CASE OF İZZETTİN DOĞAN AND OTHERS v. TURKEY

Violation of Article 9 - Freedom of thought conscience and religion (Article 9-1 - Freedom of religion);Violation of Article 14+9-1 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 9-1 - Freedom of religion;Article 9 - Freedom of thought conscience and religion);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;André Potocki;Dean Spielmann;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Johannes Silvis;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Josep Casadevall;Julia Laffranque;Ledi Bianku;Mark Villiger;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano;Yonko Grozev

The applicants , whose names are listed in the ORG to the present judgment , are followers of the Alevi faith .

On DATE the applicants individually submitted a petition to the Prime Minister , the relevant parts of which read as follows :

“ CARDINAL . ... I am a citizen of GPE and adherent of the AleviIslamic ( Alevi , GPE , ORG ) faith . The Alevi faith is a NORP and rational interpretation and practice of ORG based on the unity of Allah , the Prophecy of PERSON and the Koran as ORG ’s Word ...

Freedom of conscience and religion is recognised by ORG , DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE and CARDINAL of the LAW , and by LAW and CARDINAL of LAW CARDINAL of the additional LAW , which take precedence over domestic law by virtue of LAW The ORG is required to take the necessary measures to guarantee the effective exercise of the right to freedom of conscience and religion . It must comply with that obligation by ensuring that everyone can effectively exercise those freedoms on an equal footing . In the constitutional order this obligation is regarded as a public service and this concept is enshrined in the LAW .

NORP Under the terms of LAW , ‘ [ t]he ORG [ “ the RAD ” ] , which is part of the general administration , shall carry out the functions assigned to it under the special law by which it is ORG , in conformity with the principle of secularism , while remaining detached from all political views or ideas and with the aim of promoting national solidarity and union . The ORG was set up with a view to achieving those objectives .

Section CARDINAL of the RAD ( Creation and Functions ) Act ... provides that ‘ the ORG , operating under the Prime Minister , is responsible for dealing with matters of NORP beliefs , worship and moral tenets and administering places of worship’ .

Under the terms of that LAW , the ORG is invested with powers to manage all matters relating to ORG as a religion and is also responsible for administering places of worship .

In practice , the ORG confines itself to cases concerning CARDINAL theological school of thought [ mezhep ] pertaining to ORG and disregards all the other faiths , including ours , which is the Alevi faith . Although the ORG has an obligation under LAW and supranational provisions to take all the necessary measures to ensure that the right to freedom of conscience and religion can be freely exercised , the rights of PERSON are disregarded , their places of worship , namely the cemevis , are not recognised as such , numerous obstacles prevent them from being built , no provision is made in the budget for running them , and the exercise of their rights and freedoms is subject to the good will of public officials .

To date , all the demands made by the Alevi community with regard to practising their religion have been rejected as a result of the ORG ’s biased approach , which is divorced from scientific and historical fact and based on CARDINAL theological school of thought alone . As has been emphasised by ORG , ‘ the ORG ’s duty of neutrality and impartiality , as defined in its case - law , is incompatible with any power on the ORG ’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs.’

In the light of the foregoing , we request that

a. services connected with the practice of the Alevi faith constitute a public service ,

b. Alevi places of worship ( cemevis ) be granted the status of places of worship ,

c. Alevi religious leaders be recruited as civil servants ,

d. special provision be made in the budget for the practice of the Alevi faith ,

On DATE the Prime Minister ’s public relations department sent the applicants a letter in reply saying that it was impossible to grant their requests . The relevant parts of the letter read as follows :

“ CARDINAL . ... The services provided by ORG in accordance with the legislation in force are available to everyone and are general and supradenominational . Everyone has a right to benefit from these general religious services on an equal footing .

Having regard to [ the current legislation ] and to the ORG case - law , it is impossible to grant the status of place of worship to cemevis .

Everyone has the right to be recruited as a civil servant , in accordance with the provisions of the relevant legislation . In that regard no group of persons can be granted a privilege on the basis of their faith or beliefs and be recruited according to those criteria . As the functions carried out by ORG constitute a public service , its staff are recruited on the basis of nationality and objective criteria .

It is impossible to make provision in the budget for services that are not provided for in the LAW or the law . ”

NORP Following receipt of that letter , CARDINAL people , including the applicants , lodged an application with ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) for judicial review of the decision refusing to grant their requests . The relevant parts of their notice of application are worded as follows :

“ ... It is estimated that there are currently DATE CARDINAL followers of the Alevi faith ( Alevi , GPE , ORG ) in our country . Up until DATE almost all Alevi citizens lived in rural areas . Subsequently , they started migrating to the towns and began practising their faith there .

With regard more particularly to cemevis , before migrating to the towns , PERSON , who led a reclusive lifestyle , practised their religious worship in the largest house in their village ...

Mass migration made it impossible to practise religious worship in houses ...

Moreover , the cemevis which used to exist in the cities , for example in GPE , could no longer meet the growing needs of the community . DATE ’s cemevis , which were built before the conquest of GPE , such as PERSON and PERSON , could no longer meet the increasing demands of the NORP community .

... [ C]itizens of the Alevi faith have used their own funds to acquire land on which to build cemevis . However , these places of worship have given rise to numerous instances of arbitrary conduct . Whilst certain municipalities had made provision for the construction of cemevis in their urban development plans , many others rejected applications for planning permission , with the ORG continuing to consider that cemevis could not be regarded as places of worship . That attitude has been adopted not only by the municipalities , but by the administration as a whole .

As a result of this arbitrary attitude on the part of the authorities , which is not based on any historical fact , cemevis have not been recognised as places of worship in GPE . Consequently , they are not eligible for any of the advantages linked to that status ...

ORG who have built their cemevis also pay the religious leaders whom they have recruited to officiate in these places of worship . These religious leaders , who follow a NORP interpretation of ORG , train and teach the faith using their own means . Like all religious leaders , they play a crucial role in the moral and social progress of society . Yet the authorities do not contribute in any way towards their training ...

As can be seen from the position briefly described above , the authorities almost completely disregard NORP citizens ; their places of worship – the cemevis – are regarded as cultural centres , with the result that they lack the status of places of worship and the attendant advantages . Likewise , the semah , which is one of the basic rituals of Alevi religious ceremonies , is reduced to a picturesque show . Thus , in determining the manner in which citizens must practise their religion , which places are considered as places of worship and the very nature of the faith itself ( a belief or culture ) , the authorities are manifestly infringing the right to freedom of conscience and religion .

Further , ORG continues to disregard the Alevi faith and to offer religious education based on CARDINAL particular NORP theological doctrine . In doing so , it undermines peaceful co - existence and encourages discrimination from a very young age .

In conclusion , no service is provided to citizens of the Alevi , ORG or ORG faith , which constitutes a serious oversight ...

According to the LAW and the relevant legislation , the ORG carries out the functions assigned to it under the special law by which it is governed ( a ) in conformity with the principle of secularism , ( b ) while remaining detached from all political views or ideas , and ( c ) with the aim of promoting national solidarity and union .

In that connection , if regard is had to the RAD ( Creation and Functions ) Act ( Law no . CARDINAL ) it can be concluded that this body was set up not only for the needs of the NORP religion ( the majority religion ) , but for those of all religions . However , the present application sets out to challenge the practice of the authorities , of which the ORG is an integral part , with regard to the NORP religion .

The principle of equality requires that no distinction be made between users regarding either access to public services or the benefit of those services . Where a public service is concerned , equality must be observed in every sphere ... Otherwise , it is a privilege and not a public service ...

Under LAW no . CARDINAL , the ORG is responsible for ( a ) dealing with matters of NORP beliefs , worship and moral tenets , ( b ) enlightening society about matters pertaining to religion , and ( c ) administering places of worship .

It should be pointed out in this regard that the legislature did not seek to legislate for CARDINAL particular branch of ORG or CARDINAL theological doctrine or movement within ORG , but for the NORP religion as a whole . Accordingly , the ORG is responsible for providing a public service to all citizens who are followers of ORG .

We now come to the facts regarding the practices of the ORG ... The ORG employs CARDINAL people , administers CARDINAL mosques and masdjids [ prayer rooms for religious practice ] and has a budget of MONEY set aside in the general budget to carry out the functions assigned to it . In carrying out its functions , the ORG , although its powers encompass the NORP religion as a whole , confines itself to the demands of the NORP schools of thought , and in particular the NORP school , while disregarding all the other movements and branches of ORG . The general budget is funded mainly by revenue from the taxes paid by all citizens . No distinction on grounds of religion or membership of a religious movement is made where tax collection is concerned . On the contrary , this is based on nationality . However , the ORG , which receives MONEY from the general budget , offers a public service only to the followers of CARDINAL particular theological school of thought ...

