George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Päivi Hirvelä;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the Court by Mr PERSON and PERSON , lawyers practising in GPE .

NORP Until DATE the applicant worked as a coal miner for Gorubso – ORG ( a ORG enterprise , transformed into a ORG - owned company in DATE and later , apparently in DATE , privatised following the opening of winding - up proceedings ; currently a joint - stock company Gorubso Zlatograd DATE ) . In DATE the applicant brought proceedings against the mining company seeking payment of compensation for the occupational disease he had developed as a result of exposure to hazardous conditions in the mine . On CARDINAL DATE ORG granted the claim . The company was ordered to pay a sum of CARDINAL old NORP levs ( ORG ) ( the equivalent of MONEY ) as compensation , as well as DATE payments for DATE , from DATE , the amounts varying between ORG and BGL CARDINAL , depending on the period .

NORP In DATE the applicant requested that the enforcement judge institute enforcement proceedings against the debtor . It appears that in DATE the enforcement judge attached the company ’s bank accounts . There is no information in the case file about the development of the enforcement proceedings between DATE and DATE . In particular , there is no evidence about requests made by the applicant for enforcement measures , claims lodged in the winding - up proceedings relating to the mining company ’s assets , or information sought by the applicant on the payment of the debt .

On DATE the enforcement judge discontinued the enforcement proceedings on the basis of LAW ( д ) of LAW , as the applicant had not requested enforcement actions for DATE .

On DATE the applicant and his lawyer consulted the file of the enforcement proceedings . The applicant submits that only then did he find out that the proceedings had been discontinued in DATE , and that he was shown a document – the enforcement judge ’s register of DATE for the incoming and outgoing amounts DATE which indicated that in DATE the mining company had paid the applicant an amount of ORG CARDINAL by means of bank transfer . The applicant sent a letter of CARDINAL DATE to the enforcement judge , in which he maintained that he had never received the aforementioned amount and that he was unable to obtain a copy of the payment order as the case file had been destroyed .

By a letter of DATE , the enforcement judge informed the applicant that , as was clear from the information in the file , on CARDINAL DATE the applicant had received payment from the mining company in the amount of ORG CARDINAL ( representing the initial compensation of BGL CARDINAL plus several DATE payments ) . In a letter of DATE , the bank which had effected the payment on CARDINAL DATE informed the applicant that the documents concerning the money transfer had already been destroyed as the DATE time - limit for keeping them had expired .

NORP In DATE the applicant submitted a complaint to the prosecution authorities requesting an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the payment of DATE . In a letter of CARDINAL DATE , the enforcement judge informed the investigation authorities that , as could be seen from the enforcement judge ’s register of DATE , on DATE the applicant had received payment from the mining company in the amount of ORG CARDINAL . As to the payment orders of that date , the enforcement judge noted that they had been destroyed as the DATE time - limit for keeping payment documents under LAW had expired .

On DATE the public prosecutor refused to open criminal proceedings , noting that a long period of time had elapsed since the alleged offence had been committed , and that the time - limits for keeping the relevant documents at the respective institutions had already expired . The applicant appealed against that decision on DATE . On DATE the hierarchically superior prosecutor upheld those conclusions .

In DATE the applicant requested that the GPE ORG issue a document certifying that the case file of the enforcement proceedings had been destroyed . In a letter of CARDINAL DATE the President of ORG informed him that the file had not been destroyed and that he and his lawyer had consulted it .

In the period DATE inflation in GPE was running high and the national currency was depreciating . As of the entry into force of a law on DATE , ORG CARDINAL became CARDINAL new NORP lev ( ORG ) . The applicant submitted that due to the enforcement judge ’s inactivity over DATE and the inflation and the devaluation of the national currency , the total amount of DATE payments he was entitled to receive for DATE to DATE had devalued to ORG CARDINAL ( approximately CARDINAL euros ( EUR ) ) . He claimed that the amount he was entitled to receive from DATE had devalued to ORG CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL ) .

NORP In accordance with LAW seq . of LAW DATE ( “ the DATE Code ” ) , in force at the material time , enforcement proceedings against ORG enterprises were to be directed firstly towards their bank accounts in ORG banks . When payment upon a writ of execution against the ORG enterprise could not be received because of lack of such bank accounts or of available funds in them , enforcement was to be carried out by an enforcement judge . Certain articles of property belonging to the ORG enterprises could not be subject to enforcement , other than in winding - up proceedings . These provisions were repealed in DATE .

Article CARDINAL of the DATE Code provided that enforcement proceedings against private parties were to be instituted upon the request of the creditor . The creditors were under the obligation to state against which debtor ’s possessions ( bank accounts , immovable property , and so forth ) they would like the enforcement to be directed ( LAW ) . Throughout the proceedings the creditors could request the enforcement actions to be directed against different possessions of the debtor . If the creditors did not request enforcement actions to be undertaken for a period of DATE , the enforcement proceedings had to be terminated ( LAW ( д ) ) . The LAW DATE ( “ the DATE Code ” ) , which came into force on DATE , contained similar provisions .

Section CARDINAL of LAW DATE stipulated that the accounting registers and reports were to be kept for DATE . This provision was superseded in DATE by CARDINAL of LAW DATE .

By virtue of LAW of ORG DATE , the enforcement judges were part of the district courts system . Under the Regulations on the Organisation and Work of the District , Regional and Military Courts DATE , the general statutory time - limit for keeping the case files of archived cases in the district courts was DATE . LAW DATE , which superseded ORG and which was in force until DATE , as well as the regulations adopted on its implementation contained similar provisions .


No violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Alena Poláčková;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) approved the construction of garages alongside the ORG railway in GPE . The decision read as follows :

“ Taking into consideration that the garages on [ a QUANTITY ] stretch of the ORG railway must carry out the function of a noise shield , the GPE testing section of the ORG railway of ORG approves the construction of garages QUANTITY away from the outer rail , on the following conditions :

NORP the garages shall be built alongside the railway using reinforced concrete , in a line ;

NORP the construction of the garages shall be in strict compliance with technical safety rules for construction works in a railway zone ;

PERCENT of the garages shall be allocated to railway employees as compensation for the use of railway territory . ”

On DATE ORG of the Government of GPE ( GPE архитектурно-планировочное управление комитета по архитектуре и градостроительству г. PERSON ) ( hereinafter “ the GPE architecture and planning directorate ” ) issued a town - planning assignment ( градостроительное заключение ) for the design and construction of garages alongside the ORG railway . The document mentioned , in particular , that the land on which the garages were to be built belonged to GPE ( PERSON ) and that the garages were intended to serve as a noise shield along the railway line .

On DATE the local administration ( ORG муниципального округа “ ORG административного округа PERSON ) confirmed that they had no objections to assigning the land in question for the construction of garages by garage - building cooperative “ PERSON ” ( garage ORG partnership , “ the ORG ” ) , in accordance with the town - planning assignment .

On DATE the applicant joined the ORG and paid his share for a garage ( MONEY ( ORG ) at the material time ) .

The garages were constructed accordingly , and on DATE the local administration ’s inspection board certified that CARDINAL - storeyed capital ( immovable ) garages built by the ORG were ready for use . On DATE the prefect of the local administration gave his approval .

Garage no . CARDINAL was allotted to the applicant . The local administration issued him with a certificate attesting to his possession of the said garage as from DATE ( свидетельство о владении гаражным боксом ) . The applicant , however , never had his property rights to the garage registered in the real estate register .

On DATE ORG concluded a lease agreement with the ORG in respect of the land occupied by the garages . The lease provided that the land plot was allocated for further use of CARDINAL garage boxes and CARDINAL open parking spaces situated on it . That lease agreement remained in force until DATE .

On DATE the ORG unitary enterprise “ ORG of the ORG ” ( “ FAC of the ORG ” ) concluded a lease agreement with the ORG in respect of the land occupied by the garages . Under the agreement the lease was valid until DATE . The parties subsequently extended the validity of the agreement on CARDINAL occasions : until DATE , DATE and DATE respectively . Thereafter they tacitly renewed the agreement for an indefinite duration . The ORG continued to pay the rent due under the lease until DATE .

