No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Procedural guarantees of review)

Armen Harutyunyan;Carlo Ranzoni;Johannes Silvis;Luis López Guerra;Mārtiņš Mits

The applicant was born in DATE and resides in GPE .

The relevant facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicant was the chairman of the ORG - owned joint stock company L. On DATE ORG ( GPE novēršanas un apkarošanas birojs ) opened a criminal investigation into suspected unlawful activity by the company ’s officials .

On DATE at TIME investigator PERSON ordered a search of the applicant ’s apartment . It was possible that he was involved in the offences under investigation , and there was reason to believe that unlawfully obtained money and some other items were located there .

CARDINAL and TIME officers from the ORG carried out the search . The applicant was allowed to telephone his lawyer who , according to him , arrived at TIME

The applicant submitted that during the search he had not been free to leave the apartment .

The search record , however , stated that he and his wife had been informed of their right to remain present and make remarks about the ORG actions . They had attended the search . His lawyer had noted down in the record that the decision authorising the search did not comply with certain provisions of LAW GPE likums ) . It was signed by all CARDINAL of them .

At TIME the applicant telephoned a security guard at company PERSON to ask that his driver place his briefcase in a car .

At TIME the officers informed the applicant he was under arrest .

CARDINAL investigator PERSON drew up an arrest record specifying that the applicant had been arrested at TIME on suspicion of abuse of office with intent to obtain a material benefit and assisting money laundering , and that a witness had identified him as a perpetrator . He and his lawyer signed the record , noting also that his arrest was unjustified .

At TIME the applicant was interviewed .

The investigating authorities performed CARDINAL searches in total that day and , according to the applicant , arrested CARDINAL other individuals . The Government submitted , without indicating when , that CARDINAL individuals had been arrested . They further drew attention to the large scale of the crimes under investigation and various investigative actions .

On DATE at TIME served on the applicant a decision declaring him a suspect and an application addressed to FAC ( PERSON pilsētas ORG rajona tiesa ) for his pre - trial detention . His lawyer was present at the time .

According to PERSON there was a strong suspicion that , DATE and DATE the applicant , in his position as chairman of company ORG , had secured decisions favourable to companies ORG and ORG for the reconstruction of hydro units and regarding a thermal power plant project . A sum of CARDINAL euros ( ORG ) obtained as a result of this unlawful activity had allegedly been laundered through companies registered in GPE and abroad , by way of property transactions and investments in companies owned by the applicant and PERSON By doing so , the applicant had allegedly committed the offences of abuse of office with intent to obtain a material benefit and assisting money laundering .

The applicant , referring to his lawyer ’s handwritten application , contended that at TIME his lawyer had applied to PERSON for leave to consult , prior to the detention hearing , the documents in support of the application for detention . She had refused the request . The Government , however , submitted that neither the applicant nor his lawyer had made any complaints about access to the case file .

TIME an investigating judge of FAC held the hearing .

NORP The applicant ’s lawyer requested PERSON to provide evidence in support of the application for detention . She refused to do so and the hearing continued .

The lawyer submitted that the officers had controlled the applicant ’s movements in the apartment from the start of the search . He had therefore requested them to draw up a record of his client ’s arrest . In this connection , he pointed out that no one could be held in custody for TIME .

The investigating judge granted PERSON ’s application and ordered the applicant ’s detention pending trial . With regard to the suspicion that he had committed the offences in question , the judge reasoned as follows :

“ ... search records , inspection records , statements [ and ] other material of the criminal proceedings give rise to grounds for suspicion that [ the applicant ] has committed the offences in relation to which the criminal proceedings have been instituted ... ”

As regards access to the case file , the judge stated :

“ Section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW provides that case material is a secret of the investigation ... material and evidence that justify [ the applicant ’s ] detention contain secret information ... [ the investigator ] has the right to disclose this material ... only to officials involved in the criminal proceedings . ”

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer lodged an appeal against this decision . On DATE he submitted his arguments in support thereof .

He requested ORG ( PERSON apgabaltiesa ) to grant him access to the case file so as to be able to effectively challenge the applicant ’s detention . It did not grant the request .

On DATE an appeal hearing was held . The lawyer maintained that he had the right to access the documents upon which the applicant ’s detention had been based .

ORG dismissed the appeal and upheld the original ruling . With regard to the suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question , the judge stated :

“ The court has had sufficient time to examine the case material furnished to it . The court , like [ the lower court ] , concludes that information has been obtained ... giving rise to grounds for suspicion that [ the applicant ] has committed the accused offences . The court reached that conclusion having examined ... records of investigative actions [ and ] witness statements , and with special attention paid to information obtained by ... special investigative actions ... carried out long before the criminal proceedings were instituted . ”

As regards access to the case file , the judge reasoned as follows :

“ An official in charge of criminal proceedings presents case material to an investigating or higher judge for them to assess grounds of pre - trial detention . An investigating or higher judge examines the case material ... [ which ] is kept secret from the parties not conducting the proceedings . ”

No appeal lay against this decision .

On DATE the investigating judge released the applicant on bail .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer lodged a complaint regarding his client ’s arrest with ORG .

On DATE prosecutor PERSON dismissed it . Neither the applicant nor his lawyer had noted in the search record that the applicant ’s freedom of movement or his liberty had been restricted during the search ; they had not noted anything in the arrest record to say that he had been deprived of his liberty before this either . The applicant ’s lawyer had not specified the manner in which his client had been deprived of his liberty . It could not therefore be established that he had been deprived of his liberty during the search .

By a final decision of CARDINAL DATE chief prosecutor PERSON dismissed the complaint .


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Reasonableness of pre-trial detention)

Carlo Ranzoni;Ganna Yudkivska;Marko Bošnjak;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Georges Ravarani

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the Pest Central District Court remanded the applicant in custody under LAW ( b ) and ( c ) of LAW , on suspicion of aggravated murder within the meaning of LAW . It summarised the suspicions against him , referred to police reports , an autopsy report , the victim ’s medical documents , examinations of various exhibits and witness testimonies , and concluded that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had poisoned the victim on DATE . The court found it established that there was a need for the applicant ’s detention , because otherwise he would tamper with evidence by exerting pressure on the witnesses , as evidenced by his previous conduct whereby he had threatened them . It dismissed an argument by the applicant that he had committed the criminal offence DATE before , thus the prosecutor ’s office had erred in stating that he could tamper with evidence or influence witnesses . The court also held that the applicant ’s “ unclear ” financial situation and the severity of the possible punishment demonstrated that there was a risk of his absconding . The court gave no consideration to an application by the applicant ’s lawyer for the applicant to be placed under house arrest .

An appeal against that decision was dismissed on DATE .

On DATE the Buda Central District Court extended the applicant ’s pre - trial detention until CARDINAL DATE . It noted again that because of the severity of the possible punishment and the fact that the applicant had neither a permanent address nor a regular income , there were grounds to believe that he would abscond . The court held that there was a risk of his interfering with the investigation if he were to threaten the witnesses or destroy physical evidence .

The applicant appealed , arguing that the conditions for pre - trial detention had not been fulfilled because there was no risk of his absconding or influencing witnesses . He argued that his well - established personal circumstances – the fact that he lived with his common - law wife and CARDINAL children , his parents , and his brother ’s family – and the fact that he had no criminal record excluded the risk of his absconding . He further submitted that he had cooperated with the investigating authorities . Alternatively , the applicant requested that he be released and placed under house arrest .