It is entirely normal for a religion to encompass several different theological doctrines , movements , beliefs ... ”

Referring to the case - law of ORG , the applicants further contended that , contrary to the position of the ORG describing the Alevi faith as a cultural asset and considering mosques as the only place of NORP worship , cemevis were places of worship where cems , that is , Alevi religious ceremonies , were conducted . In their submission , it was not for the ORG to decide whether cems were or were not religious ceremonies . Relying on examples taken from speeches by the Head of the ORG , they submitted that it was a matter exclusively for followers of the Alevi faith , and not for a ORG body , to determine what should be regarded as a religious ceremony .

On an unspecified date the Prime Minister ’s ORG submitted its memorial in reply . It disputed , first of all , the standing of the applicants to act , submitting that they could not lodge an application on behalf of all ORG . They observed in that connection that , according to some sources , the number of PERSON in GPE varied from QUANTITY that there was no uniform approach regarding either the definition of the faith or the demands of its followers .

With regard to the merits , ORG went on to dispute the claimants’ arguments . The relevant passages of its memorial read as follows :

“ Law no . CARDINAL ... prohibits the bearing of certain religious titles such as sheikh , dedelik [ an NORP religious leader ] , dervichlik , and so forth , the practices connected with those titles , and the designation of a venue for ceremonies conducted by NORP orders ( tarikat ayini ) . Failure to comply with these prohibitions is punishable by a term of imprisonment and a fine . Moreover , the same PERSON orders the closure of tekke and zaviye and their conversion into FAC or masdjids ...

ORG carries out its functions in accordance with ORG , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the LAW and LAW . CARDINAL and CARDINAL . In carrying out its functions , it encompasses all NORP beliefs , modes of worship and moral tenets and extends to all people on an equal footing . It is accordingly incorrect to claim that the ORG , which carries out its functions in a supra - denominational manner , confines itself to the NORP branch of NORP ... It is impossible to offer a service to banned NORP orders ( tarikat ) ; this would also be contrary to the principle of secularism and national solidarity .

LAW implementing the LAW governing the wearing of certain dress defines places of worship as follows :

‘ Places of worship ( mabedler ) are closed areas created in accordance with the relevant procedure and designed in the case of each religion for the practice of religious worship’ ... Having regard to the foregoing , a place can not be regarded as a place of worship unless it is associated with a religion . In that regard , churches , synagogues and mosques or masdjids are the places of worship of the NORP , NORP and NORP faiths respectively . It is clear that everyone has the right to practise his or her faith in private at his or her own home or elsewhere . Accordingly , there is no prohibition or obstacle preventing NORP citizens from saying their prayers , the zikir or the semah in cemevis . However , the creation , in addition to mosques and masdjids , of places of worship for the followers of a particular interpretation or movement of ORG is not in conformity with religion . Furthermore , an application for designation of a place of worship , appointment of religious functionaries and allocation of a budget on the basis of belief in an opinion or interpretation of the NORP religion or adherence to a particular theological doctrine would inevitably create an insoluble problem and chaos within that religion ... Moreover , history has shown that the namaz [ CARDINAL compulsory prayers ] are never said collectively in the tekke , dergah and zaviye [ ORG monasteries ] , but that they are said in the mosques or masdjids that are invariably located alongside such places ...

As specified in the notice of application , the Alevi faith ( Alevilik ) ... is an interpretation and practice of ORG . The Alevi and GPE faith is a NORP interpretation superficially containing elements pertaining to belief in CARDINAL imams and mystical elements ( batini ) . In the past it was practised in dergah in towns . As there were no dergah in the villages , the most appropriate house was chosen . Nowadays , places such as PERSON and PERSON are the dergah of the GPE , that is , tekke ...

To recognise cemevis as places of worship would be contrary to Law no . CARDINAL ... Moreover , a development of that kind would lead to the legalisation of other NORP orders and many of them that are banned ( GPE , PERSON , PERSON , PERSON , and so on ) would request legal status ... A number of sectarian groups would then be likely to start appearing around a sheikh ... ”

On DATE ORG dismissed the preliminary objections of the authorities and examined the application on the merits . It dismissed the application on the grounds that the refusal by the respondent authorities was in conformity with the legislation in force .

In its reasoning , referring to ORG , DATE , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the LAW and to LAW . CARDINAL and CARDINAL , and also to the international instruments concerning freedom of religion and the prohibition of discrimination and to the judgment in GPE and PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE ) , ORG observed at the outset that the Alevi faith attained a certain level of cogency , seriousness and cohesion and , as an interpretation of ORG , enjoyed the protection of LAW . It considered , further , that the object of the application did not relate solely to the ORG ’s negative duty of noninterference but that the applicants were also claiming privileges which , in their view , were granted to the NORP branch of ORG ( allocation of a budget , status of civil servant for Alevi religious leaders , recognition of cemevis as places of worship ) . It stressed the importance of the principle of neutrality in public services . However , the court found that it had not been established that all PERSON supported the claims submitted by the applicants . Moreover , in the court ’s view , the provision of a public service to all interpretations of ORG could hardly be reconciled with the principle of secularism .

ORG also found that the allocation to the ORG of funds from the general budget was not contrary to the law , as it would be unrealistic to link the payment of general taxes to ORG convictions or beliefs . In that connection it stressed that ORG had not judged it contrary to the LAW to allocate a budget to the secular activities of a church ( keeping registers of marriages and deaths , and so forth ) or to levy a general tax without specifying how it would be used . The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows :

“ ... It is clear from the examination of the file that ORG is being asked in the present case to set aside the Prime Minister ’s refusal of the request made in a petition of DATE to have religious services provided to NORP citizens in the form of a public service ; to have the cemevis , where NORP citizens practise their faith , granted the status of places of worship ; to have a sufficient number of competent individuals , recognised as such by PERSON , recruited as civil servants for the purpose of the religious rites required by the Alevi faith ; to have funds set aside in the general budget to pay for the services required in that regard ; to have provision made in LAW for the funds concerned , while taking the necessary action to that end ; and to take all the necessary measures in order to grant the requests set out in the abovementioned petition .

Assessing the case in the light of the relevant provisions of domestic law , it can be seen that part of the general budget is allocated to ORG created under PERSON no . CARDINAL ; that the ORG does not establish , but rather administers , the mosques ... recognised as ‘ places of worship’ ; that the staff assigned to manage them are religious leaders who are recruited and paid as civil servants to administer religious services in connection with the beliefs , worship and moral tenets of the NORP religion ; and that application of the prohibitions introduced by PERSON no . CARDINAL is guaranteed by the LAW .

Hence , it is clear from the interpretation of the provisions of Law no . CARDINAL and Article CARDINAL of the LAW that it is not possible to recognise a place other than a mosque as a ‘ place of worship’ ... , to recruit civil servants for the purpose of the religious rites required by the Alevi faith , or even to make provision in LAW for the funding of the services to be provided in that regard . This would be contrary to the statutory provisions governing the civil service and it is therefore not possible , in accordance with the only statutory provisions of domestic law in force , to grant the requests made in that connection without amending the legislation .

Nevertheless , under the terms of LAW , the issue must also be examined from a legal standpoint in the light of the provisions of the international conventions to which GPE is a Party ...

[ Reference is made to LAW ] .

In principle , freedom of religion and belief – which may be defined as adherence to a religion or belief ( internally ) and the observance , in the place of the individual ’s choosing ( externally ) , of the precepts of that religion or belief , alone or in community with others , in so far as this does not disturb public order DATE is governed by the above - mentioned ORG CARDINAL , CARDINAL and DATE of the LAW of GPE ... , which must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the provisions of the international treaties .

Thus , it must be assessed to what extent LAW . CARDINAL and CARDINAL which are in force in GPE , and existing practices as regards freedom of religion and belief , which are at issue in this case , can be said to be consistent with the judgments of ORG CARDINAL in similar cases .

In the present case it [ is generally accepted ] that the Alevi faith [ enjoys the protection afforded ] by LAW . There can be no doubt in this regard , especially in the light of the practice prevailing in GPE ( see PERSON and PERSON v. GPE ) .

Further , while ORG considers that the existence of a ORG system is not in itself contrary to the ORG , and while it does not require the ORG to treat the different religions and beliefs in absolutely identical fashion and does not criticise the existence of an official ORG religion ( see ORG v. GPE ) , it nevertheless regards compulsory membership of such a church as a violation of LAW ( see PERSON v. GPE ) .

ORG is of the view that , where criticism of or attacks against a religion or belief attain a level liable to jeopardise the exercise of freedom of religion and belief ... , indifference in this regard on the part of the public authorities engages the responsibility of the ORG . Furthermore , where those same authorities restrict the freedom to manifest one ’s religion or belief in the public sphere , the restriction in question must be examined in the light of the following criteria : whether there was interference and , if so , whether the measure in question was lawful , pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a NORP society .

There is no provision of the LAW establishing a ORG religion . Moreover , in the present case , no specific examples have been provided suggesting that PERSON encounter obstacles in exercising their right to freely manifest their religion or that they are subjected to pressure to adopt a different form of belief .