Under clause CARDINAL of the lease agreement , the land plot was allocated for placement of garage boxes . Clause CARDINAL of the agreement proscribed the construction of permanent structures on the land and provided that temporary structures could be built only upon written approval by ORG of the ORG . Clause CARDINAL stipulated that at the end of the lease , all temporary structures were to be removed . Clause CARDINAL provided that the lease could be terminated unilaterally in the event of breach of the terms of the lease agreement by the ORG or failure to pay the lease for DATE , and in the event that the land in question was required for the purposes of the railway , with DATE prior notice . Clause CARDINAL stipulated that the ORG had no right to modify federal ownership of railway rights of way .

In the meantime , on DATE ORG decided to establish an open joint stock company called “ GPE ” ( “ the RZD ” ) , to succeed the ORG .

On DATE ORG for ORG responsible for GPE signed a lease agreement with the ORG in respect of the plot of land on which the garages were situated .

On DATE the ORG notified the ORG of the unilateral termination of the lease agreement , with reference to a need that had arisen to use the land in question for the purposes of the railway . The ORG invited the ORG to vacate the plot by CARDINAL DATE .

The ORG refused to do so and provided the ORG with a list of its members , from which it transpired that the applicant was the owner of garage no . CARDINAL .

On DATE the ORG notified the applicant of the necessity to vacate the garage . The applicant refused to comply .

On DATE the ORG brought court proceedings against the applicant seeking the removal of garage no . CARDINAL from the plot in question .

On DATE the Ostankinskiy District Court of GPE ( “ the ORG ” ) granted the above claim and ordered the applicant to remove the garage within DATE of the judgment becoming final . ORG further authorised the ORG to remove the garage on their own if the applicant failed to comply with the court ’s decision . ORG held as follows :

“ It follows from the case - file material that on DATE the ORG unitary enterprise “ ORG of the ORG ” and the ORG signed a lease agreement in respect of a plot of land situated within a railway right of way [ полоса отвода железной дороги ] for the purposes of reimbursement of its maintenance costs , valid until DATE , which was subsequently extended on the basis of additional agreements . Pursuant to clause CARDINAL of the above lease agreement the land was allocated for the construction of garage boxes . The construction of permanent structures on the land was prohibited ( clause CARDINAL ) . At present the lease agreement has been terminated , which is confirmed by notifications of DATE and CARDINAL DATE on the unilateral termination of the lease agreement with reference to the necessity to use the plot in question for the purposes of the railway .

The case file contains a certificate provided by the plaintiff to the effect that the ORG had [ paid rent under the lease ] until DATE , and that since then no payments had been made for the use of the plot of land .

The procedure for the use of land plots classified as federal property is determined by the Government of GPE in accordance with section CARDINAL of Federal Law no . CARDINAL of DATE on ORG in GPE .

Government Resolution no . CARDINAL of DATE stipulates that the use of land classified as federal property and provided to the ORG must be based on a land lease agreement between ORG for ORG ( its territorial body ) and the ORG .

Pursuant to ORG no . CARDINAL of DATE on ORG in GPE , railway land is land used or intended for maintaining the activities of rail transport organisations and/or for buildings , constructions , structures and other rail transport facilities , including plots of land situated within railway rights of way and safety areas .

Plots of land adjacent to railway tracks or intended for the placement of such tracks are classified as railway rights of way , as is land occupied by or intended for the placement of railway terminals , water drainage and protective facilities along railway tracks , communication lines , electric power supply facilities , production and other buildings , constructions , structures , equipment and other rail transport facilities .

The plot of land with cadastral number CARDINAL is intended for the operation and development of the railways , [ it ] is situated within a railway right of way ...

Before the lease agreement in respect of the railway right of way [ between the ORG and GPE ] was signed , the plot of land with cadastral number CARDINAL was classified as rail transport land in accordance with LAW approved by decision no . CARDINAL of ORG DATE ; decision no . CARDINAL - CARDINAL of ORG of GPE of DATE on the division of ORG property in GPE ; and ORG no . CARDINAL of DATE on ORG .

ORG decree no . CARDINAL “ Ts ” of CARDINAL DATE approved the procedure for the use of federal railway land within railway rights of way .

In accordance with this procedure , the size of a right of way is determined in accordance with standards and rules for the design of railway rights of way , approved by the ORG , as well as with design and budget documentation and general schemes for the development and reconstruction of federal rail transport facilities and stations .

The revision of the borders and size of rights of way , the withdrawal of temporarily unused plots of land and their reclassification from CARDINAL category to another is carried out by the competent authorities with the agreement of the railways , pursuant to the legislation of GPE .

The court has established that on part of the plot of land with cadastral number QUANTITY in the right of way of the Oktyabrskaya railway ... there are garages , including garage no . CARDINAL . ...

No information has been provided from ORG and Transactions in respect of the garage . No documents have been provided by the defendant or the ORG confirming their right to use the land underneath the garage either .

The ORG is the user of the plot of land in question . By virtue of LAW of LAW of GPE it is entitled to seek the elimination of violations of its rights , namely the removal of the [ applicant ’s ] garage from the plot .

To support his assertion about the lawfulness of his possession of the disputed garage , the defendant submitted to the court a certificate issued by the ORG confirming that he had paid in full his share for the garage . Also , at the request of the defendant the court joined to the case file the following evidence : a copy of the act certifying that the garages were ready for use ; notification from the federal service for ORG registration , inventory and cartography responsible for GPE about the absence of any information in ORG and Transactions about the disputed plot ; the approval by the prefect of [ the local administration ] of the inspection certificate issued in respect of the garages ; correspondence from the GPE section of the ORG railway of DATE on the approval of the construction of the garages within the railway right of way ; the town - planning assignment issued by the GPE architecture and planning directorate on DATE ; the decision of the federal service for State registration , inventory and cartography of DATE refusing to issue a cadastral certificate for the disputed plot .

However , these documents do not prove that the applicant acquired property rights in respect of the garage , nor do they prove the lawfulness of the use of the land underneath it . The defendant ’s garage [ is ] an unauthorised construction because it was built on a plot of land that was not allocated for that purpose in accordance with the procedure provided for by law and in the absence of permission issued by a competent authority , whereas a railway right of way can be used exclusively for the construction of rail transport facilities . The [ documents provided by the defendant ] do not prove that the garage was not an unauthorised construction , because the construction was carried out on land within a railway right of way and therefore was not intended for the building of garages . The approval by the prefect of the local administration of the inspection certificate does not confirm the existence of permission by the federal authorities to use the plot of land in question for building garages , regard being had [ to the fact ] that the owner of the plot is GPE and not GPE .

The management of land owned by the ORG , including giving permission for construction of immovable property , can be done only by the competent federal authority .

A garage for parking a car by an individual is not a rail transport facility , therefore a plot of land within a railway right of way can not be considered to be intended for the construction of such a garage ( garages ) .

Besides , the defendant has failed to submit evidence to the effect that the competent federal authority issued an administrative act on the transfer of a part of the land situated within a railway right of way to the defendant . It therefore follows that the plot of land was not provided to the defendant by the owner , and therefore at the present time the defendant has no legal grounds to use federal property .

The applicant would have acquired title to garage no . CARDINAL had it not been an unauthorised construction .

Having assessed all the evidence in the case , taking into consideration [ the fact ] that the defendant did not acquire property rights in respect of the plot of land classified as federal property and located within a railway right of way , on which the disputed garage is situated , that the plot was provided for temporary use , and that it is being used at the present time without any contractual basis , the court comes to the conclusion that the rights of the ORG have been violated in that the plaintiff is prevented from using the land in accordance with its intended purpose . The court therefore considers that there are lawful grounds for granting the plaintiff ’s claim for removal of garage no . CARDINAL from the plot of land with cadastral number CARDINAL ... ”

The applicant appealed . He claimed , in particular , that he was entitled to compensation .