The first - instance decision was upheld on appeal by ORG on DATE , and the court ’s reasoning was that the public interest in the applicant being detained was more important than his interest in his right to liberty being respected .

On DATE the Buda ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE . The court maintained its previous reasons justifying the need for his detention . It emphasised that there was a risk of his absconding , owing to the severity of the possible punishment and the fact that he had no declared employment and had previously not been reachable at his permanent address . It added that , if released , the applicant might influence the witnesses or destroy evidence .

On DATE ORG upheld that decision .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE under LAW ( b ) ( risk of absconding ) and ( c ) ( risk of collusion ) of LAW . As regards the risk of absconding , the court found that although the applicant had previously not been reachable at his permanent address and had only had temporary jobs , his temporary residence had been known and he had no criminal record . However , given the seriousness of the potential punishment and his “ unstable ” financial circumstances , his presence at the proceedings could only be ensured through the most restrictive measure . As regards the risk of collusion , the court dismissed an argument by the applicant ’s lawyer that the prosecution authorities should have questioned all the witnesses by that stage of the proceedings . It held that although the majority of the witnesses had been heard , further questioning could still be necessary .

On DATE ORG upheld the lower court ’s decision under LAW ( b ) and ( c ) of LAW .

Subsequently , the applicant ’s pre - trial detention was extended on a number of occasions . In particular , on DATE ORG extended his detention until DATE . The court found that he had failed to attach a “ hosting declaration ” ( befogadó nyilatkozat ) and a declaration of his host ’s financial capacity to his application to be placed under house arrest . According to the court , although the investigation was about to conclude , based on previous witness testimonies , there was a risk that the applicant would intimidate witnesses . It also held that this last reason could justify the applicant being detained until the closure of the investigation . That decision was upheld on appeal by ORG on DATE . Although by that time the applicant had submitted a hosting declaration , the appeal court objected to his release for the reason that he had not provided a declaration of his host ’s financial capacity .

Furthermore , on CARDINAL DATE ORG held that the unclarified financial situation of the applicant and the seriousness of the crime substantiated the risk of his absconding . It also found , without giving further reasoning , that there were still grounds to believe that at that stage of the proceedings the applicant would influence the witnesses . In an appeal , the applicant argued that the investigating authorities had implemented no procedural measures , the proceedings had been unreasonably lengthy , and previously he had always been reachable at his temporary residence . As regards the risk of his influencing witnesses , the applicant submitted that no such risk could be established DATE after the alleged criminal offence . On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal , stating that the investigation was being conducted in a timely manner and witness testimonies had previously evidenced that the applicant had tried to exert pressure on the witnesses .

On DATE the applicant ’s pre - trial detention was extended by ORG until DATE . The court maintained that , under Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( b ) of LAW , his detention was still necessary because of the risk of his absconding . It considered that the applicant had no “ financial or essential ” ties counterbalancing the risk of him escaping an eventual serious punishment . Although he had family ties , a child who was a minor , and a relative willing to give assurances to provide for him if he were released , given the seriousness of the charges , the gravity of the possible punishment and his unstable financial circumstances , there was a real risk that he would abscond . However , the court did not find that the risk of collusion ( Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( c ) of LAW ) was substantiated , since there was no way to influence any of the investigative measures which the prosecution had relied on . In particular , the witness who the investigating authorities still intended to hear was unlikely to testify , given the fact that he was ill and unreachable . The court also considered that although it was likely that the applicant ’s acquaintances and relatives had tried to influence witnesses in DATE following the commission of the crime , there was no reliable information that this had actually taken place , and a hypothetical risk of further attempts to do so could not substantiate the risk of collusion .

That decision was upheld on appeal on DATE .

On DATE the applicant ’s pre - trial detention was extended until DATE . The court agreed with the applicant ’s argument that his unsettled personal circumstances could not be relied on to justify his detention after the passing of a lengthy period of time following his arrest . It nonetheless held that , in the absence of any financial ties , his family ties could not counterbalance the risk of his absconding , also having regard to the severity to the potential punishment .

NORP That decision was upheld on appeal by ORG on DATE , and an appeal by the applicant to the effect that less restrictive measures could be applied in his case was dismissed .

The Budapest High Court extended the applicant ’s pre - trial detention on CARDINAL DATE , reiterating the same arguments as before . It dismissed the applicant ’s arguments that no investigative measure had been implemented for a considerable period of time . It also found that the hosting declaration of the applicant ’s family member , the fact that he was raising a child who was a minor , and the fact that his legal residence had also been clarified were irrelevant , and did not diminish the risk of his absconding . The second - instance court upheld the decision on DATE .

On DATE the applicant ’s pre - trial detention was extended again for DATE under Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( b ) of LAW . However , ORG expressed doubts as to whether there was enough evidence to conclude that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the crime . It dismissed an argument by the prosecutor ’s office that the applicant would hinder the investigation . It considered that , irrespective of the seriousness of the charges , it appeared that there was less risk of his absconding , since he was raising CARDINAL children who were minors and he had no criminal record . On appeal , ORG upheld the first - instance judgment but extended the applicant ’s detention by DATE .

On DATE the applicant ’s detention was extended ; the Budapest High Court again referred to the fact that , at the time of his arrest , the applicant had been unreachable at his permanent address and had been earning a living from temporary jobs , which , taken together with the severity of the potential punishment , substantiated the risk of his absconding . The decision was upheld on appeal on DATE .

On DATE the ORG released the applicant from pre - trial detention and placed him on bail under house arrest . According to that decision , besides the suspicion against the applicant , the only grounds for restricting his liberty were the risk of his absconding , given the gravity of the offence , and this in itself could not justify his continued pre - trial detention . On appeal , ORG reversed the first - instance decision and placed the applicant in detention on DATE . It noted that , given the seriousness of the offence , there was a danger of his absconding , irrespective of his family ties .

On DATE the ORG released the applicant from detention upon his giving an undertaking not to leave his place of residence . Relying on the ORG ’s case - law , ORG found that pretrial detention could only serve as a measure of last resort , and the applicant ’s continued detention would only serve as an anticipated punishment . The decision was overturned by ORG on DATE , and the applicant was placed in detention for the same reasons as those given before .

On DATE ORG preferred a bill of indictment .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE first - instance court ’s judgment , under LAW b ) of LAW ( risk of absconding ) , for essentially the same reasons as those given before .

On DATE the applicant applied for release , but the application was dismissed on DATE by ORG on the grounds that , given the gravity of the offence and the complexity of the case , pretrial detention did not constitute an anticipated punishment . That decision was upheld on appeal by ORG on DATE . A further application by the applicant of DATE was dismissed on DATE ( the dismissal was upheld by the second - instance court on DATE ) on the grounds that the applicant had not relied on new circumstances warranting his release .

The applicant ’s detention was reviewed on DATE by ORG . It held that the gravity of the offence , the applicant ’s lack of financial resources and essential ties , and the fact that he had only notified the authorities of his place of residence once he had been placed in detention substantiated the risk of his absconding .

On appeal , that decision was upheld by the GPE on DATE , which endorsed the reasons given by the lower court . The PERSON also found that the applicant ’s pre - trial detention was both necessary and proportionate , and no less restrictive measure would be sufficient to ensure the purpose of the criminal proceedings .

On DATE the applicant was found guilty of aggravated murder and sentenced to DATE imprisonment by ORG .


CASE OF DAMJANOVIĆ AND EUROMAG D.O.O. v. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

The first applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE . The second applicant is a privately owned company , founded by the first applicant in DATE , with its registered seat in ORG , GPE .

