CASE OF MIRONOVAS AND OTHERS v. LITHUANIA

Inadmissible (Article 34 - Victim);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano

Mr PERSON was born in DATE . When he lodged the application with the ORG in DATE , he was serving a prison sentence at FAC .

From DATE to DATE the applicant was detained at FAC . It transpires from the documents before the ORG that he was held in different remand prison cells where he had CARDINAL of living space .

After his conviction and transfer to ORG to serve his sentence , on DATE the applicant instituted civil proceedings for damages . He argued that the conditions in which he had been held at FAC had been degrading : the cells were overcrowded , full of rats and worms , appropriate toilet facilities were lacking , the cells were hot in DATE and cold in DATE , the cell walls were damp , and the roof of the remand prison was covered with asbestos , which put the applicant ’s health in danger .

The FAC Prison administration responded that they attempted to maintain the statutory norm of QUANTITY per remand prisoner held in a cell ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , but that had not always been possible . The administration acknowledged that the facility was “ constantly overcrowded ( nuolat perpildytas ) ” , because the institution could not refuse to admit persons brought there . The buildings of the remand prison were very old , they were repaired periodically and it was not possible to repair them entirely .

The case was first examined by ORG , which rejected the applicant ’s claim , inter alia , for having missed the statutory time - limit . ORG then remitted the case for fresh examination .

On DATE ORG noted that the applicant had missed , by DATE , the statutory DATE time - limit to lodge a claim for damages . The court nevertheless restored the time - limit of its own motion , having observed that the applicant had lodged his claim belatedly partly because he had not obtained in time information necessary for his civil claim .

ORG established that the applicant had been held in overcrowded cells for DATE , given that for that duration he had been held in cells where he had QUANTITY of personal space . On the basis of LAW , Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL of ORG and ORG judgment in PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , DATE ) , the first - instance court held that because of the overcrowding the applicant ’s dignity had suffered . Nonetheless , the court dismissed the applicant ’s remaining complaints about the detention conditions in FAC as not actually proven . It also noted that he had not complained to any authority of the unsanitary conditions in GPE while he had been held there . The court also took into account that after having been transferred to FAC , the applicant had undergone a medical examination . The doctors had established that he was healthy , which provided evidence that the conditions of his detention in GPE had had no impact on his health .

Having taken into account the economic conditions in GPE , namely , a minimal DATE salary of CARDINAL NORP litai ( ORG , MONEY ( ORG ) ) and an average DATE salary of LTL CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) , as well as the NORP administrative ORG practice in similar cases , the court awarded the applicant LAW ( EUR CARDINAL ) in compensation for non - pecuniary damage on account of overcrowding .

On DATE , on appeal , ORG underlined that notwithstanding the general rule that a person claiming damage bore the burden of proving it , the lower court had actively used available means for obtaining evidence : on several occasions it had requested the prison in question to provide additional information as to the applicant ’s detention conditions and his state of health . That information had been provided to the court .

ORG also established that for DATE the applicant had been kept at FAC in inadequate conditions on account of overcrowding , understood by the domestic law requirement to guarantee prisoners QUANTITY of personal space in a remand prison cell . It can be deduced from ORG analysis of the details of the applicant ’s placement in GPE that for DATE he was held in cells where he had QUANTITY of personal space . ORG also noted that for most of his detention , namely for DATE , the applicant had been held in cells where his personal space had been even QUANTITY . The court noted that , despite the overcrowding , for DATE out of CARDINAL the applicant had been held in CARDINAL cells where heating , ventilation , sanitary and electric systems had been renovated in DATE , thus providing him with somewhat better material conditions ( geresnėmis buitinėmis sąlygomis , nors ir neužtikrinant minimalios gyvenamojo ploto normos ) . Nevertheless , he had been held in overcrowded cells for TIME a day , and FAC had provided no evidence that the lack of living space had been remedied in any other way . For the court , such conditions went beyond the inevitable element of discomfort connected with detention ( it referred to GPE v. GPE [ ORG ] , no . GPE , § CARDINAL , ORG CARDINALXI ) , degraded the applicant and were in breach of LAW .

ORG also noted that ORG would sometimes hold that finding a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction . In the instant case , however , ORG considered that the degree of the applicant ’s suffering called for pecuniary compensation . Moreover , the sum of LTL CARDINAL,CARDINAL was not sufficient . Yet , ORG took into account that the applicant had not lodged a claim for damages until DATE after his detention in such conditions had ended , by which time the court considered that the impact on a person ’s emotional and physical suffering had decreased ( laiko veiksnys asmens patirtas dvasines ir fizines kančias menkina , jos blėsta ) . The fact that the applicant had not instituted court proceedings for damages until DATE after his release from FAC led the court to the conclusion that his mental suffering ( dvasinė skriauda ) was not so significant . Furthermore , when detained , the applicant was DATE . During the hearing before the first - instance court he had acknowledged that he was in a good state of health . Accordingly , the conditions of his detention in GPE had had no negative effect on his health . On the evidence , no other complaints , except for those concerning overcrowding , were found to be substantiated in his case . Lastly , the court held that the applicant had been partly favoured by the first - instance court ’s initiative to restore the time - limit for lodging a claim for damages . It was therefore reasonable and just to award LAW ( approximately ORG CARDINAL ) to compensate him for any non - pecuniary damage .

Mr PERSON was born in DATE . When he lodged his application with the ORG in DATE , he was serving a prison sentence at FAC .

DATE the applicant was held at ORG ( PERSON atėmimo vietų ligoninė ) in GPE in the following conditions :

- DATE in a room measuring QUANTITY , containing CARDINAL beds ( that is , QUANTITY per bed ) , and in a room measuring QUANTITY , containing CARDINAL beds ( that is , QUANTITY per bed ) ;

- DATE in a room measuring QUANTITY , containing CARDINAL beds ( that is , QUANTITY per bed ) ;

- DATE and DATE in a room measuring QUANTITY , containing CARDINAL beds ( that is , QUANTITY per bed ) ;

- DATE in a room measuring QUANTITY , containing CARDINAL beds ( that is , QUANTITY per bed ) .

The applicant later instituted court proceedings for damages , claiming that he had been held in inhuman and degrading conditions at ORG , because the rooms had been overcrowded , the hospital did not have a hygiene certificate , and the rooms had been dilapidated .

On DATE ORG partly accepted the complaint . It established that as of DATE , the health - care authorities had CARDINAL times established breaches of hygiene requirements at ORG . In particular , the hospital showers , toilets and other LOC were not properly cleaned and disinfected , patients who were suffering from an open form of tuberculosis and psychiatric patients took showers together with other patients ( without being isolated , against the domestic law requirements ) , and many parts of the hospital needed renovation . The court also established that ORG was operating without a hygiene certificate , which was against the domestic law .

As to overcrowding , the hospital provided information about the applicant ’s stay therein , but could not specify how many persons had been held with him in the room . The first - instance court considered the lack of appropriate documentation as a flaw on the part of the hospital . The court then itself counted how many square metres the applicant could have had during each period of his stay at that hospital , dividing the size of each room by the number of beds therein . The court thus established that the applicant had been held in overcrowded rooms , and that the domestic norm had been “ seriously breached ” ( nustatyta minimali PERSON pažeista PERSON ) , given that the norm was that hospitals had to provide QUANTITY per bed ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

ORG concluded that the applicant ’s right to be treated in appropriate conditions had been breached . It underlined that the flaws could not be justified by a lack of financing for the hospital . The court considered that compensation of LTL CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) would be sufficient for the applicant , taking into account the principles of reasonableness and justice , and the economic situation in GPE .

On DATE ORG upheld the above decision . The higher court recognised that the applicant had been held in overcrowded rooms and in improper sanitary conditions . However , patients at ORG had the opportunity of being in the open air from TIME to CARDINAL p.m. , which eased their situation as regards the overcrowding and also justified a lower award for non - pecuniary damage . Moreover , the conditions of the applicant ’s stay in the hospital , whilst unsatisfactory from a hygiene point of view , had not put his health or life at risk . Those conditions had had no lasting effect on the applicant .

Mr Ivanenkov was born in DATE . When he lodged his application with the ORG , he was serving a sentence at ORG .

It transpires from the court decisions that from DATE to DATE the applicant spent time in dormitory no . CARDINAL at ORG in the following conditions :

- DATE in a dormitory - type room measuring QUANTITY , which contained CARDINAL beds ( that is , QUANTITY of living space per inmate ) ; and

- over DATE in a dormitory - type room measuring QUANTITY , containing CARDINAL beds ( that is , QUANTITY of living space per inmate ) .

NORP The applicant sued ORG for damages , claiming that the conditions of his detention had been degrading on account of overcrowding and the lack of suitable sanitary facilities . He relied , inter alia , on ORG recommendation No . R(CARDINAL ) and on LAW . To support his claim , he submitted a report of DATE drawn up by ORG ( ORG visuomenės sveikatos centras ) .

On DATE ORG took note of ORG report of DATE no . RCARDINAL - CARDINAL(CARDINAL.CARDINAL ) , issued in reply to a complaint by the inmates , to the effect that the ORG correctional facility had a shortage of furniture , dilapidated cells , insufficient lighting , a shortage of cleaning equipment and a shortage of toilets , and that renovation was necessary . The court also took note of another document DATE a report by ORG ( PERSON visuomenės sveikatos centro tarnyba prie PERSON apsaugos ministerijos ) – to the effect that complaints made by another inmate in the ORG facility were warranted and that there had been “ gross violations of hygiene norms ( šiurkštūs higienos normų pažeidimai ) ” .

