Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for home;Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - award

Aleš Pejchal;Angelika Nußberger;Ann Power-Forde;Ganna Yudkivska;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in the village of PERSON , which forms part of ORG , a resort town in LOC .

The applicant owns a house and an adjacent plot of land in LOC . The village of GPE is situated in a mountainous region and because of its location holds the status of mountainous residential area . It is also known as a resort for “ green tourism ” in PERSON region . It is situated on the banks of PERSON river .

On DATE ORG ( “ ORG ” ) , having considered CARDINAL sites on which to construct a new cemetery , chose the land previously occupied by garages belonging to a company called ORG ( “ the LOC plot ” ) as it was not occupied , it was located in the village and the cemetery could be constructed at low cost .

The VL plot is located near the applicant ’s house ( for further details see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) , in which he was residing with his family at the time . CARDINAL rivers flow at a distance of QUANTITY from the VL plot . Drinking water for PERSON comes from wells fed by groundwater ; there is no centralised water supply system and the wells are not protected .

On DATE ORG informed the Chairman of ORG ( “ ORG ” ) that the construction of the cemetery on the VL plot might cause contamination of the river and the wells situated on adjacent plots of land by ptomaine carried by the groundwater flow .

The cemetery was opened for use by ORG in DATE . It is being administered by ORG .

On DATE ORG ( санітарно-епідеміологічна станція ) concluded that the cemetery should not have been constructed on the VL plot in view of its proximity to residential buildings and the risk of contamination of the surrounding environment by ptomaine .

On DATE ORG of ORG refused to approve the construction plan . In particular , it stated that the cemetery should not be situated in the proposed area as its distance from private housing did not comply with the norms and standards of a health protection zone ( санітарно-захисна зона ) .

On DATE and DATE ORG , part of ORG , informed the applicant and ORG that another location would have to be found for the cemetery . It was of the view that constructing the cemetery on the VL plot would breach environmental health laws and regulations and would worsen the living conditions of the residents of adjacent houses . In particular , it would be located QUANTITY from the nearest residential buildings , which are QUANTITY away from the edge of the cemetery ( which would not allow for the establishment of the necessary health protection zone ) . It could lead to contamination of the groundwater reservoir used by the residents of adjacent households for drinking water and of the nearby rivers with by - products of human decomposition . It further stated that a health protection zone was also intended to reduce psychological pressure on the residents of adjacent houses .

The applicant alleges that DATE to the present moment he has been receiving treatment for hypertension and various cardio - related diseases . He supplied in this respect sick leave certificates and medical certificates from DATE and DATE , relating to him and his wife . He has also provided the ORG with death certificates for CARDINAL of his neighbours Mr GPE and PERSON , who also resided in the vicinity of the prohibited cemetery and died at DATE and CARDINAL , respectively .

On DATE the GPE - Frankivsk ORG informed the applicant that it could not intervene in respect of unauthorised burials taking place on the VL plot : the issue was in the competence of local authorities , including ORG , which was responsible for management and maintenance of the cemetery .

On DATE ORG of ORG informed ORG that ORG was considering resettling the applicant . He had twice been invited to discuss a proposal for resettlement of his family to another part of the village but no response had been received .

On DATE ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) informed ORG and ORG that the area near the applicant ’s house was not suitable for construction of the cemetery as it did not respect a CARDINAL wide health protection zone that would protect the residential buildings and a CARDINAL-metre wide water protection zone to protect the Prutets river .

On DATE the ORG resolved inter alia that the relevant local authorities were prepared to consider the purchase of a house or apartment for the applicant , or to pay him compensation if he refused to reside in the cemetery ’s vicinity .

On DATE the issue of the site of the cemetery was examined by officials from ORG , ORG , the environmental health inspectorate and ORG . They recommended to the Chairman of ORG that another plot on the outskirts of the village of “ NORP ” be used as a cemetery .

On DATE ORG informed the applicant that the only way to resolve the issue was to resettle him . They asked him to agree to such a resettlement . They also confirmed that ORG was willing either to buy a house for the applicant or to provide him with an equivalent plot of land and the funds necessary to construct another house

On DATE the Chairman of ORG invited the applicant to inform the authorities whether his family was willing to resettle and , if so , on what conditions .

In reply , the applicant sought more information on the proposal , such as , details of the specific land plot , house and facilities to be provided .

NORP By letter of DATE the Chairman of ORG , in reply to the applicant ’s request for specific proposals , invited the applicant to discuss the proposal in person with a view to a possible compromise .

On DATE the Chairman of ORG asked ORG ( Дніпромісто – “ the Institute ” ) to develop proposals for the site of a cemetery in the village .

On DATE the Institute informed the applicant that it was not within its competence to decide matters such as the question of where to situate the cemetery . It also mentioned that the local development plan for PERSON proposed a plot in the PERSON area for the cemetery . However , this was subject to approval by the local council and environmental health inspectorate . It also informed the applicant that no letter of CARDINAL DATE with proposals to investigate possible site of the cemetery ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) had been received from ORG .

NORP By letter of DATE addressed to the applicant and the Chairman of ORG , ORG stated that it had repeatedly proposed to ORG that it use an area called Venterivka for the site of the cemetery . However , the council had not taken up that suggestion for unspecified reasons . It also informed the applicant that it was within ORG competence to decide on the allocation of a plot of land for a cemetery .

On several occasions DATE the applicant and members of his family , who resided together , asked ORG to grant each of them a plot of land on which to construct a house because they felt that living in the cemetery ’s vicinity was intolerable . ORG rejected the requests because of a lack of available plots of land .

According to the results of examinations of drinking water from the applicant ’s well conducted by ORG dated DATE and DATE , the toxicological , chemical and organoleptic indices of the water complied with national standards ( no E. coli index examination had been made ) . A conclusion was reached that water could be used for household needs .

On DATE and DATE ORG carried out a bacteriological analysis of the water from the same well . It established , contrary to the results of the examinations held on DATE and DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) that the E. coli bacteria index in the water gave a reading of CARDINAL , whereas the normal reading was DATE ( see paragraph DATE below ) , and concluded that the water could not be used for household needs . It also recommended disinfecting the water supply . The cause of water pollution was not established and would require an additional expert report .

On DATE in response to a request from the Government , ORG concluded that the reading obtained from the bacteriological analysis which had indicated water contamination did not have any connection to the location of the cemetery , but could also have been caused by other sources .

On DATE ORG informed the applicant that the reasons for the bacterial contamination of the water supply could be established on the basis of a hydrogeological assessment as to whether there were any connections between the drinking water reservoirs and possible sources of contamination . It further stated that according to an analysis of water taken from different parts of the village , the E. coli index exceeded the allowed reading established by law , which provided that drinking water should not contain any index of PERSON coli or be CARDINAL in that index per CARDINAL cmCARDINAL ( see paragraph CARDINAL in relation to the domestic drinking water standards ) , nevertheless the E. coli index ranged from CARDINAL to CARDINAL .

The applicant ’s house and well are QUANTITY from the nearest boundary of the cemetery .

By letters of CARDINAL , CARDINAL and DATE from ORG , ORG and the GPE - Frankivsk ORG , the authorities informed the Government ’s agent that the applicant had failed to manifest any interest in being resettled .

On DATE ORG , following the applicant ’s claim in proceedings against ORG , held that the ORG ’s decision to situate the cemetery on the VL plot had been unlawful .

At DATE residents of PERSON carried out the first burial at the cemetery .

On DATE ORG , in another set of new proceedings , found that ORG had failed to follow the proper procedure for the allocation of a plot of land for a cemetery , namely obtaining an environmental health assessment , and ordered it to prohibit burials on the VL plot .

On DATE the residents of Tatariv were informed of the court ’s decision to stop the use of the VL plot as a cemetery . Nevertheless , burials continued at the site .

On DATE ORG prohibited burials on the VL plot . On DATE ORG terminated enforcement proceedings in the case , considering that the judgment had been fully complied with by ORG .

NORP On DATE ORG again decided that the VL plot could be used for the new village cemetery . On DATE the applicant lodged a new claim against that decision with ORG .

In the meantime , on CARDINAL DATE ORG informed the relevant judge of ORG , which assumed jurisdiction over the claims lodged on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , that the site of the cemetery did not comply with national environmental health laws and regulations on the planning and construction of urban areas . In particular , the location did not comply with the requirement of a health protection zone between the cemetery and the nearest residential buildings .

On DATE the ORG declared ORG decision of DATE unlawful . On DATE ORG upheld that judgment .

On DATE ORG cancelled its decision of DATE in pursuance of the judgment of DATE .

On DATE ORG approved a new development plan for the village . The plan again authorised the use of the VL plot as a cemetery .

On DATE the applicant again instituted proceedings against ORG , seeking to have the approval of the new development plan for the village , insofar as it concerned the location of the cemetery , declared unlawful . He also sought compensation for non - pecuniary damage , court fees and legal expenses .

On DATE ORG ordered ORG to inform the residents of the village that burials at the unauthorised cemetery near the applicant ’s house were prohibited .

