Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Branko Lubarda;Ján Šikuta;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra

The applicants were spouses born in DATE and DATE respectively . In DATE the first applicant died , following which the second applicant expressed the wish to continue the application both in her own name and in the name of her late husband . The second applicant lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicants lodged a criminal complaint with ORG alleging that an individual , A. , had obtained an amount of money from them in return for the promise of arranging for the renovation of the flat in which they lived , that she had failed to keep that promise , and that she had not even been in the possession of the appropriate business licence for so doing . They considered that the criminal offence of fraud could have been committed in that connection , alleged that they had suffered the equivalent of CARDINAL euros worth of damage , and submitted that ORG had refused to compensate them .

On DATE the second applicant was questioned by an investigator . According to the transcript of the questioning , she inter alia referred to LAW . , as applicable at the relevant time – “ the DATE ORG ” – see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , submitted that she wished to join the proceedings as a civil party claiming damages , and proposed that the amount of the compensation be determined by a sworn expert .

On DATE a criminal investigation was opened into the suspicion of the offence of fraud having been committed by CARDINAL or more persons unknown in connection with the events mentioned above .

On DATE the investigator appointed a sworn expert to establish the value of the pecuniary damage allegedly sustained by the applicants . The expert filed his report on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE was charged but the charges were quashed by ORG ( “ the PPS ” ) on DATE . The matter was thus remitted to the investigation stage .

Meanwhile , on DATE , ORG of the PPS had informed the applicants that unjustified delay had been established in the proceedings , that it was due to the existing caseload and the staffing situation , and that the investigator ’s attention had been brought to the need to accelerate the proceedings .

NORP In a letter of CARDINAL DATE ORG of the PPS responded to the ORG repeated complaint by accepting that there had been unjustified delay in the proceedings , which had been repeatedly indicated to the investigator . However , except for flagging up the delays to the investigator , notifying the investigator ’s superior , and changing the investigator , the ORG had no means of ensuring acceleration of the proceedings .

On DATE ORG of the PPS responded to a further complaint from the applicants by again accepting that the investigation was in general vitiated by significant delays . This had repeatedly been indicated to the investigator ’s superior , but had not produced the expected improvement . The case had not been reassigned to another investigator because this did not appear to be efficient in view of the staff shortage . However , the investigator had again been reminded of the delays and if no improvement was to be seen , a new investigator would be appointed .

On DATE the investigator decided to terminate the proceedings . Referring to evidence from the second applicant , CARDINAL witnesses and the expert , as well as to documentary evidence , he concluded that there was no criminal case to answer . This decision was upheld by ORG of the PPS on DATE , following the applicants’ interlocutory appeal . No further appeal was available .

Meanwhile , on DATE , the applicants had lodged a complaint under LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL Coll . , as amended ) with ORG . They challenged the length of the proceedings on their third - party claim for damages attached to the above criminal proceedings and alleged a violation of the reasonable - time requirement under LAW and its constitutional equivalent .

On DATE ORG declared the complaint inadmissible . As to the facts , it observed that the second applicant had attached their third - party claim for damages to the proceedings orally in the interview of DATE . As to the law , ORG referred to the ORG ’s judgment in the case of PERSON and PERSON v. GPE ( no . MONEY , DATE ) and acknowledged that an aggrieved party ( obeť ) of a criminal offence who attached a third - party claim for damages ( adhézny nárok ) to the criminal proceedings was entitled to the guarantees of the civil limb of LAW . However , referring to unspecified practice of the ordinary courts and to the nature of things , ORG held that it was a condition for the aggrieved party to benefit from the guarantees in question to have made the claim against a specific person and that that person could be identified no earlier than when charges were brought against him or her . ORG further referred to its previous case - law on the subject and held specifically that the aggrieved party claiming damages in the criminal proceedings only benefited from the right to a hearing within a reasonable time under LAW after a charge had been brought against a specific person . In that regard , ORG noted that the charges against A. of DATE had been quashed on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . Therefore , at the time of the constitutional complaint , the applicants had no longer benefited from the constitutional guarantees relied on .

The decision was served on CARDINAL DATE and no appeal lay against it .


Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life)

Aleš Pejchal;Angelika Nußberger;Ann Power-Forde;Ganna Yudkivska;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger

The applicant , PERSON , was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant married in DATE and had CARDINAL children . In DATE and DATE she suffered miscarriages and a stillbirth , which caused her a long lasting psychological trauma .

In DATE she became pregnant with twins after an extramarital affair . The natural father insisted on an abortion , as did the husband of the applicant . Both men threatened to leave her .

NORP In DATE the husband of the applicant moved out and threatened to stop paying maintenance for his CARDINAL sons and to the applicant . He put further pressure on her by threatening to break off all contact with his sons if she sued for maintenance . Instead , he offered to move back in with the applicant if she gave away the “ illegitimate ” children . The applicant ’s sister and her mother refused to support her . The applicant felt extremely guilty for having destroyed the family situation for her CARDINAL sons , yet she was determined not to have an abortion .

On DATE the twin sisters , PERSON , were born prematurely . The applicant and the newborn children had to remain in hospital , where until DATE the applicant cared for the children .

The applicant did not specify the identity of the natural father of the twins .

The applicant made initial contact with ORG during her pregnancy . She allegedly initially thought about having the twins placed in foster care , due to her difficult family and financial situation . ORG DATE according to the applicant – instead suggested adoption as the applicant herself or her husband would have to pay for the foster care .

DATE until DATE the applicant received psychological treatment on the advice of her gynaecologist . According to her psychoanalyst the applicant was depressed , had suicidal tendencies , and suffered from anxiety , panic attacks and extreme feelings of guilt as well as a sleeping disorder . The applicant felt overwhelmed by the situation and the decisions to be taken . The potential adoption was a topic of discussion during the treatment .

As the applicant could not take the newborn children home she consented to having them placed in provisional care with a view to later adoption . In this way she hoped to avoid too many changes of the children ’s primary carers . She was allegedly told that if placed in foster care the newborns would first be given to an emergency foster family for DATE before being handed over to a long - term foster family .

From CARDINAL DATE onwards a staff member from ORG advised the applicant to stop visiting the children if she really intended to give them up for adoption .

On CARDINAL DATE the children were handed over to the couple who later became their adoptive parents .

In DATE the applicant personally met the future adoptive parents of the twin sisters . The applicant was allegedly so upset that she burst into tears and had to cut the visit short .

On DATE it was legally acknowledged that the husband of the applicant was not the father of the twin sisters by judgment of ORG ( no . CARDINAL F CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . The applicant began to work full time in order to support herself and her CARDINAL sons .

On DATE the applicant formally consented to the adoption of the children in a deed before the civil law notary , PERSON , in GPE . The declaration reads as follows :

“ I hereby give consent for my children , PERSON born CARDINAL in GPE , to be adopted by the married couple identified under no . [ ... ] on the list of ORG .

I declare this for the use of the competent family court . I am aware that this declaration can not be revoked .

I have been instructed by the civil law notary as to the legal consequences of the adoption , in particular the fact that all kinship of the children and their children to me and my relatives will cease as will all duties and rights that follow from kinship .

Although I do not know the names of the future parents of my children I trust that ORG has made a proper choice regarding the parents and respected the interests of the children .

In case the family court wishes to inform me about the beginning or the end of care , the beginning or the end of guardianship regarding my children or about the granting of adoption , I hereby empower ORG to receive that information for me . ”

As the identity of the natural father of the children remained unknown , he could not consent to or object to the adoption .

After the declaration of consent had been made , the applicant , the prospective adoptive parents and the twin infants met again in person . On DATE an oral agreement was reached between the prospective adoptive parents and the applicant at a meeting at ORG in the presence of a staff member . It was considered that the adoptive parents would send a short report together with photographs of the children to the applicant once DATE through ORG . Whether this agreement laid down any rules regarding regular meetings between the children and the applicant is disputed . A personal meeting in DATE was considered , but did not take place .

On DATE the future adoptive parents declared in a deed before a civil law notary that they wished to adopt the twin sisters PERSON

In DATE the District Administrator ( PERSON ) of GPE , ORG and Adoption gave an expert opinion on the development of the children in the care of the prospective adoptive parents .

On DATE the guardianship division of ORG ( proceedings no . CARDINAL XVI CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) held a hearing with the prospective adoptive parents in the presence of the twins . The record of the hearing reads :

“ It was debated how the children have been getting on in the family . Particular attention was paid to addressing anxieties resulting from the fact that the natural mother is obviously having enormous difficulties coping on a psychological level with the fact that she has given away her children . There are signs , given that a CARDINAL - open adoption was agreed on , which lead to the conclusion that the mother seeks contact with the twins . However , the arrangement involving the staff of ORG and the natural mother remains valid , namely , that photographs of the children are to be sent annually to the natural mother . The children will also be told early on that they were adopted . ”

On DATE ORG concluded the adoption of PERSON declared them the legitimate children of the adoptive parents . The family and the given names of the children were changed accordingly .

On DATE the applicant commenced proceedings before ORG in order to declare her consent to the adoption void . The court transferred the case to the competent ORG ( no . CARDINAL XVI CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . The applicant argued that the adoption was void because the father of the child had not consented to the adoption . She further argued that at the time of giving her consent she had been either in a temporary or in a pathological state of mental disturbance , which had prevented the free exercise of her will . She had not been aware of what she had been doing . She argued DATE referring to medical evidence – that she had been suffering from an “ aggravated reactive form of depression with acute risk of suicide ” since DATE , when she had been traumatised by the stillbirth .

The guardian ad litem of the children argued that a revocation of the adoption would be against the best interests of the children , as since their birth they had been almost continuously in the care of the adoptive parents who had established a very good parental relationship with them .

NORP In reaction to the arguments of the guardian ad litem the applicant partly withdrew her application with regard to custody rights and made clear that her aim was no longer to integrate the children into her own family . She acknowledged that the children were well cared for and fully settled in the adoptive family . She underlined that her aim was to regain kinship in order to have a right to contact with the children . In her view her vulnerable situation at the time of the birth had been exploited by ORG ; she now felt that she had been unduly influenced to put the children up for adoption .

ORG procured a psychiatric opinion on whether the applicant had been temporarily legally incapable of acting at the time of consenting to the adoption . The expert contacted the applicant , her psychoanalyst at the time and her long - term gynaecologist . According to the psychiatric expert the applicant had been in a situation of extreme conflict from the time she had become aware of her pregnancy . This had aggravated the depression she was already suffering from due to the accidental stillbirth in DATE . He put the applicant ’s decision to put the twin sisters up for adoption down to her desire to “ get her husband back ” . He diagnosed a certain weakness in the applicant ’s personality and a dependency on male authority . However , he could not diagnose any past or present psychotic illnesses and therefore concluded that although she had been suffering from a deep inner conflict at the time of consenting to the adoption , the applicant had been legally capable of making a decision on her own .

On DATE the court heard the applicant , who explained how , in her view , ORG had unduly used her wish to see her children in DATE in order to pressurise her into signing the adoption declaration .

In a decision of DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s claim . It acknowledged the situation of extreme conflict the applicant had been in at the time of consenting to the adoption and the psychological implications of that . It stated that solutions other than putting the children up for adoption might have been available to resolve the applicant ’s personal crisis . In line with the expert opinion , however , the court held that the applicant had still been capable of making decisions . Furthermore , the court stated that the applicant had no legal standing to rely on the lack of consent of the children ’s father to the adoption .

Since the applicant did not appeal against the decision , it became final .

On DATE the applicant filed proceedings ( no . CARDINAL F CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) for contact with the children and the right to receive information about them at ORG . She argued that she had been promised meetings with the children DATE and letters and photos of them . A meeting with the children in DATE had been scheduled according to the agreement , but did not take place because the responsible member of ORG was on extended leave . No other member of ORG had replaced the absent staff member . In DATE the applicant received photos of the children . When she mentioned that she was thinking about revoking her consent to the adoption , staff of ORG threatened to stop her contact with the children . A letter that the applicant wrote to the adoptive parents and handed over to ORG was returned with the remark that the applicant should seek psychological treatment . The applicant based her claim for contact on DATE and additionally on LAW ( see “ Relevant domestic law ” below ) . Her claim for the right to receive information about the children was based on LAW .

On DATE the adoptive parents were heard . They opposed the claim of the applicant and asked for it to be dismissed . They referred to the legal basis of adoption under LAW , which only provided for anonymous adoption . According to the hearing record the adoptive parents declared that they still intended to inform the children about the adoption before they started primary school . They had planned to see the mother of the children together with the children in DATE . This meeting had been set up for the sole benefit of the applicant , as the children would not have benefited from it . They had had the intention of sending letters to the applicant with information about the children . Now , in view of the court proceedings , they felt insecure and preferred to wait for the court decisions .

In a decision of DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request for contact with the children . According to the court LAW was not applicable to the applicant ’s case as she had lost her legal status as a parent as a result of the adoption . An analogous application of the LAW was , according to a decision of ORG of DATE ( no . CARDINAL BvR CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) , not possible . DATE of LAW was applicable , but would not grant contact rights to the applicant as she did not fulfil the legal requirements . The applicant could not be considered as a person who had cared for the children for an extended period of time . In fact , she had only cared for them for DATE . Even if the criteria of ORG in the above - mentioned decision – whether there was a social and family relationship – were applied , the applicant could not be granted contact , as she had not created a significant social and family relationship with the children . The time of pregnancy and DATE after the birth did not suffice . The Civil Code grants to the adoptive parents the sole right to establish , grant or deny contact with the children even in respect of the natural mother . Furthermore , the court argued that the children , who were DATE , might be overwhelmed by the fact that they had CARDINAL mothers .

On DATE the court also dismissed the applicant ’s claim in regard to the right to receive information about the children . LAW was not applicable , as the applicant was not a parent any more . Insofar as LAW might be construed more widely , it would not apply to the applicant as her case did not fall under the scope of LAW .

On DATE the applicant filed an appeal with ORG . She mainly complained that ORG had neither decided on DATE of LAW as a potential basis of her claim nor on whether a contractual agreement existed ; furthermore , her petition for an expert opinion on the children ’s best interests had been ignored . She further argued that the criteria of a “ long duration ” , when applied to parent - child relationships , had to be interpreted from the perspective of the child , whose concept of time differed from that of adults . The natural mother was always a “ relevant person ” in the sense of LAW , and this evaluation did not change even after the natural mother ceased to have legal responsibilities . Regarding the right to information , she argued that although she had consented to the adoption , she remained the natural mother and the constitutional protection of the family applied to her . Even the ORG had acknowledged that during pregnancy a psycho - social relationship between mother and the foetus was established ( judgment of DATE – CARDINAL BvL CARDINAL and CARDINAL BvR CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . Lastly , she complained about the length of the proceedings .

On DATE the applicant was granted legal aid .

On DATE ORG ( CARDINAL ORG CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL UF CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against the decisions of ORG of DATE and DATE . CARDINAL hearings , CARDINAL on DATE and the other on DATE , had taken place . Regarding the length of the proceedings before the district court , ORG found that that court had dealt adequately with the complex case within DATE . Concerning the contact rights of the applicant , the court found that only LAW was applicable . Although the applicant was the children ’s natural mother , she did not belong to the circle of people who had lived in “ domestic community ” with the child for a long period of time . According to the court , only foster parents are covered by this terminology . Furthermore , in order to determine “ a long period of time ” one had to establish whether a child had come to accept that his or her “ relevant surroundings ” ( PERSON ) were with the individual in question . In the present case , the time of pregnancy was irrelevant , as an unborn child does not have a concept of its surroundings . LAW was in line with the constitutional protection of the family . The natural mother ceased to have contact or custody rights at the moment of adoption . The legal provisions regarding adoption were aimed at the undisturbed development of the child , and they served the best interests of the adopted child , who had to be fully integrated into the adoptive family ; the biological family became irrelevant in accordance with the law . Even if the criteria of the judgment of ORG of DATE regarding the natural father of a child born out of wedlock were applied , the natural mother would have to have lived with the children for a considerable time , which was not the case here . As the applicant knew , the right to contact on the basis of a contractual agreement could not be enforced by the family courts , as they were not empowered to regulate such matters . DATE LAW did not give grounds for a different solution .

Having considered the claim for the right to receive information about the children DATE of LAW , the court found that the applicant had ceased to be a parent at the moment of adoption . As the legal basis was unambiguous and the circle of people who had a right to such information was strictly limited to the parents , the court found no room for a different interpretation .

On DATE the applicant raised a constitutional complaint regarding the denial of her rights to receive information about and have contact with the twin sisters after their adoption .

NORP In a decision of CARDINAL DATE , served on the applicant ’s representative on DATE , a panel of CARDINAL constitutional judges refused to admit the constitutional complaint .

The applicant also commenced proceedings in DATE concerning the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the twin sisters , in order for the children to be able to raise a constitutional complaint against the adoption decision of the guardianship division of ORG of DATE ( no . CARDINAL XVI CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . These proceedings are the issue of another complaint before this ORG ( application no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

The applicant divorced her husband and is now remarried . She had a child with her new husband in DATE .

By letter of DATE this ORG informed the applicant that on DATE the PERSON on a remedy against lengthy court proceedings and criminal investigations ( ORG I , DATE , page CARDINAL et seq . ) had come into force in GPE .


Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Ksenija Turković

The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation;Positive obligations) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Aleš Pejchal;André Potocki;Ganna Yudkivska;Helena Jäderblom;Josep Casadevall;Síofra O’Leary;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant was travelling on a tram and was approached by Mr PERSON and PERSON , ticket inspectors employed by the NORP municipal enterprise ( “ the transport company ” ) . As subsequently established by domestic authorities in the indictment and in the judgment convicting PERSON ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and DATE below ) , there was a disagreement between the applicant and the inspectors as to whether he had a valid ticket . They insisted that the applicant pay a fine for travelling without a ticket , while he insisted that he had broken no rules . The applicant was asked to get off the tram . It was then agreed that the applicant would accompany the inspectors to a tram depot to resolve the dispute . While they were on their way to the depot LOC kicked the applicant . In response the applicant sprayed the inspectors with tear gas from a can he had on him . PERSON then kicked the applicant in the left knee , causing a fracture . A struggle between the applicant and S. ensued . PERSON and PERSON then left the scene . The applicant could not stand up or walk following the knee fracture , he was helped to the nearby tram stop by the bystanders who called an ambulance for him . According to the applicant , he has been receiving treatment for his injury until DATE .

On DATE the applicant made a statement to the police describing the circumstances of the incident . In particular , he stated that on DATE of the incident he had been approached by CARDINAL ticket inspectors who questioned the validity of his ticket , suggesting that he appeared too old to be using a student ticket . While they insisted that he pay a fine he insisted his ticket was in order . He volunteered to go with them to a police station to resolve the dispute . In response they suggested that they go to the tram depot instead and he agreed . On the way to the depot he was kicked from behind . He turned round and sprayed the inspectors with tear gas , and was kicked in the knee . He stated that he did not know the names of the inspectors but could identify them by sight .

On DATE a police investigator of ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) refused to institute criminal proceedings into the incident . The investigator noted that the ticket inspector on duty on the tram line in question at the relevant time was identified as S. He went on to note that S. could not be contacted for an interview since he was said to be on sick leave from work and was not found at his home address . The investigator also noted that the gravity of the applicant ’s injuries could only be evaluated after completion of the applicant ’s treatment .

On DATE a forensic medical expert diagnosed the applicant with a knee fracture and classified this as bodily injuries of medium gravity .

On DATE ORG ( “ ORG Office ” ) quashed the decision of DATE and instituted criminal proceedings on suspicion of deliberate infliction of bodily injuries of medium gravity . On DATE ORG informed the applicant about this decision , also informing him that disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against the investigator who made the decision of DATE . According to the applicant , he first learned about the decision of DATE from this letter from ORG .

On DATE another investigator of ORG commenced the investigation .

On DATE the investigator recognised the applicant as an aggrieved party in the criminal proceedings . On DATE the applicant was interviewed in this capacity .

On DATE the investigator sent a letter to the transport company enquiring whether PERSON had been working at the relevant time as a ticket inspector and asking the company to identify who PERSON had been working with on DATE of the incident . In DATE the company responded that S. had indeed been working as an inspector at the relevant time , that PERSON had accompanied him on the day of the incident , and that S. had been dismissed on DATE for absenteeism .

On DATE the applicant , in the course of a photo identification , identified S. as the person who had assaulted him .

According to the Government , on DATE the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrator .

On DATE the investigation was resumed .

On DATE , in the course of a photo identification , the applicant identified PERSON as the person who , together with PERSON , participated in the incident .

On DATE the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrator .

On DATE ORG informed the applicant that the investigation in his case was pending .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision of DATE to suspend the investigation , finding that possible perpetrators had in fact been identified .

On DATE the investigator resumed the investigation , initiated criminal proceedings against S. and PERSON , and joined the newly initiated proceedings with the existing case file .

On DATE the investigator charged S. with infliction of bodily injuries of medium gravity , committed in conspiracy with PERSON The investigator placed PERSON and PERSON on the list of wanted persons , and suspended the investigation as the whereabouts of the accused were unknown .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the investigator decided to resume the investigation , and on DATE and CARDINAL DATE respectively to suspend it again .

On DATE the investigation was resumed .

On DATE a face - to - face confrontation was conducted between PERSON and the applicant , and the applicant was interviewed separately . The applicant stated that PERSON had kicked him on the knee . While he was not certain that PERSON had assaulted him , he was assuming that it was PERSON who had kicked him in the back on DATE .

On DATE the investigator discontinued the criminal proceedings against PERSON for lack of corpus delicti in his actions . He relied on the testimony of PERSON , who denied assaulting the applicant , and the testimony of the applicant to the effect that it was PERSON and not PERSON who had assaulted him . On DATE he suspended the remaining part of the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrator .

According to the Government , on DATE CARDINAL S. was arrested . On DATE the investigation was resumed and the charges were announced to S.

On DATE a face - to - face confrontation was conducted between S. as the accused and the applicant as the aggrieved party .

On DATE the investigator charged S. with infliction of bodily injuries of medium gravity .

According to the Government , on an unspecified date , upon completion of the pre - trial investigation in DATE ’s case , the applicant was offered an opportunity to study the case file but refused it . According to the applicant , he was not informed about the completion of the investigation or any of the subsequent developments in the criminal proceedings .

On DATE ORG approved the bill of indictment indicting S. for infliction of bodily injuries of medium gravity .

On DATE ORG of Kyiv ( “ the trial court ” ) held a preliminary hearing in LOC ’s case , in which PERSON , his lawyer and a prosecutor participated . The record of the hearing states that the applicant was not present at the hearing .

On DATE the trial court examined the case on the merits in the presence of S. , his lawyer and the prosecutor and in the absence of the applicant . The trial court , after obtaining favourable opinions from all parties present , ruled that the hearing should proceed in the absence of the applicant and witness PERSON who , the court stated , “ had been duly notified about the hearing ” . The court further ruled that , should their presence prove necessary , measures would be taken to ensure the applicant ’s and PERSON ’s appearance . In the course of the hearing the court heard a statement from LOC .. S. did not contest the charges and admitted his guilt . The court ruled that in view of S. ’s confession and admission of guilt there was no call to examine any other evidence .

On DATE the trial court convicted PERSON as charged and sentenced him to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment , suspended for DATE with probation . In sentencing PERSON the court took into account that PERSON had admitted his guilt and expressed remorse , the fact that he had no prior convictions , was employed and had positive references from his then - current place of employment .

According to the information submitted by the ORG , the domestic case file in S. ’s case does not contain any copies of summonses or notices sent to the applicant in the course of examination of the case by the trial court or any documents indicating that such summonses or notices were sent .

On DATE the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Holosiyivskyy ORG of Kyiv , against the transport company , seeking damages for the unlawful actions of its employees .

On DATE the court rejected his claim on the ground that he had not proved that he had been injured by the employees of the defendant in the performance of their duties . The court noted that the applicant had failed to explain why the individuals identified by him had not yet been charged or convicted , and that the criminal case in connection with the incident was still under investigation .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of the first - instance court .

On DATE ORG , acting as a court of cassation , upheld the decisions of DATE and DATE .


Elisabeth Steiner;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in ORG .

The applicant lodged a compensation claim for medical negligence against a hospital on DATE .

The Pest Central District Court dismissed the action .

NORP On appeal , ORG upheld the firstinstance decision on CARDINAL DATE .

The applicant lodged a petition for review . The GPE upheld the decision on DATE . The judgment was served on the applicant on CARDINAL DATE .


No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention;Reasonableness of pre-trial detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review)

András Sajó;Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant , who was then a police officer , was arrested on suspicion of extortion . On DATE FAC ( “ the ORG ” ) remanded him in custody , finding as follows :

“ There is a reasonable suspicion in the present criminal case , supported by the enclosed documents : statements by B. [ the alleged victim of the extortion ] ; the crime scene report ; the report on the marking and examination of the banknotes ; the report on the search of and seizure of money from ORG [ a co - accused ] ; TIME of interviews with PERSON , the prime suspect PERSON , and K , a witness . When deciding on the remand matter , the court is not required to evaluate whether the existing evidence is sufficient for a finding of guilt .

[ The applicant ] , a police officer , is suspected of having masterminded and supervised the commission of a serious crime by a criminal group which included other police officers . It follows from the statements by PERSON and PERSON that , after they had complained to the police about extortion , they continued to receive threats of physical violence from [ the applicant ] , PERSON . and PERSON In these circumstances , [ the applicant ] must be remanded in custody because a more lenient restrictive measure can not be imposed . ”

On DATE ORG ( “ the Regional Court ” ) upheld the decision of CARDINAL October CARDINAL on appeal .

On an unspecified date the applicant was charged with organising and facilitating prostitution .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s pretrial detention until DATE . The court noted as follows :

“ Regard being had to the submissions made by the parties , the case file , and the fact that , as a police officer , [ the applicant ] , if not in custody , might abscond , put pressure on victims and witnesses who identified him as a person who had committed a crime , or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice ... The judge does not consider that the restrictive measure imposed on [ the applicant ] can be replaced with a more lenient one ... ”

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE indicating as follows :

“ Having studied the case file and having listened to the parties to the proceedings , the court does not discern circumstances that would justify the replacement of the restrictive measure imposed on [ the applicant ] .

[ The applicant ] is charged with a serious offence . He has organised a criminal group and has been its leader . If not in custody , he can put pressure on the parties to the proceedings .

The above presumption as to the [ applicant ’s ] potential conduct is based on the information about the [ applicant ’s ] character and his modus operandi . ”

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE , noting as follows :

“ ... [ The ] court takes into account the seriousness of the crime [ the applicant ] is charged with ... The court considers that , as an active police officer able to use his position , [ the ] applicant might put pressure on victims and witnesses who directly identified him as an offender , or otherwise interfere with the establishment of the truth . Furthermore , the [ applicant ’s ] assertion that he is suffering from a serious disease ... can not be taken into account by the court . No medical report has been submitted to show whether [ the applicant ] was fit or not for detention . ”

On DATE , ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE arguing as follows :

in particular that the criminal investigation is being conducted into a group of persons and that [ the applicant ] is a police officer , the court concludes that he , if not in custody , might abscond , continue criminal activities , put psychological or physical pressure on the victim or witnesses , destroy evidence or , otherwise interfere with the administration of justice . ”

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s pre - trial detention until DATE , reiterating that the applicant might put pressure on victims and witnesses . On DATE ORG upheld this decision on appeal , but only extending the applicant ’s detention until DATE .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s pretrial detention until DATE . The court reiterated its previous reasoning that the applicant might put pressure on victims and witnesses .

On DATE the applicant was charged with organisation of a criminal group , accepting bribes , and abuse of position . It appears that the charges of extortion and of organising and facilitating prostitution were dropped .

On DATE the prosecution submitted the case against the applicant and CARDINAL co - defendants to ORG for trial .

Following a request from the prosecution , on DATE ORG allowed the return of the case file to the prosecutor on the grounds that the defendants had not been able to study it . The court dismissed the GPE request to release them on bail finding that “ the circumstances underlying their remand in custody [ were ] still present ” and extended their detention until DATE . On DATE ORG of GPE upheld the decision of DATE on appeal . In response to the applicant ’s argument that the maximum statutory period of pre - trial detention had expired and he should therefore be released , the court noted that , pursuant to the applicable rules of criminal procedure , the applicant could be detained for DATE pending investigation , owing to the seriousness of the charges against him .

On an unspecified date the prosecutor forwarded the case file to the court and on DATE ORG again granted the prosecutor ’s request and returned the case file to the prosecution for DATE on the grounds that the defendants had not studied the case file in its entirety . It also extended the applicant ’s and his co - defendants’ detention until DATE , referring to the earlier particularities justifying the GPE remand in custody and to the fact that the case involved anonymous witnesses and victims . On DATE ORG upheld the decision of DATE on appeal .

On DATE ORG received the case file and on DATE , for a third time , it decided to return the case to the prosecutor at his request , reiterating its earlier reasoning . The court extended the GPE detention until DATE , holding as follows :

“ Since the period of detention of [ the applicant ] , PERSON and PERSON . ends on DATE , this period must be extended by DATE so as to remedy a violation of the rights of the defence which resulted from the impossibility for defendants and counsel to study the case - file , as well as to allow the investigator to decide subsequently on the restrictive measure in respect of those individuals . ”

On DATE the case was re - submitted for trial .

On DATE ORG extended the defendants’ detention until DATE . The court reasoned as follows :

“ Having discussed with the parties the issue of the [ defendants’ ] detention , regard being had to the seriousness of the charges against them , the court considers that , if not in custody , the defendants might influence the victims and witnesses , abscond or reoffend . It considers it necessary to extend the earlier imposed detention ... ”

On DATE ORG fixed the trial date for DATE and noted that the detention earlier imposed on the defendants should remain unchanged . On CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld the decision of DATE on appeal .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE reiterating , in substance , its earlier reasoning .

On DATE the jury delivered a not - guilty verdict in the applicant ’s case and on DATE ORG issued the relevant judgment and ordered the applicant ’s immediate release .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of DATE on appeal .

On an unspecified date the applicant brought an action for compensation for pecuniary damage resulting from the criminal prosecution . The applicant ’s claims included : lost income , legal fees , his lawyer ’s travel expenses in connection with the appeal hearing in GPE , reimbursement of the cost of food , a television set and a refrigerator his family had sent to him while he had been in detention .

On DATE ORG granted the applicant ’s claims in part and awarded him MONEY ( RUB ) for legal fees and his lawyer ’s travel expenses and RUB CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL for loss of income . The applicant did not appeal .

On an unspecified date the applicant brought a civil claim seeking compensation for non - pecuniary damage in connection with the criminal prosecution . In particular , he alleged that he had been detained pending criminal proceedings against him in the absence of relevant evidence and sufficient reasoning . The applicant claimed RUB CARDINAL in this respect .

On DATE ORG granted the applicant ’s claims in part and awarded him RUB CARDINAL,CARDINAL . The court noted , in particular , that an acquittal in the criminal proceedings had been a catalyst for the restoration of his good name and position before the trial ( реабилитация , hereinafter “ rehabilitation ” )

“ ... ’s ] claims should be granted in part .

In the present case , the court takes into consideration that the decisions to detain [ the applicant ] pending trial were authorised by court orders which were subject to review by superior courts which examined their lawfulness and the underlying reasons and upheld [ said decisions ] on appeal . ”

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of CARDINAL DATE on appeal .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13+6-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Egidijus Kūris;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the excessive length of civil proceedings and of the lack of any effective remedy in domestic law . Some applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Civil rights and obligations;Fair hearing;Public hearing);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Ganna Yudkivska;Iulia Motoc;Marko Bošnjak;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Georges Ravarani

NORP The applicant institute is a private institute that carries out research in the field of social sciences . Its registered office is in GPE .

NORP In DATE , ORG , ORG ( hereinafter “ the Ministry ” ) made CARDINAL calls for tenders for the purpose of making awards for scientific research projects ; CARDINAL call was directed at private entities and the other at public research organisations . ORG announced that in DATE it would finance CARDINAL research hours , which were estimated to amount to CARDINAL NORP tolars ( SIT – MONEY ( ORG ) ) . The research projects were to be evaluated under LAW . The applicant institute submitted a tender for research in the field of social sciences .

Subsequently , the ORG seems to have joined the proceedings for the CARDINAL tenders , but no formal decision regarding the joinder appears to have been made . On DATE the Ministry decided that the applicant institute would not be awarded any funding .

The applicant institute applied to ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) , seeking the setting aside of the ORG ’s decision . The action was granted by a decision of CARDINAL DATE and the case was remitted to ORG for reconsideration .

On DATE the applicant institute lodged another action before ORG on account of the ORG ’s failure to adopt a decision within the prescribed time - limit .

On DATE the Ministry again decided that the applicant institute would not be awarded any funding . It explained that the institute ’s research programme had been ranked fifth among the research programmes in the field of political sciences and that CARDINAL programmes in that group would receive funding . ORG pointed out that it was presumed that no conflict of interests existed , even when evaluators worked in the same institution whose tenders they were evaluating and that this was a common NORP practice . It was further noted that evaluators had signed a declaration of confidentiality and an undertaking to withdraw in the event that a conflict of interests was found .

NORP In order to reflect the fact that the Ministry had adopted the decision of CARDINAL DATE , the applicant institute supplemented its action of DATE , which it had originally lodged on account of the ORG ’s failure to adopt a decision ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , with a request that the ORG ’s decision be set aside . It further urged ORG to decide that it would be awarded funding . It complained that ORG had joined the proceedings that had initially been intended for consideration of tenders from private research organisations to the proceedings for consideration of tenders from public research organisations , without issuing a formal decision to that effect . It also complained of errors in the evaluation of the competing programmes , because not all of the criteria specified in the Rules on Quality Assessment and Funding of the Public Research Organisation Programme had been taken into account . It argued , inter alia , that the evaluation procedure had been unfair because some of the evaluators had been biased , as they had been evaluating research programmes which were competing with the very programmes in which they themselves participated . This provoked a distortion of the results of the procedure , as shown by the fact that only those research programmes in which the evaluators were leaders or members of research teams obtained financing . The applicant institute expressly requested a hearing at which witnesses could be heard with regard to the alleged procedural errors in the evaluation of the programmes . Additionally , it submitted a letter of DATE which CARDINAL of the witnesses , PERSON , had sent to the Minister of Education , ORG and several other addressees . In the letter PERSON notified them of problems he had detected in the tender proceedings in which he had participated as an evaluator .

After the parties had exchanged a number of written submissions , ORG , without holding a hearing , dismissed the action . In its decision of CARDINAL DATE the court gave an extensive account of the proceedings before ORG and the submissions of both parties . The reasons for the decision were given on a single page . Invoking section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW ( Zakon o upravnem sporu – hereinafter “ the ORG ” , see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , ORG chiefly referred to the submissions of ORG . It considered , among other things , that ORG had not acted unlawfully in joining the proceedings . It accepted the ORG ’s submission that its decision had been dictated by the nature of the research and infrastructural programmes , taking into account the guidelines of ORG . The court also pointed out that the procedural rules for the evaluation of research programmes adopted by ORG clearly defined the stages of the evaluation procedure , the participants in it and their tasks . Regarding the alleged conflict of interests , the court stated that it agreed with ORG as to why no such conflict existed and cited section PERSON ) of the ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . As to the alleged errors in the evaluation of the competing programmes , the court merely disagreed with the applicant institute that not all criteria had been taken into account and again cited section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the ORG .

No reasons were given for not holding a hearing . None of the evidence relied on by the applicant institute in their appeal ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) was acknowledged or referred to in the court ’s reasoning .

On DATE the applicant institute lodged an appeal on points of law . It complained that ORG had not held a hearing even though the facts of the case had been contested and the applicant institute had explicitly requested a hearing at which witnesses could be heard . It also argued that ORG had failed to address its allegations that errors had been made in the evaluation procedure , and complained that insufficient reasoning had been given for the decision .

On DATE ORG rejected the appeal as inadmissible . No reasons were given in its decision on the merits of the applicant institute ’s complaints .

The applicant institute then lodged a constitutional complaint , arguing , among other things , that the decisions of the ORG and the domestic court had been arbitrary and that the courts had failed to address its allegations that errors had been made in the evaluation procedure . It reiterated that the witnesses it had proposed had not been heard and that no hearing had been held .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant institute ’s complaint , finding that it did not concern an important constitutional question or entail a violation of human rights with serious consequences for the applicant institute .


No violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression)

Aleš Pejchal;André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Dean Spielmann;Dmitry Dedov;Egidijus Kūris;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Ineta Ziemele;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Khanlar Hajiyev;Kristina Pardalos;Ledi Bianku;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mark Villiger;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Lemmens;Paul Mahoney;Robert Spano;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant is a photographer and journalist who is employed by the DATE magazine ORG . On DATE he was sent by his employer to take photographs of the demonstration which was being held in protest against the on - going LOC meeting ( ORG ) in GPE . The demonstration was an exceptionally large one in the NORP context and all media followed it closely . The applicant was to conduct an extensive report on the demonstration for the paper version of the magazine and also to publish it online immediately , once the demonstration had ended .

’ submissions , including the DVD material covering the Smash ASEM event ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) as well as the GPE ORG judgment ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE , before the demonstration took place , the NORP ORG made an assessment of the risk levels inherent in the upcoming Smash ORG demonstration and alerted ORG that the demonstration would be a hostile one and would not aim to highlight any clear political message . At that time ORG did not manage , despite all efforts , to establish contact with the organisers of the demonstration . The police based their subsequent actions , inter alia , on these grounds .

A similar risk assessment had also been made in the context of CARDINAL earlier demonstrations which had taken place in GPE during DATE , both of which had turned violent . The first one was the EuroMayDay demonstration of DATE , when a march of CARDINAL persons evolved into a riot with projectiles being thrown and property damaged . Consequently , the GPE ORG found CARDINAL persons guilty of violent rioting and resisting the police by violence and imposed suspended prison sentences . A similar incident took place during the Helsinki Night of Arts on DATE which also resulted in the destruction of property and violence and led to the detention of QUANTITY persons .

On DATE a so - called Dongzhou Coalition notified the police of the Smash ASEM demonstration . According to the report of the Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , the police did not have any information about the Dongzhou Coalition and it was thus unclear to them who the organiser was in reality . It appears from public sources that the said “ coalition ” was an informal group open to anyone who agreed with the idea defended by the Smash ASEM demonstration and who undertook not to bring any party emblems to the demonstration site .

The demonstrators announced that they were planning to march on DATE between TIME and TIME from ORG – an area of dense traffic – to FAC where the ORG summit was to be held , a distance of QUANTITY . The announced march route was the following : PERSON – Kaivokatu – Siltasaarenkatu – Agricolankatu – PERSON – Läntinen PERSON DATE Sturenkatu – Aleksis GPE – GPE – GPE – Ratamestarinkatu – DATE ending at the park next to the FAC which is close to the summit venue . The theme of the demonstration was to oppose the ORG summit , with some focus on human rights issues . In posters inviting people to take part in the demonstration , the demonstrators were asked to wear black clothing . The posters also portrayed a demonstrator throwing a Molotov cocktail and they encouraged would - be participants , inter alia , to “ bring even a little bit of disorder also to the streets of GPE ” ( “ tuoda edes hieman sekasortoa myös NORP kaduille ” , att få även en liten bit av kaos också på gatorna i Helsingfors ) .

According to the Government , the police were able to make telephone contact with CARDINAL of the organisers named as the contact person for the event . However , that person , acting on behalf of the organisers , refused to discuss matters relating , inter alia , to the conditions on which the demonstrators would be able to march from the event - site to the vicinity of the exhibition centre where LOC was being held . This refusal extended also to police efforts to establish contact with the organisers at the event - site itself .

According to the Government , there was a separate area reserved by the police for media representatives to cover the event . It was located at FAC , opposite ORG , on the other side of PERSON . The police , as standard procedure , had notified major NORP media organisations of the Smash ASEM event and included the contact information of the police ’s public relations unit , which was ready to discuss any questions the media might have about covering the event , including information about an area reserved for the media ’s convenience . Furthermore , the GPE ORG public relations unit had reserved a senior officer to be present at that very same area to answer any questions media representatives might have , as well as to give interviews on the events that unfolded during DATE .

The demonstration was to start at TIME on DATE . Some CARDINAL bystanders , a core group of CARDINAL demonstrators and CARDINAL journalists congregated at the departure point of the march . The police had made security preparations for the event by deploying CARDINAL police and border guard officers . By NORP standards , the scale of the police preparations was exceptional .

At the start of the demonstration , bottles , stones and jars filled with paint were thrown at the public and policemen . Some demonstrators kicked and hit police officers . Apparently at TIME , policemen surrounded the area of the demonstration . At this point people were free to pass through the line of policemen . The police announced several times over loudspeakers that a peaceful demonstration was allowed to take place on the spot but that the crowd was not allowed to demonstrate by marching .

After the escalation of violence , the police considered at TIME that the event had turned into a riot . From TIME to TIME the police sealed off the area in an effort to contain the rioting . The crowd tried to break through the police defence line . However , during this time , the police cordon did allow families with children , and representatives of the media , to pass through . This passage was , at times , plagued by bottles and other projectiles being thrown at the spot where people were leaving .

NORP The police announced over loudspeakers that the demonstration was stopped and that the crowd should leave the scene . This announcement was repeated several times . CARDINAL of people then left voluntarily via several exit routes established by the police . When leaving , they were asked to show their identity cards and their belongings were checked .

The applicant claimed that the line of policemen surrounding the cordon was extremely tight and multi - layered . The visibility from outside the cordon to inside was practically non - existent . The police minibuses and detention buses also impeded visibility . At TIME the police started to set up a second , wider cordon and fenced off the whole immediate downtown area . It was not possible to see from nearby streets to the GPE area .

Some demonstrators were apprehended within the cordoned - off area by force . The apprehensions by the police were effected by using the " paint - chain " method , part of which includes the opening up of the police cordon to allow detaining officers to act , followed by that cordon ’s immediate closure after the detained person is secured .

NORP The police announced repeatedly that the crowd should disperse . The applicant claimed that he heard the police order that the area be cleared for the first time at TIME The applicant called his employer and they had a conversation about whether the applicant should leave the area . The applicant noted that on the basis of , inter alia , this conversation , he came to the conclusion that his presence inside the cordon was necessary .

Towards the end of the demonstration , the applicant maintained that he had placed himself between the police and the demonstrators . The police continued to order the crowd to disperse , stating that any person who did not leave would be apprehended . At TIME a police officer told the applicant personally that he had CARDINAL last chance to leave the scene . The applicant told the police officer that he was reporting for ORG and that he was going to follow the event to its end , after which the police officer had left him alone . The applicant thought that the police would not interfere with his work after he had given them this explanation .

By TIME , CARDINAL people had left the scene via the police checkpoints . According to the applicant , CARDINAL demonstrators were still sitting on the ground in the middle of the first cordoned - off area , closely encircled by the police . The demonstrators held on to one another and were holding each other ’s arms . The situation inside the cordon had already been peaceful for TIME at this point . After this , the police broke up the crowd of demonstrators and apprehended the protesters .

The applicant claimed that , before he was apprehended , he heard a police officer shout : " Get the photographer ! " The applicant was standing next to a former Member of ORG and taking photographs when he was apprehended . He told the apprehending officer that he was a journalist , which the police officer later confirmed . The apprehending officer stated during the pre - trial investigation that the applicant did not resist the apprehension and that he had asked to make a telephone call , which he had been allowed to do . The applicant called his colleague at the magazine , explaining that the police had detained him and that he did not know what was going to happen next . He thought that he would be released soon . The applicant had also told the apprehending police officer that he had cameras in his bag , which information was taken into account by the police officer : the applicant was allowed to put his camera equipment away in his camera bag . When the apprehending police officer had asked for identification , the applicant had presented his press card . Another police officer present during the applicant ’s apprehension stated during the pre - trial investigation that the applicant did not resist apprehension but that he had not heard the applicant identify himself as a journalist . The apprehending officer also testified that he had filled in the apprehension document , giving the reasons for the applicant ’s apprehension and recording his personal information . According to the pre - trial investigation report , the basis for the applicant ’s apprehension was contumacy towards the police .

The applicant was then taken to a bus for detainees . In the bus , he allegedly explained to the police again that he was a magazine photographer . The applicant was taken to the police station where he asked to speak with the chief constable . He allegedly explained again that he was a journalist but his requests were ignored . He claimed that he “ lifted ” his press card and started to wear it visibly on his chest thereafter . The applicant also claimed that the receiving police officer at the police station had to remove his press card which was hanging around his neck . According to the applicant , the receiving police officer at the police station was therefore aware that he was a journalist . While in the custody cell , the applicant allegedly shouted also to passing police officers that they had apprehended a journalist , but he was ignored .

The applicant claimed that his camera equipment and memory cards had been confiscated . However , the ORG maintained that , as soon as the police had found out that the applicant was a member of the press , his camera , memory cards and other equipment were immediately treated as journalistic sources and were not confiscated . He had been able to retain the photographs and no restrictions on the use of the photographs had been imposed on him by any authority at any stage . According to the report of Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , the police had checked the content of the GPE mobile telephones . However , it is not clear whether the applicant ’s mobile telephone was checked and whether his memory cards were inspected .

The police kept the applicant in detention from DATE at CARDINAL TIME until DATE at TIME , that is , for TIME . He was interrogated by the police on DATE between TIME and TIME

The applicant ’s employer , the editor - in - chief of the magazine , apparently learned about the applicant ’s apprehension and that he was being held in police custody . It would appear that he telephoned the police station but was given no information concerning the applicant ’s apprehension . According to the applicant , it was only when the editor - in - chief called a senior official ( whose name the applicant did not mention in his submissions ) in ORG the following day that preparations were made for the applicant ’s release .

The police apprehended altogether CARDINAL persons at the demonstration site . The police released minors ( QUANTITY individuals ) after a few NORP apprehension . The majority of those who were apprehended were released on DATE . The applicant was the seventh detainee to be interrogated and the sixth to be released after minors . The last suspect was released on DATE at TIME

Both domestic and international media reported the event and the police measures widely . The matter was also the subject of a wide - ranging investigation by the Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman in DATE and DATE . However , due to procedural rules , the Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman could not investigate the applicant ’s case because the criminal proceedings were pending against him at that time .

It appears from the report of the Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman of DATE , inter alia , that the police did not have any information about the Dongzhou Coalition and that it was thus unclear to them who the organiser of the demonstration was in reality . It also appears that the police checked the content of the GPE mobile telephones . Moreover , the Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman criticised , inter alia , the fact that there had been an insufficient number of check - points in relation to the number of people , and that the TIME duration of holding people within the cordoned - off area was unnecessarily long . The Deputy ORG also questioned the legality of the security checks .

On DATE the police informed CARDINAL suspects that , for their part , the preliminary investigation was discontinued and that their cases would not be referred to the public prosecutor for the consideration of charges . The public prosecutor brought charges against CARDINAL persons altogether .

On DATE the public prosecutor brought charges against the applicant for contumacy towards the police ( niskoittelu poliisia vastaan , tredska mot polis ) under LAW , section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL , of LAW ( rikoslaki , strafflagen ) .

On DATE the GPE ORG ( käräjäoikeus , tingsrätten ) found the applicant guilty of contumacy towards the police under LAW , section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL , of the Penal Code but did not impose any penalty on him .

The applicant stated before the court that he had heard the orders to disperse at TIME but had understood that they concerned only the demonstrators . The court found it established that the police actions had been legal and that the applicant had been aware of the orders of the police to leave the scene but had decided to ignore them . It appeared from the witness statements given before the court that the applicant had not said or indicated to a police officer standing nearby at the time of the apprehension that he was a journalist . According to this police officer , this fact only became known to him when the relevant magazine appeared . It appeared also from the witness statement of another journalist that he and a third photographer , who had been in the sealed - off area , had been able to leave the scene without consequences just before the applicant was apprehended . This last remaining journalist witnessed that he had taken his last photograph at TIME and left the area TIME before the applicant ’s apprehension took place . ORG found it further established that the police orders had been clear and that they had manifestly concerned everyone in the crowd , which consisted of demonstrators as well as bystanders and other members of the public .

Moreover , ORG examined the justification of the interference of the applicant ’s right under LAW in the following manner :

It is disputed whether PERSON had , as a journalist and on the basis of his freedom of expression , the right not to obey the orders given to him by the police . PERSON had been prepared to use his freedom of expression as a photographer . The police orders to disperse therefore restricted PERSON ’s freedom of expression . The question is whether there was a justification for this restriction .

According to LAW , everyone has the right to freedom of expression . It includes a right to publish and distribute information without the interference of the authorities . According to LAW , more detailed provisions on the exercise of the freedom of expression are laid down by an LAW . In accordance with LAW of LAW , the exercise of the freedom of expression may be subject to formalities , conditions , restrictions or penalties which are prescribed by law . According to the said LAW and the case - law of ORG , CARDINAL requirements must be taken into account when assessing the restrictions : CARDINAL ) the restriction must be prescribed by law , CARDINAL ) it must have an acceptable reason and CARDINAL ) it must be necessary in a NORP society .

First of all , ORG notes that the police have power , in accordance with sections CARDINAL of LAW , to cordon off an area and to disperse a crowd . On the strength of this power , the police gave an order to disperse to the persons remaining in the LOC area , which order PERSON also refused to follow . The restriction was thus prescribed by law .

Secondly , ORG considers that the powers stipulated in sections CARDINAL of LAW relate to the maintenance of public order and security and to the prevention of disorder or crime , and that in this case the order to disperse given to , among others , PERSON relates to the prevention of disorder . The restriction has therefore an acceptable reason .

Thirdly , it must be examined whether the order to disperse given to PERSON and the obligation to follow it was necessary in a NORP society . ORG finds that it was necessary to stop the situation at ORG by ordering the crowd to disperse and by asking the persons to leave the area .

ORG concludes that , in the case at hand , the conditions for restricting PERSON ’s freedom of expression by ordering him to disperse along with the remaining crowd were fulfilled . ORG has taken a stand on the elements having an effect on the punishability of PERSON ’s act below .

The case referred to by PERSON ( PERSON v. GPE , DATE ) concerned a situation in which a journalist had been convicted in GPE of incitement for a breach of official secrecy when he had asked for and received information from an administrative assistant in the public prosecutor ’s office about some registry entries . The ORG found that the applicant ’s conviction could prevent journalists from participating in public discussions about questions of general interest . The conviction was not in proper proportion to the aims sought and LAW had thus been violated . ORG finds that the cited case is not similar to the case at hand .

However , relying on LAW , section CARDINAL , of LAW , no penalty was imposed on the applicant as the offence was comparable to “ an excusable act ” ( anteeksiannettavaan tekoon rinnastettava , jämförbar med en ursäktlig gärning ) . ORG found that :

The punishment of PERSON is waived in accordance with LAW , section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Penal Code because the offence , due to special reasons related to the act , can be deemed comparable to an excusable act . As a journalist , PERSON was forced to adapt his behaviour in the situation due to the conflicting expectations expressed by the police , on the one hand , and by his profession and employer , on the other hand .

By letter dated DATE the applicant appealed to ORG ( hovioikeus , hovrätten ) , claiming that ORG should have dismissed the charges against him . He argued that his apprehension and the fact that he was found guilty were against LAW and LAW . The applicant was a journalist and he had not participated in the demonstration or caused any disorder . ORG had not reasoned why his apprehension and conviction were “ necessary in a democratic society ” and had thereby failed to justify the interference .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal without giving any further reasons .

NORP By letter dated DATE the applicant further appealed to ORG ( korkein oikeus , högsta domstolen ) , reiterating the grounds of appeal already presented before ORG .

On DATE ORG refused the applicant leave to appeal .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev

The applicant was born in DATE and lived in PERSON .

He sued NORP military authorities in domestic courts , seeking recovery of pension arrears .

On DATE the Rostov - on - Don Military Circuit Court granted the applicant ’s claim and ordered ORG of GPE ( “ the military commission ” ) to pay the applicant MONEY . The judgment became final on DATE .

NORP On DATE the respondent military commission received a writ of execution in relation to the judgment debt from the court and at some point issued a payment order pursuant to the judgment in the applicant ’s favour . However , that order was subsequently revoked and the writ of execution was seized due to a check held by a military prosecutor ’s office and no funds were transferred to the applicant ’s account ( see also paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

At some point the respondent authority sought restoration of the term for challenging of the judgment by way of the supervisory review procedure . On DATE the Rostov - on - Don Military Circuit Court rejected that claim .

NORP In response to the applicant ’s several requests , the authority in charge of the payment submitted that the writ of execution was not in its possession and therefore it was unable to pay the judgment debt . At some point the applicant requested a court to issue a duplicate of the writ of execution and to restore the time - limit for its submission for execution . In its decision of CARDINAL DATE the GPE - on - Don Military Circuit Court confirmed that the writ of execution had been seized during the inquiry . However , the court found no reasons to consider the writ of execution as being lost as it was apparently in the possession of the military prosecutor ’s office . The court accordingly decided that no duplicate could be issued as the time - limit for its submission for execution had expired . The court also refused to reinstate the missed term as the applicant could have requested the prosecutor ’s office to return him the document in question and after that submit it for execution . On DATE ORG upheld the decision on appeal .

The judgment of CARDINAL DATE remained unenforced up to the date of the applicant ’s death in DATE . In DATE his widow obtained a certificate issued by a public notary by which she was officially recognised as the applicant ’s successor in respect of his right to claim the judgment debt . Then she sought in courts substitution of her late husband in the enforcement proceedings . On DATE the PERSON - on - Don Military Circuit Court rejected her claim , stating that the deceased applicant could not be substituted because no execution proceedings had ever been initiated , no writ of execution had been submitted for execution , and the threeyear term for its submission and initiation of the execution proceedings had expired . The applicant ’s widow sought in court reinstatement of the term for appealing against the decision of CARDINAL August CARDINAL . It follows from the parties’ later submissions that the request was granted and she was able to challenge the decision on appeal . The parties have not provided any information on the outcome of those proceedings .

The judgment remains unenforced to date .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Reasonableness of pre-trial detention)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and is currently detained in the Trenčín hospital for charged and convicted persons .

ORG The applicant was arrested on DATE and charges were brought against him the following day for the criminal offence of endangering public safety . The charge was based on the suspicion that he had made home - made explosive devices ; that he had sent some of them , together with written threats , to veterinarians and the head office of a supermarket chain ; and that he had planted CARDINAL of the devices next to a fast food outlet and had allowed it to explode with a view to promoting animal rights .

On DATE the ORG remanded the applicant in custody pending trial to prevent him from continuing his criminal activity . ORG took into account , inter alia , the nature of the criminal charge and the fact that the applicant had been having long - term psychiatric treatment . An interlocutory appeal by the applicant was unsuccessful .

Courts at CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction reviewed and confirmed the lawfulness of the applicant ’s detention on CARDINAL occasions as follows .

DATE and CARDINAL DATE courts at CARDINAL levels dismissed applications by the applicant for release . They relied on a risk of reoffending and took into account new charges that had been brought against him as well as the testimony of various witnesses and victims . In that connection , they referred to evidence that the applicant had been planning his attacks for a long time and in a systematic way . On DATE the domestic courts added new grounds for his detention , namely a risk that he might abscond . That was based on a statement by a witness who had allegedly said that the applicant had declared that he would try to flee if he was arrested . The evidence in the case , in particular the applicant ’s computer , suggested that he had “ entertained the idea of counterfeiting an ID ” .

On DATE the ORG prolonged the applicant ’s detention by DATE ( until DATE ) on the grounds that the investigation was not finished , that further charges had been brought against him since DATE , and that the criminal charges had been reclassified as a crime of terrorism and the acquisition and possession of firearms . The domestic courts concluded that his criminal case was complex owing to the extent and nature of his criminal activity and repeated the grounds for his detention , namely the possibility of his reoffending and absconding . The court also ordered a report by an expert on extremism and terrorism . That decision was upheld on appeal .

At the pre - trial stage the applicant was committed to the hospital for charged and convicted persons in LOC on CARDINAL occasions , namely DATE and DATE because , inter alia , he had demonstrated signs of anxiety , made threats of suicide and needed to have his mental state examined .

On DATE the applicant was indicted to stand trial on the above charges before ORG .

DATE and DATE the applicant applied CARDINAL more times for release to courts at CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction . Given the serious accusations made against him in the meantime ( on DATE ) for crimes including terrorism , the courts upheld both grounds for his continued detention . In addition , they referred to a witness statement that the applicant had written a will where he had expressed the alleged intention to commit a terrorist suicide attack . Furthermore , the courts rejected bail and guarantees of supervision offered by the applicant ’s parents since they had been unable to prevent the crimes while the applicant had lived in their house .

ORG held CARDINAL hearings in the criminal case against the applicant . It examined oral and documentary evidence , including evidence from several experts . It delivered its judgment on DATE , finding the applicant guilty of the charges and sentencing him to DATE in prison . However , on DATE ORG quashed the judgment following an appeal by the applicant and remitted the case to ORG for re - examination .

ORG observed that in the course of the appellate proceedings , on DATE , the applicant had submitted a report by CARDINAL certified experts concluding that he had long been suffering from a mental schizotypal disorder preventing him from understanding the illegal nature of his behaviour and from controlling it ( “ the second expert report ” ) . Those conclusions were contrary to those in a report by CARDINAL other experts at the pre - trial stage of the proceedings ( “ the first expert report ” ) , which had concluded that the applicant was not suffering from a mental illness but merely a personality disorder . Resolving that contradiction was imperative in order to establish whether or not the applicant was criminally responsible . ORG therefore instructed ORG to obtain a third opinion from an expert institute . In addition , it ordered the lower court to resolve an issue concerning the legal classification of the applicant ’s impugned actions .

In the meantime , on DATE , while the criminal proceedings were pending on appeal , ORG decided to keep the applicant in detention on the same grounds as before ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

The subsequent course of the trial is described in paragraphs CARDINAL et seq . below .

After the verdict was quashed on appeal and remitted to ORG for re - examination , the applicant , assisted by his lawyer , applied for release on DATE . He referred to his mental disorder as established in the second expert report of CARDINAL DATE . He added that he had been seeing a psychiatrist since the age of DATE and needed medicine on a DATE basis to prevent suicidal thoughts . He could not live without that medicine , even in detention , as he required treatment and sessions with a psychiatrist . He submitted that there was no risk of him absconding if at large as he had only had a basic education , had no financial means , no job , had never travelled alone outside his home town , and was completely dependent on his parents , emotionally , financially and for DATE care . Moreover , there was no risk he would continue his criminal activity if he was under medication and being properly treated , or , alternatively , if he was committed to a psychiatric institution , as he feared for the future after the charges had been brought against him .

The applicant ’s parents supported his application for release and offered to stand as guarantors of his pledge that he would live in accordance with the law . They also supported his request that his detention be replaced by supervision by a parole officer .

On DATE ORG heard the applicant , his lawyer , and ORG as regards his request for release . According to the transcript of the hearing , the applicant and his counsel reiterated and further developed their arguments made in the application and submitted that his mental condition meant that his absconding was not realistic .

The Government ’s observations show that on DATE ORG sent a letter to the director of the detention centre in PERSON where the applicant was being held , asking for information about the applicant ’s state of health . It enquired whether the applicant was being provided with the drugs he had been prescribed and whether the detention centre was able to provide the applicant with his treatment . The director of the detention centre replied on DATE in the affirmative .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s application to be released and his supplementary requests , a decision that was upheld by ORG on DATE after an interlocutory appeal by the applicant .

The courts concluded that there was still a strong suspicion against the applicant , which added to the reasons for keeping him detained . They observed that he had created explosives and contemplated where to plant them over a long time and in a systematic way . He had lived with his parents and a search of the home they shared had shown that they had clearly not been aware of his illegal activities and had been unable to prevent them . The applicant faced a particularly severe potential penalty , had declared openly that he would try and flee in case of arrest and a search of his computer had suggested that he had contemplated counterfeiting an ORG .

Regarding the nature , scope and seriousness of the alleged offences and the applicant ’s character , the courts concluded that the conditions for a restriction of liberty still existed . In addition , they observed that the relevant authorities had proceeded with the case expeditiously and with due diligence .

Moreover , the courts found that the requirements for alternative measures , such as a parental guarantee , a pledge by the applicant or replacing his detention with supervision had not been met .

There was no separate consideration of the applicant ’s mental condition as such . The correspondence between the district court and the director of the detention centre was not mentioned in the courts’ decisions .

The applicant subsequently turned to ORG with a complaint under LAW , alleging a violation of his rights , inter alia , LAW QUANTITY CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Convention , or their constitutional equivalents .

As to the substance , he raised arguments that were similar to those in his application to be released . He added that the courts had failed to take into account the specific nature of his situation , consisting of his mental disorder ; that the length of his detention had been excessive and based on irrelevant and insufficient reasons ; and that the only matter open to debate was whether he was legally insane , which impacted on his criminal liability .

On DATE ORG dismissed the complaint as manifestly ill - founded . It endorsed the reasons given by the ordinary courts and concluded that they had been relevant and sufficient to keep the applicant detained . It gave no answer to his argument concerning the specific nature of his situation .

NORP Following remittal of the case by ORG , ORG asked the expert institute on DATE to produce a report on the applicant ’s mental condition . On DATE it also ordered that the applicant be admitted to the psychiatric department of the Trenčín hospital for charged and convicted persons in order to have his mental health examined . The report was filed on DATE , and ORG heard the case DATE .

On DATE ORG again found the applicant guilty . ORG dismissed an appeal by the applicant on DATE . He was sentenced to PERCENT imprisonment , QUANTITY months’ protective supervision and payment of damages . No ordinary appeal being available , the judgment became final and binding .

Nevertheless , the applicant appealed on points of law and ORG quashed the District and ORG judgments owing to breaches of the law to the applicant ’s disadvantage . The matter was remitted to ORG for fresh examination . ORG provided an extensive interpretation of the criminal offence of terrorism and concluded that the lower courts’ legal interpretation of the case had been wrong as the applicant ’s motive had not included elements of the crime of terrorism .

ORG , the case returned to ORG and the applicant remained detained pending trial as of DATE .

Taking into account ORG judgment and its legal interpretation of the crime in question , ORG once again found the applicant guilty of , inter alia , the criminal offence of endangering public safety , the illegal acquisition , possession and trafficking of firearms , the making of serious threats , extortion , and attempted bodily harm and sentenced him to DATE and DATE in prison on CARDINAL DATE . It also ordered protective supervision lasting DATE . The applicant appealed and those proceedings are still pending .

On DATE the applicant was transferred from the PERSON detention centre to the hospital in PERSON after he reportedly collapsed .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention)

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE .

In DATE , the applicant was hired as a guard to accompany a shipment of QUANTITY of onions from NORP to LOC . After a DATE journey by rail , the cargo arrived at ORG station in LOC . Using sniffer dogs , NORP customs officials found concealed rubber containers inside onion skins that held a total of CARDINAL - three kilograms of heroin .

At TIME on DATE the applicant was taken to the organised crime department at the ORG police station and placed in a room ( no . CARDINAL ) under police guard . A record of his arrest was not drawn up . The applicant spent TIME on a mattress in the corridor .

At TIME on DATE a criminal case was instituted in connection with the uncovered shipment of drugs . The investigator , PERSON , accepted the case at TIME and interviewed the applicant . He was searched , and a small package of heroin was found concealed in his bag .

DATE a record of arrest was drawn up , and the applicant was formally remanded in custody on a charge of drug smuggling . According to the record , the applicant was arrested at TIME on DATE at the ORG police station .

During the applicant ’s trial , his counsel repeatedly raised the issue of his unrecorded detention from CARDINAL to CARDINAL DATE and put questions to the police officers , who were heard as witnesses , about the events following the applicant ’s apprehension . According to the hearing records , they replied as follows :

NORP The chief of the drug control department , PERSON , stated :

“ PERSON was taken to the department . While [ there ] , he remained under guard . He stayed in the department for TIME . Pending [ his placement in ] the ORG ( temporary detention cell ) , he was not allowed to go outside . During DATE period of detention , PERSON did not go to the toilet , he did not ask to . ”

NORP The deputy chief of the organised crime department , PERSON . , stated :

“ PERSON could not get up and go out because we had to take a decision on the basis of the documents . I can not say what the grounds for keeping him in the corridor were . ”

An operative of the drug control department , ORG . , testified :

“ PERSON could not go out because the door was locked , he was under guard . ”

An officer of the special - purpose department of the criminal police , PERSON , stated :

“ PERSON could not leave because I said so – the case was in progress , the expert was working . I do not know what the grounds for his detention were ... I stood guard over him so as to prevent him from going out ... ”

On DATE the ORG found the applicant guilty of drug smuggling with intent to supply and sentenced him to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment in a high - security facility .

On DATE ORG acquitted the applicant on the charge of smuggling , but upheld his conviction in the part concerning the possession of QUANTITY of heroin . The sentence was commuted to CARDINAL GPE imprisonment .

In the meantime , counsel for the applicant complained to the ORG town prosecutor about the applicant ’s unrecorded detention from CARDINAL to CARDINAL DATE . The prosecutor forwarded the complaint to the chief of the organised crime department for verification .

On DATE the chief of the organised crime department approved the conclusions of an internal inquiry a senior operative had carried out into the allegation of unlawful detention . The inquirer took a statement from the chief of the drug control department , PERSON , who claimed that the applicant had been released on TIME but had asked to stay at the police station TIME because he had had nowhere else to go . Further statements from officers PERSON . , ORG . , PERSON , Me . , and PERSON . corroborated PERSON ’s claims . Without questioning the applicant , the inquirer concluded that the allegation of unlawful detention was unsubstantiated .

By a decision of DATE , an investigator from the ORG town prosecutor ’s office refused to open a criminal investigation into the applicant ’s complaint of unlawful detention . He referred to the statements of the police officers , who had claimed unanimously that the applicant had refused to leave because he had had nowhere else to go , and that they had allowed him to stay TIME in the corridor , where he had slept on a mattress . The investigator did not interview the applicant , but reached the conclusion that his complaint to the prosecutor was to be considered “ a way of seeking to avoid liability for the particularly serious crime he had committed ” .

Counsel for the applicant challenged the decision before a court .

On DATE the ORG held that the investigator ’s decision had not been lawful or justified :

“ The descriptive part of the decision contradicts the findings of the investigation . Thus , [ the investigator ] established that on DATE PERSON had been detained on suspicion of committing a crime and that his detention was only formalised on CARDINAL DATE at TIME

The investigator did not assess all the documents in the case file : the expert report dated DATE ; the judgment of DATE , which established that on CARDINAL DATE PERSON had been taken to the organised crime department at the ORG police [ station ] and had remained there under continuous guard until his formal arrest at TIME on DATE ... The decision does not refer to the crime scene inspection report , which indicated that the scene had been inspected at TIME on DATE . All the witnesses testified that PERSON had been taken to the police station immediately after the inspection of the crime scene and had stayed there of his own will , which is contradicted by the statement of the convict .

The investigator merely reproduced the testimony of the police officers in his decision , without giving a legal assessment . The actions of the police officers , which were incompatible with LAW , were not justified . ”

On DATE another investigator from the ORG town prosecutor ’s office refused to open a criminal investigation , reproducing verbatim the text of the decision of DATE . On DATE the town prosecutor quashed that decision and ordered an additional inquiry .

Further to a complaint by counsel , on DATE ORG held that the town prosecutor had unduly delayed the inquiry into the applicant ’s complaint .

On DATE a senior investigator from the town prosecutor ’s office again refused to open a criminal case . He found that it could not be shown to the required standard of proof that the applicant had stayed in the police station against his will .

On DATE and DATE respectively , the ORG Town Court and ORG summarily upheld the investigator ’s decision .