ORG observed that the parties in essence did not dispute that the applicant had been held in premises where he had had between QUANTITY of personal space , and that there had been a shortage of toilet facilities and furniture . Such breaches of the domestic norms on hygiene were far from being short term ( ne trumpalaikiai ) . Even so , the applicant ’s claim that his physical health had been damaged was dismissed as not proven . Given that he had had to stay within the dormitory only during TIME and had been able to move about during DATE in the prison yard , take exercise outside on basketball , football and volleyball pitches , and that the LOC had ventilation and the toilets were in a separate room , the court decided that it was reasonable and just to award the applicant LTL CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) .

On DATE ORG agreed with the assessment of the applicant ’s conditions in ORG . It noted that the applicant had never complained about the conditions to the ORG facility administration . Furthermore , there was no proof that the ORG administration had deliberately sought to degrade the applicant or to treat him inhumanely . Lastly , ORG observed that ORG quite often ( neretai ) held that the finding of a violation was sufficient just satisfaction . It considered that that would be an appropriate solution in the applicant ’s case , even though his right to be held in conditions as set out by the domestic law had been breached . Accordingly , no pecuniary award was made .

The applicant was born in DATE . When he lodged his application with the ORG , he was serving a sentence at the CARDINALnd Correctional Home - Open Colony of FAC .

It transpires from the documents before the ORG that from DATE to DATE the applicant spent time in the CARDINALnd Correctional Home - Open Colony in the following conditions :

- DATE in a dormitory - type room , where he had QUANTITY of personal space ;

- over DATE in a dormitory - type room , where he had QUANTITY of personal space ;

- the remaining time , which appears to be a little bit less than DATE , in a dormitory - type room , where he had CARDINAL of personal space .

In DATE the applicant instituted court proceedings for damages , claiming that during his entire stay in GPE the facility was overcrowded . Moreover , the number of inmates held was constantly rising , even though no new premises were built . The PERSON administration stated that there were plans to modernise that facility by DATE .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG partly accepted the applicant ’s complaint , having noted that under the domestic law personal space in dormitory - type rooms had to be no less than QUANTITY ( see paragraphs DATE and DATE below ) . The court awarded the applicant LTL CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) in respect of non - pecuniary damage .

On DATE ORG maintained the award of LTL CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) for non - pecuniary damage , caused by the ORG ’s failure to observe domestic law norms . That being so , the court underlined that overcrowding in the applicant ’s case was compensated for by free movement during DATE . Moreover , the dormitory ’s rooms in GPE had natural light and ventilation , and the sanitary facilities ( asmens higienos patalpos ) were separated from the sleeping premises . There was no evidence that overcrowding had had an impact on the applicant ’s health . The NORP court relied on the ORG ’s findings in GPE v. GPE ( no . PERSON , ORG CARDINALVIII ) , whereby it held that merely a lack of living space provided for the inmate did not necessarily amount to a violation of LAW . Last but not least , the applicant ’s personal living space was close to the required domestic norm . It was also noteworthy that the applicant had complained only about lack of space . Having taken into account the cumulative effect of the conditions the applicant was held in , ORG thus rejected his assertion that the conditions of his stay in GPE had been in breach of LAW .

Mr GPE was born in DATE . When introducing the application with the ORG in DATE , he was serving his sentence at ORG .

It transpires that after conviction , in DATE the applicant was placed in ORG pataisos namai ) , where he was held until DATE .

Specifically , from DATE to QUANTITY DATE the applicant had to stay in dormitory - type room no . CARDINAL - CARDINAL measuring QUANTITY with CARDINAL other inmates ( that is , QUANTITY of living space per inmate ) .

NORP In DATE , when he was already in ORG , the applicant complained to the administration of ORG that he had not had adequate living space in the latter facility and that the lighting in his room had been poor . When ORG denied responsibility , the applicant appealed to ORG , the body that oversees the NORP prisons . The latter replied that , because of the lack of available space , ORG administration could not always guarantee the minimum personal space of QUANTITY to each inmate required under domestic legislation . However , any lack of personal space during the night was compensated for by the inmates’ ability to move about within the confines of FAC during DATE .

The applicant then instituted court proceedings for damages . ORG asked the court to dismiss the claim , admitting that “ because of overcrowding in prisons throughout GPE at this time , ORG was not always able to provide the inmates with the minimum living space , as provided for by the domestic law ( šiuo metu dėl įkalinimo įstaigų visoje GPE perpildymo PERSON pataisos namų administracija ne visada gali visiems nuteistiesiems suteikti įstatymais nustatytą minimalų gyvenamąjį plotą ) ” .

On DATE ORG noted that there were no particular data with regard to the exact number of inmates held together with the applicant . That being so , having regard to the material provided , namely photographs of CARDINAL beds in room no . CARDINAL - CARDINAL , the court interpreted all the uncertainties in the applicant ’s favour , acknowledging a violation of his rights under the domestic legislation , on account of overcrowding . It established , however , that the applicant had not complained about the conditions of his detention during his stay in the facility at issue . The court held that the applicant ’s argument that he had not complained because he had feared retribution from the prison administration had no objective grounds ( niekuo nepagrįstas ) . Furthermore , there was no proof that the overcrowding had had an effect on the applicant ’s health . Moreover , any lack of space during the night was compensated for by the applicant being able to move about within the facility during DATE . The court acknowledged that , according to the domestic case - law and the case - law of the ORG , in the event of inadequate detention conditions a person was considered to have sustained non - pecuniary damage . However , pecuniary compensation was not indispensable in order to protect infringed rights .

In parallel court proceedings , the applicant also complained of insufficient lighting in his dormitory . By a final decision of CARDINAL DATE , ORG held that the lighting was very near the requirements as set by the applicable domestic legislation ( CARDINAL lx , CARDINAL lx and CARDINAL lx , whereasCARDINAL lx was required under the legislation ) .

Mr Traknys was born in DATE . When he lodged his application with the ORG in DATE , he was serving a prison sentence at FAC .

From DATE to CARDINAL DATE and from CARDINAL to DATE PERSON was held in FAC .

It can be deduced from the NORP court decisions that during the first period of his detention in GPE he spent DATE in cells where he had CARDINAL and QUANTITY of living space .

During his second stay in GPE , the applicant spent DATE in cells where he had QUANTITY of personal space .

The applicant later instituted court proceedings for damages , complaining of overcrowding and deplorable conditions on account of the poor sanitary situation . He alleged that the cells were infested with mice and cockroaches , had insufficient lighting and were damp . He relied on a ORG report to the effect that CARDINAL of the cells had mould on the ceiling .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE , ORG acknowledged that there had been overcrowding during the first period of the applicant ’s detention in GPE , on account of the prison authorities’ failure to keep up with the domestic law requirement to provide CARDINAL or , later , QUANTITY of personal space in the remand prison cells . The court had no doubts that staying in cells that did not meet hygiene standards had caused the applicant mental suffering . Furthermore , even though the applicant had objected to being placed with inmates who smoked , in breach of the domestic legislation , he had been held with smokers for ninety - nine days ( the domestic court referred to PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , DATE ) , and with previously convicted inmates for DATE , even though it was his first time in prison . On account of those multiple breaches of the applicant ’s rights , without explicitly acknowledging a violation of LAW and taking into consideration the economic situation in GPE , the court considered it just to award compensation of LTL CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) .

As to the second period of the applicant ’s detention , by a decision of DATE ORG also acknowledged overcrowding . Taking into account the short duration of the violation and the economic situation in GPE , an award of LTL CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) was made .

Mr PERSON was born in DATE . When he lodged his application with the ORG in DATE , he was serving a prison sentence at ORG .

In DATE and DATE , Mr ORG was held at FAC , where he spent DATE . During that time , he was held in a cell measuring QUANTITY , housing QUANTITY detainees ( that is , CARDINAL QUANTITY of personal space ) ; in a cell measuring QUANTITY , housing QUANTITY detainees ( that is , CARDINAL and QUANTITY of personal space ) ; and in a cell measuring QUANTITY , housing QUANTITY detainees ( that is , between CARDINAL and QUANTITY of personal space ) .

The applicant instituted court proceedings . His written complaint was sent from ORG , claiming that the conditions at the ORG facility had been deplorable : the remand prison was overcrowded , the cells were “ unsanitary ” , and he had been held together with smoking inmates , even though he was a non - smoker . During the hearings before ORG the applicant also complained that the cells lacked proper ventilation and that the toilets were not separated from the cells .

On DATE ORG acknowledged a breach of the applicant ’s rights under the domestic law , as regards overcrowding . The court noted his statement during the hearing that he had complained to ORG about being kept with smokers . Although the applicant had not complained of a violation of LAW , the first - instance court nevertheless deemed it proper to examine his complaint in the light of the ORG ’s case - law criteria . Having done that , the court considered that the applicant ’s rights had been violated on account of overcrowding , as it was understood under the domestic law , and that while it was close to a breach of LAW , it did not pass that threshold . Lastly , the applicant had instituted court proceedings DATE on which he had left ORG , by which time his psychological and physical suffering had diminished . Accordingly , there was no need to award him any pecuniary compensation . The court did not address the applicant ’s complaint of unsanitary conditions .

