Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Ksenija Turković

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the Court by PERSON , an advocate practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant and his wife moved into a socially - owned flat in GPE with a floor area of QUANTITY .

On DATE the company S. , as the flat provider , invited the applicant to come to its offices with a view to signing a contract for use of the flat ( ugovor o korištenju stana ) and to bring along the decision whereby he had been assigned the flat in question .

On DATE the applicant was summoned to the offices of ORG of ORG ( Općina Novi GPE ) for the same reason .

NORP Since the applicant had failed to react to either of those requests , on DATE ORG ( which was later succeeded by GPE [ Grad GPE ] , hereafter “ the local authorities ” ) , represented by ORG , brought a civil action in ORG ( PERSON ) , seeking eviction of the applicant and his wife on the grounds that they had been occupying the flat without being entitled to do so .

The applicant submitted that he had received the keys to the flat from company LOC , on whose waiting list for housing he had figured for DATE . He had moved into the flat at the same time as the other tenants had moved into their flats located in the same building . He claimed to have signed several copies of the contract with company S. for use of the flat , on which occasion he had been told that CARDINAL of the copies would be sent to him by post . However , he had never received it . Over a period of DATE he had several times enquired of the company if he might obtain a copy of the contract , but had been told that it had been misplaced . The company had later been dissolved without him ever receiving his copy . Since he had already signed the relevant contract , as explained above , he did not wish to sign another and had thus ignored both the above - mentioned requests .

In answer to the question why he had not paid any rent until he was eventually sued , the applicant replied that he had done so retrospectively .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG ordered the applicant and his wife to vacate the flat . The court held that they had no right to occupy the flat in question . More specifically , the court held that ( a ) under the relevant legislation a written contract for use of a flat needed to be signed in order to acquire a specially protected tenancy ( see section CARDINAL of the DATE LAW in paragraph CARDINAL below ) , ( b ) it was against the law to move in to and occupy a flat without having signed such a contract beforehand ( see section CARDINAL of LAW in paragraph CARDINAL below ) , and ( c ) the applicant had not proved that he had ever signed such a contract .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( ORG ) dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant and upheld the first - instance judgment , endorsing the reasons given therein . It added that the applicant had never submitted the decision assigning him the flat in question , which was a precondition for concluding the contract for use of the flat ( see section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW in paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( PERSON ) allowed an appeal from the applicant on points of law ( revizija ) , quashed the judgments of the lower courts and remitted the case to the first - instance court . That court held that the lower courts had failed to examine whether the applicant and his wife had acquired a specially protected tenancy by virtue of their long - term use of the flat , that is to say , by complying for DATE with their obligations as tenants , which would have implied that there was a contract for use of the flat even though it had not been concluded in writing ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) . The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows :

“ [ The factual ] findings of the [ lower ] courts are deficient to ... [ the ] extent that they ... do not [ provide ] sufficient [ grounds ] for concluding that the defendants have been using the flat without being entitled to do so .

It is true that the existence of a written contract for use of the flat was not established . However , circumstances may suggest that such a contract existed even though not in written form . In such cases , which entail compliance [ by the occupier ] with contractual obligations for DATE , [ in particular where the occupier ] behaves like [ a tenant ] and pays the rent ... it is possible to acknowledge status as the holder of a specially protected tenancy in respect of a person who has occupied a flat on the basis of a contract of use for the [ said ] flat for DATE ( in this case DATE ) despite the non - existence of such a contract concluded in writing . ”

In the resumed proceedings , at a hearing held on DATE the local authorities withdrew their civil action in so far as it was directed against the applicant ’s wife , who had ceased to live in the flat after the couple divorced .

By its judgment of DATE ORG dismissed the action by the local authorities . On DATE the GPE ORG quashed that judgment for incompleteness of facts and remitted the case to the lower court .

On DATE ORG entered into force . It abolished the legal concept of the specially protected tenancy and provided that the holders of such tenancies who did not avail themselves of the right to purchase the flats under separate legislation were to become “ protected lessees ” ( zaštićeni najmoprimci ) . Under the Act such lessees enjoy a number of protective measures , such as the duty of landlords to enter into a lease of indefinite duration , payment of a protected rent ( zaštićena najamnina ) ‒ the amount of which is set by the Government and significantly lower than the market rent ‒ and better protection against termination of the lease .

In its judgment of DATE ORG ruled in favour of the local authorities and ordered the applicant to vacate the flat . Following an appeal by the applicant , on CARDINAL DATE ORG ( Županijski sud u GPE ) quashed the first - instance judgment and remitted the case .

In the resumed proceedings , at a hearing held on DATE the applicant submitted a copy of the contract for use of the flat he had allegedly signed on DATE , claiming that he had found it in the meantime . He asked the court to allow him to submit the original at DATE .

At the same hearing the applicant , relying on ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , also brought a counterclaim against the local authorities ( the details of which he provided later ) whereby he sought a judgment ( a ) acknowledging that he had acquired the status of a protected lessee , and ( b ) forcing a lease contract stipulating the protected rent .

At a hearing held on DATE the court invited the applicant to bring to the next hearing , scheduled for DATE , the original of the contract of CARDINAL DATE .

The applicant did not attend in person the hearing held on DATE nor did he submit the original of the contract , as requested by the court .

At a hearing held on DATE the applicant ’s representative stated that the applicant was unable to find the original of the contract . He explained that a friend of his from GPE had only recently found the copy of the contract and sent it to him . However , he had not found the original . The applicant ’s representative therefore asked the court to adjourn the hearing and allow him additional time to find it . After hearing the applicant , the court refused that request and closed the main hearing . During his testimony the applicant explained that after DATE he had been persecuted as a NORP nationalist and that criminal proceedings had been instituted against him . In those proceedings he had been represented by an advocate from GPE who had in the meantime died . Because he had not felt safe in GPE , he had transferred all his important personal documents , including the contract in question , to that advocate for safekeeping . That was the reason why he could not find the copy of the contract earlier , and why he had been unable to find the original thus far .

By a judgment of DATE ORG ( a ) ordered the applicant to vacate the flat , ( b ) dismissed his counterclaim , and ( c ) ordered him to pay MONEY ( HRK ) for the costs of the proceedings . That court held that the applicant had not proved he had ever concluded a written contract for use of the flat . In particular , the court held as follows :

“ It follows ... that the plaintiff proved facts on the basis of which its ownership of the flat at issue may be presumed in terms of section CARDINAL of the [ DATE ] LAW . It has also proved that its right to possess the flat is stronger ( in terms of CARDINAL of the [ DATE ] LAW , which was in force at the time of the institution of these proceedings ) than that of the defendant , in respect of whom this court ... finds that his use of the flat at issue has been without such entitlement . ...

... The defendant did not succeed in proving during the proceedings ... that he had moved into the flat at issue [ on DATE ] on the basis of any valid legal right to do so ... Furthermore , in this court ’s view , the defendant did not succeed in proving his arguments [ to the effect that he had ] subsequently [ on DATE ] signed a written contract for use of the flat [ and thereby obtained ] valid legal status as the holder of a specially protected tenancy in terms of section CARDINAL read in conjunction with section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the [ DATE ] Housing Act , which was in force at the [ relevant ] time .

In particular , the copy of the alleged ‘ Contract for use of a flat of CARDINAL DATE TIME , which ... the applicant did not submit until the hearing held on DATE , can not in the view of this court be regarded as valid evidence [ that there was ] a written contract for use of the flat at issue , given that the plaintiff disputed the authenticity of the said document , and the fact that the defendant had still not , by the time the main hearing was closed , submitted the original of the document in question despite being invited by the court to do so .

It is to be noted that at the hearing held on DATE this court refused the defendant ’s request to allow him additional time to submit the original of the impugned contract . [ The court did so because ] it found that the proposal was aimed at protracting the proceedings in this case and found unconvincing the defendant ’s explanation that he had managed to find the impugned contract at DATE ( that is to say , DATE after the institution of these proceedings ) and that the original is with an unnamed friend of his in GPE , who is unable to find it at this time .

The court did not give credence to the defendant ’s testimony stating that he had ... signed the ... contract for use of the flat of CARDINAL DATE on the premises of company S. , but that he had lost it after transferring all his personal documentation to an unnamed advocate in GPE , having been persecuted as a NORP nationalist from DATE . [ The court ] finds such testimony unconvincing and illogical , and contradictory of other evidence taken during these proceedings . ”

On the question of whether the applicant had acquired a specially protected tenancy on the basis of his long - term use of the flat , the court held as follows :

“ Even though under the former LAW a specially protected tenancy could exceptionally have been recognised in cases where there was no written contract for use of a flat , that was possible only in cases where the long - term occupation , combined with compliance with all the obligations incumbent on the holder of a specially protected tenancy , was the result of an agreement between the provider of the flat and the person occupying [ it ] – the potential holder of the specially protected tenancy .

