Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)

Branko Lubarda;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in DATE and is currently being detained in PERSON .

In DATE the applicant started serving a CARDINAL - year sentence for murder . On DATE he was placed in PERSON . Except for short periods of time when he was transferred to other prisons in order to appear before the courts and QUANTITY occasions when he was hospitalised for a maximum of DATE in prison hospitals , the applicant was held in PERSON .

The applicant alleged that the conditions of his detention in PERSON since his incarceration in DATE amounted to torture . More specifically , he alleged that he was being held in severely overcrowded cells with CARDINAL forty prisoners , with worn - out furniture and without natural light or ventilation . He further submitted that the cells were full of bed bugs and the food was insufficient and of very poor quality . The applicant also alleged that he was being held in cells with smokers .

The applicant lastly alleged that he had become sick as a result of the inhuman conditions to which he had been subjected . He submitted in that connection a medical certificate issued by the prison doctor on DATE , according to which he was suffering from : chronic cholecystitis , fatty liver disease , chronic venal insufficiency of the legs , type - II diabetes , chronic pancreatitis , gastroduodenitis , lumbar discopathy and impulsive personality disorder .

The Government submitted that the applicant had been held for unspecified periods of time in CARDINAL different cells of the Târgu PERSON infirmary block , which are described below .

Cell E CARDINAL.CARDINAL measured QUANTITY m , of which QUANTITY . m were occupied by a bathroom ( QUANTITY . m of remaining space ) . The cell had CARDINAL rows of bunk beds and accommodated CARDINAL prisoners ( QUANTITY . m of personal space , including the space occupied by the beds ) . Ventilation was ensured by a window measuring CARDINAL by QUANTITY The bathroom had its own window measuring CARDINAL by QUANTITY .

Cell E CARDINAL.CARDINAL measured QUANTITY . m , of which CARDINAL sq . m were occupied by a bathroom ( QUANTITY . m of remaining space ) . The cell had CARDINAL rows of bunk beds and accommodated CARDINAL prisoners ( QUANTITY m of personal space , including the space occupied by the beds ) . Ventilation was ensured by a window measuring CARDINAL by QUANTITY The bathroom had its own window measuring CARDINAL by QUANTITY .

Cell E CARDINAL.CARDINAL measured QUANTITY . m , of which CARDINAL sq . m were occupied by a bathroom ( QUANTITY . m of remaining space ) . The cell had CARDINAL rows of bunk beds and accommodated CARDINAL to CARDINAL prisoners ( CARDINAL and QUANTITY . m of personal space , including the space occupied by the beds ) . Ventilation was ensured by a window measuring CARDINAL by QUANTITY The bathroom had its own window measuring CARDINAL by QUANTITY .

For the rest of the time the applicant was held in non - smoking cells , a description of which is set out below .

Cell E CARDINAL.CARDINAL measured QUANTITY m , of which QUANTITY . m were occupied by a bathroom ( QUANTITY . m of remaining space ) . The cell had CARDINAL beds and accommodated CARDINAL to QUANTITY prisoners ( an average of QUANTITY . m of personal space , including the space occupied by the beds ) . The cell had CARDINAL windows measuring CARDINAL by QUANTITY and the bathroom had a window measuring CARDINAL by QUANTITY .

Cell E CARDINAL.CARDINAL measured QUANTITY m , of which QUANTITY . m were occupied by a bathroom ( QUANTITY m of remaining space ) . The cell had CARDINAL rows of bunk beds and usually accommodated CARDINAL prisoners ( QUANTITY . m of personal space , including the space occupied by the beds ) . The cell had a window measuring CARDINAL by QUANTITY . The bathroom had its own window measuring CARDINAL by QUANTITY .

Cell E CARDINAL.CARDINAL measured QUANTITY m , of which QUANTITY . m were occupied by a bathroom and QUANTITY m by a storage room ( QUANTITY . m of remaining space ) . The cell had CARDINAL rows of bunk beds and accommodated CARDINAL to QUANTITY prisoners ( between QUANTITY . m and QUANTITY . m of personal space , including the space occupied by the beds ) . It also had CARDINAL windows measuring QUANTITY . The bathroom had its own window measuring CARDINAL by QUANTITY .

The Government submitted that all of the cells contained adequate furniture and that disinfection operations took place whenever the presence of insects was reported .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Aleš Pejchal;Angelika Nußberger;Ganna Yudkivska;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE ORG instituted insolvency proceedings against the company S. , at that time the applicant ’s employer .

On DATE the receiver in insolvency issued a decision on the termination of the applicant ’s employment contract with the company S.

On an unknown date , the applicant lodged his claim for a redundancy payment in the insolvency proceedings . Since the receiver disputed the claim , ORG on DATE referred the applicant to labour proceedings .

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings before ORG of ORG .

In the same period CARDINAL claims similar to that of the applicant were lodged before the same court .

In DATE ORG issued decisions in CARDINAL cases similar to the applicant ’s , dismissing the claims . It held that the workers who had lost their jobs owing to the employer ’s insolvency before section CARDINAL of the CARDINAL LAW ( “ the DATE LAW ) became effective were not entitled to a redundancy payment . Section DATE explicitly foresaw a right to a redundancy payment for workers who were let go after a company had become insolvent .

In DATE several applications for a constitutional review of section DATE Act were lodged with ORG , challenging the constitutionality of non - retroactive application of that provision .

On DATE , following the negative decisions issued in the CARDINAL cases ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , the trade union which was also representing the applicant requested the court to postpone hearings scheduled in other cases . The union wanted to first check whether the other workers wanted to withdraw their claims in order to avoid the costs of the proceedings .

No formal decision on adjourning or staying the proceedings was issued by the court .

On DATE ORG dismissed the motions for review of the constitutionality of section CARDINAL of LAW . It held that they were unfounded , since they were based on the false premises that the right to a redundancy payment for workers laid off because of their employer ’s insolvency was introduced only by section DATE , and that moreover it did not apply retroactively . Referring to its own decisions issued in DATE , it stressed that this right had already been foreseen by the general labour legislation in force prior to the adoption of the CARDINAL Act . It explained that the purpose of LAW was solely to explicitly clarify that also workers who lost their jobs because of the insolvency of their employers were entitled to redundancy payments . Such clarification was needed because of the conflicting case - law of the lower courts . In this respect the Constitutional Court emphasised that while it could not interfere with the correct interpretation of legal norms by the lower courts , the latter could not apply an interpretation which would be unconstitutional , arbitrary , or clearly wrong .

On DATE , the parties settled with the company S. , which acknowledged the applicant ’s claim .

On DATE the applicant lodged a claim for compensation for damage sustained because of the length of the labour proceedings .