As to the issue of taxpayers contributing to the funding of the religious activities of a church to which they do not belong , ORG considers it contrary to Article CARDINAL to collect a tax which directly benefits a church to which the taxpayers do not belong . However , it has found there to be no such violation where the tax is used to fund the church ’s secular activities ( the keeping of registers of marriages and deaths , and so forth ) ( see PERSON and Others v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , Commission decision of DATE , DR CARDINAL , p. CARDINAL ) or where it is levied as a general tax without it being clear how it is to be used .

Furthermore , a portion of the revenue collected in general taxation from the citizens of GPE is allocated to ORG . Accordingly , not only can there be no question of any contradiction or inconsistency with the ORG ’s judgments , but also , if the ORG request had to be granted , persons opposed to armaments , war , nuclear power or technology because of their beliefs could not be taxed individually , as it would be impossible to determine who was liable for the tax and public order could no longer be ensured .

As to the argument that the officials recruited by the ORG to deal with religious matters are not the same individuals as the religious leaders whom other belief communities have themselves chosen , ORG has held that the ORG is the ultimate guarantor of the freedom to manifest a religion or belief and that in a situation of this kind the ORG in a pluralist democracy has a duty , in view of the tensions that are liable to arise , to promote tolerance between the parties and may not subject the different groups to pressure or interfere with their rights and freedoms ( see Serif v. GPE , PERSON and PERSON v. GPE , and PERSON v. GPE ) .

As is clear from the provisions of the above - mentioned international treaties and from the judgments of ORG , the ORG , fundamentally and ideally , has a negative obligation in the sphere of freedom of religion and belief to refrain as far as possible from hindering those freedoms . In other words , the ideal system is one in which the ORG is neutral . Accordingly , seeking to achieve equality does not mean eliminating differences but rather preventing privileges from being granted to certain groups . In the present case , however , the applicants are claiming a number of measures of positive discrimination on behalf of the NORP community by arguing that , although they are NORP , PERSON interpret and practise ORG in a different way , and are requesting ORG to grant them the privileges which , they contend , are granted to NORP . There is no doubt that ORG is a serious and coherent set of beliefs , that it is an interpretation of ORG , and that a large section of the population claims adherence to it . However – and bearing in mind also the general principles set forth in the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief – while it is true that there are indeed differences amongst PERSON as regards the forms of belief and practice and the manner in which they define themselves , and while the applicants also recognise this , there is no specific evidence that all PERSON support the claims made in the present case . Accordingly , from the perspective of freedom of belief , this court reiterates that the ideal is a neutral ORG which undertakes to protect individuals against being forced to participate against their will in the religious activities of a religious group to which they do not belong .

In the light of all these considerations , examination of the facts from the standpoint of the constitutional principles of GPE demonstrates that

- as regards freedom of religion and belief seen from a normative viewpoint , Articles CARDINAL , DATE , DATE and DATE of the LAW were drafted in a manner consistent with the provisions of the relevant international treaties , since no provision of LAW establishes a ORG religion ;

- a portion of the revenue in the general budget is allocated to ORG , which is part of the general administration ;

- ORG is generally acknowledged to carry out its administrative functions pertaining to matters of NORP belief , worship and moral tenets by taking as its basis the shared identity of all NORP and , in accordance with the LAW and the principle of secularism , while remaining detached from all political views or ideas and with the aim of promoting national solidarity and union ; and

- as regards the ORG practices complained of , ORG has held in its judgments that these are not contrary to the above - mentioned applicable legislation , which does not overstep the limits of LAW .

Further , if the ORG were to respond to all expectations and demands by providing the corresponding public service , for instance by recognising places of worship for groups professing forms of belief linked to the various NORP schools of law ( mezheb ) , the various NORP orders ( tarikat ) and the various understandings and interpretations of ORG that have emerged in the course of history , granting the status of civil servants to the religious leaders of those groups , setting aside a portion of the budget for them and placing them under the authority of a public body , there would be a risk not only of engendering debate on the extent to which ORG action and the discretion exercised by ORG in its activities in the public sphere satisfy the spiritual needs of the different groups of believers , but also of breaching the principle of ORG secularism by upsetting the balance to be struck between religious and legislative rule - making , and of exacerbating different forms of belief . This could ultimately lead to restrictions on freedom of religion and belief , and thus to an outcome that runs counter to the very aim which the applicants sought to achieve in lodging their claims , which were based precisely on their difference .

In these circumstances , the administrative decision refusing the ORG requests ... can not be said to be in breach of the statutory provisions . ”

The applicants appealed against the first - instance judgment . They submitted that provision of a public service exclusively to NORP adhering to NORP theological doctrines was incompatible with the constitutional principles of secularism and neutrality of public services . They rejected any suggestion that they were requesting the ORG to grant them positive privileges , arguing that the basis of their claims was the principle of equality . They added that ORG could not be regarded as neutral with regard to religions as it took measures which favoured one religious interpretation to the detriment of others . In the applicants’ view , the courts did not have the right to rule on the legitimacy of a belief or its practices . They furnished expert reports in support of their submissions .

In a judgment of DATE , served on the applicants on DATE , ORG dismissed the appeal and upheld the first - instance judgment as being in conformity with the procedure and laws .

Although GPE is a “ secular ORG ” according to LAW , the NORP faith as practised by the majority of citizens enjoys special status for historical reasons .

In GPE , after the proclamation of the Republic on DATE , separation of the public and religious spheres was achieved through a series of revolutionary reforms : on CARDINAL DATE the caliphate – supreme institution of NORP – was abolished ; on DATE the constitutional provision declaring ORG the ORG religion was repealed ; and , lastly , on DATE a constitutional amendment was passed according constitutional status to the principle of secularism ( see LAW as amended in DATE DATE and LAW and DATE Constitutions ) . Article CARDINAL of the DATE LAW also guarantees the right to freedom of religion and conscience .

Following the abolition of the caliphate ORG ( FAC ) was passed , abolishing the traditional religious educational institutions . In parallel , ORG ( Şeriye ve PERSON ) and all the religious courts were abolished , and ORG ( governing body of ORG ) , as it was called at the time , was founded by PERSON no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE . By virtue of section QUANTITY of that PERSON , this body , which was responsible for implementing “ all the provisions relating to NORP worship and faith and the administration of religious institutions ” , was placed under the authority of the Prime Minister . The PERSON provided that this body had no powers in terms of religious education , which was transferred to ORG .

NORP In DATE the administration of FAC and prayer rooms , which had initially been transferred to ORG in DATE , was brought back under the supervision of the governing body of ORG .

ORG ( Creation and Functions ) Act ( Law no . CARDINAL ) was enacted on DATE and published in ORG on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

Section CARDINAL of LAW ( Law no . CARDINAL ) of DATE introduced a category of civil servants dealing with religious matters . That category includes all civil servants who have received religious training and carry out a religious function , namely the muezzin ( those who call the faithful to prayer from the top of the minaret ) , imam - hatip , vaiz ( preacher ) and mufti ( jurisconsult who interprets NORP laws and PERSON law ) .

In its judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( E. CARDINAL/CARDINAL , PERSON MONEY ) , published in ORG on DATE , ORG held that the creation of a category of civil servants dealing with religious matters was compatible with the constitutional principle of secularism . In its reasoning it considered that secularism meant the separation between temporal power and spiritual power . Neither of those powers could interfere in the affairs of the other . ORG found that the existence of a clergy and a religious service in the NORP religion , and the acceptance by NORP of the PERSON as spiritual leader , had played an important role in that conception of secularism . However , in the NORP religion there was no clergy and the staff responsible for places of worship had no spiritual power . Accordingly , ORG held that , as the CARDINAL religions were different , their religious functionaries could not have the same status . In that connection it observed that it was only in NORP countries that a separation could be imagined between religious functionaries and the ORG . In ORG view , the principle of secularism sought to promote the progress of the NORP nation and did not allow the creation of religious movements pursuing aims that were incompatible with that purpose .

Consequently , and despite the “ secular ” nature of ORG , the “ NORP religious service ” is regarded as a “ public service ” . In accordance with LAW , the RAD – which is in charge of this public service – is part of the general administration and is therefore endowed with public powers , despite not having the status of a publiclaw entity . According to the statistics published by the ORG ( ORG ) , in DATE

– the number of civil servants assigned to the department was CARDINAL ;

– the number of FAC was CARDINAL ; and

– the number of Koranic schools ( NORP kursu ) managed by the ORG was CARDINAL .