However , even leaving aside the fact that the [ evidence ] suggested that the defendant had moved into the flat illegally , ... from the defendant ’s own testimony it follows ... that in the relevant period , [ that is to say ] between the time he moved in and the date when these [ civil ] proceedings were instituted , [ he ] had not paid the rent or other charges in respect of the flat . [ It ] was only in DATE that he [ retrospectively ] paid ... the plaintiff [ a certain amount ] for the rent and charges [ accrued ] in the period DATE and DATE . It can not therefore be concluded that the defendant in the relevant period had complied with the obligations incumbent on a holder of a specially protected tenancy in respect of the flat at issue . In addition , in the view of this court the fact that the defendant was paying the rent and charges after the institution of these proceedings is not decisive for their outcome because [ it became evident ] at the latest when these proceedings were instituted that the defendant had been using the flat without the consent of the plaintiff , it being understood that the use of a flat without entitlement does not imply using the flat for free . ”

On DATE the applicant appealed against that judgment , arguing that the evidence suggested that a written contract for use of the flat had indeed existed but had been misplaced .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal and upheld the first - instance judgment , which thereby became final . ORG endorsed the reasons given by ORG . It added :

“ Since in his appeal the defendant contests only the finding of the [ first - instance ] court that he did not acquire a specially protected tenancy by having signed a [ written ] contract for use of the flat , but [ he does ] not [ contest ] the finding ... that he did not acquire a specially protected tenancy [ by long - term use of the flat ] with the knowledge and the consent of the plaintiff as the provider of the flat , the first - instance court correctly ... [ ruled in favour ] of the plaintiff ... given that the defendant does not have any right entitling him to possess [ i.e. occupy ] the flat . ”

The applicant then lodged an appeal on points of law ( revizija ) with ORG .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal on points of law in so far as the contested second - instance judgment entailed a decision dismissing his counterclaim . To the extent that the impugned second - instance judgment entailed a decision allowing the plaintiff ’s action and ordering the applicant to vacate the flat , ORG declared inadmissible the applicant ’s appeal on points of law because the value of the subject matter of the dispute did not reach the statutory threshold for lodging such an appeal .

On DATE the applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint alleging violations of his constitutional rights of equality before the law , equality before the courts and fair procedure .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) declared inadmissible the applicant ’s constitutional complaint , finding that the case did not raise any constitutional law issue . It served its decision on the applicant ’s representative on DATE .

Meanwhile , on CARDINAL DATE the local authorities had applied to ORG for enforcement of its judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the court issued a writ of execution ( rješenje o ovrsi ) ordering the eviction of the applicant from the flat at issue .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal against writ .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG , at the request of the applicant , to which the local authorities agreed , decided to postpone the enforcement ( odgoda ovrhe ) until DATE .

Following a motion by the local authorities , by a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG decided to stay the enforcement proceedings ( prekid postupka ) pending a final decision in the concurrent administrative proceedings ( see paragraphs CARDINAL - CARDINAL below ) . The enforcement court regarded the issue to be decided in those proceedings as a preliminary question ( prethodno pitanje ) in the enforcement proceedings and thus grounds for stay .

It would appear that the enforcement proceedings have been stayed ever since .

Meanwhile , by a letter of CARDINAL DATE , the relevant department of the local authorities informed the applicant that he could regularise his status regarding the flat in question by lodging a request that it be allocated to him under a local regulation setting out the criteria and the procedure for renting out flats owned by GPE . The letter also specified that together with his request the applicant had to submit the relevant supporting documents , namely , the proof that he had regularly paid the charges in respect of the flat and the proof that he had paid the costs of the above civil and ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) enforcement proceedings .

On DATE the applicant lodged such request but without enclosing the relevant supporting documents .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the local authorities’ commission for allocation of flats informed the applicant that his request was incomplete and invited him to enclose the relevant supporting documents ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

Since the applicant did not do so , on DATE the commission adopted a decision whereby it declared the applicant ’s request inadmissible as incomplete .

NORP The relevant provision of LAW of DATE ( Zakon o stambenim odnosima , ORG of ORG no . CARDINAL with subsequent amendments ) , which was in force between DATE and DATE , reads as follows :

“ It is against the law to move into or occupy a flat without having signed a contract for use of the [ said ] flat beforehand , save in the cases provided for in this LAW . ”

“ A specially protected tenancy shall be acquired on DATE [ an individual ] lawfully moves into a flat on the basis of a contract for use of the [ said ] flat , unless this LAW provides otherwise . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) A contract for use of a flat in social ownership shall be concluded between a holder of a specially protected tenancy and the [ respective ] organisation for maintenance of residential buildings in social ownership .

( CARDINAL ) The contract referred to in paragraph CARDINAL of this section shall be concluded on the basis of a decision by the provider of the flat , if the issuance of such a decision is envisaged by the agreement between the provider of the flat and the organisation for maintenance of residential buildings in social ownership .


Violation of Article 7 - No punishment without law (Article 7-1 - Heavier penalty;Nulla poena sine lege;Retroactivity);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Iulia Motoc;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Marko Bošnjak;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in DATE and is detained in GPE pri ORG .

On DATE the DATE Amendment to the DATE LAW entered into force ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the applicant was convicted of robbery by ORG and sentenced to DATE in prison . He began serving his sentence on DATE and completed it on DATE .

On DATE Criminal Code came into force ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the applicant was convicted by ORG of having paid with a bad cheque and of fraudulent use of a bank card in the period DATE and DATE . He was sentenced to CARDINAL months’ imprisonment . The judgment became final on DATE . The applicant started to serve the sentence on DATE .

In the meantime , on DATE ORG found the applicant guilty of murder committed together with another person on DATE . He was sentenced to DATE in prison , the maximum penalty provided for under the CARDINAL Criminal Code applicable at the time at which the offence was committed . The conviction was upheld on appeal by ORG on DATE and became final on DATE .

On DATE the applicant applied to ORG to have the CARDINAL prison terms joined in an overall sentence .

On DATE ORG , by means of a judgment , joined the CARDINAL above - mentioned prison sentences , including the one for robbery which the applicant had already completed , in an overall sentence . Applying LAW as applicable before the introduction of LAW ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) , the court noted that the applicant should have had an overall sentence imposed on him as the conditions under LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) had been met but the provision had not been applied in his case . While acknowledging that LAW ( CARDINAL ) of the DATE LAW applied to the case ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , ORG sentenced the applicant to an overall term of DATE imprisonment . In its reasoning , it noted that the principle of the rule of law required , inter alia , that criminal - law provisions be drafted in a clear and precise manner in order to avoid sentences being imposed arbitrarily . It went on to note that the legislation applicable to the present case was unclear , ambiguous and deficient for the following reasons . Although the maximum sentence applicable under LAW had been DATE imprisonment and the rules on combining multiple sentences in an overall sentence , enshrined in LAW ( CARDINAL ) of the DATE LAW , provided that the overall sentence must exceed each of the individual sentences , these same rules prescribed a maximum sentence of DATE . The court took the view that the legislature had not intended to enact legislation enabling those offenders who had been sentenced to DATE imprisonment for CARDINAL of the offences for which they subsequently had had their sentences joined to benefit from an overall sentence that would have been DATE lower than the highest individual sentence to which the offender had been sentenced . In support of its view , ORG pointed out that LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) had provided that in cases where an offender had been due to serve DATE imprisonment along with sentences for other offences , the overall sentence would have consisted only of that term . Therefore , ORG considered that the legislature had made an obvious error in LAW CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of the DATE LAW , which had , however , been rectified in the meantime by LAW . The court found that the latter made the rules on the determination of an overall sentence certain , clear and complete and that “ [ o]nly the so amended provisions therefore prevent[ed ] arbitrary sanctioning of criminal offenders for multiple criminal offences as required by the principle of legality ” .

The applicant appealed against the judgment , arguing that ORG decision lacked a legal basis and was in breach of the principle of the rule of law and the principle nullum crimen et nulla poena sine lege . He also claimed that the primary method of interpreting legal texts should be semantic interpretation . It was only where that method proved unsatisfactory in determining how a certain rule should be applied that other methods of interpretation should be applied . Lastly , the applicant agreed with ORG that the provision in question could be regarded as unclear , ambiguous and deficient , but pointed out that any possible ambiguities or deficiencies should not be interpreted to his detriment .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG rejected the appeal lodged by the applicant and upheld the first - instance judgment , reiterating the lower court ’s reasoning . In the Higher Court ’s opinion , ORG had correctly assessed that the legislature had not intended to permit individuals convicted of several offences from benefiting from a lower maximum term of imprisonment than they would have had to serve if they had been convicted of CARDINAL of those offences . According to ORG , such an interpretation would lead to a situation “ defying the law as well as common sense ” .

The applicant applied to ORG for the protection of legality ( an extraordinary legal remedy ) , reiterating his arguments . He also argued that the rule of law was a principle which should not be applied at the ORG discretion .