On DATE ORG dismissed his claim . It held that LAW of the Right to a Trial without Undue Delay ( “ LAW ” ) was not applicable , since that provision only applied to cases where an individual had already lodged an application on account of length of proceedings before an international court . Applying the general rules of LAW on pecuniary damages , it further concluded that since the case had been settled the applicant had failed to prove that he had incurred any damage . In any case , there was also no causal link between the conduct of the court and the damage allegedly sustained . The applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG upheld the applicant ’s appeal and remitted the case back to the first - instance court .

On DATE ORG , in a renewed set of proceedings , again dismissed the applicant ’s claim . It concluded that he had failed to prove either any damage on account of delays in the proceedings or any causal link . The applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal .

On DATE ORG granted the applicant ’s constitutional appeal by referring to its decision of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and remitted the case to the higher court .

On DATE ORG remitted the case back to the first - instance court .

On DATE ORG , applying by analogy , in accordance with the instructions of ORG , the provisions of LAW , dismissed the applicant ’s claim . Referring to the case - law of ORG , it held that it had been reasonable to suspend the examination of the applicant ’s claim pending the outcome of some similar cases and of the proceedings before ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . It held that it could not identify any unreasonable delays in these similar cases , which took DATE at CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction , of which DATE were before ORG . The applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . The applicant lodged an application for leave to appeal on points of law and a constitutional appeal .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request for leave to appeal on points of law .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s constitutional appeal .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy)

Branko Lubarda;Georgios A. Serghides;Pere Pastor Vilanova

All the applicants were convicted by NORP courts and given custodial sentences .

They served their sentences in penitentiary facilities which were overcrowded and suffered from a shortage of sanitary installations .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention;Speediness of review);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-f - Expulsion;Extradition;Prevent unauthorised entry into country);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-f - Expulsion;Extradition;Prevent unauthorised entry into country)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant was born in DATE , and at the time of the introduction of the application was detained in FAC , in ORG .

The applicant entered GPE in an irregular manner by boat on DATE . On arrival she was registered by the immigration police , given an identification number ( PERSON ) and presented with LAW and a Removal Order . The applicant was immediately detained in PERSON ; her detention was based on LAW ( see Relevant domestic law below ) .

The Return Decision stated that she was a prohibited immigrant by virtue of LAW ) because she was in GPE “ without means of subsistence and liable to become a charge on public funds ” . ORG also informed the applicant that her stay was being terminated and that she had the possibility to apply for a period of voluntary departure . LAW was based on the consideration that the applicant ’s request for a period of voluntary departure had been rejected . It informed the applicant that she would remain in custody until removal was effected , and that an entry ban would be issued against her . The CARDINAL documents further informed the applicant of her right to appeal against ORG before ORG ( “ the IAB ” ) within DATE .

On DATE the applicant was assisted to submit a Preliminary LAW ) , thereby registering her wish to apply for asylum under LAW , LAW of LAW . On DATE the applicant was called for an interview by ORG ( ORG ) .

On DATE the ORG rejected her application on the basis , inter alia , that she had failed to support her claim that she was from central / southern GPE with convincing evidence ( in particular , she had shown insufficient knowledge about GPE and her speech displayed phonological , grammatical and lexical features not typical of those spoken in GPE ) . Her appeal was also rejected by ORG ( the “ NORP ” ) on DATE . The appeal decision reads as follows :

“ ORG refers to a fill - in - the - blanks form received in its ORG on DATE and to a legal submission on your behalf received in its ORG on DATE .

The ORG notes that you travelled to GPE in DATE , first via GPE and then via GPE . In none of these countries did you consider applying for refugee status . During the popular insurrection against the PERSON regime in GPE you disembarked on the island of GPE , illegally and undocumented on DATE , claiming that you were looking for peace , although CARDINAL of your siblings still live in GPE . You also claim that your brother had been killed by a terrorist NORP organization , PERSON , because they thought he worked for the Government . However , you also claim that if there was peace back home , you would be prepared to return . Since you left , as you may know , PERSON has been driven out of GPE and Presidential elections have been successfully held and several NORP are repatriating .

Your appeal for the grant of refugee status by GPE can not be upheld according to law . ”

Up to the date of the lodging of her application with ORG on DATE the applicant had heard no news about any steps being taken in connection with her removal . In practice GPE effected no removals to GPE or GPE .

Ever since her arrival in GPE the applicant suffered from several medical problems , such as headaches , earaches and fainting , and was frequently hospitalised ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) . She showed signs of severe anxiety and depression which got worse following the refusal of her asylum request . In consequence , on DATE , she was referred to the Agency for ORG ) by ORG ( ORG ) . This referral was made with a view to obtaining her release from detention in terms of government policy on the grounds of vulnerability due to physical and psychological ill - health . According to the referral form , filled in by an official of the ORG :

“ PERSON has been complaining of several medical problems ever since she arrived in GPE . She had several appointments in hospital was also taken to emergency by ambulance after collapsing in detention . PERSON was also rejected by ORG , causing her to be very depressed . Every time we visit she is in her bed crying and showing signs of severe anxiety . ”

NORP In DATE the applicant was interviewed ( for TIME ) by LAW , with a view to determine whether she should be released on the grounds of vulnerability . The interview was held in LANGUAGE and the applicant was assisted by another detainee who was not fluent in the language . Her impression is that she was verbally informed that she would be released . On DATE , that is just under DATE after the referral , the interviewers verbally informed her that she would be released . The Government also confirmed that eventually the applicant ’s request for release on the ground of vulnerability was acceded to by AWAS .

Nevertheless , up to the date of the lodging of her application with ORG on DATE the applicant was still in detention . She hoped to be released in DATE after the lapse of an DATE detention as per domestic practice at the time .

The applicant submitted that LAW operated by ORG was developed by the said organisation in order to give effect to a government policy introduced in DATE which stated that vulnerable individuals should not be detained . The applicant submitted that although AWAS was not formally charged with the responsibility of this procedure by the law which set it up , in practice the agency had full responsibility for the procedure . However , in spite of the fact that this procedure can have a determining impact on the continued detention of individuals detained in terms of LAW , it was not adequately regulated by law or by publicly available rules or procedures . The determining authority does not give written reasons for its decision and there is no possibility of appeal , although it may be possible to request a review if more evidence is available or there is a degeneration of the individual ’s condition .

According to the Government the Vulnerable Adult Assessment Procedure , which was operated to assess vulnerability , was widely known within the migration sector and a policy document had been issued about it . Forms were distributed to individuals working in the sector such as NGOs . The Government submitted that LAW was a quick process in straightforward cases ( such as pregnant women and families with very young children ) which were usually determined within DATE . However , less straightforward cases such as assessments on the grounds of mental health , psychological problems or chronic illness , required a more complex assessment procedure which was therefore lengthier .

A certificate issued by a doctor in DATE confirmed that the applicant had been hospitalised on DATE ( upon her arrival in GPE ) for dehydration , she was seen again on DATE and DATE of DATE . She suffered “ fits ” and was waiting for an appointment .

According to the documents provided by the applicant , after her initial hospitalisation , and apart from the CARDINAL visits mentioned above , she was seen by a doctor at the state hospital CARDINAL times between May and DATE , and each time was prescribed medication . On these occasions she suffered from , inter alia , epigastric pain and nausea ( repeatedly ) , bilateral conjunctivitis , inflammation , bleeding gums , insomnia , otalgia / earaches ( also repeatedly ) causing reduced hearing , as well as headaches and toothaches , and dizziness . In none of these occasions was she kept under observation TIME , or hospitalised . In DATE following claims by the applicant that she had been falling repeatedly , and that she was having episodes of jerking and tongue biting ( which had left evident marks ) , the doctor requested her referral to a specified department to run the relevant tests to exclude epilepsy – the result of these tests , if undertaken , are unknown to the ORG .

A medical certificate issued in DATE states that at the time the applicant was suffering from “ low mood and insomnia ” and had been “ complaining of somatic symptoms such as chest pain ” . The doctor noted “ evident deterioration of her mental state ” and suggested she be considered as vulnerable .

An attestation issued by a doctor in DATE states that according to available records “ she has stayed unwell and been treated or referred to ORG [ the ORG hospital ] more than usual ” and that “ her health has posed challenges in keeping her at the ORG detention centre and any assistance will be appreciated ” .

The applicant was detained in ORG in PERSON , in conditions which she considered prison - like and basic . She explained that the ORG is divided into CARDINAL zones alike in terms of layout and facilities . The applicant was detained in GPE for DATE and was afterwards transferred to Zone D for DATE until she moved to Zone A.

She noted that in Zone C there were CARDINAL ( sic ) single women and at CARDINAL point the detention centre was so crowded that there were not enough beds and people had to sleep on metal tables in the television room . She noted that Zone D was less crowded but that it still lacked privacy and sanitation .

She complained about the lack of constructive activities to occupy detainees , overcrowding ( particularly during DATE ) , lack of privacy , limited access to open air , difficulties in communication with staff , other detainees and with the outside world , lack of information about their own situations , and the lack of proper arrangements for heating and cooling , leading to extreme cold in DATE and extreme heat in DATE . The applicant highlighted the lack of female staff - in particular she noted that TIME male soldiers barged into her dormitory while the inmates were still asleep to make a head count , during which they removed the sheets to check for their presence . This meant that the applicant had to sleep fully dressed TIME , including her headscarf , to avoid embarrassing moments .

The applicant also complained of limited access to medical care , also because of a lack of interpreters to enable communication with medical staff .

NORP The applicant was informed of the AWAS decision to accede to her request and was released from detention on DATE .


No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Extradition) (Conditional) (the United States of America)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE in GPE and is currently detained in FAC .

The applicant has been living in GPE with his family since DATE .

In an indictment filed on DATE in GPE ( hereinafter , “ the GPE ” ) ORG for LOC of GPE , the applicant was charged with CARDINAL count of conspiracy to import QUANTITY of heroin , a Schedule I controlled substance , into GPE in violation of LAW , LAW , sections CARDINAL(a ) , GPE ) , CARDINAL ) , and CARDINAL , and LAW , LAW , sections CARDINAL et seq . ( Count Four ) ; and CARDINAL count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute CARDINAL or QUANTITY of heroin , a Schedule I controlled substance , in violation of LAW , LAW , sections CARDINAL(a)(CARDINAL ) , CARDINAL ) , and CARDINAL , and LAW , LAW , sections CARDINAL et seq . ( ORG ) . Each of those offences carried a possible maximum term of life imprisonment .

By diplomatic note of DATE , the GPE authorities transmitted a request to the NORP authorities for the applicant ’s provisional arrest with a view to his extradition .

On DATE the applicant was arrested in PERSON by the NORP police . ORG . CARDINAL ( Juzgado Central de Instrucción ) initiated extradition proceedings on DATE and ordered his provisional release . The extradition request was then allocated to FAC .

On DATE ORG agreed to the applicant ’s extradition .

On DATE the Audiencia Nacional granted the extradition request on condition that the GPE authorities provided a guarantee that any life sentence that was handed down would not be irreducible . The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision .

On DATE the ruling was upheld by the Plenary of ORG . The applicant subsequently lodged a plea of nullity ( incidente de nulidad de actuaciones ) against that decision . On DATE the Plenary of ORG ruled against the applicant , arguing that the object and purpose of annulment proceedings was not to serve as a second appeal instance against an extradition decision , but to correct possible violations of a fundamental right committed in a decision which was not subject to appeal .

On DATE ORG issued a note verbale , which provided the following answer :

“ GPE notes that the bilateral extradition treaty between GPE and GPE does not provide a basis for conditioning extraditions on assurances relating to life sentences . While GPE is not , therefore , obligated to provide the assurance requested , in consideration of the request of ORG and given the intentions of the GPE prosecutor , GPE is prepared in this particular case to inform the Government of GPE as follows : Should PERSON be convicted of either of the charges in the indictment filed on DATE for which extradition is sought , he will not be subject to an unalterable sentence of life imprisonment because , if a life sentence is imposed , he may seek review of his sentence on appeal and he may subsequently seek relief from his sentence in the form of a petition for a pardon or commutation to a lesser sentence ... ”

On DATE the note verbale was communicated to the interested parties . On DATE ORG submitted a report stating that the guarantees provided by GPE were adequate and that consequently extradition should be granted .

On DATE the Audiencia Nacional issued a decision ( providencia ) assessing the GPE guarantees , deeming them to be “ sufficient ” .

The applicant brought CARDINAL súplica appeals against that decision , the first of which was lodged on DATE . The applicant argued that the decision of CARDINAL DATE should be declared null and void since the matter should have been addressed through an auto , instead of a providencia . Secondly , the applicant contested the argument that ORG had provided sufficient guarantees , stating that they were identical to the ones that had already been analysed by ORG in the case of GPE v. GPE ( no . DATE ( extracts ) ) and found to be in violation of LAW ( inter alia ) . The second súplica appeal was lodged on DATE and included CARDINAL different requests . First , he requested that the decision on whether the GPE guarantees were sufficient be addressed and dealt with by the Plenary of FAC . He also sought the recusal of CARDINAL judges who were members of the bench which had initially issued the decision of DATE . Lastly , he lodged an application for the general recusal of all the judges of the Audiencia Nacional who “ had been invited by GPE on holiday trips ” which had been paid for by that country .