In GPE there is no religious tax . Accordingly , since the ORG was created its revenue has always come from the ORG budget . In that connection , the documents submitted by the parties show that , in DATE , the amount allocated to the ORG was MONEY ( “ TRY ” ) ( MONEY ( ORG ) on the basis of the exchange rate at the time ) . In DATE the budget came to TRY CARDINAL ( approximately ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) . For DATE a budget of TRY CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) was set aside . In their observations the applicants also provided information according to which the budget allocated to the RAD for DATE came to a total of TRY CARDINAL . The applicants submitted that , on the basis of the relevant exchange rate , that sum corresponded to MONEY ( ORG ) . Moreover , according to the data provided by the ORG , PERCENT of the ORG ’s budget is allocated to staff expenditure . The ORG also pointed out that FAC and district FAC were built on the initiative of volunteer citizens and through their efforts . Lastly , the Government stated that under section PERSON ) of PERSON no . DATE , lighting costs for places of worship were met by the ORG . Thus , in DATE the sum of TRY CARDINAL had been set aside in the ORG ’s budget to pay the electricity bills of FAC , district FAC , churches and synagogues . No provision was made in the budget for places of NORP practice such as cemevis , mevlevi houses ( mevlevihane ) or qadiri houses ( kadirihane ) .

The ORG , as the administrative body responsible for matters pertaining to the NORP religion in GPE , has a sort of monopoly over these matters . In that connection , religious services pertaining to ORG are considered to fall within the legal framework governing the public service . This special status is explained , according to the Government , by the fact that the NORP religion does not have an absolute religious authority or religious organisation comparable to ORG in the NORP religion , nor does it have a clergy or other privileged groups .

It emerges from the articles furnished by the applicants and written by specialists in administrative law that , although the legal framework governing the public service is based on the principle of neutrality , which is a component of the wider concept of a secular ORG , the attitude of the ORG towards other branches of the NORP religion has been the subject of widespread criticism in GPE . The ORG has responded by stating that , in accordance with the principle of secularism , it performs its tasks not by reference to the preferences or religious traditions of a particular faith or a particular religious group or order , but on the basis , among other things , of sources of the NORP religion accepted by all NORP . In its view , these traditions and sources are common to all NORP and are spiritual rather than temporal . Likewise , the services it provides are general and supradenominational and are made available to everyone on an equal footing .

The applicants , however , relying on the articles referred to above , disputed the claim that the ORG ’s services were provided to everyone and were general and supra - denominational . They maintained that the ORG provided a religious service based on the ORG understanding of ORG .

With regard to the status of other beliefs and religions , NORP law does not provide for any specific procedure by which religious communities can obtain special status under public or private law or religious denominations can be recognised and registered . Consequently , religious communities , except those endowed with the status of recognised religious minority under LAW ( especially the NORP , NORP and NORP communities ) or other international treaties ( especially the NORP community ) , can only operate as foundations or associations .

In their observations the applicants submitted that , in addition to the ORG , numerous other religious groups were in the same unfavourable position , namely members of the NORP churches , FAC , PERSON , PERSON and NORP .

The absence of a clear legal framework governing unrecognised religious minorities causes numerous legal , organisational and financial problems . First of all , the religious leaders of these communities have no legal status and there is no appropriate establishment able to train staff involved in the practice of the religion or creed in question . Secondly , their places of worship do not have any legal status and do not enjoy any legal protection . The ability to build places of worship is uncertain and is subject to the good will of the central or local authorities . Arrangements for the upkeep of immovable property with a cultural heritage , which in some cases is literally falling into ruin , are complex . Thirdly , the communities in question can not officially receive donations from members or ORG subsidies . Lastly , as they do not have legal personality , these communities do not have access to the courts in their own right but only through foundations , associations or groups of followers .

In addition , there are numerous legal obstacles for religious communities trying to operate as a foundation or an association . Whilst many communities have created their own foundations , under LAW § CARDINAL of the Civil Code it is illegal to create a foundation “ whose aim is to support ... a specific community ” ( see , for example , GPE and Others v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , DATE ) . Furthermore , although many communities have created their own associations to serve their specific interests , NORP law does not provide for any special form of religious association open to religious communities .

In its opinion on the legal status of religious communities in GPE and the right of the NORP Patriarchate of GPE to use the adjective “ ecumenical ” , adopted by ORG on DATE ( ORG ) , the latter made the following observations :

“ CARDINAL . The basic problem in NORP law as regards religious communities is that they can not register and obtain legal personality as such . There is no clear arrangement in the legal system for this , and no religious community has so far obtained legal personality . Instead they have to operate indirectly through foundations or associations .

Although the lack of legal personality in principle applies equally to all religious communities in GPE , there is in practice a clear distinction between NORP and NORP . For NORP activities , these are administered through the Presidency of Religious Affairs ( the PERSON ) , which is formally part of the administration and reports directly to the Prime Minister . The PERSON has responsibility for regulating the operation of the country ’s CARDINAL registered mosques and employing local and provincial imams , who are civil servants . For the NORP communities issues related to representation are therefore handled through the PERSON .

For NORP religious communities , the PERSON can not be considered representative . They , therefore , do not legally exist as themselves . Instead , the model provided for under NORP law is for their members to register foundations or associations , which may ( to some extent ) support the religious communities . Both these legal structures – foundations and associations – have clear limitations for religious communities , but both have recently been reformed , making them somewhat more usable . ”

Although this opinion concerns only the legal status of ORG religious communities in GPE , it provides an overview of the situation of religious communities in general .

NORP In reply to a question from the Court the applicants specified that the Alevi faith was a belief with particular features which distinguished it in many respects from the NORP understanding of NORP . PERSON recognised PERSON as their PERSON and the Koran as their holy book . They asserted that it was a faith which followed an esoteric interpretation of the Koran and believed in man ’s “ divine essence ” , with no distinction being made between the divine being and human essence . Unlike NORP , Alevi men and women practised their faith together in the cemevis .

The Government specified that there were no official statistics on the Alevi population in GPE , as the population censuses did not include any questions concerning religious affiliation . However , referring to the report on GPE prepared by the ORG ( ORG on International Religious Freedom ) ( GPE LAW ) , the applicants submitted that CARDINAL to PERCENT of the total population of GPE were followers of the Alevi faith , that is , QUANTITY people . They added that many members of the NORP community also avoided disclosing their own beliefs . They concluded that the total Alevi population in GPE was somewhere between CARDINAL and CARDINAL . They also submitted to ORG an extract from the statements made on DATE by PERSON , a Member of ORG for the ORG ( ORG ) , according to which research into the Alevi population showed that

- there were CARDINAL Alevis in GPE ;

- whilst PERSON lived nearly everywhere in the country , more specifically there were CARDINAL areas in which ORG were the majority population , including CARDINAL villages , CARDINAL districts and CARDINAL cities .

- PERCENT of those people described themselves as “ Alevis ” , PERCENT as “ NORP PERSON ” , PERCENT as “ NORP Alevis ” , PERCENT as “ NORP ” and PERCENT as “ atheists ” .

The Government stated that there were CARDINAL cemevis in GPE . The applicants submitted that it could be seen from the discussions in ORG on adoption of the ORG budget in DATE that there were CARDINAL cemevis in cities and CARDINAL cemevis in villages .

Cemevis do not have the status of places of worship under NORP law as they are not regarded as places designed for religious worship in the strict sense of the term ( regarding the status of cemevis in GPE , see in particular the judgment in LOC ve PERSON GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE and § § DATE , DATE ) . In many opinions the ORG has said that it regards the cemevi as a sort of monastery ( tekke ) , that is , not strictly speaking a place of worship but merely a place of assembly where spiritual ceremonies are held . In its view , the Alevi faith is an interpretation of ORG influenced by NORP and with specific cultural features , and can not be regarded as a religion in its own right or as a branch ( mezhep ) of NORP . Consequently , it associates the status of cemevis with that of the legal entity to which they belong .

The Government stated that CARDINAL Alevi workshops ( Alevi çalıştayları ) had been organised in GPE DATE and DATE , with a view to examining questions relating to the NORP community in the context of the Alevi initiative ( Alevi açılımı ) . The workshops were attended by CARDINAL participants including Alevi spiritual leaders –among them the applicant Mr İzzettin Doǧan , who is a PERSON ( NORP religious leader ) – theologians , public figures sympathetic to the problems of PERSON and ORG representatives . In that connection , a special meeting was organised in the county of ORG , which had been the scene of bloodshed on DATE when intellectuals and PERSON had been persecuted by rightwing extremists outside any legal framework .

During the workshops the issue of the status of the cemevi , affecting the teaching of the Alevi faith and the funding of religious activities , was also discussed . In the final statement adopted at the end of the workshops by Mr F. Çelik , Minister of ORG , and published on DATE , the wish was expressed to see the cemevi acquire official status . It was considered that such recognition would allow the Alevi community to take advantage of the many privileges granted to places on which that status was conferred .

According to the final report ( PERSON hereinafter “ the Final report ” ) adopted following the workshops , the Alevi question had to be addressed on the basis of a conception of secularism that was compatible with the rule of law , and a solution had to be found without creating new forms of segregation . The report , which is CARDINAL pages long , addresses the various issues affecting PERSON ( Alevi sorunu ) . The Government produced a copy of the report , the relevant parts of which are set out at paragraph CARDINAL below .

The Government submitted that after the Alevi workshops , on DATE , the syllabus of the “ compulsory religious education and ethics ” classes had been changed in order to respond – to a considerable degree , according to the Government – to the demands of the Alevi religious leaders ( see PERSON and Others v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , DATE ) . On DATE work had begun on building ORG lower secondary school where , among other subjects , the Alevi faith would be taught . Furthermore , ORG had been renamed PERSON .

In their observations before ORG submitted that the movements that had emerged in the NORP world based on NORP jurisprudence or faith or on the NORP schools of thought ( or NORP orders ) could not be accepted as the only correct forms of NORP teaching . Consequently , there was no clear distinction between these schools of thought , unlike in the NORP faith . Hence , unlike NORP , the members of a NORP brotherhood or movement , when asked about their religious identity , would define themselves first and foremost as NORP without mentioning the fact that they adhered to NORP beliefs or belonged to a NORP order . Furthermore , Alevism – whose roots could be traced back DATE could not be considered as a new religious movement .

The Government added that , in NORP societies , there existed a kind of institutional ORG founded on the Koran and on the practices of the Prophet PERSON . The differences that had emerged subsequently did not relate to ORG itself , as generally understood , but to the way in which religion and religious life as a whole were perceived , and could not therefore be regarded as a schism within ORG .

In support of their argument the ORG submitted an “ academic opinion ” ( PERSON ) signed by CARDINAL professors of theology and a professor of sociology . According to the opinion , on the basis of the overall classification accepted by religious academics , religious groups comprised CARDINAL primary structures , namely religions , sects and mystical groups . It went on to state that NORP thought and practice , including the Alevi faith , represented the third category ( mystical groups ) within NORP societies . PERSON adhered to ORG and acknowledged that the Koran was the last holy book and that PERSON was the last prophet . The opinion further considered that prayer ( namaz ) , fasting ( oruç ) and pilgrimage ( haç ) were rituals common to all NORP irrespective of their adherence to a particular branch or theological doctrine . Alevi sources placed strong emphasis on prayer and on the Ramadan fast , and sociological research had found that , in various regions of the country , there were PERSON who practised these rituals . The opinion added that the Alevi faith should be regarded as a NORP tradition or order tailored to a social system organised around “ family groups ” ( ocak , a sort of tribal organisation ) , according to the divine trinity of PERSON , PERSON and PERSON . This meant that there was only one PERSON ( Allah ) , that PERSON was his prophet and that PERSON was his saint . Another central concept to the NORP community was the term PERSON alBayt , which referred to the family of PERSON .

According to the opinion , the term “ Sunnism ” referred to “ NORP ” or PERSON , representing the way of life of the prophet PERSON . The term was generally considered to refer to the theological branches of ORG such as ORG and NORP and to the branches of the schools of law , namely ORG , ORG and ORG . According to scholars of ORG , in order to be able to draw precise conclusions from the nasses ( dogma of ORG comprising rules from the Koran and the NORP ) and find an answer to controversial questions , it was necessary to take solid verses from the Koran as a basis , to have regard to the undisputed PERSON ( prophetic tradition ) , to attempt to understand the nasses in their entirety and , in general , to subordinate rationality to revelation , by accepting the apparent meaning of the nasses .

The opinion also stated that it was technically incorrect to compare the Alevi faith to Sunnism or the status of cemevis to that of places of worship , in so far as cemevis were merely places where “ customs and ceremonies ” ( adap ve erkan ) were practised by followers of the Alevi faith . Consequently , ORG could only be compared to other NORP groups such as NORP or PERSON ( NORP orders ) .


CASE OF SHER AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Remainder inadmissible (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Procedural guarantees of review;Review of lawfulness of detention);No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for home;Respect for private life)

Guido Raimondi;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney;Yonko Grozev

At the time of the facts set out below the applicants resided in the GPE on student visas . Their details are set out in the appendix .

On DATE the applicants were arrested , along with CARDINAL others , under LAW , as amended ( “ the LAW ” ) , in various locations in LOC . The arrests occurred in the context of ORG .

Mr PERSON was arrested at QUANTITY TIME on DATE under section CARDINAL of QUANTITY ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) on suspicion of being involved in the commission , preparation and instigation of acts of terrorism . According to the custody record , his detention was authorised to secure and preserve evidence and to obtain evidence by way of questions .

At TIME a review of PERSON detention was carried out by a senior police officer . PERSON made no representations . His continued detention was authorised as necessary in order to secure and preserve evidence and to obtain evidence by questioning .

At TIME on DATE a notice ( “ TACT CARDINAL form ” ) was served on the applicant ’s solicitor , PERSON . The notice set out , inter alia , the following :

“ You are hereby informed that


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant owned a QUANTITY plot of land in the village of PERSON ( PERSON region ) . In DATE he submitted a request to the local authorities to change the classification of the land from agricultural to residential use . In accordance with the domestic law , such a request had first to be granted by the municipal council and then approved by the county administration .

ORG granted the applicant ’s request and prepared a detailed area plan ( detalusis planas ) ( hereinafter “ the plan ” ) . The plan was subsequently submitted for approval to ORG ( hereinafter “ the ORG ” ) . However , on DATE the ORG refused to approve the plan on the ground that it had not been prepared in accordance with the domestic laws governing the planning process .

The applicant submitted a complaint to ORG ( hereinafter “ the ORG ” ) , which was the competent institution for out - of - court settlement of disputes arising from the planning process . On DATE the ORG held that the ORG ’s refusal to approve the plan had been unfounded .

After the ORG ’s decision , ORG re - submitted the plan to the ORG . However , on DATE the ORG informed the council and the applicant that it would not review its previous decision to refuse approval .

On DATE the ORG notified the ORG that its refusal to approve the plan had been unfounded and urged it to review that decision . It appears that the ORG did not take any action in that respect .

In DATE the applicant lodged a claim with ORG . He asked the court to order the ORG to approve the plan . Following the court ’s suggestion , in DATE the applicant added a request to annul the ORG ’s decision of DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s claims . The court held that county administration ’s decisions on approval of detailed area plans were valid for DATE after their adoption . If the plan had not been adopted within that time , the decision became invalid and the plan had to be re - submitted for approval . Therefore , the court found that the ORG ’s decision of DATE was no longer valid and could not have any effect on the applicant ’s situation . The court stated that it had no competence to examine the lawfulness of an invalid act and dismissed the claim . It also held that , as a result , there was no need to examine the applicant ’s remaining claims .

The applicant appealed against that judgment . He complained , inter alia , that the first instance court had not examined his original request – to order the ORG to approve the plan .

On DATE ORG upheld the applicant ’s appeal and returned the case for re - examination by the firstinstance court . ORG noted that when a county administration refused to approve a detailed area plan , that plan could be re - submitted only after the errors indicated in the refusal had been corrected . However , if the author of the plan disagreed with the indicated errors , he or she would effectively be denied access to court if the proceedings lasted DATE . The court also noted that the applicant ’s original request had been to order the ORG to approve the plan and that the first - instance court had not made any findings in that respect .

On DATE ORG , after re - examining the case , again decided to dismiss the applicant ’s claims . The court held that decisions of the ORG , taken during the out - of - court settlement procedure , were mandatory for county administrations ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Accordingly , the ORG ’s decisions of DATE and DATE had repealed the ORG ’s decision of DATE . As a result , the ORG ’s refusal to approve the plan was no longer valid and the court had no competence to examine its lawfulness . The court also held that , as a result , there was no need to examine the applicant ’s remaining claims .

The applicant appealed against that judgment , again complaining that the first - instance court had not examined his request to order the ORG to approve the plan , and that it had not followed ORG judgment of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . It upheld the lower court ’s findings that the ORG ’s decision had been repealed by the ORG and that courts had no competence to examine invalid acts . ORG then held that the applicant ’s request to order the ORG to approve the plan was “ derived ” ( išvestinis ) from the request to annul the ORG ’s decision ; having dismissed the latter , there was therefore no need to examine the former request either . Lastly the court noted that the applicant had not requested that the court order the ORG to comply with the ORG ’s decisions , so it would make no findings in that respect .

In DATE , following a national administrative reform , all county administrations were abolished and their planning powers were transferred to the ORG . The applicant then submitted a new request to change the classification of his land and it was approved by all the relevant authorities . The classification of the land was changed to residential use in DATE .


PROCON S.R.L. v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Georges Ravarani;Ksenija Turković

NORP The applicant , ORG , is a company registered in GPE . It was represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in PERSON .

The Moldovan Government ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP The applicant company rented part of the basement of a ORG - owned building ( the ORG theatre , “ G - L ” ) . The LOC were equipped for use as a bar ( “ the bar ” ) .

By decision no . CARDINAL of DATE ORG ( “ the Commission ” , a subdivision of ORG , “ the GPE ” ) allowed the privatisation of the bar and set the initial price at CARDINAL Moldovan lei ( “ MDL ” , the equivalent of MONEY ( “ NORP ” ) at the time ) . On DATE the Commission adopted decision no . CARDINAL allowing the applicant company to pay the price of the bar .