On DATE the second applicant requested a licence to build a petrol station on the main highway in GPE and GPE .

On DATE ORG ( “ the Directorate ” ) rejected the request . The second applicant appealed on DATE .

On DATE ORG upheld that decision .

On DATE the second applicant initiated proceedings for judicial review before ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) .

On DATE and DATE the second applicant urged ORG to expedite the proceedings .

On DATE ORG quashed the decisions of DATE and DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL above ) on procedural grounds , and remitted the case to the ORG .

NORP On DATE the second applicant informed ORG that the decision of DATE had not been enforced yet .

On DATE the ORG rejected the second applicant ’s request . On DATE the second applicant appealed .

On DATE the second applicant complained to ORG about the inaction of the administration .

On DATE ORG upheld the decision of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The decision was served on the second applicant on DATE .

On DATE the second applicant initiated proceedings for judicial review with ORG seeking it to quash the decisions of DATE and CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL above ) . On DATE ORG referred the claim to ORG , as the competent court .

On DATE ORG rejected the application for judicial review .

On DATE the applicant submitted a request for an extraordinary review of the decision of CARDINAL DATE with ORG , which request was rejected as unfounded on DATE . That decision was served on the second applicant on DATE .

On DATE the second applicant lodged a constitutional appeal before ORG ( “ the LAW ” ) complaining , notably , about the length of the above administrative proceedings .

On DATE ORG rejected the appeal as unfounded . It noted that the relevant proceedings had lasted DATE and DATE in total , that CARDINAL different decisions had been rendered by the competent authorities and that , therefore , the length of the proceedings had not been excessive .


Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 37-1 - Striking out applications);Violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Right to free elections-{general} (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Stand for election);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

The applicant nominated himself to stand as an independent candidate in the parliamentary elections of CARDINAL DATE and applied for registration as a candidate in the single - mandate ORG No . DATE .

As LAW required that each nomination as a candidate for parliamentary elections be supported by a minimum of CARDINAL voters , on DATE the applicant submitted to ORG ( “ the ConEC ” ) CARDINAL signature sheets containing CARDINAL voter signatures collected in support of his candidacy .

Before the DATE ’s decision on the question of the applicant ’s registration as a candidate , the accuracy of the signature sheets and other registration documents submitted by the applicant were to be first examined by a special working group ( işçi qrupu ) established by the ConEC .

On DATE , the applicant was invited to the ConEC . He was informed that the validity of supporting signatures submitted by him had already been examined by the ConEC working group and that , based on the results of that examination , the ConEC had held a hearing on whether to register him as a candidate . According to the applicant , he orally protested to the fact that he had not been informed of the time of the examination by the working group of his signature sheets and that the ConEC had taken a decision without his participation .

On DATE the applicant was informed that by a decision of CARDINAL DATE the ConEC had refused the applicant ’s request for registration as a candidate . The ConEC found that , according to the opinion of the working group , a number of submitted supporting signatures were invalid , and that the number of the remaining valid signatures was below CARDINAL . According to the ConEC decision , the working group had relied on opinions of CARDINAL of its experts . In particular , expert PERSON found that CARDINAL signatures were not authentic , because they had been executed repeatedly by the same persons who had already signed the signature sheets . Expert GPE found that a total of CARDINAL signatures were invalid . No more detail was given in the ConEC decision as for the reasons for the invalidation of those signatures .

The applicant was provided with a copy of the ConEC decision on DATE . However , the relevant expert opinions were not made available to him until a further written request by the applicant to this effect .

According to the applicant , the expert opinion by ORG was undated , while the expert opinion by GPE was dated DATE . No copies of those expert opinions were submitted to the ORG either by the applicant or the Government . However , it can be discerned from other documents in the case file that , according to those expert opinions , the following grounds were given for invalidation of some of the signatures : ( a ) CARDINAL groups of signatures , consisting of a total of CARDINAL signatures , had been “ probably ( ehtimal ki ) executed by the same person in each group ” ; for these reasons , CARDINAL of those signatures were deemed valid , while the remaining CARDINAL were considered invalid ; ( b ) CARDINAL signatures were found to be invalid because the information on voters’ addresses was incomplete ( only the city of residence was mentioned ) ; and ( c ) CARDINAL signatures were considered invalid because the information on the relevant voters’ addresses omitted the city of residence ( all those voters lived in PERSON ) .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) against the PERSON decision to refuse registration . He complained , inter alia , of the following :

( a ) NORP contrary to the requirements of LAW , the applicant had not been invited to participate in the process of examination of the signature sheets by the ConEC working group and , thus , deprived of the right to give necessary explanations to the experts ;

( b ) NORP contrary to the requirements of LAW , he had not been provided with a copy of the record on the results of the examination of the signature sheets CARDINAL prior to the PERSON meeting on the applicant ’s registration ;

( c ) the applicant ’s presence at the PERSON meeting of DATE had not been ensured ; and

( d ) the findings of the ConEC working group that such a large number of signatures were invalid were factually wrong , arbitrary and unjustifiably formalistic . In particular , the finding that CARDINAL signatures were “ executed by the same person ” was accepted as an established fact merely on the basis of an indication of such probability by the expert , in the absence of any further factual verification . Furthermore , invalidation of the remaining signatures owing to incomplete information on the voters’ addresses had been wrong , because such information was not “ incorrect ” within the meaning of LAW ( on which the ConEC had relied ) , but simply incomplete and could , therefore , be rectified if the applicant had been given an opportunity to do so as required by LAW . In the applicant ’s view , taking into account the territorial location of the constituency , it should have been clear to the ConEC that the relevant voters resided in PERSON , even though they had not mentioned the city of residence on the signature sheets .

Enclosed with his complaint to the ORG , the applicant submitted written statements by CARDINAL voters , whose signatures had been declared invalid , affirming the authenticity of their signatures . He also submitted photocopies of ID cards of several voters in order to clarify the situation with their residence addresses . However , according to the applicant , those documents were not taken into consideration by the ORG .

The ORG conducted another examination of the signature sheets by members of its own working group . The applicant was not invited to participate in this process . According to the working group ’s DATE and CARDINAL expert opinions , a total of CARDINAL signatures were considered to be invalid . In particular , expert PERSON found that CARDINAL signatures were invalid because they belonged to persons with no right to vote ( minors DATE ) and that CARDINAL other signatures had been executed by persons whose identification document number was stated incorrectly . Expert U.A. found that “ CARDINAL groups of signatures , consisting of a total of CARDINAL signatures , had been probably executed by the same person in each group ” ( “ CARDINAL ədəd imza CARDINAL qrup olmaqla öz aralarında ehtimal ki , eyni şəxs tərəfindən icra olunmuşdur ” ) . This meant that CARDINAL signature in each such group should be considered valid ( a total of CARDINAL ) , while the remainder should be considered invalid ( a total of CARDINAL ) .

The applicant was not invited to the ORG meeting dealing with his complaint against the PERSON decision of DATE .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE the ORG dismissed the applicant ’s complaint and upheld the ConEC decision of DATE . It found that , based on the findings of the ORG ’s own working group , CARDINAL out of CARDINAL signatures submitted by the applicant were invalid and that the remaining number of CARDINAL valid signatures was below the minimum required by law .

