CASE OF LÓPEZ RIBALDA  AND OTHERS v. SPAIN

Remainder inadmissible (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria;Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Alena Poláčková;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

At the time of the events the applicants were all working as cashiers for ORG , a NORP family - owned supermarket chain .

At DATE the applicants’ employer noticed some irregularities between the supermarket stock levels and what was actually sold on a DATE basis . In particular , the shop supervisor identified losses in excess of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL in DATE , ORG DATE , ORG CARDINAL in DATE , ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL in DATE and ORG CARDINAL in DATE .

NORP In order to investigate and put an end to the economic losses , on DATE the employer installed surveillance cameras consisting of both visible and hidden cameras . The purpose of the visible cameras was to record possible customer thefts and they were pointed toward the entrances and exits of the supermarket . The purpose of the hidden cameras was to record and control possible employee thefts and they were zoomed in on the checkout counters , which covered the area behind the cash desk . The company gave its workers prior notice of the installation of the visible cameras . Neither they nor the company ’s staff committee were informed of the hidden cameras .

On DATE and DATE all the workers suspected of theft were called to individual meetings . During those meetings the applicants admitted their involvement in the thefts in the presence of the union representative and the company ’s legal representative .

Hereafter and for the sake of clarity , the applicants will be referred to as the first , second , third , fourth and fifth applicants ( see the attached ORG ) .

On DATE and DATE the applicants were dismissed on disciplinary grounds : they had been caught on video helping co - workers and customers steal items and stealing them themselves . According to their letters of dismissal , the security cameras had caught them scanning items from the grocery baskets of customers and co - workers and afterwards cancelling the purchases . Security cameras had also caught them allowing customers and co - workers to leave the store with merchandise that had not been paid for .

NORP On DATE the first applicant brought proceedings for unfair dismissal before ORG no.CARDINAL ( hereinafter “ the Employment Tribunal ” ) . DATE the second applicant brought similar proceedings before ORG in a joint application with the third , fourth and fifth applicants ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

In the framework of the proceedings both applicants objected to the use of the covert video surveillance , arguing that it had breached their right to protection of their privacy .

On DATE ORG issued CARDINAL judgments ruling against the applicants , declaring both dismissals fair . The main evidence supporting the fairness of their dismissals was the recordings resulting from the covert surveillance , as well as the witness statements of co - workers dismissed for their involvement in the thefts , the shop manager , the union representative and the company ’s legal representative .

The Employment Tribunal found in both judgments – as regards these CARDINAL applicants in DATE that the use of covert video surveillance in the workplace without prior notice had been in accordance with LAW ) , which allowed an employer to use monitoring and surveillance measures which he or she deemed appropriate to verify that an employee was fulfilling his or her employment duties , as long as the employer respected “ human dignity ” . This had been confirmed by ORG in several judgments ( see , among other authorities , judgment CARDINAL of DATE ) . According to ORG case - law , an employer ’s right to adopt organisational arrangements and act as a disciplinary authority had to be weighed against an employee ’s fundamental right to privacy recognised under LAW . In cases where there were substantiated suspicions of theft , special circumstances justified interference with an employee ’s right to privacy , which was considered to be appropriate to the legitimate aim pursued , necessary and proportionate . Following this case - law , ORG , having regard to the evidence before it , found that the employer had had sufficient grounds to conclude that the applicants’ conduct amounted to a “ breach of contractual good faith and abuse of trust ” and thus declared both dismissals fair in conformity with LAW .

The applicants appealed before ORG GPE on DATE respectively . On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the court upheld both first - instance judgments , referring to ORG case - law and endorsing ORG finding that the defendant party had been authorised to carry out the covert video surveillance of the cash desks . While acknowledging that it was possible that the employer could face an administrative sanction for not informing its employees and the staff committee in advance of the installation of the cameras , that fact alone had no relevance from a constitutional point of view , since from that perspective the covert video surveillance had been justified ( in that there had been reasonable suspicions of theft ) , appropriate to the legitimate aim pursued , necessary and proportionate . Consequently , their dismissals had been justified on the same grounds as already stated by ORG .

The applicants brought cassation appeals , which were declared inadmissible on CARDINAL DATE and DATE respectively . Ultimately the applicants lodged amparo appeals with ORG , which were declared inadmissible on DATE and DATE respectively , due to the “ non - existence of a violation of a fundamental right ” .

On DATE and DATE the applicants were dismissed on disciplinary grounds : they had been caught on video helping co - workers and customers steal items and stealing them themselves . According to the employer , the security cameras had caught the third applicant scanning items from the grocery baskets of customers and co - workers and afterwards voiding the receipts . Security cameras had also caught her allowing customers or co - workers to leave the store with merchandise that had not been paid for . As regards the fourth and fifth applicants , security cameras had caught them stealing goods with the help of their co - workers , such as the second applicant .

On DATE that they were dismissed all CARDINAL applicants signed a document called a “ settlement agreement ” ( acuerdo transaccional ) , by which they committed themselves not to bring proceedings against their employer for unfair dismissal , while the employer committed itself not to bring criminal charges against them for theft . In the meetings CARDINAL union representative and the company ’s legal representative were also present .

NORP Despite the settlement agreements , on DATE the applicants , together with the second applicant ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , brought proceedings for unfair dismissal before ORG . According to the applicants , the settlement agreements had to be declared void . They claimed that the consent they had given was not valid , since they had been under duress at the time they had signed the settlement agreements ( a company representative had allegedly threatened to bring criminal proceedings against them if they did not sign the agreements ) . They also argued that the evidence derived from the covert video surveillance had been obtained illegally .

On DATE ORG ruled against the applicants and declared the dismissals fair . It carefully analysed the settlement agreements signed by the applicants . In particular , it addressed their allegation of invalid consent , finding that there was no evidence proving the existence of any kind of duress or intention to commit a crime ( dolo ) at the time the applicants had signed the settlement agreements . The court concluded that the applicants had signed the settlement agreements freely and voluntarily with the clear purpose of avoiding criminal proceedings for the alleged thefts they had been accused of ( and to which they had already confessed ) . Further evidence as to the lack of any threat or coercion was the fact that other employees in the same situation as the applicants ( such as the first and second applicants ) had refused to sign the settlement agreements . Accordingly , the settlement agreements were declared valid under LAW and , consequently , ORG ruled against the third , fourth and fifth applicants . As the signing of the settlement agreements rendered their dismissals fair , the use and analysis of the impugned videos as evidence in the proceedings was deemed unnecessary .

The applicants appealed before ORG GPE on DATE . On DATE it upheld the first - instance judgment and endorsed ORG finding that the settlement agreement signed by the applicants was valid . The court also analysed , for the sake of clarity , the legality of the covert video surveillance . Referring to ORG case - law , it confirmed that the defendant party had been authorised to carry out the covert video surveillance on the applicants .

The applicants brought a joint cassation appeal , which was declared inadmissible on DATE . Ultimately , they lodged a joint amparo appeal with ORG , alleging a violation of ORG DATE and CARDINAL of the LAW . It was declared inadmissible on DATE due to the “ non - existence of a violation of a fundamental right ” .


André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Erik Møse;Mārtiņš Mits;Síofra O’Leary;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by Mr A. GPE , who withdrew from the case on DATE , Mr H. PERSON , and Mr PERSON , lawyers practicing in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their successive former Agents , most recently Mr PERSON of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant entered into a share - purchase agreement ( “ the SPA ” ) with ORG , a company incorporated under the laws of GPE ( “ the GPE company ” ) . By the terms of the ORG , the applicant acquired , for MONEY ( ORG ) , a PERCENT stake in ORG ( hereinafter “ the tobacco company ” ) , a company co - founded by the ORG company and incorporated under NORP law . PERCENT of the shares were owned by PERSON . ( “ the minority shareholder ” ) .

The applicant and Mr Y.A.L. , a duly authorised representative of the ORG company , both arrived in GPE in TIME of DATE with the specific purpose of signing the LOC . At FAC they were welcomed by Mr GPE , a friend of the applicant , Mr PERSON , a lawyer then authorised to act on behalf of the tobacco company and subsequently implicated in the unconfirmed allegations of and criminal proceedings related to the fabrication of a power of attorney on the applicant ’s behalf ( see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) , and PERSON . , a notary public registered in GPE ( “ the first notary public ” ) .

Without leaving the airport building , the applicant and Mr ORG signed the ORG which was then certified by the first notary public . In addition , the notary certified a power of attorney by which Mr Y.A.L. was authorised to represent the applicant and to sign official documents on his behalf .

On DATE , a certain Mr GPE ceded to the applicant his claim against the tobacco company with a value of GPE CARDINAL ( approximately MONEY ( ORG ) ) . The contract did not stipulate any obligations on the applicant ’s behalf in exchange for the said cession .

On DATE Mr A.Y. ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) instituted proceedings against the applicant before FAC , indicating PERSON ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) as the applicant ’s representative .

Mr GPE claimed that on DATE he had entered into an agreement with the applicant according to which the former had ceded to the latter a claim to the tobacco company with a value of ORG ( EUR CARDINAL ) . He further asserted that in exchange for the cession , the applicant should have paid him “ a certain amount of money ” by DATE . Owing to the applicant ’s alleged failure to perform that obligation , PERSON GPE demanded the annulment of the agreement of DATE and the restoration of the situation existing before the alleged breach of the contractual duty .