On DATE ORG upheld the above judgment on appeal . ORG held that the law did not provide for the possibility of claiming compensation for the demolition of an unauthorised construction .

On DATE the Ostankinskiy District bailiffs’ service in GPE instituted enforcement proceedings . The applicant was notified on DATE .

As the applicant refused to comply voluntarily with the judgment of CARDINAL DATE , as upheld on appeal on DATE , the ORG proceeded to demolish his garage .

On DATE the Ostankinskiy District bailiffs’ service was informed accordingly .

On DATE the enforcement proceedings were terminated .

According to the Government , in DATE the construction of the fourth main track of the ORG railway between GPE and ORG was completed on the land previously occupied by the garages of the ORG and was opened for circulation of the suburban electric train . In DATE noise - reduction barriers were installed along the ORG railway line in the area of the NORP residential district .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13+6-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Right to a fair trial;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Egidijus Kūris;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

NORP The applicant ’s details are set out in the appended table .

NORP The applicant complained of the excessive length of civil proceedings and of the lack of any effective remedy in domestic law .


Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 34 - Victim);Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Constitutional proceedings;Article 6-1 - Impartial tribunal);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Carlo Ranzoni;Erik Møse;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mārtiņš Mits

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE , GPE .

Since DATE , the applicant and GPE have been involved in legal disputes against each other concerning the property rights in PERCENT of the bearer shares in both EMK stock company ( hereinafter “ EMK ” ) and EMK Engineering stock company ( “ EMK Engineering ” ) , companies resident and registered in GPE .

In DATE and DATE ORG ( PERSON ) ordered by way of an interim measure that GPE ’s entry in the commercial register as a member of the EMK and the EMK Engineering companies’ respective supervisory boards with power to represent those companies may not be cancelled .

On DATE GPE brought an action against the applicant in ORG . He requested that the court oblige the applicant to hand over a specified number of bearer shares in EMK and in EMK Engineering and establish that the applicant did not hold and had never held any shares in those GPE companies . The action was served on the applicant ’s counsel on DATE .

In a decision dated DATE ORG , following a hearing on DATE , dismissed the applicant ’s objection to the GPE courts’ jurisdiction ( file no . CARDINAL CG.CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) . It found that it had jurisdiction on grounds of location of assets ( GPE ) to decide upon ORG action . The applicant had assets in GPE , specifically claims for salary and fees against EMK and EMK Engineering , which both had their seat in GPE . Furthermore , GPE ’s action for restitution of the bearer shares in these corporations was of a pecuniary nature .

In a decision dated DATE ORG , in interlocutory proceedings , dismissed the applicant ’s appeal of DATE against ORG decision of DATE .

Following a constitutional complaint of CARDINAL DATE , on DATE ORG granted the applicant ’s application to have ORG interlocutory decision be given suspensory effect . It further ordered ORG not to hold any further hearings in the proceedings at issue until ORG had taken its decision on the applicant ’s constitutional complaint .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s constitutional complaint as ill - founded ( file no . PERSON ) .

Following the termination of the proceedings before ORG , ORG resumed the proceedings . It heard evidence from the parties , their counsel and CARDINAL witnesses in person in hearings on DATE , DATE and DATE . It further took note of the written submissions of the parties and of numerous documents as well as of the case files in several related proceedings .

On DATE the applicant asked ORG to deliver its judgment , given that the oral proceedings had concluded on DATE .

On DATE ORG , in a judgment running to CARDINAL pages , upheld ORG ’s action ( file no . CARDINAL CG.CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) . It ordered the applicant to hand over a specified number of bearer shares in EMK and in EMK Engineering to GPE and declared that the applicant did not hold and had never held shares in those companies .

Having regard to the evidence before it , ORG considered that GPE ’s submissions regarding the question of who had been the owner of the shares in dispute had been more credible than that of the applicant . It found that the applicant ’s mother , PERSON , had never obtained ownership of the shares in question as there had not been a sales contract between her and GPE She had been in possession of the shares in order to make a minority shareholder think that GPE was no longer holding shares in the companies . The applicant had known this on conclusion of his contract with PERSON transferring the shares to him as a gift in DATE at the latest . PERSON had not , therefore , been the owner of or authorised to transfer ownership of the shares to the applicant ; the latter had not obtained ownership thereof for lack of good faith .

Following a hearing , on CARDINAL DATE ORG , endorsing the findings of ORG , dismissed the applicant ’s appeal dated DATE . It considered that ORG had taken all evidence necessary for its decision . It further rejected new documentary evidence submitted by the applicant to support his allegations as inadmissible for having been submitted out of time in an attempt to protract the proceedings . The judgment was served on the applicant ’s counsel on DATE .

In a judgment and decision dated CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant on DATE . It found that the lower courts had not made an error of law in the legal classification of the facts they had established , that they had not failed to take necessary evidence and that they had sufficiently reasoned their judgments . The judgment and decision were served on the applicant ’s counsel on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint ( running to CARDINAL pages plus annexes ) with ORG against ORG judgment and decision . Relying , inter alia , on Articles CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the Convention and on LAW . CARDINAL to the LAW , the applicant complained , in particular , about the length of the proceedings . He stressed that the outcome of the proceedings , to the duration of which he had not contributed , was of vital importance to him as it concerned his means of subsistence . He further submitted in that context that he had not had at his disposal an effective remedy , such as an application to speed up the proceedings , in order to enforce his Convention rights .

On DATE the President of ORG granted the applicant ’s application to have his complaint given suspensory effect . The court reserved its decision on the costs arguing that the duty to bear the costs depended on the outcome of the main proceedings . The applicant would have only had to bear the decision fee if his constitutional complaint had been dismissed .

On DATE GPE lodged a submission in reply to the applicant ’s constitutional complaint .

On DATE the President of ORG , PERSON , informed the applicant that he , alongside Judges PERSON . , PERSON . , PERSON and PERSON , would decide on his constitutional complaint in a hearing in camera on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint alleging bias ( running to CARDINAL pages plus annexes ) against the CARDINAL judges of ORG called upon to decide on his complaint .

The applicant argued , in particular , that all of the CARDINAL challenged judges had taken arbitrary decisions to his disadvantage and in breach of his Convention rights in relation to the previous injunction and other proceedings brought by him , and that the court , which was influenced by the executive , discriminated against foreign nationals such as the applicant .

The applicant further submitted that , for different reasons , the CARDINAL judges of ORG individually had not been impartial . As regards the court ’s President , Judge PERSON , the applicant complained that he had delayed the appointment of the judges who were to decide on his complaint . Moreover , he was a close friend of H. , the court ’s Vice President and brother of GPE , the party opposing the applicant in the proceedings at issue .

According to the applicant ’s submission , Judge PERSON . was biased because he worked for the Government drawing up expert reports on constitutional questions and giving seminars organised by the Government . He further worked with Judge PERSON on a regular basis .

Judge PERSON . , for his part , was not impartial as he was also a professor at ORG and had himself argued in a publication that judges should be appointed for life or for a long single term of office .

The applicant further stressed that Judge PERSON was a member of the supervisory board of a state - owned company and was therefore not independent and impartial .

Finally , Judge PERSON was a partner in a law firm with a lawyer against whom the applicant had brought proceedings concerning an inheritance . Another lawyer of that firm had already represented EMK and EMK ORG . Moreover , Judge PERSON had previously worked as a lawyer in Judge PERSON ’s law firm .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE , ORG , with the CARDINAL judges whom the applicant had challenged for bias comprising the bench , dismissed the applicant ’s complaints of bias .

ORG stated that , in accordance with the principle that , if possible , a complaint of bias should not be decided upon by the challenged judge , the challenged judges , respectively , had not participated in the deliberations and the decision on the respective complaint alleging bias against them , which had been decided upon by the CARDINAL remaining judges .