The applicant was given copies of the ORG decision and the relevant working group documents on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against the ORG decision with ORG . He reiterated his complaints made before the ORG concerning the PERSON decision and procedures . Moreover , he raised , inter alia , the following complaints :

( a ) NORP contrary to the requirements of the electoral law , the ORG failed to notify him of its meetings and to ensure his presence during the examination of the signature sheets and the examination of his complaint ;

( b ) the relevant ORG documents had been made available to him in a belated manner , which was contrary to the requirements of the electoral law and had deprived him of the opportunity to challenge the decisions of the ORG and its working group more effectively ;

( c ) NORP both electoral PERSON decisions were based on expert opinions that contained nothing more than conjecture and speculation ( that the signatures were “ probably ” ( “ ehtimal ki ” ) falsified ) , instead of properly established facts ;

( d ) the ORG had ignored the written statements by CARDINAL voters confirming the authenticity of their invalidated signatures and had failed to take them into account ; and

( e ) the ORG had failed to provide any reasoning and had not addressed any of the applicant ’s arguments in its decision .

By a judgment of DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . In its judgment , the court took note of the ConEC and ORG decisions , proceeded to cite a number of provisions of LAW and LAW without explaining their relevance to the facts of the case at hand , did not address any of the applicant ’s arguments , and dismissed his appeal as “ unsubstantiated ” without providing reasons for reaching such a conclusion .

On DATE the applicant lodged a further appeal with ORG , reiterating his previous complaints and arguing that ORG had not carried out a fair examination of the case and had delivered an unreasoned judgment .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal as unsubstantiated , without examining his arguments in detail and finding no grounds for doubting the findings of the electoral commissions and ORG .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Deprivation of liberty;Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Deprivation of liberty;Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-b - Secure fulfilment of obligation prescribed by law);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for correspondence;Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant had a university degree in law ; he did not seek admission to the Bar as an advocate ( адвокат ) . He made his living as a registered private entrepreneur providing legal services . He worked for and later managed ORG ( арбитражное бюро « Витязь DATE ) , a private legal entity in the town of ORG . In DATE the applicant undertook to provide legal services to a private company in relation to administrative - offence proceedings against it . The company issued CARDINAL originals of an authority form for the applicant .

According to the applicant , CARDINAL original was inserted in the file of a then pending case before a commercial court ; the other one was used in submissions before ORG .

NORP In DATE criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of forgery of the administrative - offence record ( “ the offence record ” ) in the above case . According to the authorities , the applicant had added a handwritten note to the record which said , “ We want counsel to be present during the compiling of the offence record ” , and modified the date on which a copy of the record had been handed over to the defence .

Up until DATE the official database had FAC as the applicant ’s registered residential address . It appears that before or after that date , the applicant moved from his flat ( on FAC ) to reside in his mother ’s flat in the same town ( on FAC ) . He notified the residence registration office about that change .

The investigator dealing with the case issued a summons ( sent to the applicant ’s address on FAC ) requiring his attendance at her office on DATE in order to carry out investigative measures . On DATE a police officer reported that he had not delivered the summons since nobody had answered the door at that address .

On DATE the applicant was informed of the decision to institute criminal proceedings against him . On the same date , Investigator PERSON interviewed the applicant , who added handwritten comments to the interview record . It was mentioned in the interview record that the applicant was ( temporarily ) residing in GPE village ; the address on FAC was mentioned as his official residence ; the record also contained a note of the telephone number provided by the applicant .

NORP Further interviews were scheduled for CARDINAL and DATE , when the applicant refused the services of a legal - aid lawyer , PERSON also refused to sign an undertaking to appear at subsequent interviews when requested by the investigator .

Subsequently , the case was reassigned . On DATE a new investigator in charge of the case made telephone calls to the number which had been previously given by the applicant . The applicant abruptly put an end to the conversations .

On DATE the investigator called again and talked to the applicant ’s wife , who refused to assist the authorities in delivering the summons to the applicant . However , she clarified that the applicant was residing at his mother ’s flat ( on FAC ) . According to the Government , this address was different from the one he had previously given to the investigating authority .

On DATE the investigator interviewed the applicant ’s wife , who stated that the applicant was living on FAC and had been residing in PERSON during DATE .

On DATE the investigator issued a decision , under LAW ( “ the CCrP ” ) ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , ordering that the applicant be brought before her on DATE at TIME It was noted that the applicant resided at his mother ’s address and had previously failed to comply with summonses .

A similar decision was then issued on DATE , apparently , because the decision of CARDINAL DATE had not been enforced .

On DATE the chief officer of the investigating authority issued a decision , under LAW of the CCrP ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , requiring that measures be taken to locate the applicant . The decision read as follows :

“ On several occasions the suspect was summoned for the purpose of investigative measures ... but failed to appear , without reference to any valid excuse . The measures for establishing his current whereabouts have not produced any positive results . The investigating authority has reason to consider that the suspect is taking action to flee prosecution ... ”

On DATE the police talked to the applicant ’s mother , who provided information about the applicant ’s office address . At TIME the police arrived there . The applicant was informed that his name was on the list of wanted persons and that he was to follow the police officer in order to be taken before the investigator with a view to enforcing the decision of DATE .

According to the applicant , despite having requested it , he was not shown any official authorisation for such an order . In reply to his refusal to comply , the officers warned him that they would employ force . Thus , he was compelled to follow them to the police station to be taken before the investigator . The latter explained that she was not in possession of the case file at that time . At the investigator ’s request , the applicant gave a written undertaking to appear before her on DATE . No other investigative measures were taken on DATE in relation to the criminal case . The applicant left ORG at TIME

It is unclear whether the interview on DATE took place .

Subsequently , the applicant brought proceedings under LAW ORG complaining of having been deprived of his liberty on DATE and also about the decision of CARDINAL DATE . By a judgment of QUANTITY DATE , ORG of ORG rejected his claim . It held as follows :

“ The court dismissed as having no legal basis [ the applicant ’s ] allegation that the circumstances of the case required the drawing up of an arrest record under LAW of the CCrP. Such a record ‘ may be’ drawn up ( that is to say it is not an obligation ) if there are grounds cited in LAW ...

Article CARDINAL of the Code contains strict rules concerning arrest and detention of a suspect . Following escorting to the competent official , it is necessary to draw up , within TIME , an arrest record . It should indicate the dates and that notification of the procedural rights has been made . [ The applicant ] was present in the police station and ORG offices for DATE to clarify some details relating to the investigation of the criminal case and to take a decision concerning the pending request regarding [ the applicant ’s ] whereabouts . After this he was free to go . Thus , the court does not accept that the applicant was held within the meaning of LAW .

Therefore , it was not incumbent on the escorting officer or the investigator to provide counsel , to apprise [ the applicant ] of his rights or to compile an arrest record .

Under LAW ORG , arrest is defined as a measure of procedural compulsion used by an enquiring or investigating officer for a period not exceeding TIME after the actual taking of the person into custody on suspicion of a criminal offence ...

[ The arresting officer ] was a law - enforcement officer and thus the court has no doubts that his actions concerning [ the applicant ’s ] escorting to the police station and then to ORG were within the scope of his functional responsibilities . ”

The applicant appealed , arguing as follows . While agreeing with the court that the situation did not fall within the ambit of “ escorting ” under LAW CCrP , he insisted that the court , in substance , had denied the fact of his “ deprivation of liberty ” and had failed to cite another applicable statutory basis for it . In particular , LAW could not supply a valid basis since it only concerned escorting for identification purposes . In the applicant ’s view , LAW was applicable and thus the non - observance of its requirements ( namely , the drawing up of an arrest record and notification of procedural rights ) disclosed unlawfulness . The reference to TIME for drawing up the record did not imply that there had not been “ deprivation of liberty ” if a person was held for TIME , or that LAW CCrP would not apply .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment in the following terms :

“ The available material and testimonies do not disclose that the applicant was restricted in his right to liberty and personal security . The court rightly concluded that the investigator had lawfully issued the decision to determine the applicant ’s whereabouts . The police had acted on the basis of the investigator ’s decision , the enforcement of which required [ the applicant ’s ] escorting to the police . Thus , the police ’s actions could not be declared unlawful ...