On DATE ORG by its judgment I ORG rejected the application for the protection of legality , disagreeing with the applicant that semantic interpretation should take precedence over all other methods of legal interpretation . ORG referred to ORG judgment , pointing out that the latter court ’s reasoning evidently showed that the historical interpretation of the rule on combining multiple sentences also had to be taken into account in assessing the aim of the legislature in enacting the provision at issue . That method of interpretation entailed the examination of not only the provision in its original form , as relied on by the applicant , but also the subsequent amendment , which showed the true aim of the provision . In addition , ORG relied on the systematic interpretation of the rule in question , emphasising that it could not be interpreted entirely separately from the provisions prescribing that individual prison sentences for various criminal offences must be combined to form an overall sentence . Since under the un - amended DATE LAW a prison sentence could be imposed for a term not shorter than DATE and not longer than DATE , it was not logical that an overall sentence combining several prison terms , CARDINAL of which was for DATE , could be DATE lower than the highest individual prison sentence imposed . According to ORG , the rules on multiple offences were aimed not at reducing the general maximum prison sentence , but at ensuring that the overall length of several sentences did not exceed the general maximum prison sentence , which in the applicant ’s case was DATE .

The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint , reiterating that the imposition of an overall sentence of DATE imprisonment contravened LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW , which clearly provided that such a sentence could not exceed DATE . In the applicant ’s opinion , the purpose of the provision at issue could be drawn from interpreting it semantically and no additional means of interpretation were therefore required in order to understand the legislature ’s intention .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s complaint , finding that it did not concern an important constitutional question or entail a violation of human rights with serious consequences for the applicant .

On DATE the applicant was convicted of another murder committed on an undefined date between CARDINAL June and DATE . For that murder he was sentenced to DATE imprisonment , but a new overall sentence of DATE was imposed . The latter overall sentence covered the previous overall sentence imposed by the judgment of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , another sentence of DATE imprisonment , which in the meantime had been imposed on him following a conviction for yet another criminal offence , and the DATE imprisonment imposed by that last judgment of DATE . An appeal and an application for the protection of legality by the applicant were dismissed , the latter by ORG on DATE .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review)

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the excessive length of their pre - trial detention . In application no . MONEY the applicant submitted also a complaint under LAW .


George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE . The President granted the applicant ’s request for her identity not to be disclosed to the public ( Rule CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) . She is represented before the ORG by Ms PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) are represented by their Agent , PERSON of ORG .

NORP The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP In DATE the applicant filed with the PERSON ORG a claim for the protection of her personal rights against the company S. which publishes the newspaper “ PERSON ” , its editor - in - chief ORG and journalist PERSON She referred to an article published in this newspaper in DATE which , in the applicant ’s submission , had breached her rights protected by ORG and CARDINAL of LAW . She sought compensation in the amount of MONEY ( ORG ) in respect of non - pecuniary damage caused by disclosing information about her private life accompanied by denigrating and untrue statements and views about the applicant published in the newspaper in an article written by PERSON She further requested that all CARDINAL defendants publish apologies , on the newspaper ’s website for DATE and in a DATE edition of a countrywide DATE newspaper ORG wyborcza , for damage caused by describing her in a mendacious and wrongful manner ( w sposób nieprawdziwy i krzywdzący ) .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE the court ordered the applicant to provide the court with the private addresses ( miejsce zamieszkania ) of ORG and GPE within DATE , referring to LAW para . CARDINAL of the Code of Civil Procedure .

In her pleadings of CARDINAL DATE the applicant submitted that it was impossible for her to establish the defendants’ private addresses and even less so within DATE . It was true that it was possible for her to ask ORG for the addresses of private persons , but such a request had to be accompanied by the statistical numbers ( ORG ) of the persons concerned . The applicant did not know these numbers and had no way of obtaining them . She argued that in her statement of claim ( pozew ) she had provided the court with the newspaper ’s publisher ’s official address which should be sufficient for effective service of the court correspondence both on the journalist and the editor - in - chief working there . She submitted ’ private addresses amounted to an undue restriction of her right of access to court .

On DATE the applicant requested the court to lift the order of CARDINAL DATE , referring to the ORG ’s judgment in the case of PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , DATE ) . She submitted that the domestic court ’s approach was unduly formalistic as no proper regard had been had to the practicalities of the situation , in particular to the difficulties in establishing the defendants’ private addresses . She argued that it was in fact possible to ensure effective service of the court correspondence on the editor and journalist at the newspaper ’s official address .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE the court , referring to LAW of the Code of Civil Procedure , returned the statement of claim to the applicant ( zwrot pozwu ) in so far as it concerned the editor - in - chief and the journalist . The court referred to the applicant ’s failure to give their private addresses and refused to entertain her claim . The court referred to ORG decision given in DATE to the effect that in the protection of personal rights cases in the context of press publications the requirements of LAW were to be understood as imposing on plaintiffs an obligation to submit private addresses of journalists to the court in the statement of claim ( PERSON CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . Article CARDINAL of the ORG providing for service of court pleadings at the employer ’s address ( doręczenie zastępcze ) could not be applied .

The applicant appealed . She reiterated that she had indicated the publisher ’s address in her statement of claim and that both the editor and journalist could easily be contacted at that address and the court correspondence served on them . Hence , it was possible for the court to establish an effective channel of communication with the CARDINAL defendants and to ensure effective protection of their rights without the need for their private addresses being indicated to the court .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . It was of the view that the contested decision was lawful given that LAW CARDINAL para . CARDINAL of the Code of Civil Procedure required that the private address ( miejsce zamieszkania ) of a defendant who was a natural person was indicated in the statement of claim and in the pleadings . The court observed that the ORG ’s judgment in the case of PERSON v. GPE was irrelevant to the circumstances of the present case . ORG had found a violation of LAW in respect of a situation where the court obliged the plaintiff who did not have a permanent private address to give such an address for the purposes of judicial proceedings . The present case was different in that it concerned private addresses of defendants who had permanent addresses .

On DATE the applicant requested the newspaper ’s publisher , S. company , to provide her with ORG ’s and PERSON ’s private addresses , referring to the civil claim lodged with ORG . There was no reply to this letter .

On DATE the applicant submitted a request to ORG for ORG ( Generalny Inspektor Ochrony Danych Osobowych ) to oblige the publisher to provide her with the addresses concerned . She argued that the courts in the GPE region had developed an unduly restrictive practice requiring plaintiffs to give the personal addresses of defendants in all cases and had regard neither to practical difficulties in establishing these addresses , nor to the fact that in many cases , like in her case , it was in fact possible to proceed with the case as other addresses of the defendants , such as their employer ’s permanent addresses , were available . Establishing effective communication between the court and the plaintiff was therefore feasible .

On DATE the ORG allowed her request .

The S. company appealed , submitting that the addresses were not necessary for the purposes relied on by the applicant . The applicant could find the necessary data in the press titles register run by ORG . The publisher was further of the view that disclosure of the personal addresses of the journalist and the editor without their consent would have amounted to a breach of the legislation on the protection of personal data .

Following the publisher ’s appeal , on CARDINAL DATE the ORG reexamined the case and upheld the contested decision . He noted that the lack of consent on the part of persons whose personal data were to be disclosed was not a single or decisive factor determining the lawfulness of such a disclosure . Personal data could be disclosed also when it was necessary for the protection of legally protected interests of third parties . In the present case the personal addresses of the journalists were necessary for the applicant to pursue her civil case against them . Hence , the publisher , in its capacity of administrator of its employees’ personal data , was obliged to disclose them .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal brought to it by the publishing company , essentially reiterating the reasoning of the administrative authority .

On DATE the publisher ’s lawyer lodged a cassation appeal with ORG against that judgment . It was argued , inter alia , that there was no legitimate aim that would justify the disclosure of the journalist ’s and editor ’s addresses to the applicant , regard being had to the fact that ORG had already returned the applicant ’s statement of claim ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . In the absence of any pending case between the applicant on the one hand and ORG ( who had in the meantime married and her new name was PERSON ) and PERSON on the other , the disclosure would not serve any practical purpose .

On DATE ORG dismissed the publisher ’s appeal . It shared the reasoning and conclusions reached by the administrative authority and by the first - instance court .

On DATE the PERSON ORG allowed the applicant ’s claim in so far as it was directed against the publisher company . It ordered it to publish apologies in their newspaper , for DATE , for having breached her personal rights by disclosing and publishing details of her personal life and describing them in a mendacious and wrongful manner ( w sposób nieprawdziwy i krzywdzacy ) . It further ordered that the article should be removed from the newspaper ’s website within DATE from the judgment becoming final . The applicant was awarded compensation in the amount of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL .

LAW of DATE provides :

“ The personal address of a natural person shall be the town where that person resides with the intention of remaining permanently . ”

Article CARDINAL of the Code of Civil Procedure specifies the information that pleadings in civil cases should contain . Paragraph CARDINAL provides , in particular , that the first pleading submitted to a court in a case directed against a natural person should indicate the parties’ personal addresses .