ORG considered that the fact alone that several of the challenged judges had already taken part in prior decisions finding against the applicant did not suffice to substantiate that there were objectively justified doubts as to their impartiality for the purposes of LAW . Moreover , the fact that the judges had been elected for DATE did not compromise their impartiality . The applicant further had not substantiated that the executive had influenced the judges of ORG in the present proceedings in any way . Nor did the fact that the judges concerned worked together with GPE ’s brother , the Vice President of ORG , on a regular basis and were friends of the latter objectively cast doubts on their impartiality .

On DATE , on CARDINAL DATE , ORG delivered its judgment ( file no . PERSON CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . It granted the applicant ’s constitutional complaint in part , finding that the applicant ’s rights under LAW and under LAW to a decision within a reasonable time had been breached in the proceedings at issue . It ordered that GPE reimburse the applicant the fee for lodging the constitutional complaint ( MONEY ( CHF ) ) and bear the further court costs , that is to say , the judgment fee ( CHF CARDINAL ) . It further ordered GPE to reimburse GPE , who , unlike the applicant , had been represented by counsel in the proceedings before ORG , lawyers’ fees of CHF CARDINAL,CARDINAL.CARDINAL .

ORG found that the total duration of the proceedings alone , which lasted DATE after the action of DATE had been brought , did not justify the finding of a breach of the right to a decision within a reasonable time . It had to be noted in that context that DATE had been necessary to deal with the interlocutory proceedings on the GPE courts’ jurisdiction brought by the applicant himself . Moreover , the courts had generally duly furthered the proceedings . There had only been a delay of DATE and DATE between the last hearing before the court of first instance on DATE and the delivery of the judgment on DATE . Such a period of inactivity could no longer be considered as reasonable despite the complexity of the proceedings . Therefore , there had been a violation of LAW .

ORG noted that GPE law did not contain any provisions stipulating which consequences should result from a breach of the right to proceedings within a reasonable time . However , it would be utterly unjust if a breach of this constitutional right did not have any consequences as a result of a lack of legislative provisions . There was therefore a gap in the law which had to be filled by way of judicial interpretation . In ORG view , it was therefore necessary to impose the costs of the proceedings ( court costs and ORG fees ) upon the ORG in order to compensate for and redress the breach of the fundamental right at issue . However , the judgment fee could not be imposed on the ORG as a measure of compensation as GPE had to bear that cost anyway .

The Constitutional Court further dismissed the remainder of the applicant ’s constitutional complaint . It considered that the applicant ’s property rights had not been infringed in the proceedings at issue in which the opposing parties had both claimed to be the owner of the shares in question . Moreover , the GPE courts had been independent tribunals . In particular , GPE ’s brother , the Vice President of ORG , had not taken part in the decision - making process of any of the GPE courts . Moreover , the findings of facts , the assessment of the evidence and the legal reasoning of the lower courts did not disclose any arbitrariness .

The judgment and the decision of CARDINAL DATE were served on the applicant on DATE .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

Alena Poláčková;Helen Keller;Johannes Silvis

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE ORG of PERSON ( NORP гарнизонный военный суд ) convicted the applicant of laundering of the proceeds of crime and sentenced him to a fine .

On DATE ORG of ORG ( ORG окружной военный суд ) acquitted the applicant on appeal .

On DATE the Presidium of ORG of ORG , on a public prosecutor ’s initiative , annulled the judgment of CARDINAL DATE by way of supervisory review and remitted the case for fresh consideration to the appeal court . The annulment was reasoned by CARDINAL main arguments : ( CARDINAL ) unresolved contradictions between witnesses’ statements pertaining to the applicant ’s criminal intent , and ( CARDINAL ) absence in the appeal judgment of a summary of the arguments presented by the prosecution during the appeal proceedings .

On DATE ORG of ORG , acting on appeal , reversed the judgment of DATE and remitted the case for fresh consideration to the trial court .

In DATE the criminal proceedings against the applicant were terminated due to decriminalization of his actions under the domestic law .


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Deprivation of property)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE and PERSON .

The applicants , together with another person , were joint owners of a plot of land and the house built on it .

The first applicant owned a CARDINAL share of a house constructed DATE ( her share amounting to QUANTITY . m , of which CARDINAL sq . m was living space ) , and QUANTITY . m of land . The property had been her registered address since DATE . It appears that her title originated in the inheritance she had received after her late mother ’s death in DATE .

The second applicant owned a CARDINAL share in the same house ( amounting to some CARDINAL sq . m ) and QUANTITY . m of the same plot of land . It appears that he had first had a right of use ( as part of inheritance after another person ) in respect of the land and had then acquired title to it in DATE ; that he had inherited his share in the house after another person in DATE .

The remainder of the house and plot of land were owned by the first applicant ’s brother .

On DATE ORG LOC issued a decision to “ adopt ” the general plan of LOC town , “ to invite the PERSON municipality to continue co - operating with the authors of the general plan when preparing future projects , bearing in mind that the plan is the main legal document in relation to town planning ” . In DATE the decision was amended to indicate that the ORG “ had adopted the plan for further approval in accordance with the established procedure ” ( see also paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

In DATE the LOC municipality ( “ the municipality ” ) adopted a programme aimed at demolishing dilapidated housing .

NORP In DATE the local authorities adopted draft construction guidelines for the Oktyabrskiy Proezdy district where the applicants’ house was situated . The draft guidelines were published in a local newspaper on DATE . It appears that they were eventually adopted in DATE .

A committee composed of officials attached to various public authorities was asked to make a proposal regarding a plot of land for constructing blocks of flats . The committee considered that it would be appropriate to construct blocks of flats at FAC . It does not transpire from the committee ’s deliberations that they considered any other plots of land . On CARDINAL DATE the municipality issued a decision by which it agreed to the construction of several blocks of flats ( including CARDINAL on the LOC land ) and authorised a specialised ORG enterprise to start the compiling of the necessary technical documents .

In DATE the regional administration , the PERSON town administration and a ORG enterprise signed an investment contract for the construction of multi - storey blocks of flats in the area , including the ORG land . Under the terms of the contract , the enterprise would arrange to buy the land from private owners and the municipality would acquire title to it . The investor would also take measures to resettle any inhabitants and provide them with compensation . The municipality and the investor would own PERCENT and PERCENT of the newly built housing space respectively . The estimated preliminary cost of the project amounted to MONEY ( ORG ) .

As transpires from the available information , the block of flats to be built on the applicants’ land comprised CARDINAL floors , CARDINAL flats with the total space of QUANTITY . m. Under the investment contract , the municipality was to receive title to CARDINAL flats for the overall space of QUANTITY m.

The investor also agreed to make a contribution of funds corresponding to PERCENT of the estimated costs for constructing a kindergarten for CARDINAL children , an annex building for a school and some other amenities or facilities .

In DATE a private company , ORS - Grupp , replaced the ORG enterprise as the project investor .

In DATE the municipality issued an order aimed at implementing the demolition programme adopted in DATE and “ improving the architectural appearance of the town and the resettlement of inhabitants from housing that no longer [ met ] sanitary requirements ” . The above investment project was CARDINAL of the measures by which the municipality intended to achieve those aims . In total , the order concerned some CARDINAL investment contracts in relation to over CARDINAL dwellings , of which CARDINAL properties were privately owned and the remainder was owned by the municipality .

The municipality assessed the situation as regards the private owners , including the applicants , and decided to proceed by way of expropriation for municipal needs under LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the municipality ordered the expropriation of the applicants’ house and land for municipal needs , namely the construction of a block of flats under the investment contract .

According to the Government , on DATE the second applicant received notice of the planned expropriation .

On DATE the municipality amended the expropriation order , indicating that pursuant to the investment contract the investor had to provide funds for paying compensation for the land being expropriated and provide inhabitants with comparable alternative housing . The investor was required to request expert valuations to determine the market value of the properties being expropriated ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) and then buy those properties .