[ The applicant ] was kept in the police station and before the investigator for TIME , which means that he was not ‘ ORG [ or ] ‘ ORG within the meaning of LAW

On an unspecified date in DATE or DATE , the investigation was suspended . It was resumed on DATE . The applicant was summoned for an interview with Investigator NORP “ on DATE at CARDINAL p.m ” . According to the applicant , he received the summons only on DATE . It turned out later on that there had been a mistake in the summons : the interview was planned for DATE .

On DATE , CARDINAL May and DATE the investigator issued orders for the applicant to be taken to the investigating authority ( LAW . According to the Government , the police did not enforce these orders since the applicant was not present at his residential and office addresses .

On DATE Investigator PERSON ordered that the applicant be brought before him on DATE at TIME It was indicated that the applicant had previously failed to comply with summonses ( on unspecified date(s ) ) , most recently by referring to an illness but failing to submit any related document .

On DATE the chief investigating officer came to the applicant ’s office and interviewed him . The applicant made a written statement concerning the criminal case . It appears that the investigating officer issued summonses for further interviews to be held on CARDINAL and DATE .

According to the applicant , on DATE he gave a written note to the officer indicating that he would not be able to attend on account of his state of health . The applicant did not attend the interview on DATE . It also appears that the applicant did not attend the interview on DATE .

A further decision to bring the applicant in for interview was issued on DATE .

On DATE Investigator PERSON issued a decision ordering the authorities to determine the applicant ’s whereabouts and suspending the investigation .

On DATE the deputy town prosecutor ordered the resumption of the investigation .

On DATE the chief investigating officer issued an order indicating that the applicant had failed on several occasions without a valid excuse to attend interviews with the investigator(s ) . Thus , he ordered that the applicant be brought before him on DATE at TIME

On DATE the police arrived at the applicant ’s office at TIME and compelled him to follow them to the police station instead of ORG , which was situated elsewhere . At the police station , the applicant was locked in a room and then provided with a copy of the order of DATE . The applicant was again informed , in the presence of counsel , of his rights and the decision to carry out a forensic examination . The applicant was interviewed and stated that he had received the summons for an interview scheduled in DATE or DATE , but could not come on account of his illness and had informed the investigating authority accordingly ; he had not submitted any medical certificate because , according to him , “ it [ had been ] his constitutional right not to do so ” . It is unclear whether the applicant left the police station at TIME

According to the Government ( who referred to the police station ’s logbook ) , the applicant was kept in the police station without being locked up CARDINAL and was then taken before the investigator . The Government submit that the applicant was in CARDINAL of the offices and that the building entrance door was equipped with an electronic lock for security measures .

The applicant brought proceedings under LAW ORG complaining about his arrest on DATE . By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE , ORG rejected his claim . The court held that the applicant had not been arrested , only compelled to appear before the investigator . The court also indicated that it was not possible to challenge the police actions under LAW . On DATE ORG upheld that judgment .

On CARDINAL DATE the authorities discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant due to the expiry of the statutory prosecution period . Apparently , on an unspecified date this decision was quashed . On DATE the case against the applicant was discontinued due to the absence of corpus delicti . The applicant was informed that he was entitled to claim compensation from ORG of the CCrP ) .

It appears that the applicant ’s wife was a private entrepreneur and managed ORG . In DATE she employed the applicant as a legal consultant . It appears that on an unspecified date he was appointed as the managing director of the firm .

According to the applicant , following a strained situation at home vis - à - vis his mother and wife on account of the pending criminal investigation against him , he temporarily moved into his office , using part of it as a dwelling . The office had electricity and heating facilities ; it was accessible TIME Apparently , the applicant did not notify the investigating authority of this change in his personal situation .

On DATE the investigator in charge of the criminal case against the applicant issued a warrant authorising the search of PERSON ’s offices , referring to LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The investigator indicated that a forensic examination of the applicant ’s handwriting was necessary . For this , it was necessary to seize handwriting samples of the applicant and the original of the authority form issued to him by the client private company ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . In the investigator ’s view , these documents could be found at the premises of ORG .

According to the applicant , on DATE several officers , including the investigator , arrived in the office . They allowed the applicant to read the search - and - seizure order . He made no request for a lawyer to be present during the search . The officers then carried out the search in the presence of attesting witnesses and examined the applicant ’s medical file and asked him questions about the information contained therein .

The applicant sought judicial review of the search - and - seizure order and the manner in which it was implemented .

By a judgment of DATE the ORG of ORG dismissed the claims . The court held as follows :

“ Under LAW CCrP a suspect , accused or another person on his or her instructions may retain counsel . When requested , an [ officer involved in a preinvestigation inquiry ] , investigator , prosecutor or a court shall appoint counsel .

Before the beginning of the search [ the applicant ] made no request for counsel while having had access to the search order ...

Under [ Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the CCrP ] it is within the investigator ’s purview to decide whether a search is opportune and , if so , to issue the relevant order , except for a search of residential LOC . It is also up to the investigator to decide which documents or other evidence are important for the case ...

[ The applicant ’s ] allegation that the office ... was his ‘ ORG is unsubstantiated , within the meaning of LAW CCrP ... Thus there was no legal requirement to obtain a court order for the search . ”

On DATE , following an appeal by the applicant , ORG upheld the judgment , endorsing its reasoning .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained that they had been unfairly convicted of drug offences following entrapment by ORG agents .


Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 14+P1-3 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Right to free elections-{general};Stand for election)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Carlo Ranzoni;Ganna Yudkivska;Mārtiņš Mits;Síofra O’Leary

NORP The applicant party was founded in DATE and is based in PERSON . It claims to represent the interests of the NORP minority in GPE but limits its political activities to ORG ( GPE ) where LOC traditionally settle . The applicant party estimates the number of people of NORP origin within the territory of ORG at CARDINAL out of the total population of CARDINAL . The PERSON have their own language and cultural identity which is similar among the West Frisians in the GPE and ORG in GPE , while ORG in GPE have mainly stopped speaking their language .

Under LAW GPE ( PERSON , see relevant domestic law , paragraph CARDINAL below ) , parliamentary seats – apart from those seats attributed to the candidates obtaining the majority of the votes in their constituency – are allocated under the D’Hondt system of proportional representation . Under section QUANTITY of LAW , seats are attributed only to parties which obtain a minimum threshold of PERCENT of the total of votes validly cast . This threshold is also included in LAW of LAW ( see relevant domestic law , paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

NORP By letter of CARDINAL DATE to the Prime Minister of PERSON and by letter of CARDINAL DATE to the President of ORG , the applicant party asked to be granted an exemption from the minimum threshold for the upcoming elections . The request was refused .

In the elections of DATE , the applicant party attained an overall total of CARDINAL votes , amounting to PERCENT of all votes validly cast . Irrespective of the minimum threshold , the number of votes received would not have been sufficient to obtain a parliamentary mandate .