On DATE the Audiencia Nacional issued a decision stating the following :

“ FIRST - We will examine in the first place the plea for a referral to the Plenary formation of ORG of the decision about the sufficiency of the assurances given by ORG concerning the possibility for CARDINAL life sentences to be imposed on the extradited person . PERSON , given that the President of this ORG has duly empowered it to decide about this matter , considers that the referral is not necessary as the assurances given are correct and sufficient , and furthermore show compliance with the CARDINAL case - law in the GPE vs GPE case referred to by the appellant ....

Therefore , if the assurances given by ORG are the following :

“ Should PERSON be convicted of either of the charges in the indictment filed on DATE , he will not be subject to an unalterable sentence of life imprisonment , he may seek review of his sentence on appeal and he may subsequently seek relief from his sentence in the form of a petition for a pardon or commutation to a lesser sentence ; ”

we can conclude that the warranty expresses the actual existing legal means for the revision of a sentence of life imprisonment in a way that shows that this punishment is not irreducible during the whole life - span of the person , complying with what the ECtHR has requested in order to consider that there has been no violation of LAW .

That is why there is no need to refer a decision on this matter to the Plenary formation of this ORG . ”

Additionally , the Audiencia Nacional agreed on opening a procedure aimed at addressing the issue of the recusals requested by the applicant through a full report , at the same time ordering the suspension of the extradition proceedings until the recusal proceedings had been terminated .

On DATE the Audiencia Nacional issued a decision ( acuerdo gubernativo ) dismissing the applicant ’s request .

On DATE the Audiencia Nacional ordered the applicant ’s provisional detention ( auto ) . The applicant lodged another súplica appeal against that decision and requested that the extradition proceedings be suspended on the grounds that no decision had been taken on the issues complained of in the first súplica appeal of CARDINAL DATE .

NORP In a decision of CARDINAL DATE the Audiencia Nacional rejected the applicant ’s request to stay the extradition proceedings , finding that the complaints contained in the first súplica appeal had already been dealt with in the decision of DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged another súplica appeal against the decisions of CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE , contesting the reasoning as regards his request to stay the extradition proceedings and emphasising that no decision had been taken on the issues complained of in the first súplica appeal of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the Audiencia Nacional issued a new decision dismissing the súplica appeals lodged by the applicant and confirming the decision on the applicant ’s imprisonment pending extradition to GPE . In particular , the decision stated the following :

“ The applicant considers that his súplica appeal lodged against the decision of DATE has not been answered ... .

ORG refers at this point to what was already established in its decision of DATE ... .

Nevertheless , in order to clarify any doubts that the applicant might have concerning whether or not he has received an answer to his súplica appeal , we [ the ORG ] will resolve here the issued raised in that appeal .

The guarantees provided have been considered sufficient for the ORG . Consequently , regardless of the judgment mentioned by the applicant , we consider that they comply with the requirements established in the ECtHR ’s judgment PERSON v. GPE [ ( no . CARDINAL , DATE ) ] , as well as the judgment of CARDINAL DATE [ GPE v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE ) ] , lodged by a NORP citizen ...

Taking into consideration the above - mentioned reasoning , the ORG

Decides

to dismiss the súplica appeals referred to in the present ruling , maintaining the order of imprisonment for PERSON , in view of his extradition to GPE ” .

On DATE the applicant was detained for the purposes of being extradited to GPE .

On DATE the applicant lodged an amparo appeal with ORG against the extradition decision . He asked for interim measures , requesting ORG to order a stay of the extradition while the case was still pending . He contended , inter alia , that the assurances provided by the GPE authorities did not fulfil the criteria for assessing the reducibility of a life sentence and that the extradition would amount to a violation of his right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment .

On DATE ORG issued a decision declaring the amparo appeal and the request for interim measures inadmissible . In particular , it found that the part of the amparo appeal concerning the validity of the assurances given by the GPE authorities and about a possible violation of the applicant ’s right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment had been lodged too late as the alleged violations stemmed from the decision of DATE , thus the DATE timelimit established in section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW on LAW . CARDINAL/CARDINAL had already passed when he had lodged his amparo appeal .

On DATE the applicant lodged a request for interim measures with the ORG under Rule CARDINAL of ORG . He requested the ORG to indicate to ORG that his extradition should be stayed pending the outcome of proceedings before the ORG . The request was granted on DATE on a temporary basis until DATE , and the Government were asked the following questions :

“ a.- Does the applicant risk under GPE criminal law , in respect of the charges , a maximum penalty that precludes early release and/or release on parole ?

b.- What are the concrete mechanisms and under what GPE legal basis is the applicant entitled to review his possible final life sentence ? In this sense , are the appeal , pardon and other review mechanisms referred to in the note verbale of DATE the ones described in the case of GPE v. GPE ( application no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE , § CARDINAL ) ? ”

On DATE the Government submitted their response and attached a document issued by ORG of ORG called “ supplemental information to GPE on Sentencing Issues in Relation to PERSON , a / k / a ‘ PERSON Flores’ ( hereinafter , “ the GPE report ” ) . The report stated the following :

“ By way of introduction , PERSON extradition is sought in order for him to stand trial on federal narcotics offenses in LOC of GPE . In essence , PERSON , a veterinarian , is charged with having been a member of a conspiracy DATE and DATE , the goal of which was to import heroin into GPE for subsequent distribution , in which PERSON role was to surgically implant packages of liquid heroin into the bodies of dogs that later were transported to GPE . The charges followed the search , in DATE , of a farm PERSON operated in GPE , GPE , in which law enforcement authorities seized CARDINAL puppies into which QUANTITY of liquid heroin had been surgically implanted . The CARDINAL puppies were bound for GPE , and the heroin they carried was surgically removed . After the search of his farm , PERSON fled GPE . ”

As regards the first question put to the Government , the GPE report argued that there were pretrial factors that could affect the applicant ’s sentencing . In particular , the report noted the following :