It appears that on CARDINAL DATE the investor obtained a valuation report regarding the applicants’ house and land to determine their market value . The company used was PERSON , a private company licensed by the ORG to carry out valuation assessments ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The ORG was not provided with a copy of this valuation report .

According to the Government , on CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE the first applicant was served with notice of the planned expropriation . In DATE both applicants were informed that the amended expropriation order had been officially registered .

According to the Government , on DATE there was a meeting between FAC residents and , apparently , a representative of the local authorities or the private company . The ORG stated that the residents had been given access to a construction planning document for the area , documents concerning the choice of plots for such construction , the town plan and some other documents .

As no comparable plots of land were available in the area , having regard to the valuation report of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , the first applicant was offered several options of “ compensation in kind ” , namely CARDINAL or CARDINAL - room flats in GPE or GPE with market values of MONEY ( ORG ) , apparently with ownership title . She was also offered monetary compensation for the land and her part of the house of up to ORG CARDINAL . However , she turned down these offers , considering them insufficient or the location of the alternative housing unsuitable . The second applicant appears to have turned down offers of plots of land in nearby areas ranging MONEY in value . The second applicant also turned down another offer : ownership title to CARDINAL flats measuring CARDINAL sq . m and QUANTITY . m each together with ORG CARDINAL . The second applicant stated that he was entitled to compensation amounting to ORG CARDINAL . The investor then made a new offer of ORG CARDINAL as compensation for his part of the house and land . The second applicant did not accept it .

On DATE the investor requested another valuation report regarding the applicants’ house and land from ORG . On DATE it issued a report indicating that the overall market value of the first and second applicant ’s shares of the house and land were ORG CARDINAL and ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL respectively . ORG was provided with part of that report , which reads :

“ [ Description ] of the assessment object : a residential house ( a single - storey building made of wood , [ measuring ] CARDINAL [ sq . m ] , of which CARDINAL [ sq . m is ] living space ) and annexes ; a plot of land [ measuring ] CARDINAL [ sq . m ] ...

[ Location ] of the assessment object : ...

The assessment object is situated in the centre of the old town of LOC . On the one hand , there are old buildings ( essentially residential houses dating back to DATE ) and , on the other , [ there are ] new buildings consisting of modern blocks of flats . The town ’s major traffic arteries are in the immediate proximity of the assessment object . There is a car park on CARDINAL side of the street and a residential area ont the other ... They have a well - developed infrastructure , good access to transport up to GPE metro station , central PERSON and the above residential area ...

Description of the plot of land : ... GPE metro station is within a TIME ride by public transport ...

Description of the house : ... the main building was first constructed in DATE ; the remaining buildings later , until DATE ... The house is habitable , although it requires some superficial repairs ... ”

In DATE the district chief architect and the local land authority informed the municipal administration that the town ’s general plan of DATE made no provision for the construction of individual housing . On DATE , in reply to an enquiry raised by the investor company , the municipality announced that it had no available plots of land that would be equivalent to the land to be expropriated from the applicants , namely those assigned for the construction of individual housing .

In DATE the town administration brought proceedings in ORG of LOC ( “ the ORG ” ) seeking judicial authorisation for the expropriation of the applicants’ house and land . In DATE the first applicant lodged a separate claim against the municipality , arguing that the expropriation orders of DATE and CARDINAL DATE were ultra vires and otherwise unlawful and disproportionate . On DATE ORG held a hearing . After hearing evidence from a representative of the municipality , it decided to join the cases . An appeal brought by the first applicant was not processed since the procedural order was not amenable to appeal .

In the meantime , ORG replied to a request for information from the second applicant , informing him that the regional ministry had acted ultra vires in taking a decision on the general plan in DATE and that no copy of it existed ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The applicants informed the court examining their case accordingly .

The court held several hearings in the expropriation case . It appears that on DATE the court ordered a new report from ORG . The applicants did not oppose the choice of company and did not ask for any particular questions to be put to its experts .

In DATE a group of CARDINAL experts compiled a report indicating ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL as the market values of the first applicant ’s land and part of the house respectively , and FAC CARDINAL and CARDINAL as the second applicant ’s ( compare the earlier assessment in paragraph CARDINAL above ) . The land and house were therefore valued at ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL per sq . m respectively .

In reply to the second applicant ’s complaint , on DATE the ORG provided the following reply ( see also DATE and DATE below ) :

“ Regarding your complaint about unlawfulness relating to the adoption of LOC town plan :

I inform you that ORG DATE , DATE , DATE and CARDINAL of the old LAW provided for a procedure relating to consultation with the local population in relation to the documents relating to town planning . At the same time , the Code did not specify any particular manner for obtaining the population ’s view , and thus consultations could be done in any form . It has been established that LOC town plan was adopted on DATE by ORG of the Moscow Region and not by a municipality , in breach of LAW . Moreover , there is a breach of the same provision due to the fact that there is currently no Lyubetsy town plan . The municipality will be ordered to remedy the violation of the LAW . ”

On DATE the municipality ’s mayor wrote to ORG asking to speed up the court proceedings , arguing that some of the flats were to be given to the people waiting for social housing and that the procrastination of the proceedings was also prejudicial to the people who had invested in the construction project .

On DATE ORG delivered a judgment , stating as follows .

The applicants appealed . They contended , inter alia , that the expert report relied on by the first - instance court had in fact been requested by the municipality and was thus biased and based on the material provided by them ; no court - requested report had been prepared . The first applicant also argued that the expert report had failed to take into account the scarcity of land in LOC for individual housing ; the commercially attractive location of the land , which bordered the city of GPE ; the proximity of a metro station under construction ( or planned ) ; and the intended use of the land being expropriated for commercial gain arising from the construction of blocks of flats . The applicant also contested the expert assessment regarding the value of the house to be demolished pursuant to the expropriation decision . The expert had not used the “ method of prospective use ” for determining the value of the house and land . The expert valuation was based on the premise that the land ’s use was for a DATE cottage use rather than for the use relating to multi - storey blocks of flat ; this premise was inappropriate , given that the property was already surrounded by similar blocks of flats . With reference to the above considerations , the applicant ’s own calculations amounted to ORG CARDINAL for her part of the land .

On DATE ORG upheld the first - instance judgment .

On DATE the first applicant applied for supervisory review of the court decisions of DATE and DATE , requesting that the enforcement proceedings be suspended .

In the meantime , on CARDINAL DATE the applicants were evicted and had their belongings removed from the house . According to the Government , the first applicant ’s belongings were then delivered to the social housing flat where they were then stored , under the supervision of a local public official , until DATE when she received the keys .

A bank account was opened for the first applicant , and the expropriation compensation was credited into it on DATE . The bank issued a certificate allowing the accountholder to use the money . On CARDINAL DATE the first applicant was informed of the above .

On DATE ORG dismissed the first applicant ’s application for supervisory review . The reviewing judge held that the municipality had had competence to issue the expropriation decision , referring to the available general plan and all the other necessary documents .

In DATE the first applicant lodged a further application for review before the President of ORG . On DATE the application was examined and rejected by another judge of ORG . In DATE the first applicant again applied for review before the President of ORG . In a letter of DATE the President of ORG dismissed her application , upholding the earlier refusals .

The first applicant lodged an application for supervisory review with ORG . On DATE it was dismissed . The applicant challenged that decision before the Deputy President of ORG . In a letter of DATE he agreed with the lower courts’ decisions . In DATE , in reply to a new application , ORG informed the first applicant that she could lodge no further supervisory review applications in respect of the court decisions .

According to the Government , until DATE the first applicant refused to accept the keys to the flat and the bank certificate relating to the account into which the expropriation compensation had been credited .

On DATE the applicant received the keys for the flat , the bank certificate and her belongings that had been in safekeeping .

According to the second applicant , in DATE the municipality resold the properties it had acquired under the investment project to the investor .

