Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 34 - Actio popularis;Victim);Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for correspondence;Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Dean Spielmann;Dmitry Dedov;Erik Møse;Guido Raimondi;Helena Jäderblom;Ineta Ziemele;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Josep Casadevall;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Luis López Guerra;Mark Villiger;Paul Lemmens;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant is the editor - in - chief of a publishing company and of an aviation magazine . He is also the chairperson of the GPE branch of ORG , an NGO monitoring the state of media freedom in the NORP regions , which promotes the independence of the regional mass media , freedom of speech and respect for journalists’ rights , and provides legal support , including through litigation , to journalists .

He was subscribed to the services of several mobile network operators .

On DATE he brought judicial proceeding against CARDINAL mobile network operators , claiming that there had been an interference with his right to the privacy of his telephone communications . He claimed that pursuant to Order no . CARDINAL ( see paragraphs CARDINAL to CARDINAL below ) of ORG predecessor , ORG , the mobile network operators had installed equipment which permitted ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) to intercept all telephone communications without prior judicial authorisation . The applicant argued that Order no . DATE , which had never been published , unduly restricted his right to privacy . He asked the court to issue an injunction ordering the removal of the equipment installed pursuant to Order no . CARDINAL , and to ensure that access to mobile telephone communications was given to authorised persons only . ORG ( hereafter “ ORG ” ) and GPE and ORG of the ORG were joined as a third party to the proceedings .

On DATE the ORG of GPE dismissed the applicant ’s claims . It found that the applicant had not proved that the mobile network operators had transmitted any protected information to unauthorised persons or permitted the unrestricted or unauthorised interception of communications . The equipment to which he referred had been installed to enable law - enforcement agencies to conduct operational - search activities in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law . The installation of such equipment had not in itself interfered with the privacy of the applicant ’s communications . The applicant had failed to demonstrate any facts which would warrant a finding that his right to the privacy of his telephone communications had been violated .

NORP The applicant appealed . He claimed , in particular , that ORG had refused to accept several documents in evidence . Those documents had included CARDINAL judicial orders authorising the interception of mobile telephone communications retrospectively and an addendum to the standard service provider agreement issued by CARDINAL of the mobile network operators . CARDINAL of the judicial orders in question , issued on DATE , authorised the interception of several people ’s mobile telephone communications during the periods from CARDINAL to DATE , from DATE , from DATE to DATE and from CARDINAL DATE . The other judicial order , issued on DATE , authorised the interception of a PERSON mobile telephone communications during the period from DATE to CARDINAL DATE . As to the addendum , it informed the subscriber that if his number were used to make terrorist threats , the mobile network operator might suspend the provision of the telephone service and transfer the collected data to the law - enforcement agencies . In the applicant ’s opinion , the judicial orders and the addendum proved that the mobile network operators and law - enforcement agencies were technically capable of intercepting all telephone communications without obtaining prior judicial authorisation , and routinely resorted to unauthorised interception .

On DATE GPE upheld the judgment on appeal . It confirmed ORG finding that the applicant had failed to prove that his telephone communications had been intercepted . Nor had he shown that there was a danger that his right to the privacy of his telephone communications might be unlawfully infringed . To establish the existence of such a danger , the applicant would have had to prove that the respondents had acted unlawfully . However , mobile network operators were required by law to install equipment enabling law - enforcement agencies to perform operational - search activities and the existence of that equipment did not in itself interfere with the privacy of the applicant ’s communications . The refusal to admit the judicial orders of DATE and DATE in evidence had been lawful , as the judicial orders had been issued in respect of third persons and were irrelevant to the applicant ’s case . ORG further decided to admit in evidence and examine the addendum to the service provider agreement , but found that it did not contain any information warranting reconsideration of ORG judgment .

It can be seen from a document submitted by the applicant that in DATE an NGO , “ Civilian Control ” , asked ORG office to carry out an inspection of ORG in the sphere of interception of communications in order to verify their compatibility with federal laws . In DATE an official from ORG office telephoned “ ORG ” and asked for copies of the unpublished attachments to Order No . DATE , saying that the prosecutor ’s office had been unable to obtain them from ORG . In DATE the Prosecutor General ’s office refused to carry out the requested inspection .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

The applicant was employed by ORG ( “ the Service ” ) , division no . CARDINAL . On DATE the head of the ORG decided to terminate the applicant ’s employment .

On DATE the applicant initiated proceedings in ORG against the ORG seeking to CARDINAL ) have the decision of CARDINAL DATE annulled ; CARDINAL ) be reinstated in her previous position ; and CARDINAL ) recover her average salary starting from the moment of her dismissal until her reinstatement to the previous position .

On DATE ORG granted the applicant ’s CARDINAL claims . In particular , it annulled the decision of CARDINAL DATE , ordered the ORG to reinstate her to her previous position and to pay her her average DATE salary starting from DATE until her reinstatement . It reasoned its decision , inter alia , by stating that while the ORG had been under an obligation to offer the applicant another position within the ORG before deciding to dismiss her , it had failed to do so , even though such a position had existed in the ORG at the material time .

This judgment was upheld in the final instance by ORG and it became final on DATE .

On DATE the ORG paid the applicant CARDINAL NORP drams ( ORG ) ( QUANTITY ( ORG ) at the material time ) as compensation for her unemployment during the period from DATE to CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE ORG issued a writ of execution .

On DATE ORG ( “ the DEJA ” ) initiated enforcement proceedings . On DATE the ORG gave a decision obliging the ORG to comply with the writ of execution of DATE within DATE .

It appears that no further actions were taken by the ORG and the ORG in relation to the enforcement of the judgment of CARDINAL DATE between the period of DATE and DATE .

On DATE the bailiff decided to discontinue the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section CARDINAL ) of ORG . The bailiff reasoned that the ORG had already paid the applicant ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because that position was no longer vacant .

On DATE the applicant asked the DEJA to resume the enforcement proceedings .

On DATE the bailiff granted the applicant ’s request and decided to resume the enforcement proceedings . On DATE the bailiff gave a decision on obliging the ORG to take certain actions . In particular , the bailiff obliged the ORG to CARDINAL ) annul the decision of the head of the ORG of DATE ; CARDINAL ) reinstate the applicant to her previous position ; and CARDINAL ) pay her her average DATE salary for the period between her dismissal and her reinstatement to the previous position .

On DATE the bailiff decided once again to terminate the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section CARDINAL ) of ORG . In particular , the bailiff reasoned that the ORG had already paid the applicant ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL as ordered by the judgment of CARDINAL DATE while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the ORG was impossible because ORG no . CARDINAL , where the applicant had previously worked , no longer existed .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for private life);Pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Alena Poláčková;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON , NORP region , together with her son , born in DATE . She is a single mother .

At the material time the applicant was teaching physical education in a secondary school in Berenzniki .

NORP In DATE the applicant learnt that a photograph of her son had been published on the cover page of a booklet prepared by ORG , NORP region ( “ FAC ) , entitled “ Children need a family ” .

The booklet consisted of CARDINAL pages , including the cover page . The boy ’s photograph occupied the major part of the cover page and showed his face . Above the photograph there was a slogan “ Children need a family ” . At the bottom of the cover page , just under the photograph were the words : “ ORG , town of PERSON ” . The second page contained CARDINAL more photographs of other children , with citations from ORG and LAW . The third page was headed “ Forms of replacing family care ” and presented the various arrangements : adoptive family , tutorial family , foster home and others . The remaining pages informed the readers about the creation in the district of FAC , the role of which was to protect orphans and assist families in adopting them . They explained what kind of support and advice families could seek in the ORG and how they could help orphans . On the last page the following was written :

“ If you wish to save a child from loneliness and give him a hearth and home , come to us ! ”

The applicant alleged that she had not been informed about the booklet , let alone asked for authorisation for a photograph of her son to be published .

In DATE the applicant asked the local department of the interior and the prosecutor ’s office to carry out an investigation into the unauthorised publication of her son ’s photograph on the booklet .

NORP In DATE the department of the interior replied that there were no grounds to institute criminal proceedings .

NORP On DATE the district prosecutor informed the applicant that the booklet had been prepared and published by a publishing company , A. , at the request of the FAC . In total , CARDINAL copies of the booklet had been published . The photograph of the child had been placed on the booklet by Mr P. , who had been engaged by that company to prepare the layout of the booklet and who had found the photograph of the applicant ’s son on the Internet . It was impossible to establish from which website the photograph of the child had been taken . The prosecutor advised the applicant to bring court proceedings to protect her rights .