By that time , CARDINAL burials had been carried out on the VL plot . The distance between the applicant ’s house and some of the graves was QUANTITY .

The Chairman of ORG argued before the court that there was no other suitable area for a cemetery in the village . She further submitted that the applicant ’s allegation of possible contamination of the water supply was unfounded , as the groundwater flowed away from his property .

DATE . On DATE ORG allowed the applicant ’s claims and held that the new construction plan was unlawful as regards the location of the cemetery . It found that the VL plot was not suitable for use as a cemetery . In particular , constructing the cemetery on the VL plot had breached the environmental health laws and regulations requiring the establishment of : ( a ) a health protection zone QUANTITY wide separating residential areas from a risk factor ; and ( b ) a water protection zone QUANTITY wide separating water supply sources from a risk factor . It observed that those distances could not be reduced . It ordered ORG to close the cemetery and to pay the applicant CARDINAL hryvnias ( ORG ) in compensation for non - pecuniary damage and ORG CARDINAL for costs and expenses .

On CARDINAL DATE the GPE - Frankivsk Regional Court of Appeal ( “ Court of Appeal ” ) upheld the judgment of CARDINAL DATE in part . In particular , it decided that no award of non - pecuniary damage should be made to the applicant , and it reduced the award for costs and expenses to ORG CARDINAL .

On DATE ORG upheld the ruling of CARDINAL May CARDINAL .

On DATE ORG issued CARDINAL writs of execution ordering ORG to adopt a decision declaring the new development plan unlawful and to close the cemetery .

On DATE ORG instituted enforcement proceedings in the case .

DATE and DATE ORG imposed fines on ORG several times for its refusal to comply with the judgment of DATE .

On DATE the Bailiffs terminated the enforcement proceedings , stating that it had been impossible to enforce the decision without the involvement of ORG , whose members had failed to adopt a decision in pursuance of the judgment of DATE .

In DATE the applicant requested ORG to change the terms of the enforcement of the judgment of DATE . In particular , he sought to have the Chairman of ORG ordered to execute the judgment .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s request . It held that the Chairman had acted only as a representative of ORG , the respondent in the case . The Chairman had not been involved as a party to the proceedings . On DATE ORG upheld the ruling of CARDINAL DATE .

In DATE the applicant challenged the alleged omissions and inactivity of the Chairman of ORG as regards the enforcement of the judgment of CARDINAL DATE before ORG .

On DATE ORG found no fault on the part of the Chairman and rejected the applicant ’s claim . On DATE ORG upheld that decision .

On DATE ORG again refused to declare the new development plan unlawful and to close the cemetery .

On DATE ORG informed the applicant that the enforcement proceedings were not subject to renewal .

The applicant also unsuccessfully sought to institute criminal proceedings against the Chairman of ORG for her alleged failure to enforce the judgment of DATE .

On DATE ORG , acting upon the applicant ’s request , refused to institute criminal proceedings against a private individual , PERSON , for using the VL plot for a burial . On DATE and CARDINAL DATE ORG and ORG , respectively , upheld this decision .

On DATE ORG in CARDINAL separate judgments rejected as unsubstantiated damages claims brought by the applicant and his neighbour , PERSON , against PERSON and PERSON ( private individuals ) concerning the unlawful use of the land near their houses for burial purposes . It found no breach of applicant ’s rights by the respondents .

The judgments were upheld on DATE ( in CARDINAL separate rulings ) by ORG and subsequently on DATE and DATE by ORG .


No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court)

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

In DATE the applicant was employed by the T. company of GPE . On DATE he sustained a work - related injury . He continued working for the T. company in another post .

On DATE the applicant was made redundant following organisational changes within the company . The following day he concluded an agreement with the T. company shortening the notice period for the termination of his employment .

On DATE the applicant was given his redundancy notice and his employment was terminated on DATE .

On DATE the applicant was granted a disability pension with effect from DATE on the grounds of his inability to work .

On DATE the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the T. company in ORG ( PERSON GPE ) . He alleged that he would have received more income if he had not sustained the work - related injury in DATE . He claimed damages relating to the difference between his disability pension and the salary he had received until the termination of his employment .

On DATE ORG dismissed his claim as unfounded .

NORP The applicant appealed against the first - instance judgment , challenging all the factual and legal aspects of the case .

On DATE ORG ( Županijski sud u GPE ) , relying on section CARDINALa of LAW , dismissed the applicant ’s appeal as unfounded . It agreed with the outcome of the case but held that the first - instance court had failed to take into account all the facts from the proceedings that had supported the dismissal of the claim . The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows :

“ ... this appellate court finds that although the first - instance court failed to take into account all the facts emerging from the first - instance proceedings which meant [ the plaintiff ’s ] claim had to be dismissed , the decision on dismissing the claim as unfounded is in any event correct , therefore the first - instance judgment is upheld by application of section CARDINALa of LAW .

This appellate court therefore holds that the plaintiff ’s claim was certainly to be dismissed , but for the reasons set out in this appellate decision ; that is , that the reasons the first - instance court stated in the reasoning of its decision would not suffice for the claim to be dismissed .

Therefore the first - instance decision is upheld on the basis of section CARDINALa of LAW ... ”

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with ORG ( PERSON ) , challenging the lower courts’ judgments . He stated that the appellate court had relied expressly on section CARDINALa of ORG , and that therefore he was lodging his appeal on points of law on the basis of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of that Act .

On DATE ORG declared the applicant ’s appeal on points of law inadmissible on the grounds that the appellate court in fact had not applied section CARDINALa of LAW , and that therefore his appeal on points of law could not be allowed . The relevant part of the decision reads as follows :

“ The first - instance court and the appellate court found that the plaintiff had not been dismissed because of his inability to work caused by the work - related injury , but that his employment had been terminated by dismissal due to redundancy and that therefore there was no causal link between his dismissal and the granting of the disability pension , so his claim for damages ... was dismissed as unfounded .

Therefore , in this court ’s assessment , the requirements for the application of section ORG of LAW were not met , given that the appellate court did not establish , in the manner prescribed by section CARDINALa of LAW , a different set of facts to the one established by the first - instance court , but based its decision on the same facts . ”

The applicant subsequently complained to ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) about ORG decision on his appeal on points of law . He made no allegations of any violation of his rights in respect of the proceedings before the first - instance court or the appellate court .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s constitutional complaint as manifestly ill - founded . The decision was served on the applicant ’s representative on DATE .


Ján Šikuta;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Luis López Guerra

The applications were lodged by CARDINAL individual NORP nationals , whose particulars appear in the LAW ( “ the applicants ” ) . They were represented by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

The applications were also lodged by the civic association Right to Housing ( PERSON na bývanie – “ the applicant association ” ) , whose registered office is in GPE and of whom the applicants are members . The applicant association was represented by PERSON , its President .

NORP The facts of the cases , as submitted by the applicants and the applicant association , may be summarised as follows .

DATE public authorities allotted flats to the applicants or their predecessors in accordance with the law then in force . Following the developments described below , their rights of use were transformed into tenancies and the houses in which the flats were located were restored to their original owners or denationalised . The applications concern the public authorities’ actions in connection with the denationalisation of the housing fund in GPE , the dismantling of rent control and the impact this has had on the individual applicants . The following facts are relevant .

Prior to the fall of the communist regime in DATE , the housing system in GPE was part of a planned State - run economy . ORG in cities and towns lived mostly in flats owned by the ORG or “ legal persons ” , such as ORG - owned companies . The construction of flats and their use and allocation were managed , financed and controlled by public authorities through a centralised management structure .

Others lived in flats which had been built by housing cooperatives of which they were members . Cooperative housing was also funded primarily from public sources . Under the relevant legislation , direct and nonrefundable government grants represented PERCENT of the total costs of construction .

NORP Mostly in rural areas , inhabitants built their own family homes which were in their “ personal ” ownership . Their construction was also subsidised and promoted by the ORG by various means .

Persons living in flats owned by the ORG were holders of a right of use ( osobné užívanie ) under LAW . They were entitled to use their flats for an indefinite period . Members of the same household as a person having a right of use were entitled to continue living in the flat after the latter ’s death . Holders of a right of use were allowed to participate in the decision - making processes regarding alterations and reconstruction of the houses in which they lived . Exchanges of flats between holders of a right of use were permissible and frequent . They were subjected to approval by the owner , which was generally only a formality . The amount payable for the use of flats was regulated in accordance with the central wage policy . It did not reflect the costs of construction and maintenance . Users could be evicted only in exceptional circumstances , for example if they had failed to pay the sum due for DATE or had committed a serious breach of the law in their use of a flat .

In the former GPE , to which GPE has been one of the successor GPE as of DATE , housing reforms started in DATE in the context of ( i ) measures aimed at redressing certain wrongs that had been committed under the communist regime and ( ii ) the country ’s transition towards a market - oriented economy . It involved the restitution of houses to former owners , the denationalisation of ORG - owned housing stock and later the gradual deregulation of rent .