At the main hearing of DATE Mr PERSON ( “ the applicant ’s alleged representative ” ) presented a power of attorney authorising him to represent the applicant ( “ the power of attorney ” ) . The document was dated DATE and indicated the handwritten name “ PERSON ” together with the alleged signature of the applicant . It was certified by a notary public , PERSON ( “ the second notary public ” ) .

During the hearing of DATE , PERSON raised the value of his claim to CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) . Neither the revised nor the original claim contained any reference to supporting documentation . The applicant ’s alleged representative acknowledged the debt allegedly owed by the applicant to Mr GPE At the suggestion of Judge PERSON , the parties agreed to settle the case . As per the friendly settlement agreement , the applicant ’s alleged representative agreed to transfer the ownership of PERCENT of the shares in the tobacco company to Mr GPE The settlement was endorsed by LOC in a decision of DATE ( “ the decision of DATE ” ) .

Judge PERSON issued a writ of enforcement immediately , despite the statutory appeal period of DATE and on DATE Mr A.Y. was listed in ORG as the owner of PERCENT of the shares in the tobacco company .

On DATE a purchase agreement was concluded between Mr A.Y. and the minority shareholder of the tobacco company ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) whereby the latter acquired the former ’s shares in the tobacco company by means of cancelling an outstanding debt stemming from a contract concluded between them on DATE . The minority shareholder consequently became the PERCENT shareholder of the tobacco company .

The property in question became the subject of various subsequent transactions among third parties . In DATE the applicant obtained an extract from ORG revealing that the minority shareholder had sold PERCENT of shares in the tobacco company to a certain ORG , a company registered in GPE .

On DATE the applicant lodged an interlocutory complaint against the decision of DATE on account of not having been summoned to the hearing and having been represented by an unauthorised person based on a forged power of attorney . He argued that he had become aware of the dispute only on DATE .

On DATE the complaint was declared inadmissible by Judge PERSON The judge noted that there was no need to summon a party if a duly authorised representative were present . Additionally , the decision had become res judicata and no interlocutory appeal lay against it .

On DATE the examination of the applicant ’s appeal against the decision of CARDINAL DATE was stayed on account of the non - payment of the court fees and he was asked to correct the error .

On DATE the appeal was left unexamined owing to the failure to pay the court fees . The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against that decision arguing that he had given the necessary sum to his representative who , for an unknown reason , had apparently failed to proceed with the payment . It does not appear that the applicant instituted criminal proceedings against the representative on that account . The applicant requested that the decision of DATE be quashed and that the examination of his complaint continue .

As a result of several interlocutory appeals and decisions , on DATE ORG remitted the case to the appellate court to consider the admissibility of the applicant ’s interlocutory appeal against DATE decision ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the appellate court considered the interlocutory appeal lodged against its DATE decision and found it inadmissible . The court noted that the applicant had failed to pay the court fees at the time his appeal was lodged ; nor had he done so after receiving the court ’s notice and a deadline to correct the procedural error . The reason advanced by the applicant to justify the failure , namely that he had personally paid the sum to the representative , who had allegedly failed to execute the payment , was not considered a valid justification for the procedural shortcoming .

On DATE in a final decision ORG rejected the applicant ’s complaint against the decision of CARDINAL DATE as inadmissible . It reasoned that the applicant had not alleged a violation of procedural rules by the lower courts in rejecting his interlocutory appeal and that his argument concerning the alleged misappropriation of the court fees by his representative was not valid grounds to set the domestic courts’ decisions aside .

On DATE the applicant lodged an application with FAC to have the final decision of DATE quashed and the proceedings reopened owing to the court ’s failure to ensure the attendance of a party , as provided by LAW ( b ) of LAW ( “ the ORG ” ) ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Relying on a private forensic report dated DATE he further argued that the power of attorney presented by PERSON had been forged .

On DATE the first - instance court found the application inadmissible . It reasoned , among others , that the application to have the decision of DATE quashed had been time - barred . It referred to the DATE time - limit under LAW of the ORG , which had started to run after the applicant had become aware of the grounds for his application . The court found that , in view of the applicant ’s interlocutory proceedings on the matter instituted on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , he had become aware of such grounds well before the lodging of his application on DATE .

On DATE the applicant ’s interlocutory complaint against the decision of DATE was declared inadmissible .

On DATE the NORP ORG , sitting as a court of final instance , upheld the lower court ’s findings and declared the application inadmissible as time - barred .

On DATE the applicant lodged an application with ORG for the annulment of the purchase agreement of DATE by which Mr GPE had sold a PERCENT interest in the tobacco company to the minority shareholder in exchange for having his outstanding debt cancelled ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . He argued that Mr A.Y. had not been authorised to manage the property , which he had got hold of illegally , and that the impugned agreement had been based on a fraudulent power of attorney .

After a series of decisions on procedure , jurisdiction , and postponements , the court of first instance dismissed the application on DATE . It found that the criminal proceedings which had been terminated on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) had not confirmed the forging of the impugned power of attorney . That decision of the prosecuting authorities had been upheld by the first - instance and appellate courts on DATE and DATE respectively ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) . Accordingly , the purchase agreement had been concluded by the lawful owner of the property [ Mr GPE ] , rendering the applicant ’s complaint unfounded . The applicant appealed on DATE .

On DATE the applicant was asked by the appellate court to indicate the value of his claim and to pay the court fees accordingly . The latter requested that the value be designated as indeterminate . The appellate court indicated to the applicant that the interest underlying the impugned contract was determined and the court fees amounted to PERCENT of that sum , capped at CARDINAL NORP laris ( GEL ) .

Eventually , on DATE , after sending the applicant a final warning concerning the consequences of non - payment of the court fees to the amount of GEL CARDINAL , and in the absence of further information from the applicant , ORG left the appeal unexamined .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the applicant lodged CARDINAL applications for damages against Mr PERSON , Ms GPE . , Mr GPE , Mr GPE ( the latter ’s lawyer ) , and the minority shareholder ( Mr A.Ts . ) , as well as the tobacco company . It appears from the case - file and the applicant ’s submissions before the ORG , that these were subsequently abandoned in favour of his third application ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE , the applicant lodged a third application for damages in respect of pecuniary and non - pecuniary damage caused by criminal activities . The claim was based on the verdict of CARDINAL DATE reached as a result of the plea - bargain agreement between PERSON and Ms K.Ch . ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The applicant applied for an exemption from the court fees under LAW ( c ) of the ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the ORG dismissed the application of DATE owing to the absence of a final conviction in a criminal case , as the criminal proceedings had been reopened ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE ORG upheld the lower court ’s decision on the same grounds .

On DATE ORG asked the applicant to pay the court fees to have his appeal on points of law considered . On DATE the applicant submitted to the court a statement claiming exemption from the court fees under LAW ( c ) of the ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE ORG ruled that the applicant was not entitled to the exemption owing to the absence of a final conviction in a criminal case and ordered the applicant to pay the fees within DATE . It does not appear that the applicant attempted to either comply with that decision or challenge it . His appeal on points of law was therefore left unexamined owing to the failure to pay the court fees .

On DATE the applicant applied to ORG , asking it to quash the decision of DATE and to reopen the civil proceedings under LAW ( a ) and ( c ) and QUANTITY of the ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) in view of newly discovered circumstances . As such , the applicant referred to the final judgment of CARDINAL DATE , reached as a result of the plea - bargain agreement between Mr PERSON and PERSON . in relation to the falsification of the power of attorney of DATE that had enabled PERSON to cede the applicant ’s property on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s application . It referred to the relevant criminal proceedings on the matter and reasoned that the decision to close the criminal case had become final on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Accordingly , considering the absence of a crime confirmed by a final judgment , the grounds to reopen the case under LAW ( a ) and ( c ) did not exist .

On DATE the ORG upheld , in a final decision , the lower court ’s finding on the same grounds .

On DATE the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the finance police , the agency responsible for investigating financial crimes , and ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) . He reported that he had never given Mr PERSON any authority to represent him and that the power of attorney presented to LOC on DATE had been forged .

On DATE the finance police opened a criminal case concerning the allegation of fraud and misappropriation of the applicant ’s shares in the tobacco company . Various witnesses were questioned in the course of the preliminary investigation .

During the proceedings , several forensic reports were commissioned by the applicant , the investigating authorities , and the defendants concerning the validity of the power of attorney . Specifically , CARDINAL forensic reports were carried out by ORG experts on the initiative of the investigating authorities , CARDINAL alternative forensic report was implemented by a private expert institution at the request of the defendant , and another alternative expert report was carried out on the applicant ’s initiative . The respective findings are set out below .

On DATE an expert of ORG issued an opinion ( “ the first ORG forensic report ” ) , according to which neither the handwritten name “ PERSON ” nor the signature made in the name of the applicant on the power of attorney of DATE belonged to the applicant .

On DATE an expert of ORG confirmed ( “ the second ORG forensic report ” ) the findings of the first forensic report . On DATE , the applicant was recognised as a victim and a civil claimant in the criminal case . The second notary public , PERSON . , was charged and remanded . Mr PERSON was charged as well , but , as his whereabouts were unknown , he was declared wanted by the prosecution .

DATE an alternative expert examination was carried out on PERSON . ’s request . The private expert concluded ( “ the first alternative forensic report ” ) that whilst the signature did not belong to the applicant , the handwritten name “ PERSON ” did .