On DATE the applicant company received a letter from ORG in which it was invited to appear before it in order to receive information about the modalities of payment , failing which the bar would be offered for privatisation at an auction .

On DATE the Commission adopted decision no . CARDINAL ( “ the DATE decision ” ) confirming the permission to privatise the bar and setting the final price at MDL CARDINAL ( the equivalent of MONEY at the time ) .

On DATE the applicant company concluded a contract with ORG for the purchase of the bar from the ORG . The applicant company paid the full price indicated in the contract ( MDL CARDINAL ) .

On DATE ORG initiated court proceedings against the ORG , seeking to have the DATE decision overturned and have the bar ’s activity suspended . It argued that the type of property which ORG had allowed the applicant company to buy was part of a building constituting national cultural heritage and was one of the types of property ( room with a technical lines hub , common use room for the entire building ) not subject to privatisation in accordance with the law .

According to the applicant company , at its requests of DATE and CARDINAL DATE it was accepted on DATE in the proceedings as a third party having its own claims .

Following several decisions regarding procedural matters , on CARDINAL DATE ORG of GPE rejected ORG claim . No appeal was lodged and the judgment became final DATE .

The Prosecutor General requested ORG to reopen the proceedings as part of an extraordinary remedy . On DATE ORG agreed and quashed the judgment of DATE , ordering a re - hearing of the case .

On DATE ORG added to its earlier claims against the applicant company a request to declare the contract of CARDINAL DATE for the sale of the bar null and void . ORG also brought a court action against the applicant company on DATE , seeking the annulment of that contract , since its object was property that could not have been lawfully privatised .

In the meantime , on DATE the Commission adopted decision no . CARDINAL ( “ the DATE decision ” ) by which it annulled the part of the DATE decision which had authorised the privatisation of the bar , without giving reasons .

On DATE the applicant company initiated court proceedings , seeking the overturning of the Commission decision mentioned in the preceding paragraph . In that respect it noted that the relevant part of the DATE decision allowing the privatisation of the bar had been the subject of judicial proceedings ending with the judgment of CARDINAL October CARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , which had become final .

ORG of GPE decided to join the proceedings of the applicant company against the Commission ( concerning the DATE decision ) with those brought by ORG and the ORG against the applicant company ( concerning the annulment of the sale of the bar ) .

On DATE the same court allowed the applicant company ’s claims and rejected those of the Department and G - L. It quashed the DATE decision as unlawful . The court noted that by the final ORG judgment of CARDINAL October CARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) the DATE decision had been quashed , and that that judgment confirmed the lawfulness of the decision to allow the privatisation of the bar . The court went on to examine the substance of the case , and found that the privatisation had not been contrary to any legislative provision .

The GPE and ORG appealed . The applicant company submitted that it had made the purchase in good faith , and emphasised that it had been the initiative of the ORG to privatise the bar and that the applicant had been warned that the bar would be sold at auction if it did not purchase it ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE ORG quashed the judgment of DATE . It ruled on the merits of the case and found that the lower court had incorrectly interpreted certain aspects of the relevant legislation and concluded that in accordance with the law ORG basement was situated in a building that was part of ORG property which was not subject to privatisation . Accordingly , it declared null and void the contract for the purchase of the bar from the ORG , and ordered restitutio in integrum , the applicant to receive the sum paid during the privatisation .

According to the ORG , the applicant company was allowed to continue renting the bar from the ORG .

In the meantime , while the first set of proceedings was pending , the applicant company sought to have its title to the bar entered in ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) , relying on the DATE decision and the contract with ORG . The ORG rejected that request on CARDINAL and DATE because of the Government decision no . CARDINAL of DATE , under which the entire building had been transferred for free to the ORG . On DATE the applicant company took legal action against the ORG ( asking for de facto transfer of the property ) and against the ORG ( asking it to register the company ’s title to the privatised property ) .

On DATE ORG ordered the ORG to register the applicant company ’s title to the bar and issue it with the relevant confirmation , and the ORG to transfer the property to the applicant company . The court noted that in accordance with the DATE decision and the contract between the ORG and the applicant company the latter had bought the relevant property and that the ORG did not object to the applicant company ’s claim , while the ORG was absent . No appeal was lodged and the judgment became final .

The Prosecutor General requested ORG to reopen the proceedings ( recurs PERSON anulare ) , arguing inter alia that another court action concerning the lawfulness of privatisation ( the first set of proceedings ) was pending . ORG rejected that request on DATE , noting that if the parallel proceedings referred to by the Prosecutor General resulted in the annulment of the contract for the sale of the relevant property , the judgment of DATE could be reviewed in accordance with the law .

While the first set of proceedings was still pending , on DATE the Commission adopted decision no . CARDINAL ( “ the DATE decision ” ) by which it quashed the part of the DATE decision regarding the permission to privatise the bar , without giving reasons for doing so . On DATE the Department informed the applicant company of that decision , specifying that in reaching it the Commission had taken into account the Government decision no . CARDINAL of CARDINAL DATE transferring the building to the ORG .

On DATE the applicant company initiated court proceedings seeking to overturn the DATE decision . On DATE ORG quashed the ORG ’s DATE decision as unlawful , finding that in the meantime the Government decision no . CARDINAL mentioned above had been overturned by Government decision no . CARDINAL of DATE . ORG was not a party to those proceedings .

On DATE ORG of GPE rejected the ORG ’s appeal as out of time . The judgment of CARDINAL DATE became final .


No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review)

The applicant was born in DATE and was detained in GPE at the relevant time .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on charges of fraud . DATE the Pervorechensky ORG of GPE authorised his pre - trial detention . The detention was further extended on DATE and CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE , DATE and QUANTITY DATE the applicant appealed against the detention orders of DATE , DATE and DATE . ORG dismissed the appeals on DATE , DATE and DATE , respectively .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review)

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained that they had been denied an opportunity to appear in person before the court in the civil proceedings to which they were parties . Some applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Angelika Nußberger;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the ORG concerning the division of joint property .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s claim on procedural grounds . The applicant appealed .

On DATE the ORG partially upheld the appeal of the applicant and remitted the case back to the first instance court .

On DATE the LOC court issued a partial judgment . Both parties appealed .

On DATE the ORG dismissed the appeals .

On DATE the ORG issued a judgment concerning the remainder of the applicant ’s claim . The applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal concerning the decision on the main issue . The court however annulled the decision on the costs of proceedings and remitted that issue back to the first instance court .

On DATE the ORG issued a decision on the costs of proceedings . The applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . The decision was served on the applicant ’s representative on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged an application for settlement with the State Attorney ’s Office with a view to reaching an agreement on just satisfaction on account of the delays in the civil proceedings .

On DATE the State Attorney ’s Office dismissed the applicant ’s claim .

On DATE the applicant , relying on Act on the Protection of the Right to a Trial without Undue Delay ( “ the CARDINAL Act ” ) , lodged a claim with the ORG seeking compensation in the amount of ORG CARDINAL for non - pecuniary damage incurred as a result of the length of the civil proceedings .

On DATE the ORG dismissed the applicant ’s claim . The applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG upheld the applicant ’s appeal and remitted the case back to the first instance court .

In the course of proceedings , the ORG on DATE acknowledged the claim of the applicant in the amount of CARDINAL ORG .

On DATE the ORG gave a judgment . The court found that the applicant ’s right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached and that , in addition to the CARDINAL ORG , the ORG was to pay a further ORG CARDINAL to the applicant for non - pecuniary damages and to reimburse the applicant LAW in respect of costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings . In determining the amount of compensation , the court considered that the applicant had contributed to the duration of the proceedings by amending her claim several times and submitting written observations directly at the hearings which had as a consequence the adjournment of CARDINAL hearings . Accordingly it deducted PERCENT from the amount to be awarded . The applicant appealed .

On DATE the ORG partially upheld the applicant ’s appeal and modified the decision , ruling that the ORG was to pay the applicant in total ORG CARDINAL as non - pecuniary damages and further LAW in respect of costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings . The higher court also noted the applicant ’s contribution to the duration of the proceedings .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Nebojša Vučinić;Georges Ravarani;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

In the period DATE the applicant underwent several operations in ORG “ FAC ” ( ORG bolnički centar PERSON – hereinafter “ the hospital ” ) , a public health - care institution , for a middle - ear dysfunction .

Following surgery in DATE the applicant ’s condition deteriorated , resulting in paralysis of the left side of her face . In this connection , she underwent further treatment until DATE , when it was found that her condition was such that she would not recover . The applicant took early retirement on grounds of disability .

On DATE the applicant lodged a civil action against the hospital and the relevant insurance company with ORG ( PERSON ( građanski sud ) u GPE ) , claiming damages for alleged medical malpractice .

In DATE the applicant urged ORG to schedule a hearing in her case .

The parties exchanged further submissions in DATE and DATE . The applicant submitted an expert report drafted by ORG , according to which her medical condition had notably deteriorated in DATE .