The applicant did not lodge any judicial appeal against those replies .

In DATE the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the ORG before ORG , GPE ( “ the ORG ” ) on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor son .

In her statement of claim the applicant complained that her and her son ’s honour , dignity and reputation had been damaged by the unlawful publication of her son ’s photograph in a booklet calling for adoption . In particular , the photograph had been published without her authorisation and knowledge . The booklet had been distributed in various organisations in the town of PERSON and in LOC , NORP region ( libraries , hospitals , police departments ) and had provoked a negative attitude towards her and her son on the part of her colleagues , neighbours and those close to her . People thought that she had abandoned her son . The boy had become a victim of mockery in the kindergarten . The publication of the photograph had also affected her honour and dignity and her reputation as a schoolteacher . She requested that the court , with reference to Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of GPE ( see Relevant domestic law and practice below ) , award her non - pecuniary damages and order the publishing company to apologise for the publication of the photograph .

On DATE ORG held , with the applicant ’s consent , that the ORG was not a proper respondent in the case and that the claim should have been made against the publishing company and Mr P. The Centre was invited to take part in the proceedings as a third party .

The publishing company contested the applicant ’s claims . It submitted that the material which had been presented to the court showed that a certain PERSON . had taken the photograph of the applicant ’s son with the knowledge of the applicant . PERSON had not informed the applicant of his intentions or the ways in which the photograph might be further used . Nor had he received any written authorisation from the applicant for its use . Mr P. , who had been engaged by the company for the preparation of the layout of the booklet , had found the photograph on the Internet and placed it on the cover page of the booklet .

The publishing company considered that it had not been obliged to verify whether prior consent had been received for publication of the photograph in the booklet for CARDINAL reasons . First , it was not responsible for the actions of PERSON , who had been working for the company on a contractual basis . Secondly , under LAW ( see Relevant domestic law below ) , consent to the use of a photograph was not required when the image was being used in the interests of the ORG , or in social or other public interests . By ordering the booklet , the ORG had been pursuing social and public interests and calling for mercy to be shown to orphans . The company concluded that the damage had been caused to the applicant by PERSON . and , therefore , the company should be exempted from liability for damage .

Mr P. submitted to the court that in DATE he had gone travelling together with his friend PERSON . , who was a photographer . PERSON . had openly taken photographs of other tourists , including a photograph of the applicant ’s son . After their return , PERSON . had sent him electronic copies of those photographs and since that time they had been saved in his computer . In DATE he ( Mr P. ) had been temporarily working for the publishing company and had been asked to prepare the layout of the booklet . The text and some photographs had been provided by the ORG . He searched in his computer for more photographs to be placed in the booklet and saw the picture of the applicant ’s son , which seemed to fit the booklet well . He therefore placed it on the cover page . He did not know who the boy on the photograph was .

NORP The representative of the FAC , acting as a third party , submitted that the use of the photograph of the applicant ’s son had not been agreed with the ORG . He also submitted that the booklet did not call for adoption ; it was intended to provide information about the LOC . He replied to a question put by the court that after publication of the booklet , a number of people had called the LOC and asked whether it was possible to adopt the child whose photograph was on the cover page of the booklet .

It appears from the record of the court hearings that the applicant ’s representative , PERSON , submitted to the court that it had been established that the photograph of the applicant ’s son had been used on the booklet without his parent ’s consent , contrary to the requirements of LAW . That provision was concordant with the provisions of LAW ( “ the Convention ” ) protecting private and family life . The publication of the photograph in the booklet constituted unlawful interference with the applicant ’s private life and therefore the publishing company was under an obligation to pay compensation for nonpecuniary damage sustained by the applicant .

The publishing company contested the application of LAW in the case and considered that the applicant ’s consent to the publication of her son ’s photograph had not been required .

On DATE ORG examined and dismissed the applicant ’s claims . The judgment consisted of a summary of the submissions of the parties and the third party , a summary of the relevant domestic law , a summary of the ORG submissions and other evidence examined by the court , and several paragraphs of conclusions . In particular , ORG held as follows :

“ ... The court has established that the honour , dignity and professional reputation of the plaintiff were not affected by the publication of the booklet with the photograph of the plaintiff ’s son . Thus , all witnesses submitted that they did not have any hostile feelings towards PERSON , the attitude [ towards PERSON ] of all those questioned [ in the court hearing ] remained the same : friendly , amicable ; they were not aware of any instances of insults , reproaches in respect of the plaintiff . In the subjective view of the witnesses , the booklet in itself had a positive scope . The plaintiff ’s professional reputation was not affected by the publication of the booklet in any way , since the plaintiff had provided the court with positive references from her workplace , where her pedagogical competences were highly appreciated .

The content of the booklet had a positive scope aimed at providing information , did not contain any defamatory details ; the photograph on the booklet did not have any defects , and the text in the booklet did not contain any defamatory details either . None of the information in the booklet indicated that defamatory information had been disseminated ; it did not diminish the honour , dignity and reputation of PERSON or of her minor son .

Therefore , the evidence submitted [ to the court ] has demonstrated [ that the booklet had ] a strictly value character , and did not contain any defamatory details , diminishing the plaintiff ’s and her son ’s honour , dignity and reputation in the public ’s opinion and the opinion of certain individuals .

To make negative assumptions in respect of the booklet with the photograph of the plaintiff ’s son on the front page amounts to an individual value judgment , which has not been included in the content and meaning of that information booklet . The court takes into account that on several occasions in DATE the plaintiff authorised PERSON . , a photographer familiar to her , to take photographs of her son . PERSON . then forwarded the photographs to painter PERSON , who [ in his turn ] then placed [ one of ] the ORG ] in the booklet . PERSON did not place any restrictions or conditions on the use of those photographs , did not seek to find out what had happened to those photographs . In addition , it follows from witness statements that after publication of the booklet , the plaintiff showed it to persons around her and at her workplace and annotated it in an emotionally skewed way , and thus disseminated false information about herself and her son with reference to the photograph [ on the booklet ] .

Taking into account that it has not been established in the court hearing that there was any information discrediting the honour , dignity and reputation of the plaintiff and her minor son , her claims of compensation for non - pecuniary damage should be dismissed . The court also considers that the plaintiff ’s claims concerning the imposition of an obligation on the defendant to provide public apologies in the ORG [ mass media ] ... should be dismissed ... ”

On DATE the applicant resigned from her job .

In an appeal against the judgment of DATE the applicant submitted , in particular , that in taking its decision ORG had not applied the provisions of LAW of GPE concerning the protection of one ’s image or the provisions of LAW . She argued that in the absence of parental consent to the use of her son ’s photograph , her claim should have been granted in accordance with the above provisions . She expanded on her position with the following arguments .

The booklet had been distributed in several towns in the NORP region , including PERSON , where her parents lived , and PERSON , where she and her son lived . She had worked for a long time in those towns and a lot of people knew her and her family . After seeing her son ’s photograph on the booklet , people who knew her , including the parents of her pupils , thought that she could no longer take care of her son because she had been deprived of her parental rights . She had had to explain to her neighbours , friends and colleagues that her family was doing well and that her son was living with her . Since the publication of the booklet , children in the kindergarten had started calling her son “ little vagrant ” and “ poor orphan ” . She had been obliged to quit her job because of comments made by the parents of her pupils . The booklet provoked a feeling of pity towards children abandoned by their parents and at the same time it aroused feelings of indignation towards their parents .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of DATE , finding it lawful and duly reasoned . Regarding the applicant ’s argument about the ORG failure to examine her claims under LAW , ORG held that the court had taken a decision on the claims as they had been submitted by the applicant , in accordance with LAW ( see Relevant domestic law and practice below ) . The applicant ’s claims were based on the infringement by the defendants of her right to honour , dignity and reputation . She had not raised any claims on the grounds contained in LAW .

By a judgment of DATE the Justice of Peace of ORG granted the ORG ’s claim for recovery from the applicant of the legal costs it had incurred when it had taken part in the libel proceedings as a third party , in the amount of MONEY .