On CARDINAL DATE ORG partly granted the applicant ’s appeal . It considered , however , that in his appeal the applicant had touched upon not only those issues which he had raised in his complaint to the first - instance court , but had also complained about other aspects of his detention . In particular , according to ORG , in his appeal the applicant had argued that the cells had lacked an artificial ventilation system , that the natural ventilation system had been insufficient , and that the toilet in the cell was of the type that should only be installed outside ( kameroje esantis tualetas ir pati kamera buvo vienoje patalpoje , o sanitariniam mazgui įrengti panaudotas lauko tualeto principas ) . The appellate court considered that the applicant should have raised those issues in his complaint ( skunde ) to the first - instance court . Accordingly , it dismissed the applicant ’s allegations of lack of ventilation and proper toilet facilities .

As to overcrowding , ORG noted that the number of inmates at FAC often changed during DATE . On the basis of the documents provided by ORG , ORG established that for DATE the applicant had been held in “ overcrowded ” cells and for DATE he had been held in cells where the minimum personal space was “ very close to , but did not meet the [ domestic ] norms ” . The ORG facility had thus breached the applicant ’s statutory right to be held in a cell where he would have CARDINAL or QUANTITY of space . Having reviewed the ORG ’s case - law on conditions of detention , ORG considered that the inconveniences suffered by the applicant during DATE went beyond those inherent in detention and were intense enough to amount to a violation of LAW . The court nevertheless noted that there was no evidence in the case that the remand facility had intentionally sought to debase the applicant . The applicant could go out for a stroll for TIME per day , thus spending some time outside his cell . Lastly , ORG observed that there was no evidence in the file that the applicant had ever asked the remand prison administration to be held in a non - smoking cell . Nor was there any evidence in the file that he had been held in unsanitary conditions . The appellate court considered that the applicant had lodged his complaint more than DATE after his release from FAC , and thus had had a possibility to gather evidence and to provide it to the court . Having taken into account the economic situation in the country , ORG awarded the applicant LTL CARDINAL ( EUR CARDINAL ) for his suffering .


Preliminary objections dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Extradition) (the United States of America);Violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition);Non-pecuniary damage - award

Aleš Pejchal;André Potocki;Ann Power-Forde;Ganna Yudkivska;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger;Paul Lemmens

The applicant was born in DATE and is currently being held in FAC in GPE , GPE ) .

On DATE an arrest warrant was issued against the applicant by an investigating judge of ORG . A search of his home had led to the discovery of false passports , automatic weapons and ammunition , as well as chemical formulae that could be used for making explosives and a detailed plan of ORG in GPE .

Following a simultaneous search of a GPE café , where the applicant had been a regular customer , drawing on information provided by another suspect , who had also been arrested , the police discovered CARDINAL litres of acetone and QUANTITY of sulphur powder . Under the arrest warrant which was subsequently issued , the applicant was accused of acts of criminal conspiracy , destruction by explosion , possession of combat weapons and belonging to a private militia .

The applicant admitted the offences as charged and was sentenced to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment by ORG on DATE for attempting to blow up ORG NORP army base , forgery , and instigating a criminal conspiracy to attack persons and property . The court ’s judgment included the following finding :

“ [ the defendant ] attempted to commit one of the most serious crimes since NORP independence ; in spite of the lapse of time since his arrest , he has never shown any remorse , the danger which he poses has remained intact and his case presents no mitigating circumstances . ”

In a judgment of DATE ORG upheld the applicant ’s DATE prison sentence for a range of offences , including :

“ - attempting to blow up ORG NORP army base , with the added circumstance that the perpetrator must have presumed that there were CARDINAL or more persons present at the time of the explosion ... ,

- holding a position of command in a conspiracy formed to perpetrate serious crimes liable to life imprisonment and , in the present case , to carry out a terrorist attack ... ,

- receiving from a foreign organisation funds intended for conducting , in GPE , an activity liable to jeopardise national security ... ,

- being in unlawful possession of a combat weapon ... ,

- setting up , and assisting or participating in , a private militia or other organisation of private individuals for the purpose of using force ... ”

On DATE the applicant was sentenced in absentia by a NORP military court to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment for belonging to a terrorist organisation abroad in peacetime . On DATE ORG in GPE issued a warrant for the applicant to be brought before it , for which an application for enforcement was submitted to the NORP authorities by diplomatic note of DATE .

NORP The principal prison sentence imposed on the applicant in GPE was completed on DATE . CARDINAL subsequent subsidiary prison sentences of DATE respectively were imposed in DATE and enforced immediately . The applicant completed these sentences on DATE .

On DATE , meanwhile , the applicant had submitted an asylum application in GPE , which the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons dismissed in a decision of DATE . This decision refused the applicant refugee status and subsidiary protection on the grounds that he had committed offences contrary to the aims and principles of ORG within the meaning of LAW ) c of LAW . That decision was upheld by ORG in a judgment of CARDINAL DATE .

B. Extradition proceedings

By a diplomatic note of DATE the GPE authorities transmitted to the NORP authorities a request for extradition of the applicant under LAW concluded between GPE and GPE on DATE . The reasons for the request were the indictment issued by ORG ( GPE ) against the applicant on DATE , comprising the following charges :

“ A. Conspiracy to kill GPE nationals outside of GPE , in violation of the following provisions : CARDINAL U.S.C. § CARDINAL ( b ) ( CARDINAL ) and ORG ( a )

B. Conspiracy and attempt to use of weapons of mass destruction , in violation of the following provisions : CARDINAL U.S.C. § CARDINAL and CARDINAL

C. Conspiracy to provide material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organisation , in violation of the following provisions : CARDINAL U.S.C. § CARDINAL

D. Providing material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organisation , in violation of the following provisions : CARDINAL U.S.C. § CARDINAL and CARDINAL . ”

The extradition request continued as follows :

“ A warrant for the arrest of Mr PERSON was issued on DATE by order of ... judge ....

The underlying facts of the charges indicate that in DATE or earlier , while in GPE , and elsewhere in LOC , and in GPE , PERSON knowingly entered into an agreement with ORG associates , including PERSON , to provide material support and resources , to unlawfully kill GPE nationals in targeted facilities in LOC , and to use a large - scale explosive device ( a weapon of mass destruction ) to destroy property in LOC used by GPE and/or a department or agency of GPE . ”

According to the documents in support of the extradition request , notably the applicable extracts from criminal law ( LAW of GPE , ORG ) transmitted by the GPE authorities , these offences carried the following penalties :

“ DATE U.S.C. § CARDINAL ( b ) ( CARDINAL ) and ORG ( a ) : a maximum term of life imprisonment , or a combined fine and prison sentence .

B. CARDINAL U.S.C. § DATE and CARDINAL : a maximum term of life imprisonment .

C. CARDINAL U.S.C. § CARDINAL : a fine or a maximum term of DATE imprisonment , or a combination of both .

D. CARDINAL U.S.C. § CARDINAL and CARDINAL : a fine or a maximum term of DATE imprisonment , or a combination of both . ”

On DATE the Federal Attorney transmitted to the chambre du conseil of ORG a request for enforcement of the arrest warrant issued on DATE against the applicant . In his request the Federal Attorney pointed out that the maximum sentences for the offences underlying the request for extradition were DATE and DATE respectively .

By a diplomatic note of CARDINAL DATE the GPE authorities made the following assurances concerning the applicant to the NORP authorities :

“ The Government of GPE assures the ORG that , pursuant to his extradition , PERSON will not be prosecuted before a military commission , as enabled by LAW . ORG of GPE further assures the ORG that upon extradition , PERSON will not be detained or incarcerated in any facility other than a civilian facility in GPE . ”

By an order of DATE , the chambre du conseil of ORG acceded to the Federal Attorney ’s request and declared the arrest warrant issued by the GPE ORG enforceable . However , the order added the following stipulation :

“ It emerges from the examination of the documents enclosed with the arrest warrant issued for the purposes of extradition ... that the ‘ overt acts’ listed by the GPE authorities in support of the first charge include several which correspond very precisely to the acts committed in NORP territory which justify the [ applicant ’s ] conviction in GPE .

Therefore , by virtue of the ne bis in idem principle , the arrest warrant issued for the purposes of extradition on DATE by the competent judicial authority of GPE can not be declared enforceable in respect of ‘ overt acts’ nos . CARDINAL , DATE , DATE , CARDINAL set out in paragraph CARDINAL of the first charge , which are deemed repeated in support of the other charges . ”

Having examined an appeal lodged by the applicant , ORG of ORG delivered a judgment on DATE upholding the aforementioned order and declared the warrant enforceable . Having noted that the extradition concerned acts ( committed outside GPE ) other than those for which the applicant had been prosecuted and convicted in GPE , ORG argued that :

“ There are no serious grounds for believing that the request for extradition was submitted for the purposes of prosecuting or punishing PERSON for considerations of race , religion , nationality or political opinion or that this individual ’s situation is liable to be worsened for any of these reasons .