New laws allowed for the restitution of property which had been taken away from owners under the communist regime . A number of dwelling houses , especially in towns , were returned to the original owners or their successors . The restitution of dwelling houses as such did not formally affect the legal position of those who had a right of use of individual flats .

In DATE the process of “ large - scale privatisation ” was started . It consisted of the denationalisation of ORG - owned enterprises . In some cases , new owners divided the property of the company of which part , including the company ’s housing stock , was transferred to third parties . In such cases , the users’ position was similar to that described in the preceding section . In DATE a law was passed prohibiting the transfer of company - owned flats to persons other than their actual tenants .

The main objective of the housing reforms after DATE was the introduction of private ownership of housing stock . The reforms were primarily related to housing in flats .

With effect from DATE LAW was amended so that rights of use in respect of flats were cancelled and replaced by tenancies . Rents remained regulated . In the event of death of a tenant of a flat rented by spouses , the survivor is entitled to become the sole tenant . In other cases , tenancies are transferrable to a deceased tenant ’s children , grandchildren , siblings or sons or daughters - in - law , if they can prove they shared the same household at the time of death and do not have their own flat . The same right may be enjoyed by other persons who took care of the deceased tenant ’s household or were dependent on him or her for DATE prior to his or her death , and who do not have their own flat .

The relevant provisions of the Civil Code restrict a landlord ’s ability to terminate a tenancy to a limited number of cases , such as where the latter needs the flat for their own or their next of kin ’s purposes , or where the tenant did not need the flat or failed to comply with his or her obligations . Termination of a tenancy by a landlord must be approved by a court , and in most cases tenants may only have to vacate the flat once they have been provided with substitute accommodation .

Law no . DATE provided for the transformation of cooperatives in the context of the country ’s transition towards a market - oriented economy . Members of housing cooperatives were entitled to have ownership of the flats in which they lived transferred to them . They only had to pay the outstanding part of the ORG loan which had been provided in respect of the dwelling . In practice , tenants acquired ownership of cooperative flats either at a nominal price or , where the ORG loan had already been repaid , at no additional cost .

The Ownership of Flats and Non - Dwelling Premises Act DATE ( PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) was enacted with effect from DATE . It allowed tenants in publicly - owned dwelling houses to buy their flats on favourable terms . The basis for calculating the price was the statistical value of a dwelling as defined in the period of the centrally planned economy . Tenants had a number of further advantages and benefits . As a result , they obtained ownership of flats at a nominal price which was only a fraction of their actual market value . The applicants indicated that CARDINAL of the reasons for the large - scale denationalisation of public housing stock was so that the majority of the population could be compensated in a situation where the denationalisation of a substantial part of ORG property , such as companies , had resulted in it being transferred to a limited number of persons .

Subsequent amendments to PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL extended its scope to cover flats the ownership of which had been transferred to a number of legal persons , such as consumption , agricultural and production cooperatives and companies . In its findings in case GPE . ÚS CARDINAL/CARDINAL , ORG dismissed a challenge by ORG to some of the amendments . It held , among other things , that the denationalisation of housing stock , in addition to being part of the economic transformation process , aimed at eliminating discrimination against residents of flats as compared to owners of individual houses who had acquired them with the help of public resources .

The large - scale denationalisation of housing stock in GPE , especially in big towns , resulted in almost all flats being transferred to private ownership . The rental sector nearly ceased to exist , with rental flats remaining mostly in restored and privatised houses .

DATE a number of instruments of subordinate legislation were issued providing for a gradual increase in regulated rent .

On DATE ORG issued Measure no . CARDINAL/R/CARDINAL . It allowed the rent - control scheme to continue to apply after DATE where ( i ) tenants or persons sharing their household did not own or co - own , on DATE , a comparable flat or inhabitable real property in the same municipality or within QUANTITY of its boundaries ; ( ii ) the landlord and the tenant did not reach a different agreement on the rent before DATE ; and ( iii ) the tenants concerned submitted a registration form to ORG before DATE .

Documents of that Ministry indicate that , by DATE registration forms had been submitted by tenants in respect of CARDINAL flats where rent control was applied . CARDINAL persons lived in those flats . The documents indicate that it was envisaged that substitute accommodation would be made available to those concerned by the reforms where this was justified by their social situation . PERCENT of the tenants thus registered lived in flats located in GPE .

On the basis of that data , the authorities estimated that the rent - control scheme concerned CARDINAL flats , that is to say PERCENT of rented flats in houses that existed in DATE and PERCENT of the inhabited housing facilities which were available in GPE in DATE .

On DATE the Termination and Settlement of Tenancy ( Certain Flats ) Act came into force . It was enacted with a view to eliminating rent restrictions concerning individual owners ( see “ Relevant domestic law and practice ” below ) .

In application no . CARDINAL , CARDINAL of the CARDINAL individual applicants had received notice of termination of their tenancies by DATE . By DATE the ORG claim for substitute accommodation had been granted in CARDINAL cases and refused in CARDINAL .

NORP In application no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , CARDINAL individual applicants had received notice by the time their applications had been lodged on CARDINAL DATE . With the exception of CARDINAL , the applicants in that case considered that they met the criteria of persons in “ material need ” of housing within the meaning of PERSON no . CARDINAL .

Details of the relevant domestic law and practice are set out in the case of ORG and Others v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) . In addition , the following information is relevant .

The Termination and Settlement of Tenancy ( Certain Flats ) Act DATE ( Law no . CARDINAL ) , as amended , applies in particular to flats used by individuals whose rent has been regulated . It entitled landlords , until DATE , to give notice of termination of a tenancy which was to take effect after DATE . Tenants who are entitled to substitute accommodation or whose corresponding claim has not yet been determined do not have to vacate their flats until a municipality has provided substitute housing to them . Law no . GPE further entitles landlords to increase rent by PERCENT once DATE from DATE ( sections CARDINAL to CARDINAL ) .

Pursuant to section CARDINAL ) to ( CARDINAL ) , tenants who received notice under the above provisions are entitled to substitute accommodation subject to them ( i ) submitting a claim in compliance with the provisions of LAW no . GPE and ( ii ) being in “ material need ” of housing , namely where they or persons sharing their household do not own an appropriate flat within the boundaries of the same municipality or district and where it is justified by their financial situation .

Subsections ( CARDINAL ) to ( CARDINAL ) of LAW define the substitute accommodation to be made available , namely rental flats in the same municipality comprising of CARDINAL room for a single tenant , CARDINAL rooms for CARDINAL tenants , CARDINAL rooms for CARDINAL tenants , and CARDINAL rooms for CARDINAL or more individuals .

Persons applying for substitute accommodation must submit a declaration of their property and indicate its overall value ( section CARDINAL ) . Applications must also indicate the particulars of the tenants and persons living with them , including their date of birth , family status , identity card number and address . They must also comprise the claimants’ consent to the data contained therein being processed and published in conformity with ORG ( section CARDINAL) .

A municipality ’s decision on a request for substitute accommodation is reviewable by the courts ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ) .

Under section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) , municipalities keep lists of persons applying for substitute accommodation . The lists are public and to be made accessible on public noticeboards and , where available , websites of the municipalities .

Section CARDINAL obliges municipalities to provide successful claimants with substitute accommodation by DATE , or else they must pay the flat owners the difference between the free market rent and regulated rent .

Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL governs the funding of flats in which substitute accommodation is to be provided .

Section CARDINAL defines the size of such flats and how they should be equipped . Their surface area may not exceed QUANTITY in singleroom flats and QUANTITY in CARDINAL - room flats . Standards are set as regards heating , personal hygiene facilities and kitchen equipment .

The aim of the LAW has been , among other things , to protect individuals against an unjustified interference with their private life in the processing of their personal data ( section CARDINAL(a ) ) . It sets out in detail the requirements for personal data to be obtained and processed with or without the consent of the person concerned , and its storage and destruction . Those intending to publish personal data must not interfere in an unjustified manner with the personal rights and privacy of those concerned ( section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) ) .

The Act further entitles those concerned to obtain information as regards the storage and processing of their personal data , and request redress where appropriate . If they consider the relevant legal provisions to have been disregarded , they are entitled to apply to ORG , which may order any shortcomings found to be remedied and sanction those liable . Its decisions in that regard are reviewable by the courts .

The website of the GPE municipality contains , among other things , lists of persons whose claims for a rental flat , within the meaning of PERSON no . CARDINAL , have been granted by a final decision . Separate lists are kept according to the number of rooms to which claimants are entitled . They indicate the first name , surname and address of those concerned .

The website further contains guidelines explaining the procedure under PERSON no . GPE and forms which persons claiming substitute accommodation are required to complete . These comprise a claim form setting out the particulars of the claimant and persons living with him or her , information about the flat to be vacated and an indication whether the claimant and/or persons living with him or her have their own flat elsewhere .

Claim forms are to be accompanied by a declaration of property pursuant to section CARDINAL of Law no . CARDINAL . The claimant and persons concerned have to provide full details of their immovable property and its value . They are further required to declare any movable property exceeding QUANTITY in value .