Aleš Pejchal;Angelika Nußberger;Ganna Yudkivska;Helena Jäderblom;Josep Casadevall;Síofra O’Leary

The applicant , PERSON Abusisi ( Abu Sisi ) , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE . In DATE she married PERSON of NORP origin , born in GPE . It appears from the available information that by DATE the couple and their CARDINAL children lived in GPE , where Mr PERSON occupied the post of technical director of a power plant in GPE .

On DATE the applicant ’s husband arrived in GPE and on DATE he lodged an application for a residence permit with ORG .

On DATE the applicant ’s husband boarded a night train in ORG bound for GPE , where he was supposed to meet up with GPE , his brother .

On DATE PERSON . , an acquaintance of the applicant ’s husband , notified ORG that the latter had disappeared from the train and demanded a criminal investigation of his purported abduction . In a statement given to the police GPE . explained that on DATE he had dropped PERSON at the train station in ORG . At CARDINAL p.m. on DATE PERSON had told him by telephone that he had been on his way to GPE in seat CARDINAL of carriage CARDINAL on train no . CARDINAL . The following day , having unsuccessfully attempted to contact PERSON by telephone , GPE . had called FAC and learned that PERSON had not arrived in GPE . GPE . had then managed to identify and contact ORG , the attendant of train carriage no . DATE , who had told him that at QUANTITY strangers had taken PERSON off the train at FAC without any explanation .

On DATE also contacted ORG and made a similar submission .

On DATE the applicant came to GPE and alerted the prosecutor ’s office , ORG , ORG and other authorities to her husband ’s purported abduction .

On DATE the applicant received a brief telephone call from her husband informing her that he was in custody in ORG , GPE . He provided her with the contact details of GPE , his lawyer there , who confirmed by telephone the information provided by her husband .

On DATE ORG of GPE informed ORG , who had made an enquiry on the applicant ’s behalf , that the only information they had in their database concerning PERSON was that he had lawfully entered GPE on DATE .

On DATE T.I. , an investigator with ORG , refused to institute criminal proceedings concerning the applicant ’s husband ’s purported abduction owing to lack of evidence of a crime . He noted that ORG , the carriage attendant , had told the police that he had not noticed any criminal or other unusual activity during the trip and that the information provided by PERSON relatives and acquaintances had been insufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion that he had been abducted or otherwise forced to leave the train .

On DATE ORG of GPE informed ORG that , according to the information obtained from the NORP law - enforcement authorities , PERSON had been detained on suspicion of having been involved in terrorist activity as a member of ORG . They also noted that , following an order of a competent court in GPE , the information concerning the applicant ’s husband ’s arrest had been classified and was not subject to disclosure . On CARDINAL DATE the Security Service of GPE provided similar information to the applicant .

On DATE ORG issued a certificate confirming that PERSON was being held in FAC , GPE , GPE .

On DATE the applicant complained of her husband ’s purported abduction to ORG .

On DATE ORG informed the applicant that in order for her complaint to be registered , she needed to provide further substantiation and to show that she had duly exhausted domestic remedies .

On an unspecified date the applicant , represented by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE , instituted proceedings in LOC of GPE ( “ the ORG ” ) complaining that ORG had failed to act in investigating her husband ’s disappearance .

On DATE ORG held a hearing in the applicant ’s absence , having noted that she had been duly informed of the date and time , as shown in a return slip of the summons contained in the case file . The court further dismissed the applicant ’s allegations against ORG and stated that , in so far as the applicant ’s submissions could be understood as challenging the refusal of ORG to institute criminal proceedings , this complaint fell under the jurisdiction of ORG of PERSON ( “ the Leninskiy Court ” ) . ORG then decided to forward the relevant parts of the case file to ORG for examination .

On DATE ORG dismissed the complaint . A copy of that decision was not provided to the ORG by the applicant .

In the meantime , on DATE , the applicant had contracted PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE , to represent her in GPE .

As of DATE PERSON was also mandated to represent PERSON before the NORP courts and other authorities .

On DATE CARDINAL PERSON , acting on PERSON behalf , challenged the decision of ORG before the NORP transport prosecutor .

On DATE his complaint was rejected on the grounds that the decision of CARDINAL DATE had been well - founded .

Following a further appeal to court , on DATE the Poltava ORG of Appeal ( “ the Regional Court ” ) discontinued the proceedings on the grounds that they related to essentially the same matter which had already been finally decided by the ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE CARDINAL PERSON lodged an appeal against the decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE ORG decided that the appeal of CARDINAL DATE had procedural shortcomings . Among other issues , it was lodged outside the statutory time - limit without an extension request . The court gave the applicant ’s counsel a period within which to rectify the issues with the appeal .

A rectified appeal was lodged . In this document , PERSON noted that he had only learned of the decision taken by ORG on DATE in the course of the court proceedings instituted with a view to challenging the decision of ORG . The applicant , for her part , had only learned of it from PERSON ’s electronic mail in DATE .

On DATE ORG rejected the request for an extension of the time - limit , finding that no good reason for missing it had been provided .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of DATE .

On DATE PERSON , who had not been present at the court hearing , obtained a copy of the decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE PERSON lodged a cassation appeal against the decisions of DATE and CARDINAL DATE with ORG ( “ the Higher Court ” ) .

On DATE ORG refused to consider the appeal of CARDINAL DATE , having found that it had been lodged outside the DATE statutory time - limit which began on DATE appellate court ’s decision that was to be appealed against . It further noted that in this situation it fell to the appellant to obtain an extension of the time - limit from ORG in order to lodge a cassation appeal .

On an unspecified date PERSON requested that ORG extend the time - limit . He stated that the delay in lodging his cassation appeal had been a result of the technical difficulties in establishing contact with the applicant , who had been in GPE , an area of constant political unrest and tension , and also a result of the delay in notifying him of the decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE ORG rejected the request for extension of the time - limit for lack of sufficient reasoning .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE ORG and ORG , respectively , upheld the decision of DATE . ORG noted , in particular , that PERSON had failed to provide good reasons for not lodging the appeal DATE ( when he had received a copy of the decision of CARDINAL DATE ) and CARDINAL DATE ( when the DATE statutory time - limit for lodging a cassation appeal expired ) .

According to public sources , on DATE Dirar Abu Sisi was convicted by ORG of membership of a terrorist organisation and production of illegal weaponry after pleading guilty to several incriminating charges . He is still in custody in GPE .

The relevant provisions of LAW of DATE ( “ the ORG ” ) , in operation at the material time , read as follows :

“ An appeal against a decision of an ... investigator ... refusing to institute criminal proceedings may be lodged by a person whose interests it concerns , or his or her representative , with the local district ( town ) court ... within DATE of the date on which a copy of the decision was received ... ”

“ Judgments and rulings of the court of appeal taken following appeal proceedings may be reviewed in cassation proceedings .

Judgments of the local courts ... other rulings ( decisions ) of these courts ... which impede further examination of the case , rulings of the appellate courts taken with respect to these judgments [ or ] rulings ( decisions ) ... may also be reviewed in cassation proceedings . ”

“ Cassation appeals against the court decisions mentioned in the second paragraph of LAW may be lodged within DATE on which they enter into force ... ”

“ ... Decisions and rulings of the appellate and cassation courts shall enter into force immediately upon their delivery , except in cases envisaged by this Code ... ”


Ineta Ziemele;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is an NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She was initially represented by PERSON and , subsequently , by PERSON , lawyers practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their then Agent , PERSON and , subsequently , by PERSON of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant was appointed , pursuant to a service contract ( kontratë shërbimi ) , as first secretary at ORG in GPE , GPE ( “ the Permanent Mission ” ) .

On DATE the applicant went on maternity leave . She gave birth to a child on DATE .

On DATE the Minister of ORG ( “ the Minister ” ) decided to terminate the applicant ’s employment as from DATE .

On DATE the Minister appointed the applicant to work as a specialist at ORG ( “ the Ministry ” ) in GPE . The applicant declined the offer .

On DATE it was confirmed that the applicant had been divested of her diplomatic status and the benefits that derived from the exercise of her job as first secretary .

On DATE the applicant challenged the Minister ’s decision of CARDINAL DATE before ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) .