András Sajó;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE . He is currently serving a prison sentence in LOC .

The NORP Government ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , PERSON , of ORG .

NORP In its judgment PERSON v. GPE of DATE ( app . no . CARDINAL ) , the ORG found a violation of LAW on account of the cumulative effect of the inadequate medical care and inappropriate conditions in which the applicant , who had a history of mental disorder , was held throughout his pre - trial detention .

In the operative part of the judgment the ORG held that the respondent ORG was to secure at the earliest possible date adequate conditions of the applicant ’s detention in a specialised institution capable of providing him with necessary psychiatric treatment and constant medical supervision ( see also § CARDINAL of the judgment ) .

The Government requested that the case be referred to ORG ; however , their request was rejected and the ORG ’s judgment became final on DATE .

The execution of this judgment is pending before ORG in the framework of enhanced procedure but only with respect to the general measures . The applicant ’s judgment belongs to a group of cases against GPE concerning issues of adequacy of medical care provided to prisoners . According to the information submitted by the Government to ORG in DATE , the applicant , who is now serving a prison sentence , has been provided with appropriate medical care . ORG decided at its ORG meeting ( DATE ) that no other individual measures appeared necessary in the light of information submitted by the Government , according to which the applicant ’s conditions of detention were compatible with his state of health .

The facts of the present case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The Government submitted that the applicant had a long criminal record . In the period subsequent to the ORG ’s judgment of DATE , the applicant ’s criminal record included , inter alia , the convictions for :

a ) causing bodily injury , aggravated assault , punishable threat , armed robbery and aggravated theft - ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE , case no . II K CARDINAL/CARDINAL ;

b ) aggravated assault – ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE , case no . II K CARDINAL/CARDINAL ;

c ) punishable threat , trespass and aggravated theft - ORG judgment of an unspecified date , case no . II K CARDINAL/CARDINAL ;

d ) aggravated assault , CARDINAL counts of armed robbery and property damage - ORG judgment of DATE , case no . VIII K CARDINAL ;

e ) assault on a public official - ORG judgment of an unspecified date , case no . PERSON .

The applicant served various terms of imprisonment and was released in DATE . In DATE he was imprisoned again . The applicant was detained in the following establishments :

a ) FAC No . CARDINAL ( psychiatric ward ) : CARDINAL DATE – CARDINAL DATE ;

b ) Częstochowa Remand Centre : DATE ;

c ) Przemyśl Prison : DATE ;

d ) Częstochowa Remand Centre : DATE ;

e ) Przemyśl Prison : DATE ;

f ) Częstochowa Remand Centre : DATE ;

g ) FAC : CARDINAL DATE ;

h ) PERSON : DATE ;

i ) Przytuły Stare Prison : DATE – DATE ;

j ) FAC : DATE ;

k ) FAC : DATE ;

l ) Strzelce Opolskie Prison : DATE present .

The applicant submitted that has been suffering from severe mental disorders . He claimed that in DATE he had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia . The applicant relied , in particular , on CARDINAL medical opinions of DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE .

The Government rebuffed the applicant ’s assertion . They maintained that the applicant had been inaccurately diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia . The Government submitted that the applicant did not mention CARDINAL opinions ( CARDINAL psychiatric and CARDINAL psychological ) which concluded that he was not suffering from schizophrenia or any other mental disorder . The applicant further concealed the fact that at DATE opinions ( CARDINAL psychiatric and CARDINAL psychological ) established that he was feigning his mental illness .

The Government submitted a complete list of psychiatric and psychological opinions regarding the applicant issued DATE in the course of various criminal proceedings against him .

The Government submitted that CARDINAL opinions confirmed the applicant ’s alleged mental disorder ( opinions of CARDINAL DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE ) . However , in their view , these opinions were imprecise ; short ( CARDINAL , CARDINAL , DATE and CARDINAL long respectively ) ; based on a short ( DATE ) consultation ; prepared without reference to opinions in which no mental disorder had been diagnosed and without adequate access to all medical data ; and based on documents submitted by the applicant and his suggestions .

Due to the discrepancies in the assessment of the applicant ’s mental health , the relevant courts and prosecutor ’s offices , at least on CARDINAL occasions , ordered the applicant to undergo a psychiatric observation in hospital . The applicant ’s hospital observation took place in the following periods : from DATE to DATE ; from DATE to DATE and from CARDINAL DATE to CARDINAL DATE . All opinions issued following the hospital observations ( dated DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE ) excluded that the applicant was mentally ill . The Government asserted that the above opinions were detailed ; long ( CARDINAL , DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE long respectively ) ; prepared after a prolonged hospital observation ; based on all previous opinions and on a various medical data .

The Włoszczowa ORG requested a psychiatric opinion as to whether the applicant could participate in the trial against him ( case no . II K CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . The applicant was examined on CARDINAL DATE . In an opinion of CARDINAL DATE , CARDINAL psychiatrists noted that verbal contact with the applicant was difficult and that he had difficulties in concentrating . The applicant stated that he had hallucinations and could not sleep well . The psychiatrists concluded that the applicant suffered from a mental disorder similar to paranoid schizophrenia . He did not have acute psychotic symptoms , but anxieties persisted . The psychiatrists concluded that the applicant could not take part in the trial for DATE .

The Government submitted that the above opinion was CARDINAL - page long . The opinion also stated that the applicant had refused to be hospitalised in ORG . In CARDINAL previous opinions issued in the course of the same criminal case the psychiatrist opined that the applicant was not suffering from any mental disorder and that his psychiatric treatment DATE was without prejudice to his ability to recognise his criminal acts .

The Częstochowa Regional Court requested a psychiatric opinion on the applicant ’s mental condition for the purposes of the appellate proceedings ( case no . PERSON CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . In their opinion of DATE , the CARDINAL psychiatrists opined that the applicant has suffered from paranoid schizophrenia from his teenage years . Currently his mental condition was relatively stable ; however in DATE , despite regular treatment , he had some psychotic spells leading to self - harm . His condition was chronic and there was a possibility that it will become more acute at any time . However , the psychiatrists concluded that the applicant could take part in the appellate proceedings .

On DATE ORG declared the level of the applicant ’s disability as “ moderate ” . It noted that the applicant was unfit for work and needed assistance of social services in his daily life . The decision was in force until DATE .

ORG requested a psychiatric opinion on the applicant ’s mental condition , including whether he could be held criminally responsible ( case no . TIME CARDINAL ) . The applicant was examined on DATE . In their opinion of DATE , the CARDINAL psychiatrists opined that there were no grounds to diagnose the applicant with mental disorder . They took note of the applicant ’s medical records and the CARDINAL opinions , produced by the applicant , in which he had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia . However , they noted that these opinions did not establish the presence of psychotic symptoms at the time of the applicant ’s examination ; these symptoms had only been related by the applicant . In the course of the current examination , the applicant did not show any symptoms present in schizophrenia . The psychiatrists concluded that the applicant was not mentally disabled , having regard to the history of his schooling , his subsequent activities and the quality of contact during his examination . They found that the applicant had features of antisocial personality . In their conclusion , the applicant could be held criminally responsible and participate in the proceedings against him .

ORG requested a psychiatric opinion as to whether the applicant suffered from a mental illness preventing him from serving his sentence ( case no . II K CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . In their opinion of DATE , the psychiatrists diagnosed the applicant with acute psychotic disorder in the form of paranoid schizophrenia . His intellectual ability was assessed to fall within a norm . The experts concluded that the applicant ’s current mental condition made him unfit for serving a prison sentence .

The Government submitted that the above opinion was CARDINAL - and - a - half page long . It was issued after DATE of examination . It corroborated that the applicant , regardless of several referrals to psychiatric hospitals , had refused to be hospitalised in connection with his alleged mental disorder . Furthermore , DATE , on DATE the psychiatrists examining the applicant in connection with another set of criminal proceedings had declared him mentally fit . The psychiatrists disproved the CARDINAL psychiatric opinions produced by the applicant which attested to his mental illness . They underlined that in the course of the examination leading to the issuance of those CARDINAL earlier opinions no symptoms of mental disorder had been noticed and that the mental disorder had only been reported by the applicant .

The Włoszczowa ORG requested a psychiatric opinion on the applicant ’s mental health in connection with the proceedings in which the applicant had been charged , inter alia , with robbery and assault ( case no . II K CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . The applicant was interviewed at FAC . CARDINAL . In their opinion of DATE , the CARDINAL psychiatrists ( ORG and PERSON ) , having analysed the medical documentation , stated that they were unable to determine the question of the applicant ’s sanity at the time of the alleged offences . They noted that in the past the applicant had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia , and that this diagnosis raised doubts and could not have been properly verified during a short stay at the hospital . The applicant ’s mental condition did not indicate any psychotic process , but his “ rich ” medical documentation gave rise to difficulties in making a diagnosis . The psychiatrists requested the district court to order the applicant ’s psychiatric observation in hospital and requested access to various medical and penitentiary documentation in order to assess the applicant ’s mental health .