On DATE the applicant party lodged an objection against the validity of the election result . The applicant party submitted , in particular , that it represented the interests of the NORP people residing in GPE . The NORP people formed a national minority within the meaning of LAW for ORG ( “ the LAW ” , ORG . CARDINAL , see ORG documents , paragraphs CARDINAL below ) . The applicant party complained , in particular , that the minimum threshold resulted in their factual exclusion from participating in the parliamentary elections and amounted to discriminatory treatment visàvis other small political parties which were , at least theoretically , capable of reaching that threshold . The applicant party further relied on LAW in conjunction with LAW No . CARDINAL to the Convention .

On DATE , the Election Supervisor of Lower Saxony ( Landeswahlleiter ) , jointly with ORG , submitted written comments on the objection . They considered , firstly , that it was doubtful whether the group of NORP qualified as a national minority . Under the declaration submitted by ORG when signing LAW , only the NORP of NORP citizenship and members of the NORP people with NORP citizenship were recognised as national minorities in GPE . Conversely , the declaration merely stated that LAW also applied to the ethnic group of NORP with NORP citizenship . It was thus clear from the wording of the declaration that the PERSON did not qualify as a national minority . Even assuming that the ethnic group of PERSON had the status of a national minority , this did not necessarily entail the obligation to exempt the applicant party from obtaining the minimum threshold of PERCENT of the votes . There was no such obligation under LAW or under LAW or under LAW . Neither could such an obligation be derived from section QUANTITY of LAW ( Bundeswahlgesetz ) , as the ORG were competent to pass their own electoral laws without being bound by LAW . The privileges enjoyed by ORG in ORG did not allow any further conclusions , as the protection and promotion of the NORP minority was prescribed by the constitution of the respective Land . Finally , and again assuming the minority status of the ethnic group of PERSON , it was questionable whether the applicant party would qualify as the party of the NORP national minority . The assessment of this question did not only depend on the party ’s vision of itself , but on an overall assessment of all factual and legal circumstances .

On DATE ORG on ORG ) held a public hearing on the applicant party ’s objection .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant party ’s objection as being unfounded . Relying on the submissions made by ORG jointly with ORG , the ORG considered that an obligation to exempt the applicant party from the minimum threshold could neither be derived from LAW , nor from ORG . It followed that the applicant ’s objection was unfounded .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG ( PERSON ) . The applicant party requested ORG to quash the parliamentary decision of DATE and to declare the result of the elections held on DATE invalid ; or , alternatively , to declare section QUANTITY of LAW unconstitutional .

On DATE the Constitutional Court of Lower Saxony rejected the applicant party ’s complaint as being unfounded . ORG observed , at the outset , that the relevant provisions did not allow for an exemption from the minimum threshold for national minorities . ORG further considered that the minimum threshold interfered with the principle of equality of the vote . This interference was justified because it pursued the legitimate aim of safeguarding the functioning of the elected parliament . Parliamentary work within a democracy necessitated that the parliaments remain able to take decisions and that they were not inhibited in their work by the participation of splinter parties . ORG further referred to the case - law of ORG regarding the PERCENT minimum threshold . There was no obligation under LAW to exempt parties of national minorities from the PERCENT threshold . It was true that certain electoral laws provided for such exemptions . This was , in particular , the case with LAW , which provided an exemption for parties of national minorities , and with LAW and GPE , providing for exemptions for the parties of the NORP and the NORP minorities , respectively . However , both ORG provided special rights for national minorities in their respective constitutions . No such provisions could be found in LAW . ORG had declared the respective provision in LAW constitutional , even though LAW did not contain special rights for national minorities . However , ORG had also emphasised that the legislator enjoyed a margin of appreciation in this respect . ORG finally considered that the alleged right could be derived neither from ORG nor from LAW . LAW did not contain any special rights for national minorities . Relying on the wording of LAW , the court considered that this provision did not contain any obligation to exempt national minorities from the minimum threshold , but left the question undecided as to how to create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in public affairs . It followed that the contracting parties enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in this respect . In GPE , participation of national minorities in public life was already guaranteed by the constitutional system . By including the PERCENT threshold in LAW without providing for an exemption , ORG had given precedence to the functioning of the parliament over granting privileges to national minorities . Accordingly , ORG did not find it necessary to determine whether the PERSON qualified as a national minority and whether the applicant party qualified as the political party of this national minority .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)

Dmitry Dedov;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .


Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Nebojša Vučinić;Georges Ravarani;Ksenija Turković

The applicants , whose details are set out in the appendix , are NORP nationals . They are represented before the ORG by Mr Mahmut Birlik , a lawyer practising in ORG . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent .

NORP The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

In DATE , ORG ( “ the Ministry ” ) expropriated certain plots of land belonging to the applicants for construction of a dam in GPE . The applicants initiated compensation proceedings for additional compensation plus interest at the statutory rate . The payments were made DATE after the date of expropriation . The details of the applications appear in the attached table .

A description of the relevant domestic law may be found in GPE and Others v. GPE ( ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

The applicant took part in the cleaning up operation at the GPE nuclear disaster site .

On DATE the Staryy ORG of LOC granted the applicant ’s action against ORG and awarded him and his family , comprising CARDINAL members , a flat in the town of PERSON and MONEY ( MONEY ) in compensation for non - pecuniary damage . The representative of ORG did not attend the hearing : in writing he had requested ORG to adjudicate the case in his absence .

The judgment was not appealed against and became final on DATE .

On DATE the Staryy ORG issued a writ of execution and enforcement proceedings were instituted .

On DATE ORG lodged a statement of appeal against the judgment of DATE . The ORG also asked ORG to restore the DATE time - limit for lodging the appeal . The ORG claimed that it had received a copy of the judgment of DATE by fax on DATE . The ORG asked to stop the enforcement proceedings .

The applicant insisted that there had been no reason to restore the time - limit . He noted that a copy of the judgment had been forwarded to ORG at DATE .

On DATE the Staryy ORG restored the time - limit for lodging the appeal , accepted the ORG ’s statement of appeal and stopped the enforcement proceedings .

On DATE the ORG examined the ORG ’s appeal , quashed the judgment of DATE and remitted the case for a fresh examination to ORG .

On DATE the Staryy ORG , in the new examination of the case , accepted the applicant ’s action in part . The relevant part of the judgment read as follows :

“ Order that ORG should provide ... Mr Babynin G.A. and his family with housing LOC , which satisfy sanitary and technical requirements , in their turn according to the housing waiting list of families having persons with disabilities and individuals who had taken part in the cleaning operation at the site of the GPE nuclear plant .

Dismiss [ the claim ] for compensation for non - pecuniary damage . ”

On DATE a writ of execution was issued and enforcement proceedings were instituted .

According to the applicant , from DATE a group of CARDINAL people , including the applicant , began a hunger strike to protest against the poor level of welfare protection provided for the GPE victims .

On DATE the mayor of PERSON decided to provide the applicant with a flat measuring CARDINAL,CARDINAL ORG .

On DATE the applicant received from the mayor an occupancy voucher in respect of the flat assigned to him . He found the flat satisfactory .


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Egidijus Kūris;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

From DATE the applicant was employed as a civil servant at ORG . Her service was terminated by the employer on DATE .

Under new legislation ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) the applicant ’s severance pay was subject to special tax at a PERCENT rate in its part exceeding MONEY ( ORG ) . Accordingly , special tax was levied upon her severance pay in the amount of ORG CARDINAL ( MONEY ( ORG ) ) .


Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)

André Potocki;Ganna Yudkivska;Síofra O’Leary

On DATE the applicant ’s DATE daughter , PERSON , was found dead in a field in the ORG region . Her body was naked and had numerous injuries .

