Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-f - Expulsion);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-f - Expulsion);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-f - Expulsion);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-2 - Information on reasons for arrest;Prompt information);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-2 - Information on reasons for arrest;Prompt information);No violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 - Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens-{general} (Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 - Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens)

George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Paul Mahoney;Yonko Grozev

The applicants , PERSON ( “ the first applicant ” ) and PERSON ( “ the second applicant ” ) , who are wife and husband , are NORP nationals of NORP origin and were born in GPE in DATE and DATE respectively . They live in GPE .

The second applicant left GPE on DATE and entered GPE illegally on DATE after travelling from GPE .

He applied for asylum DATE .

The first applicant left GPE at a later date in order to join the second applicant in GPE as they had been engaged to be married . She entered GPE illegally on DATE after travelling from GPE .

The applicants married in GPE on DATE and the first applicant applied for asylum on DATE .

NORP The applicants’ asylum applications were examined jointly by ORG .

ORG held an interview with the applicants on DATE .

Their applications were dismissed on DATE on the ground that they did not fulfil the requirements of LAW of DATE ( as amended up to DATE ) , in that they had not shown that they had a well - founded fear of persecution for reasons of race , religion , nationality , membership of a particular group or political opinion or a well - founded fear of serious and unjustified harm for other reasons . ORG noted that there had been contradictions in the account of facts given by the second applicant with regard to his participation in a demonstration concerning the PERSON events which raised doubts as to his credibility . Furthermore , it considered that there was no possibility of the second applicant being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment if returned to GPE . Consequently , it held that the asylum applications had not been substantiated .

On DATE the applicants lodged an appeal with ORG against ORG decision .

On DATE ORG decision was upheld and the appeal dismissed .

The Reviewing Authority underlined the contradictions and inconsistencies in the second applicant ’s claims . It pointed out that he had not given the same reasons for leaving GPE in his written application and in his interview . In the former he had stated that he had come to GPE to find work whereas in his interview he claimed that he had left GPE because he feared arrest following his participation in a demonstration . Further , ORG gave weight to the fact that the second applicant had stated that following the demonstration he had allegedly participated in , nothing had actually happened to him and that he had not been sought by the authorities . In his asylum application he had stated that he had not been arrested , detained , harassed , persecuted or wanted by the NORP authorities . He had also been able to leave GPE legally . The second applicant ’s claims were therefore unsubstantiated . No issue arose in respect of the first applicant as she had stated that she had left GPE in order to join the second applicant and marry him and had admitted that she did not face any problems in GPE .

ORG concluded by observing that the applicants had not established that they were at risk of persecution if they returned to GPE . Nor did they satisfy the conditions for temporary residence on humanitarian grounds .

On CARDINAL DATE the second applicant brought a “ recourse ” ( judicial review proceedings ) before ORG ( first - instance revisional jurisdiction ) under LAW challenging the decision of ORG . A subsequent application to amend the recourse by adding the first applicant as a complainant was withdrawn as the time - limit of DATE had in the meantime expired ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE the applicants filed the present applications with the ORG . The second applicant , in his application form stated that on DATE he had taken part in a demonstration in his village in PERSON . The purpose of the demonstration was to go to PERSON to show solidarity with the NORP demonstrators following the events of DATE . Following the intervention of the authorities this had not been possible . The second applicant stated that the police had attacked the demonstrators killing CARDINAL persons . After going into hiding for DATE in a neighbouring village , the second applicant was arrested in PERSON . He was detained for DATE and subjected to torture . He was subsequently transferred to the central prison of GPE where he was detained for DATE . After bribing the authorities he was released on the condition that he would present himself to the authorities in GPE DATE . He did not do so , however , out of fear to be detained and tortured again .

On DATE ORG dismissed the second applicant ’s recourse . It upheld ORG decision of DATE after examining all the grounds of annulment put forward by the second applicant . The court noted , inter alia , that the main ground for which the second applicant ’s asylum claim had not been accepted was the lack of plausibility of his principal allegations and the existence of significant contradictions and omissions which had undermined his credibility . The second applicant had not substantiated that he was at risk of persecution if returned to GPE because he had allegedly participated in a demonstration . Furthermore , the fact that the second applicant was of NORP origin was not sufficient in itself to justify the granting of refugee status . ORG also held that new grounds and allegations concerning his detention , arrest and ill - treatment following the events could not be taken into account . Its jurisdiction under LAW was limited to reviewing his claim as it had been made before ORG and ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Grounds for annulment that had not been put before ORG could not be examined for the first time by the court .