In a note dated CARDINAL DATE FAC informed LOC that the applicant had been admitted to the psychiatric ward on DATE in the light of pharmacological treatment related to suspected schizophrenia . During his stay there , doctors did not notice any symptoms of schizophrenia or other mental illness and it was decided to stop administering antipsychotics . After that the applicant ’s mental condition remained good . It was noted on the basis of existing documentation that the applicant had been frequently consulted by psychiatrists , who had diagnosed him with schizophrenia basing themselves solely on the applicant ’s “ stories ” . The most comprehensive opinion on the applicant ’s mental health was prepared in DATE following his observation at ORG . The psychiatrists of that hospital did not observe any psychotic symptoms . They found that the applicant suffered only from a personality disorder which corresponded to the conclusions of the current observation at FAC . The psychiatrists of FAC requested access to extended medical and penitentiary documentation on the applicant , to which previous experts had no access . It was noted during the applicant ’s observation at FAC that in situations which were uncomfortable for the applicant ( i.e. when he was summoned to a hearing ) he immediately began simulating symptoms of mental illness .

The Częstochowa Regional Prosecutor ’s Office requested a psychiatric opinion on the applicant ’s mental condition in connection with the proceedings in which the applicant had been charged , inter alia , with robbery , punishable threats , insult of a public official , participation in an organised gang and extortion ( case no . V Ds CARDINAL/CARDINAL/s ) . The psychiatric opinion was prepared by the same experts ( ORG and PERSON ) who prepared the opinion of DATE , following the applicant ’s observation at the psychiatric ward of FAC between DATE and DATE . The psychiatrists verified the applicant ’s medical documentation and carried out a number of tests and examinations . They discovered no organic dysfunctions . The psychiatrists noted that the applicant had attempted to feign the symptoms of mental illness . For example , he related in a stereotypical manner that “ voices are calling him to commit suicide ” . The results of various tests showed no symptoms which could have even suggested the presence of depressive or manic disorders , either at present or in the past . During the examination , the applicant could not say anything about his symptoms and changed the subject of conversation . It was visible that the questions put to him in this respect were distressing . The experts carried out a test to determine the symptoms of schizophrenia , but this proved negative . The experts noted that :

“ PERSON behaviour hid a clear motive and intentional effort to achieve a defined goal which was to mislead the experts and , consequently , to avoid his criminal responsibility . To this end , he feigned his mental illness . ”

The experts further noted that the applicant was unwilling to undergo certain tests . The applicant complained about problems with sleep or anxieties , but his observation at the psychiatric ward did not confirm his assertions . The experts found that the applicant displayed no typical behaviour for a person suffering from psychotic disorders , such as being suspicious vis - à - vis the other patients and staff . The applicant demanded to take anti - psychotic drugs , whereas in reality the mentally - ill avoid taking them . The applicant ’s ostentatious behaviour and tendency to focus attention on the alleged hallucinations were also reported . The experts noted that the symptoms showed by the applicant did not correspond to any known illness .

In conclusions of their opinion of CARDINAL DATE , the psychiatrists stated :

“ CARDINAL . We conclude that PERSON shows no symptoms of mental illness or of mental disability .

We conclude that PERSON has an antisocial personality and that he feigns his mental illness ( ... ) . ”

They lastly established that the applicant could be held criminally responsible and to participate in the proceedings .

The Częstochowa Regional Prosecutor ’s Office also requested a psychological opinion on the applicant . The opinion was prepared on the basis of interviews and tests carried in the course of the applicant ’s observation in FAC . In his opinion of DATE , the psychologist PERSON concluded that the applicant ’s intellectual ability fell within a broad norm and that he had no organic dysfunctions . The psychologist noted that the applicant did not function as a mentally disabled person . This was demonstrated by his ability to adapt , the manner of functioning in a group and of formulating his thoughts orally and in writing . The expert was unable to determine the applicant ’s genuine intellectual ability since the latter had not properly participated in the tests . The expert also concluded that the applicant ’s personality was improperly developed . In this respect , he noted that the applicant poorly internalised socio - moral norms .

The Włoszczowa ORG requested a psychiatric opinion on the applicant ’s mental health in connection with the case against him ( no . II K CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . The opinion was prepared by the same experts in psychiatry as the earlier opinion of CARDINAL DATE ( ORG and PERSON ) and based , in addition , on the applicant ’s examination on DATE . In their opinion of CARDINAL DATE , the experts confirmed their earlier findings made in the opinion of DATE . In addition , they found that the applicant could be transported to court and noted that his earlier behaviour during transport resulted from him feigning a mental illness .

ORG also ordered a psychological opinion in connection with the same case . In his opinion of CARDINAL DATE , the psychologist PERSON reached the same conclusions as those presented in his earlier opinion of DATE .

On DATE the applicant was consulted by a psychiatrist at FAC . She noted that the applicant was undergoing psychiatric treatment and had been frequently hospitalised in psychiatric hospitals in GPE , PERSON and Opole in connection with his schizophrenia . The psychiatrist expressed negative prognosis for the applicant given the chronic nature of his condition which was characterised by remissions .

It appears that on DATE the applicant was transferred to FAC . On CARDINAL DATE the applicant was consulted by a doctor of the prison . Her findings were similar to those made by a psychiatrist on CARDINAL September CARDINAL .

In the course of the civil proceedings against the applicant which concerned a claim for increase of child maintenance , the Kraków - Podgórze ORG requested a psychiatric opinion on the applicant . The applicant was interviewed on DATE by a psychiatrist in a court building . In his opinion of DATE , based on the interview , the case file of the civil case and some medical documentation , the psychiatrist established that the applicant suffered from chronic mental illness : paranoid schizophrenia . The applicant displayed low level of intellectual ability , hyperactivity and claimed to have hallucinations . It transpired from the medical documentation that despite a pharmacological treatment ( large doses of antipsychotics ) his condition did not improve and he often showed psychotic symptoms and agitation . There were also attempts to commit suicide . The expert concluded that the applicant was unable to work in prison due to his chronic mental illness .

The provisions pertaining to medical care in detention facilities and general conditions of detention , and the relevant domestic law and practice are set out in the ORG ’s judgments in the case of PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE . More recent developments are described in the ORG ’s decision in the case of PERSON v. GPE DATE . ) ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Right to free elections-{general} (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Vote)

Iulia Motoc;Marko Bošnjak;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in DATE and is currently detained in FAC .

On DATE the ORG convicted the applicant of burglary , rape and murder and sentenced him to CARDINAL DATE imprisonment . In application of LAW , his right to vote and to be elected was withdrawn during detention .

The decision became final on DATE when ORG dismissed the appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant .

The applicant is currently serving his prison sentence in FAC where he has been held since DATE .

The applicant described the conditions of his detention as follows :

- there was no water during DATE ;

- he was placed with smokers ( in the court - room and for DATE during detention ) although he did not smoke ;

- the windows were covered with bars and thick galvanised wire which rendered the ventilation of the cell impossible ;

- he was transported to court hearings in small dirty vans , with no ventilation or natural light ;

- from DATE until DATE information received ( DATE ) he had been held with CARDINAL other inmates in a CARDINAL sq . m cell infested with bugs .

Based on the documents presented by ORG , the Government explained that during his stay in FAC the applicant had occupied the following cells , all non - smoking :

- cells nos . ACARDINAL , PERSON , ACARDINAL , PERSON , LOC , CCARDINAL , PERSON , CCARDINAL , PERSON , PERSON , PERSON , ECARDINAL.CARDINAL , ECARDINAL.CARDINAL , PERSON , PERSON , ECARDINAL.CARDINAL , PERSON , ECARDINAL.CARDINAL , ORG , ECARDINAL.CARDINAL , ECARDINAL.CARDINAL , ECARDINAL.CARDINAL , ECARDINAL.CARDINAL which each measured CARDINAL sq . m and which he shared with a maximum of CARDINAL other detainees , DATE and DATE , DATE and DATE , DATE and DATE , between CARDINAL May and CARDINAL DATE , DATE and DATE , between DATE and DATE , between CARDINAL May and DATE , DATE and CARDINAL DATE , DATE and DATE , DATE and DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE and DATE and DATE .

- cells nos . CCARDINAL , CCARDINAL , CCARDINAL and ECARDINAL.CARDINAL which each measured CARDINAL sq . m and which he shared with another person , CARDINAL and DATE , DATE and DATE , CARDINAL and DATE and DATE .

The sanitary annexe measured CARDINAL sq . m and was provided with a sink , a shower cabin , shelves , mirror and a toilet . All rooms had windows and ventilation . The detainees collected the trash and cleaned the cells twice every day .

The inmates received the hygiene products from the prison administration and had access to warm water DATE . Access to drinking water was unlimited .

The information submitted by ORG concerned conditions of detention only until DATE .