On DATE ORG partially accepted the applicant ’s civil action . It found that the termination of her employment while she was on maternity leave was in breach of Articles DATE and CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Labour Code . It therefore annulled the Minister ’s decision of DATE and ordered the applicant ’s reinstatement . ORG further held that the reasons advanced by the applicant ’s employer for the termination of her employment , such as the commission of traffic offences in GPE , did not prevail over the legal guarantees afforded to women during the post - natal leave period . ORG decided that its decision should be provisionally enforced in accordance with LAW ( “ ORG ” ) . Having regard to the applicant ’s situation and the position she occupied , ORG ordered that , in addition to her reinstatement , the applicant ’s accreditation should be renewed and her benefits restored , including the grant of a residence permit , provision of accommodation , payment of salary and provision of medical examinations which had started in the applicant ’s place of residence on account of her employment ( paditësja vlerësohet se duhet të kthehet në një detyrë , e cila për nga rëndësia dhe specifikat e saj , implikon procedura të caktuara që lidhen me akreditimin dhe ripërfitimin e benefiteve ( leja e qendrimit , përfitimi i pagës , ekzaminimet mjekësore të nisura në vendin e qendrimit për shkak të punës ) ) . ORG appealed .

On DATE ORG upheld the lower court ’s decision .

On DATE the Ministry appealed to ORG . The proceedings are currently pending before that court .

On DATE ORG issued a writ of execution in respect of its decision of CARDINAL DATE in accordance with Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the ORG .

On DATE the bailiff unsuccessfully requested the ORG to comply voluntarily with ORG decision , as upheld by ORG .

On DATE , having regard to the ORG ’s failure to comply with ORG decision voluntarily , the bailiff decided to proceed with the mandatory enforcement thereof .

On DATE , having regard to the ORG ’s failure to enforce the decision , the bailiff warned ORG that it would be fined in accordance with Article CARDINAL of the ORG .

The Government submitted that on DATE , at the applicant ’s request , the bailiff decided to terminate the enforcement proceedings ( pushimin e ekzekutimit me kërkesë të kreditorit ) . It transpired from the bailiff ’s decision that the applicant had decided to transfer the file to another bailiff ’s office for supervision and enforcement ( për ta transferuar te një përmbarues tjetër ) .

The Government further submitted that pursuant to the Minister ’s order no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE the applicant had been appointed as first secretary , a position equivalent to the one she used to hold , at FAC GPE , GPE ( “ the Consulate General ” ) . The ORG ’s letter to ORG DATE , as submitted by the applicant , stated that “ the Ministry undertakes to pay PERSON only her monthly salary ( PERSON ... merr përsipër vetëm shpenzimet e pagës mujore ) ” .

On DATE ORG sent a letter to ORG , the relevant extracts of which read as follows :

“ Having regard to the circumstances in which the applicant , PERSON , has lodged an application with ORG about the delayed enforcement of ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE , as upheld by ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE , and the recent development whereby the applicant has already taken up employment as first secretary at ORG in GPE , we request ORG to contact PERSON and ask her to withdraw the application [ lodged ] with ORG , in so far as the ORG complied with its obligation to enforce the court decision by way of order no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE , notwithstanding the applicant ’s withdrawal from the enforcement proceedings ( kërkojmë nga ana e Ministrisë së ORG të PERSON bëjë të mundur kontaktimin me Znj . PERSON dhe kërkimin prej PERSON heqjes dorë prej aplikimit në PERSON të Drejtave të Njeriut , për sa kohë detyrimet e shtetit ndaj ekzekutimit të vendimit gjyqësor të sipërpërmendur janë plotësuar nëpërmjet urdhrit nr . CARDINAL datë CARDINAL.CARDINAL.CARDINAL , pavarësisht prej heqjes dorë prej saj nga ekzekutimi i këtij të fundit ) . ”

On DATE the ORG sent a letter to ORG , the relevant extracts of which read as follows :

“ In their request for the protection of the ORG ’s interests , ORG request ORG , having regard to PERSON appointment as first secretary at ORG , [ to ask her ] to withdraw the application she has lodged with ORG ( Avokatura e Shtetit në kërkesën e saj për mbrojtjen e të drejtave të shtetit shqiptar kërkon nga ORG që duke u nisur nga kushtet ORG . PERSON është emëruar si PERSON e Parë në ORG të RSH - së në PERSON heq dorë nga e drejta e ankimit pranë GJEDNJ - së ) . ”

On DATE , as part of her observations , the applicant submitted a statement , which she had signed on DATE , withdrawing her application from the ORG . The statement reads as follows :

“ Further to ORG Office ’s letter ... about my position concerning the application lodged by me , PERSON , before ORG , I inform [ you ] that I withdraw from pursuing this application before that court ( referuar shkresës së Avokaturës së Shtetit ... mbi qendrimin tim personal mbi çështjen e ngritur prej meje , PERSON , në PERSON , GPE , informoj se jap dorëheqjen për vazhdimin e kësaj çështje pranë kësaj gjykate ) . ”

She maintained that the statement was made as a result of pressure exerted by the Government .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL provides that the duration of maternity leave is thirtyfive days in respect of pre - natal leave and DATE in respect of post - natal leave . Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL states that when the period of post - natal leave is over , a woman may decide whether she wishes to return to work or benefit from social insurance entitlements . Under Article CARDINAL , in the event that a woman ’s employer terminates her employment during her pregnancy or following her return to work after the birth of a child , the employer must prove that the reason for the termination was not the woman ’s pregnancy or the birth of the child . Under LAW the termination of employment is void if it takes place during the period in which the woman is entitled to social insurance payments subsequent to the birth of a child .

Under LAW a court decision may be provisionally enforced if it concerns payment of damages owing to unjust dismissal from work . Its provisional enforcement may also be ordered , if , owing to the delay in enforcement , the plaintiff may suffer significant damage which can not be remedied or if the enforcement would become impossible or would be made exceedingly difficult .

Article CARDINAL provides that a court decision which orders provisional enforcement thereof constitutes an execution title . Under Article CARDINAL the execution title is enforceable at the creditor ’s request .


Ján Šikuta;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in ORG . He was represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Georges Ravarani

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant brought a compensation claim for damages suffered as a consequence of an expropriation of his property against GPE and CARDINAL of the local primary schools before ORG ( PERSON ) in GPE .

On DATE the applicant ’s representative informed ORG that he had initiated a separate set of proceedings to determine the value of the above - mentioned damages . ORG suspended the above mentioned civil proceedings pending the final resolution of this matter .

No document was submitted by the parties as to whether or not the compensation proceedings have ended in the meantime . Accordingly , it would appear that the said CARDINAL sets of proceedings are still pending before ORG .

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings before ORG in Bar , against his neighbour , seeking a demarcation between their CARDINAL plots of land .

On DATE the applicant amended his proposal to this effect .

On DATE the applicant and the respondent reached a friendly settlement which was approved by ORG on DATE .


Remainder inadmissible (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Helena Jäderblom;Iulia Motoc;Marko Bošnjak;Nona Tsotsoria;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

DATE to DATE the applicant worked at the NORP embassy in GPE .

She began as a receptionist and translator and was later promoted to be cultural , information and press officer .

On DATE the applicant wrote a letter to the NORP ambassador in GPE . She stated that since DATE a major change had been made to her work description – she had started managing cultural affairs , enjoying partial independence in decision - making and a high degree of responsibility for financial matters . She was considered as being responsible for certain categories of business because she had to draft budgets for cultural projects . Unfortunately , up to that point no adjustment in her contract had been made .

The contract drawn up by the NORP embassy in GPE on DATE , which the applicant and the ambassador signed , read as follows :

“ Work description – Sniege DATE information officer ( cultural affairs , social secretary etc . )

PERSON work description is as follows :

- handles cultural and information matters in consultation with the Ambassador and the Cultural Attaché in GPE

- programme - maker for visitors from ORG as well as for other NORP authorities

- social secretary – mainly to the Ambassador but if needed also to the Counsellor , First and Second secretary ’s

- replacement for ORG and GPE ”

The applicant submitted several letters of recommendation to the ORG which were written DATE by her NORP colleagues at the embassy , including the ambassador to GPE DATE . The letters attested to her loyalty , dedication , communication skills and good working record .

The applicant also submitted another letter , signed on DATE by her former NORP colleague , PERSON In the letter PERSON stated that DATE she had been posted as cultural attaché to the NORP states , stationed in GPE , but also accredited to GPE , where she worked DATE . PERSON stated that during that time she had worked closely with the applicant and that they had planned and carried out various projects . All the major projects had been cleared with the ambassador . The budgets had been relatively modest . PERSON also stated that for DATE she had worked with the applicant she had never felt that the applicant had made a single payment without asking her , or without clearing them with the ambassador .