On DATE the investigator of the finance police in charge of the criminal case ordered another graphological examination of the signature by a panel of experts from ORG and ORG in view of the findings reached by a private expert in the first alternative forensic report ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the forensic examination was conducted by the panel of experts ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The experts assessed the authenticity of signatures on the impugned power of attorney and the notary public ’s related registry records retrieved from her office . They concluded ( “ the third ORG forensic report ” ) that whilst the signature did not belong to the applicant , the handwritten name “ PERSON ” on both , the power of attorney and the notary ’s registry records did .

On DATE the ORG issued a ruling declaring the prosecution of PERSON and PERSON . terminated and the criminal case closed in view of the inconclusive evidence . The ruling reasoned , inter alia , that the investigative steps which could have been taken in the course of investigation had been exhausted , as had the possibilities to collect any other evidence .

On DATE the applicant appealed against the ORG ’s ruling of DATE and requested the resumption of the investigation which , according to the applicant , had been closed hurriedly and arbitrarily .

DATE . On DATE a NORP forensic expert , following a request by the applicant , produced a forensic report concerning the impugned power of attorney of DATE ( “ the second alternative forensic report ” ) . It concluded that the applicant was not the author of the impugned signature dated DATE .

On DATE , after the applicant ’s complaint of CARDINAL DATE had been examined several times at various court instances , ORG annulled the ORG ’s ruling of DATE . It ordered the resumption of the criminal proceedings as the case had been closed hastily .

On DATE , another graphological expert report was ordered and carried out by the authorities . The experts concluded ( “ the fourth ORG forensic report ” ) that none of the signatures on the impugned power of attorney and in PERSON . ’s notary logbook belonged to the applicant . The following day , PERSON and PERSON . were once again charged with fraud .

According to the applicant , on DATE the deputy head of the finance police initiated friendly settlement negotiations between the parties , which failed when the applicant refused to agree to the terms of the settlement . No evidence except for the applicant ’s unanswered letter addressed to the finance police on that subject was submitted to the ORG in support of this claim .

On DATE the ORG approved a plea - bargain agreement between the ORG and PERSON and PERSON . As a result of that judicial endorsement of the bargain , Mr PERSON and PERSON . ’s guilt became confirmed without a full examination of the merits of the case ( see paragraph DATE above ) . The latter were sentenced to a suspended DATE term of imprisonment , and fined GEL CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL ) , in accordance with the terms of the agreement and LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The judgment became final after the statutory DATE time - limit for appeals had elapsed .

On DATE the CARDINAL convicted persons , Mr PERSON and Ms GPE . , lodged an application with ORG for the restoration of the statutory time - limit to appeal against the judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . They first argued that the judgment of CARDINAL DATE had only been served on them on DATE . Furthermore , relying on Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Code of Criminal Procedure providing for a restoration of a time - limit for appeal based on a valid excuse , they stated that the decision to confess as well as their decision not to appeal in due time had been made under duress as their family had received serious threats by some unidentified persons . In a decision dated DATE the ORG reasoned that Mr PERSON and Ms GPE . had provided valid reasons for the restoration of the time - limit and allowed their application .

On DATE Ms K.Ch . and Mr PERSON lodged an appeal against the judgment of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) arguing that the plea - bargain agreement and the related confession had not been a result of their free will but of duress . They maintained that their family had received serious threats from unidentified persons .

On DATE ORG granted the application lodged by PERSON . and Mr PERSON The court heard PERSON . and Mr PERSON who noted that at the time of concluding the plea - bargain agreements they were detained and did not notify the investigative authorities about the threats , including one to kill PERSON . ’s young daughter , due to the fear that their declaration would have resulted in the fatal outcome for their loved ones . The court reasoned that the plea - bargain agreement and the related confession had been obtained under duress and was to be declared invalid as not concluded voluntarily . The case was therefore returned to the ORG for examination .

On DATE the ORG declared the prosecution of PERSON PERSON and PERSON . terminated . It reasoned that the findings of the forensic examinations were not consistent as some of them pointed to the applicant ’s involvement with the impugned document ( see paragraphs DATE and CARDINAL above ) . The ORG also relied on the statement of an interpreter who confirmed having witnessed the applicant ’s signature on the document . Among other witnesses , CARDINAL of applicant ’s former representatives noted that the applicant was a fictitious owner of the shares , and that the real person behind him and the shares , Mr ORG helped the applicant find the private expert who would easily confirm the applicant ’s version of the events . Another witness , Mr. PERSON , the applicant ’s former public relations representative stated that he parted ways with the applicant after becoming aware of some shady arrangements between Mr ORG and the applicant . He also noted that the applicant had never explicitly denied having signed the power of attorney and instead had mentioned that at the time he signed numerous documents . The ORG also noted the existence of several domestic court decisions and judgments issued DATE in other sets of proceedings attesting to Mr PERSON ’s uncontested representation of the applicant based on the impugned power of attorney as a strong indication of the validity of the document and the applicant ’s awareness of its existence for DATE before contesting it in DATE . Finally , statements of the family members of PERSON and PERSON . attesting to the pressure placed upon the latter by unidentified persons to confess to the crime ( concerning which a separate investigation was pending ) were noted . The prosecutor concluded that the body of evidence did not warrant a conclusion concerning the existence of a crime of fraud .

On DATE the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) with ORG against the reopening decision of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The appeal was rejected as inadmissible both by ORG and ORG on DATE and CARDINAL DATE respectively on the grounds that the legislation did not provide for a victim ’s right to challenge judicial decisions relating to a plea - bargain agreement concluded between the prosecution and an accused . The applicant ’s constitutional appeal on this matter was rejected on DATE . ORG reasoned that the legislature ’s approach to limiting the right of victims to appeal against plea - bargain agreements was justified by the principle of efficient criminal justice and balanced by enabling the victim to challenge decisions of the investigating and prosecuting bodies before the judicial authorities , a right of which the applicant had availed himself .

On DATE the applicant appealed against the ORG ’s ruling to terminate the investigation .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . The court reasoned that no clear evidence had been obtained during the investigation that would confirm the guilt of the CARDINAL accused . It further noted that :

“ ... the investigating authorities have correctly assessed the witness statements of [ CARDINAL persons ] that confirmed that Mr PERSON had been aware of the existence of the concerned power of attorney and that it had been signed by him . These arguments are further strengthened ... by the decisions obtained by the investigating authorities from courts of various levels of jurisdiction , according to which Mr PERSON had participated in court hearings as Mr PERSON representative based on the impugned power of attorney . ”

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal of CARDINAL DATE and upheld , at final instance , the lower court ’s decision of CARDINAL DATE . The appellate court reasoned that :

“ All possible investigative measures were carried out [ by the investigating authorities ] , persons directly ... or indirectly connected with the issuance of the impugned power of attorney were questioned . Several forensic examinations were carried out . ... All evidence available in the case must be assessed in its entirety in the context of whether it is sufficient to reach a conclusion concerning a person ’s guilt , [ and ] doubt concerning the authenticity and sufficiency of [ such ] evidence should be decided in favour of the accused ... ”

On DATE the applicant lodged a disciplinary complaint against Judge PERSON of LOC with ORG , accusing the latter of various violations of procedural law , including the failure to ensure the attendance of a party at the hearing on DATE .

On DATE ORG of ORG of GPE reached the following conclusions :

“ Judge PERSON has violated LAW ... as he did not serve the legal claim and the supporting documentation to PERSON .

The Judge has also violated Article CARDINAL [ of the Code ] , given that PERSON , the respondent in the case , was not informed by a court summons , of the time and venue of the hearing or of the decision to terminate the proceedings [ as a result of a friendly settlement ] ... in contravention of Article CARDINAL [ of the ORG ] ...

... Regardless of the scope of the power of attorney , the respondent ’s representative can not procedurally turn into a respondent . ...

Accordingly , the disciplinary panel considers that ... Judge PERSON has committed a gross violation of law ... owing to which damage has been inflicted upon a party inasmuch as the latter had been unable to participate in the hearing .

... Having considered the Judge ’s actions ... a strict punishment [ such as the removal from the judicial panel ] should be imposed . ”

NORP The decision became final after the statutory DATE appeal time - limit elapsed .

The applicant not having been a party to the proceedings , he was neither informed of the decision nor given access to the relevant documents ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

The Code of Civil Procedure ( DATE ) , as it stood at the material time , provided as follows :

“ CARDINAL . [ The following categories of persons ] are exempted from the payment of court fees :

c ) applicants in applications [ in respect of damage ] caused by a crime ... ”

“ CARDINAL . A final judgment may be declared null and void following a request of a concerned party if : ...

b ) CARDINAL of the parties or DATE if the party needed legal representation – their representative was not summonsed to the hearing .

An application to declare a final judgment null and void based on these grounds is inadmissible if the party could have presented them during the hearing at the courts of first instance , appeal , or cassation . ”

“ CARDINAL . A final decision may be subject to a reopening application based on newly discovered circumstances if :

a ) it transpires that the document on which the decision was based had been fabricated ; ...

c ) criminal behaviour of the parties and their representatives or of a judge is established ... ”

“ CARDINAL . An application to declare a decision null and void ... must be lodged within DATE ... [ T]he renewal of this time - limit is not permitted .

The time - limit starts to run from DATE on which a party becomes aware of the grounds for declaring a decision null and void ...

If an application to declare a decision null and void is based on LAW CARDINAL ( b ) , the time - limit starts to run when a party , or if the latter is legally incapable , their legal representative is informed of the decision . ... ”

Under Articles CARDINAL - CARDINAL of LAW , an interlocutory appeal could be lodged regarding different types of decisions defined in the LAW . Among others , LAW provided for the lodging of such an appeal against an immediate enforcement of a judgment . Under LAW of the LAW a party could lodge an interlocutory appeal against a court ’s refusal to reinstate statutory time - limits for appeal . LAW CCP ) ( DATE ) provided for a party ’s right to lodge an interlocutory appeal against a court ’s decision concerning the termination of a preliminary investigation .