According to the Government , from DATE the applicant had been sharing the cells with a maximum of CARDINAL other persons , in compliance with the decision adopted on DATE by ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

The applicant complained repeatedly to the post - sentencing judge ( PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL on the execution of sentences ; hereinafter “ PERSON no . CARDINAL ” ) about the conditions of his detention .

By CARDINAL decisions of QUANTITY DATE and CARDINAL DATE the post - sentencing judge for PERSON noted that the applicant was no longer held with smokers . The judge also considered that because of the large number of inmates held in that Prison , it was impossible to ensure more personal space for the applicant . He also concluded that in so far as the inmates were responsible for cleaning their cells , the presence of bugs was not the authorities’ fault , but that of the prisoners . The applicant appealed against these CARDINAL decisions . On DATE ORG ordered FAC administration to ensure the applicant CARDINAL sq . m of personal space , as provided by law .

The applicant also complained before the post - sentencing judge for ORG , that while he was held in there , from DATE , he was again placed in cells with smokers . On DATE the postsentencing judge dismissed the request as having been lodged after the expiry of the DATE time - limit provided for by PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL . The decision was upheld by ORG on DATE .

Ruling on a similar complaint lodged by the applicant about his stay in a cell with smokers from DATE in ORG , the postsentencing judge for this prison decided , on DATE , that no measure could be imposed on ORG as the applicant was no longer there . He also noted that the applicant could bring a separate claim for compensation before the civil courts .


No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for private life)

Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant was born in DATE and is detained in PERSON .

At the time of the events in question , the applicant was serving a prison sentence in LOC .

On DATE the applicant ’s grandmother died . On DATE the applicant lodged a request with ORG and the Penitentiary judge for leave to attend her funeral which was to take place on DATE . Together with his application he submitted a statement from his sister ORG who confirmed that she would personally collect the applicant from prison and bring him back after the funeral .

On DATE the Penitentiary judge of ORG ( GPE NORP PERSON w PERSON ) allowed the applicant to attend the funeral under prison ORG escort . The reasoning of the decision read as follows :

“ In view of [ the applicant ’s ] multiple convictions and his long term of imprisonment there is no guarantee that he will return to prison ”

The applicant refused to attend the funeral , since he believed his appearance under escort of uniformed officers would create a disturbance during the ceremony .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal with ORG ( PERSON ) complaining that the compassionate leave was granted under escort and also that he was only allowed to participate in the funeral ( not the preceding church service ) .

On DATE ORG upheld the Penitentiary judge ’s decision and dismissed the appeal . The court stressed that the applicant had been allowed to participate in the funeral under prison ORG escort . It further noted that the applicant was a habitual offender sentenced to a long term of imprisonment therefore there was no positive criminological prognosis and no guarantee that he would have returned to prison after the ceremony .


No violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Carlo Ranzoni;Egidijus Kūris;Ganna Yudkivska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Georges Ravarani

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant ’s husband asked the national authorities to restore his property rights to a house and a plot of land in GPE which had belonged to his grandfather before nationalisation . On DATE the applicant ’s husband specified his initial request and asked to have the plot of land restored in natura to him if possible , or to provide him with another plot of land in GPE .

The property rights of the applicant ’s husband were restored to some LOC ( a storehouse ) in GPE in DATE and it was decided to pay him monetary compensation for the other premises that had not been returned to him in natura .

On DATE ORG informed GPE that the property rights of the applicant ’s husband would be restored to QUANTITY of land for residential purposes .

On DATE the GPE informed ORG that a plot of land of CARDINAL.CARDINAL hectares had been formed near the buildings owned by the applicant ’s husband .

NORP In DATE the GPE City ORG established as a legal fact that the grandmother of the applicant ’s husband had owned a plot of land in GPE measuring QUANTITY ” ( sieksnis – QUANTITY ) .

On DATE the ORG informed GPE that the property rights of the applicant ’s husband would be restored and that he was a candidate to receive a plot of land measuring QUANTITY in natura . In DATE ORG issued a document stating that the applicant ’s husband had a right to a plot of land of QUANTITY .

In DATE the authorities replied to the applicant husband ’s letter asking why only a plot of land of QUANTITY instead of QUANTITY had been formed near the house , and stated that the plot of land QUANTITY where the LOC had been situated , would be divided for several co - owners of the LOC and the rest of the land would be returned to the applicant ’s husband by the means he chose .

On DATE the applicant ’s husband died and the applicant became his heir .

On DATE the applicant ’s son , as the representative of the applicant , asked the authorities to restore the property rights of his father to the plot of land of CARDINAL hectares by paying compensation in securities .

On DATE the property rights of the applicant ’s husband were restored in natura to QUANTITY of land and it was provided that compensation of MONEY ( ORG ) would be paid in securities for the remaining QUANTITY of land . On DATE this decision was changed and it was decided to restore the applicant ’s husband ’s property rights to a plot of land of QUANTITY in natura and to pay compensation in securities for the plot of land of QUANTITY , amounting to approximately ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL .

NORP In DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG , claiming that the compensation in securities , established by the national authorities , was unjust , and asking to have the value of the plot of land measuring CARDINAL hectares recalculated . In DATE the applicant applied to have the administrative proceedings suspended and to have the matter of calculation of compensation referred to ORG .

On DATE ORG held that ORG had calculated the compensation in accordance with the methodology approved by ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . However , the calculation of the municipality provided that the market value of the plot was approximately EUR CARDINAL and the market value of the plot as calculated by ORG was approximately ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL . The court stated that in comparison with these numbers , the value of the plot of land provided by ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) was CARDINAL times lower , and it could not conform to the principle of equal value . Moreover , in accordance with the methodology approved by the Government , the calculation was the same for plots of land in the city centre and outside the city . The court thus decided to suspend the administrative proceedings and to refer the matter to ORG .

NORP In DATE ORG informed the applicant that the relevant laws had been changed and that she could change the form of restoration of the property rights to QUANTITY of land . Instead of securities she could choose CARDINAL of the following : to be assigned a new plot of land of equivalent value to the one held previously ; to have the liabilities to the ORG legally voided ; to be assigned a new plot of land for individual construction ; to receive monetary compensation . It appears that the applicant did not reply to this letter .

On DATE the applicant was included on the list of persons to receive a plot of land for construction of an individual house .

After the matter had been resolved by ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , ORG rejected the applicant ’s claim on DATE . The court analysed the domestic regulation regarding the calculation of the value of the land and observed that this matter had been referred to ORG , which held that the methodology approved by the Government setting down the principles of calculation of the value of the land was in accordance with the law . ORG also held that the PERSON on the Restoration of Citizens’ Ownership Rights to Existing Real Property had been changed and persons could , before DATE , choose other means to restore their property rights than by payment of securities . If no other means were chosen , the property rights had to be restored by paying monetary compensation . The court further observed that the authorities had suggested the applicant choose other means to have her property rights restored ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , and that in DATE it had been decided to include the applicant on the list of persons to receive a plot of land for construction of an individual house . The decision the applicant complained of , that is to say the calculation of the compensation to be paid in securities , had not been of legal importance to the applicant because the Law on the Restoration of Citizens’ Ownership Rights to Existing Real Property had been changed and it had become impossible to restore the property rights in securities . The decision to restore the applicant ’s property rights by paying her compensation in securities had to be changed to monetary compensation . Because the applicant had been included on the list of persons to receive a new plot of land for individual construction , she could use another way to restore her property rights .

The applicant appealed . On DATE ORG upheld the first - instance decision . The court also emphasised the argument of ORG that , in calculating the compensation , it was justified to pay heed not only to the market value of the property but also to its value at the time of nationalisation and to the changes in the quality and the value of property . ORG also held that the applicant had complained about the length of the court proceedings . The court held that the applicant had lodged the complaint on DATE ; it had been accepted by ORG on DATE . On DATE ORG had decided to apply to ORG , which had adopted its decision on DATE . The proceedings in the administrative case had recommenced on DATE and the decision had been adopted on DATE . Given the complexity of the case and referral of the matter to ORG , the length of proceedings had not breached the reasonable time requirement .

On DATE ORG informed the applicant ’s son , as the applicant ’s representative , that on DATE it had become possible to restore the property rights by receiving a plot of forest of equal value . The applicant was asked to express her wish before DATE . It appears that she never replied to this letter .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention;Reasonableness of pre-trial detention)

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant was arrested on suspicion of causing grievous bodily injuries to Mr K. On DATE ORG of GPE remanded him in custody .

On DATE the applicant and other persons were charged with running of a criminal syndicate , extortion and other offences . On DATE the case was sent for trial to ORG .

On DATE ORG , further to a verdict by a jury , found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment .

On DATE ORG of GPE quashed the conviction and remitted the case for a new trial . It decided that the applicant should stay in custody :

“ Zavorin , P[. ] , K[. ] , Sp[. ] and Sl[. ] stand accused of serious and particularly serious offences . Having regard to the gravity of the charges and the information on their character which is available in the case materials , the court considers that the grounds listed in paragraph CARDINAL of LAW are present . The information about the case , taken in its entirety , gives reason to consider that , if the above individuals were to be released from custody , they might abscond and thereby prevent the case from being examined within a reasonable time ( the time the proceedings before the first - instance court have already taken should not be discounted ) or they might influence the witnesses or victims . Under these circumstances , the court considers that these individuals must be placed into custody for DATE ” .

On DATE ORG returned the case to the prosecutor so that certain procedural defects could be remedied . It also extended the applicant ’s and other defendants’ detention for a further DATE , referring mainly to the gravity of the charges but also to the wording of ORG decision of DATE . In so far as the applicant sought to rely on the ORG ’s admission of a violation , ORG held as follows :

“ The defendant PERSON filed an application for release on an undertaking to appear and to be of good conduct , relying on the fact that his prolonged detention in the present proceedings was deemed to be unjustified in the framework of the proceedings on his application before ORG and that the [ NORP ] Government offered him compensation ... which he refused ...

PERSON [ and another co - defendant ] submitted documents concerning the examination of their applications by ORG which are in LANGUAGE ; they are not translated into LANGUAGE or properly certified . The document in LANGUAGE which PERSON submitted is not certified either . The court is not competent to translate the documents which the parties submitted ...

Having regard to the number and nature of the offences imputed to Sp[. ] , P[. ] , A. L. LOC and St[. ] and the public danger they represent , the information on their character , the particular complexity of the criminal case , the time that the remedying of the defects and a subsequent trial will take , the court considers that their detention must be extended for a further three months , until DATE . ”

On DATE the senior investigator of ORG ordered the applicant ’s release , noting that he had spent in custody CARDINAL DATE , whereas the Code of Criminal Procedure set the maximum duration of pre - trial detention at DATE .


Julia Laffranque;Paul Lemmens;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Georges Ravarani;Ksenija Turković

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the Court by Ms Tuğba Tüfek , a lawyer practising in GPE .

On DATE the applicant was dismissed from his employment . In the dismissal notice , it was noted that the poor performance of the applicant had been brought to his attention in previous appraisal interviews and that a prior warning had been issued . It was also indicated that remedial coaching had been provided to the applicant on several occasions during DATE ; however , the employer company had not discerned any progress .

On DATE the applicant initiated proceedings before ORG against his former employer , requesting the annulment of his dismissal and asking to be reinstated . During the proceedings , the domestic court requested an expert report to determine if the dismissal notice had been issued in accordance with the relevant legislation and whether the grounds for dismissal given by the employer could be justified . In their report , the experts stated that there had been no procedural shortcomings in respect of the dismissal notice . The experts nevertheless stated that dismissal in such cases should be a last resort and that the applicant could have been given continuous coaching and mentoring to improve his performance .

On DATE ORG gave its judgment and dismissed the applicant ’s case . The first instance judge concluded that the dismissal grounds had been notified to the applicant in accordance with the law and that the applicant had been able to put forward his defence submissions . The judge , after taking into consideration the expert report , held that the applicant ’s performance had not been satisfactory and that he had not participated in necessary team work exercises . He therefore concluded that the grounds for dismissal had been sufficient . In his appeal petition , the applicant argued that his performance could not be considered as insufficient . On DATE , finding in line with the first instance court ’s reasoning , ORG rejected the applicant ’s appeal .

Article CARDINAL of LAW in so far as relevant reads :

“ An employee who alleges that no reason was given for his dismissal or who considers that the reasons indicated were not sufficient as to justify his dismissal shall be entitled to lodge an objection with the labour court within DATE of his receipt of the dismissal notice ...

The first - instance court must apply fast - track procedures and conclude the case within DATE . If an appeal is lodged , ORG must issue its final verdict within DATE . ... ”


Violation of Article 6+6-3-d - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-d - Examination of witnesses)

Ján Šikuta;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE ORG indicted the applicant and a third party for procurement and for unlawful deprivation of freedom . It held , amongst other things , that there was reasonable suspicion that the applicant and his co - accused had threatened and forced into prostitution CARDINAL underage girls , namely ORG , GPE , ORG , ORG and G.S.S. It relied on testimonial evidence , including the statements of the CARDINAL girls , the minutes of witness confrontations , a report of the search carried out at the applicant ’s home , lists of telephone calls , the applicant ’s medical documents , his statements and those of his co - accused .

DATE and DATE ORG adjourned the proceedings CARDINAL times to allow , amongst other things , the summoning of the witnesses who had been heard at the pre - trial stage of the proceedings . At the hearings of CARDINAL and DATE the applicant ’s lawyer asked the court to hear the aforementioned witnesses . The court ordered that as from DATE any witness who refused to appear should be fined .

DATE and DATE , bailiffs tried CARDINAL times to enforce the warrants ( mandate de aducere ) issued by the court for some of the witnesses to appear before the court . According to the bailiffs’ reports , witnesses had left the country ( M.M.K. , F.P.D. and ORG ) , moved to unknown addresses ( PERSON , ORG , ORG ) or could not be found at home ( NORP ) . PERSON was still living at the indicated address but was not found at home . C.R.R. , as confirmed by her neighbours , had changed her name and had moved to an unknown address DATE . PERSON was not living at the address known by the authorities ; he had sold his flat and was not registered at a different one . According to the available information he had left for GPE . M.M.K. , who was a foreign national , had left the country on an unspecified date and for an unknown destination , while ORG ’s and ORG ’s mothers declared that their daughters had left the country for GPE , GPE and GPE in DATE and on DATE , respectively , and that they did not know their addresses . According to ORG ’s relatives , she had married , changed her name and did not plan to return to GPE in the near future because she was pregnant . ORG ’s neighbours confirmed her mother ’s statements . G.C.R. had changed his name and according to his neighbours he had moved some time ago to an unknown address . ORG address was incorrect and no one with the witness ’s first name lived at the available address .

ORG asked ORG ( PERSON ) , ORG and ORG on several occasions to provide information on the whereabouts of the witnesses who had failed to appear before the court , namely PERSON , ORG C.R. , F.P.D. , ORG and PERSON At the hearing of CARDINAL DATE the court noted that ORG had confirmed that the witness ORG had changed his name to ORG and continued to summon him under both names . On DATE the ORG informed the court that according to ORG ’s relatives , she had left the country after marrying a NORP national , and confirmed that she had changed her name and was residing at an unknown address in GPE . The authorities provided the courts with the available information concerning the aforementioned remaining missing witnesses , and stated repeatedly that they had no other records of their current valid addresses .

By interlocutory judgments of DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE ORG held that on the basis of information provided in the enforcement reports produced by the bailiffs , ORG , ORG , ORG , ORG and ORG , it was impossible to hear ORG , F.P.D. , ORG , ORG , ORG It relied on LAW and held that the statements of ORG , ORG , ORG , ORG and PERSON given at the pre - trial stage of the proceedings would be read out before the court at the end of the judicial investigation stage of the proceedings . Except for PERSON ’s statement , there is no evidence in the case file that the statements of those witnesses were read out before the court .

On DATE I.I.C. attended a hearing before ORG , but he was not heard by the court because the applicant ’s chosen legal representative was missing . The court adjourned the proceedings until DATE pending the arrival of the applicant ’s legal representative . PERSON informed the court that he could not wait because he had to undergo surgery . He asked to be summoned for the following hearing , and promised to present documentation attesting to his need for medical treatment . The court noted that the witness was living without being registered at an address in the town of GPE . By the time the proceedings were reopened DATE , PERSON had left the court . He did not attend any subsequent hearings and the authorities failed to find him , although they also attempted to summon him at the aforementioned unregistered address .

Some of the witnesses who testified against the applicant at the pretrial stage of the proceedings were located by the authorities and brought before the court .

On DATE , DATE and DATE the ORG heard M.A , NORP , ORG , F.H.A. and J.L.A. The court dismissed PERSON ’s request to be heard in the applicant ’s absence . PERSON stated amongst other things that the applicant had threatened her and had forced her into prostitution . She had not met any other girls apart from ORG and had been sold to the applicant by PERSON withdrew her previous statement given at the pre - trial stage of the proceedings and declared that the authorities had forced her to accuse the applicant of procurement . ORG confirmed his previous statements given at the pre - trial stage of the proceedings . He contended that he knew the applicant and that although he had met some of the girls , they did not live with him . F.H.A. stated that he did not know the applicant . Although he had had sex with several of the girls he had met at the club allegedly run by the applicant , he had not paid for it . PERSON withdrew his statement given at the pre - trial stage of the proceedings , denied that he knew the applicant or that he had previously been asked by the authorities if he had paid for sexual relations .