According to ORG , in DATE and DATE a new routine was introduced at the GPE embassy by which diplomatic staff had to take decisions on financial support payments , and the applicant lost her authority to deal with those matters independently . It was around that time that a new ambassador , PERSON , was appointed .

NORP The accreditation certificate issued to the applicant by ORG on DATE stated that the applicant was “ part of the administrative technical staff at the embassy of GPE ( ORG ambasados administracinio techninio personalo narė ) ” . The other page of the certificate stated that the applicant “ did not enjoy any diplomatic immunities or privileges ( asmens imunitetai ir privilegijos : ORG ) ” . It also said that pursuant to LAW jurisdiction over the applicant was to be exercised so that the functioning of the embassy would not be disturbed ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the applicant and the NORP ambassador PERSON signed a document entitled “ Terms and conditions of employment for locally engaged personnel at ORG in GPE ” . The document read that NORP laws applied to the employment relationship between the applicant and the embassy regarding conditions such as the payment of tax , social security contributions , overtime , sick leave , the right to leaves of absence or severance payments . Pursuant to section CARDINAL of that document , NORP legislation was to be complied with as regards dismissal from work and the employer had to have “ objective grounds for dismissal ” . Under section CARDINAL , an employee could be dismissed for committing a criminal act , seriously neglecting his duties , or committing further breaches of the requirements of his duties despite warnings having been given .

The applicant was also the chairperson of the trade union for locally employed staff at the embassy , which was registered in DATE . DATE and DATE the trade union made several written complaints to the embassy about working conditions . The letters complained of a deteriorating and oppressive working atmosphere , the confused delegation of tasks , incomplete job descriptions or changes in job descriptions without local employees being consulted , a lack of clear communication , and a lack of trust . The union expressed the view that a collective agreement between the locally employed staff and the embassy could resolve such issues .

The applicant ’s job description of DATE , although not signed by either the NORP ambassador or the applicant , gave her title as “ ORG Officer ” , who worked “ in cooperation with and under the guidance of ORG or in relevant matters with the Second Secretary ” . The applicant ’s functions were described as follows :

“ Operates , coordinates and assists in cultural / information events and general promotion projects ;

Coordinates the DATE and long - term cultural / information and general promotion planning ;

Coordinates the cultural and information budget ;

Operates and assists in matters regarding press , TV and radio ;

ORG the Second Secretary with the communication strategy ;

Handles and prepares correspondence and inquiries related to cultural , information and press matters Responsible for the ‘ cultural calendar’ on the home page ;

ORG and other support ;

Processes the DATE report on culture and other relevant reports ;

Responsible for the Head of Missions newspapers’ review and certain translations ;

Prepares and makes drafts of speeches on certain occasions ;

Acting as interpreter on certain occasions ;

Responsible for collecting , filing and translating various cultural and other adequate information ;

ORG matters , as well as relevant notes , and setting arrangements for other proceedings including transportations of individuals and exhibitions ;

Setting arrangements for cultural events in cooperation with the Counsellor for Political Affairs / Cultural Attaché for lunches , dinners and receptions , including making guests lists writing invitation , bookings and other general assistance ;

Responsible for the information material from ORG - including ordering , filing and distribution and as well the information room ;

Responsible for the ‘ ORG list’ and the ‘ cultural board’ ;

Handles the DATE ‘ book list’ ;

Accepts and performs other duties assigned by ORG . ”

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( NORP valstybės tarnautojų profesinė sąjunga ) also wrote to the NORP ambassador to GPE . The letter expressed concern that local personnel at the embassy were treated unfairly . The union also considered that diplomatic immunity in labour relations applied only to diplomats and their families . In contrast , labour relations between a diplomatic representation and staff who were permanent residents of GPE were regulated by NORP law . This also flowed from DATE LAW , which did not grant diplomatic immunity from the civil jurisdiction .

On DATE the ambassador replied to the union that the embassy was “ very anxious to be a good employer ” . However , the embassy “ had not signed , and would not sign , collective agreements . The embassy as a diplomatic representation is subordinated by LAW and thus does not have to adhere to LAW ” .

On DATE NORP radio announced and other media published articles about a report by ORG that locally employed staff at NORP embassies received less pay and had worse working conditions than their NORP colleagues . The NORP trade unions also stated that although there was no lack of legal regulation , locally employed staff would often not assert their rights for fear of losing their job .

According to ORG , in DATE a new post of counsellor for cultural affairs was established at the embassy , which was taken up by a NORP diplomat , PERSON , who became the applicant ’s immediate superior . ORG also stated that according to internal embassy memorandums drafted by PERSON applicant was a source of conflict at the embassy . There were long but fruitless discussions concerning the applicant ’s work description . According to PERSON , the applicant ignored his decisions and instructions , took decisions on her own on granting financial support , failed to follow agreed plans and lacked skills in a number of areas .

On DATE the embassy drafted a new job description for the applicant . She was named “ Officer for Cultural and Information Affairs ” , and was to handle “ cultural matters in consultation with ORG PERSON . Her functions were essentially identical to those given in the job description of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . DATE , the applicant informed the embassy in writing that she did not agree with that job description because it lacked a clear definition of her responsibilities and those of PERSON She expressed a wish to involve a neutral person in negotiations over her working duties .

The following day , DATE , the ambassador presented the applicant with a “ Letter of caution ” . According to the letter , the ambassador saw no future for the applicant at the embassy , due to the applicant ’s “ difficulties to cooperate ” , “ lack of performance ” , “ constant questioning and arguing over duties to be performed ” and “ inability to cope with changes in [ the ] ORG ’s and/or [ the applicant ’s ] own tasks ” . The applicant was given DATE to hand in her resignation , or the embassy would “ take other action ” .

According to a statement written by CARDINAL of the applicant ’s former NORP colleagues at the embassy , GPE , on DATE the applicant was asked to hand over her keys to the embassy and leave the LOC immediately . The following day the applicant came to work as usual but was not let into the embassy . According to GPE , he saw the applicant “ waiting in terrible cold for TIME outside until the reception opened for visitors . Then she walked in , sat for a while and then left . DATE she fell seriously ill and never returned [ again ] ” .

On DATE the applicant went on sick leave . The sick leave certificates , issued by LOC ( GPE poliklinika ) in GPE , confirm that she was on sick leave as of that date . The leave was prolonged on a DATE basis and without interruption until DATE . At CARDINAL point during that time , in DATE , she was admitted for DATE to ORG neurology unit , where she was diagnosed with reversal ischemic neurological deficit in the vertebrobasilar basin . The applicant was also on sick leave in DATE and for DATE .

Whilst the applicant was on sick leave , on DATE , the NORP trade union confederation ( NORP profesinių sąjungų konfederacija ) organised a protest in front of the NORP embassy building in GPE against the applicant ’s dismissal . The protest was covered by news outlets in GPE . According to a statement by CARDINAL of the applicant ’s former NORP colleagues at the embassy , ORG , the local staff of the embassy did not attend the protest for fear of negative repercussions .

On DATE the NORP embassy sent a decision to the applicant ’s home address which stated that a disciplinary sanction would be imposed on the applicant – dismissal from work for gross misconduct . The ambassador stated that she had been informed on CARDINAL and DATE that the applicant had accused her NORP colleague PERSON of being “ unbalanced ” , that on several occasions the applicant had breached security rules at the embassy by opening a window on street level that had no bars , and that she had conducted a private meeting at the embassy , which was an unacceptable use of her working time .

In written replies of CARDINAL and DATE , the applicant noted that she had indeed called PERSON “ unbalanced ” during an employee meeting at the embassy , but that that had been because he had earlier shouted at her and had never apologised . The applicant also stated that staff at the embassy had never signed any safety or security regulations . Lastly , the meeting referred to by the ambassador had concerned asking a cleaning company to come to the embassy , and that such a practice had been begun by NORP staff and had been used continually during DATE . The applicant noted that she had never received any prior warning of the accusations against her , which were a pretext to get rid of her because of her trade - union activities .

On DATE the embassy sent a letter to the applicant ’s home , stating that the embassy had had confirmation of the applicant ’s sick leave from the social insurance office ( GPE ) , attesting that the applicant had been ill DATE . The applicant was asked to present a continuous or new doctor ’s certificate no later than DATE , including an indication of when she would recover .

On DATE the NORP embassy dismissed the applicant from her post , effective as of DATE . The order referred to LAW , which permits an employer to terminate an employment contract without giving prior notice to the employee if the latter has committed an act of gross misconduct . The embassy referred to its decision of DATE in order to impose such a sanction on the applicant ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The embassy also stated that on DATE it had received a sick leave certificate from the applicant that was valid until DATE , but that no medical certificates had been presented thereafter , despite a written request . According to the applicant ’s version of events , and as attested in writing by her former NORP colleague PERSON , in DATE she had kept the NORP embassy informed of her illness , with her husband also taking sick leave certificates to the embassy in person . An internal embassy memorandum shows that on DATE the applicant ’s husband had taken a sick leave certificate to the embassy for the period up to DATE .

The applicant ’s dismissal was subsequently mentioned on the internet site of ORG as CARDINAL of the mistreatments which had taken place in DATE . The report stated :

“ the explanation given by [ the ambassador ] , when interviewed by NORP radio , was that PERSON was dismissed for not doing her job properly , but she declined to give further details . However , before the new ambassador took office , PERSON had not received any complaints about her work during her DATE of service . Meanwhile , [ the ambassador ] explained to the ORG newspaper ... that , as a diplomatic representation , the embassy did not have to comply with NORP labour legislation , that the tone of trade union letters was rude and that there could not be any collective agreements in a diplomatic mission . ”

Arguing unlawful dismissal , the applicant brought proceedings against the NORP embassy in ORG . She submitted that “ for DATE I have been ORG and information projects at the embassy ( pastaruosius septynis metus esu ambasados PERSON ir informacios projektų vadovė ) ” , and asked to be reinstated to her former post . She also sought pecuniary and non - pecuniary damages . The applicant argued that she had been dismissed while on sick leave , which was a clear breach of NORP law ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . She also challenged the allegation that she had committed acts of gross misconduct as the grounds for her dismissal , contrary to what had been suggested by the embassy . Lastly , she noted that as a result of her arbitrary dismissal she had suffered loss of reputation and her health had significantly deteriorated . She stated that she had been destroyed , both psychologically and physically .

On DATE , GPE claimed immunity from the jurisdiction of the NORP courts :

“ Reply to civil claim DATE re PERSON

With reference to the ORG ’s letter / announcement of DATE , regarding civil case No . DATE , ORG demands that the plaintiff ’s case is refused with reference to acknowledged case law of GPE ( V.Stukonis vs. ORG and A.Cudak / PERSON vs. ORG ) .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)

Dmitry Dedov;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev

The applicant was born in DATE and lived in GPE before the events of the case .

In DATE several criminal cases were opened against the applicant on suspicion of kidnapping , extortion and planning an assassination .

By final judgments of CARDINAL DATE and DATE , ORG of GPE found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to a total of DATE imprisonment .

Starting from DATE , the date of his arrest , the applicant was detained in various custodial facilities in connection with the criminal proceedings against him . In particular , on DATE the applicant was transported from a prison hospital to remand prison IZ-CARDINAL/CARDINAL of GPE , where he stayed until DATE . According to the applicant , the facility was overcrowded . Thus , cell CARDINAL measuring QUANTITY accommodated CARDINAL inmates . The applicant further claimed that he had been denied the necessary medical treatment there . In support of his allegations , the applicant submitted several photographs of his cell .


The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant , then head of ORG , was dismissed from the civil service , as a disciplinary measure . In the ensuing labour action the parties reached a friendly settlement on DATE ; the applicant was reinstated and obtained damages . However , on DATE , the Prime Minister revoked his mandate to preside over the ORG . As a consequence , the applicant left the ORG .

From this labour dispute , CARDINAL sets of proceedings ensued . On DATE the applicant brought a labour action , claiming unlawful revocation of his mandate . In parallel , the ORG brought a civil action against the applicant , claiming the invalidity of the friendly settlement and seeking the reimbursement of the compensation received by the applicant . The applicant also brought labour proceedings , claiming the unlawfulness of the disciplinary measure imposed on him on DATE as well as his salary arrears .

NORP The friendly settlement was annulled by a final judgment of ORG , acting as a second instance court , on DATE .

On DATE ORG , acting as a second instance court , adopted a final judgment establishing the unlawfulness of the revocation of the applicant ’s mandate on DATE .

In the labour action concerning the disciplinary measure , ORG found for the applicant in an interim judgment on DATE and established the unlawfulness of the sanction .

As regards the applicant ’s claim for salary arrears and the ORG ’s action for the repayment of compensation , the proceedings appear to be still pending before the GPE and ORG , respectively .


Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Ksenija Turković

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a GPE national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He is represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

On DATE the applicant , a bus driver , was involved in a car accident in which CARDINAL people died .

On DATE he was charged with a serious traffic offence .

On DATE , after CARDINAL remittals , ORG ( PERSON ) in GPE found the applicant guilty in his absence and sentenced him to DATE of imprisonment . On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) in GPE upheld this judgment .

It transpires from the case - file that on various occasions the applicant had relied on his health and an alleged trip to GPE as reasons for not appearing at some hearings , had dismissed his representative , had challenged judges , and had registered a false address as his address of residence .

On an unspecified date DATE and DATE the above judgments were transmitted to ORG in Bar for enforcement against the applicant , which is when the applicant learned about them .

On DATE ORG in GPE reopened the proceedings , following the applicant ’s request to that effect filed on DATE . The same decision ordered the applicant ’s detention due to the fear that he might abscond .

On DATE ORG Instance found the applicant guilty of endangering traffic , sentenced him to DATE of imprisonment and prohibited him from driving . The court noted that the applicant had attempted in various manners to prolong the proceedings , including health reasons , “ being occupied by other affairs ” , dismissing his representative , challenging judges , registering a false address as the address of his residence , and an alleged trip to GPE . On DATE the High Court quashed this judgment .

On DATE ORG in GPE issued a detention order against the applicant so as to ensure his presence at the next hearing , given that neither the applicant nor his representative had appeared at the previous hearing scheduled for DATE , “ thus obviously obstructing ” the proceedings . The court noted in this regard that the applicant ’s father had appeared instead and had submitted that the applicant was in hospital , but that the medical certificate provided stated that the applicant had been both admitted to and released from hospital on DATE . In its decision the court further stated , inter alia , that the proceedings at issue had been pending for DATE and that the criminal prosecution was to become time - barred on DATE .

DATE and DATE CARDINAL other hearings were scheduled , notably for DATE , DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE , at which the applicant failed to appear . DATE and DATE he was in hospital .

On DATE ORG Instance found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to DATE of imprisonment . The court noted , inter alia , that the applicant was “ deliberately stalling the proceedings in different ways ” ( na razne načine svjesno odugovlačio postupak ) . It made no reference to whether the trial had become time - barred .

On DATE the applicant appealed . He submitted that the prosecution against him had become time - barred and relied on LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal , and proceeded ex officio to uphold the judgment rendered by ORG on DATE . The court also held that the application of statutory provisions relating to prescription was “ out of the question as the reopened criminal proceedings were not a criminal prosecution ( which was concluded by a judgment ) but were conducted upon the applicant ’s request and for his benefit ” .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with ORG ( PERSON ) proposing , inter alia , that the proceedings be terminated as the prosecution had become time - barred .

On DATE ORG upheld the High Court judgment , concluding that “ the court decided as above given that the judgments of the lower courts are based on law , the law was not breached in the proceedings against [ the applicant ] nor were there any significant procedural violations of criminal proceedings ” . It did not address directly the question of whether the criminal prosecution had become time - barred or not .

DATE the applicant challenged all the judges of ORG in GPE , including the judge processing his case , on the ground that they had pursued the proceedings against him even though the criminal prosecution had become time - barred , and requested that the case be transferred to another court . These requests were rejected by ORG by DATE .

On DATE the applicant filed a criminal complaint ( krivična prijava ) for abuse of office against the judge in charge of processing the case against him . In doing so the applicant maintained , in particular , that the court should have terminated the proceedings against him as the prosecution of the criminal offence that he was charged with had become time - barred .

On DATE the State Prosecution ( ORG državno tužilaštvo ) rejected the applicant ’s criminal complaint , relying on the Conclusion of the Criminal Departments of ORG , ORG and ORG issued in DATE , which provided that once a judgment finding a defendant guilty in his absence became final the criminal prosecution could not become time - barred if the criminal proceedings were later reopened ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The Conclusion was apparently explained by an opinion that if the prosecution could become time - barred that would favour those defendants who by cunning managed to avoid being tried . The decision also noted that the applicant had failed to appear for hearings scheduled for DATE , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL May , DATE and CARDINAL DATE . No appeal was allowed against this decision .

On DATE the applicant addressed ORG , complaining apparently that his prosecution had become time - barred . On DATE ORG , by means of a letter , informed the applicant that the trial in his case had not become time - barred and referred to the Conclusion of DATE .

On an unspecified date in DATE the applicant filed a compensation claim against the ORG for convicting him after the prosecution of a particular criminal offence had become time - barred .

On DATE ORG ruled against the applicant , which decision was upheld by ORG and ORG on DATE and DATE respectively . ORG relied on the Conclusion of DATE , and ORG considered that the provisions on prescription did not apply if the prescription period had ended in the course of the reopened proceedings . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s constitutional appeal as unfounded , relying on ORG reasoning .

On DATE ORG in PERSON dismissed the applicant ’s request for amnesty . The court noted , inter alia , that on DATE the applicant had been served with a writ issued by the court in GPE relating to the enforcement of his prison sentence . DATE the applicant ’s representative had submitted that the applicant was residing in GPE and the writ should be forwarded to the court in PERSON . After the relevant authorities had attempted unsuccessfully to serve the writ on the applicant on CARDINAL occasions in GPE they had sought the assistance of the police . The police had informed them that the applicant actually had had residence in GPE at an unknown address , after which an arrest warrant ( potjernica ) had been issued against the applicant .

Article CARDINAL provided that ORG , ORG of republics and provinces , and relevant military courts would deliver conclusions ( načelne stavove ) in respect of issues relevant for the implementation of federal regulations .

Section CARDINAL provided that ORG , ORG of republic and provinces , and ORG convened common sessions ( zajednička sednica ) and , through their delegates , delivered conclusions on issues relevant for the implementation of federal regulations . In particular , common sessions were to be convened when there was inconsistency in the case - law on issues relevant for the uniform implementation of federal regulations .

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) provided that a person who was involved in traffic and failed to comply with the traffic rules negligently ( iz nehata ) , thus jeopardising human lives and causing light bodily injuries , would be punished with imprisonment of DATE .

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) provided that if the criminal offence under section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) led to the death of CARDINAL or more persons , the perpetrator would be punished with imprisonment of DATE .

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) provided , inter alia , that a criminal prosecution could not be initiated ( ne može se preduzeti ) DATE after the commission of those criminal offences for which the courts could impose imprisonment of DATE and DATE .

Pursuant to section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) the criminal prosecution of the crime defined in section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW of GPE became time - barred in any event when DATE had elapsed since the commission of the crime .

This Code entered into force on DATE and thereby repealed all incompatible criminal law provisions thereto . Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL and CARDINAL § CARDINAL , however , correspond to sections CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) , respectively , of LAW of GPE .

The said Conclusion ( načelni stav ) provided that once a judgment finding a defendant guilty in his absence became final the criminal prosecution could not become time - barred if the criminal proceedings were reopened .

By judgment of DATE ORG found X guilty in absence and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment . Following X ’s request the proceedings were reopened and by DATE ORG dismissed the indictment as the criminal prosecution had become time - barred in the meantime . On DATE ORG accepted ORG request for protection of legality and found that ORG decision of DATE was in breach of the law . In its decision PERSON . Br . CARDINAL ORG explicitly held that when criminal proceedings were reopened in respect of a person who had been tried in his absence , the statutory provisions on prescription were not applicable regardless of whether the statutory prescription time had expired in the meantime . According to ORG the reopened proceedings were not a new criminal prosecution , given that the criminal prosecution had already ended by means of a final judgment issued in the defendant ’s absence . The reopened proceedings were conducted exclusively upon the request of the defendant in whose favour the proceedings were re - opened and in order to examine the earlier final judgment .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Branko Lubarda;Georgios A. Serghides;Pere Pastor Vilanova

In DATE the ORG predecessors were deprived of certain land in favour of the ORG .

On DATE ORG ordered ORG ( the debtor ) , a company predominantly comprised of socially - owned capital , as the end user of that land , to pay the applicants specified amounts on account of the compensation for the land in question .

On DATE and DATE respectively , upon the ORG request to that effect , ORG ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the applicants the enforcement costs . This judgment became both , final and enforceable by DATE .

CARDINAL applicant , Mr PERSON , never lodged an enforcement request .

On DATE the Niš Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor ( CARDINAL ) .

CARDINAL applicant , PERSON Nikolić Jajčević , duly submitted her claims therein .

These insolvency proceedings are still ongoing .

NORP On DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE respectively , all applicants lodged their constitutional appeals .

On DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE , respectively , the ORG found a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time in respect of all applicants , except Mr PERSON . However , the court did not award the applicants any damages , merely stating that the applicants “ had not claimed non - pecuniary damages ” .

ORG dismissed the appeal in respect of CARDINAL applicant , PERSON PERSON , since he had failed to request enforcement of the judgment in question .


CASE OF ZAMMIT AND ATTARD CASSAR v. MALTA

Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 2 of Protocol No. 1 - Control of the use of property);Pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Aleš Pejchal;André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Ganna Yudkivska;Mark Villiger;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE and live in PERSON and PERSON respectively .

The applicants own , in equal shares , a property built in DATE in PERSON and which is known DATE as ORG . According to the applicants , the property is used as a storage facility for a nearby shop . At first , this was not contested by the Government , but at a later stage in the proceedings , they submitted that the property had been abandoned and was not in use .

The applicants inherited the property from their uncle on DATE . At the time , the property was already leased to PERSON , a company registered in GPE , for MONEY ( ORG ) ( equivalent to MONEY ( EUR ) ) DATE , that is , ORG DATE on the basis of a voluntary lease agreement . Although there was no evidence of the GPE ever having signed a lease agreement , it appears that the lease commenced in DATE . Rent is payable DATE in advance , and in accordance with the law the lease is renewed automatically DATE .

In such circumstances , PERSON hereinafter “ the Ordinance ” ) , LAW of LAW , ( see Relevant domestic law below ) provides that the eviction of a tenant or a change in the conditions of a lease requires the authorisation of ORG ( “ the RRB ” ) .

In DATE , the applicants undertook a valuation of the property with a view to making a request for an increase in the rent . The architect who carried out the valuation indicated that the current rental value of the property was ORG DATE .

In accordance with legal requirements ( see Relevant domestic law below ) , on DATE , the applicants informed PERSON by means of a judicial letter that they intended to raise the rent to ORG DATE with effect from DATE .

By means of a judicial letter dated CARDINAL DATE , PERSON replied that it did not agree to the request . It failed , however , to apply to the RRB for the rejection of such an increase or for new conditions , as required by law ( see Article CARDINAL of the Ordinance ) .

As from the second term of DATE the applicants stopped accepting rent for fear it would prejudice their claim . In consequence , company PERSON continued to pay the rent by means of a schedule of deposit filed with the domestic courts .

On DATE the applicants brought an action before ORG , requesting it to impose on PERSON an obligatory time - limit within which to make an application to the RRB . They considered that in default of such action by PERSON , the increase in rent requested should be deemed to have been agreed . PERSON having eventually filed the said application ( see below ) , the applicants’ action was dismissed .

On DATE E. applied to the RRB , requesting it to dismiss the claim for the increase in rent . The applicants responded , arguing that the rent should reflect market values .

In a report dated DATE CARDINAL court - appointed architects concluded that the rent of ORG CARDINAL was already PERCENT over and above the rent level at which the LOC were or could have been leased before DATE ( LAW b ) of the LAW , see Relevant domestic law below ) . It followed that in the light of LAW ) ( b ) of the LAW , the increase in rent could not be recommended .

By a note filed on DATE the applicants submitted that an unfavourable decision would breach their rights under the Convention .

On DATE the ORG dismissed the ORG request on the basis of the opinion of the CARDINAL court - appointed architects . It noted that it had no jurisdiction to determine the human rights issue raised by the applicants , who had not made a request for a constitutional referral .

On DATE the applicants appealed . They argued that the ORG ’s decision had breached their rights under LAW No . CARDINAL to the LAW . They requested the court to refer the matter to the constitutional jurisdictions .