“ Before any trial , PERSON could , with the advice of his lawyer , decide to give up the right to a trial and plead guilty to the charges in the indictment , with or without the agreement of the prosecution . See Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure CARDINAL(a ) . A timely admission of guilt is a factor which could reduce the sentence the judge decides to impose following a conviction . In GPE , the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved by guilty pleas . PERSON may seek to reach an agreement with the prosecution wherein he would plead guilty in exchange for certain favorable actions , such as an agreement to allow him to plead guilty to fewer than all the charges in the indictment ( with the remainder of the charges to be dismissed at sentencing ) , or even to lesser charges , or in exchange for the government ’s promise to affirmatively recommend to the court that a particular lesser sentence be imposed . The agreement may also include the parties’ recommendation as to the appropriate sentence that - depending upon the type of plea agreement that is negotiated - may or may not bind the judge regarding the sentence that will be imposed . Such agreements are within the discretion of the government to enter into , and the judge may also decline to approve an agreement she or he does not believe to be in the interests of justice . The agreement may include , inter alia , an agreement to cooperate with GPE authorities . Thus , if PERSON were willing and able to provide substantial assistance to GPE in the investigation or prosecution of another person who had committed a crime , a plea agreement might include a promise by the government attorneys , in exchange for his guilty plea , to file a motion with the court asking that PERSON cooperation be taken into account and permitting the ORG to impose a lower sentence that it might otherwise impose . LAW , LAW , Section CARDINAL(e ) ; ORG , Section CARDINALKCARDINAL.CARDINAL . In such cases , it is not atypical for a judge to impose a sentence that is significantly less than the Guidelines recommendation . ”

It also observed that “ [ i]f , however , PERSON decides not to plead guilty and instead exercise his right to a trial , and if he is found guilty of CARDINAL or more charges , his sentencing exposure will vary , depending on the nature of the charges on which he is found guilty . Moreover , the judge will have broad discretion to determine the appropriate sentence [ ... ] ” .

As regards the estimated sentence that the applicant could face , the GPE report stated firstly that , “ In imposing a sentence in a federal criminal case , the judge must consult ORG Federal Sentencing Guidelines ” . It added that the Guidelines were advisory since the judge had “ the discretion to impose a sentence outside the applicable LAW long as the court states ‘ with specificity,’ both at sentencing and in the written judgment and commitment order , its reason for doing so ” . It additionally stated that , ” . Moreover , the decision whether to sentence a person convicted of multiple counts concurrently or consecutively was at the discretion of the court . Section CARDINAL of LAW of LAW , states , in part , that “ [ m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time run concurrently unless the court orders or the statute mandates that the terms are to run consecutively ” . The report further stressed the following :

“ Prior to sentencing , a probation officer will prepare a presentence report that contains information about the defendant ’s offense , his criminal history , other background information , and a calculation of the advisory sentencing range under LAW . The defendant has the right to object to the information and conclusion in the present report . Later , during the sentencing phase of the proceedings , defense counsel will be able to present to the judge various mitigating factors to consider that may result in the reduction of his sentence . Specifically , under LAW , LAW , Section CARDINAL(a ) , in determining the particular sentence imposed on a defendant , the court shall consider : ( CARDINAL ) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant ; ( CARDINAL ) the need for the sentence imposed to promote respect for the law , punishment for the offense , deter the defendant or others from committing similar criminal conduct , and the need to protect the public ; ( CARDINAL ) the kinds of sentences available ; ( CARDINAL ) the applicable guideline range ; ( CARDINAL ) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training , medical care , or other correctional treatment ; ( CARDINAL ) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities ; and ( CARDINAL ) the need to provide restitution to the victims of the offense(s ) . In assisting the court in considering the above CARDINAL factors , defense counsel will be able to present to the court in detail any mitigating factors relating to these criteria . This would enable the defense to provide to the sentencing court information regarding PERSON background and circumstances , including : his family environment and relationships , the environment in which he was raised , his work history , ... socioeconomic factors including educational opportunities or lack thereof , his physical and psychological well - being and any past or current treatment , prior criminal conduct , if any , and any resultant rehabilitative programs and periods of probation , incarceration , and parole , as well as PERSON longterm educational , vocational , and sociological goals ” .

NORP The report noted that there were many factors that contributed to the imposition of a sentence and that it was “ impossible to address every conceivable permutation that could occur or every possible scenario that might arise ” . However , the report indicated that according to ORG , the advisory sentencing range was “ CARDINAL to CARDINAL DATE incarceration , far less than the possible life sentence provided for under the statutes with which he was charged ” .

Furthermore , the report stated that under section CARDINAL(a ) of Title CARDINAL of LAW , there was a “ need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities ” . In that regard , the report stated that several of the applicant ’s co - conspirators had already been sentenced in a related case before the same judge who had been assigned to the applicant ’s case . CARDINAL of the co - conspirators “ faced a Guidelines range of CARDINAL to DATE and received a sentence of DATE incarceration ” , another “ faced a Guidelines range of DATE and received a sentence of DATE incarceration ” and a third had “ faced a Guidelines range of DATE and received a sentence of ORG Served ( DATE incarceration ) ” . The GPE report also noted that none of those defendants had entered into cooperation agreements with the government . Consequently , the sentences imposed on the applicant ’s co - conspirators by the same judge who had been assigned to the applicant ’s case “ [ could ] be of value in assessing the sentence that will be imposed on him ” .

The report concluded that while it was possible that any available maximum sentence could be imposed for an offence , under the circumstances present in this case , “ the risk of PERSON receiving such a sentence is low ” .

As regards the second question , the GPE report stated that if the applicant was sentenced to a life term , he could benefit from a variety of mechanisms to seek to have the sentence invalidated or reduced or to obtain early release .

Concerning the applicant ’s right to invalidate or reduce his sentence , the ORG stated that the applicant would have the right under GPE law to lodge an appeal with ORG , asking for a reversal of his conviction “ based on an error in the proceedings ” . The applicant would also be able to “ ask ORG to review the appropriateness of his sentence ” . He could argue that a life sentence was “ unreasonable ” in the circumstances of his case . The report also stated that even after the applicant had exhausted his rights at trial and on appeal , he could under GPE law file “ a motion in the trial court claiming that his life sentence was imposed ‘ in violation of the LAW or the laws of ORG , or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence , or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law , or is otherwise subject to collateral attack ” .

Concerning the applicant ’s right to obtain early release , the report specifically stated that “ since DATE , there has been no federal parole system in GPE ” . The applicant , however , could ask for early release if he provided substantial assistance after his conviction and the imposition of his sentence . In addition , GPE law also allowed for compassionate release under section ORG of Title CARDINAL of LAW . The report specifically stressed that ORG could reduce the applicant ’s sentence if it found that there was “ an extraordinary and compelling reason to do so ; for example , if a medical condition arose with PERSON that would warrant such a modification ” . Finally , the applicant could also seek executive clemency in the form of commutation ( reduction ) of his sentence . The report noted that in cases similar to the applicant ’s , commutation of life sentences was not “ a rare occurrence ” . It gave as an example that of CARDINAL DATE , when President PERSON had commuted the life sentences of “ CARDINAL persons who had been convicted of drug related offenses ” .

On DATE the interim measures under Rule CARDINAL were extended and the ORG requested that the ORG stay the applicant ’s extradition to GPE while the proceedings were pending before the ORG .


George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney

The applicant , GPE , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and resides in GPE .