In DATE the second applicant brought separate proceedings challenging the orders of DATE and CARDINAL DATE . On DATE ORG took a final decision rejecting his claim , primarily because it was time - barred but also because the main arguments had already been dealt with in the final judgment of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the first applicant brought separate proceedings in ORG ( i ) alleging that the bailiffs had acted unlawfully in the enforcement proceedings , and ( ii ) claiming compensation in respect of pecuniary and non - pecuniary damage . Her claim was turned down on several occasions because she had failed to comply with the required formalities . It appears that the relevant procedural orders were annulled because they reached the applicant after the respective time limits for complying with them had expired . Several hearings were scheduled in DATE . Sometime during DATE ORG decided that the claims for compensation should be processed separately .

In DATE the applicant resubmitted her claim for compensation . On DATE ORG refused to deal with the case because she had failed to comply with its instructions to specify the amount of the claim , to submit calculations concerning the loss and to pay a court fee .

On DATE ORG granted the first claim in part , considering that the applicant had not been informed in good time of the order launching the enforcement proceedings in DATE . She had thus been deprived of the right to contest the documents relating to the enforcement .

The applicant sued the municipality , complaining of losses she had suffered because of inflation arising from the delay in enforcement of the judgment of DATE in the part relating to the expropriation compensation . On DATE ORG awarded her CARDINAL MONEY ( RUB ) in pecuniary damages arising from the fact that the judgment had actually been enforced on DATE . On CARDINAL DATE ORG quashed that judgment on appeal and instead awarded the applicant RUB CARDINAL,CARDINAL , considering that the judgment had been enforced on DATE when the expropriation compensation had been credited into the bank account opened for her .

In DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with the bailiff service , requesting compensation for belongings that had either been lost or damaged during or following demolition of the house . On DATE ORG replied that an inventory of her belongings had been compiled before the demolition . They had all been transferred to her social housing flat and entrusted to a public official for safekeeping ; she had had DATE to reclaim them . In DATE a new complaint by her was dismissed by ORG , which noted that the notices dated CARDINAL , DATE , and DATE of the impending demolition of the house had not been served on her personally as she had been away from her temporary address . DATE and DATE various courts in GPE declined jurisdiction or turned down for procedural reasons a related civil claim by her against ORG .


Violation of Article 4 - Prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 4-1 - Trafficking in human beings);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Armen Harutyunyan;Kristina Pardalos;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Pauliine Koskelo;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in Z. Owing to problems in her family , DATE she lived with a foster family . Then she moved to a public home for children and young persons , where she stayed until she completed her professional training as a waiter .

On DATE the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the NORP police against a certain PERSON , a former policeman , alleging that in the period DATE he had physically and psychologically forced her into prostitution . He had given her a mobile telephone so that clients could contact her and had driven her to meet clients in various places . He had also forced her to give sexual services in the flat where they had lived together . During that whole period she had been under the control of PERSON When she had refused to give sexual services to other men , he had physically punished her . After she had left him , he had threatened her and her family and had attempted to contact her through a social - networking website .

The criminal record of PERSON showed that in DATE he had been convicted of the criminal offences of pandering and rape and sentenced to DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment . He was released from prison on a conditional leave in DATE and the conditional leave expired in DATE .

The GPE State Attorney ’s ORG opened an investigation in respect of PERSON On DATE , following an order by ORG , the police conducted a search and seizure of PERSON ’s premises , where they found , inter alia , several pieces of automatic rifles , a number of mobile phones and condoms .

On DATE the applicant gave her evidence to the prosecuting authorities . She said that PERSON had first contacted her at DATE through a social - networking website and that he had already known her mother and introduced himself as a friend of her parents . She had met PERSON on various occasions in cafés and she had asked him to help her in finding a job . PERSON had told her that he could find a job for her as a waitress or a shop assistant .

DATE at DATE he had told her that he would take her to CARDINAL of his friends who could help her in finding a job . When they had arrived at the house of that man PERSON had told the applicant to go to a room with him . The man had then told the applicant that he had expected sexual services from her . The applicant had said that she had not wanted to do it . That man had also told her that he had answered an advertisement on the Internet under the name PERSON ( “ little fig ” ) and that PERSON had told him that PERSON and the applicant had been a husband and wife who “ [ had done ] such things together ” . PERSON , who had been eavesdropping outside the room , had stormed into the room and started to shout at her and slap her and had then told her that she had been there with a purpose , that she should not have behaved like that . The man had secretly given her CARDINAL NORP kunas ( HRK ) ; when she had told PERSON about that , he had then taken that money from her .

At that time she had still lived with her friend PERSON who had no knowledge of the events at issue . PERSON had again contacted her and told her that they had needed to talk about what had happened . She had agreed to meet him but they had not discussed what had happened . DATE PERSON had given her a mobile telephone so that clients seeking sexual services could contact her . PERSON had also told the applicant that she had had to give her physical description to men who would contact her and charge HRK CARDINAL for TIME of sexual services or HRK CARDINAL for an hour , and that she had had to give CARDINAL of that money to PERSON

The applicant also said that she had acquiesced to all that because she had been scared of PERSON and that he had threatened to tell all to her parents .

DATE after that PERSON had rented a flat , where the applicant and PERSON had then lived together . She had provided sexual services in that flat and on CARDINAL to six occasions PERSON had driven her to clients . During the period in question she had had CARDINAL clients . Since PERSON had lived in the same flat with her , he had controlled everything she had been doing .

When she had refused to have sexual intercourse with him or when he had been dissatisfied with the manner in which she had given sexual services to clients , PERSON had beaten her . He had beaten her DATE .

Questioned as to why she had not contacted the police earlier , the applicant answered that she had been afraid of T.M. Once , when he had been out of the flat and had left the key , the applicant had called her friend PERSON , who had known that the applicant had been giving sexual services to men for money . The applicant had asked ORG to help her escape .

After that ORG boyfriend , T. , had arrived by taxi , helped the applicant to collect her things and taken her to ORG ’s home . She had stayed with ORG for DATE .

The applicant also said that PERSON had told her that he had previously had a girlfriend , PERSON , whom he had “ treated in the same way ” and later on he had told her that after her , the applicant , he had had another girlfriend whom he had “ helped in it ” . PERSON had told the applicant that he had filmed those girlfriends and punished them when they had been “ insolent ” .

On DATE PERSON gave her evidence to the prosecuting authorities . She said that she had never met PERSON but that the applicant was her friend and she had known her for DATE . ORG ’s last contact with the applicant , before the applicant had come to her flat , had been CARDINAL previously . ORG had known already at DATE , beginning of DATE that the applicant had been giving sexual services for money because the applicant had told her so .

At DATE the applicant had suddenly come to her home with a bag containing her things . ORG had then learned that the applicant had agreed with ORG mother to come to stay with them , but did not know any details since she ( ORG ) was not in very good relations with her mother .

The applicant had told her about PERSON , from whom she had escaped because she had no longer wished to be involved in prostitution “ for him ” . Before the applicant had come to her flat PERSON had not known where or for whom the applicant “ did that ” . Only then had ORG learned that the applicant “ had being doing it for GPE . The applicant had been very distressed and scared . She had told PERSON that PERSON had repeatedly beaten her ; watched her through a key lock when she had been giving sexual services to clients and afterwards also beaten her for “ not being in a position he had approved of ” .

ORG also said that in her understanding the applicant had voluntarily given sexual services because she had needed money . The applicant had told her that she had had an agreement with PERSON to work for him and to share the money , that she had had a mobile telephone for clients to call her and that there had been a small ad through which she had been contacted for appointments by clients . The applicant had said that PERSON had given her that mobile telephone and placed the advertisement .

ORG also said that she could not remember if the applicant had told her that she had opposed PERSON It was true that the applicant had said that she had not wished to “ do it ” but in ORG ’s understanding that had rather meant that the applicant had been “ doing it ” because she had had no other means to earn money . The applicant had also told her that PERSON had slapped her for very minor reasons which she ( the applicant ) had not expected . When she had refused sexual relations with him PERSON would beat her and the applicant had not known what would make him “ explode again ” . PERSON had also told the applicant that he had had another girlfriend who had worked for him and whom he had also beaten . The applicant told PERSON that she had used the opportunity to run away from PERSON when he had been out of the flat where they had lived .