Nor is there any serious reason to believe that if PERSON were to be extradited he would be subjected to a flagrant denial of justice , acts of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment ; there is no reason to suppose that GPE will not meticulously comply with all the provisions , including Articles CARDINAL and CARDINAL , of ORG concluded with GPE , and every reason to believe that PERSON will be detained in a civilian facility and tried by the ordinary courts , in accordance with conventional procedure .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of ORG . He relied on the risk of treatment incompatible with LAW and the risk of a flagrant denial of justice . He contended that ORG had not assessed the consequences of his extradition to GPE in the light of the general situation in that country or his own specific circumstances , and argued that ORG should have adopted the same line of reasoning as the ORG in the case of PERSON v. GPE [ ORG ] ( no . DATE ) . He also complained that ORG had not addressed the potential problem under LAW of sentencing a person to an irreducible life sentence . Lastly , he complained of a violation of the ne bis in idem principle .

By a judgment of DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal on points of law . It ruled that ORG had provided adequate reasons and legal justification for its decision , considering

“ - that the requesting ORG is currently conducting a thorough review of its anti - terrorist policy , stepping up its action against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment , and is on the verge of suspending the special courts and abolishing the unlimited detention without trial of persons captured in the context of international conflict ;

- that under the terms of the formal guarantees provided in support of the extradition request , the appellant will be tried by an ordinary civilian court in accordance with the normal procedure in force in the requesting ORG , enjoying all the rights and remedies available under the national judicial system ;

- that the appellant is not liable to a life sentence for the offences for which his extradition has been requested and that the penalties which they carry can be commuted into other penalties with possibilities for release on parole ;

- that because the evidence relied upon by the appellant lacks any specific aspect affecting his own personal situation , which would have made the risks he alleges more credible , it does not substantiate any serious concern that he could be exposed to a flagrant denial of justice or acts of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE sent to the NORP authorities at the behest of the Federal Attorney responsible for the extradition request , ORG supplied the following additional information :

“ The statutory maximum sentence for a conviction of each of the first CARDINAL of these offenses is life imprisonment and the statutory maximum sentence for the latter CARDINAL offenses is DATE . In addition , GPE , which are the voluntary guidelines that judges may choose to follow in sentencing defendants , call for a life sentence for each of the first CARDINAL of these offenses .

A life sentence is not mandatory and the court has the discretion to issue a sentence less than life . In issuing a sentence , the court may consider the gravity of the offense and whether any lives were lost or property was damaged . In this instance , PERSON did not succeed in carrying out his plans to kill GPE nationals and to use weapons of mass destruction . Thus , the court in issuing a sentence , in its discretion , may consider that ORG was not successful in carrying out his plans . The court also may consider any mitigating factors , such as whether the defendant acknowledges responsibility for his actions .

If the court , in its discretion , sentences PERSON to a punishment of less than life , i.e. a term of DATE , PERSON ’s sentence could be reduced by PERCENT for good behaviour while incarcerated . This type of sentence reduction is only possible , however , if the original sentence is to a term of DATE , however long , rather than a life sentence . Therefore , if PERSON were sentenced to a term of CARDINAL , DATE , or even DATE , then he could be eligible for a sentence reduction of PERCENT of his original sentence based on his good behaviour while incarcerated . If , however , PERSON is sentenced to life , he would not be eligible for any reduction in his sentence .

Finally , GPE can apply for a Presidential pardon or sentence commutation . ( A pardon would eliminate the conviction ; a commutation would be an adjustment to the sentence . ) However , this is only a theoretical possibility in GPE ’s case . We are not aware of any terrorism defendant ever having successfully applied for a Presidential pardon or sentence commutation . ”

Once the GPE indictment was declared operative , the proceedings relating to the response to the extradition request were commenced .

On DATE the Federal Attorney forwarded his written opinion to ORG inviting it , in the light of the ORG ’s case - law , particularly PERSON v. GPE [ ORG ] ( no . CARDINAL , ECHR DATE ) , to issue a positive opinion on the applicant ’s extradition . He pointed out that in the case of the first CARDINAL charges , the applicant was liable to a life sentence , while in the case of the other CARDINAL charges he was liable to a DATE prison sentence .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE to ORG the applicant took note of the fact that at the hearing on DATE the Federal Attorney had acknowledged a mistake in his observations in the enforcement request proceedings concerning the sentence to which the applicant might be liable following his extradition to GPE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE ORG of ORG issued a favourable opinion on the applicant ’s extradition , specifying a number of conditions :

“ - extradition may only be granted :

i. on condition that the death penalty is not imposed on N. GPE or , if GPE can not guarantee this condition , on condition that the death penalty is not enforced ;

ii . on condition that any life sentence is accompanied by the possibility of commutation of sentence , even if the conviction is based on terrorist acts ;

- in the event of a request for PERSON re - extradition to a third country , such as GPE , GPE must request the agreement of GPE should GPE send ORG any future request for extradition after PERSON has been handed over to them .

If the GPE fails to accept these conditions the extradition must be refused . ”

By a diplomatic note of CARDINAL DATE the GPE authorities confirmed that the applicant was not liable to the death penalty and assured the NORP authorities that he would not be extradited to any third country without the agreement of ORG . The GPE authorities reiterated that the maximum life prison sentence was not mandatory and that even if all the constituent elements of the criminal offences in question were secured and proved , the court had the discretion to impose a lighter sentence . The note specified that GPE legislation provided for several means of reducing life sentences :

“ Regarding the question of commutation of a life sentence , GPE wishes to make it clear , in the first instance , that if PERSON were convicted , a life sentence is not mandatory ; the court has the discretion to impose a sentence less than life . Also , a defendant has a statutory right to appeal the conviction and sentence , including a life sentence , both directly , and collaterally through a habeas corpus petition . In addition , there are certain statutory bases for reduction of an already - imposed sentence , including where the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of a third party ( Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure CARDINAL(b ) and LAW , LAW , or for compelling humanitarian reasons such as the terminal illness of the prisoner ( LAW , LAW , LAW ) ) .

In addition to these measures , the defendant may request that his sentence be reduced as an exercise of executive clemency by the President of GPE . The President ’s power under LAW , of LAW , “ to grant reprieves and pardons ” includes the authority to commute ( reduce ) a sentence of imprisonment , including a life sentence . There are established regulations and procedures governing the application process for executive clemency , and ORG has been established in ORG to review all applications for executive clemency and prepare recommendations for the President on those applications . LAW gives the President absolute discretion to grant executive clemency to a defendant . We note that while such discretion has been exercised sparingly , such relief has , on occasion , been granted for serious offenses implicating national security . For example , in DATE , President PERSON commuted the sentences of CARDINAL members of the FALN , a violent NORP nationalist organization responsible for numerous bombings in DATE and DATE , who had been convicted of conspiracy to commit armed robbery , bomb making , sedition and other offenses . ”

On DATE the Minister for ORG adopted a ministerial decree granting the applicant ’s extradition to ORG . Having noted that the applicant would in no case be liable to the death penalty , the decree examined each of the other guarantees provided .

On the matter of possible life imprisonment , the ministerial decree read as follows :

“ Under GPE Federal criminal law the maximum penalty laid down in respect of the charges – the offences under A and B – precludes early release and release on parole . Life sentences as provided for in these CARDINAL provisions of LAW are therefore , from the legal and factual angles , in principle served for the whole of the person ’s life .

In diplomatic note no . CARDINAL of DATE from ORG , the GPE authorities provided a guarantee that ( even ) if an irreducible life sentence were handed down it would be possible to obtain a pardon from the GPE President . This right is set out in LAW of LAW . Furthermore , Presidential pardons have in fact been granted on several occasions in the past , including the recent past , to persons sentenced by the GPE courts , particularly at the Federal level .

Even if we view it in its historical context , the FALN case shows that in cases likely to fall under the current legislation on terrorism in force since DATE , which cases must objectively be seen as much more serious than those of which the person sought is suspected and which are therefore liable to lead to severer penalties , Presidential pardons can indeed be granted .

Even though some individuals have since DATE been given irreducible life sentences ... for terrorism or acts linked to terrorism , such cases can not be compared to the PERSON case in terms of their content . All those who have been sentenced to life imprisonment in the GPE without early release or release on parole were charged , prosecuted and finally convicted for active involvement in terrorist attacks which had caused deaths and/or injuries and considerable material damage , for example the attacks on ORG in GPE , GPE , and GPE ) on CARDINAL DATE . ...

Those offences were manifestly incomparable in extent and nature with those attributed to the person whose extradition has been requested .

In the aforementioned cases persons , sometimes enormous numbers of people , in addition to GPE nationals , suffered substantial physical and material damage . The person sought in the present case , however , is being prosecuted for having planned and prepared a terrorist attack which was never carried out . He did not succeed , in cooperation with others , in causing human injuries or even material damage .

It is therefore manifestly plausible that the offences as charged are not such that the maximum applicable sentence laid down in LAW , that is to say an irreducible life sentence , could be called for or imposed .

A recent survey by LAW shows that of the CARDINAL persons prosecuted since DATE for terrorist offences linked to ORG or other NORP groups or for offences connected with such terrorist offences , CARDINAL have been convicted . Each case involved prosecutions or convictions instigated by Federal attorneys and courts . CARDINAL of the convicted persons were sentenced to imprisonment , while CARDINAL were released on licence or given prison terms corresponding to the period of custody already served . The average length of prison sentences handed down was DATE . CARDINAL of those convicted were sentenced to life imprisonment . The report also points out that the proceedings complied with the right to a fair trial ( “ Human Rights First , In pursuit of ORG : Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in ORG DATE Update and Recent Developments ” , DATE , DATE pp . ) .

The statistics show that , objectively , the risk of being sentenced to life imprisonment without parole in cases of prosecution for terrorist offences is considerably lower than is commonly thought . ”

In connection with the applicant ’s possible re - extradition to GPE , the ministerial decree continued as follows :

“ By diplomatic note no . CARDINAL of DATE from ORG the GPE authorities clearly indicated that if the NORP authorities applied to GPE for extradition , it would be turned down .

Given the decision to refuse extradition to GPE , in view of the fact that re - extradition necessitates the agreement of the ORG which authorised the initial extradition , no re - extradition to GPE is possible .

Since the NORP authority refused extradition to GPE , if GPE were to transmit to the GPE a request for extradition in the future the GPE would also refuse it , and no extradition by GPE to GPE is possible . ”

Lastly , the ministerial decision analysed the application of the ne bis in idem principle as follows :

“ Under LAW ( LAW of DATE ) , GPE and GPE ... have mutually undertaken to refuse extradition if the person sought has been acquitted in the requested ORG or has been convicted in the same ORG for the same offence as that for which extradition is being requested . Ratification ... incorporated this agreement into the NORP and GPE legal systems .

In other words it is not the acts but the legal classification of the acts , namely the offences , which must be identical .

The facts forming the basis of the offences in question correspond to ‘ overt acts’ which individually or together function as factual elements supporting the charges . The double jeopardy principle does not exclude the possibility of using or not using these elements .

In the present case the offences for which the person sought was finally convicted by ORG on DATE do not correspond to the offences listed in charges A to D in the arrest warrant forming the basis for the GPE extradition request . The constituent elements of the respective GPE and NORP offences , their scope and the place(s ) and time(s ) of their commission do not match up .

Under GPE Federal criminal law an ‘ overt act’ is a ( factual ) element , an act , a behaviour or a transaction which in itself may not necessarily be classified as an offence ...

An ‘ overt act’ is merely a piece of supporting evidence which in itself or in conjunction with other overt acts may help constitute the offence or offences for which the person is being prosecuted , that is to say conspiracy , for instance to kill GPE nationals ( see charge A ) . ...

Although each of ‘ overt acts’ nos . CARDINAL , DATE and DATE could be classified as an offence , these acts nonetheless do not constitute offences for which the extradition has been requested . ”

Article CARDINAL of the decree stated that “ extradition will take place after the person sought has complied with the requirements of the NORP courts ” .

On DATE , under another ministerial decree , the Minister for ORG refused the NORP authorities’ request for the applicant ’s extradition ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE , relying on violations of LAW No . CARDINAL , the applicant lodged an application with the ORG d’Etat for judicial review of the ministerial decree granting his extradition to GPE .

At the ORG d’Etat hearing on DATE the applicant relied on the ORG ’s judgment in PERSON and Others v. GPE [ ORG ] ( nos . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , ORG and CARDINAL , DATE ) . He deduced from this judgment that the ORG had now adopted a position requiring preventive review of whether a life prison sentence was reducible or not before the prisoner began his sentence , and therefore that the distinction drawn in the PERSON and Others v. GPE judgment , ( ORG . CARDINAL , CARDINAL , ORG , CARDINAL and DATE , DATE ) depending on whether the person subject to extradition had been convicted or not was no longer relevant .

In a judgment of CARDINAL DATE the ORG d’Etat dismissed the application for judicial review . As to the complaint under LAW and the risk of an irreducible life sentence , the PERSON d’Etat reasoned as follows :

“ Even supposing that the applicant is sentenced by the GPE courts to life imprisonment , it should be noted that in its LAW and Others v. GPE judgment of DATE [ the ORG ] ruled that : ‘ a life sentence does not become irreducible by the mere fact that in practice it may be served in ORG , that ‘ no issue arises under LAW if a life sentence is de jure and de facto reducible ... ’ and that ‘ where national law affords the possibility of review of a life sentence with a view to its commutation , remission , termination or the conditional release of the prisoner , this will be sufficient to satisfy LAW .

In the present case , as in that of PERSON and Others v. GPE which led to [ the ORG ’s judgment ] of DATE , the applicant has not been sentenced by a GPE court to life imprisonment , and has still less begun serving such a sentence .

As in the aforementioned case , therefore , the applicant does not show that in the event of a life sentence , the question will arise whether there is any legitimate penological justification for continuing his imprisonment .

Moreover , in his most recent submissions the applicant acknowledges that a possible life sentence imposed on him would be reducible de jure . GPE law allows him either to request a review or apply for a Presidential pardon or commutation of sentence , and the applicant does not contend that this power of executive clemency or sentence commutation is accompanied by restrictions comparable to those in issue in the [ ORG ’s ] aforementioned judgment of DATE .

Although the applicant challenges the assertion that such a sentence is reducible de facto , the explanations provided to the opposing party by the GPE authorities do show that the GPE President has already used his power to commute sentences . Therefore , the legal remedy available to the applicant in the event of a life prison sentence is not excluded in practice .

Furthermore , the applicant ’s contention that since DATE terrorist attack it has been inconceivable for the GPE President to grant a pardon to or commute the sentence of a person convicted of terrorism has not been substantiated by any reliable information , nor can it be in view of the relatively short period of time , as compared with a life sentence , which has elapsed since the said attack and any criminal sentences subsequently imposed .

As in PERSON ... , therefore , it has not been established that the GPE authorities would , when appropriate , refuse to implement the available sentence - reducing mechanisms where there was no legitimate penological justification for continuing the applicant ’s imprisonment .

Any possible life sentence imposed on the applicant would therefore also be reducible de facto .

Consequently , it is unnecessary to determine whether the opposing party was wrong to consider that the applicant would not necessarily be sentenced to life imprisonment , because , even if he were sentenced to such a prison term , this penalty would not constitute a breach of LAW [ of the LAW ] ” .

As to the complaint under LAW between GPE and GPE , LAW , the ORG d’Etat held that :

“ The GPE authorities request the applicant ’s extradition on CARDINAL charges , namely :

CARDINAL ) Conspiracy to kill GPE nationals outside of GPE ;

CARDINAL ) Conspiracy and attempt to use of weapons of mass destruction ;

CARDINAL ) Conspiracy to provide material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organisation ;

CARDINAL ) Providing material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organisation , in violation of the following provisions .

Again according to the GPE authorities , in order to commit these offences as charged the applicant and CARDINAL accomplices carried out a series of ‘ overt acts’ , including those for which extradition is being granted to the GPE authorities presented as follows : [ a list of CARDINAL charges follows ] .

In GPE the charges ( ‘ in the GPE judicial district and , on related charges , elsewhere in the GPE ) against the applicant are as follows : [ a list of CARDINAL charges follows ] .

Comparing all the ‘ overt acts’ for which extradition has been granted to the GPE authorities with all the NORP charges valid ‘ in the GPE judicial district and ... elsewhere in the GPE , it will be noted that the former have no territorial link with GPE , constituting a set of acts which serve as the constituent elements of the CARDINAL charges presented by the GPE authorities .

It emerges from the case file that the applicant is wanted by the GPE authorities for a number of offences in respect of which he has not been ‘ found guilty , convicted or acquitted in the requested State’ and that the ‘ overt acts’ constitute so many elements to be used by the GPE judicial authorities to establish whether the applicant is guilty or innocent of the CARDINAL charges brought against him . ”

On DATE , the date of notification of the ministerial decrees relating to the requests for extradition ( see CARDINAL and DATE ) , the applicant lodged a request with ORG for the indication of an interim measure pursuant to LAW with a view to suspending his extradition .

On DATE the ORG acceded to the applicant ’s request and decided to indicate to the Government , in the interests of the parties and of the proper conduct of proceedings before it , that it should not extradite the applicant to GPE .

On DATE , arguing that the interim measure had been indicated prematurely because the applicant had not yet been placed in custody pending extradition and that such a measure would create a situation detrimental to the proper administration of justice , ORG requested that the measure be lifted .

On DATE , the ORG , having re - examined the application in the light of the information supplied by the parties , decided , on the basis of the said information , to refuse to lift the interim measure .

On DATE the Government submitted a second request for the lifting of the interim measure .

In reply , the ORG pointed out , in a letter of CARDINAL DATE , that the request to lift the measure and the application would be re - examined once the judgment delivered on DATE by the ORG in PERSON and Others v. GPE , cited above , had become final .

In a letter of CARDINAL DATE the ORG informed the parties that the examination of the request to lift the interim measure had been postponed indefinitely in view of the request for referral to ORG of the cases PERSON and Others v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) and ORG and PERSON v. GPE ( nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL ) .

On DATE the ORG informed the parties that it had been decided to refer the aforementioned PERSON case to ORG and that the question of the request to lift the interim measure would be re - examined when a decision had been taken on the request for referral of the aforementioned case of PERSON and Others to the Grand Chamber .

The application was communicated to the respondent Government on DATE .

In their observations on the admissibility and merits of the application the ORG requested , for the third time , the immediate lifting of the interim measure .

In a letter of DATE the ORG replied that the Government would be informed in due course of the decision taken by ORG on the interim measure .

DATE . On DATE it was decided to maintain the interim measure for the duration of the proceedings before the ORG .

In a letter of DATE in reply to a fourth request from the Government to lift the interim measure , the ORG stated that the interim measure had been maintained and would be applied until the end of the proceedings before it .

On DATE the ORG informed the parties that examination of the case had been adjourned in view of the imminent delivery of the judgment of the ORG d’Etat and of the ORG judgment in ORG and Others [ ORG ] ( ORG . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , ORG and CARDINAL , DATE ) .

In reply to a question from the Government on the deadline for dealing with the case , the ORG informed them on CARDINAL DATE that the examination of the case would begin at DATE or DATE .

On DATE the ORG informed the parties that the chamber constituted to examine the case was intending to relinquish the case to ORG under LAW .

By letter of CARDINAL DATE the applicant expressed his agreement to such relinquishment . The Government , on the other hand , indicated , by letter of DATE , that they opposed relinquishment .

On DATE , having served the sentences imposed on him ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , the applicant was taken into custody pending extradition in pursuance of section CARDINAL of LAW of DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a first application for release with ORG . By an order of CARDINAL June DATE the chambre du conseil dismissed the application . The order was upheld by ORG of ORG on DATE .

Subsequently , having meanwhile been transferred first to FAC and then to FAC , the applicant lodged a second application for release on CARDINAL DATE with ORG . On DATE the chambre du conseil allowed his application . On appeal from the public prosecutor , by judgment of DATE , ORG of ORG set aside this decision and dismissed the application .

On DATE the applicant lodged a third application for release . By an order of DATE the chambre du conseil of ORG declared the application unfounded . The applicant appealed to ORG of ORG , which upheld the aforementioned decision by judgment of DATE .

In DATE , having meanwhile been transferred to PERSON , the applicant lodged a fourth application for release , which was declared unfounded by the chambre du conseil of the Mons Regional Court on DATE , and then by ORG of ORG on DATE .

On DATE , having meanwhile been transferred to ORG , the applicant lodged a fifth application for release . This application was dismissed by the chambre du conseil of ORG on DATE and then by ORG of ORG on DATE .

Meanwhile , on DATE , the applicant had left ORG , having obtained a date for his wedding to a NORP national with whom he had had CARDINAL children .

On DATE the applicant was informed that he was being transferred from FAC to ORG . In fact he was being taken to NORP military airport , where ORG ( ORG ) agents were waiting for him . At TIME he was extradited to GPE .

The Minister for ORG issued a public statement announcing the applicant ’s departure at TIME

At TIME the applicant ’s lawyer made a highly urgent ex parte application to the President of ORG . The decision , which was given at TIME , stated that ORG was required to comply with the interim measure indicated by the ORG , and ordered “ prohibition or suspension of the applicant ’s extradition , as far as this might be possible ” , on pain of a fine of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL ( MONEY ) . The ORG has not been informed of any appeal against this order .

In GPE the applicant was immediately placed in custody . On DATE , assisted by an officially appointed lawyer , he was brought before ORG of GPE to hear the charges against him .

The applicant is currently being held in the GPE regional prison in GPE ( GPE ) . On DATE a letter from the prison administration to the NORP authorities stated that the applicant was subject to the same conditions of detention as all other prisoners .

According to an email sent on DATE by the applicant ’s GPE lawyer to his representative before the ORG , the applicant was allowed to have postal contact with the outside world , but all correspondence would be translated and read in advance by ORG . He was also allowed to have telephone contact with some members of his family provided that an interpreter was available . Close relatives could visit him subject to obtaining a GPE entry visa .

DATE . The applicant was visited by his lawyer , who , in an email sent to a member of his family on DATE , said that he had been placed in an isolated cell . She expressed concern about his mental state .


Guido Raimondi;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney;Yonko Grozev

The applicants , Mr PERSON and Mr PERSON , are NORP nationals who live in GPE . They were represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent , Mr PERSON of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The case concerns criminal proceedings in which a judgment was rendered against the applicants by ORG ( hovioikeus , hovrätten ) on CARDINAL DATE . On DATE ORG ( korkein oikeus , högsta domstolen ) refused the applicants leave to appeal and ORG judgment thus became final .

On DATE the first applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal before ORG , requesting it to annul ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE and to refer the matter back to it for a new examination . He claimed that the composition of the court had not been competent ( päätösvaltainen , domför ) as CARDINAL of the appeal court justices had been biased in the matter .

On DATE ORG found that the justice in question had been biased in the case and that therefore the composition of the court had not been competent . ORG thus annulled ORG judgment as far as the first applicant was concerned and referred the matter back to ORG for a new examination .

Subsequently , the second applicant also requested the annulment of ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE as far as he was concerned . The outcome of his request was the same as for the first applicant : ORG annulled the Appeal Court judgment as far as he was concerned and referred the matter back to ORG for a new examination . The public prosecutors never requested annulment of ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE .

During the reopened ORG proceedings the applicants claimed that ORG could no longer examine those charges which had been dismissed by the final ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE as the ORG request for reopening did not concern these parts of the case . They referred both to the prohibition of reformatio in peius and to the ne bis in idem principle . On the other hand , the public prosecutors claimed that the case had been referred back to ORG in its entirety . They claimed that , as the competency of the composition was a matter that concerned all parties , the prohibition of reformatio in peius did not apply and the examination of the case was to be conducted as if the case had only now become pending before ORG .

On DATE ORG dismissed , without examining the merits , those charges which had already been finally decided by ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE . The court noted that the public prosecutors had not challenged the impartiality of the composition of the court but that only the applicants had made such claims . Therefore , also taking into account the case - law of ORG , the previously dismissed charges could no longer be examined .

By letter dated CARDINAL DATE the public prosecutors appealed to ORG against this ORG decision . They claimed that the rules on impartiality were designed to protect all parties to the proceedings . In such a situation the prohibition of reformatio in peius was no longer applicable . As the earlier judgment had been annulled in respect of the applicants , there existed no earlier final judgment concerning them . The applicants disagreed with the public ORG conclusions . They pointed out that they did not even have any interest or right to appeal against ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE in so far as it was favourable to them . A final judgment could not be annulled without any specific request to that effect .

On DATE ORG granted the public prosecutors leave to appeal .

On DATE ORG quashed the ORG decision and referred the case back to it for a new examination . It found that the prohibition of reformatio in peius was valid in the NORP legal system and that it was applied both in ordinary and extraordinary appeal proceedings . The question of whether a case was annulled and referred back for a new examination in its entirety or only in part depended on the nature of the procedural error in the case at hand . If the procedural error affected the whole judgment and the proceedings , the case was referred back in its entirety , even if the judgment had been favourable to the appellant . The court noted that in the Convention or in its Protocols there was no specific mention of the prohibition of reformatio in peius but that it formed a part of the general fair trial guarantees . ORG had made a Recommendation on this subject in DATE . However , in the case - law of the ORG no similar case was to be found . On the other hand , there was caselaw about a judge ’s partiality , which issue had been considered by the ORG to be such a grave procedural error that it always led to the annulment of a judgment . The principle of ne bis in idem did not prevent new examination of the case if in earlier proceedings a grave procedural error had taken place . All partiality grounds were unconditional . In the present case the lack of competence of the composition concerned the whole ORG proceedings and the judgment in its entirety . Therefore the court had earlier annulled ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE in its entirety . As the prohibition of reformatio in peius only applied to judgments which had become partially final , it did not apply to the present case in which a final judgment had been completely annulled . ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE was thus no longer binding in any respect . ORG reached this conclusion by CARDINAL votes to CARDINAL . The decision contains CARDINAL dissenting opinions .

There is no explicit provision concerning the principle of reformatio in peius in the domestic law . The established interpretation is , largely on the basis of the national case - law , that this principle is valid in the national legal system . This principle is inferable from LAW , LAW , subsection CARDINAL , of LAW ( oikeudenkäymiskaari , rättegångsbalken ; as amended by Act no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) which reads as follows :

“ [ ORG a criminal case , ORG may amend , in favour of the defendant , the judgment that ORG has given on the charges even if only the public prosecutor has appealed against this . ”

ORG has dealt with the principle of reformatio in peius in some of its precedent cases .

PERSON : After ORG had referred the criminal case back to ORG on the basis of the defendant ’s appeal , the complainant claimed damages in the retrial proceedings , although he had declared in the earlier proceedings that he had no claims for damages . Because the question about the complainant ’s right to damages had not been examined or determined by a judgment before , no impediment existed for examining the claim for damages .

KKO:CARDINAL:CARDINAL : When sentencing the defendant to a punishment for robbery , ORG had obliged him to pay the complainant damages for mental suffering . When the defendant appealed to ORG , the complainant , in a counter - appeal , claimed an increase in the damages for mental suffering . ORG upheld the judgment of ORG . The complainant abided by ORG judgment but , on the basis of the defendant ’s appeal , ORG referred the matter back to ORG for a main hearing . In the new proceedings the complainant , on the basis of the counter - appeal , continued to claim an increase in the damages . ORG held that the counter - appeal could be examined in the retrial proceedings .