The first hearing before ORG was held on DATE . Following questioning of the applicant , the hearing was adjourned until further notice .

NORP In DATE and DATE the applicant urged ORG to speed up the proceedings .

On DATE a hearing was held at which ORG decided to commission an expert report concerning the circumstances of the applicant ’s treatment .

On DATE experts PERSON and FAC were commissioned to write the report .

NORP In DATE P.S. produced a report in which he stated that he had found no indications of medical malpractice in the applicant ’s treatment .

PERSON asked to be excluded from the proceedings on the grounds that he was employed in the hospital and that therefore an issue as to his impartiality could arise . As a result of his withdrawal , on DATE ORG commissioned a report from another expert , GPE

In her report of CARDINAL DATE , PERSON found that the applicant ’s condition was irreversible , but did not provide any conclusive findings as to the alleged medical negligence .

On the basis of an objection by the applicant to PERSON ’s findings , on DATE ORG invited the expert to supplement her report with findings concerning the applicant ’s allegations of medical malpractice .

On DATE PERSON submitted a supplement to her report , finding that there were no indications of medical negligence in the applicant ’s treatment .

NORP In DATE the applicant challenged PERSON ’s findings and asked ORG to question the experts at a hearing .

On DATE a hearing was held for the questioning of the experts , who reiterated their findings . ORG found that it was necessary to commission another expert report from ORG ( PERSON fakultet GPE u GPE ) concerning the question whether the applicant ’s condition was a result of medical negligence .

An expert report was commissioned from ORG on DATE .

ORG produced a report on DATE . It found that the applicant ’s facial paralysis was a result of complications during surgery and not medical malpractice .

NORP In response to the expert report of ORG , the applicant specified her claim , arguing that the report established a causal connection between the surgery and the deterioration of her health . She also considered that according to the principle of objective liability , the hospital was responsible . The applicant did not express any objections concerning the report .

In DATE and DATE the applicant urged ORG to schedule a hearing .

At a hearing held on DATE ORG questioned the applicant and ordered that the experts from ORG , PERSON . and FAC . , be questioned at the next hearing .

On DATE ORG heard evidence from GPE . and J.Šk . They reiterated their findings , according to which the deterioration of the applicant ’s condition had been a result of complications during surgery .

A further hearing was held on DATE at which ORG decided that GPE , the doctor who had treated the applicant , would be questioned as a witness .

A hearing on DATE was adjourned because GPE , who at the time lived in GPE , had not been properly summoned to appear as a witness .

At a hearing on DATE ORG questioned the applicant . It also found that GPE had not been properly summoned .

On DATE a hearing was held at which ORG questioned GPE , who explained the circumstances of the applicant ’s operations and further treatment .

On DATE ORG commissioned another expert report from GPE with regard to the question of a causal link between the applicant ’s condition and her disability pension . In a report of CARDINAL DATE the expert found that there was a direct causal link between the applicant ’s condition and her retirement on grounds of disability .

At a hearing on DATE the applicant asked that experts from ORG be appointed as expert witnesses in her case . ORG dismissed that request and concluded the hearing .

In a further submission of the same date the applicant challenged the impartiality of the expert witnesses from GPE , arguing that it was clear from the negligible number of cases where medical malpractice had been established that they were biased in favour of the defendants .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s civil action , holding that in the case at issue the principle of presumed fault ( presumirane krivnje ) should be applied . That meant that it was for the defendants to show that the hospital had acted in accordance with professional standards and that the damage was not the result of a lack of diligence on the part of the doctor who had performed the surgery . Relying on a detailed assessment of the expert reports obtained during the proceedings , the court found that on the facts of the case , the deterioration of the applicant ’s health had been a result of complications in the treatment and not of medical malpractice . It also pointed out that there was nothing putting into doubt the quality of the expert reports commissioned during the proceedings and that the applicant ’s request that another expert report be commissioned from abroad would unnecessarily further prolong the proceedings and generate further expense .

On DATE the applicant appealed against that judgment before ORG ( Županijski sud u GPE ) alleging , inter alia , that the medical experts who had drafted the reports had a personal and professional conflict of interest in the proceedings , as they involved allegations of malpractice against their colleagues and the experts were financially dependent on the hospital system .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal as unfounded on the grounds that there was no reason to doubt the quality and findings of the expert reports .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with ORG ( PERSON ) , reiterating her previous arguments concerning lack of impartiality on the part of the experts and the quality of the expert reports commissioned during the proceedings .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal on points of law as unfounded , endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) complaining of lack of an effective procedure before the competent civil courts to deal with her allegations of medical negligence . She also reiterated her complaints as to the lack of impartiality of the medical experts , arguing that the relevant statistics showed that it had been impossible to establish her allegations of medical negligence on the basis of the expert reports commissioned from the domestic experts .

On DATE ORG declared the applicant ’s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill - founded . The decision of ORG was served on the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the applicant complained to ORG about the excessive length of the proceedings before ORG .

On DATE the ORG found a violation of the applicant ’s right to a trial within a reasonable time and awarded her CARDINAL NORP kunas ( HRK – approximately QUANTITY ( EUR ) ) in compensation . It also ordered ORG to terminate the proceedings within a further period of DATE following the service of its decision .

The decision of ORG was served on ORG on DATE .


No violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Carlo Ranzoni;Erik Møse;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mārtiņš Mits;Yonko Grozev

The applicant was born in DATE and is detained in GPE .

On DATE ORG ( Ağır Cinayətlər Məhkəməsi – hereinafter “ the ORG ” ) , sitting as a court of first instance for serious offences , convicted the applicant and his wife of fraud . The applicant was sentenced to DATE imprisonment with confiscation of property , and his wife to DATE imprisonment , suspended for DATE on probation .

On DATE ORG ( GPE Apellyasiya Məhkəməsi – hereinafter “ the ORG ” ) overturned the judgment of DATE , reducing the applicant ’s term of imprisonment to DATE and lifting the confiscation of property sanction .

The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with ORG ( PERSON DATE hereinafter “ the Supreme Court ” ) . The prosecutor lodged a cassation protest in respect of the judgment of DATE with ORG , requesting that it be set aside and the case remitted to ORG .

ORG scheduled the first hearing for DATE but adjourned the proceedings until DATE at the request of the applicant ’s lawyer who pleaded that he had not enough time to familiarise himself with the case - file and collect further evidence .

At the hearing of DATE the applicant ’s lawyer requested another adjournment referring to health problems and lack of time for familiarisation with the case - file . ORG scheduled the next hearing for DATE . According to the TIME of the hearing of DATE provided by the ORG , the applicant ’s lawyer was present when the court declared that his request had been granted and that the proceedings were adjourned until DATE .

On DATE , having examined the case in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer but in the presence of the prosecutor , ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal and accepted the prosecutor ’s application for supervisory review in part . The prosecutor made oral submissions during the hearing , seeking the dismissal of the applicant ’s appeal .

ORG upheld ORG judgment as regards the applicant ’s conviction , but quashed his wife ’s conviction , remitting that part of the case to ORG for fresh examination . ORG found that proof of the applicant ’s guilt had been duly established during the trial in the first - instance court and ORG and that his actions had been properly classified under criminal law . Citing Article CARDINAL of the Code of Criminal Procedure , ORG decision stated that the examination of the case was possible in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer given that the lawyer had failed to appear despite having been duly notified and the applicant , who was serving his prison sentence , had made no request to attend .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13+6-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the Justice of the Peace of the CARDINALst ORG of GPE of LOC ordered Municipal unitary enterprise of housing maintenance No . CARDINAL ( « УМПЖХ № CARDINAL » , hereinafter “ debtor company ” ) to pay MONEY ( ORG ) to PERSON . The judgment became final on DATE .

On DATE ORG initiated enforcement proceedings .

Following Ms ORG ’s death , on DATE the Justice of ORG replaced the initial applicant , PERSON , by her successor , PERSON , in the enforcement proceedings .

The award was subsequently index - linked in the course of the enforcement proceedings by the decisions of DATE ( final on DATE ) , DATE DATE ( final on DATE ) , DATE ( final on DATE ) , and DATE ( final on DATE ) . Each decision replaced and cancelled the previous one .

The award has not been paid to the applicant to date .

The company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise set up by a decision of the local administration and provided housing maintenance services . The company had “ the right of economic control ” ( право хозяйственного ведения ) over the assets allocated to it by the administration in order to carry out their statutory activities .

On DATE the debtor company was declared insolvent and liquidation proceedings started . As a result , the company was liquidated on CARDINAL DATE .


Preliminary objection joined to merits (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life)

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

NORP In DATE the applicant ’s wife , PERSON , gave birth to a daughter , A.

In DATE the applicant and ORG divorced .

On DATE LOC childcare and guardianship authority ( hereafter “ the childcare authority ” ) determined that A. would reside with the applicant during even DATE and with her mother , ORG , during DATE . In DATE and DATE was to live with the applicant for DATE of his choice per month .