According to the information submitted by the ORG , on DATE a post mortem was carried out . It established that PERSON had been strangled and that her body had been dragged to the place where it had been discovered . There was no indication that she had been raped . She had not been pregnant . Nor had she been under the influence of alcohol or drugs .

On DATE the ORG inter - district prosecutor ’s office opened a criminal case in respect of the murder .

On DATE the applicant was admitted to the proceedings as an aggrieved party .

On DATE the police inspected the scene of the crime . They discovered the remnants of a fire and CARDINAL plastic bags not far from the place where PERSON ’s body had been found . Samples of the coal and the bags were collected as material evidence .

On DATE another examination of the crime scene was carried out and the following objects were found : some matches , CARDINAL cigarette ends , CARDINAL plastic bags , a burnt notepad with some notes written by PERSON ( her parents identified her handwriting later ) . Furthermore , the police discovered the burnt remains of a calendar , some tampons , a student ID with a stamp containing the word “ LAW ( PERSON was a student at ORG ) , and a lighter .

On DATE a forensic cytological examination established that it was not PERSON who had smoked the cigarettes .

On DATE the police seized CARDINAL of PERSON ’s shoes , which had been discovered by a villager at some distance from the crime scene .

On DATE a witness stated that on the evening of DATE she had twice seen a beige car belonging to a certain PERSON , with CARDINAL male passengers and a girl resembling PERSON , near the crime scene . The witness also submitted that PERSON had apparently had the car seat covers changed shortly thereafter .

On DATE the investigator in the case instructed the police to verify whether PERSON and his CARDINAL passengers of DATE could have been involved in the murder and to identify the girl who had been seen with them . The police questioned those seen in the car and concluded that sufficient grounds did not exist to treat them as suspects . As regards an inspection of the car and the covers of the seats , it appears that none was carried out at the time as the investigator had to order CARDINAL again on CARDINAL DATE . That belated inspection produced no tangible results .

The investigation of PERSON ’s murder has been unsuccessful . DATE it was suspended CARDINAL times for failure to establish who had committed the murder . CARDINAL of those decisions were quashed as premature and as not based on a comprehensive investigation . In the remaining instances the investigation was resumed without any further details being given in the respective decisions . At CARDINAL times ( in particular , in DATE , DATE and DATE ) the investigator complained to his supervisors that his instructions to the police had not been complied with . In particular , on DATE the investigator , when instructing the police to undertake certain investigative measures , noted that earlier instructions to that effect , given in DATE , had not been followed up . Overall , throughout the period in question , the investigator ’s instructions to the police remained the same : to identify all the possible witnesses to the murder and to verify whether any of PERSON ’s acquaintances , or any people with a criminal record living nearby , could have been involved in it .

The applicant submitted numerous complaints to the prosecution authorities about the length and ineffectiveness of the investigation . He also put forward his own version of events and mentioned the names of several people whom he suspected of being involved in the crime . He was informed on CARDINAL occasions that there had indeed been omissions in the investigation and that the police officers responsible had been disciplined . As regards the applicant ’s requests for access to the case file , they were rejected on the grounds that under the applicable procedural legislation , an aggrieved party could only have such access after the pre - trial investigation had been completed .

The applicant also brought a civil claim against the prosecution authorities , but courts at CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction found against him .

There is no information in the case file about any developments in the investigation after DATE .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Luis López Guerra

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of detention during their transport . The applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .


George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Päivi Hirvelä;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

NORP The applicant , Ms FAC , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON . She is represented before the Court by Ms M. Pecyna , a lawyer practising in GPE .

The NORP Government ( “ the Government ” ) are represented by their Agent , Ms J. Chrzanowska of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP The applicant ’s daughter , PERSON , had been suffering from schizophrenia since DATE . She had been hospitalised on numerous occasions .

On DATE E. was admitted to a psychiatric hospital in GPE ( Świętokrzyskie Centrum Psychiatrii ) . She had already been admitted to that hospital on CARDINAL previous occasions .

E. was placed in room no . CARDINAL in the observation area of ward no . CARDINAL . The ward was divided into CARDINAL areas – an “ observation ” area and a “ peaceful ” area for male patients . The areas were separated by a lockable door . The patients were free to circulate in their own areas and to use the bathroom .

According to her medical records , at the time of her admission E. had been behaving strangely . She showed symptoms of restlessness and agitation , and her behaviour was aggressive and loud . Contact with her was difficult and communication was limited . On DATE she made an unsuccessful attempt to flee the ward , but was prevented from doing so by the staff .

A copy of the medical record kept by the hospital staff from CARDINAL to DATE was submitted to the ORG . No reference to suicidal tendencies or thoughts on PERSON ’s part was made throughout that time .

At TIME on DATE CARDINAL nurses on duty in the ward were dealing with an aggressive patient in room no . CARDINAL . A nurse from ward no . CARDINAL , GPE , was called to help them .

While the nurses were busy trying to overpower the patient , PERSON tried to commit suicide by hanging herself in the bathroom , using torn sheets from her bed . Another patient found her there and alerted the nurses . Nurse GPE removed the “ rope ” made from the torn sheets from E. ’s neck . CARDINAL nurses on duty , PERSON , ORG and GPE , attempted to resuscitate E. The doctor who was on duty that night was alerted , and participated in the resuscitation attempt . An ambulance equipped with intensive - care equipment was called .

The ambulance left ORG ( ORG Specjalistyczny w ORG ) at CARDINAL a.m. and arrived at the psychiatric hospital at CARDINAL a.m. The ambulance doctors took over the resuscitation attempts and took PERSON to the FAC hospital . They arrived there at CARDINAL a.m. and the resuscitation attempt continued .

E. did not regain consciousness and remains in a coma .

The police arrived at the psychiatric hospital at TIME on DATE . On the same date they started an investigation into the circumstances of the accident with a view to establishing whether the offence of exposing someone to the risk of loss of life or detriment to health , within the meaning of LAW of LAW , had been committed . A note drawn up by the police on DATE stated that PERSON had not been suffering from depressive tendencies .

The applicant was questioned on DATE . She stated that PERSON had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia DATE and had been admitted on numerous occasions to LOC hospital .

NORP The applicant was informed that an official note had been prepared to the effect that PERSON had hanged herself from the bars of the bathroom window by a rope made of torn sheets which she had taken from her bed . The applicant commented that it was difficult to understand how PERSON could have hanged herself as the bars on the window were covered by wire mesh . She was also of the view that the staff had failed to exercise their duty to supervise the patients properly .

The applicant made no comments at that stage about possible thirdparty involvement in the incident .

Nurse PERSON was questioned on DATE . She stated that she had been on duty on the critical night with nurses GPE and ORG At TIME of the patients had started to behave aggressively towards her and other patients . The witness had requested the assistance of other nurses in overpowering that patient and taking her to the isolation room . She had earlier checked on PERSON , who had not been asleep but had been lying on her bed .

Shortly afterwards , PERSON had been checking on the patient in the isolation room when she had heard nurse GPE cry out . PERSON had run to the bathroom , where she had seen PERSON hanging from the window bars . GPE had been trying to hold her aloft . Together they had taken PERSON down , carried her to the corridor and started resuscitation . They had called ORG , who in turn had alerted the doctor on duty . Resuscitation attempts had continued until the arrival of the ambulance from the GPE hospital . PERSON ’s heartbeat had been restored after the arrival of the ambulance . PERSON had been a patient of the hospital on many occasions ; she had never had suicidal tendencies and there had been no indication that she might try to take her life .