By an interlocutory judgment of DATE ORG dismissed , among other things , a request lodged by the applicant ’s lawyer to adjourn the proceedings in order to allow him to locate NORP and to bring him before the court as a witness . Having assumed that PERSON would be heard by the court , he had not examined the file thoroughly enough to be able to submit oral observations on behalf of the applicant . The court refused his request , holding that it had already decided that it was impossible to have PERSON heard and that the absence of the witness did not hinder the examination of the merits of the case .

On DATE the statement given by PERSON at the pre - trial stage of the proceedings was read out before the court . Subsequently , the court allowed the parties to submit oral observations on the merits of the case and allowed a request submitted by the applicant ’s lawyer to adjourn the proceedings in order to allow the parties to submit written observations on the merits of the case .

By a judgment of DATE ORG acquitted the applicant of unlawful deprivation of freedom , convicted him of procurement and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment . It held that the facts of the case had been established on the basis of the statements given by ORG ; the statements of the girls forced into prostitution , namely ORG , NORP , ORG and GPE – the girls described how they had met the applicant and his co - defendant , and how they had prostituted themselves ; they provided details on how they had been contacted by clients , the money given to the applicant , and the appearance of some of the clients ; the report of the search carried out at the applicant ’s home ; the description of the objects found in the applicant ’s home which belonged to ORG ; the letter received by ORG from her mother , which referred to rumours that her daughter and the other girls had been prostituting themselves ; the list of telephone calls made from the applicant ’s phone , which established the phone contact between the applicant , his co - defendant and some of the clients who had contacted the applicant ’s co - defendant or with whom she had had sexual relations , namely ORG , FAC , ORG , GPE , GPE , F.H.A. , PERSON and PERSON ; and the witness testimonies of NORP , PERSON , ORG , F.H.A. , J.L.A. and PERSON made at the pre - trial stage of the proceedings , which established , with the help of the list of telephone calls and the statements of the QUANTITY underage girls , the applicant ’s involvement in procurement . The court noted that only GPE and ORG had confirmed their own statements given at the pre - trial stage of the proceedings . It also noted that ORG , PERSON and M.M.K. could not be heard as witnesses by the court . In addition , witnesses NORP , J.L.A. and F.H.A. , like the applicant ’s co - defendant , had significantly changed the statements they had given at the pre - trial stage of the proceedings by affirming that they had never paid for sex . Having regard to the conflicting witness and co - defendant statements , the court decided to rely on those testimonies which had been confirmed by the other evidence available in the file . Consequently , it considered that the testimonies given by the witnesses and the co - defendant at the pre - trial stage of the proceedings were accurate as they had been made closer to the date of the unlawful acts and had also been corroborated by the remaining available evidence . Furthermore , it dismissed PERSON ’s statement and those of the defendants given before the court because they contained several inaccuracies .

The applicant appealed against the judgment , arguing that the court had summoned as witnesses , but had failed to summon as victims , the QUANTITY girls who had allegedly been forced into prostitution . In addition , the statements of the QUANTITY girls were not supported by any other evidence , and all the victims of his alleged unlawful acts should have been heard by the court .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG allowed in part the applicant ’s appeal in so far as the classification of his offence was concerned , upheld his sentence and dismissed the remaining points of his appeal . It held that given the nature of the unlawful act with which the applicant had been charged , it would not have been justified to summon as victims the girls he had forced into prostitution . Moreover , the applicant could not rely on the court ’s failure to do so as long as his personal interest was not affected . As for the facts established by the first - instance court , the appeal court held that they had been confirmed by the evidence in the file . In particular , the testimonies of the CARDINAL girls , ORG , ORG , ORG and ORG had been corroborated by the testimonies of PERSON , GPE , ORG , ORG and FAC that with the help of the applicant ’s co - defendant , they had paid for sexual relations with several girls . PERSON had testified that the applicant had been interested in meeting girls who wanted to leave the country and work as dancers in bars , and PERSON had repeatedly driven the applicant and the girls to various hotels . Consequently , the appeal court considered that the first - instance court had correctly convicted the applicant of procurement .

The applicant appealed on points of law ( recurs ) against the judgment . He argued , amongst other things , that the court had summoned as witnesses , but had failed to summon as victims the QUANTITY girls who had allegedly been forced into prostitution . In addition , the judicial investigation of the case had been insufficient because the evidence had not been administered publicly .

At a hearing of DATE before ORG the applicant ’s lawyer reiterated some of the arguments which he had raised before the second - instance court . Moreover , he contended that some witnesses , including ORG , ORG , had not been heard directly by the first - instance court and that the court had not provided reasons for its failure to hear them . Also , the address on the summons intended for I.I.C. had been incomplete . The summons had been sent to a town in the county of GPE , even though ORG had stated that the witness was not registered there . The courts had failed to hear other witnesses as well , including GPE , and to take measures to bring those witnesses before them . Consequently , he asked the court to quash the judgments of the lower courts and to order a review of all the evidence in the file .

By a final judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG allowed in part the applicant ’s appeal on points of law in so far as it reduced his sentence to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment , and dismissed the remainder of the appeal . It held that the lower courts had correctly established the facts of the case and the applicant ’s guilt on the basis of the evidence administered at the pre - trial stage of the proceedings and re - confirmed at the trial . The fact that the girls forced by him into prostitution had been summoned during the trial not as victims but as witnesses was not an argument the applicant could rely on as long as his personal interest had not been affected . As for the evidence establishing the facts of the case , the court reiterated the reasoning of the second - instance court . Moreover , the applicant ’s arguments that the court had failed to administer and examine directly all the evidence raised during the pre - trial stage of the proceedings , that his rights of defence had been breached and that the debate had not been adversarial were unsubstantiated . A court could rely either on the testimonies given at the pre - trial stage of the proceedings or on the ones given before the court if it was convinced that only some of them reflected the truth and were corroborated by the evidence in the file . A court could rely on the testimonies given at the pre - trial stage of the proceedings if it was impossible to hear the witness directly . A judgment could not be quashed on the grounds that a witness had not been heard directly by the court , unless a party had been prejudiced . In the present case , the lower courts had allowed the applicant ’s requests to hear the witnesses who had testified at the pretrial stage of the proceedings and had taken measures to secure their attendance at the trial . The judgments of the lower courts could not be quashed because they had provided reasons for their inability to hear some of the witnesses , namely that they had left the country , and the testimonies had been read out at a public hearing . Consequently , the lower courts had followed the correct procedure in establishing the applicant ’s guilt by using evidence collected both at the pre - trial and the trial stages of the proceedings .

On DATE the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal ( contestație ȋn anulare ) , seeking the quashing of the final judgment of CARDINAL DATE . He argued that his right of defence had been breached on DATE because he had been unable to attend the hearings held before the last - instance court on account of his serious medical condition and therefore he had been unable to ask for additional evidence .

On DATE ORG allowed the applicant ’s extraordinary appeal , quashed the judgment of DATE and ordered the last - instance court to re - examine the appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant against the judgment of CARDINAL DATE because he had been unable to attend the hearings before the last - instance court on account of his medical condition .

On DATE the applicant submitted his reasons for appeal on points of law before the last - instance court . He argued , among other things , that some of the witnesses , including ORG , ORG , had not been heard . In addition , the first - instance court had dismissed the request to re - summon the witness I.I.C. , whose testimony had been relevant for the case . Other witnesses , including GPE , had also not been heard and no steps had been taken to bring them before the first - instance court .

By a final judgment of DATE ORG allowed in part the applicant ’s appeal on points of law against the judgment of CARDINAL DATE and reduced his sentence to DATE imprisonment . It held that the first and second - instance courts had been active and had collected all the relevant evidence for the case . They had diligently taken all the necessary steps in order to hear the evidence directly and to verify the applicant ’s defence arguments . They had valid reasons for not having directly heard all the victims and witnesses in the case , namely that the individuals in question had left the country . Consequently , the courts had applied LAW . The factual circumstances had been established on the basis of ORG and ORG ’s statements ; the statements of the girls forced into prostitution , namely ORG , NORP , ORG and ORG , who described how they had met the defendants and how they had prostituted themselves , and provided details on how they had been contacted by clients and on the money given to the applicant ; the report of the search carried out at the applicant ’s home ; the report containing a description of the objects belonging to ORG , which had been found in the applicant ’s home ; the letter received by ORG from her mother , which had been found in the applicant ’s home ; the list of telephone calls made from the applicant ’s phone , which had established the phone contact between the defendants and some of the clients who had contacted the applicant ’s co - defendant or with whom she had had sexual relations ; and the witness testimonies of NORP , PERSON , ORG , F.H.A. , J.L.A. and M.M.K.

On an unspecified date ORG instituted criminal proceedings for perjury against the witness NORP who had changed her testimony before the first - instance court in the applicant ’s favour .

By an order of DATE ORG discontinued the criminal proceedings for perjury against NORP on the grounds that her action had not met the level of severity required for an offence and the domestic courts had disregarded her statement given at the trial . However , it fined NORP the sum of RON CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL ) for her behaviour . G.S.S. did not challenge the order before the domestic courts .