DATE . The Act of DATE on Disciplinary Proceedings against ORG ( “ the Disciplinary Proceedings Act ” ) , as it stood at the material time , provided that disciplinary proceedings against judges could be initiated , among others , on the basis of an application of an individual ( Section CARDINAL ) but the latter was neither a party to the proceedings ( LAW ( CARDINAL ) ) , nor were they notified of the outcome ( Sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ) .

According to Article CARDINAL of LAW ( DATE ) , it was the domestic ORG discretion to impose a suspended sentence instead of imprisonment , with or without an additional sentence , including in relation to plea - bargain agreements .

Relevant legal provisions of the ORG concerning the nature of and procedure relating to the plea - bargain agreements were summarised by the ORG in the GPE and PERSON v. GPE judgment ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , ORG DATE ( extracts ) ) . The acceptance of the plea bargain entailed the waiver of the rights to an ordinary examination of a case on the merits ( see ibid . , § CARDINAL ) .

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the ORG as it stood at the material time , provided that a lapsed time - limit for appeal could be reinstated based on a “ valid excuse . ” Article CARDINAL ) § § CARDINAL ( c ) and CARDINAL provided that if a plea - bargain agreement was concluded under duress , the judgment approving the agreement was annulled and the case was returned to the preliminary investigation for examination . Article CARDINAL ) § CARDINAL provided that a review of a final judgment was allowed under common rules , based on newly discovered or newly revealed circumstances .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1-c - Bringing before competent legal authority);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Helena Jäderblom

NORP The case originated in an application ( no . CARDINAL ) against GPE lodged with ORG under LAW ( “ the LAW ) by a NORP national , PERSON ( “ the applicant ” ) , on DATE .

NORP The relevant details of the application are set out in the appended table .

NORP The applicant complained of the inadequate conditions of her detention . She also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .

The application was communicated to ORG ( “ the Government ” ) .


No violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 - Right not to be tried or punished twice-{general} (Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 - Right not to be tried or punished twice)

George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Päivi Hirvelä;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

On DATE the applicant was charged with , inter alia , causing a serious traffic hazard ( törkeä liikenneturvallisuuden vaarantaminen , grovt äventyrande av trafiksäkerheten ) and operating a vehicle without a licence ( ajoneuvon kuljettaminen oikeudetta , olovlig körning ) , both acts having been committed on CARDINAL DATE . The prosecutor requested that , in relation to the charge of causing a serious traffic hazard , a driving ban be imposed .

On DATE ORG ( käräjäoikeus , tingsrätten ) convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to DATE - fines , amounting to CARDINAL ( ORG ) . A driving ban was also imposed until DATE on the basis of section CARDINAL of the Driving Licence Act of GPE .

No appeal was made against the judgment and it became final .

On DATE the police imposed a new driving ban on the applicant from DATE to CARDINAL DATE on the basis of section CARDINAL § § CARDINAL ( c ) and CARDINAL of the Driving Licence Act of GPE . In their decision the police referred to the fact that on DATE the applicant had been driving a vehicle without a licence and that ORG had convicted him for this by final judgment on DATE .

By letter dated DATE the applicant appealed to ORG ( hallinto - oikeus , förvaltningsdomstolen ) , claiming that he had been tried and convicted twice in the same matter . He referred to LAW .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal and upheld the driving ban . The court found that ORG had imposed the driving ban for causing a serious traffic hazard whereas the police had imposed it for operating a vehicle without a licence . Therefore , the applicant was not punished twice for the same offence and his rights protected by LAW were not violated .

NORP By letter dated CARDINAL DATE the applicant appealed to ORG ( korkein hallinto - oikeus , högsta förvaltningsdomstolen ) , reiterating the grounds of appeal already presented before ORG . He stressed that both the criminal and the administrative proceedings had related to the same facts which had taken place on DATE .

On DATE ORG upheld ORG decision . It found that ORG had imposed the driving ban for causing a serious traffic hazard whereas the police had imposed it for operating a vehicle without a licence . LAW had therefore not been violated . The decision was not unanimous and one of the judges expressed a dissenting opinion . In her opinion , it was not to be ruled out that a driving ban constituted a criminal sanction . Referring to the case GPE v. GPE , she considered that after the applicant ’s final conviction by ORG , a new driving ban based on the same facts on the basis of which he had already been convicted could no longer be imposed . Therefore , she would have quashed the police decision as well as ORG decision .


Alena Poláčková;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra

The first applicant , PERSON , is the widow of PERSON PERSON , who was killed on DATE , while serving in ORG , as a result of an explosion at the ORG naval base near the village of GPE . The second and third applicants , PERSON and PERSON , are their sons . The applicants are NORP nationals and were born in DATE and DATE respectively . They all live in GPE .

The applicants were represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

On DATE at around TIME an explosion occurred on the ORG naval base . This was caused when CARDINAL containers of explosives , mainly gunpowder , burst into flames . These had been stored out in the open on the base since DATE , after being confiscated from a GPE - flagged NORP - owned vessel – the Monchegorsk , heading from GPE to GPE – for violation of ORG weapons sanctions . CARDINAL people were killed by the explosion and CARDINAL people were injured . Substantial damage to property was caused and there was significant financial damage and loss .

By an order dated DATE , and pursuant to ORG PERSON . DATE , as amended at the time by LAW . CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , ORG appointed a lawyer in private practice , Mr P.G.P , as a CARDINAL - member commission of inquiry ( “ the investigator ” ) , to look into the explosion and the circumstances which had led to it , as well as potential responsibility for the explosion .

On DATE the investigator submitted an extensive report of CARDINAL pages to the then President of the Republic ( “ the President ” ) , the President of ORG and the Attorney - General . In this , he stressed that , as an investigator appointed under the relevant law , he did not constitute a disciplinary or judicial authority , nor did he act as a coroner . His duties were purely investigative , and his findings and recommendations were not binding . He could not determine or establish legal or criminal responsibility . Any decisions in respect of possible criminal responsibility leading to a prosecution lay exclusively within the competence of the Attorney - General under LAW , following a police investigation in accordance with his instructions ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Decisions as to actual criminal responsibility lay exclusively with the courts . He observed that , in his investigation , he had mainly dealt with possible State and/or political responsibility ( πολιτειακές και/ή πολιτικές ευθύνες ) . He was of the opinion , however , that although he could not determine or establish criminal responsibility , he had the right and obligation to express general views on the matter .

NORP The investigator , giving detailed reasons for his decision , concluded that both the Minister of Defence and the Minister for ORG had very serious responsibilities , both statutory ( θεσμικές ) and personal . However , he found that the main responsibility lay with the President , who was the head of the State and the Government . The President bore the greatest responsibility for the inadequacy ( ανεπάρκεια ) , negligence and remissness ( ολιγωρία ) that had been shown , and had failed to take care of or at least take basic measures to ensure the security of the citizens of GPE , and in particular that of the soldiers and firemen in question . The fate of the cargo had been decided by the executive , which , headed by the President , had completely failed to take the necessary measures to handle the matter , including keeping the cargo safe in GPE . The investigator pointed out that the President , over and above his state office and his institutional capacity ( πέραν του πολιτειακού του αξιώματος και της θεσμικής του ιδιότητας ) , had undertaken to deal with the dangerous cargo himself , had had ultimate control over it and had been responsible for taking important decisions on the subject . The investigator also emphasised and explained that he referred not only to the President ’s statutory and ex officio ( θεσμική και εξ’αξιώματος ) political responsibility , but also his significant personal responsibility for the tragic event and its consequences .

His comments concerning criminal aspects were general and did not attribute criminal responsibility to any particular person . He expressed the view that the Attorney - General had a duty to examine the possibility that a number of criminal offences might have been committed , including the offences of manslaughter and causing death by reason of a rash , reckless or dangerous act ( πρόκλησης θανάτου λόγω αλόγιστης , απερίσκεπτης ή επικίνδυνης πράξης ) under sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW ( PERSON . CARDINAL ) .

The applicants submitted that the Attorney - General had publicly stated that the report would be taken into consideration in the relevant police investigations , and that such investigations had in fact been initiated in accordance with his instructions . According to the applicants , the relevant police reports were handed to the Attorney - General towards DATE or DATE , but they contained no reference to the President .

By a letter dated CARDINAL DATE the applicants’ lawyer requested that the Attorney - General seek leave from ORG to lift the President ’s immunity from criminal prosecution . It appears that a similar request had already been made to the Attorney - General by the families of some of the other victims . In the above letter , the applicants’ lawyer expressed the view that the relevant acts and omissions of the President had constituted the offence of manslaughter and had been committed during his term of office and in the exercise of his functions , and not in his private capacity , as alleged in the request made by the other families . It appears that both requests remained unanswered .

As the Attorney - General did not take the steps requested , on DATE separate applications were filed by the applicants ( application no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) and the relatives of other victims ( applications nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) under the relevant procedural rules ( Rule CARDINAL of ORG of DATE ; see paragraph CARDINAL below ) for leave to commence proceedings in ORG for the interpretation under Article CARDINAL(b ) of the LAW of certain alleged ambiguities in LAW . In the applicants’ application and in application no . CARDINAL , those ambiguities concerned the interpretation of the allegedly vague and imprecise terms “ offence involving dishonesty ” and “ offence involving moral turpitude ” in LAW , as well as “ any offence committed by him [ the President of the Republic ] in the execution of his functions ” in LAW ( see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) , and the conflicting interpretation by the applicants and the Attorney - General concerning the possibility of the President being criminally prosecuted before the end of his mandate for his acts and omissions in his handling in general of the matter of the dangerous explosives . As regards the remaining application ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , this focused on a number of disagreements with the Attorney - General as to the provisions of DATE and its alleged vagueness .

The applications were heard together by ORG ( Full Bench ) , which rejected them on DATE .

In its decision , ORG observed that the applicants maintained that the terms “ offence involving dishonesty ” and “ offence involving moral turpitude ” included manslaughter , and that they relied on alleged statements by the Attorney - General that the above terms did not cover this offence . The Attorney - General , however , denied that such statements had any legal consequence , even if they had been made . He could not remember making them . It was also admitted that the letters to him on this point from the plaintiffs had never been answered . The question which arose was whether , even if the Attorney - General had made such statements , this disagreement would constitute a “ difference of opinion ” within the meaning given to this term by the relevant jurisprudence ( such a difference being a prerequisite for ORG jurisdiction under Article CARDINAL(b ) of the LAW ) . ORG considered that this was not the case . It stated that it was not possible for any citizen who disagreed with another person or an authority , by means of CARDINAL simple disagreement , to create a “ difference of opinion ” which would satisfy the relevant provisions of the jurisprudence . Accepting such a position , as proposed by the applicants in the applications before it , would amount to recognising in every case an actio popularis . Moreover , accepting to undertake to interpret the LAW in the case would simply and solely be a decision on a difference of opinion which constituted a theoretical question , since it could not lead to any consequence . If and when the Attorney - General decided to prosecute the President , only then would it be possible to raise the question of interpretation , and it would then be the duty of ORG , within the framework of the appropriate procedure , to judge and decide on the content , meaning and legal consequences and effects of the relevant LAW provisions . Otherwise , it was not the duty of ORG to solve theoretical problems and questions which would not themselves have legal consequences . In view of its conclusion about the non - existence of a “ difference of opinion ” , ORG stated that there was no need to rule on the other preconditions which needed to be satisfied in order for the leave sought to be given .

In the meantime , on DATE the Attorney - General had brought criminal proceedings ( case no . CARDINAL ) against CARDINAL high - ranking officials before ORG : the former Minister for ORG , the former Minister of Defence , the former Deputy Commander of ORG , the Commander of ORG , the Deputy Commander of ORG ( ORG της ORG και ORG της ORG ) , and the Chief of ORG ( Ε.Μ.Α.Κ.-Ειδική PERSON ) ( “ the first , second , third , fourth , fifth and sixth defendants ” ) . They were charged with manslaughter and causing death by reason of a rash , reckless or dangerous act under sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW . They each faced separate charges .

On DATE the ORG gave judgment . The first and third defendants were acquitted ; the second defendant was found guilty of both offences and was sentenced to DATE imprisonment ; the remaining defendants were found guilty of the second offence pursuant to section CARDINAL of PERSON . CARDINAL , but were acquitted of the remaining charges . They received a DATE sentence of imprisonment .

The second , fourth , fifth and CARDINAL defendants lodged appeals against their conviction and sentence before ORG ( appeal nos . CARDINAL , DATE ) . The Attorney - General also filed appeals in so far as the first - instance judgment concerned the first , second , and DATE defendants ( appeal nos . DATE ) . On DATE ORG dismissed the appeals lodged by the second , fifth and sixth defendants and the corresponding appeals of the Attorney - General , as well as an appeal lodged by the Attorney - General concerning the acquittal of the first defendant . Further , it upheld the appeal of the fourth defendant against his conviction , acquitting him of all charges . Consequently , it dismissed the appeals against his conviction and sentence .

Under the LAW , the Attorney - General is an independent officer of GPE ) . LAW CARDINAL of the LAW provides that :

“ The Attorney - General of the Republic shall have power , exercisable at his discretion in the public interest , to institute , conduct , take over and continue or discontinue any proceedings of an offence against any person in the Republic . Such power may be exercised by him in person or by officers subordinate to him acting under him and in accordance with his instructions . ”

Pursuant to LAW , the President enjoys immunity from criminal prosecution during his term of office . However , this is not absolute , the exceptions being high treason and offences involving dishonesty or moral turpitude . The above - mentioned provision provides as follows :

“ CARDINAL . The President or the Vice - President of the Republic shall not be liable to any criminal prosecution during his term of office except under the provisions of this Article .

The President or the Vice - President of the Republic may be prosecuted for high treason on a charge preferred by the Attorney - General and the Deputy Attorney - General of the Republic before the High Court upon a resolution of ORG carried by a secret ballot and a majority of CARDINAL of the total number of Representatives :

Provided that no such resolution shall be taken and no item shall be entered on the agenda or debated in ORG in connection therewith unless the proposal for such resolution is signed by CARDINAL of the total number of Representatives .

The President or the Vice - President of the Republic may be prosecuted for an offence involving dishonesty or moral turpitude upon a charge preferred by the Attorney - General and the Deputy Attorney - General of the Republic before the High Court with the leave of the President of ORG .

( CARDINAL ) The President or the Vice - President of the Republic upon being prosecuted under paragraph CARDINAL of this Article shall be suspended from the performance of any of the functions of his office and thereupon the provisions of paragraph CARDINAL of Article CARDINAL shall apply .

( CARDINAL ) The President or the Vice - President of the Republic on any such prosecution shall be tried by ORG ; on his conviction his office shall become vacant and on his acquittal he shall resume the performance of the functions of his office .

Subject to paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL of this Article the President or the Vice - President of the Republic shall not be liable to prosecution for any offence committed by him in the execution of his functions but he may be prosecuted for any other offence committed during his term of office after he ceases to hold office .

No action shall be brought against the President or the Vice - President of the Republic in respect of any act or omission committed by him in the exercise of any of the functions of his office :

Provided that nothing in this paragraph contained shall be construed as in any way depriving any person of the right to sue the Republic as provided by law . ”

Under DATE ) of the LAW , in the event of ambiguity , ORG has exclusive jurisdiction to interpret the LAW in any manner , due regard being had to the letter and spirit of LAW of DATE and LAW of DATE .

Pursuant to Rule CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(b ) of ORG of DATE , as applied by ORG , when a reference is not made by a court , proceedings under , inter alia , Article ORG ) of the LAW shall be commenced “ with the prior leave of ORG , or any CARDINAL judges acting in agreement , applied and obtained for the purpose , and in such manner as it may be directed upon granting such leave ” .


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Egidijus Kūris;Iulia Motoc;Krzysztof Wojtyczek

NORP The case originated in an application ( no . CARDINAL ) against GPE lodged with ORG under LAW ( “ the LAW ) by CARDINAL NORP nationals , Mr PERSON , Mr PERSON , Mr Gábor Horn , PERSON , Mr Zoltán Pintér and Ms Mária ORG ( “ the applicants ” ) , on DATE .

The applicants were represented by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by PERSON , Agent , ORG .

NORP On DATE the ORG complaints under LAW No . CARDINAL to the Convention concerning the imposition of PERCENT tax on their severance payment were communicated to the Government .


No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Iraq)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Ann Power-Forde;Helena Jäderblom;Johan Hirschfeldt;Mark Villiger;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE and originates from GPE .

The applicant applied for asylum in GPE on DATE . He stated in essence the following in support of his application . He is formally NORP , but does not practise and considers himself to be an atheist . He had a shop in GPE where he had rented out computer games and game consoles . In DATE he had employed a young woman who did not wear a veil . After DATE , on DATE , CARDINAL masked men claiming to be members of PERSON , an NORP branch of ORG , had entered the shop . They had told him that hiring a woman without a veil was against ORG and had required that she leave her job immediately . The applicant had refused their demand and had stated that “ if this is ORG , then I am not a NORP ” . The woman had quit her job DATE . Still , DATE the applicant had received a letter with a bullet , stating that he had to excuse himself before the emir within DATE or else he would be considered to have left ORG and could be killed . The applicant had refused to apologise . DATE he had received a death threat and had been shot at . Soon thereafter , his shop had been destroyed by a bomb . Through a friend , whose brother had worked for the police , the applicant had been informed that the police were looking for him because they believed that the applicant had destroyed the shop himself to cover up for hiding weapons for terrorists there . His GPE neighbour had later told him that both the police and NORP had come to the GPE apartment to look for him on several occasions . The applicant had then fled to PERSON in GPE , as ORG was less dominant there . Nothing had happened to him in PERSON . After a month there , he had left GPE on DATE . The applicant claimed that he risked being sentenced to death if he returned to GPE , since he had uttered an unacceptable religious opinion in front of local ORG representatives and since he was wanted by the police for alleged cooperation with terrorists . Both ORG and the police were allegedly searching for him all over GPE .

On DATE ORG ( Migrationsverket ) rejected the application and ordered the applicant ’s deportation to GPE . The ORG questioned the applicant ’s allegations that ORG had been searching for him in his parent ’s home and that he was sought by the police for having hidden weapons for terrorists in his shop , because he had submitted this information only very late in the proceedings . In any event , noting that the police accusations were false , ORG did not consider that the risk of being prosecuted could be characterised as persecution that would justify the grant of asylum . However , it accepted the applicant ’s claim that his life had been threatened by ORG and that he would thus face a real risk of persecution upon return to GPE . ORG went on to examine the possibility of internal flight and found that the applicant had not made it plausible that he was at risk in all parts of GPE . He was not considered in need of protection in relation to areas of the country where ORG was not strong . ORG noted that , while ORG retained a strong presence in GPE , the security situation in LOC was stable and displaced persons could gain entrance there without a sponsor . Having regard to the general situation and the applicant ’s personal circumstances – including his gender , age , health , religion and ethnicity – , it further found that he could reasonably relocate to LOC , even if he would lack a social network there . That finding was supported by the fact that he had already stayed in PERSON for a month without encountering any problems .

The applicant appealed , reiterating the claims he had made to ORG .

On DATE ORG ( Migrationsdomstolen ) upheld the decision of ORG , agreeing generally with its conclusions .

NORP In his appeal to ORG ( Migrations - överdomstolen ) , the applicant submitted a copy of an NORP document , purporting to be a warrant for his arrest .

Subsequently , in DATE , the applicant claimed that there were impediments to the enforcement of his deportation order . He added the following to his story . His family had previously collaborated with PERSON and the new PERSON government therefore considered them to be supporters of PERSON . Several of the applicant ’s relatives had been arrested in DATE and were being kept in a secret prison run by the government .

On DATE ORG rejected the petition , finding that no new circumstances justifying a reconsideration had been presented .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of ORG . It noted , inter alia , that the applicant ’s allegation that he was wanted by the police had been examined earlier in the proceedings and that the arrest warrant presented later thus did not constitute a new fact which gave reason to grant him a new examination of his case . The applicant did not appeal against ORG judgment .

In DATE the applicant lodged a further petition for reconsideration , claiming that new important facts had emerged in his case . The petition was rejected on DATE by ORG , which noted that the applicant had not presented anything concrete in support of it . No appeal was made against this decision .

Another petition for reconsideration was submitted later . The applicant now stated that he had been wrongly convicted of terrorism and sentenced in absentia to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment . He submitted CARDINAL documents in LANGUAGE , allegedly a copy of an arrest warrant and a copy of the judgment convicting him .

On DATE ORG rejected the petition , again finding that no new circumstances had been presented which justified that the case be reconsidered . It noted that the documents submitted were copies and of a very simple nature and that handwritten text had been added to the judgment . It thus considered that their value as evidence was very low .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of ORG and on DATE ORG refused leave to appeal .

NORP The applicant submitted a fourth petition for reconsideration in DATE . It was rejected by ORG on DATE and by ORG on DATE . The applicant did not appeal against ORG judgment .

A fifth petition was lodged by the applicant in DATE . It was rejected by ORG on an unknown date and by ORG on DATE . On DATE ORG refused the applicant leave to appeal .


Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom

The applicants live in GPE . The first applicant is the mother of the second applicant and of FAC , who was born in DATE and died in DATE . The third and fourth applicants are PERSON children .

PERSON was a well - known investigative journalist who made a name for herself covering alleged violations of human rights in GPE committed in the course of the counterterrorism operation in the region , an operation widely known as the “ Second Chechen War ” . Ms Politkovskaya was also an adamant critic of President PERSON ’s politics .

On DATE PERSON was fatally shot in the lift in her block of flats in GPE . A PERSON pistol with a silencer and bullet cartridges were found on the stairs .

On DATE the prosecutor ’s office of GPE opened a criminal investigation in case no . DATE under LAW ( b ) of LAW ( “ murder of a person committed in connection with his or her professional or civic duties ” ) . Later , the case was transferred to the department for the investigation of particularly important cases of ORG for investigation .

At an early stage of the investigation investigators inspected the crime scene , collected footage from surveillance cameras located in the vicinity , and examined logs of telephone connections made in the area around the time of the killing .

On DATE forensic experts established that the death had been caused by gunshot wounds to the victim ’s head , chest and right leg . On the same date a death certificate was issued .

On DATE the fourth applicant was granted victim status . Later , the third applicant received such status as well .

Seeking to discern the motive for the crime , the investigation studied PERSON critical publications to establish against whom they had been targeted . They also questioned PERSON colleagues , friends and family as witnesses . In the ORG ’s submission , as a result of such actions , the investigation established that PERSON had met “ a well - known NORP former politician ” in GPE , and that unnamed person had proposed that she publish articles “ to discredit the leadership of GPE , which she [ had ] refused to do , to his dislike ” .

On DATE the Prosecutor General of GPE stated at a press conference that there had been serious progress in the investigation of PERSON ’s killing , and that QUANTITY people had been arrested in connection with the investigation . Another official of ORG stated that a certain P.R. had been arrested . On CARDINAL DATE the Tvoy Den’ newspaper ( “ PERSON ” ) published a list of people arrested in connection with PERSON murder , and commented that there were known hitmen among those detained . On CARDINAL DATE a press officer of ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) disclosed to the public a list of CARDINAL people detained in connection with PERSON assassination .

In the course of DATE CARDINAL people , ORG , GPE , GPE . and P.R. , were arrested in connection with the assassination . CARDINAL brothers , ORG and GPE , had made phone calls near ORG building ; their car had been seen leaving the area on DATE of the killing . Later , the investigation established that fibres found in their car were identical to those left on the murder weapon . S.Kh . , a police officer , was arrested on the basis of a witness statement by ORG , also a police officer . P.R. was an officer of the ORG ) who had known LAW . for a long time .

NORP In DATE ORG , GPE and GPE . were formally charged with contract killing in conspiracy with others . S.Kh . was regarded as the leader of the organised criminal group . P.R. was charged in the same set of proceedings with abuse of powers and extortion .

At some point ORG , a brother of ORG and GPE whom the investigation suspected to be implicated in the assassination , fled GPE on a forged passport . As appears from the LOC and the ORG ’s respective submissions , the forged passport was issued by staff of a department of the interior .

At some point ORG name was put on an international wanted list . On DATE a criminal case against ORG was severed from the case against QUANTITY . , P.R. , GPE and GPE

In DATE the investigators prepared a case against GPE . , P.R. , GPE and GPE to be transferred to a court . The applicants requested that the case file remain with the investigators . In their view , the investigation was incomplete , and sending the case file to a court would be premature . Nevertheless , the case file was transferred to ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) for a jury trial .

In the course of court hearings in DATE , a highranking officer of ORG of the ORG , was questioned as a witness for the prosecution . He submitted that , acting in his professional capacity , he had organised and conducted surveillance on PERSON shortly prior to her assassination . A certain L .- A.G. was also questioned as a witness .

At an unspecified point in time in DATE , the investigation included a summary of its findings in the case material , which the applicants referred to as a “ presentation ” . In particular , the summary contained details regarding PERSON , including the fact that she had had NORP nationality . The “ presentation ” was never shown to the jury .

On DATE , having heard the prosecution and the defence , the jury delivered a not - guilty verdict in respect of QUANTITY . , P.R. , GPE and GPE

On DATE ORG acquitted PERSON , P.R. , ORG and GPE The prosecution appealed . The third and fourth applicants decided not to appeal against the acquittal .

On DATE , in the appeal proceedings , ORG of GPE quashed the judgment of DATE and remitted the case to ORG for fresh examination .

On DATE the third and fourth applicants requested that ORG remit the case to the prosecutor ’s office for further investigation . On DATE ORG dismissed the application . The applicants appealed .

On DATE ORG granted the third and fourth applicants’ application , and the case was transferred to the prosecutor ’s office for further investigation .

On unspecified dates the charges against P.R. were dropped ; ORG was indicted .

On DATE PERSON , who had spent some time hiding in GPE , was arrested in GPE .

According to the applicants , at an unspecified point in time a certain PERSON informed them that he had information which was crucial for the investigation , and that he was willing to testify as a witness . At the ORG request , an investigator questioned him . PERSON stated that PERSON was implicated in the murder . According to the ORG , the investigator in charge of the case attempted to find PERSON , but could only gather evidence from him after he had been informed of the witness ’s whereabouts in GPE .

On DATE ORG of GPE ( “ the ORG ” ) ordered ORG ’s placement in custody .

On DATE PERSON entered a guilty plea with the investigating authorities . He claimed that his acquaintances , ORG and QUANTITY . , had proposed that he organise unauthorised surveillance of FAC . ORG had expressed his intention to kill the journalist and had said that PERSON could take part in the preparation for the assassination for a fee , which ORG had accepted . Having received a large sum of money and instructions from ORG , he had bought a pistol with a silencer from a stranger and passed it on to R.M. In the ORG ’s submission , ORG had not reported the motives for the killing , but had “ mentioned that the crime [ had been ] ordered by a wellknown person living in the GPE ” .

On DATE the criminal case against PERSON was severed and a separate investigation was created ; the applicants disagreed with that decision . On DATE ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) sentenced PERSON to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment . The applicants appealed against the judgment , arguing that the sentence was too lenient . On an unspecified date PERSON ’s conviction was upheld on appeal .

At some point the case file against LOC . , PERSON , GPE and L.A.G. was transferred to ORG for trial .

On DATE ORG commenced a jury trial of GPE . , GPE , GPE , GPE and GPE .- A.G.

On DATE the jury was dismissed for the reason that only CARDINAL jurors out of CARDINAL appeared in the courtroom .

On DATE hearings before a new composition of the jury commenced .

On DATE the jury delivered a verdict finding all CARDINAL coaccused guilty of PERSON murder . They also found ORG guilty of kidnapping a third party in DATE .

On DATE ORG delivered a judgment . It found that ORG had “ accepted an offer from an unidentified person who had been dissatisfied with publications by PERSON in ORG concerning violations of human rights , the embezzlement of ORG property , and abuse of public office by civil servants ” – an offer of a fee of MONEY to organise the journalist ’s killing . ORG had then involved his nephews , PERSON , and GPE , as well as “ a person in respect of whom the criminal case had been severed ” and his acquaintance LOC . in the preparation for the killing . On the basis of the jury ’s guilty verdict , ORG characterised the murder as one committed by an organised group for a fee in connection with the victim ’s performance of her professional and civic duties . It also found that ORG , ORG and FAC were guilty of illegal arms operations . It refused to terminate the proceedings against ORG the events of DATE under the statute of limitations , because the latter had been wanted in connection with those events since DATE , and found him guilty of kidnapping and extortion . ORG sentenced ORG regarded as the organiser of the killing DATE and DATE regarded as the hitman DATE to life imprisonment . ORG and GPE were sentenced to CARDINAL and DATE imprisonment respectively . PERSON . was sentenced to DATE imprisonment . Civil claims by the third and fourth applicants were resolved as follows . The third and fourth applicants were each awarded MONEY ( ( RUB ) – MONEY ( ORG ) ) to be paid by ORG and ORG respectively , RUB MONEY ( approximately EUR CARDINAL ) to be paid by GPE . , and RUB CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) to be paid by ORG and GPE respectively .

The defendants appealed against the conviction .

On DATE , in the appeal proceedings , ORG of GPE found that the guilty verdict was based on a thorough examination of the evidence . Upholding the conviction as a whole , ORG slightly mitigated the sentence regarding illegal arms operations in respect of L .- A.G. , ORG and FAC However , pursuant to the rules on combining sentences for multiple offences , this did not affect ORG ’s and ORG life sentences . PERSON ’s term of imprisonment was reduced to DATE .

In the ORG ’s submission , the investigation into PERSON killing has not been terminated . They provided copies of ORG judgment of DATE and ORG appeal judgment of DATE .


CASE OF ERLA HLYNSDOTTIR v. ICELAND (No. 3)

Violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Helen Keller;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano

The applicant , PERSON , is an NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON . She is a journalist , working for the newspaper DV .

In DATE the Director of Public Prosecutions issued an indictment against CARDINAL individuals for importing cocaine into GPE . The cocaine had been hidden in a ORG vehicle , where it had been discovered by customs officers . The police had removed the cocaine and put another substance in its place . CARDINAL of the accused , Mr A , had collected the car from customs and had paid customs duties for it . He and the other accused had driven the vehicle to a garage , where the substance had been removed .

The newspaper ORG published an article on DATE on the ongoing criminal proceedings against Mr A and his co - accused before ORG . A picture of PERSON A was published on the front page of the newspaper showing him walking into the courtroom . There was a large headline under the photograph which read “ Scared cocaine smugglers ” and underneath that it was written that both the accused were afraid of retaliation by their accomplices and had therefore refused to identify them . Mr PERSON name also appeared on the front page , with a report that he and his co - accused could expect prison sentences of DATE and CARDINAL to DATE respectively for removing the substance .

The article itself was reproduced on page CARDINAL of the newspaper and the applicant was identified as its author . Next to the article appeared another photograph of ORG , again using his name . The article stated that Mr A had been afraid to reveal the identity of the man he claimed had actually been behind the importation , and that he feared for his family ’s and his own safety . The article contained the following passage :

“ The Director of Public Prosecutions is requesting a punishment of DATE ORG imprisonment in respect of [ Mr A ] , who has been indicted for importing QUANTITY of cocaine , intended for sale , together with an unknown accomplice . A punishment of DATE is requested in respect of [ Mr B ] , who is also charged in the case with removing the alleged drug from the vehicle , in cooperation with [ Mr A ] , ” .

In the next paragraph it was stated :

“ The cocaine was hidden in a vehicle which [ Mr A ] imported into the country and took possession of in DATE , believing that the cocaine was still in the vehicle , but the police had already confiscated the cocaine and replaced it with a decoy drug . ”

This sentence was a verbatim rendering of a part of the description of the facts contained in the indictment , without explicit reference being made to that document .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG acquitted both PERSON A and his co - accused of all charges , and on DATE ORG upheld the acquittal .

On DATE Mr A lodged defamation proceedings before ORG against the applicant and Mr S.M.E. , who was the editor of DV at the time . In his writ he requested that the headline ( “ Scared cocaine smugglers ” ) which had appeared on the front page of the newspaper published by DV on DATE and the passage quoted in paragraph CARDINAL above be declared null and void . In addition , Mr A requested that the respondents jointly and severally be ordered to pay him CARDINAL NORP krónur ( ORG ) in respect of non - pecuniary damage and LAW to cover the costs of publishing the judgment in the case in CARDINAL newspapers .

Mr A argued that the responsibility for the statements lay with the applicant as the author of the article , in accordance with section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW no . GPE . No one had been identified as the author of the front - page headline , and therefore the publisher or editor was responsible for it ( see section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of the same LAW , at paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG found for the applicant and the editor . In its reasoning it referred to the right to freedom of expression and protection of private life , as guaranteed by LAW . It further stated :

“ When there is an overlap of the defendant ’s aforementioned interest in the enjoyment of freedom of expression and the plaintiff ’s interest in the enjoyment of respect for his private life , it must be examined whether the publication of the material , for which the defendants are responsible , can be considered to have taken place in the context of a general public debate and therefore to be of interest to the public . The disputed comments appeared in newspaper coverage of public criminal proceedings in which the plaintiff had been accused of a serious crime . The proceedings were open to the public and to those who wanted to observe , in accordance with the usual practice , and the defendants’ account is in accordance with what was revealed at the proceedings . News reporting of criminal cases being tried before the domestic courts must be considered normal and part of a journalist ’s work . It can not be a requirement that news reporting must await the outcome of a trial before publication . It makes no difference that the plaintiff was later acquitted of the charges . It must therefore be held that the published material , at the time it was published , was relevant to the public and was newsworthy . Although the headline on the front page is sensationalist , it has to be kept in mind that it refers to what was revealed during the testimony of the plaintiff in the criminal case , namely that he did not want to reveal the name of the person on whose behalf he was acting in respect of the charge of importing the drugs , as he feared for his own and his family ’s safety . In view of all this , the statements are not considered to have been insulting or hurtful to the plaintiff , as defined in LAW , or to contain an insinuation , as in LAW . Moreover , they will not be deemed to entail an illegal injury to his character and honour ... ”

Mr A appealed against ORG judgment to ORG .

By a judgment of DATE , ORG overturned the ORG judgment . It declared null and void the words “ cocaine smugglers ” on the front page and the statement “ ... believing that the cocaine was still in the vehicle ” and ordered the applicant and the editor jointly and severally to pay the appellant ORG CARDINAL ( MONEY ( ORG ) ) in compensation for non - pecuniary damage , plus interest , and ISK CARDINAL for the costs of publishing the judgment . Its judgment contained the following reasons :

“ When the statements at issue in the present case appeared in DV on DATE , the criminal proceedings against the appellant and another man were pending before ORG . This was clearly stated in the article , in which the substance of the charges against them was reproduced , along with a few essential points from the prosecution ’s evidence and the statements which they had given at the hearing . It is not argued that the narrative was in any way incorrect , with the exception of those statements which are at issue in this case . The material published concerned a serious criminal case , which was being tried at a public hearing . It was therefore not subject to any limitations under LAW no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , in force at the time , which would have prevented the media from utilising its freedom [ of expression ] under LAW , to report on the case , including freedom to identify the accused . However , in that discussion special weight ought to be attached to the fact that it is the role of the courts , not the media , to determine whether an accused person is guilty of an offence .

... The appellant was acquitted of the ... criminal charges by a judgment of ORG exactly DATE after the publication of the statements in DV , and that conclusion was unaltered after the adoption of ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE . By virtue of that conclusion the courts had rejected the accusation that the appellant and the co - accused in this case had been guilty of being ‘ cocaine smugglers’ , and also that the appellant in DATE had taken possession of the aforementioned vehicle ‘ believing that the cocaine was still in the PERSON . However , these CARDINAL assertions were made in the statements which the appellant seeks to have declared null and void , without any reservation being made with reference to the fact that the assertions were based on an indictment which was contested in court . Bearing in mind the outcome of the criminal proceedings that had been instituted by that indictment , the statements in question contained an insinuation against the appellant , and there is no ground for rejecting his request for them to be declared null and void . As regards the other statements which the appellant claims should be declared null and void , it must be held that the word ‘ PERSON in the headline on the front page contained a value judgment , and was also supported by comments made by the appellant and the co - accused during the criminal proceedings . The narrative in the article inside the newspaper , stating that the cocaine had been hidden in the vehicle which the appellant had imported into the country and had taken possession of in DATE , after the police had confiscated the drugs and replaced them with another substance , was merely a description of facts that were later substantiated during the criminal proceedings . There are therefore no grounds for declaring the statements relating to this matter null and void .

The statements which are declared null and void were published in an article , of which [ the applicant ] was named as the author , except for one word [ kókaínsmyglarar ] in the headline on the front page . She is liable to pay compensation for them , as provided for in section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW . On the other hand , since the author of the front - page headline was not identified , liability to pay compensation for that statement falls on the defendant [ Mr S.M.E. ] as the editor of the newspaper , under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of the same LAW . The statement in the front - page headline and those in the article on page CARDINAL were linked to such a degree [ voru þau tengsl ] that the defendants must be ordered jointly to pay compensation for them . It is considered that since , in the present case , declaring the statements null and void alone rectifies the appellant ’s position to a great extent , compensation in the amount of ISK CARDINAL is appropriate , with default interest , as further specified in the operative part of the present judgment . With reference to LAW , the defendants must also be ordered to pay ORG CARDINAL to the appellant to cover the costs of publication of the outcome of this case ; he has not claimed interest on that amount . ”

After his acquittal , Mr A initiated proceedings before the domestic courts , seeking compensation from the NORP State for unlawful detention during the above - mentioned criminal investigation , but to no avail . ORG , in its judgment of DATE , found the detention to have been justified even though he was later acquitted .

NORP In DATE , Mr A was again arrested for involvement in importing drugs into GPE , and in DATE he was sentenced by a final judgment to DATE PERSON imprisonment for his part in the crime .


Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

NORP The applicant , Ms Marina Vuletić , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She was represented before the Court by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP In DATE , after a verbal altercation in a bar , A.B. attacked the applicant , causing a multiple fracture of her right arm .

The injury was characterised by a medical expert as grave bodily injury , and the applicant sought psychological help concerning the attack .

On DATE the ORG Attorney ’s ORG ( Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u GPE ) indicted PERSON in ORG ( Općinski kazneni sud u GPE ) on charges of causing serious bodily injury .

On DATE the applicant submitted a civil claim for damages to ORG .

In the period between CARDINAL DATE and DATE several hearings were held , at which the trial court heard the applicant , PERSON and several witnesses , and obtained the relevant medical evidence . During the proceedings , the applicant assumed the victim status and was represented by a lawyer .

On DATE ORG adopted a judgment which was quashed on appeal by ORG ( Županijski sud u GPE ) on DATE , and a retrial was ordered .

In the resumed proceedings , on DATE ORG terminated the proceedings against A.B. , on the ground that the prosecution had become statute - barred . This decision was not served on the applicant . It became final on DATE .

In DATE the case file was destroyed according to the internal court rules ( see paragraph QUANTITY below ) . Only the decision terminating the proceedings was kept in the archives of ORG .

On DATE the applicant inquired in ORG about the status of her case and was then served with the decision of DATE by which the proceedings had terminated .

The relevant provisions of LAW ORG , ORG nos . DATE , CARDINAL , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL , DATE , ORG DATE , CARDINAL , CARDINAL and DATE ) read as follows :

Article CARDINAL

“ No one shall be subjected to any form of ill - treatment ... ”

The relevant provisions of LAW ( PERSON , ORG nos . TIME , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE and DATE ) provide :

Article CARDINAL

“ ( CARDINAL ) Criminal prosecutions for the purposes of applying the criminal legislation of GPE , ... , may not be instituted after expiry of the following periods , calculated from the time the offence was committed :

- DATE if the case concerns a criminal offence punishable by a sentence of DATE imprisonment ... ”

Article CARDINAL

( CARDINAL ) The limitation period shall start to run from the date on which the offence was committed .

( CARDINAL ) The statutory limitation period shall be interrupted each time a procedural step is taken concerning the prosecution of the offence .

( CARDINAL ) The statutory limitation period shall start to run again after each interruption .

( CARDINAL ) Criminal prosecutions shall in all cases become time - barred after expiry of the double statutory limitation period . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) Anyone who inflicts grievous bodily harm on another or seriously impairs another ’s health shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term from DATE . ”

The relevant provisions of LAW ( Zakon o kaznenom postupku , ORG nos . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL and DATE ) provided :

“ ( CARDINAL ) The president of the trial panel shall terminate proceedings and shall serve his or her decision on the parties and the victim ... when ...

CARDINAL ) NORP he has learned that the proceedings can not be continued for the reasons provided for in LAW . ... “

“ A judgment dismissing the charges shall be issued if ...

CARDINAL ) NORP the proceedings have become statute - barred ... “

The relevant provision of the Courts’ Rules ( ORG poslovnik , ORG nos . ORG , ORG , CARDINAL , GPE , GPE , GPE , CARDINAL , GPE , FAC and CARDINAL ) provides :

Section CARDINAL

After the expiry of the relevant time - limit ... the case files shall be transferred from the common archives to the archives , that is to say given [ for recycling ] or destroyed . ”

Section CARDINAL

“ The case files shall be kept in the common archives :

... DATE after the final termination of the [ criminal ] proceedings ... ”


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for home)

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant bought a flat in GPE at CARDINAL ORG ( “ the flat ” ) . The seller of the flat , PERSON , had acquired it under the privatisation scheme in DATE .

NORP Before its privatisation the flat was owned by GPE . On an unspecified date it was allocated to PERSON as social housing .

On DATE PERSON died .

On DATE the GPE housing authorities authorised a certain exchange of flats which resulted in Mr M. moving into the flat which had previously been allocated to PERSON

On DATE and DATE respectively Mr M. registered his grandfather , PERSON , and his grandmother , PERSON , as also living in the flat .

On DATE Mr M. and PERSON moved out of the flat .

On DATE Mr S. signed a social tenancy contract with ORG of GPE ( PERSON жилищной политики и жилищного фонда г. GPE , hereinafter “ the GPE Housing Department ” ) .

On DATE ORG transferred the ownership of the flat to Mr S. under the privatisation scheme .

On DATE Mr S. registered his ownership of the flat in the ORG register ( Единый государственный реестр прав на недвижимое имущество и сделок с ним ) .

On DATE an “ informational ban ” ( информационный запрет ) was imposed in respect of the flat by the criminal investigations service of ORG of the ORG ( ORG г. GPE ) in view of the possible illegal alienation of the flat .

On DATE Mr S. sold the flat to the applicant . The terms of the purchase included an undertaking by the seller to buy the applicant an equivalent flat in the event that she lost the title for reasons relating to any defects in the title which pre - dated her purchase of the flat .

According to the Government , on DATE the applicant ’s representative was informed that the registration of her ownership of the flat had been postponed for DATE .

On DATE , at the request of PERSON , the “ informational ban ” in respect of the flat was lifted .

On DATE the applicant ’s ownership of the flat was entered in the ORG register .

The applicant moved into the flat and has been living there ever since .

On DATE the criminal investigations service of ORG of the ORG informed ORG that it had discovered that the exchange of flats between Mr P. and PERSON had taken place after the former ’s death ( see paragraph PERSON above ) .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG instituted proceedings against PERSON , PERSON and PERSON and the applicant , asking the court to declare null and void the flat exchange between PERSON and PERSON of DATE , the social tenancy contract between Mr S. and ORG of DATE , the privatisation of the flat in favour of Mr S. of DATE and its subsequent sale to the applicant of CARDINAL DATE . They further sought the applicant ’s eviction , the termination of her title to the flat , and the return of the flat to the city of GPE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a counterclaim seeking to have her title to the flat recognised by the court . She contended that she had purchased the flat in good faith ( as a bona fide buyer ) and that she had not known that Mr S. had had no right to sell it .

On DATE ORG of GPE ( “ the ORG ” ) granted the claim of ORG . The court found that , since PERSON had died on DATE , the flat exchange and all the subsequent transactions in respect of the flat should be declared null and void . The court refused to recognise the applicant as a bona fide buyer , having found that she could and should have known of the “ informational ban ” imposed on the flat , of which the registration service had informed her representative on DATE .

By an additional judgment of DATE ORG dismissed the counterclaims lodged by the applicant .

On DATE the ORG quashed the judgments of DATE and DATE on appeal and remitted the case to ORG for a fresh examination by a different bench . In particular , the court held that ORG refusal to recognise the applicant as a bona fide buyer had not been based on sufficient grounds . Furthermore , having recognised ORG as the owner of the flat and having found that the flat had left GPE ’s possession without the latter ’s intention to divest itself of it , ORG had not taken into consideration that the flat exchange had not stripped the owner of its title , and that the subsequent transfer of the flat to Mr S. under the privatisation scheme had taken place with the participation of ORG . Therefore , in violation of the principle of equality of arms ORG had failed to examine why , in transferring the title to the flat to Mr S. on DATE , ORG had failed to check the circumstances under which Mr S. had acquired the right to own the flat . The court further noted in this connection that by DATE Mr P. had no longer been registered as living in the flat , as the information on his death had already been available .

On DATE ORG granted the claim of ORG and dismissed the applicant ’s counterclaims . The court found the flat exchange and all the subsequent transactions in respect of the flat null and void . It refused to recognise the applicant as a bona fide buyer , holding that she should have known of the existence of the “ informational ban ” imposed on the flat , as it had caused a DATE ’s delay in the registration of her title with the ORG . The court also pointed out that the flat had been owned by Mr S. for DATE before being sold to the applicant and that the applicant had bought it below the market price , which should have raised reasonable doubts as to the legal status of the acquired property .

On DATE ORG , in appellate proceedings , upheld the judgment , having endorsed ORG reasoning . It appears from the record of the appeal hearing that the plaintiff explicitly stated that it had no grounds to doubt that the applicant had bought the flat in good faith .

On DATE ORG refused to institute cassation proceedings , having found no violations of material or procedural norms in the previous proceedings .

The applicant requested a suspension of the execution of the judgment of DATE in so far as it concerned her eviction . On DATE ORG dismissed her request . On DATE ORG upheld that decision on appeal .

According to the applicant ’s latest submissions , she has not yet been evicted but considers it imminent .