In DATE the applicant , a police officer , was arrested and charged with what he describes as serious sexual offences . His trial took place in DATE and he was acquitted . He was permitted to return to police work in DATE , although subject to certain unspecified restrictions . Moreover , the applicant states that because of his relatively uncommon name it is easy to find news reports on the Internet about the charges brought against him , his trial and his acquittal .

In light of the seriousness of the charges , information about them will be retained by the police until the date of his CARDINALth birthday in accordance with current policy , and may be disclosed in certain circumstances as explained below . The applicant did not take any domestic legal proceedings in relation to his complaint .

The law and practice in relation to the retention and disclosure by police of personal information ( arrests , charges , convictions , acquittals and so forth ) which were current at the time of the applicant ’s trial are referred to the ORG ’s judgment in GPE v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE ( see § § DATE regarding retention and § § CARDINAL regarding disclosure ) .

In summary , and as the applicant has indicated , under LAW , information relating to the charges brought against him as well as the fact of his acquittal will be retained on ORG until DATE birthday . The Guidelines make detailed provision for the “ stepping - down ” of information held by the police . Information that has been “ stepped down ” is accessible only to the police . None of the other bodies with which police forces share information may gain access to it . Where a person has been acquitted , the information is stepped down immediately . It would only be disclosed as part of an enhanced criminal record check if the police decided that it was relevant to the purpose of such a request and not disproportionate to do so .


Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for home)

Erik Møse;Yonko Grozev;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

In DATE GPE , the applicant ’s future husband and his parents living in corporate housing ( “ flat A ” ) owned by “ GPE ” , a ORG company ( hereinafter “ the GPE company ” ) , were offered the chance by the latter to exchange this accommodation for larger corporate housing accommodation ( “ flat B ” ) , which was also owned by ORG . Having accepted this offer , the CARDINAL of them signed a written undertaking to vacate flat A when they moved to flat B.

NORP In DATE the applicant married PERSON and joined him , his parents and brother to live in flat A.

In DATE the applicant ’s and ORG ’s son was born . Along with the applicant , he was registered by the local authority as a co - tenant of flat A on the grounds that both of them had become members of the original tenants’ family .

In DATE the GPE company transferred ownership of flat A to the municipality .

At various subsequent dates the applicant ’s husband and parents - in - law moved out into flat B and registered their residence at the new address .

According to the Government , the applicant and her son also moved into flat B at the material time .

According to the applicant , she and her son remained residents in flat A , as her marriage with ORG was falling apart and living together had become intolerable .

In DATE V.D. and the applicant divorced .

On DATE the GPE company decided to reallocate flat A to the family of NORP , its employee , who lived in an accommodation hall ( гуртожиток ) .

NORP In DATE the GPE company lodged a claim in the Kalush ORG , seeking , in particular , to evict the applicant and her son from flat LAW It argued that there was no legal basis for them to remain in the property , which had been reallocated to a new tenant ( NORP ) .

On DATE the court dismissed the claim for the eviction of the applicant and her son . It found , in particular , that the applicant had lawfully moved into flat A as a member of the original tenants’ family and so had acquired all the rights of a social tenant , within the meaning of Article CARDINAL of LAW ( DATE ) . She and her son had never promised to relocate and had remained residents of flat A at the material time . They had not been included in the occupancy voucher ( « ордер ORG ) of flat B and had not been provided with any other housing . They could therefore not be evicted without being provided with alternative accommodation . Moreover , in DATE the GPE company had transferred flat A to municipal ownership . It had therefore had no standing in DATE to reallocate the same flat to NORP ’s family or to bring the present proceedings .

NORP The GPE company appealed , referring to LAW .

On DATE the GPE - Frankivsk ORG of Appeal quashed the judgment of DATE and ordered the applicant ’s and her son ’s eviction “ without provision of any other accommodation ” . It held that ORG , having properly established the relevant facts , had interpreted the law incorrectly . Notably , according to ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW , the applicant ( together with her son ) – having settled in flat A as a member of the original tenants’ family – was bound by the duty of the original tenants to vacate the flat . There was therefore no legal basis for the applicant ’s and her son ’s continued residency in flat A , and this fact constituted a sufficient basis for their eviction without the provision of any other housing . Furthermore , ORG had erred in respect of the GPE company ’s legal standing . Under LAW of LAW , notwithstanding the transfer of the property to the municipality , the GPE company had retained the right to allocate the flat to CARDINAL of its employees . It had therefore had legitimate standing to seek the vacation of the flat by its previous tenants .

The applicant lodged a request for leave to appeal in cassation . She noted that she and her minor son had been lawful and registered residents of the disputed flat for DATE . During this period , she had dutifully engaged in the payment of all expenses relating to her occupancy of the flat . Unlike her former husband and in - laws , she and her son had not given any promises to vacate flat A and had not acquired any rights to live in flat B with them . Accordingly , her and her son ’s eviction would effectively render them homeless .

On DATE ORG of GPE rejected the applicant ’s request for leave to appeal in cassation , ruling that her submissions did not contain any argument creating an appearance that there could be a problem under applicable law .

On DATE the applicant requested ORG to postpone her eviction , in particular , because she had no other accommodation and her salary was too small for her to rent private - sector housing .

On DATE , while the applicant ’s request was pending consideration , the ORG bailiffs arrived at flat A and had the applicant vacate it and surrender the keys .

On DATE the local registration authority annulled the applicant ’s and her son ’s registration as residents of flat A.

On DATE ORG allowed the applicant ’s request for her and her son ’s eviction to be postponed ; it postponed their eviction for DATE , referring to her indigent status and the interests of a minor child .

According to the applicant , after her eviction she had to seek emergency refuge in the home of a colleague and subsequently rented odd accommodations at various places . She submitted testimony given by various acquaintances and copies of some fixed - term lease agreements .

The Government contested this account , insisting that the lease agreements were fictitious and the applicant had de facto lived in flat B permanently since DATE without proper registration .


No violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression)

András Sajó;Iulia Motoc;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

At the relevant time , the applicant was a chief corporal in ORG ( ORG ) , working at the PERSON territorial post .

On DATE the applicant sent an email to ORG ( Inspecção - Geral da Administração Interna ) on the subject “ Suspected misuse of money ” , in which he made reference to an alleged misuse of money by Commander PERSON of the PERSON territorial post in accordance with what he had heard in a conversation with colleagues at the PERSON territorial post . He asked ORG to investigate the alleged facts , stating as follows :

“ In DATE the ORG [ ORG ] ORG distributed money to the territorial posts of its area of command ... for the DATE dinner ...