NORP Moreover , LAW , section CARDINAL , subsection CARDINAL , of LAW ( as amended by Act no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) provides that :

“ On the basis of a complaint invoking procedural fault , a final judgment may be annulled :

CARDINAL ) if the court had no quorum or if the case had been taken up for consideration of the merits even though there was a circumstance on the basis of which the court should have dismissed the case on its own motion without considering the merits ;

According to LAW , section CARDINAL , of the same Code ,

“ [ i]f it is found that a procedural fault has occurred , the judgment shall be annulled in full or for the part necessary and , if the case is to be retried , it shall be referred back to the court where the procedural fault had occurred . In this event , ORG shall also order the deadline and manner for the bringing of the case to a retrial . ”


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment)

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention , which were incompatible with their disabilities , and that there was no effective remedy in that regard . In application no . CARDINAL , the applicant also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention .


CASE OF BRAGA v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND RUSSIA

Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment;Positive obligations) (Substantive aspect) (the Republic of Moldova);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect) (Russia);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention) (the Republic of Moldova);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention) (Russia);Violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of application) (the Republic of Moldova)

Dmitry Dedov;Julia Laffranque;Ledi Bianku;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE , the applicant was arrested in GPE by virtue of a decision of a prosecutor from the self - proclaimed “ GPE ( the “ FAC ; for further details about the “ FAC , see ORG and Others v. GPE and GPE [ ORG ] , no . CARDINAL , § § CARDINAL - CARDINAL , ECHR CARDINALVII , and ORG and Others v. GPE and GPE [ ORG ] , ORG . CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL others , § § DATE , ORG DATE ( extracts ) ) . He was charged with fraud and incitement to bribery .

On DATE , ORG , which was under the jurisdiction of the “ FAC ” , convicted the applicant and sentenced him to DATE imprisonment . According to the applicant , he appealed , but his appeal was rejected by the “ FAC ORG on an unspecified date .

The applicant initially served his sentence in PERSON no . CARDINAL . On DATE , he was transferred to FAC , which was under the control of the GPE authorities . On DATE , he signed a form of authority authorising the PERSON - based non - governmental organisation ORG ) to represent him before this ORG . That form of authority , together with the application form , reached the ORG on DATE .

On DATE , a lawyer from ORG informed ORG that the applicant and CARDINAL other people were being held in FAC on the basis that they had been convicted by “ FAC courts . He asked for their immediate release , in view of the fact that they had been convicted by unlawful courts . He also submitted that some of those CARDINAL detainees had already lodged applications with the ORG , and that a failure to immediately release them or any attempt to transfer them back to the “ FAC authorities would result in GPE incurring responsibility . A similar letter was sent on DATE to the Minister of ORG .

On DATE , members of ORG organised a press conference , ’s ORG on DATE .

Also on DATE , all CARDINAL detainees , including the applicant , were allegedly transferred back to “ FAC prisons .

On DATE , ORG informed the media of the detainees’ transfer back to the “ FAC authorities on DATE .

On DATE , the Head of ORG of ORG informed ORG that the detainees mentioned in their request of DATE were not being held at FAC .

On DATE , the lawyer from ORG wrote to the “ FAC Ministry of Justice , asking for permission to see the applicant and stating that he was planning to lodge in the applicant ’s name an application before the Court . He never received a reply to that letter .

On DATE , the applicant was released from prison on the basis of an amnesty act .

The applicant described the conditions of his detention in the “ FAC in the following manner . He was allegedly detained in a cell with several people suffering from tuberculosis , and risked contracting that disease himself . During his detention in FAC no . CARDINAL , CARDINAL detainees there died of tuberculosis . He was also affected by parasitic insects . The applicant is a person with a category CARDINAL disability , but he was not given any medication during his detention . Food was served only once a day and was of very poor quality .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Alena Poláčková;Helen Keller;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in Budenovsk , LOC of GPE . He is a former military officer .

On an unspecified date the applicant sued his former employer military unit .

On DATE ORG of FAC ( “ the military court ” ) ordered , inter alia , the head of the respondent military unit to re - calculate the period of the applicant ’s service , applying the favourable terms of such calculation for the time when the applicant had participated in a military operation . The military court obliged the head of the military unit to issue the relevant orders , to calculate and to pay the applicant some additional payments and field allowance for the periods specified in the judgment . The judgment contained information on the indexes and other parameters that should be applied for the awarded amounts to be calculated .

On DATE the judgment came into force .

In DATE the applicant obtained the writ of execution and submitted it to ORG in Budenovsk .

On DATE ORG returned the writ of execution to the applicant on the ground that the military unit did not have an account there , and the judgment contained no specific amounts awarded to the applicant .

On DATE the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs’ service . On DATE the enforcement proceedings were initiated .

On DATE the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the writ was returned to the applicant without enforcement following his request to withdraw the writ .

In DATE the applicant applied to the domestic courts for clarification of the initial judgment with the view to establish the specific amounts due to him . The applicant ’s requests were dismissed as being lodged out of time . The courts noted that , in any case , the matter concerning the awarded amounts should have been resolved by way of an additional decision rather than clarification of a final judgment , and informed that an application for an additional decision should have been lodged before the entry into force of the main judgment .

It is not disputed between the parties that the judgment of CARDINAL DATE remained unenforced in the part concerning the payment to the applicant of the second salary and the field allowances for the periods specified in the judgment .

On DATE , after communication of the present case , ORG of GPE calculated the amount due to the applicant under the judgment of DATE . According to this calculation , the main debt amounted to MONEY .


Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Ledi Bianku;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano

A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agent .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicants are the wife , children , parents and siblings of PERSON DATE , who died on DATE as the result of an explosion in an unlicensed fireworks workshop operating in GPE , a district of GPE . It appears that CARDINAL other people lost their lives in the same explosion , and that some QUANTITY people were injured .

On DATE the PERSON public prosecutor ’s office initiated an investigation of its own motion into the incident . Accordingly , evidence was collected from the accident site , including photographic and forensic evidence , and an incident report was prepared . The PERSON public prosecutor ’s office also commissioned CARDINAL expert reports , CARDINAL involving a chemical analysis of the substances collected from the accident site ( “ the first expert report ” ) , and the other concerning the establishment of the circumstances of and responsibility for the explosion , including any responsibility on the part of any ORG officials ( “ the second expert report ” ) .

On DATE a lawyer from the GPE branch of ORG lodged a criminal complaint , in the name of that association , against various public officials in connection with the explosion .

The first expert report , which was added to the investigation file on DATE , concluded that most of the samples obtained from the accident site contained barium nitrate , a highly toxic and explosive chemical substance .

The second expert report was added to the investigation file on DATE . The report , which contained very detailed findings based on an examination of the forensic evidence and statements given to the police by a number of witnesses , found that DATE under the relevant regulations – the following persons and authorities had been responsible for the accident :

- S.B. , the owner of the workshop , had been CARDINAL responsible for the explosion , on account of his failure to comply with various licensing and security requirements provided by the relevant legislation ;

- GPE and GPE had each been CARDINAL responsible , mainly on account of their failure to fulfil their respective licensing and inspection duties , as specified in the relevant legislation ;

- the electricity distribution company BEDAŞ ( Boğaziçi Elektrik Dağıtım Anonim Şirketi ) had been CARDINAL responsible on account of having supplied electricity to a building which did not possess an occupancy permit ;

- ORG had been QUANTITY responsible , on account of having failed to inspect the workshop , in which uninsured workers had been employed .

Having regard to the findings of the experts and the criminal complaint lodged by ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , and in compliance with the mechanism set out under PERSON no . DATE ( the PERSON on the Prosecution of Civil Servants and Public Officials ) for the prosecution of civil servants , the GPE public prosecutor ’s office sought authorisation from the competent authorities for the prosecution of a number of public officials .

After conducting its own examination into the matter , on DATE the GPE Governor ’s ORG refused to authorise the prosecution of the former GPE Governor of GPE ( GPE ) and the Security Director of GPE ( ORG ) . It held that these authorities had been under no obligation to take action in respect of the workplace at issue , given that no irregularities had been brought to their attention by other organs , such as local municipalities , which had been responsible for inspecting that workplace . It appears that the applicants were not able to lodge an objection in respect of this decision , as it was not served on them .

On DATE the GPE public prosecutor ’s office issued a decision not to prosecute GPE and ORG , in accordance with the decision of ORG .

On an unspecified date the ORG representative lodged another criminal complaint against GPE and ORG Referring to its previous decision of DATE , on CARDINAL DATE the GPE public prosecutor ’s office issued , once again , a decision not to prosecute . The applicants lodged an objection to that decision ; this was rejected by ORG on DATE .

On DATE ORG – relying on the findings of an internal investigation ( conducted by CARDINAL of its own inspectors ) into the respective responsibilities of the mayor of GPE ( GPE ) and the mayor of GPE ( GPE ) in respect of the incident – decided not to grant permission for their prosecution . According to the findings of ORG inspector , the licensing and inspection of the workplace at issue had been outside the scope of the duties of GPE . Moreover , those officials from GPE who had been responsible for the licensing and inspection of the workshop had indeed undertaken such an inspection , but since the owner had not declared that he was engaged in the production of pyrotechnic articles , such as fireworks , they had had no reason to take any measures against the workshop . The applicants lodged an objection against that decision .

On DATE ORG dismissed that objection in so far as it concerned PERSON , but it accepted it in so far as it concerned PERSON , holding that under the relevant legislation , it was his municipality that had been responsible for licensing and inspecting the workplace in question . ORG therefore granted permission for his prosecution .

Accordingly , the GPE prosecutor ’s office issued a decision not to prosecute in respect of GPE Nevertheless , an investigation was launched by the PERSON public prosecutor ’s office into whether or not PERSON had been responsible ; that investigation resulted in a decision not to prosecute PERSON on account of a lack of evidence indicating negligence or misconduct on his part in connection with the incident . The applicants lodged an objection against that decision .

On DATE ORG upheld that objection and annulled the decision not to prosecute PERSON

Upon receipt of the prosecution request from the PERSON public prosecutor ’s office , an internal investigation was conducted at GPE into the responsibilities of current and former licence inspection directors of GPE ( GPE , GPE and ORG , which found that the licensing and inspection of the production of the explosive material in question was outside the scope of the duties of GPE .

Accordingly , on DATE the GPE ORG refused to authorise the prosecution of GPE , GPE and ORG ; on DATE ORG dismissed an objection lodged by the PERSON prosecutor ’s office against that decision , as the objection had been lodged outside the statutory time - limit .

Following a request by the PERSON public prosecutor ’s office for the prosecution of the GPE personnel who had been in charge of the overseeing and inspection of the workplace at issue , the Zeytinburnu ORG Office carried out a preliminary examination in respect of the following GPE personnel : CARDINAL zoning and urban development directors ( GPE , GPE and PERSON ) ; the licensing and inspection director ( PERSON ) ; the licence inspection and finance director ( ORG ) ; and the municipal police director ( ORG . By a decision dated DATE , the Zeytinburnu ORG decided not to grant permission for the prosecution of these individuals , on the grounds that they had not been at fault or been negligent in respect of the occurrence of the explosion .

The PERSON public prosecutor ’s office lodged an objection against that decision ; on DATE ORG revoked the decision of ORG and granted permission for the prosecution of the persons in question . ORG held that there was enough material in the case file to justify an investigation into whether the GPE personnel in question had been responsible for the explosion .

It appears from the submissions of the Government that the PERSON public prosecutor ’s office also sought permission for the prosecution of ORG , the former director of ORG , which was attached to ORG . While the GPE Governor ’s ORG initially refused permission for the prosecution of ORG , that decision was subsequently overturned by ORG on DATE .

After obtaining administrative authorisation ( idari izin ) for the prosecution of the public officials in question , the PERSON public prosecutor ’s office issued CARDINAL separate bills of indictment in respect of the incident .

The first bill of indictment was filed on DATE against the GPE personnel GPE , GPE , GPE , GPE and PERSON ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , the owners of the building in question ( Res . PERSON and PERSON . PERSON ) , and PERSON ( one of the employees of the workshop in question ) . All suspects were accused of causing death and bodily harm through negligence under LAW of LAW . The GPE personnel were also accused of misconduct in office ( görevi kötüye kullanma ) under LAW .

The second bill of indictment was filed on DATE in respect of ORG , the director of ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , under Articles CARDINAL § CARDINAL and CARDINAL § CARDINAL of LAW .

The third bill of indictment was filed on DATE against ORG , the mayor of PERSON ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , under LAW of LAW .

The proceedings in respect of the incident were held before ORG , which joined the CARDINAL cases . During the course of the proceedings , statements from CARDINAL people were taken by the court as victims or complainants . The court also took many witness statements and examined all evidence collected during the preliminary investigation ( such as photographs and video footage , autopsy reports , ORG reports , on - site examination reports , internal investigation reports issued by the public bodies concerned and other expert reports ) . It also ordered its own expert report from a group of experts consisting of CARDINAL university professors and engineers , and also requested information and documents from all the public authorities concerned in relation to the circumstances that had led to the explosion at issue .

Relying on all the information and evidence before it , and having regard to the jurisprudence of ORG on the matter ( as established in the case of GPE v. GPE ( [ ORG ] , no . CARDINAL , ORG CARDINALXII ) , on DATE the ORG delivered its judgment , which contained the following findings :

- it found the GPE personnel GPE and PERSON guilty as charged and sentenced them DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment ;

- it found the GPE personnel GPE and GPE guilty as charged , sentenced them DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment , and in both cases converted that sentence to a judicial fine of CARDINAL NORP liras ( TRY ) ( MONEY ( ORG ) at the material time ) ;

- it found the GPE employee PERSON guilty as charged , sentenced her to DATE and CARDINAL months’ imprisonment , and converted that sentence to a judicial fine of TRY CARDINAL ( approximately ORG CARDINAL at the material time ) ;

- it found the building owners GPE . PERSON and PERSON . PERSON guilty as charged , and sentenced them each to CARDINAL years’ imprisonment ;

- it acquitted the mayor of GPE ( GPE ) and the former director of ORG ( ORG ) ; and

- it acquitted PERSON , an employee of the workplace in question .

An appeal was lodged against the judgment of ORG . According to the latest information in the case file , the appeal proceedings are still pending before ORG .

On an unspecified date in DATE the applicants brought an action for compensation in ORG against ORG , ORG , GPE , GPE and BEDAŞ . They requested a total of TRY CARDINAL in respect of pecuniary damage and TRY CARDINAL in respect of non - pecuniary damage .

Relying on the evidence in the criminal case file , together with an expert report that it commissioned to ascertain the damage incurred by the applicants , on DATE ORG found that GPE and GPE had been jointly and severally liable for the incident in question . It awarded the applicants TRY MONEY ( approximately ORG MONEY ) in respect of pecuniary damage and TRY CARDINAL ( approximately EUR CARDINAL ) in respect of non - pecuniary damage , plus interest .

On DATE ORG quashed that judgment upon an appeal lodged by all parties . It held that while only GPE and GPE had been found responsible for the incident , the information and documents in the case file suggested that the remaining CARDINAL respondents had also been at fault .

On DATE ORG dismissed a request lodged by all CARDINAL respondents for the rectification of its decision .

ORG ordered a new expert report to determine the respective liabilities of the respondents ; the report found that all the respondents had been responsible for the accident to some degree . Accordingly , on DATE the administrative court ordered the payment of the amounts it had previously determined ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) jointly and severally by the CARDINAL respondents .

The relevant provisions of LAW are as follows :

Article CARDINAL

“ ( CARDINAL ) Anyone who negligently causes the death of another shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of DATE .

( CARDINAL ) If the act results in the death of CARDINAL person , or injury to CARDINAL person together with the death of CARDINAL or more persons , the offender shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of DATE . ”

Article CARDINAL

“ ( CARDINAL ) ... any public officer who secures an unjust financial benefit for another or causes any loss to the public or to an individual by acting contrary to the requirements of his office shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of DATE .

( CARDINAL ) ... any public officer who secures unjust financial benefit for another or causes any loss to the public or an individual through omission or delay in the performance of his duties shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of DATE . ”

Detailed information regarding PERSON no . DATE on ORG may be found in the cases of PERSON and Others v. GPE ( nos . PERSON and CARDINAL others , § CARDINAL , DATE ) and ORG v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , CARDINAL DATE ) .


CASE OF PETROVIĆ v. "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA"

Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Aleš Pejchal;Armen Harutyunyan;Kristina Pardalos;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Pauliine Koskelo;Ksenija Turković

On DATE the applicant instituted proceedings for restitution of a hotel in GPE which had been confiscated from his predecessor in DATE . On DATE a commission responsible for such matters within ORG dismissed the applicant ’s claim . On DATE he appealed . On DATE a second - instance commission set up within the Government dismissed his appeal . Subsequently , the case went back and forth several times between the administrative bodies and courts at CARDINAL levels of jurisdiction . The proceedings are currently pending before ORG , awaiting a decision on an appeal by the applicant of CARDINAL DATE against a judgment of ORG .

On DATE the applicant applied to ORG for a ruling that the length of the restitution proceedings had been excessive , to award him compensation and set a DATE time - limit for the court dealing with his case to decide on his restitution claim .

By letters dispatched DATE ( received on DATE ) and DATE , ORG requested the case file from ORG . The case file , which was with the administrative bodies , was forwarded to ORG on DATE .

On DATE the first - instance panel of ORG found that the relevant period to be taken into consideration had started to run on DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . It further established that the case had not been complex and that there had been no delays attributable to the applicant . It concluded that there had been a violation of the applicant ’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded him the equivalent of MONEY ( ORG ) in compensation .

By a letter of DATE ( received on DATE ) , ORG asked ORG to provide assistance in delivering its decision because the applicant lived in GPE . Between CARDINAL August and DATE , ORG of the respondent ORG asked , on CARDINAL occasions , that the relevant Ministry in GPE serve ORG decision on the applicant . By a letter of DATE ( received on DATE ) , ORG informed the relevant Ministry of the respondent ORG about the date of service of ORG decision to the applicant .

In an appeal against ORG decision of DATE , the applicant complained that it had taken too long for that court to decide on his application . He referred to section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of LAW , which required ORG to decide on a length of proceedings remedy within DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . He also complained that the amount of compensation awarded to him had been too low .

On DATE the second - instance panel of ORG ruled partly in favour of the applicant . It endorsed the findings of the first - instance panel regarding the complexity of the case and that no delays were attributable to the applicant , found that the proceedings had lasted for DATE , DATE and DATE and set compensation at the equivalent of ORG CARDINAL .