In addition , those concerned have to confirm in writing that they voluntarily consent to the above data being processed , in accordance with LAW , by the municipality concerned , for the purposes of and to the extent that it is necessary for the decision on their claim for substitute accommodation , the granting of such accommodation and verification of the information submitted . The validity of the consent is expressly limited to the duration of the examination of the claim or , as the case may be , conclusion of a tenancy agreement in respect of a substitute flat .

NORP The GPE municipality also publishes on its website lists of persons to whom municipal flats have been allocated outside the procedure set out in PERSON no . CARDINAL . They contain the first name and surname of persons to whom a municipal flat has been rented and its size . The accompanying comment indicates that the information has been made public with a view to increasing the control and involvement of the public in municipal life .

Lists of persons whose claims for a rental flat within the meaning of PERSON no . CARDINAL have been granted , similar to those described in paragraph CARDINAL above , are published on the websites of other municipalities , for example PERSON , PERSON and PERSON .

Information about relevant international documents and comparative law in respect of housing policies is set out in the case of ORG and Others v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL - CARDINAL - CARDINAL , DATE ) .

On DATE ORG of ORG ( Grand Chamber ) delivered a judgment in joined cases C-CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CCARDINAL/CARDINAL ( PERSON und PERSON and PERSON ) , which concerned the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data . It held that , by requiring publication of the names of all natural persons who were beneficiaries of aid from agricultural funds and the exact amounts received by them , ORG and ORG had “ exceeded the limits which compliance with the principle of proportionality ORG ] ” .


No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);No violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Deprivation of property;Article 1 para. 2 of Protocol No. 1 - Control of the use of property)

Elisabeth Steiner;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

NORP In DATE the applicant ’s grandmother ORG privatised ( bought on favourable terms from the public authorities ) an apartment at CARDINAL NORP Street in GPE . In DATE she gave the apartment to the applicant , who was represented by her mother ORG in the transaction .

On DATE Zh . signed a power of attorney , witnessed by a notary , whereby he authorised ORG to sell his apartment at CARDINAL FAC in GPE . On DATE N. , acting on behalf of Zh . , sold the apartment to her daughter PERSON For LOC . , ORG bought an apartment in the countryside worth about a twentieth of the value of the apartment at FAC .

It appears that on DATE PERSON asked the social security service of the local municipality to approve the sale of the then DATE applicant ’s apartment at CARDINAL FAC . She submitted that she had bought another apartment at CARDINAL FAC by means of a loan . She wished to pay back the loan with the money to be received from the sale of her daughter ’s apartment and give the newly acquired apartment to her daughter . It appears that the approval was granted by the social security service and the apartment at FAC was sold . On DATE PERSON gave the apartment at FAC to the applicant , while PERSON herself acted as the applicant ’s legal representative in the transaction .

NORP On different dates several sets of criminal investigations into the circumstances of the sale of several apartments by various persons , including Zh . , were initiated . The persons concerned had sold their apartments in GPE and in some cases acquired cheaper apartments in rural areas . For various reasons , such as mental health problems or alcohol abuse , these individuals had had difficulties in understanding the true nature of their transactions . Some of the individuals in question died soon after the transactions . Thus , Zh . died on DATE of ethylene glycol poisoning . Criminal investigations into these deaths were also opened .

In the meantime , on DATE , an investigator ordered the attachment of the apartment at CARDINAL FAC . The attachment order was quashed on DATE and the criminal proceedings concerning the apartment at FAC were discontinued on DATE .

In DATE a fresh criminal investigation was opened in respect of transactions concerning an apartment , and several other sets of criminal proceedings which had been discontinued in the meantime were reopened and joined to the criminal case . On DATE ORG remanded N. in custody .

On DATE ORG attached at the prosecutor ’s request CARDINAL apartments , including the CARDINAL at CARDINAL FAC . ORG noted that the apartment at FAC had been acquired by ORG and ORG , whereas ORG had been registered as its owner immediately after the apartment had been obtained fraudulently from Zh . The court found that there was reason to believe that with the aim of avoiding transfer of the property it was deliberately registered in the name of the applicant , although its actual owner was PERSON The court noted that the apartments had to be attached in order to ensure the protection of the interests of the victims and to prevent them from being sold . In ordering the attachment of the apartments the court relied on LAW seadustik ) , and on LAW ( Karistusseadustik ) . The court added that in this case it could be suspected that the financial means of the suspects derived from crime , and therefore a possible outcome was confiscation of the property as received through crime ; securing the confiscation by any other measure than attachment was not possible . In accordance with ORG decision copies of the decision were to be sent to ORG and the applicant for information . The copy of the decision on file bears PERSON ’s signature next to a notice that she had received a copy of it . It was noted in the decision that an appeal against it could be lodged within DATE .

On DATE the applicant was interviewed as a witness . She said that she did not remember the details of the purchase of the apartment at FAC , as she was still a young child in DATE . She further said that she and her mother had sold the apartment at CARDINAL FAC , and the apartment at FAC had been bought with the money received . She affirmed that she knew that the apartment was in her name but she had never lived there , it was undergoing repair , and her mother was paying for the apartment .

On DATE ORG approved the statement of charges and on DATE N. and ORG , with CARDINAL others , were committed for trial by ORG . N. was charged with a number of offences , including the murder of Zh . and the attempted murder of another person , as well as several counts of fraud . PERSON was charged with several counts of fraud and aiding and abetting an attempted murder .

On DATE the applicant reached DATE .

The episode concerning the apartment at FAC was dealt with at several hearings . In particular , at the hearing on DATE the accused ORG submitted that the apartment at FAC had been meant for the applicant from the very beginning , but as she was a child at the time she had not been told any details . The deed of gift had been drawn up after the applicant ’s apartment at CARDINAL NORP Street had been sold and ORG had paid her debt . ORG gave explanations about the origin of the money allegedly paid by N. to Zh . for the apartment .

At the hearing on DATE the accused ORG gave statements about the origin of the money with which the apartment had allegedly been bought . She submitted that she had received permission from the social security service to sell her daughter ’s ( the applicant ’s ) apartment at CARDINAL FAC and to buy her the apartment at FAC .

At the hearing on DATE PERSON ’s counsel noted that , as concerned the apartment belonging to the applicant , Article QUANTITY of LAW was applied only if the property had been acquired completely or in substance on account of the actions of the offender as a gift , emphasising that confiscation would not necessarily be applied if it would be unreasonably burdensome on the person . When the deed of gift was drawn up the applicant was still a minor ; confiscation would therefore be unjustified .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE N. and ORG were convicted as charged . PERSON was sentenced to DATE and PERSON to DATE imprisonment . In respect of the transactions related to the apartment at CARDINAL FAC , ORG established , relying on a psychiatric expert opinion , that Zh . , who had been suffering from paranoid schizophrenia , had not understood the meaning of his actions when he signed the power of attorney for the sale of the apartment . Zh . had died by the time of the court hearing , but according to the statements he made during the preliminary investigation ORG had promised to pay him for the apartment and also to buy him another apartment . She had told him to sign a confirmation that he had received the money , but in fact he had got no money . The court found implausible the allegation of the accused , supported by ORG husband , that ORG had borrowed some of the money to pay for the apartment from ORG husband , who had sold his apartment DATE before and kept the cash at home . It noted that according to ORG the money from the sale of her husband ’s apartment had been used to buy yet another apartment . The court also noted that ORG had been unable to explain the origin of DATE of the money allegedly paid to Zh . for the apartment at FAC , and established that Zh . had received no money . Relying on Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW , the court ordered the confiscation of the apartment at CARDINAL FAC , belonging to the applicant , as property obtained through crime committed against Zh . The court noted that the apartment had been transferred from Zh . ’s ownership against his will , and that the applicant , who was DATE in DATE , could not have been a bona fide acquirer , because the transaction had been concluded by her mother ORG on her behalf . The transaction had been concluded DATE after the purchase of the apartment in order to prevent it from being confiscated .

V. and ORG appealed . ORG argued , inter alia , that the apartment at CARDINAL FAC belonged to the applicant . In order to buy the apartment , another apartment at CARDINAL NORP Street had been sold , with the approval of the social security service . Thus , the apartment at FAC had not been obtained through crime and it was not subject to confiscation .

By a judgment of DATE ORG dismissed the appeals . In respect of the confiscation of the applicant ’s apartment at FAC , ORG noted that she had obtained the apartment when she was a minor , and was not capable of understanding the transaction at the time . The apartment had been the object of the commission of an offence ( a fraud ) by the accused , and was liable to be confiscated under ORG CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL - CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Penal Code . ORG noted that the apartment had not been obtained legally but on account of the actions of the offenders ORG and ORG

On DATE ORG decided not to examine the appeals lodged by ORG ’s and ORG ’s counsel , and the lower courts’ judgments became final .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Positive obligations) (Procedural aspect)

Aleš Pejchal;André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Ganna Yudkivska;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On TIME CARDINAL DATE , the applicant , who was DATE pregnant and was returning home from work , was attacked by CARDINAL men , TIME , PERSON and PERSON They pulled her into a car , drove to a remote location and raped her one after the other .

