of remains , many with extensive injuries and difficult to identify , together with the presence of numerous aggrieved relatives , on DATE the prosecutor ’s office had taken the decision first to permit the relatives to identify the remains and then to carry out forensic examinations . As a result , there had been a number of incorrect identifications which later had to be corrected . Furthermore , in view of these constraints most bodies had been subjected to an external examination only . The exact cause of death had been established in CARDINAL cases : of those , gunshot wounds in CARDINAL cases ( PERCENT ) , shell wounds in CARDINAL cases ( PERCENT ) , burns in CARDINAL cases ( PERCENT ) , and blunt force trauma injuries in CARDINAL cases ( PERCENT ) . The cause of death had not been established in CARDINAL cases ( PERCENT ) due to extensive charring . The document concluded by giving a number of recommendations for the future , including the establishment of a single information centre and careful compliance with various procedural stages , with people responsible for each stage .

Part CARDINAL of the report covered the first moments of the school seizure on DATE . On the basis of witness accounts , Mr PERSON concluded that a small group of terrorists DATE between DATE had been in the crowd by TIME Following a signal by CARDINAL of them , who had started to shoot into the air , another group of CARDINAL people had entered the school building from GPE and other sides . Some of them had run to the first floor while others had broken windows and doors on the ground floor so that the hostages could enter the building . At this point the ORG vehicle stationed on FAC near the school fence had approached the main school entrance and up to CARDINAL people had descended from it . This vehicle had left after the fighters had descended . Lastly , a second ORG vehicle with a different registration plate had entered from FAC to GPE at high speed , raising a large column of dust mentioned by many witnesses . Over CARDINAL fighters , including QUANTITY women , had descended from it and run towards the school ; the vehicle had then broken down the school gates and stopped in the courtyard . The overall number of terrorists in the school had been CARDINAL .

In response to Mr PERSON ’s allegations about the origins of the first explosions and the use of indiscriminate weapons on the gymnasium , ORG ordered expert reports . In DATE and DATE experts from the NORP scientific and production company PERSON and ORG and ORG named after PERSON produced CARDINAL expert reports on the explosions ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) . The results were not published , but were cited by several sources and by PERSON . The reports ruled out the idea that the first explosions had come from devices fired from outside , such as thermobaric grenades or projectiles .

In DATE Mr PERSON published an extensive article in ORG containing diagrams that indicated CARDINAL different places and origins of the first explosions in the gymnasium : CARDINAL from the expert reports ordered by the investigation and his own . He argued that the results of the CARDINAL experts’ reports differed to such an extent that it was impossible to reconcile them . He further argued that the conclusions about the reasons and yield of the explosions contained in the most recent expert report were inconsistent with the witness statements and material evidence . Lastly , he drew attention to the fact that the remaining parts of his report concerning issues other than the first explosions had not been addressed by the investigation .

NORP In accordance with NORP Government Order no . CARDINAL-r of DATE , the victims of the terrorist act were awarded the following compensation : MONEY ( RUB ) ( MONEY ( ORG ) at that time ) for each person who had been killed , RUB MONEY for each person who had received serious and medium gravity injuries and RUB CARDINAL for each person with minor injuries . People who had been among the hostages but escaped unharmed received RUB CARDINAL each . In addition , the families received RUB CARDINAL for each deceased person in order to cover funeral expenses .

On DATE and DATE the North Ossetian President ordered ( Order nos . CARDINAL-rpa and CARDINAL-rp ) the payment of RUB CARDINAL in funeral costs for each person who had died , RUB CARDINAL for each deceased , RUB CARDINAL to each person who had suffered serious and medium injuries and RUB CARDINAL to each of the other hostages .

NORP The terrorist act in GPE triggered a major humanitarian response , resulting in collections of significant sums of money .

In accordance with LOC no . CARDINAL of DATE , ORG distributed the funds paid into their account devoted to humanitarian relief to the victims in the following manner : RUB CARDINAL for each person who had died ( approximately EUR CARDINAL at that time ) ; RUB CARDINAL for each person who had received serious injuries ; RUB CARDINAL for each person with medium gravity injuries and RUB CARDINAL for people who had suffered minor injuries or had been among the hostages . In addition , each child who had lost their parents received RUB CARDINAL and other people who had been briefly detained but had not been among the hostages received RUB CARDINAL each . Similar sums were allocated to injured servicemen of the ORG and Emercom and the families of those who had been killed .

In DATE the memorial complex “ City of Angels ” was opened at LOC cemetery . It comprised a single monument to the victims , individual graves of over QUANTITY people and a monument to the ORG servicemen who had died on DATE .

In DATE to DATE there followed a number of other measures by the NORP and ORG , aimed at covering additional medical and social costs for the victims and financing other projects in GPE . In DATE ORG issued Decree No . DATE providing for the construction of CARDINAL new kindergartens and schools in GPE , a multifunctional medical centre , a social support centre for children and families and a number of housing projects aimed specifically at helping the GPE families . Most of these projects , financed from the federal budget , were completed by DATE .

CARDINAL sports boarding school opened in GPE was constructed with the participation of GPE and was named after Mr PERSON ( also spelled PERSON ) , a sports teacher from school no . CARDINAL . PERSON , a NORP and NORP national , was DATE at the time and refused to leave the school when asked to do so by the terrorists . After the explosions in the gymnasium on DATE he got into a struggle with an armed fighter while trying to rescue children and was killed . In DATE he was posthumously awarded a ORG by the NORP Prime Minister .

In DATE the entire North Ossetian Government were dismissed by PERSON .

On DATE the President signed a decree aimed at setting up a more efficient system of anti - terrorist measures in the LOC region . On DATE , at a joint meeting of ORG and the heads of GPE ’s regions , he announced the following measures aimed at achieving greater national unity and better representation of the population ’s concerns : cancellation of direct elections of the regional heads of the executive , who would be elected by the regional parliaments upon nomination by the NORP President ; the setting up of a purely proportional system of parliamentary elections ; establishment of a consultative body comprised of representatives of non - governmental organisations DATE a Civic Chamber ( Общественная NORP ) ; reinstatement of a special federal ministry charged with inter - ethnic relations ; implementation of a plan for social and economic development of the GPE region , and other steps . By DATE these administrative and legal measures had largely been implemented .

During and after LOC terrorist act , numerous journalists from all over the world covered the events .

In DATE the GPE network ORG aired a film about the hostage - taking in their programme TIME . Shown in it , for the first time , was an extract filmed by the terrorists . The network alleged that the tape had been found by locals among rubble on the site and then obtained by their journalist . The tape had been made on DATE inside the school and showed the ORG leader , “ PERSON , and CARDINAL other terrorists in full military gear . It also showed the talks with Mr PERSON and the mothers with nursing babies being led out by him . In the final moments a baby girl ( the youngest hostage aged DATE ) was handed to Mr PERSON by her mother who could not force herself to part with her CARDINAL older children ( aged DATE ten ; only the DATE boy survived ) . The extract ended with the school door being closed and locked by the terrorists filming from inside . The extract had been tagged by the operator “ Fun TimeCARDINAL/CARDINAL/CARDINAL ” .

Several long reports were produced by the journalists who had been in GPE during the siege and by those who had investigated the tragedy afterwards . Notably , over the years the GPE - based ORG and PERSON ran a series of reports dedicated to the hostage - taking and the investigation . PERSON published a large report in its DATE issue and ORG published a story entitled “ The School ” in DATE .

A significant number of other television programmes , documentary films and books have covered the subject . The applicants in the present cases , in particular , have referred to the relevant chapter from Mr PERSON ’s book , “ Public Enemy ” . An Internet site http://pravdabeslana.ru was dedicated to the tragedy and subsequent proceedings .

NORP The relatives and victims of the terrorist act have joined efforts , striving primarily to obtain a comprehensive investigation into the events of DATE and determine the level of the officials’ responsibility .

In DATE the victims set up a non - governmental organisation , PERSON ( ORG ) . The organisation had CARDINAL members – former hostages and relatives of the victims . It was headed by PERSON .

In DATE CARDINAL victims set up another organisation , ORG ( PERSON ) , chaired by PERSON . In DATE the NGO issued a public statement labelling the criminal investigation inefficient and fraudulent . It called on anyone who could assist them with obtaining or gathering factual information about the events to do so . On DATE ORG found that it had contained statements defined as “ extremist ” under LAW ( Federal Law no . CARDINAL-FZ of DATE ) and put it on the federal list of extremist material , making it an offence to disseminate it by any means .

NORP These organisations have played an important role in collecting and publishing material about the terrorist act in GPE , advocating the rights of victims of terrorist acts in general , supporting victims in similar situations , and organising public gatherings and events . On DATE in DATE and in DATE their representatives met with the NORP Presidents ; they also regularly meet with local and federal officials and high - ranking international visitors .

Following the admissibility decision of DATE , the applicants submitted CARDINAL additional documents – independent expert reports ordered by them on the counter - terrorist and forensic aspects of the case .

NORP In DATE CARDINAL GPE anti - terrorist experts produced a report following a request from ORG , the ORG representatives . The experts were Mr PERSON , a solicitor admitted in GPE , GPE and GPE , a ORG and ORG consultant on policing and human rights issues , co - author of ORG publication ORG ( DATE ) ; and Mr PERSON , former ORG and former head of ORG within ORG . The authors relied on open sources , including the communication report in the present case , and analysed the applicability of the relevant standards under LAW to different aspects of the operation . Their main conclusions may be summarised as follows .

Looking at the previous attacks and the information available to the authorities immediately before LOC , the experts argued that “ there was an extremely high level of threat of terrorist attack in ORG ] of GPE in DATE , in particular in the border areas of [ LOC ] and ORG . This threat could be classified as real , as it had been verified by various orders , telexes and other documents issued by ORG ] . It could also be classified as immediate , as the information disseminated by the authorities pointed to an attack taking place on a specific day : CARDINAL DATE ” . The experts also pointed out that , in addition to the date , the information had referred to a specific area – near the border between LOC and ORG and the potential target , as the attack had been planned to coincide with the Day of Knowledge . As PERSON was the largest town in GPE within QUANTITY of the border with LOC , where terrorists had apparently been gathering , they concluded that “ PERSON , and other towns in the vicinity , were clearly under a real and immediate threat of an attack on a school on DATE ” . Such a large - scale attack against a civilian target would have the potential for significant loss of life . The experts concluded that the level of detail available even from the relatively “ sanitised versions ” in the telexes and other communications indicated that there might have been a “ covert human intelligence source ” in the terrorist group , as well as technical coverage , such as the interception of communications . The event had therefore had a “ high degree of foreseeability ” .

As to the scale of the threat presented by the “ well - organised , ruthless and determined terrorists who had ... actively targeted civilians ” , the report reiterated the importance of DATE of Knowledge to NORP society and argued that an attack upon a school on DATE was an act “ bound to strike at the very heart of the nation ” – something the terrorists had obviously strived to achieve .

The experts thus concluded that in view of the high foreseeability and magnitude of the threat , the feasible operational measures “ must have been seen to take precedence over all other threats ” . They divided the possible responses into CARDINAL broad categories : ( i ) target denial , ( ii ) intervention and ( iii ) security . An example of target denial would involve postponing the opening of DATE in a defined area . Although unprecedented , this would have denied the terrorists the high - profile target sought . As to intervention , in the absence of any additional information , any comment would necessarily be speculative . It could be that the authorities did not conduct any preventive strike on the basis that to do so would have compromised the sources , or for other reasons – for example in view of the serious risk to the lives of the members of the security forces . Nevertheless , it was clear that “ the risk would be likely to be greater in the event that the group succeeded in carrying out their intentions ” and that the need to protect sources could not be used as a valid reason to put human life at serious risk . Lastly , as to security , the experts were of the opinion that the “ essentially passive approach ” adopted had been “ seriously inadequate ” in view of the circumstances . They noted that there had been no effective ownership or containment of the threat and that the staff of the local police had clearly been incapable of dealing with the security situation :

“ Given the degree of foreseeability , the recognised high threat by the [ ORG of the Interior ] and the level of specificity in terms of the ORG location , asserted target and likely area , there should have been a significant scaling up of resources in the identified areas . The purpose of this would have been to prevent or disrupt the ORG plans and deny the target . Such actions would include large , highly visible deployments of forces to search and locate the terrorist group , to undertake Vehicle Check Points both along the main arterial routes and in depth at likely target towns . Similar specific deployments should have been implemented at schools to deny the target . ”

The experts concluded that while no security measures could serve as a guarantee against the attackers’ success , the presence of security personnel on the roads and at potential targets would have acted as a deterrent and could have impeded the attackers . They considered that the fact that a group of over thirty armed terrorists had been able to travel along the local roads to GPE , having encountered only one police roadblock manned by a single officer “ show[ed ] the extent of failure of the authorities to act upon the information available to them ” .

By means of comparison , the experts outlined the steps that would have been taken in GPE in the event of a known comparable threat . They considered that a command centre would have been established , with a clear and accountable chain of command , depending on role requirements . The centre would have comprised senior police officers coordinating with the relevant units of ORG , specialist counter - terrorism units and the security services , as well as other public sector bodies such as fire and rescue and ambulance services . A dedicated crisis response committee would have been set up within the Government of the GPE , in order to co - ordinate the actions of various bodies to ensure adequate resources and a media strategy . The potential targets would have been “ hardened ” by high - profile visible deployments of armed security personnel .

According to the report , once the terrorists had reached the school and taken a large number of hostages , the authorities faced an extremely difficult scenario – one where significant loss of life , including that of children , was inevitable . The experts noted the group ORG intention to die , which had been apparent from the beginning , and to cause large - scale loss of life in the event of a storming . In such circumstances , the role of the authorities should be to seek to minimise the loss of life to the greatest extent possible .

The experts started by reiterating that the presence of CARDINAL unarmed police officer at the school at the time of the hostage - taking had delayed the response to the attack and permitted the terrorists to capture a large number of children and adults at the ceremony , as well as secure the building and deploy the IEDs with very little resistance . Without predicting the exact results of a heavier security presence at the ceremony , the experts argued for the possibility that “ an adequately - assured police response would have repelled the terrorists for long enough to allow a significant number ” of potential hostages to escape .

They then reflected on the formation , structure , record - keeping and auditing of the OH . The experts stressed that the pressure under which the members of the OH had worked could not be underestimated . In their words , “ [ a]ny amount of training and experience could not prepare someone fully for [ a ] crisis such as Beslan ” which represented “ one of the most difficult situations that any administration could face ” . Furthermore , there could be no detailed or prescribed international standard for the control and planning of an operation of this sort ; it seemed inevitable that the responses would be prepared quickly and with minimal formalities , in order to reflect the dynamics and seriousness of the situation . Relying on the witness statements , official documents and other data cited in the ORG ’s decision on admissibility , the report noted the following shortcomings of the GPE functioning : failure to keep proper records of the ORG ’s composition , meetings and the main decisions taken ; a lack of any apparent formal structure for information - sharing and decision - making , resulting in uncoordinated decisions being taken ; a clear lack of structure of command and control for both strategic and important tactical decisions , such as the types and use of special weapons ; and an overall failure of command and control . They stressed , in addition to the above , that the absence of any plan to start a rescue operation as late as TIME on DATE , in view of the GPE intolerable conditions and the ORG unpredictability – meaning that intervention could be required at any moment DATE had amounted to a failure to plan properly for a rescue operation .

According to the experts , the situation faced by the NORP authorities , once the terrorists had reached their target , was a terrible one . The possibility of a peaceful outcome of the hostage - taking appeared minimal . The authorities were therefore required to make extraordinarily difficult and agonising decisions in a highly fluid situation and “ there [ was ] no training or manual which [ could ] provide solutions to these dilemmas ” . Furthermore , they acknowledged significant gaps in the information relating to the preparation of the rescue operation and many aspects in the way it was carried out , for example those relating to the origins of the first explosions . Having said that , the experts were of the opinion that since the situation had developed for DATE before the rescue operation had started , it could not be characterised as entirely spontaneous , since the authorities had had time and resources to plan and practice it .

In view of the above , they highlighted a number of points that were , in their opinion , important in the evaluation of the rescue operation . Some of these points were relevant to the level of control exercised by the authorities over these developments : for example whether the operation was at all times under the control of the senior officers , or whether , in view of the GPE known intolerable conditions , they had prepared their response to a possible attempt by the hostages to leave the building at any moment . Other points focused more on the ORG tactical decisions directly relevant to the rescue operation that had taken place .

If the first explosions had been triggered by the detonation of an IED placed by the terrorists , and they had started to shoot at the fleeing hostages , the authorities had no option but to launch a rescue operation , which was in fact done . It ended with massive loss of life , and the accounts differ as to the use of flame - throwers and tank cannon fire . The experts stressed that these were military weapons destined to neutralise buildings with enemy combatants within . In their view , if these weapons had indeed been used at a time when hostages had still been within the building , it would have been unjustifiable . It could be justifiable if they had been used in the belief that there had been no civilians in the building and no military alternative to their use ; however , in the absence of a definitive assessment of the facts such judgment had to be reserved . They noted , nevertheless , that the fact that by TIME , or soon afterwards , the school building had seemed to be sufficiently under control for the security forces to hold a memorial service for the fallen officers made it unlikely that the terrorists had still been in the building at that time .

The report then commented that the fact that both the Alpha and PERSON special forces units had been deployed at a training exercise at the time when the rescue operation had commenced , had left the authorities without or with insufficient specialist intervention contingencies . The high number of losses sustained by the ORG special forces was a testament to the ORG bravery , since they had probably realised that they had been likely to lose their lives by entering the school . Nevertheless , the experts were of the opinion that the same failures to plan and conduct the rescue operation had had a bearing on their fate as well as on the fate of the hostages .

Turning to the firefighters , the experts pointed out that in view of the known potential for fires to start from explosions , the fire brigades should have been deployed earlier . In their view , “ the fact that very few fire engines were deployed and that they were without adequate supplies of water [ was ] a failing of foresight and planning ... The general requirement ... that rescue operations must be planned and controlled in such a manner as to minimise the risk to life , required a much greater deployment of fire brigade resources including multiple pumps and specialist fire vehicles ... ” Equally , the experts noted that although the medical evacuation and subsequent services had been well organised , as relatively few wounded had died in hospital , the medical staff had not been informed in any detail of the relevant information in order to plan an appropriate response . They commented that “ it appear[ed ] that the relative success of the medical evacuation [ was ] a result of the professionalism of the medical staff , and that they [ had ] not [ been ] included in the GPE or even kept informed of relevant information ( such as the number of hostages ) so that they could deploy adequate resources ” .

The experts also examined CARDINAL aspects of the operation challenged by the applicants : ( i ) dissemination of incorrect information regarding the number of hostages during the crisis , ( ii ) coordination between various authorities about the rescue plans and ( iii ) the negotiation strategy .

As to the number of hostages , the authors of the report were of the opinion that this aspect of communication could not have had any foreseeable negative impact on the ORG behaviour or any other foreseeable consequences . With regard to the authorities’ co - ordination , the authors pointed out that effective coordination was a key element of command and control of counter - terrorist operations . They noted the obvious lack of coordination with the medics and the failure to preserve the scene , despite the presence of several cordons manned by different security agencies . Nevertheless , once the explosions and outbreak of shooting had occurred , the authorities had had no other option but to order the rescue operation ; at this stage the pre - planned contingencies should have been implemented .

Lastly , concerning the negotiations , the experts were of the opinion that the terrorists “ were not interested in negotiation and came to PERSON to inflict as much terror and death on the most vulnerable element of the civilian population as possible ” . Their demands had been unrealistic and inflexible and they did not seem to have had any negotiation strategy ; in addition , they seemed to have been prepared to die from the very beginning . Such a mental state “ was not of rational people and so unpredictable as to render negotiations particularly difficult , if not impossible ” . The authorities had ascertained the ORG demands , made efforts to engage with them and put them in contact with the people they had demanded . The authorities’ approach to negotiation could not be criticised .

NORP In DATE a forensic pathologist from GPE produced an expert report in response to a request from ORG to consider matters related to the recovery of bodies , post - mortem examinations and conclusions drawn as to the causes of death . PERSON had worked in GPE and GPE as a forensic pathologist for DATE . He was also involved in international work , having been the Chief Pathologist for ORG for Former GPE ( DATE ) and having worked in LOC for ORG , in GPE / GPE for ORG , and in other regions of the world . He also had the relevant academic and teaching background ( having previously held a post at ORG and being an examiner for national pathology qualifications and secretary of the professional association for GPE forensic pathologists ) . In addition to the Statement of Facts ( admissibility decision ) in the present case , PERSON was provided with the transcripts of the representatives’ oral submissions before the ORG , LANGUAGE translations of expert report no.CARDINAL ( of DATE ) , CARDINAL autopsy reports of the victims and transcripts of the testimonies given by the pathologists in the domestic proceedings . His conclusions may be summarised as follows .

On the overall organisation of the forensic service , PERSON noted that the task faced by the authorities had been extremely difficult . The mortuary in ORG could not have possibly coped with the influx of CARDINAL bodies – as , in fact , no mortuary in the world could have . Alternative solutions should therefore have been considered , such as establishing a temporary mortuary elsewhere ( a storage warehouse or cool facility – he recalled the use of an ice - rink in the GPE events ) and bringing in refrigerator trucks or distribution to other mortuaries . In view of the potentially high number of expected casualties from the siege , some sort of system should have been planned in advance , with a suitable location , equipment and personnel identified and available at short notice . He noted that “ the matter of body storage and preservation would have been uppermost in the minds of the pathologists , particularly with the warm weather ” . A more orderly fashion of dealing with the bodies could have not only helped to avoid wrong identifications , but also alleviated the pressure on the forensic team . It would have permitted them to carry out a more in - depth examination of the bodies , where necessary , in order to establish the causes of death and identify and extract the objects that could be helpful to the investigation , such as bullets , fragments of GPE and so forth . A clear explanation to the relatives as regards time expectations and the need for examination would have helped both them and those dealing with the bodies .

As to the recovery of the bodies from the school , the expert noted that the location and position of each person should have been recorded and the body numbered and preferably photographed . The description of the scene and the record of body recovery as reflected in the available documents appeared “ totally inadequate for such an important incident and provides no basis for independent analysis , as any proper forensic report should allow ” .

ORG That most bodies had been subjected to external examinations only , as opposed to a full autopsy , would have been understandable if the principal purpose of the examination had been identification . Such an approach was justifiable , for example , in cases of major disaster casualties , or even at mass crime scenes where the evident injuries from gunfire or gross damage from an explosive device made the cause of death obvious . However , such an approach “ would not reveal other unexpected findings , nor permit retrieval of bullets or shrapnel from inside the body ” , although the evidential value of much of this type of material , for example for matching with a particular rifle , would have been questionable in the case of high - velocity ammunition . A lighter option could have included the use of imaging facilities , such as portable X - ray machines usually available at hospitals . This could have assisted in deciding whether a more in - depth examination had been required . In some cases , the expert noted , the conclusions about the cause of death had been inconsistent with the number of examination carried out , and should have been “ couched in far more cautious terms ” . With respect to those cases where the cause of death had not been established , mostly in view of extensive burns , PERSON was of the opinion that this could have been established relatively easily . “ Questions of where and when they died , and whether it was from gunshot , explosion , fire , other trauma , or any combination , could and should have been established ... ”

The expert also commented on the people who had been burnt to an extent that the cause of death could not be established , and whether these burns could have been received ante or post mortem . He stressed that post mortem burns often masked those received while the person had been alive ; that most people died in fires from smoke inhalation rather than from burns ; but that smoke inhalation could only be proved by an internal examination including a carboxyhaemoglobin blood test and dissection of the body in order to examine to what extent the air passages were lined with soot . The expert stressed that “ [ i]nternal examination of a body to establish smoke inhalation can be done on even very charred and partly destroyed remains ( which generally are remarkably well preserved inside ) , certainly on the type seen in the photographs and described in the post - mortem reports above . Thus , to say that no cause of death could be established because the body was burned is nonsense and dishonest ” .