The only members of the military [ in Arganil ] who attended the dinner were the Commander of the post and Corporal PERSON ; the total amount of money that had been given to the military from the [ territorial ] post [ to pay for the dinner ] was paid to the restaurant ’s manager in exchange for a receipt ... it seems that the Commander has since then been going with his family to the mentioned restaurant , where the cost of his meals is deducted from the money that was not spent [ on the above dinner ] ... Note : I have just become aware of this matter through rumours within the military of the mentioned post , who claim that they have not reported the situation for fear of reprisals , and because of that [ fear of reprisals ] I ask you for secrecy during the investigation because I am also a member of the military ... ”

On an unknown date ORG forwarded the email to ORG ( ORG ) and to the PERSON public prosecutor ’s office ( PERSON ) .

On an unknown date the PERSON public prosecutor ’s office opened an investigation into the applicant ’s allegations . On DATE the PERSON public prosecutor ’s office discontinued the proceedings on the grounds that , following investigations by the criminal investigation police ( ORG ) , it had found no evidence of the criminal offence denounced by the applicant .

The General Inspectorate of Internal Administration also conducted an inquiry into the applicant ’s allegations . On DATE the inquiry was discontinued .

The General Command of ORG also started an internal inquiry into the allegations on DATE . On DATE Commander PERSON was heard in that respect . He then became aware of the email of DATE and its content . On CARDINAL DATE the inquiry was converted into disciplinary proceedings against Commander PERSON at the request of the official in charge of the inquiry on the grounds that the management of the cafeteria of the PERSON territorial post showed signs of lack of transparency which required further investigation .

On DATE the disciplinary proceedings against Commander PERSON were discontinued on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to take disciplinary action . The decision to discontinue the disciplinary proceedings also took into account the decision of the PERSON public prosecutor ’s office to discontinue the criminal proceedings against Commander PERSON

On DATE Commander PERSON lodged a criminal complaint before the PERSON public prosecutor ’s office , accusing the applicant of defamation . He alleged that the applicant ’s email had disseminated injurious statements about him .

On DATE the public prosecutor brought charges ( acusação ) against the applicant for aggravated defamation on the grounds that the statements made in his email called into question Commander PERSON ’s honesty , honour and professional reputation , which the applicant had intentionally attacked .

On DATE Commander PERSON lodged a claim for damages against the applicant in the amount of MONEY ( ORG ) .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG convicted the applicant of aggravated defamation and sentenced him to CARDINAL day - fines , totalling ORG CARDINAL . The applicant was also ordered to pay ORG CARDINAL in damages to Commander PERSON ORG described its findings of fact and the manner in which it had assessed the evidence , and held as follows :

“ ... since the existence of such a rumor has not been proved in any way , the court is fully convinced that the defendant ’s intention was to undermine the honour of the offended party , once he knew that this was just a rumour and that therefore he was making an allegation that was not true .

The allegation made in the defendant ’s complaint , by its content , put into question the offended party ’s honesty , honour and professional reputation as commander of a territorial post of ORG – which was well known to the defendant .

The defendant has therefore acted in a free , voluntary and conscious way , with the achieved aim of attacking the offended party ’s honour and personal and professional reputation .

The disclosure of irregular situations has to be seen as a duty ( as the performance of an obligation ) when it falls within the competence and responsibilities of the whistle - blower and when it does not go beyond the facts which were effectively observed . [ Whistle - blowing ] can not be used as a basis to cast suspicion which can not be supported by any factual element .

In the instant case , the defendant accuses the offended party of facts which are objectively dishonorable without having any evidence to substantiate them . Indeed , by submitting that the offended party and his family were using the existing credit to have dinner at the mentioned restaurant , the defendant knew that he was accusing the offended party of a dishonorable deed , all the more because he knew that the offended party was in charge of ORG PERSON territorial post . He further knew that the allegation was inconsistent with the truth and that he could easily have clarified its authenticity with the restaurant owner .

Through such conduct , the defendant acted of his own free will and in the knowledge that ... [ his actions ] were not allowed . ”

On an unknown date the applicant appealed against the judgment to ORG . In particular , he contested the established facts as , in his opinion , he had not acted with the intention of attacking Commander PERSON ’s honour and reputation .

On DATE ORG upheld the first - instance court ’s decision . It considered that there were no reasons to change the facts established by the first - instance court and , as such , no reasons to reach a different conclusion with regard to the applicant ’s guilt and conviction .

On DATE ORG of ORG instituted disciplinary proceedings against the applicant .

On DATE the official in charge of the inquiry within the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant submitted a final report in which he concluded that the applicant had breached his duties . The relevant passage of the report reads as follows :

“ ... the defendant breached the duty of loyalty ... as being on duty and being part of ORG in the quality of Deputy Commander of the ORG , he did not inform his hierarchical superiors , in clear disregard of the functional hierarchy principles , of the acts allegedly committed ... ”

NORP In the report it was also taken into account that the applicant ’s allegations had been investigated by different authorities , all of which had discontinued their investigations . Additionally , it had regard to the fact that the applicant had been convicted by the domestic courts in the criminal proceedings against him . The report further analysed the existence of a fine which Commander PERSON had imposed on the applicant before the latter had sent the impugned email . However , the official responsible for the report considered that fact to be innocuous and irrelevant .

On DATE , at the request of the official responsible for the disciplinary proceedings , ORG imposed on the applicant a disciplinary sanction consisting of suspension from duty for DATE , its enforcement being suspended for a period of DATE .

According to the material submitted in the case file , it seems that the applicant did not lodge an appeal against the disciplinary sanction with the Minister of ORG .


CASE OF TRAPEZNIKOVA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA

Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect)

Alena Poláčková;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicants , PERSON , PERSON and PERSON , are NORP nationals who were born in DATE , DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE . The applicants are members of the family of Mr PERSON .

On DATE Mr PERSON started serving a DATE prison sentence in correctional colony no . IK-CARDINAL in LOC . When examined by a doctor on DATE , he stated that following a craniocerebral injury he had been under psychiatric supervision since DATE and that he had been suffering from drug addiction since DATE .

On DATE Mr PERSON had swallowed several metal objects , including a spoon , and had cut himself on his stomach . On DATE he had been taken to hospital and had been treated until DATE .

On DATE Mr PERSON was transferred to disciplinary cell no . CARDINAL for smoking outside the designated area . On DATE he complained of a headache and of feeling ill . At TIME PERSON examined Mr PERSON , noted that he had high blood pressure and gave him an injection . On the doctor ’s recommendation , Mr PERSON was transferred to another cell in the disciplinary section , where he was detained alone . As requested by the doctor , he was provided with bed linen . Doctor PERSON examined Mr NORP again at TIME and noted that his condition had improved . At TIME the cell where Mr PERSON was held was locked and the alarm system was turned on . The guards in charge of the disciplinary cells observed Mr PERSON at TIME on DATE through a peephole in the cell door . He was lying on his bed . During the next round of visits at TIME the guards saw Mr PERSON , hanging . They reported this to the duty officer . After entering the cell , the officers discovered Mr PERSON hanging by a ligature fashioned out of a bed sheet . They cut the rope and put his body on the floor . Doctor PERSON examined Mr LOC ’s body and noted no injuries apart from the ligature mark on his neck .