ORG boyfriend , T.R. , had told her that he had spoken with the applicant but he had not given any details . ORG had broken up with him DATE after that but still had his address .

ORG also said that the applicant had stayed with her and her mother for DATE and that PERSON had continued to contact the applicant through a social - networking website and had threatened her as well as her mother . He had also sent messages , saying that he had loved her and asking her to come back to him .

On DATE the GPE State Attorney ’s Office indicted PERSON in ORG on charges of forcing another to prostitution , as an aggravated offence of organising prostitution under LAW .

On DATE the applicant was officially given the status of victim of human trafficking by ORG ( PERSON , GPE ljudska prava i prava nacionalnih manjina ) . On DATE the police contacted ORG and its employees informed the applicant of her rights ( accommodation , medical check - ups , psycho - social support , legal aid and material support ) . The applicant told them that she was not interested in the right to safe accommodation since she lived with her mother and sister . According to the Government the applicant contacted ORG on CARDINAL occasions DATE and DATE . She received psycho - social support through individual counselling and material support . ORG also organised individual counselling for the applicant with a psychologist in ORG . Further to this the applicant was provided legal aid by a non - governmental organisation , GPE , within the legal - aid scheme supported by the ORG .

The summons served on the applicant contained detailed information on her rights as a victim , such as psychological and practical support and of the possibility to contact ORG and Victims within ORG . Contact details of that ORG were also provided .

At hearings held on DATE and CARDINAL DATE PERSON gave his evidence . He denied that he had forced the applicant into prostitution . He confirmed that he had contacted the applicant through a social - networking website because he had recognised her surname since he had known her parents . He had also known that the applicant ’s mother had been a prostitute .

PERSON and the applicant had started to see each other and the applicant had told him that she had had no money and needed a job and that she had some debts . The applicant had also told him that previously she had given sexual services for money and had kept telephone numbers of her clients and asked him whether he could take her sometimes to those clients , which he had done .

He confirmed that he had been in a relationship with the applicant during that time . However , he had not lived with her in the flat she had rented but only sometimes spent TIME there . He had had the keys of that flat and the applicant had had them as well and she had been free to come and go as she liked . He had also been in the flat on some of the occasions when the applicant had given sexual services there . He had known that the applicant had charged HRK CARDINAL for TIME and HRK CARDINAL for TIME but these prices had been set by her and not him . Initially he had lent her some money and from that sum she had bought a mobile telephone on which clients could contact her . Later on she had returned the money she had borrowed from him . She had also given him some money even though he had been reluctant to take it but she had insisted telling him that it had been for petrol . However , it had mostly been he who had given money to the applicant because she had constantly complained that she had had no money .

He admitted that he had slapped the applicant once when they quarrelled about her refusal to work in a bakery .

He also said that he had found her a job in a restaurant but that after he had told her about it she had disappeared .

Both the applicant and PERSON gave their evidence at a hearing held on DATE . A lawyer was provided to the applicant by PERSON . Before giving her evidence the applicant told the trial court that she feared the accused . The accused was then removed from the courtroom and the applicant gave evidence in his absence .

The minutes of that hearing indicate that the applicant repeated her statement given on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) and also said that PERSON had told her that he had been a former policeman and together with her father in the war . Her father had confirmed that and had said that PERSON was “ an okay person ” . Her mother on the other had told her that he was not a reliable person .

After the first time PERSON had driven her to give sexual services to another man , she had sat in the backseat of his car . PERSON had been very angry and had been nagging her and at TIME he had stopped the car and slapped her . She had exited the car , attempting to run away but he had caught up with her and taken her back to the car .

She had agreed to meet him DATE because he had told her that they would discuss what had happened but they had not .

She had been afraid of him and for that reason had agreed to give sexual services to other men and also because he had threatened her that he would “ tell all ” to her parents and that he would “ cram her mother into prison ” .

PERSON had found the flat to rent , but the applicant had signed the contract and paid the rent for the flat . She had not had the keys to that flat .

Even though on CARDINAL occasions he had allowed her to leave the flat alone to go to a nearby shop , she had not dared to flee because PERSON had followed where she had been going from the balcony and she had been scared of him . He had set some rules for her : she had been forbidden to talk with the clients ; the clients had not been able to touch her ; and she had been allowed to give sexual services only in the manner ordered by PERSON When she had refused to have sexual intercourse with him or when he had been dissatisfied with the manner in which she had given sexual services to clients , PERSON had beaten her .

Questioned again as to why she had not contacted the police earlier , the applicant said that PERSON had told her that he had “ connection ” at the police and that he would very soon learn if she reported “ anything ” .

Questioned as to why she had not attempted to run away when PERSON had driven her to the clients the applicant said that she had been sure that PERSON would have found her and that she had been allowed to stay with the clients for TIME .

When the applicant had called her friend PERSON , who had known that the applicant had been giving sexual services to men for money , the applicant had asked ORG to help her escape . She had also spoken with ORG mother . PERSON had continued to contact her through a social - networking website , at first sending her love messages and then threatening to tell all to her parents . Then PERSON had sent a letter to the authorities , accusing the applicant ’s mother of neglecting the applicant ’s younger sister . Her mother had been asked to come to a police station on that account . The applicant had then decided to contact the police .

The applicant also explained that she had been very much scared of PERSON , that she had feared for her life because he had threatened to “ beat her to death ” . PERSON had also threatened her with publishing naked photographs of her . She had agreed to being photographed because she had been scared of him . PERSON had also told her that as a former policeman he had known a lot of policemen and if she had reported him he would have fabricated stories about her .

Later on she had learned from her mother that PERSON and her mother had lived together for a while and that a former girlfriend of PERSON had reported him to the police for forcing her to give sexual services to other men .

M.I. repeated her statement given before the prosecuting authorities ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE ORG acquitted PERSON on the grounds that although it had been established that he had organised a prostitution ring in which he had recruited the applicant , it had not been established that he had forced her into prostitution . However , he had only been indicted for the aggravated form of the offence at issue and thus he could not be convicted for the basic form of organising prostitution . In finding this , the trial court in particular noted that it could not give sufficient weight to the applicant ’s testimony because her statement had been incoherent , she had been unsure and that she had paused and hesitated when speaking . At the same time , given that there was no other conclusive evidence , it applied the in dubio pro reo principle and acquitted PERSON The relevant part of the first - instance judgment reads :

“ On the basis of the evidence given by the accused and the victim in these criminal proceedings the following facts have been established : that the accused and the victim met through the social network ORG when the accused contacted the victim ; ... that the accused gave a mobile telephone to the victim so that she could be contacted by the clients with whom she discussed providing sexual services ; that the victim indeed did provide sexual services in the flat where she lived with the accused ; that on CARDINAL or six occasions the accused drove the victim to the addresses of clients where she provided sexual services ; that the victim charged for providing sexual services the sum of HRK CARDINAL for TIME and the sum of HRK CARDINAL for an hour ... ”

The State Attorney ’s ORG appealed against this decision , arguing that the first - instance court had erred in its factual findings concerning the charges against PERSON when it did not accept the applicant ’s testimony .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal of ORG and upheld the first - instance judgment , endorsing its reasoning as well as the facts as established by the trial court . That decision was served on the applicant on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) , complaining about the manner in which the criminal - law mechanisms had been applied in her case . She relied on ORG DATE , DATE and DATE of the LAW ( see below paragraph CARDINAL ) and Articles CARDINAL , CARDINAL , DATE and CARDINAL of the Convention . In particular , she alleged that the national authorities had not properly investigated and addressed the element of force . Also , owing to the failure of the authorities to reclassify the offence , PERSON had not been convicted of any offence , to the applicant ’s detriment . She further stressed that she had not been provided with any psychological help or assistance during the court hearing to help cope with the fear and pressure she had felt from PERSON while testifying , which all resulted in her testimony being regarded as incoherent by the trial court . The applicant also alleged a failure of the authorities to secure effective respect for her private life in particular through the domestic court ’s inadequate assessment of all the relevant circumstances in which she had been recruited to PERSON ’s prostitution ring .

On DATE ORG declared the applicant ’s constitutional complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the applicant had not had the right to bring a constitutional complaint concerning the criminal proceedings against PERSON since these proceedings had concerned a criminal charge against him . The decision of ORG was served on the applicant ’s representative on DATE .


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 2 of Protocol No. 1 - Control of the use of property)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicants are owners or co - owners of residential buildings which comprise flats that were or still are subject to rent control . They obtained ownership of the flats by various means , such as restitution , donation , inheritance or purchase . Under the relevant legislation they had to accept that the flats were occupied by tenants with a regulated rent and that they could charge them no more than the maximum amount of rent fixed by the ORG . The relevant legislation precluded them from unilaterally terminating the leases , or selling the flats other than to the tenants ( “ the rentcontrol scheme ” ) . The particulars of the flats affected by the rentcontrol scheme are set out in LAW ( columns ORG ) .

The situation of the applicants is structurally and contextually the same as in GPE and Others v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE ( merits ) and DATE ( just satisfaction ) and CARDINAL subsequently decided cases concerning the rent controlscheme in GPE ( Krahulec v. GPE , no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ; ORG and Others v. GPE , no . CARDINAL ; and PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , all adopted on DATE ) .

It is in dispute between the parties in the present case what amount of rent the applicants would be able to receive by letting their flats under freemarket conditions . By extension , that disagreement translates into an argument over the proportion of the market rent that the regulated rent represents .

NORP In that connection , the Government submitted an expert ’s opinion drawn up in DATE in relation to all CARDINAL applications ( “ the ORG ’s expert opinion ” ) , according to which the DATE free - market rent for flats comparable to the ORG was CARDINAL and MONEY ( ORG ) per sq . m in the municipality of ORG and ORG MONEY and CARDINAL per sq . m in the municipality of PERSON . The regulated rent in the flats owned by the applicants ranged between ORG CARDINAL.CARDINAL and QUANTITY per sq . m. According to those calculations therefore , the regulated rent of the flats possessed by the applicants corresponded to PERCENT of the market rent in DATE . The relevant data are set out in LAW ( columns ORG ) .

The applicants for their part relied on different sources of information to support their contention that the regulated rent was disproportionately low compared with similar flats to which the rent - control scheme did not apply . The data submitted by them are set out below separately in relation to each application .

The applicants maintained that in DATE the regulated rent ranged between ORG DATE and CARDINAL a month whereas the average free - market rent for comparable flats in a similar location was ORG CARDINAL a month . They submitted an expert ’s opinion which showed that the difference between the general rental value of the property and the regulated rent they actually received was EUR CARDINAL for the period DATE .

The applicants submitted that in DATE the regulated rent for their flats amounted to ORG CARDINAL and CARDINAL a month , whereas the DATE free - market rent for comparable flats was ORG CARDINAL . They relied on data from ORG ( “ the NORP ” ) . Depending on the period and the relevant law in force , the regulated rent represented PERCENT of the market rent for comparable flats in the area . They further submitted that the sum which they and the other coowners had invested in repairing the building was CARDINAL times the income they obtained from letting the flats under the rentcontrol scheme .

In DATE the applicant was allowed to charge a DATE rent of ORG CARDINAL for each of his flats . He submitted that the market rent in the same area in DATE was between ORG CARDINAL and ORG CARDINAL a month for the single - room flat and between ORG CARDINAL and ORG MONEY a month for the CARDINAL - room flats . He relied on information about average rental prices published in the press .

The applicants submitted that the regulated rent for their flats ranged between ORG CARDINAL and ORG DATE in DATE . Relying on data from the NORP , they maintained that the market rent for comparable flats in the area amounted to approximately ORG CARDINAL a month .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court)

Egidijus Kūris;Iulia Motoc;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicants were born in DATE , DATE and DATE respectively and live in LOC .

NORP In DATE a group of engineers patented an invention concerning a method for separating hydrocarbon . The first applicant is one of the inventors . The second and third applicants are heirs of the other members of the group .

On DATE the applicants lodged an action for compensation against company NORP , a privately - owned former ORG company which had used the DATE invention DATE ( for details about those proceedings , see PERSON and Others v. GPE , no . GPE , § § CARDINAL , DATE ) .

NORP In a decision of DATE ORG allowed in part the action lodged by the applicants against company NORP , and ordered the latter to pay to the first applicant MONEY ( ROL ) , an amount representing compensation for the use , DATE , of the invention patented in DATE . The second and third applicants appealed , and in a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG also awarded them compensation – ROL CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL,CARDINAL to the second applicant and ORG to the third applicant .

On DATE the applicants and company NORP signed an agreement for the payment of the compensation awarded by the court . CARDINAL DATE the company paid PERCENT of the amounts granted .

On DATE ORG and ORG took note of the terms of the agreement of DATE and concluded that company NORP had withdrawn its appeal on points of law against the decision of CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph DATE above ) , which thus became final .

Meanwhile , on DATE company NORP had sought its judicial reorganisation under a procedure provided for by Law no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL on judicial reorganisation and bankruptcy .

On DATE ORG allowed the application , started the reorganisation proceedings and nominated a judicial administrator . The applicants’ claims were accepted by ORG and recorded in the register of claims compiled by the judicial administrator in conformity with the provisions of the applicable law ( tabloul creditorilor , hereinafter “ the register of claims ” ) .

The applicants lodged an objection to the register of claims , asking to be recognised as priority creditors ( creditori privilegiaţi ) . CARDINAL other creditors also lodged objections against the records in the register of claims .

Meanwhile , on DATE the judicial administrator had submitted a reorganisation plan to a vote by the creditors . It was proposed that the priority claims ( creanţe privilegiate ) be paid in full , and the remaining unsecured non - priority claims ( creanţe chirografare ) be paid at a rate of PERCENT of their value . In an interlocutory judgment of DATE the ORG validated the plan after examining the objections raised by the unsecured creditors ( creditori chirografari ) . In DATE company NORP paid its debts in accordance with the plan .

On DATE ORG held a hearing on the objections to the register of claims lodged by the applicants . The first applicant was present at the hearing to represent both himself and the other applicants . ORG gave the parties until DATE to submit written observations . On DATE , in the applicants’ absence , it adjourned delivery of the judgment to CARDINAL DATE . ORG gave its judgment on DATE ; it found against the applicants .

On DATE , in accordance with the rules on notification in relation to court documents in insolvency proceedings ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , the judgment of CARDINAL DATE was published in ORG ( PERSON , “ the Bulletin ” ) .

On an unspecified date the applicants enquired about the judgment ’s date of delivery and asked ORG to provide them with a copy of the judgment , which was sent to them on DATE ; they received it on DATE . On DATE they lodged an appeal by post .

Before ORG , the applicants argued that , as they had not had access to the Bulletin , they had not been able to know on which date the judgment had been published .

In a final decision of DATE ORG dismissed that argument and concluded that the appeal had been made out of time , as it had been lodged DATE after DATE , the date on which ORG judgment had been published ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . Relying on ORG decision no . CARDINAL of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , ORG considered that the notification procedure via the Bulletin had offered sufficient safeguards to the participants in the proceedings , and had been justified by the nature of the insolvency procedure .

On DATE ORG closed the insolvency proceedings and noted that company NORP had complied with all the obligations set out in the reorganisation plan ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , and thus it no longer had any debts .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Helena Jäderblom

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of inadequate conditions of their detention .

NORP In applications nos . MONEY , ORG and DATE the applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .

Having studied the terms of the ORG ’s unilateral declarations made in some cases , the ORG considers that the proposed declarations do not provide a sufficient basis for concluding that respect for human rights does not require it to continue its examination of these applications . The declarations are therefore rejected .