On DATE the applicant discovered several bruises on A. ’s body . Suspecting that she had been beaten and sexually abused by ORG ’s new partner , he refused to return PERSON to ORG

During DATE lived with the applicant and her paternal grandmother . On several occasions the applicant allowed N. to visit A. in his presence .

On DATE the applicant complained to the police and to the LOC investigation committee that his daughter PERSON had been beaten and sexually abused by ORG partner . The investigation committee opened a pre - investigation inquiry .

NORP The applicant and LOC both applied to ORG of PERSON for a residence order in respect of A.

On DATE was questioned by an investigator in the presence of a psychologist , in the framework of the pre - investigation inquiry . A. stated that she wanted to live with the applicant because he was nice , whereas her mother and her mother ’s new partner had treated her badly . She was again questioned by the investigator in the presence of a psychologist on DATE and CARDINAL DATE , and confirmed her previous statements .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG granted ORG ’s application for a residence order and refused the applicant ’s similar application . The court found that both parents had taken an equal share in DATE upbringing . They both had sufficient financial means and their standard of living was equally satisfactory . However , taking into account ORG ’s gender and age , it was preferable for her to be brought up by her mother . A child under the age of twelve could be separated from the mother only in exceptional circumstances . No such circumstances had been established in the present case . N. was employed and had sufficient income . There was no evidence of negligence or mistreatment on her part . A. ’s bruises could have been sustained as a result of a fall or in the course of a game , and were insufficient to prove mistreatment . A criminal inquiry into the allegations of mistreatment was still pending . The court - appointed expert psychologist ’s finding that A. was emotionally closer to her father and paternal grandmother than to her mother could not be taken into account in the absence of established evidence of mistreatment by the mother . The court concluded that it was therefore in A. ’s best interests to live with her mother .

On DATE the childcare authority noted that A. wished to live with her father . An inspection of the applicant ’s flat had revealed that he had created all the appropriate conditions for A. ’s normal development . The childcare authority therefore found that A. should reside with the applicant .

On DATE ORG of GPE upheld the judgment of CARDINAL DATE on appeal . It found that ORG had failed to consider the childcare authority ’s findings and opinion and had therefore committed a serious breach of the procedure prescribed by law . However , given that the childcare authority ’s opinion was advisory rather than binding on the court , the failure to consider that opinion did not warrant reconsideration of the judgment , which was correct in substance .

On DATE the LOC investigation committee opened criminal proceedings into the alleged mistreatment and sexual abuse of A.

As the applicant continued to retain PERSON , ORG applied to ORG for an injunction requiring the applicant to return PERSON to her .

On DATE ORG allowed ORG ’s application . It found that the applicant had refused to comply with the judgment of CARDINAL DATE , upheld on appeal . It ordered that , in compliance with that judgment , the applicant should return PERSON to ORG On DATE ORG of GPE upheld that judgment on appeal .

On an unspecified date the applicant applied for a second time to FAC for a residence order in respect of A. At the same time he applied for a restriction of ORG ’s parental authority over A.

On DATE ORG dismissed the application and confirmed its previous order to the effect that A. should live with her mother , citing the same reasons as in the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . The court found no reasons to restrict ORG ’s parental authority over A. On DATE ORG upheld that judgment on appeal .

On DATE N. kidnapped A. from the applicant . She has since prevented the applicant from seeing his daughter .

On DATE was again questioned by the investigator in the presence of a psychologist . She said that she liked living with her mother and that her mother was treating her well .

On DATE was examined by a panel of psychologists appointed by the investigator in the framework of the criminal proceedings . They found that A. was not suffering from any learning difficulties or disorders . However , owing to her age , level of development and susceptibility to external influence , she was unable to give reliable evidence about her relationships with her mother , her father or her mother ’s new partner .

On DATE the LOC investigation committee discontinued the criminal proceedings , finding that there was no evidence of mistreatment or sexual abuse and that the bruises could have been caused by DATE . According to the experts , ORG ’s statements that her mother ’s partner had treated her badly were unreliable . The witnesses had been unable to provide any information confirming the applicant ’s allegations of child abuse .

The applicant applied for a third time to FAC for a residence order in respect of A. He also asked that ORG be deprived of parental authority over A.

While those proceedings were pending , ORG lodged an application with ORG , contesting the applicant ’s paternity of PERSON She requested that his name be deleted from A. ’s birth certificate and that A. ’s family name and patronymic be changed .

On DATE a DNA paternity test established that the applicant was not A. ’s biological father .

On DATE ORG allowed ORG ’s claims . It found that the applicant was not A. ’s biological father and terminated his parental status in respect of her . It ordered that the applicant ’s name be deleted from ORG ’s birth certificate and that A. ’s family name and patronymic be changed to a family name and a patronymic not connected with the applicant . On DATE ORG of GPE upheld that judgment on appeal .

On DATE ORG discontinued the proceedings concerning the applicant ’s application for a residence order and an order to deprive N. of parental authority over A. The court reasoned that as the applicant was not A. ’s biological father , he had no standing under domestic law to lodge civil actions concerning parental authority over A. or A. ’s residence arrangements . The applicant was absent from the hearing because he was ill .

On DATE ORG upheld that decision on appeal . According to the applicant , he had not been informed of the date of the hearing . Nor was he informed about the appeal decision until DATE .

On DATE a judge of ORG refused to refer a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant to the presidium of that court for examination , finding that no significant violations of substantive or procedural law had influenced the outcome of the proceedings . It noted , in particular , that there was proof in the case file that a letter had been sent to the applicant on DATE informing him of the date of the appeal hearing . Information about the hearing date had also been published on the court ’s official website . The applicant had therefore been duly informed of the date of the appeal hearing .


Alvina Gyulumyan;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Luis López Guerra

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , claims that he is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and is currently residing in the GPE . He was represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr R.A.A. Böcker , and Deputy Agent , PERSON , of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant applied for asylum in the GPE on DATE , claiming that he hailed from GPE , GPE and belonged to the minority PERSON population group and the PERSON clan . When he was DATE , he and his family had moved to GPE where he had resided illegally . In DATE , the NORP authorities had expelled the applicant to GPE . His mother had accompanied him because he did not know anybody in GPE . They had moved in with an uncle of the applicant ’s . As the applicant was unknown to most neighbours , he had been suspected of involvement in LOC . The applicant had been abducted by some neighbours . After a ransom had been paid by his family he had been released and he had fled the country . He feared that , upon return to GPE , he would fall victim to human rights violations by CARDINAL of the warring factions there . He also claimed that , as a member of a minority clan , he had a higher risk of falling victim to human rights violations .

By decision of CARDINAL DATE the Minister of Justice ( minister PERSON ) rejected the asylum application , considering that the applicant ’s account lacked credibility . The Minister held that the applicant had failed to establish his nationality and identity . The applicant had been unable to describe how he had been identified as a NORP national by the NORP consular authorities in GPE . In this respect it was noted that the applicant had stated that the only NORP words he knew were ‘ hello’ and ‘ good afternoon’ . He had further claimed that the conversation with the consular authorities had been conducted in LANGUAGE . It was thus considered implausible that the consular authorities had been able to determine the NORP origins of the applicant . He had further been unable to describe the airports in GPE and GPE .

NORP The Minister further disbelieved the account of the applicant ’s departure from GPE . The applicant had claimed that he had been on a direct flight from GPE to GPE , GPE . However , according to country of origin information all flights from GPE to GPE had to make a safety stop at GPE , GPE . The applicant had not mentioned this stop .

The applicant ’s appeal was dismissed by ORG ( rechtbank ) of GPE sitting in GPE on DATE . His further and final appeal was dismissed on summary grounds by ORG of ORG ( Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State ) on DATE .

On DATE , a report of a linguistic analysis of the applicant ’s speech concluded that he spoke deficient NORP with a PERSON accent ; that NORP was not his first or dominant language ; and that he had grown up in a diaspora community where ( PERSON ) NORP was spoken .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in LOC .

The applicant was employed by “ HP Fagram DP ” , a socially - owned company based in Smederevo ( hereinafter – “ the debtor ” ) .

On DATE ORG ordered the debtor to pay the applicant certain sums in respect of salary arrears , social security contributions and procedural costs .

On DATE the judgment became final .

On DATE the applicant lodged an application for the enforcement of the above court decision with ORG .

On DATE the court allowed the application and issued an enforcement order .

On DATE ORG opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor , which led to the ongoing enforcement proceedings before ORG being stayed .

NORP In DATE the applicant duly registered a claim for the sums specified in the judgment referred to above .

On DATE ORG accepted the applicant ’s claim . His right to separate settlement from the immovable property of the debtor was contested and he was instructed to initiate separate civil proceedings in order to secure his right to separate settlement of his claim .

The applicant did not initiate separate civil proceedings .

On DATE ORG adopted the decision on final distribution of the company ’s insolvency assets , classifying the applicant into the fourth sequence of payment . In the course of the insolvency proceedings the final judgment in the applicant ’s favour was partially enforced .