Nurses GPE and ORG were also questioned on DATE . Their testimonies were essentially concordant with the account of the facts given by PERSON

GPE stated that she had been alerted by CARDINAL of the patients crying out that someone had hanged herself in the bathroom . She ran to the bathroom and saw PERSON hanging by a rope from the window bars . She had tried to hold her aloft and called for the help of other nurses . After PERSON had arrived , GPE untied the sheet from PERSON ’s neck . They carried PERSON to the corridor and started to resuscitate her .

ORG stated that at TIME the cries of the aggressive patient in room no . CARDINAL had woken up other patients in that room , including PERSON , who had covered herself with a blanket . PERSON uncovered her head to check on her , to which PERSON objected . ORG heard GPE cry out TIME after the nurses had finished dealing with the aggressive patient . In ORG ’s view , there had been no indication that PERSON would try to commit suicide .

When questioned subsequently on DATE , ORG stated that the window frames in the bathroom were old and had no handles . The windows could be easily opened , as the frames were dilapidated . It had already happened before that the patients had been able to open them . For that reason , bars had been fixed on the outside to prevent the patients from jumping out of the window . It was allowed to open the windows in order to air the bathroom .

On DATE the police visited the bathroom and found that the window had no handles inside , and had bars on the outside . The window ledge was QUANTITY from the floor .

On DATE the applicant submitted written comments , having been given access to the case file . She expressed the view that the investigation had been insufficient . She still failed to understand how it had been possible for her daughter to hang herself from the outside bars of the window . She asked the prosecution to check what had been happening CARDINAL a.m. and TIME on the critical date ; whether the medical records properly recorded PERSON ’s suicide attempt ; whether there were records available concerning the handling of the aggressive patient ; and whether blood samples had been taken to establish which medication PERSON had been on . She further stated that during her visits to the ward she had often seen patients left without reasonable supervision .

On DATE M.O. , the chief physician of the intensivecare ward of the FAC hospital , was questioned . He stated that PERSON remained in a coma and that her condition had not improved since she had been brought to the hospital on DATE . On DATE in question there had been a bruise on the patient ’s neck caused by hanging ; no blood samples had been taken on DATE as there had been no grounds for doing so .

On DATE PERSON , the chief physician of the psychiatric ward , was questioned . He stated that he had spoken with PERSON on DATE and that she had been calm and reasonable . She had not demonstrated any symptoms of depression or suicidal tendencies .

On DATE PERSON was questioned again . She confirmed her previous statement ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . She further stated that the bars were on the outside of the window and that they had been installed to prevent the patients from fleeing . There was no obligation to keep the windows closed and in any event it was easy to open them , despite the fact that they had no handles , as the window frames were old . ORG , who was questioned again on DATE , confirmed PERSON ’s statement .

On DATE the GPE district prosecutor discontinued the investigation . The written grounds for that decision read as follows :

“ The investigation into the circumstances in which ORG had been exposed to a risk to her life was conducted under the supervision of FAC .

All the witnesses in the case were questioned . An on - the - spot inspection of the scene of the suicide attempt was carried out .

As the findings of fact did not lead to the conclusion that the incident had been caused by any acts of third persons , the investigation was discontinued , as a criminal offence punishable under LAW § CARDINAL of LAW had not been committed . ”

The applicant appealed . She argued that the decision had been excessively succinct and had failed to give a reasonably detailed account of the relevant facts . In particular , no findings had been made as to whether the hospital staff had complied with their duty of care . It had not been explained how it could have been possible for PERSON to leave her room unobserved , take her bed sheets with her , go to the bathroom , tear the sheets , open the window and hang herself from the window bars on a kind of rope she had made from the torn sheets . The only people to have been questioned were nurses who had a vested interest in giving their own version of events . No forensic examination of PERSON had been carried out to check whether she had any injuries or bruises . In particular , it had not been established whether she had any injuries on her neck typical of hanging . The orderly of the ward had not been questioned . The report on the handling of the aggressive patient by the nurses on duty during TIME at issue had not been included in the file . No steps had been taken to establish whether and how it had been possible to open the window in the bathroom and how that window was secured , if at all .

The applicant added that PERSON had not been suffering from depression at that time . On the whole , the contested decision was obviously flawed and the investigation should be conducted again in a thorough manner .

Following an appeal lodged by the applicant , on DATE the PERSON district prosecutor set the contested decision aside , finding that the applicant ’s objections should be addressed by way of further investigative measures . The investigation was resumed .

On DATE Dr M.O. was questioned again as to the circumstances of PERSON ’s admission to the hospital .

A further CARDINAL witnesses were heard . Neither their professions nor their connection to the facts of the case were specified .

On DATE the GPE district prosecutor discontinued the investigation . The relevant decision read :

As the findings of fact did not lead to the conclusion that the incident had been caused by any acts of third persons , the investigation was discontinued as a criminal offence punishable under LAW § CARDINAL of LAW had not been committed . ”

The applicant appealed , essentially reiterating the arguments which she had raised in her earlier appeal . She argued in particular that the decision had been excessively succinct and had failed to give a reasonably detailed account of the relevant facts .

On DATE ORG PERSON ) , upheld the contested decision . It was of the view that no one had a case to answer and that it could not be said that the staff had failed in their duty to take appropriate care of PERSON It further stated that the prosecuting authorities had taken all the necessary evidence and examined it carefully .

Article CARDINAL of the Criminal Code reads as follows :

“ CARDINAL . Anyone who exposes a human being to an immediate risk of loss of life , serious bodily injury , or a serious impairment of health shall be subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for DATE .

If the perpetrator has a duty to take care of the person exposed to danger , he shall be subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for a term of DATE . ”


Violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation .

On DATE the applicant ’s statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer . During the interrogation , the applicant gave a detailed account of her acts within the illegal organisation ORG ( ORG ) .

On DATE the applicant was heard by the public prosecutor and the investigating judge at ORG , again in the absence of a lawyer . Before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge , the applicant partially retracted her previous statements maintaining that she had given statements to the police under duress . On DATE , upon the order of the investigating judge , the applicant was placed in pretrial detention .

On DATE the public prosecutor at ORG filed an indictment accusing the applicant of membership of an illegal terrorist organisation under LAW .

At a hearing held on DATE , the applicant gave evidence in person in the presence of her lawyer . She stated that she had left GPE through her own means and that she went to GPE , GPE , GPE and GPE with the help of the people whose names she could not remember anymore . She further stated that she had stayed in camps in GPE and GPE . While she was at the camp in GPE she was not involved in many activities owing to her young age . She further maintained that she had wanted to return to GPE due to her health condition and for family reasons . She further stated that she had turned back to GPE through the mountains with the help of people who knew the area well . While the applicant was staying at her elder sister ’s house , she was arrested by the police . The applicant also claimed that she did not know any of the other accused in the case and that she had not received any training in the camps . Lastly , she stated that she had been called the code name “ PERSON ” at the camp in GPE .

When asked about her statements to the police , the applicant denied them , claiming that they had been taken under duress . When asked about her statements to the public prosecutor , she denied them except for the parts concerning her travel . When asked about her statements to the investigating judge , she denied them claiming once again that the police had put pressure on her .

On DATE , relying on , inter alia , the applicant ’s statements to the police , ORG convicted the applicant under LAW of the new LAW and sentenced DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of ORG .


András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Guido Raimondi;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Nebojša Vučinić;Robert Spano

The applicant , PERSON , is an NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He is represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .