No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 6+6-1 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

András Sajó;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano

The applicant was born in DATE and is currently serving a prison sentence in PERSON .

On DATE , at TIME , the applicant was arrested on suspicion of being a member of an illegal organisation , namely ORG , ORG , “ the ORG ” . The arrest records held by the police stated that they had had to use force to arrest the applicant , who had tried to escape when officers approached him to conduct an identity check .

On DATE he underwent a medical examination at TIME at FAC in GPE . The report drawn up afterwards stated that no indication of ill - treatment had been observed on the applicant ’s body .

The applicant was examined again DATE , at TIME at the same hospital . The report issued following that examination noted that the applicant had a healing , scabbed scratch measuring CARDINAL x QUANTITY on his right elbow . It concluded that there was no indication of physical violence on his body .

Following the medical examinations , the applicant was transferred to GPE , where he was placed in police custody at FAC of ORG . According to his submissions , he was subjected to ill - treatment during his time there .

On DATE the applicant ’s residence in GPE was searched by the police , who found several guns and cartridges , which were later sent to ORG for ballistic examination .

On DATE the applicant was examined by a doctor at ORG , who noted a swelling , a bruise and a scratch measuring CARDINAL x CARDINAL cm on his right elbow , as well as another scratch measuring CARDINAL x CARDINAL cm on his arm . The doctor recommended that the applicant undergo an orthopaedic examination .

At the request of the public prosecutor , on DATE ORG decided to extend the applicant ’s police custody by DATE .

On DATE the applicant was examined again at ORG . This time , CARDINAL scars on his gluteal region were noted .

On an unspecified date the applicant made statements to the police , in the absence of a lawyer .

On DATE of his police custody , namely on DATE the applicant underwent another medical examination at ORG . The report drawn up afterwards indicated a scar measuring CARDINAL x QUANTITY on his right elbow . The doctor also noted that the applicant ’s medical condition was generally good , and recommended that he should undergo a urological consultation to follow up his complaint of rectal pain . He stated that a final report would be issued by ORG .

On DATE the applicant was heard by the public prosecutor at ORG . He was not legally represented when he made his statements .

Subsequently , the applicant was brought before the investigating judge at ORG ; he was remanded in custody . In the presence of a lawyer appointed by ORG , he retracted his previous statements and maintained that he had been subjected to illtreatment during his time in police custody . In response to a question by the investigating judge , the applicant maintained that he did not object to the content of the medical report drawn up DATE .

According to the applicant ’s submissions , on DATE he was examined by a doctor at ORG . The Government stated that there had been no such examination .

On DATE the public prosecutor at ORG filed an indictment with that court , accusing the applicant of membership of an illegal armed organisation and of involvement in activities which undermined the constitutional order of the ORG , pursuant to LAW in force at the time ( Law no . CARDINAL ) . In this respect , the public prosecutor noted that the applicant had taken part in several armed acts of the illegal organisation , including murder .

On DATE the applicant informed ORG that he would not attend the hearing that was to be held DATE , as he had had no opportunity to have prior consultation with his lawyer . The court asked the public prosecutor ’s office to ensure the applicant ’s attendance at the subsequent hearing .

At a hearing dated DATE , during which the applicant ’s lawyer was present , the court noted that although it had requested that the applicant be brought before the court , it had received no response from the public prosecutor concerning the matter . At the same hearing the case was joined to another one , in which the applicant was being tried together with some others .

During subsequent hearings , which were conducted in the absence of the applicant , the court heard submissions from some of the co - accused and some witnesses . At CARDINAL of these hearings , on DATE , the applicant ’s lawyer asked the court to obtain the medical reports issued at ORG in DATE . He also stated that the applicant had been transferred to another prison and that the order for him to attend the hearing had not been sent there .

On DATE the court noted that the applicant could not be brought to the hearing as he had been transferred once again .

On DATE ORG gave an interlocutory decision , holding that the applicant should be brought before the court for the subsequent hearings , and that failure to do so would result in those responsible for his absence being subject to a criminal investigation .

On an unspecified later date the applicant ’s lawyer submitted a letter to the court , noting that the applicant had not been brought before the court following its interlocutory decision dated DATE . He argued that the prison personnel and police officers concerned should be prosecuted for this .

On DATE the applicant was brought before the court . He submitted his defence , indicating that he had been severely beaten during his arrest in GPE and had been subjected to electric shocks , hung by the arms , hosed with cold water and sexually assaulted during his DATE police custody at ORG . He claimed that although his right arm had been broken and he had developed facial paralysis , he had not been taken to ORG . In that respect , he asked the court to obtain the medical reports issued following his examination at ORG , where he said a plaster cast had been put on his broken arm .

At hearings on DATE , DATE and DATE the applicant and his lawyer submitted additional defence statements .

During those proceedings , in DATE ORG were abolished following a constitutional amendment , and the case was transferred to ORG .

At a hearing on DATE the applicant informed the court that his lawyer had failed to attend the hearings , and asked for time to appoint a new lawyer .

On DATE the applicant ’s new lawyer reiterated the applicant ’s allegations of ill - treatment and asked the court to assess the medical reports on him . In that connection , she maintained that the applicant had not undergone urological or orthopaedic consultations , although the doctors at ORG had recommended that he should . The lawyer added that the applicant had never been taken to ORG , and that the court had not obtained the reports from ORG , despite the applicant ’s request for them . She also stated that the applicant had not been present at the hearings when the court had heard certain key witnesses .

On DATE the applicant ’s lawyer submitted a request to ORG for the medical reports on the applicant ’s medical examination on DATE . However , the hospital administration informed her that the records for DATE had been destroyed in DATE , as a result of a sewage pipe explosion above the archives .

On DATE , on the basis of several items of evidence , including the applicant ’s police statements , the guns found at his home , and ballistic reports on those guns , ORG found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment .

The applicant ’s lawyer appealed against the judgment , arguing that the applicant had been subjected to ill - treatment while in police custody and had been convicted on the basis of statements extracted under duress .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment of ORG . This judgment was pronounced on DATE .


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE .

The applicants are the widow and the son of Mr PERSON , who died in DATE .

In DATE , following publications in the media concerning the income of the first applicant and her husband , the GPE regional public prosecutor ’s office opened proceedings against them under LAW of the Citizens’ LAW ( “ the CPA ” , see paragraphs CARDINAL below ) . In a decision of DATE a prosecutor from that office discontinued the proceedings .

NORP The prosecutor found , first , that for the period from DATE Mr PERSON ’s expenditure had exceeded his income , but that in DATE he had paid the difference to the ORG budget . Accordingly , there was no ground to pursue the proceedings for that period ( section CARDINAL of the CPA , see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

Next , the prosecutor described the income and the expenditure of the first applicant and Mr PERSON for the period from DATE , but did not make an explicit finding as to whether she considered their income lawful within the meaning of the CPA .

Lastly , analysing the couple ’s income and expenditure for DATE , the prosecutor concluded that they were equivalent , and that there were no grounds for bringing forfeiture proceedings under the CPA .

On an unspecified date the GPE regional public prosecutor ’s office opened new proceedings under LAW . On DATE it brought an action in ORG against the CARDINAL applicants , seeking the forfeiture of CARDINAL flats , CARDINAL in GPE and CARDINAL in GPE , a garage , an office and a share in a plot of land in GPE , a holiday house in the PERSON resort and a ORG Land Cruiser car , all acquired by the first applicant and Mr PERSON with income received DATE , which was allegedly “ unlawful ” within the meaning of LAW CARDINAL of the CPA ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

The Sofia Regional Court gave a judgment on DATE . It analysed in detail the income received by the first applicant and her husband and their expenditure during the period at issue . Due to the difficulties in making an assessment because of the high inflation of that time , the court relied on expert conclusions , calculating all the amounts in GPE dollars ( USD ) .

ORG accepted in particular , referring to rent contracts , the tax declaration submitted by the first applicant in DATE and witness statements by those involved , that in DATE the first applicant and her husband had received substantial income from farming .

On the basis of its calculations , ORG concluded that the couple ’s expenditure for the period at issue had exceeded their proved income by MONEY , which by virtue of section CARDINAL of the CPA represented “ unlawful ” income . Accordingly , allowing the action brought before it in part , ORG ordered the forfeiture of property of that value , namely the flat in GPE , the share in a plot of land in GPE and CARDINAL of the flat in GPE .

Both parties lodged appeals .

On DATE the second - instance ORG gave a judgment . It found that the applicants had not established all the income considered proven by ORG , in particular as concerns the family ’s farming business . According to ORG it was unacceptable to prove such income on the basis of the evidence presented before the lower court , without any further documents showing , for example , expenditure and revenue received . It also considered unproven CARDINAL monetary gifts , CARDINAL of them allegedly made by the first applicant ’s parents and the other allegedly received on the occasion of her wedding to PERSON Dimitrov in DATE .

ORG calculated that the expenditure of the first applicant and her husband for DATE had exceeded their income by MONEY . It considered further that the properties for which the prosecution authorities sought forfeiture had been acquired with this “ unlawful ” income , and accordingly ordered the forfeiture of the flats in GPE and GPE and the office , the garage and the share in a plot of land in GPE . As to the remaining properties at issue , namely a holiday house in PERSON and a car , given that they had in the meantime been transferred to third parties , ORG ordered the applicants to pay their monetary value to the ORG .

The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law . In a final decision of DATE ORG refused to accept the appeal for examination .

On the basis of the judgment of DATE , on DATE the regional governor of ORG issued a decision declaring the flat in ORG property . Similar decisions concerning the properties in GPE were issued by the GPE regional governor on DATE and CARDINAL DATE . Following these decisions the applicants surrendered possession to the ORG .

On DATE the applicants paid MONEY ( ORG ) to the ORG budget , representing the value of the remaining forfeited properties , namely the holiday house in PERSON and the car , and the court fees and other costs due by them . In the domestic proceedings they had been ordered to pay ORG in total in fees and other expenses .

In DATE and DATE the relevant tax authorities carried out probes into the income received by the first applicant and her husband DATE . Their decisions , calculating the income tax due , were given on DATE and CARDINAL DATE .

In respect of the first applicant the respective decision was partly quashed on DATE by ORG .


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions);Violation of Article 13+P1-1-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property;Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant is the owner of CARDINAL FAC , GPE , a twostorey tenement with a surface area of DATE . ( hereinafter “ the property ” ) . In DATE , and DATE , following the death of their father , mother and uncle respectively , the applicant and her CARDINAL brothers inherited an estate which included the property . By a deed of partition of CARDINAL DATE the property was assigned to the applicant and she became its sole owner .

The property was requisitioned in DATE by means of a requisition order . The premises were then allocated to ORG in GPE hereinafter “ the band club ” ) . The owners of the property never recognised the tenant or accepted any rent from the club . According to a judgment of DATE of ORG ( FAC ) in its ordinary jurisdiction , the owners were entitled to do so because the tenement had not been leased as a dwelling , and thus greater risks were involved .

In DATE that followed rent was paid to the owners by the competent authority ( then ORG , DATE ORG ) . The DATE rent payable amounted to CARDINAL NORP Lira ( MTL – approximately MONEY ( ORG ) ) , less than ORG DATE . According to an architect ’s valuation from DATE submitted by the applicant , the rental value of the tenement at the time was ORG CARDINAL ( approximately ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) per month . The Government challenged this estimate , as the valuation had contained no explanation as to the basis for the calculations , or whether the property was considered residential or commercial , or vacant or occupied . They relied on a valuation in an architect ’s report concerning a property ( FAC ) requisitioned in DATE for the purposes of the band club – which stated that the rental value in DATE was ORG DATE , which meant ORG DATE . The Government did not refer to the different address , arguing as though the valuation referred to the property at issue in the present case .

NORP Over DATE the band club carried out extensive structural alterations , without obtaining the consent of the owners or the relevant permits from the competent authorities . According to an architect ’s report , there had been a total change and the alteration effected had effaced what had once been the traditional layout of important buildings in old NORP towns . According to the applicant , this deprived her of the valuable quality and historical and architectural importance of the property , thus devaluing it . The Government argued that the applicant had not availed herself of any ordinary remedy in this regard and had thus failed to substantiate the loss in value . Moreover , in their view the property was in a good state of repair and the alterations had increased its value .

According to the applicant , the band club also repeatedly breached the tenancy agreement which it had signed , by manufacturing fireworks on the LOC and conducting commercial activities ( such as running a bar and letting the LOC out as a wedding venue despite not having the requisite authorisation ) . The Government submitted that these were unsubstantiated allegations , which had not been proved before the domestic courts .

As from DATE , in the light of constitutional proceedings ( see below ) , the band club started depositing the DATE rent in court .

NORP The applicant and her brothers also owned a property ( CARDINAL ORG , GPE adjacent to the tenement above , which was requisitioned in DATE and also assigned to the band club .

NORP In DATE the owners of the tenement instituted civil proceedings before ORG ( FAC ) in its ordinary jurisdiction against the ORG Secretary and the band club . They requested that the requisition order of CARDINAL DATE be declared null and void as being contrary to LAW , and sought to regain possession of the tenement . They also requested compensation for the damage allegedly sustained .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( FAC ) in its ordinary jurisdiction rejected the ORG claim . The owners appealed against that decision .

In a judgment of DATE ORG declared the requisition order null and void and ordered that the appellants be given possession of the LOC within DATE . It held that the requisition for the purposes of assigning the property to the band club could not be considered to be in the public interest . It sent the case back to ORG ( FAC ) in its ordinary jurisdiction for it to award the appellants compensation .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG rejected a request for a new trial submitted by the band club .

In a judgment of DATE ORG ( FAC ) in its ordinary jurisdiction found the ORG Secretary and the band club liable for the damage suffered by the owners in connection with the structural alterations to the property . This judgment was upheld by ORG on DATE .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( FAC ) in its ordinary jurisdiction awarded the owners ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL in damages , covering LAW for missing objects , ORG CARDINAL to rectify the structural changes made and LAW for the loss of use of the property for DATE . This judgment was upheld by ORG on DATE .

NORP In DATE the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings in relation to the property requisitioned in DATE , asking the court to declare that , as a result of the requisition order and the continued occupation of the LOC , she had suffered a breach of her rights under LAW . She asked the court to award her compensation for the taking of possession of the property and for the violations suffered , and to order any other measure capable of preventing the continuation of the violation , including the release of the property .

The defendants , the Director of ORG , the Attorney General and the band club , argued that no such violations had occurred .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG ( FAC ) in its constitutional jurisdiction upheld the applicant ’s claims . It considered that the requisition order had been issued for the property to be enjoyed by a private entity and therefore the measure had not been in the public interest . In this connection , it referred to a judgment of DATE by ORG concerning what it considered to be the same property ( see above ) . Moreover , the measure had not been proportionate . The rent had been derisory , causing the applicant to suffer a disproportionate and excessive burden . She had therefore suffered a violation of LAW No . CARDINAL . According to the court , the applicant had also suffered a violation of LAW , as only her property had been requisitioned for the use of the band club . In determining the amount of compensation , the court did not take into account the fact that the applicant or her ancestors had received rent , given that the amount was derisory . Bearing in mind the values established by the applicant ’s expert as to the rental value and sale value of the property , which was ORG CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL ) ( pg.CARDINAL of the judgment ) , as well as the length of time the requisition was and remained in place , the court awarded the applicant ORG CARDINAL in compensation ( kumpens ) for the requisition of the LOC and the violations found , noting it was not awarding civil damages ( danni ċivili ) in this context . DATE of the amount was to be paid by ORG and DATE by the band club . It further ordered the band club to vacate the LOC within DATE of judgment and to return the LOC to the applicant .

The band club appealed , arguing that it could not be held responsible for breaches of human rights and that , in any event , the measure had been in the public interest . It further contested the order to vacate the property . The Attorney General and the Director of ORG also appealed , in particular in relation to the findings of a lack of public interest , a violation of LAW and the redress awarded . The applicant crossappealed , arguing that the compensation awarded was too low and did not reflect the losses she had incurred over DATE .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld the first - instance judgment in part . It reiterated the finding of a violation of the applicant ’s rights under LAW No . CARDINAL only in so far as the requisition had been disproportionate . It found , however , that it had been in the public interest – the court considered that jurisprudence had shifted since the time of the judgment of DATE of ORG on which the first - instance court had based its assessment . In the present case the requisition had served a social and cultural purpose for the generality of citizens and could not be said to have served solely private interests .

It further found that there had been no violation of LAW .

As to the redress , the Constitutional Court revoked the order for the club to vacate the LOC . Considering that the violation of LAW No . CARDINAL was a consequence of the lack of a fair balance between the interests of the landlord and those of the tenant , and given that the validity of the lease was not at issue in the present case , it did not seem appropriate for it to evict the tenant ; it sufficed that that unfair balance be redressed .

The Constitutional Court confirmed the amount of compensation awarded by the first - instance court , including the way in which it had to be shared . It considered that the band club had benefited from the situation and had never attempted to fix it , despite the fact that it had not been recognised as a tenant . In relation to the amount of compensation , it considered that the disproportionality of the measure had not persisted since the start of the requisition in DATE , but had started to be so only after DATE . Furthermore , the applicant had received the rent paid by the department and had only instituted constitutional proceedings in DATE ( while never contesting the validity of the requisition ) , thus it was legitimate and in line with local case - law to reduce her compensation . It also held that the property had been taken in the public interest and therefore the compensation needed not reflect market values . It followed that the compensation had to be reduced , however , given that the property was not to be vacated , it was appropriate to retain the amount awarded by the firstinstance court . Lastly , the court held that the claim for damages for the depreciation of the property as a result of structural works did not fall within the ambit of a constitutional complaint , and it was thus not its place to award such damages .

ORG ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the cross - appeal and CARDINAL the judicial costs of the proceedings before the CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction .


Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 34 - Victim);Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 35-3-a - Ratione materiae);Remainder inadmissible (Article 35-3-a - Manifestly ill-founded);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);No violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Mārtiņš Mits;Nona Tsotsoria;Yonko Grozev;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in Rīga .

She worked as an accountant in a building management company ( namu pārvalde ) from DATE . From DATE she also fulfilled the duties of a cashier and she was fully responsible for any shortfall in the material assets ( materiālās vērtības ) entrusted to her .

On DATE the applicant ’s colleagues reported to the police that illicit cash withdrawals from the company ’s cash registers had been made . Allegedly , the withdrawals had been made by the applicant and her colleague , PERSON , by means of annulling the records of cash transactions and then taking the money received in respect of those transactions from the cash register .

Internal and external audits were carried out and it was discovered that certain data in the company ’s cash registers had been manipulated . Specific amounts of cash and dates were noted in the audits , as well as the customer numbers in respect of which this manipulation had been executed . It was later established that the data had been manipulated in order to conceal illicit cash withdrawals . Further internal and external audits were carried out in DATE and DATE .

On DATE the applicant gave a written explanation ( paskaidrojums ) to a police inspector . The applicant testified that she had annulled CARDINAL cash transactions and made CARDINAL cash withdrawals in the amount of CARDINAL NORP lati ( ORG – QUANTITY ( ORG ) ) . She had done so at the request of the deputy head of the company and had handed the cash over to him . As concerns the remainder of the missing cash , she stated that she had not taken it . Nor had she annulled any other cash transactions .

On DATE the police inspector issued a decision to institute criminal proceedings ( lēmums par krimināllietas ierosināšanu ) in respect of “ the misappropriation of funds in the amount of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL [ approximately ORG CARDINAL ] carried out by the applicant and PERSON by annulling records of cash transactions ” . The applicant was not informed of this decision at that time . Instead , she was issued a summons to talks ( pārrunas ) and she was interviewed on DATE . A witness statement record ( liecinieka nopratināšanas protokols ) was drawn up . The applicant was informed of the rights and obligations of witnesses , as stipulated by LAW ( GPE kodekss , see paragraph CARDINAL below ) ; she was also informed that if she refused to testify or gave false testimony she would incur criminal liability . The applicant repeated that she had annulled CARDINAL cash transactions and had made CARDINAL cash withdrawals . She had handed the cash over to the deputy head .

According to the applicant she appeared at the police station on DATE , accompanied by a lawyer whom she had authorised to represent her . Her request to be represented by the lawyer was refused DATE she was told that her status was that of a witness and that witnesses were not entitled to legal assistance . The Government contested the applicant ’s submission , as there was no mention of this in the witness statement record ; the ORG stated that the applicant had signed the record and had made no remarks .

In DATE the applicant was interviewed as a witness CARDINAL more times : on DATE and DATE , CARDINAL DATE , and CARDINAL DATE and CARDINAL DATE . Her rights and obligations as a witness – as well as the fact that she would render herself criminally liable if she refused to testify or gave false testimony – were explained to her ( reference was made to LAW , see paragraph CARDINAL below ) ; no mention of any right to legal assistance was made . She reiterated that she had annulled CARDINAL cash transactions and had made CARDINAL cash withdrawals . She had handed the cash over to the deputy head of the company . She furthermore added that she had already repaid to the company approximately ORG CARDINAL ( approximately ORG MONEY ) .

A confrontation ( konfrontācija ) was also held between the applicant and PERSON on DATE and with the deputy head of the company on DATE , who were also considered witnesses . Another confrontation between the applicant and the chief accountant was scheduled to take place on DATE and DATE , but neither of them attended .

In DATE the police considered the case material to be sufficient for bringing charges against the applicant and referred the case to the prosecutor ’s office . However , several prosecutors identified various shortcomings in the investigation and transferred the case back to the police for additional investigation .

The identified shortcomings included the following aspects .

First , the criminal case material was found to be insufficient to establish guilt and therefore no charges could be brought . Serious breaches of LAW and other regulations were found . The criminal case material had contained uncertified copies of documents , missing pages of explanations and incomplete procedural records . In addition , the audits had not been carried out in accordance with law . Another audit had to be commissioned and more witnesses had to be questioned .

Second , there had been discrepancies in the total amount of missing cash and it was impossible to establish that a crime had been committed or to bring charges against anyone . The audit had to be carried out by a certified auditor .

A conclusion was made that the pre - trial investigation had been deficient , chaotic and had been carried out aimlessly . Moreover , the role of the chief accountant and the deputy head of the company in the cash withdrawals had not been properly investigated .

The police carried out further investigative measures – they commissioned another audit , collected further evidence , and questioned more witnesses ( including the head , the deputy head , and the chief accountant of the company , as well as some of its customers ) .

On DATE the police referred the case to the prosecutor ’s office for the fourth time . This time the case material was deemed sufficient for charges to be brought and , on DATE , the applicant was officially charged with CARDINAL episodes of misappropriation of funds . She thus became an accused person ( apsūdzētā persona ) in the criminal proceedings against her and was informed of her right to have a lawyer . A preventive measure – a prohibition on her changing her place of residence , which she had to acknowledge by giving her signature ( paraksts par dzīves vietas nemainīšanu ) – was imposed on her . On DATE the charges were slightly amended in respect of the total amount of misappropriated funds .

On DATE , DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE the applicant was questioned as an accused person . On CARDINAL occasions ( on DATE and on CARDINAL DATE ) the applicant stated that a lawyer ’s presence was not necessary . On another occasion ( on DATE ) she stated that she would continue giving testimony without the presence of a lawyer . No remarks were made regarding the absence of a lawyer during the questioning of CARDINAL DATE . The applicant was given access to the criminal case file in order that she could acquaint herself with its contents . She subsequently requested that further investigative measures be taken . Some requests for further investigative measures were granted and some were refused .

On DATE the final bill of indictment was served on the applicant ( uzrādīta galīgā apsūdzība ) in the presence of a lawyer . The total amount of misappropriated funds was again slightly amended . On DATE other preventive measures – a prohibition on leaving the country and the obligation to reside at a particular place of residence ( uzturēšanās noteiktā dzīvesvietā ) – were imposed on the applicant . On the same date the prosecutor ’s office forwarded the case file to ORG ( PERSON apgabaltiesa ) .

On DATE the first hearing was held . On DATE ORG convicted the applicant of CARDINAL episodes of misappropriation of property that had been entrusted to her . The applicant did not admit her guilt . She agreed that she had annulled CARDINAL cash transactions and made CARDINAL cash withdrawals in the amount of ORG CARDINAL ( approximately ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) , but stated that she had done so at the request of the chief accountant and the deputy head of the company with a view to paying out salaries . As concerns other cash transactions , she had not annulled those . The court , relying on witness testimony and other case material ( the results of CARDINAL audits , the electronic cash register records , the relevant bills and receipts , the respective employment agreements etc . ) , convicted the applicant . The court did not rely on the applicant ’s statements made during the pre - trial investigation .

NORP The applicant was given a DATE suspended prison sentence , with CARDINAL years’ probation ( a more lenient sentence than the minimum provided by law ) . In setting the sentence the court took into account her state of health , the fact that she had partly compensated the company for the damage in question , and the fact that she had committed the crime DATE previously and that since then she had not committed any other crimes . The applicant lodged an appeal on DATE .

The first appellate hearing was scheduled for DATE . On CARDINAL DATE ORG ( GPE tiesas GPE tiesu palāta ) quashed the applicant ’s conviction for lack of evidence in respect of CARDINAL episodes of misappropriation of property . The applicant ’s sentence was reduced to a DATE suspended prison sentence , with DATE probation . In setting the sentence the court took into account the significantly lower number of episodes for which the applicant had been convicted , the fact that a particularly long period of time had elapsed since the commission of the crime , and the fact that there was no indication that she had committed any other crimes since then . The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law on DATE .

On DATE the ORG of ORG ( PERSON tiesas PERSON ) dismissed the applicant ’s appeal on points of law . The ORG indicated that the former Criminal Procedure Code ( which had been in force in DATE , when the charges had been brought against the applicant ) had not excluded that a person could have the procedural status of a witness while a pre - trial investigation was in progress and could only be officially charged once there was sufficient evidence concerning that person ’s guilt .


Angelika Nußberger;Carlo Ranzoni;Erik Møse;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mārtiņš Mits;Yonko Grozev

NORP The applicant , Mr Ivars Kibermanis , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He is represented before the Court by Mrs J. Kvjatkovska , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent at the time , PERSON , and subsequently by PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the State Police instituted criminal proceedings for fraud , in particular for attempts to obtain by fraud the immovable property of a victim , PERSON , by using fake cession contracts and carrying out other fraudulent activities , which had taken place , inter alia , at the bailiffs’ office where the applicant worked .

On DATE a judge of the Riga City Latgale District Court authorised a search of the applicant ’s office , limiting the seizure to :

“ ... documents , contracts , letters , notices , and other documents concerning PERSON , PERSON , and PERSON for the period from CARDINAL DATE until the material date ” .

The search of the office was carried out on DATE , and the investigators seized CARDINAL hard drives from the applicant ’s and his assistant ’s computers . The items were sealed and the search records do not reveal any complaints from the applicant with respect to the seizure . He nevertheless commented that the computers contained documents which under section CARDINAL of the Bailiffs Law were not to be removed from the bailiffs’ office .

On DATE the investigator ordered a technical expert report in order to find out whether the memory of the seized hard drives contained certain deleted documents : a cession contract dated DATE and letters and other documents containing the names of CARDINAL persons , PERSON , PERSON , and PERSON ( all of whom at that time were suspects or accused in the same criminal proceedings ) , and PERSON , the victim . On DATE the hard drives were returned to the applicant .

On DATE the applicant complained to ORG that the investigators had exceeded their powers by seizing the hard drives , since the judge ’s search order had not authorised the seizure of anything but documents . He relied on LAW , submitting that the search and seizure at his office had violated his right to respect for his private life and that of his clients in that the seized items had included CARDINAL hard drives containing information relating to his private life and documents relating to his clients . Later he added the complaint that the seized objects had not been correctly sealed and were accessible to anyone .

On DATE the applicant ’s claim was dismissed . The prosecutor stated that the search had been conducted in accordance with section CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Bailiffs Law , which in criminal proceedings concerning fraud authorised the seizure of documents from bailiffs’ offices , and that the search warrant must be interpreted as covering not only documents but also any other device containing the relevant documents . It added that the hard drives had not been seized , but only taken in order to extract from them the information the judge had authorised to be obtained .

The applicant submitted various similar complaints to higherranking prosecutors , claiming that during the search and seizure the investigating officer had been accompanied by an IT specialist who could have copied on the spot the necessary information from the hard drive , as the applicant had suggested . On DATE a supervising prosecutor dismissed the complaint by contending that electronic documents which were stored in hard drives could be changed ; therefore in the particular circumstances the seizure of the hard drives had been an appropriate decision , in that it would not have been possible to select the correct document without special knowledge . A similar conclusion was reached in the final decision of the Prosecutor General of DATE .

Meanwhile , on DATE the applicant was charged with fraud . Subsequently the charges were amended , adding a charge of document forgery . In DATE the criminal case was sent to court in order for the adjudication to commence .

Following another complaint , on DATE ORG reiterated that ORG had given a final decision on the complaints . Moreover , the applicant was reminded that the pre - trial criminal process had been terminated , therefore any future requests and submissions were to be addressed to the court .

On DATE the applicant submitted to the investigating judge of the Riga City Latgale District Court a similar complaint to the one mentioned above about the allegedly unlawful seizure of the hard drives . The investigating judge noted that section CARDINAL of LAW provided for a separation between the pre - trial criminal process and the trial , therefore the investigating judge could only have examined the complaints of alleged human - rights infringements during the pre - trial criminal process , that is before the criminal proceedings were referred to ORG for adjudication . Therefore , on DATE the applicant ’s complaint was dismissed owing to the fact that his criminal case had been sent to trial in DATE and the beginning of the adjudication had been set for DATE .

In DATE and DATE the applicant and his co - accused were asked to give voluntary voice samples to establish the authenticity of tapped telephone conversations between the CARDINAL . They both refused and were subjected to compulsory voice sampling . On DATE and DATE the applicant was provided with copies of the material in the criminal case file .

On DATE ORG convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment , which was suspended . The court relied on , inter alia , the telephone conversations between the applicant and the co - defendants which were tapped in DATE .

On various dates after the lower court ’s judgment the applicant ’s representative asked the Chairman of ORG and the appellate court to inform him whether the telephone tapping had been in accordance with the law , in particular whether it had been authorised by a judge .

On DATE the Chairman of ORG refused to provide any information on grounds of ORG secrecy . On DATE a judge sitting on the panel of ORG of ORG ( hereinafter “ the appellate court ” ) told the applicant that she would herself ascertain whether the phone tapping of DATE had been authorised by a judge .

On DATE the appellate court quashed the lower court ’s judgment in part and sentenced the applicant to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment . The court referred to information received from ORG ) confirming that the phone tapping from DATE to DATE had been carried out after authorisation had been obtained from a judge of ORG .

Following an appeal on points of law by the applicant on DATE the ORG of ORG quashed the appellate court ’s judgment in part ( on the counts of bribery and fraud ) and sent it to the appellate court . The remainder of the judgment ( in respect of document forgery ) took effect .

On DATE the appellate court delivered a judgment in the quashed part . The applicant submitted an appeal on points of law against the judgment in which he did not raise the Article CARDINAL complaint later invoked before the ORG .

NORP In DATE and DATE the applicant asked the Chairman of ORG and ORG respectively to provide information on whether there had been a judge ’s authorisation for the recording of his telephone conversations . On DATE the Office of the Prosecutor General confirmed that the tapping of the applicant ’s telephone conversation was based on authorisation by a judge of ORG , as required by DATE ) and LAW .

The final judgment in the part which had been quashed was delivered on DATE , when the ORG of ORG terminated the criminal proceedings , finding that there had been an incorrect interpretation of the substantive norms of LAW .

Section CARDINAL provides , inter alia , that a search may be conducted only on the basis of a judicial decision .

Pursuant to section CARDINAL , an investigator or prosecutor is strictly limited to seizing only documents which may have direct relevance to the [ criminal ] case in question .

Section QUANTITY provides that complaints about the actions of the investigating authorities may be submitted to a prosecutor .

Section CARDINAL provides that a complaint about the actions of a public prosecutor may be submitted to a higher prosecutor .

Section CARDINAL provides that an investigating judge is the judge assigned by the chairperson of the district ( city ) court for a specific term in relation to each case and in accordance with the procedure specified by law , to supervise the observance of human rights in criminal proceedings . The powers of the investigating judge depend on the stage of the criminal proceedings .

Section CARDINAL provides that during a pre - trial investigation and criminal prosecution an investigating judge has , inter alia , the duty of reviewing the conduct of the procedural activities . The same section provides that during the pre - trial investigation and criminal prosecution an investigating judge has the right to familiarise himself with all the material in the criminal case in respect of which the complaint has been received . He or she also has the right to request additional information about criminal proceedings where special investigative actions are being conducted , as well as to determine the terms for the performance of the special investigative actions . At this stage the investigating judge is authorised to apply a procedural sanction for the non - execution of duties or the non - observance of procedures during pre - trial criminal proceedings . He or she can propose that officials who are authorised to perform criminal proceedings are to be held liable for infringements of human rights committed in the carrying out of criminal procedural activities .

Section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) provides that from the moment the criminal case has been committed to trial , and before the adjudication of the case has commenced , the investigating judge has a duty to decide on the application of an accused in relation to the amending or revocation of security measures and the proposal of a public prosecutor in relation to the selection or amendment of a security measure .

The Office of the Prosecutor is a judicial institution which independently carries out supervision of the observance of law within the scope of its competence as determined by law . Its role is , inter alia , to supervise the work of investigative institutions and the investigatory operations of other institutions .

The relevant provisions are set out in the ORG ’s judgment in the case of LOC v. GPE , no . GPE DATE , DATE , in particular :

“ Section CARDINAL provides :

“ If an individual believes that a body carrying out operational activities ( operatīvās darbības subjekts ) has infringed his lawful rights and freedoms , he or she is entitled to lodge a complaint with the prosecutor , who shall conduct an examination and issue a conclusion ( atzinums ) concerning the lawfulness of the contested actions of the official of the body carrying out operational activities ( operatīvās darbības subjekta amatpersona ) , or the individual may bring an action before the court .

Section CARDINAL provides :

“ ( CARDINAL ) The Prosecutor General and prosecutors specially authorised by him shall be responsible for monitoring ( uzraudzība ) the conformity of operational activities with the law . For the purposes of monitoring they shall be entitled to consult such documents , materials and information , at any stage of the operational activities , as are available to the investigating body ( operatīvās darbības iestāde ) . Secret information and its sources shall be revealed only to ORG , or to the prosecutors specially authorised by him with the permission of the head of the investigating body .

( CARDINAL ) In order to take a decision with respect to operational measures which require approval by a judge , the judge shall be entitled to consult those documents , materials and information available to the investigating body on which the necessity for the operational measure , according to the special method , is based . Secret information and its sources shall be revealed to the judge only with the permission of the head of the investigating body . ” ”

On CARDINAL DATE the Constitutional Court delivered its ruling in case no . DATE . It found that the regulatory framework included in LAW referred to a monitoring mechanism for operational activities that must be assessed in conjunction with the right of a person to protection of his or her infringed rights . By relying on sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of the above legislative act ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , ORG concluded that ORG and specialised prosecutors reviewed operational activities and , on the basis of the results of such a review , provided an opinion on the lawfulness of operational activities . However , the effective regulatory framework also established judicial supervision , including subsequent scrutiny . Consequently , ORG did not agree with the argument raised by the applicant in the constitutional proceedings that the effective regulatory framework failed to provide independent subsequent scrutiny in respect of operational measures . For a more detailed review see PERSON , cited above , § CARDINAL .


No violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Positive obligations;Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

At TIME on DATE the applicant took his son PERSON to the emergency unit of ORG , accompanied by their family doctor . PERSON was immediately examined by the doctor on duty , Mr C.C.R. , who recorded an initial diagnosis on the observation sheet of “ icteric syndrome ” ( jaundice ) . Following subsequent tests the diagnosis was changed to " hepatic cirrhosis with gastrointestinal haemorrhage ” and the patient was treated with drugs .

Dr C.C.R. filled in forms to admit the patient to the gastroenterology unit , as provided for by the hospital ’s code of practice for patients with gastrointestinal haemorrhage . However , owing to the fact that the gastroenterology unit was in a separate building and had no elevator , the patient remained in the emergency unit .

Despite the treatment he was given , the patient ’s condition worsened and at TIME he was examined by TIME , a doctor who specialised in intensive care . She recommended that the treatment be continued and ordered blood transfusions . Owing to a lack of beds in the intensive care unit , the patient was not immediately transferred there .

At TIME , PERSON was transferred to the intensive care unit . Dr A.M. , on duty that night in the unit , came to see FAC times . At some point during TIME the blood transfusions were stopped .

After TIME the next morning PERSON ’s condition began to worsen and he was given blood transfusions again .

At TIME , because the patient ’s state continued to deteriorate , PERSON , the head of the gastroenterology unit , decided to perform an endoscopy of the stomach . The procedure did not succeed because of massive gastrointestinal bleeding .

At TIME on CARDINAL DATE PERSON was declared dead owing to cardio - respiratory failure . According to the hospital observation sheet , the direct cause of death was upper gastrointestinal haemorrhage , ruptured oesophageal varices , decompensated hepatic cirrhosis and a haemorrhagic duodenal ulcer .

On DATE the applicant and his wife lodged a criminal complaint against ORG and TIME , accusing them of manslaughter . The applicant firstly complained that , despite repeated requests , PERSON C.C.R. had refused to allow the patient to be transferred to another , better equipped , hospital . The applicant also complained of the failure to provide blood transfusions , which he said caused the death of his son , and of the generally poor treatment received by his son in ORG .

On DATE the CARDINAL doctors were questioned by ORG . Dr C.C.R. explained that the patient ’s state of health did not allow him to be transferred to another hospital . He also submitted that a particular medicine , Lactulose , had been missing from the hospital ’s pharmacy and that he had asked the applicant to buy it . Concerning the lack of blood for transfusions , the doctor said that that was not his fault and that the hospital had run out of blood that night . In conclusion , the doctor stated that the patient , who was suffering from hepatic cirrhosis , had received the necessary treatment . PERSON said that the patient ’s condition had had a poor prognosis , that she had provided the correct treatment and that a transfer to another hospital would not have been possible under the circumstances .

The applicant ’s statement was taken on DATE . He reiterated his previous complaints . In addition , he criticised the delay in the administration of Lactulose to his son .

An autopsy report issued on DATE said that PERSON had not died by violent means . The death was caused by upper gastrointestinal haemorrhage due to the rupture of varices in the oesophagus and a duodenal ulcer in a patient already suffering from hepatic cirrhosis . The report concluded that no issues had been found that could raise questions about the medical treatment received by the patient .

On CARDINAL DATE the applicant complained to ORG of excessive delays in the investigation . He also requested a forensic medical expert report to verify whether his son had received the necessary treatment . He included the results of various blood tests made by GPE DATE , intending to prove that his son had not been ill in DATE before his admission to ORG .

On DATE ORG of ORG sent a request for a forensic report to ORG . On DATE ORG replied that it could not deliver such a report because its chief doctor had already performed the autopsy in the same case . Therefore , on DATE the request was sent to ORG .

On DATE the forensic report was added to the case file and on DATE it was made available to the applicant . The report noted that hospital practice had not been adhered to as the patient should have been admitted to the gastroenterology section , given the diagnosis . Nevertheless , the conclusion was that the treatment received by PERSON was adequate and correct and there was no indication of medical error .

On DATE the applicant submitted objections to the report and requested it to be reanalysed by ORG in GPE . On DATE the applicant ’s objections to the forensic report were rejected by the prosecutor , who only allowed it to be referred to ORG for approval .

On DATE , in a CARDINAL - page letter , ORG approved the report drafted by ORG .

On DATE , in a briefly - worded decision based on the forensic medical report , ORG of ORG decided not to commence criminal proceedings against the CARDINAL doctors as there had been no finding of medical errors . That decision was upheld on DATE by the chief prosecutor of the same prosecutor ’s office .

A complaint by the applicant against the CARDINAL decisions was allowed by ORG on DATE . The court decided to send the case back to the prosecutor in order to commence criminal proceedings against the CARDINAL doctors . The court observed that the ORG decisions had been based only on statements by the CARDINAL doctors and on the forensic report and held that the investigators in the case needed to clarify whether the patient ’s state of health had required his admission to the gastroenterology unit and whether treatment in that unit could have influenced the course of the victim ’s illness . The court ordered that such questions should be answered by way of a more thorough investigation , taking statements from doctors specialising in gastroenterology , as well as from other employees of the hospital . In addition , the court requested the prosecutors to clarify , by way of witness statements and confrontations , what was the practice of the hospital in dealing with cases of gastrointestinal bleeding and whether the CARDINAL doctors had observed that practice . The judgment became final on DATE when an appeal on points of law by the CARDINAL doctors was rejected by ORG .

On DATE the investigation resumed with the questioning of Dr P.P.J. , a gastroenterologist employed at ORG , and on DATE of PERSON , who had performed the endoscopy on GPE On DATE , ORG and TIME , the CARDINAL doctors under investigation , were questioned for a second time .

On DATE the ORG of ORG again found no fault in the actions of the CARDINAL doctors . That decision was communicated to the applicant on CARDINAL DATE . On DATE a complaint by the applicant against that decision was rejected as ill - founded by the chief prosecutor of the same prosecutor ’s office . The applicant took his case against those decisions to court .

On DATE ORG allowed the applicant ’s complaint and ordered the reopening of criminal proceedings , considering that the questions raised in its judgment of DATE had still not been answered . The court held that , bearing in mind the seriousness of the case , which involved the death of a man , the investigation should have been more detailed and the applicant ’s allegations should have been more thoroughly checked . More specifically , the court noted that the applicant had maintained , among other things , that PERSON had been healthy and had never previously been admitted to hospital and that there had been delays in the administration of a particular drug and in giving blood transfusions . However , the medical reports had said that the deceased was suffering from an ulcer and cirrhosis . The court also reasoned that , even if it could be accepted that rapid changes could occur in such conditions , it was hard to believe that the victim had had no previous symptoms and had not been under the supervision of medical professionals prior to CARDINAL DATE . In view of the above , the court further requested that the prosecutors take statements from the family doctor and gather evidence about the victim ’s state of health prior to his admission to ORG .

On DATE the investigation resumed with a letter being sent to ORG in which the prosecutor requested their assistance in obtaining a statement from the victim ’s family doctor , as well as copies of any medical documents she might have concerning the victim ’s state of health prior to his hospital admission on DATE . In DATE the family doctor , GPE , gave a statement to the police . She recalled that , during an examination in DATE , PERSON had presented with signs of hepatic distress and that she had recommended various tests . The tests had come back showing results that were slightly above the norm , so she had advised him to see a gastroenterologist .

Dr PERSON was again questioned on DATE . CARDINAL doctors who had been on duty when PERSON was admitted were questioned in DATE . They did not remember any relevant details about the case .

On DATE the Prosecutor ’s Office of ORG , considering it established that the applicant had been suffering from cirrhosis well before DATE and that nothing could have been done to save his life , decided not to press criminal charges against the CARDINAL suspects on the grounds that they had not committed any criminal act . A complaint by the applicant against that decision was rejected as ill - founded by the chief prosecutor of the same prosecutor ’s office on DATE .

A complaint by the applicant against the ORG decisions of CARDINAL July and CARDINAL DATE was allowed by ORG on DATE . The court considered that all the facts had still not been clarified by the investigation and again ordered the reopening of criminal proceedings . Specific instructions were again given to the prosecutors . The court noted that , in order to observe the equality of arms and to guarantee a fair trial , the applicant should have been consulted on which witnesses to hear and given the opportunity to call doctors of his own choice as witnesses . The court further reiterated the instructions given in its previous judgments in the case , which it did not consider had been carried out by the prosecutor . Finally , the court ordered the prosecutor to conduct a speedier investigation , bearing in mind that a long time had passed since the lodging of the applicant ’s complaint and that the inquiry had been totally ineffective up to that point .

The investigation was reopened on DATE . On CARDINAL DATE a statement from the applicant was taken by the prosecutor . He stated that he did not know the names or addresses of the medical staff on duty at the time of the incident . He further requested a confrontation with the CARDINAL doctors under investigation .

On DATE the prosecutor asked ORG for a list of employees on duty on DATE of PERSON ’s stay in hospital . On DATE the hospital replied that it no longer had the duty sheets as that type of document was only kept for DATE .

On DATE CARDINAL doctors specialising in gastroenterology , called as witnesses by the applicant , testified before the prosecutor that the diagnosis and treatment applied by Drs C.C.R. and A.M. had been correct in the circumstances . They noted that the only drug capable of removing blood from the stomach in order to prepare the patient for an endoscopy under the proper conditions was not available in GPE at that time .

A confrontation between ORG , A.M. and the applicant took place on DATE .

DATE the prosecutor took statements from several employees of ORG . They all declared that they did not remember anything about the patient GPE

By a decision issued on DATE ORG of ORG ended its criminal investigation , finding no guilt in the actions of the CARDINAL doctors . The prosecutor noted that according to the hospital ’s practice , the patient should have been admitted to the gastroenterology unit but that this had not been possible because the unit did not have an elevator for wheeled beds . However , the prosecutor observed that all the medical reports drafted in the case had concluded that the patient ’s diagnosis had been correct and that he had had the appropriate treatment . This conclusion was also confirmed by the CARDINAL specialists called as witnesses by the applicant . The prosecutor stated that the endoscopy performed before the patient ’s death had been rendered more difficult owing to the absence in the country of the drug needed to clear blood from the patient ’s stomach . With regard to the applicant ’s complaint concerning the ORG failure to administer blood transfusions , the prosecutor held that the patient ’s death had been caused not only by anaemia but also by hepatic insufficiency .

The prosecutor ’s decision was upheld on DATE by the head prosecutor of ORG of ORG .

A complaint by the applicant against those CARDINAL decisions was rejected with final effect on DATE by ORG . The court , quoting widely from the prosecutor ’s decision of DATE , held that the investigation had correctly led to the conclusion that there was no proof of fault by the CARDINAL doctors .

On DATE the applicant and his wife lodged a disciplinary complaint against Drs C.C.R. and A.M.

The disciplinary committee of ORG opened an investigation into the patient ’s death , collecting documents from the patient ’s medical file and taking statements from the doctors who had treated him . It gave its decision on DATE , ruling that no medical errors had been made .

The applicant objected to the committee ’s conclusions and his appeal was examined by the superior disciplinary committee of ORG .

On the basis of the evidence presented to it , on DATE ORG terminated the disciplinary proceedings against Drs C.C.R. and A.M. Relying on the medical documents in the file and on the opinion of a university professor , the authority considered that it had been established that no medical errors had been made .

The applicant and his wife brought an action for the quashing of the decision adopted on DATE , pointing to the failure by the CARDINAL doctors to provide appropriate treatment for their son .

On DATE ORG dismissed the action as illfounded and upheld the decision of ORG .

An appeal by the applicant against that judgment was allowed by ORG on DATE . The case was sent to ORG for rehearing because the lower court had not examined any evidence other than the documents in the file , which had been the sole basis for its decision .

On DATE ORG took note of the fact that the applicant and his wife no longer wished to pursue the proceedings and closed the case .


András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

NORP The applicant , PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He is represented before ORG by Ms M. NORP , a lawyer practising in ORG .

The application concerns national bonds issued by ORG in DATE . The bonds were to have been redeemed by DATE . However , the ORG failed to undertake any steps to redeem them or to pay interest to the holders of those bonds .

On DATE the applicant instituted civil proceedings for payment against ORG , represented by ORG . He claimed MONEY ( ORG ) ( approximately MONEY ( EUR ) ) .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s claim , finding that it had become time - barred and that , moreover , its value would in any event approach MONEY after the application of all due indexation methods .

The applicant appealed against that judgment .

On DATE ORG quashed the firstinstance judgment and remitted the case to ORG . It considered , inter alia , that finding the applicant ’s claim time - barred had been contrary to the principles of community life ( sprzeczna z zasadami współżycia społecznego ) . ORG found that ORG should have examined the applicant ’s claim on the merits .

On DATE ORG found part of the claim well founded , awarded the applicant ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( approximately ORG MONEY ) and dismissed the remainder of the claim .

On DATE ORG lodged an appeal against that judgment .

On DATE ORG asked ORG for an explanation of a legal question concerning the applicability to the present case of the indexation clause contained in Article CARDINAL§ CARDINAL of the Civil Code . In particular , ORG had doubts as to whether the indexation clause should be applied if a significant change in the value of a claim had resulted from legislative changes .

On DATE ORG , in reply to ORG request , ruled that ORG had failed to meet the requirements which would have allowed it to turn to ORG for interpretation ; instead , it stated that ORG should decide independently on the present case .

On DATE ORG amended the challenged judgment and dismissed the applicant ’s claim . The court found , inter alia , that the national bonds had lost their real value because of the DATE Decree ( see paragraph CARDINAL ) and LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL ) . Relying on the judgment of ORG of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL ) , it ruled that the indexation of the value of the applicant ’s claim by way of judicial decision was inadmissible because the change in the value of the claim had been caused by the lawmaker and had not been a result of external , unpredictable causes .

The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with ORG .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s cassation appeal . ORG endorsed the reasoning of the judgment given by ORG and confirmed that the applicant ’s claim had indeed lost its economic value as a result of legislative changes enacted in DATE and DATE .

DATE provides :

“ The payment of dues resulting from pecuniary obligations arising from any title of a private or public nature before the entry into force of the present decree and not redeemed until DATE may only be effected in the NORP currency . ”

At the relevant time , LAW , subsequently repealed , provided :

“ ( CARDINAL ) The change in the purchasing power of money during the time between the creation of an obligation and its payment date or performance does not constitute a basis for a change in the amount of the obligation or in the means of the execution of the contract or dissolution of the contract .

( CARDINAL ) Payment of an obligation , specified in NORP currency on the basis of this decree , shall be made in banknotes of the NORP ORG according to their nominal value , which is equal to the nominal value of banknotes or other means of payment , which were expressed in zlotys and which were in circulation on the territory of GPE or a part thereof before the introduction of ORG banknotes into circulation .

( CARDINAL ) For the establishment of the value of pecuniary obligations referred to in the present Decree and expressed in the NORP currency , it is irrelevant what means of payment was in circulation at the time of the creation of the obligation . ”

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL provides :

“ The amount of obligations expressed in zlotys in gold is calculated at MONEY for MONEY in gold . ” ( PERSON należności z zobowiązań pieniężnych wyrażonych w złotych w złocie liczy się jeden złoty za jednego złotego w złocie )

The Change of Monetary System Act of DATE ( o zmianie systemu pieniężnego ) provided that all public and private obligations expressed in zlotys , irrespective of the time at which they came into existence , were to be recalculated with effect from DATE according to the following ratio : CARDINAL “ old ” NORP zlotys equals MONEY .

Under LAW , all amounts expressed in “ old ” zlotys and mentioned in legal provisions binding on DATE of the entry into force of this Act were recalculated , by virtue of law , according to the following ratio : CARDINAL “ old ” zlotys = MONEY .

The Polish Zloty Denomination Act of DATE Act ( ustawa o denominacji złotego ) introduced a new payment unit : with effect from CARDINAL DATE the new unit of ORG was to be worth CARDINAL “ old ” NORP zlotys .

Article CARDINAL of the LAW reads :

All persons shall be equal before the law . All persons shall have the right to equal treatment by public authorities .

No one shall be discriminated against in political , social or economic life for any reason .

Article CARDINAL of the LAW reads , in so far as relevant , as follows :

Everyone shall have the right to ownership , other property rights and the right of succession .

Everyone , on an equal basis , shall receive legal protection regarding ownership , other property rights and the right of succession ...

Article CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the Civil Code provides :

“ In the case of an essential change of the purchasing power of money after an obligation falls due the court may , after considering the interest of the parties and in accordance with the principles of community life , change the amount or the mode of payment , even if these were fixed in a decision or a contract . ”

On DATE the ORG gave a judgment ( ORG CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) in which it held that section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the LAW of DATE amending LAW , in so far as it limited the possibility of judicial indexation referred to in Article LAW of LAW as regards pecuniary obligations which had come into existence before DATE as a result of bonds emitted by ORG , was inconsistent with LAW CARDINAL in conjunction with LAW .

In the part named “ effects of the judgment ” ORG noted :

“ Taking into consideration the effects of this judgment and the impossibility of claiming the full value of claims arising from national bonds issued DATE , the matter of possibility and scope and , in particular , the amount of just satisfaction for persons holding such bonds should be resolved by the lawmaker . As stressed on many occasions in its case - law , ORG should not replace the lawmaker .

The finding by ORG that section CARDINAL ) of the LAW DATE amending LAW was inconsistent with LAW ... will enable the holders of national bonds to access the indexation of their claims guaranteed by LAW . However , in practice , the expiry of limitation periods may effectively deprive claimants of a chance to achieve a positive outcome in the relevant proceedings .

If [ the ORG ] does not enact new provisions before LAW ( CARDINAL ) of the LAW of DATE expires , holders of national bonds , who have been patiently waiting for the settlement of their claims , will be able to lodge [ with civil courts ] their claims for payment in an amount which will be calculated with the application of the indexation clause .

However , the present judgment of ORG does not indicate to the courts the scope , direction or scale of the indexation . ”

The provisions which had been found unconstitutional were subsequently repealed , which opened the way for applicants to lodge their claims before the courts and to demand that the value of their claims be increased by judicial order .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13+6-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the excessive length of civil proceedings and of the lack of any effective remedy in domestic law . In applications nos . ORG and CARDINAL/CARDINAL the applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Helena Jäderblom

On various dates the applicants brought civil actions against ORG of GPE , seeking to recover the monetary value of ORG promissory notes for purchases of Russianmade cars .

The first - instance courts found in the applicants’ favour . Those judgments were upheld on appeal and became final . They were subsequently quashed by supervisory review courts upon applications lodged by ORG on the grounds of incorrect application of substantive law ( for more details , see the Appendix ) .

All the judgments in the ORG favour remained unenforced until DATE of their quashing .