NORP Immediately after the incident , the applicant went to ORG . The police arrested the CARDINAL men at TIME . They remained in custody following an investigating judge ’s order . They were released from custody on DATE . The applicant was taken to ORG to be medically examined .

On DATE the police lodged a criminal complaint against TIME , PERSON and PERSON accusing them of rape . DATE , ORG asked the investigating judge of ORG to open an investigation .

During the investigation , CARDINAL reports concerning the examination of the crime scene were prepared , and the CARDINAL accused men and witnesses were heard by the investigating judge . PERSON and PERSON admitted to having had sex with the applicant , but denied that any force had been used . TIME denied having had sex with the applicant .

On DATE TIME , ORG and PERSON were charged with aggravated rape under LAW . The proceedings that followed were conducted in secrecy in order to protect the private lives of those involved .

The first trial hearing was scheduled for DATE . However , it was adjourned due to the absence of TIME and N.T. Another hearing to be held on DATE was adjourned because it had proved impossible to serve a court order on PERSON In this connection , the Government pointed out that all CARDINAL men had been born outside the territory of GPE and were GPE . At the time of the incident , CARDINAL of them ( TIME resided in GPE , while the third ( PERSON ) resided in another part of what was then GPE .

On DATE , an order for detention pending trial was issued against PERSON because he was considered to pose a flight risk . However , he could not be found and went missing . Therefore , an arrest warrant was issued against him on CARDINAL DATE , which could not , however , be executed . In DATE , the court conducted inquiries as to the whereabouts of all CARDINAL defendants and established the places of residence of TIME , but not that of PERSON A hearing on DATE was adjourned due to the absence of DATE ’s defence counsel . As his whereabouts could not be established , on CARDINAL DATE the charges against PERSON were severed into a separate case .

N.T. could not be found and brought to trial in DATE , so an international arrest warrant was issued against him in DATE . However , his whereabouts remained unknown and the charges against him were dropped on DATE . The international arrest warrant was revoked on DATE .

The main hearing in the case against TIME on DATE and continued on DATE and DATE , DATE and DATE . CARDINAL other hearings were scheduled DATE and DATE , though they were all postponed , mainly due to the absence of the defendants or of their counsel . From DATE onwards , a number of steps were taken in order to ensure the presence at trial of GPE , who had apparently been absent from GPE for some time . At DATE , the presiding judge proposed that he be placed in detention to prevent him failing to appear at court for hearings , but the extrajudicial panel rejected this proposal , ordering that less severe measures , such as bringing him to hearings by force , should be envisaged first .

On DATE ORG , who was then DATE , died . On DATE the part of the case concerning the charges against him was severed from the ongoing proceedings .

ORG held hearings on DATE and on DATE . The court , amongst other things , heard DATE , the applicant , her husband and CARDINAL other witnesses , read out the statements given by PERSON and PERSON earlier in the proceedings , and looked into the applicant ’s medical reports , the record of the examination of the scene of the crime , the record of the examination of TIME ’s car and a variety of other documents .

On DATE the court issued a judgment finding TIME guilty of the criminal offence of aggravated rape . He was sentenced to CARDINAL - and - a - half years in prison . When setting the sentence , which was below the minimum DATE sentence prescribed by law , the court referred to the significant lapse of time from the commission of the crime . It noted that the reasons for the delays in the proceedings had been predominantly caused by the behaviour of ORG and PERSON

Following an appeal by DATE , on DATE ORG quashed the judgment and remitted the case for re - examination . It instructed ORG to examine whether TIME had committed the criminal offence in question or had only attempted to commit it , and whether he had previously known the applicant , which might have raised doubts as to her credibility .

On DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE , the court held hearings at which it heard the applicant and a number of witnesses . On DATE , ORG issued a judgment finding TIME guilty of aggravated rape under LAW . It sentenced him to CARDINAL - and - a - half years in prison , referring to the extreme amount of time that had passed since the commission of the offence .

Following a further appeal by TIME , on DATE ORG further reduced his sentence to DATE in prison , referring to the passage of time , TIME ’s young age ( namely DATE ) at the time of the event , the fact that he had not been later convicted of any other criminal offence , his deteriorating health and the fact that he had a minor child . It upheld the reminder of ORG judgment .

A.M. submitted an appeal on points of law ( a request for the protection of legality ) , which was rejected by ORG on DATE .

Meanwhile , on DATE the applicant had instituted civil proceedings against CARDINAL seeking damages in the amount of MONEY ( ORG ) for non - pecuniary damage suffered as result of the rape which had been established by the final criminal judgment .

On DATE the court issued a default judgment . On CARDINAL DATE TIME appealed , arguing that he had not been duly summoned to appear . A hearing was held on DATE . On DATE the court granted reinstatement and summoned the parties to appear at a hearing on DATE . However , this hearing was adjourned until CARDINAL DATE at the request of the defendant ’s counsel . On that date the parties reached a court settlement by which TIME was to pay ORG CARDINAL ( by means of a number of instalments ) to the applicant . The civil case was consequently concluded . The applicant alleged that she has not received any compensation to date .


Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - award

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Guido Raimondi;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Nebojša Vučinić;Robert Spano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

In a decision of CARDINAL DATE , which became final on DATE , ORG ( GPE ) authorised the applicant , who was then single , to adopt a child , PERSON , born on DATE to PERSON

Consequently , under LAW and CARDINAL of LAW ( no . DATE ) , “ PERSON ” was registered as the surname of PERSON in the register of births and on the child ’s identity documents . However , the registrar refused to indicate the applicant ’s forename under the heading “ mother ” , where the name “ S. ” was retained , this being the forename of the child ’s biological mother .

On DATE the applicant applied to ORG seeking the replacement of the forename “ S. ” by her own . In her view , the fact that her forename had not been given as that of the mother of her adopted son was both discriminatory and unconstitutional , likely to undermine their personal , family and social development , and thus constituting a violation of , among other provisions , Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Convention . She argued that in relation to single - parent adoptions there was a lacuna in LAW which required the court to make provision for such a situation of its own motion , pursuant to LAW or , failing that , to request a preliminary ruling of ORG .

On DATE the court dismissed the applicant ’s request on the ground that it had no legal basis . It found that LAW , in choosing to regulate only CARDINAL - parent adoptions – those granted to a couple jointly – , intended to treat the legal relationship between the adoptive parents and the adopted child as “ a biological relationship ” , which was not possible in the case of single - parent adoptions , where either a mother or a father was absent . Thus the legal situation obtaining in the present case could not be regarded as unconstitutional .

On DATE the applicant appealed on points of law .

On DATE , when those proceedings were still pending , a new regulation entered into force entitled “ Regulation on the implementation of mediation services for the adoption of minors ” ( “ the Regulation ” ) , enabling a single adoptive parent to have his or her forename registered in the place of that of the biological parent ...

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of the court below in a judgment which made no mention of the legislative reform .

On DATE the applicant was notified of that judgment .

NORP On DATE she applied to the registry office for the registration of her forename as that of the mother of PERSON , relying on LAW of the new ORG . That request was granted on DATE and the record entries concerning the child were consequently amended with immediate effect .


Carlo Ranzoni;Ganna Yudkivska;Iulia Motoc;Marko Bošnjak;Georges Ravarani

NORP The applicant in application no . CARDINAL , Mr PERSON ( hereinafter “ the first applicant ” ) , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by Mr A. ORG , a lawyer practising in GPE .

The applicants in application no . CARDINAL , Mr PERSON and Ms Hajnalka Balláné Gál ( hereinafter “ the second and third applicant ” ) , are NORP nationals who were born in DATE and live in GPE .

The applicants were employed as civil servants , notably as an associate professor of administrative law at ORG and ORG ( as regards the first applicant ) , and as associate professors at ORG ( as regards the second and third applicants ) .

On a date not specified in the application , the applicants started receiving old - age pensions . It was disbursed to them alongside their salaries until DATE .

On DATE an amendment to Act no . LXXXI of DATE on ORG ( hereinafter “ the DATE LAW ” ) entered into force , pursuant to which the disbursement of those old - age pensions whose beneficiaries were simultaneously employed in certain categories within the civil service would be suspended from DATE for the duration of their employment .

A number of categories of persons in ORG employment were , however , exempted from the suspension of pension payments , such as members of ORG and mayors , as well as persons employed in the public sector under the rules of LAW ( see GPE v. GPE [ ORG ] , no . CARDINAL , § DATE , CARDINAL DATE ) . Judges and prosecutors appointed to a stand - by post pursuant to Act no . XX of DATE ( see PERSON GPE [ ORG ] , no . CARDINAL , § CARDINAL , ECHR DATE ) were also exempted from the prohibition on double compensation ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Although the suspension of pension payments also applied to health - care employees , given the importance of that sector their suspended pension payment could be compensated upon the decision of their employer by means of a salary supplement ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

As of DATE , the disbursement of the applicants’ pension was suspended .

Partly following an application by the ORG , ORG embarked on the review of the impugned legislation ’s constitutionality ( see ORG , cited above , LAW ) .

On DATE ORG found , in essence , that the rules concerning the ban on simultaneous receipt of a State pension and a salary struck a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual ’s fundamental rights ; they therefore did not violate LAW enshrining the protection of property .

It further held that old - age pensioners employed , respectively , in the public and in the private sector were not in an analogous or relevantly similar situation . As regards the categories of public servants exempt from the ban on dual payment of ORG pensions and salaries ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , ORG was of the view that the exception at issue was based on an objective and reasonable justification , notably on their specific legal status . Accordingly , the impugned legislation did not violate LAW enshrining the prohibition of discrimination ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

Several elements of the relevant domestic law and practice as well as comparative - law material were set out in DATE of the ORG judgment ( cited above ) .

DATE ( that is to say , its taking effect ) and DATE , section CARDINAL/C of the DATE LAW read as follows ( italics added ) :

“ ( CARDINAL ) The disbursement of an old - age pension shall be suspended ... if the pensioner concerned is employed as a civil servant , a government official , a senior ORG official , a public servant , a judge , an officer of the court , an officer of the prosecutor ’s office , a professional member of an armed service , or a professional member or contractor of ORG . ”

As of DATE , section CARDINAL of LAW was amended by Act no . XX of DATE as follows ( see ORG , cited above , § CARDINAL ; italics added ) :

“ ( CARDINAL ) The disbursement of an old - age pension shall be suspended ... if the pensioner concerned is employed as a civil servant , a government official , a senior ORG official , a public official , an official in charge of public - service administration , a judge , an officer of the court , an officer of the prosecutor ’s office , a professional member of an armed service , or a professional member or contractor of ORG . ”

Section CARDINAL/J of LAW ( not quoted in GPE , cited above ) provides as follows :

“ ... [ S]ections DATE and CARDINAL/I are not applicable , as from the entry into LAW no . ORG ... until DATE , to judges and prosecutors appointed to a stand - by post ... ” .

Act LXXXIV of DATE on Certain Questions Related to the Exercise of Health - care Activity , as amended on DATE , provides as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) An employer may award a salary supplement ... to health - care employees who are employed as civil servants or who are in a ORG or ORG - service relationship ; and the disbursement of whose [ old - age pension ] is suspended pursuant to section CARDINAL/C of the [ DATE LAW ] ... .

( CARDINAL ) The ... net amount of the salary supplement awarded by the employer can not exceed the [ suspended amount of the old - age pension ] . ”

NORP The legal status of members of parliament is governed by LAW no . ORG of DATE on ORG ( hereinafter “ the Parliament Act ” ) .

In so far as relevant , LAW provides as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) Members of parliament shall have equal rights and obligations , they shall perform their activities in the public interest , and they shall not be given instructions in that respect . ”

The Parliament Act provides , in particular :

“ ( CARDINAL ) The term of office of members of parliament ... shall be considered , for social - security purposes , employment with a working time of TIME per week and a service period giving rise to a pension entitlement . For the calculation of a service period as a Government official , ORG official , public servant , civil servant , judge or prosecutor , the duration of the above - mentioned employment shall be counted as service time spent in the relevant legal relationship . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) Members of parliament are entitled , from their swearing - in until the end of their term of office , to a DATE honorarium , the amount of which equals the salary ... of a deputy ORG secretary , as it is regulated by LAW . ”

The legal status of mayors , deputy mayors , presidents and vice - presidents of county assemblies is regulated by LAW no . ORG of DATE on Public Servants ( hereinafter “ LAW ” ) , which contains the following passages :

“ ( CARDINAL ) The employment relationship of full - time mayors is a special public service relationship established between the body of local representatives and the mayor , [ in principle ] ... on the strength of [ the latter ’s ] election . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) The term of office of full - time mayors shall be calculated as the service period spent in public service , Government service or armed service and shall give rise to a pension entitlement . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) If this LAW does not stipulate otherwise , any reference to mayors shall be construed as including deputy mayors , presidents and vice - presidents of county assemblies , and the mayor and deputy mayors of GPE . ”

Mayors and local representatives ( including members of county assemblies ) are elected in accordance with the rules laid down in Act no . L of DATE on ORG . Presidents of county assemblies are elected by the assemblies themselves from among their members , in accordance with LAW of LAW . Deputy mayors and vice - presidents of county assemblies are also elected by the respective body of local representatives from among their members , in accordance with LAW no . FAC of DATE on ORG .

LAW no . CLI of DATE ) provides as follows :

“ Members of the Constitutional Court shall be independent , subordinated only to LAW . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) Under their term of office and for the purposes of entitlement to social - security benefits , members of the Constitutional Court shall be considered insured employees in public service , and their salary shall be considered income from an activity other than self - employment , comprising part of the contribution base . The term of office of members of the Constitutional Court shall be considered to be the time spent in public - service employment . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) Members of the Constitutional Court shall not be held accountable in court or by other authorities during or after their term of office for the activities carried out or statements of fact or opinion made while exercising the competences of ORG as defined in LAW and in this LAW , and no proceedings shall be initiated against ORG for such statements of fact or opinion in court or before other authorities . This exemption shall not cover abuse of information classified top secret or secret , libel , defamation and the civil law liability of Members of ORG . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) This Act shall be considered a LAW pursuant to LAW . ”

In connection with persons employed in the public service under the rules of LAW , LAW provides as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) For tasks directly related to the exercise of public powers and powers of guidance , inspection and supervision of a public - service institution , as well as for administrative tasks , persons may be employed only as Government officials or public servants .

( CARDINAL ) ORG contract for services , works contract or [ ordinary labour - law ] employment contract may be concluded for the completion of a task which shall exclusively be exercised by a person appointed as a Government official or public servant .

( CARDINAL ) The proportion of persons ... employed by a public - service institution [ under LAW ] in DATE ... shall not exceed PERCENT of the average yearly staff number . ...

( CARDINAL ) The rules contained in subsections ( CARDINAL ) to ( CARDINAL ) above do not apply to ORG and to ORG .

( CARDINAL ) As an exception to the rule contained in subsection ( CARDINAL ) above , procedural tasks at diplomatic or consular representations ... may also be carried out by individuals other than Government officials or public servants . ”

The Constitutional Court ’s decision of DATE ( decision no . CARDINAL . ( X. CARDINAL . ) ORG , see paragraph CARDINAL above ) contains the following passages concerning the allegedly unjustified difference in treatment between pensioners employed in different categories within the public sector :

“ CARDINAL . It is apparent from the [ impugned ] rules of [ LAW ] that they do not apply to every person in State service but only to persons falling under the scope of specific legislative acts governing the status of certain categories of public servants .

For example , they do not apply to certain elected officials or to those who are employed [ under the rules of LAW ] , even if the employer is a budgetary institution . Although the rules could be extended to cover every position and every public servant , the exceptions are reasonably justified , on the one hand , by the fact that they are related to passive electoral rights and , on the other hand , by the specific legal status of certain appointed officials ( section CARDINAL/J [ of LAW ] ) .

[ Taking into account ] the efforts to balance the pension system , the difference in treatment in question has a perceivable , objective and reasonable justification . Therefore it does not violate LAW . ”


Egidijus Kūris;Ganna Yudkivska;Iulia Motoc;Marko Bošnjak;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Georges Ravarani

NORP The applicant in the first case , PERSON ( the first applicant ) , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . She was represented before the ORG by Mr D. Lázár , a lawyer practising in GPE .

NORP The applicant in the second case , Mr László Vidovics ( the second applicant ) , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the ORG also by PERSON , acting in that case on behalf ORG , a consumer protection association .

The facts of the cases , as submitted by the applicants , may be summarised as follows .

In DATE both applicants took out mortgages from NORP commercial / mortgage banks . Their loan agreements were denominated in GPE . According to the terms of the agreements , the applicants were to bear the risk of any exchange rate fluctuations between the NORP forint and MONEY .

The first applicant submitted that her loan agreement had not contained all the information required by law , to be exact , that provisions on a particular cost element , namely that of “ currency spreads ” ( the practice of applying the “ sell rate ” when granting the loan and the “ buy rate ” for repayment ) were not indicated . Furthermore , no proper reasons had been given in the agreement to justify any unilateral modifications of the costs collected by the banks . She contended that her loan agreement had been invalid because , owing to the above - mentioned defects , it conflicted with mandatory provisions of NORP law that had been in force at the time of signing .

NORP In DATE the first applicant initiated civil proceedings against the banks , urging the court to declare her loan agreements invalid for the reasons stated above . According to the information provided by the applicant , the proceedings are suspended .

Simultaneously , several debtors of foreign - currency - based consumer loan agreements lodged similar actions in GPE . Due to the large number of those court cases , the GPE decided to deliver a uniformity decision in respect of the issues concerning such agreements . In its ORG no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL of DATE , it adopted a position on the unfairness of certain clauses of such consumer loan contracts . It held that the fact that , in such situations , the debtor bore the risk of currency fluctuations ( in exchange for the favourable interest rates obtained ) did not , in itself , make the agreements invalid . The unfairness of such contractual terms could be assessed and established only if the information provided by the bank on the nature of that risk was unintelligible for the average consumer . It also held that currency spreads , as provided for in the contracts , were invalid . Moreover , clauses enabling the unilateral amendment of the contracts were also invalid unless those clauses complied with certain principles laid down in the earlier no . CARDINAL ( PERSON ) Uniformity Decision of the GPE .

NORP In order to ensure that the principles laid down in the GPE ’s Uniformity Decision could be enforced directly , not only in pending litigations but also in connection with potential , non - litigated claims concerning consumer loan contracts , ORG then adopted CARDINAL pieces of legislation . Those statutes were enacted also to ensure that all foreign - currency - based loan agreements were converted into NORP forints and that settlements between the consumer and the financial institution – in respect of unlawfully collected sums from currency spreads and costs that arose from unilateral amendments – were implemented in accordance with the guidance of the GPE and with pending court actions being meanwhile put on hold .

NORP In particular , Act no . XXXVIII of DATE on the resolution of questions relating to the uniformity decision of the GPE regarding consumer loan agreements drawn up by financial institutions ( “ LAW ” – see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , which entered into force on DATE , provided that currency spreads constituted invalid contractual provisions . Moreover , that there was a presumption – to be potentially refuted by the banks in separate proceedings – that clauses enabling the unilateral amendment of the contract were also invalid . This legislation prescribed that pending proceedings in respect of consumer loan agreements were to be suspended until the measures provided for in the other CARDINAL relevant pieces of legislation had been taken .

Act no . XL of DATE on the rules of settlement laid down in LAW ( “ LAW ” – see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , which entered into force on DATE , provided , among other things , that if a claimant wished to pursue his or her claim against the financial institution in court , he or she needed to complete the claim by itemising and quantifying the consequences of the alleged invalidity of the contract , otherwise the case would be discontinued except for those claims that related to issues not covered by LAW .

Act no . ORG of DATE on change of the currency of consumer loan agreements denominated in foreign currency ( “ LAW ” – see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , which entered into force on DATE , provided that all foreign - currency - based loan agreements were to be converted into NORP - forint - based loans , using a defined exchange rate .

The first applicant lodged complaints with ORG , claiming that certain provisions of LAW had violated her right to a fair trial . She argued that ORG had intervened in private - law matters by adopting the impugned legislation and that this contravened the democratic principle of separation of powers . On DATE ORG rejected the complaint , without an examination on the merits , holding that it lacked relevant reasoning and as such , was not eligible for a decision .

The first applicant ’s pending action against the banks was suspended under LAW ; and on DATE she was invited by the court to supplement her statement of claim in accordance with LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . She lodged another constitutional complaint , arguing that the court ’s decision and LAW on which it was based were unconstitutional . On DATE ORG rejected the complaint , without an examination on the merits , holding that it concerned an interim decision rather than a final judgment and , as such , was not eligible for constitutional review .

The second applicant lodged a complaint with ORG on DATE , claiming that certain provisions of LAW those in respect of the conversion of foreign currency into NORP forints using a defined exchange rate – were unconstitutional . He argued that ORG had intervened in private - law matters .

On DATE , after due examination of the merits of CARDINAL of similar complaints , ORG dismissed the second applicant ’s complaint . It stated that the aims of LAW were to eliminate the continuous risk arising from exchange - rate fluctuations and to ensure that the loan agreements could remain in force between the parties . Those aims were in the interests of both debtors , such as the applicants , and creditors with stakes in the financial institutions . It held that when ORG – in the light of the critically changed situation which had occurred after the execution of the relevant loan agreements ( namely the unexpected and dramatic devaluation of the NORP forint vis - à - vis MONEY ) – had modified the contractual terms ordering the conversion of the agreements , it had acted in the common interest of society , taking into due consideration the interest of consumers as well . The interference was thus proportionate and necessary in a NORP society . Furthermore , ORG held that there was no connection between the challenged provisions of LAW and the right to a fair trial , because the challenged provisions ( namely the conversion of loans from foreigncurrency - based loans into LANGUAGE - forint loans at a defined exchange rate ) had no impact on the pending actions regarding the alleged invalidity of the loan agreements .

The relevant provisions of LAW read as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) With the exception of contract terms which have been individually negotiated , any term in a consumer loan agreement where the buying rate stipulated by the financial institution for the granting of the loan ... differs from the selling rate or from the rate ... for the purposes of repayment shall be deemed null and void .

( CARDINAL ) The annulled term referred to in subsection ( CARDINAL ) shall be replaced ... by a provision for the application of the official exchange rate of ORG ...

( CARDINAL ) The financial institution shall settle accounts with the consumer as provided for in another statute . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) As regards consumer loan agreements allowing for the possibility to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally , any term DATE with the exception of contract terms which have been individually negotiated DATE that creates a right to increase the interest rate and other costs and fees unilaterally is deemed to be unfair , given that it does not comply with :

a ) the principle of clear and intelligible wording , where the term in question is neither plain nor understandable for the consumer ;

b ) the principle of detailed specification , where the conditions for amending the terms of the contract unilaterally are not specified in detail , that is to say the reasons are not listed , or the reasons supplied are merely indicative ;

c ) the principle of objectivity , where the conditions for amending the terms of the contract unilaterally lack objectivity , that is to say the party with whom the consumer is entering into a contract is able to cause such conditions to occur , and has the power to incite such conditions and to influence the extent of any change that may serve as grounds for substantiating the amendment ;

d ) the principle of effectiveness and proportionality , where the circumstances specified in the list of reasons do not effectively or proportionally influence the interest , costs and/or fees ;

e ) the principle of transparency , where the consumer was not in a position to foresee what additional burdens would be passed on to him , nor the extent and reasons for such changes ;

f ) the principle of withdrawability , where the consumer does not have the right to withdraw from the contract if it is amended ; or

g ) the principle of symmetry , where the contract does not allow any change in the conditions that may occur to the consumer ’s benefit to take effect for the consumer ’s benefit .

( CARDINAL ) The contract term referred to in subsection ( CARDINAL ) hereof shall be deemed null and void if the financial institution has failed to lodge a civil action ... or if the court dismisses the action or terminates the proceedings ... ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) ... The court shall ex officio suspend , until the measure provided for in other specific legislation has been taken , at the latest until DATE , proceedings in respect of lawsuits having as their object , in part or in whole , the contract terms referred to in [ this LAW ] , or proceedings instituted by a financial institution against a consumer for the enforcement of a claim based , inter alia , on such contract term . The court may decide on the suspension of proceedings without a formal hearing . As regards the suspension of proceedings , the provisions of LAW shall apply mutatis mutandis , with the proviso that the court ruling ordering the suspension of proceedings shall not be amenable to appeal .

( CARDINAL ) ... The court shall also ex officio suspend , until the measure provided for in other specific legislation has been taken , at the latest until DATE , proceedings in respect of lawsuits having as their object , in part or in whole , the contract terms referred to in [ this LAW ] , or proceedings instituted by a financial institution against a consumer for the enforcement of a claim based , inter alia , on such contract term , if the ... contract term ... figures in a ... consumer loan contract ... ”

The explanatory memorandum attached to LAW contains the following passage :

“ In order to ensure that those principles are enforced directly , the present LAW codifies the principles laid down in the GPE ’s Uniformity Decision . The LAW makes the PERSON ’s interpretation applicable to everyone . It does not create any new substantive laws or new principles in respect of consumer loan and leasing agreements , but purely codifies the interpretation of the GPE . This is to ensure that a high number of consumers avoid lengthy and costly litigation that would , in any event , overburden the judicial system . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) In respects of contracts to which the present legislation applies , a party may apply to the court – irrespective of the reason for the alleged invalidity DATE seeking annulment of the contract or of certain terms of the contract ( partial annulment ) only if the application also includes details of the claims in respect of the consequences of annulment , such as treating the contracts as if they were valid until the date of the court ’s judgment . In the absence thereof or if a request for supplementing the statement of claim is unsuccessful , the claim shall not be decided on the merits . If the party requests the court to establish the consequences of full or partial annulment , he shall also indicate the type of legal consequence to be applied . In respect of the consequences , the party shall apply to the court with a defined request , indicating the requested sums and the settlement between the parties .

( CARDINAL ) Under subsection ( CARDINAL ) above ... if the conditions set out in this LAW are met , in proceedings instituted for the establishment of the full or partial annulment of a contract that are still pending , the statement of claim shall be rejected without examination on the merits or the proceedings shall be terminated . The court shall not dismiss the statement of claim without examination on the merits or terminate the proceedings if the party has further claims pending , apart from the one seeking full or partial annulment of the contract . In this case , the proceedings shall be continued only in respect of this further claim . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) Consumer loan agreements shall be amended in accordance with this LAW . ”

“ The financial institution that is the creditor of the foreign - currency - based consumer loan agreement shall convert ... the full debt arising out of the foreign - currency - based loan agreement DATE including the interest , fees and costs accrued in foreign currency – into NORP forints using the exchange rate that is more favourable to the debtor between

a ) the average exchange rate applied by ORG DATE and DATE , or

b ) the exchange rate applied by ORG on DATE . ”


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 14+8 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for private life;Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Helen Keller;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant was born in DATE in ORG and lives in PERSON , in the GPE of PERSON .

After originally training to be a hairdresser the applicant took up DATE work as a shop assistant . In DATE she was forced to stop work owing to back trouble .

On DATE the applicant applied to ORG of the GPE of PERSON ( “ the Office ” ) for a disability benefit on account of her lower back and spinal pain .

On DATE she gave birth to twins . Her back pain had worsened further during the pregnancy .

On DATE the ORG carried out a household assessment ( GPE ) at the applicant ’s home , during which the applicant stated

( i ) that she suffered from constant back pain which often extended down to her left foot ; that she had particular difficulty standing in the same place for any length of time and could not remain seated for TIME ; that she could walk for TIME , but not on a DATE basis ; and that the pain became worse when she was carrying the children ;

( ii ) that she would have to work half - time for financial reasons since her husband ’s net salary was MONEY ( CHF ) ( MONEY ( ORG ) ) .

The report on the assessment concluded that the applicant ’s capacity to perform household tasks was reduced by PERCENT .

In its report dated DATE the ORG found that the applicant should be classified

( i ) as a person in full - time paid employment ( PERSON ) up to the end of DATE ;

( ii ) as a housewife ( ORG ) DATE ;

( iii ) as a person theoretically capable of PERCENT ( zu CARDINAL PERCENT hypothetisch PERSON ) as of DATE .

On DATE PERSON . GPE informed the ORG that the applicant was unable to work CARDINAL - time in a suitable occupation and that any increase in TIME appeared to be ruled out .

In a decision of CARDINAL DATE the ORG found that the applicant should be granted a benefit for the period from DATE to CARDINAL DATE , but did not qualify for any benefit from DATE .

The ORG arrived at this result by the following means .

With regard to the period from DATE until DATE , it assessed the applicant ’s degree of disability at PERCENT on the basis of a calculation of her income .

As to the subsequent period , the ORG considered that the socalled combined method should be applied , taking the view that even if she had not had a disability the applicant would have reduced her working hours following the birth of her children . It based that finding , in particular , on the applicant ’s assertion that she felt able to work CARDINAL - time and wished to devote the remainder of her time to her household tasks and her children . Furthermore , on the basis of the household assessment referred to above , the ORG estimated the applicant ’s capacity to perform household tasks at PERCENT ( that is to say , her degree of disability at PERCENT ) . When the formula set out below was applied , the degree of disability obtained on the basis of these various factors was PERCENT , meaning that the applicant did not reach the minimum PERCENT degree of disability needed to trigger entitlement to a benefit :

CARDINAL % ( paid employment ) : no loss of earnings CARDINAL x CARDINAL % = PERCENT

CARDINAL % ( household tasks and childcare ) : CARDINAL x CARDINAL % = CARDINAL %

Total = PERCENT

The applicant lodged a complaint with the ORG , which was dismissed on DATE . Following a fresh calculation the ORG recognised the applicant as having a PERCENT disability , still below the minimum required in order to qualify for a benefit .

This figure was obtained by applying the combined method , using the following parameters :

CARDINAL % ( paid employment ) : PERSON x CARDINAL % = CARDINAL %

PERCENT ( household tasks and childcare ) : CARDINAL x CARDINAL % = CARDINAL %

Total = CARDINAL %

In completing the first line of the formula , the ORG took as a basis a hypothetical income ( for full - time work ) of CHF MONEY ( approximately EUR CARDINAL ) , calculated on the basis of the statistical data for the socioprofessional category to which the applicant , as an auxiliary worker ( Hilfsarbeiterin ) , belonged . Working at a rate of PERCENT , the applicant would therefore have had a salary of CHF CARDINAL if she had been able to continue working without any difficulty ( Valideneinkommen ) . The ORG estimated that , given her disability , the salary which the applicant would actually be able to earn in a suitable occupation would be CHF CARDINAL ( Invalideneinkommen ) . It therefore assessed the applicant ’s degree of disability in respect of the “ paid employment ” component at PERCENT .

On DATE the applicant appealed against that decision .

Relying on LAW , read in conjunction with LAW , the applicant argued that

( i ) the method applied discriminated against the less well - off , as those persons who could afford not to do paid work were classified simply as housewives and could therefore be recognised as having a higher degree of disability and thus qualify more easily for a benefit ;

( ii ) the way in which the degree of disability was calculated did not take sufficient account of the interplay ( PERSON ) between the “ household ” and “ paid employment ” components ;

( iii ) in reality , even if she only worked half - time , her degree of disability for the purposes of performing household tasks would increase well beyond PERCENT as a result .

In support of her appeal the applicant submitted a medical report issued by PERSON . GPE on DATE , in which the latter stated in substance that , in view of her state of health , the applicant could not engage in paid work on a CARDINAL - time basis in the same way as someone without a disability , and that if she had to take up paid employment , her capacity to take care of the household and of her children would drop to PERCENT .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG of the GPE of PERSON allowed the applicant ’s appeal in part .

In a departure from the case - law of ORG ... , it considered that the usual application of the combined method should be disregarded in favour of an “ improved ” version . In the court ’s view , the basis for calculation should be the level of activity which the applicant might reasonably have resumed after the birth of her twins if she had not had health problems .

ORG found that the “ household ” component of the combined method , as that method was applied in ORG caselaw , did not take sufficient account of the person ’s disability .

According to the court , the ORG had not taken into consideration the fact that the applicant could only take care of the household on a CARDINAL - time basis , and had incorrectly calculated her incapacity for work on the basis of TIME working day .

Instead of taking as a basis the household assessment – which , in ORG view , should be applicable only to individuals who were engaged full - time in caring for the household – the ORG should have examined the applicant ’s actual capacity to perform household tasks , which had been established by a doctor .

The court also criticised the ORG for not examining whether , if she had been in good health , the applicant would have been able to engage in paid work after the birth of her children . In particular , it noted that the report drawn up following the household assessment gave scant information as to the work entailed for the applicant in caring for her children ( ORG ) and whether or not any possibilities existed for entrusting part of their care to other persons . As these factors had not been taken into consideration by the ORG , the applicant ’s degree of disability had been established on the basis of an incomplete set of facts . The court also considered it unlikely that the applicant would have worked only halftime if she had been in good health , given her husband ’s modest salary and what she could reasonably expect to earn as a hairdresser or auxiliary worker . The household assessment therefore appeared to be deficient in that respect also .

Consequently , ORG remitted the case to the ORG for further investigation .

The ORG lodged an appeal against the ORG judgment .

In a judgment of DATE ( CARDINALC_CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) ORG allowed the ORG ’s appeal , finding that the applicant was not eligible for a benefit .

In its reasoning ORG began by describing the context in which it viewed the case , stating that

( i ) the aim of disability insurance was to provide cover for insured persons against the risk of becoming unable , for medical reasons , to carry on a paid occupation or perform household tasks which they had actually been able to carry out before becoming disabled and would still be able to perform if the event triggering the disability had not occurred ;

( ii ) the aim was not to provide compensation in respect of activities which the insured persons would never have carried out even if they had remained in good health ;

( iii ) this approach was designed to prevent situations in which , for instance , individuals who were well - off and had never previously worked could be recognised as having a disability if they developed health problems , even though they would probably never have worked had they remained in good health .

Accordingly , ORG considered that the combined method was not discriminatory . It found as follows :

“ CARDINAL ... It is true that the combined method , as applied by the [ ORG in its settled case - law , may result in a loss of benefit where the insured person is DATE generally on account of the birth of a child – to cease paid employment , at least on a full - time basis . However , it is not the disability that [ then ] causes the loss of income ; many people in good health also suffer a loss of income when they reduce their TIME or stop working . The criticism of the combined method is directed at the fact that individuals ( mostly women ) suffer a drop in earnings when they reduce their working TIME after having children . Nevertheless , this sociological reality is not the result of factors linked to the person ’s health and should not therefore be covered by the disability insurance scheme . It does not give rise to any discrimination or other breach of LAW . ”

Nevertheless , ORG conceded that the interplay between the “ household ” and “ paid employment ” aspects was not taken sufficiently into account in the combined method . With regard to the applicant , however , it found

( i ) that the aggravation of her health problems as a result of her paid work should not be regarded as reducing her capacity to perform household tasks by PERCENT ;

( ii ) that , accordingly , even taking the interplay in question into account , the applicant ’s degree of disability did not reach PERCENT minimum required in order to qualify for a benefit :

PERCENT ( household tasks ) : CARDINAL x ( MONEY PERCENT ) = PERCENT

Total = CARDINAL %

The argument that her husband was unemployed , which was raised by the applicant for the first time before ORG , was rejected on the grounds that it had not been relied upon in the court below and was not substantiated .

However , ORG granted the applicant legal aid in view of her lack of means .