According to the death certificate , Mr PERSON died on DATE .

According to an autopsy conducted on DATE , the cause of death was asphyxiation by hanging . In addition to the ligature mark on his neck , the forensic expert PERSON . documented bruises on the deceased ’s head behind the left ear , at the corner of his right eye , on the right cheek and on the right side of the lower jaw . The expert decided against conducting a histological examination given that he had no doubts about the cause of PERSON PERSON ’s death .

On an unspecified date the acting head of the correctional colony conducted an internal inquiry . He established that despite Mr PERSON ’s condition the administration of the correctional colony had not provided him with any psychiatric supervision or treatment . It had been obvious from Mr LOC ’s case file that he had had suicidal tendencies .

On DATE the deputy city prosecutor PERSON refused to institute a criminal investigation into Mr PERSON ’s death . The investigator based his decision on the reports filed by Doctor PERSON and the officers who had discovered Mr PERSON ’s body , the report on the inspection of the cell where Mr PERSON had been found and on his body , and on his medical file . He also questioned prisoners GPE . , PERSON and PERSON . who had been detained with the deceased in cell no . DATE , where he had been held prior to his removal to a cell where he was found . They submitted that they had not had any conflicts with him .

On DATE the first applicant asked the regional prosecutor to institute a criminal investigation into Mr PERSON ’s death . Referring to the numerous injuries on Mr PERSON ’s body , she challenged the official version that he had committed suicide by hanging himself .

On DATE the city prosecutor PERSON quashed the decision of CARDINAL DATE and ordered a further inquiry into the circumstances of PERSON PERSON ’s death . Referring to the first applicant ’s complaint , he considered it necessary to determine the existence and origin of the injuries on Mr PERSON ’s body .

On DATE deputy city prosecutor PERSON refused to open a criminal investigation into Mr PERSON ’s death . The prosecutor again questioned PERSON , PERSON . and GPE . , who had been detained with Mr PERSON in cell no . CARDINAL on DATE . They submitted that it had been very stuffy in the cell and that at TIME Mr PERSON had complained of a headache . He had been sitting at the table , had stood up and had then fallen down , hitting his head against the table . They had not noticed any injuries on Mr PERSON . The prosecutor concluded that Mr PERSON had committed suicide by hanging himself .

On DATE the first applicant appealed against the decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the deputy regional prosecutor A. quashed the decision of CARDINAL DATE and ordered a further inquiry . He noted that it was necessary to obtain information concerning Mr PERSON ’s health , to determine whether the medical assistance provided to him had been sufficient and prompt and to establish whether it had been known that PERSON PERSON had intended to commit suicide . The prosecutor also ordered the noose used by PERSON to be found and for it to be examined . Lastly , the prosecutor noted that the inquiry had failed to take into account the injuries on Mr PERSON ’s head and that it was necessary to determine their origin and whether they had had any connection with his death .

On DATE investigator GPE . refused to open a criminal investigation into Mr PERSON ’s death , repeating verbatim the findings of the previous inquiry .

On DATE a supervising prosecutor quashed the decision of CARDINAL DATE as premature and unsubstantiated .

On DATE investigator GPE . again refused to open a criminal investigation into Mr PERSON ’s death . In addition to the earlier findings the investigator examined Mr PERSON ’s medical file . He again questioned Doctor PERSON about the state of Mr LOC ’s health on DATE . The doctor explained that following the treatment he had been given Mr PERSON had been in a satisfactory condition and that it had been possible to leave him alone in a cell . The investigator also questioned the forensic medical expert PERSON . , who had conducted the autopsy . The expert considered that the injuries on Mr PERSON ’s head could have been due to convulsions which had caused an impact with blunt , solid objects .

On DATE the supervising prosecutor dismissed the first applicant ’s complaint against the decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the first deputy head of the regional investigative committee quashed the decision of DATE and ordered a further inquiry , noting that the prosecutor ’s instructions of CARDINAL DATE had not been followed .

On DATE investigator Am . refused to institute criminal proceedings . Relying on the materials of the previous inquiries , the investigator confirmed the earlier finding that Mr PERSON had committed suicide . The investigator could not establish the cause and time of the injuries on Mr PERSON ’s body , but he noted that they were not related to his death .

On DATE the head of the regional investigative committee quashed the decision of DATE .

On DATE investigator PERSON again refused to open a criminal investigation , relying on the earlier findings . On CARDINAL DATE that decision was quashed on the grounds of the incompleteness of the inquiry .

The investigating authorities subsequently refused to open a criminal investigation into Mr PERSON ’s death on DATE and CARDINAL DATE . On DATE and CARDINAL DATE respectively the supervising prosecutor quashed those decisions and ordered a further inquiry into the matter , noting each time that the inquiry had been incomplete and the findings contradictory . In particular , on DATE , the regional prosecutor noted that the reports of CARDINAL DATE and DATE concerning the inspection of the cell where PERSON PERSON had been found had given different and mutually contradictory descriptions of the layout of the cell .

On an unspecified date a senior investigator , PERSON , started another inquiry in response to the first applicant ’s complaint . The investigator questioned the correctional colony officers who had been on duty on DATE to CARDINAL DATE and had seen or observed Mr PERSON on DATE . She also saw PERSON . , the prison psychiatrist , and a drug counsellor , PERSON . Ozh . stated that he had never seen Mr PERSON or prescribed him any psychiatric supervision or treatment . After studying Mr PERSON ’s medical file , the investigator established that he had a history of drug addiction , CARDINAL instance of self - harming and had undergone treatment in a psychiatric institution prior to his incarceration . The investigator noted that the cell where PERSON PERSON had been found dead had been mistakenly indicated in the inquiry case file as no . DATE and conducted an examination of cell no . CARDINAL . On DATE the investigator talked to the forensic expert PERSON . , who submitted that his superior had advised him against making any written statements about the autopsy . If necessary , the investigator could question him as a witness within the framework of the criminal proceedings . On CARDINAL DATE S. concluded that Mr PERSON had committed suicide and refused to open a criminal investigation into his death . She also considered that the injuries found on Mr PERSON ’s head had resulted from convulsions which had caused his body to repeatedly strike against a metal grill .

The senior investigator ’s decision was subjected to judicial review at CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction . On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the ORG of GPE and ORG respectively upheld the investigator ’s findings on Mr PERSON ’s death .