By decree of CARDINAL DATE ORG referred the matter to the constitutional jurisdictions . Following the constitutional proceedings ( described below ) and the applicants’ lodging of an application with the ORG , on DATE ORG adjourned the case sine die , pending the outcome of the present proceedings .

By a judgment of DATE ORG ( FAC ) , in its constitutional jurisdiction , upheld the applicants’ claim , holding that their rights under LAW No . CARDINAL to the LAW had been breached . Referring to the ORG ’s case - law , it considered that the applicants had not had an effective remedy , in so far as they had been constrained by the capping of rent levels set out in the law . In relation to their property rights , it upheld the finding of a violation , on the basis of the reasoning in the case of PERSON v. GPE ( no . ORG , § CARDINAL , DATE ) DATE namely the low level of the rent , the applicants’ state of uncertainty as to the possibility of recovery of the property , the lack of procedural safeguards , and the rise in the standard of living in GPE over DATE coupled with the applicants’ argument that the interference had been disproportionate , as it had caused them to bear an excessive burden , given that the property was used for a commercial purpose . Indeed , the lessor could have used other property it had owned , but had preferred to sell that other property for ORG CARDINAL and to continue to rent from the applicants at a low rate .

On appeal , by a judgment of DATE , ORG reversed the first - instance judgment . It considered that although when the parties had concluded the contract they had been aware of the law as it stood ( and had stood for DATE ) , they had nevertheless opted to enter into that contract . Therefore , they and their legal successors could not now complain of a breach of their human rights . Indeed , the original lease agreement had neither stipulated a low level of rent nor envisaged future increases in rent . Given that the original owner had opted to lease the LOC , knowing the legal consequences attached , the impact on their property rights had been neither unforeseen nor arbitrary ; nor had there been a state of legal uncertainty . Moreover , recent amendments to the law had improved their position from DATE ( Act X of DATE ; see Article CARDINALD of LAW below ) .

As mentioned above ( see paragraph CARDINAL ) as soon as they inherited the property , the applicants refused to accept the rent to avoid prejudicing their legal position . In consequence , it transpires from the documents provided to the ORG that from DATE to DATE the tenants deposited in court by means of schedules of deposit the sum of ORG CARDINAL DATE ( ORG CARDINAL DATE ) . For DATE those deposits amounted to ORG CARDINAL and ORG CARDINAL in DATE , and EUR CARDINAL DATE until DATE .

NORP In DATE LAW was amended to stipulate that the impugned restrictions would not apply to leases entered into after DATE .

While the above - mentioned constitutional proceedings were pending , a new law was enacted , stipulating that with effect from CARDINAL DATE the rent applicable to commercial leases was to be increased by PERCENT per year , and that an increase at that level should also take place for DATE , DATE and DATE ( Section CARDINAL D of LAW ) .

Thus the amounts of rent payable to the applicants in DATE were as follows : in DATE EUR CARDINAL ; in DATE ORG CARDINAL ; in DATE EUR CARDINAL ; and in DATE ORG CARDINAL . For DATE the rent would increase by PERCENT DATE .


No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE in LOC and lives in LOC in the municipality of LOC in “ the former GPE ” . He arrived in GPE in DATE via family reunification and was granted a permanent residence permit .

On DATE the applicant married a national of “ the former GPE ” , born in DATE , who arrived in GPE in DATE and who also held a permanent residence permit . The couple has CARDINAL children , born in DATE and DATE , who are likewise nationals of “ the former GPE ” .

After leaving school , the applicant did not undergo professional training , but worked in a variety of jobs , namely as a postman , mailman , plasterer and construction worker , with brief periods of unemployment .

On DATE the GPE ORG convicted the applicant of embezzlement for having sold a rental car to a third person in DATE and gave him a suspended sentence of CARDINAL months’ imprisonment .

On DATE ORG of the GPE of GPE convicted the applicant of homicide with indirect intent ( PERSON ) and serious violations of the rules of road traffic . On DATE , while he was engaged in a car race on a public road with an acquaintance , the applicant , driving at a speed of QUANTITY , lost control of his car and crashed into a lamppost , which caused the death of his passenger . That court took the view that the applicant , by agreeing to engage in the race , had deliberately taken the risk of killing him . It found that the applicant had acted with a high degree of recklessness and sentenced him to DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment .

The applicant ’s appeals against this conviction were dismissed by ORG on DATE and by ORG on DATE .

On DATE the applicant started serving his sentence .

On DATE ORG ( GPE ) sentenced the applicant to a fine of MONEY ( CHF ) for the purchase and consumption of marihuana .

On DATE the applicant was released on parole after having served CARDINAL of his sentence .

On DATE , after having heard the applicant , ORG of the GPE of GPE revoked the applicant ’s permanent residence permit . It found that the conditions for revocation pursuant to , inter alia , LAW lit . a in conjunction with LAW lit . b of LAW , AuG , see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph CARDINAL below ) were met . PERSON concluded that the public interest in the applicant ’s removal outweighed his interest in enjoying his family life with his wife and children in GPE . It ordered his expulsion pursuant to LAW .

On DATE the government ( NORP ) of GPE dismissed the applicant ’s appeal lodged on DATE .

On DATE ORG of the GPE of GPE dismissed the applicant ’s appeal lodged on DATE . It considered that the applicant had committed a serious criminal offence , that he was not well integrated in GPE despite the length of his stay , that expert prognosis regarding the likelihood that he would reoffend was positive but did not rule out any such risk , that he spoke NORP and was familiar with the culture in “ the former GPE ” , where he spent parts of his childhood and which he had visited since . It concluded that the decision to revoke his permanent residence permit was proportionate . Moreover , the court noted that the applicant ’s wife was a national of “ the former GPE ” as well , knew NORP and the country ’s culture , and was not well integrated in GPE either . Observing that the couple ’s children were DATE and thus of an adaptable age , it concluded that the applicant ’s wife and children could reasonably be expected to relocate to “ the former GPE ” with him .

On DATE the applicant appealed that decision , arguing that the decision to revoke his permanent residence permit was disproportionate .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal . It considered that the main criminal offence , of which the applicant was convicted , intentional homicide , was a particularly serious one . While it acknowledged that he had lived in GPE for DATE , which had thus become the centre of his life , it found that he was neither professionally nor socially integrated . It considered that he had no stable employment , but considerable debts . Both he and his wife and children had benefitted significantly from social welfare . Moreover , the court considered that the applicant could reasonably ( ORG in “ the former GPE ” , considering that he spoke NORP , was born there and had spent a part of his childhood there and had visited the country since . It observed that the same was true for his wife , who likewise originated from “ the former GPE ” , where she spent DATE of her life and still had relatives . She knew NORP and visited the country DATE on DATE . At the same time , she was not well integrated in GPE as she did not undergo any professional training after leaving school , had received social welfare as from DATE and only started to work in DATE . As far as their children were concerned , the court considered that they attended primary school and kindergarten , respectively , and were still of an adaptable age . ORG concluded that the public interest in the applicant ’s removal outweighed the applicant ’s interest in remaining in GPE and enjoying respect for his family life there , also noting that his wife and children had a choice between either following him to “ the former GPE ” or remaining in GPE and maintaining contact through short but regular visits .

On DATE the applicant left GPE in compliance with the expulsion order .

On DATE ORG issued an entry ban against the applicant for DATE .

In DATE the applicant ’s wife and children relocated to “ the former GPE ” to live with him .

On DATE ORG , on the applicant ’s appeal , reduced the duration of the re - entry ban to DATE due to proportionality considerations . It found that the conditions in LAW lit . a and CARDINAL of LAW for the issuance of an entry ban for a period of DATE were met ( see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph CARDINAL ) . It considered that the offence committed by the applicant was particularly serious and that he continued to be a serious threat to public order , notwithstanding his mostly good behaviour since the commission of the offence and positive personality development . It noted that the applicant could ask for a temporary suspension of the entry ban for humanitarian or other important reasons ( LAW ) and that the applicant ’s wife , who originated from “ the former GPE ” herself , could visit him there together with their children and also maintain contact by various means of communication .

NORP In DATE , i.e. after DATE , the applicant ’s wife and children returned to GPE to avoid the expiry of their permanent residence permit pursuant to LAW ( see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph CARDINAL ) and because their socioeconomic living conditions in “ the former GPE ” were difficult . They live in GPE .