No appeal was lodged against the first instance judgment .

In the meantime , on CARDINAL DATE ORG and other NORP from GPE organised a demonstration in GPE , near ORG , ORG and ORG . They were protesting against the restrictive policies of ORG in granting international protection . CARDINAL NORP from GPE , including the applicants , remained in the area around the clock , having set up CARDINAL tents on the pavement . According to the ORG , the encampment conditions were unsanitary and protesters were obstructing road and pedestrian traffic . The encampment had become a hazard to public health and created a public nuisance . The protesters performed their DATE chores on the pavement , including cooking and washing in unsanitary conditions . The sewage pits had overflown , causing a nuisance and offensive odours . The public lavatories were dirty and the rubbish bins of the Government buildings were being used and , as a result , were continuously overflowing . Furthermore , the protesters were unlawfully obtaining electricity from ORG . Members of the public who lived or worked in the area had complained to the authorities . The Government submitted that efforts had been made by the authorities to persuade the protesters to leave , but to no avail . As a result , the authorities had decided to take action to remove the protesters from the area .

On DATE instructions were given by the Minister of the Interior to proceed with the deportation of NORP - NORP failed asylum seekers in the normal way .

On DATE the Minister requested the Chief of Police , among others , to take action in order to implement his instructions . Further , he endorsed suggestions made by the competent authorities that deportation and detention orders be issued against NORP - NORP failed asylum seekers who had passports and did not have PERSON or PERSON status and that the police execute the orders starting with the ones issued against the leaders of the protesters . The police were also directed to take into account the policy guidelines and to use discreet methods of arrest .

According to the ORG , letters were sent by ORG to a number of failed NORP - NORP asylum - seekers informing them that they had to make arrangements to leave GPE in view of their asylum applications being turned down ( see PERSON v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § DATE , ECHR DATE ( extracts ) ) . They submitted a copy of such a letter which was dated DATE and addressed to the applicants .

From documents submitted by the Government it appears that from DATE until DATE the authorities kept the area under surveillance and kept a record of the NORP DATE activities and of all comings and goings . In the relevant records it is noted that invariably , between TIME a.m. and TIME , things were , in general , quiet , and everyone was sleeping apart from those keeping guard . During the above - mentioned period a large - scale operation was organised by ORG , “ ERU ” ( “ FAC ) , and a number of other authorities , including the Police Aliens and Immigration Unit , for the removal of the protesters and their transfer to the ORG headquarters for the purpose of ascertaining their status on a case - by - case basis .

In the meantime , CARDINAL DATE and DATE orders for the detention and deportation of CARDINAL failed asylum seekers were issued following background checks . Letters were sent by ORG of ORG to the Director of ORG and ORG , containing a short paragraph with information as to the immigration status of each person . This information included the date of rejection of the asylum application or the closure of the asylum file by ORG , the date of dismissal of the appeal by ORG , where lodged , and the date some of those concerned had been included on the authorities’ “ stop list ” ( a register of individuals whose entry into and exit from GPE is banned or subject to monitoring ) . The letters recommended the issuance of deportation and detention orders . The Government submitted copies of CARDINAL such letters with information concerning CARDINAL people .

On DATE , letters were also prepared in LANGUAGE by ORG informing those concerned of the decision to detain and deport them . The Government submitted that , at the time , the authorities did not know whether those individuals were among the protesters .

The removal operation was carried out on DATE , TIME with the participation of CARDINAL officers from ORG , the ERU , ORG , ORG , ORG and ORG . The protesters , including the applicants , were led to buses , apparently without any reaction or resistance on their part . At TIME the mini buses carrying the male protesters left . The women , children and babies followed at CARDINAL a.m. A total of CARDINAL people were located at the place of protest and were transferred to the ORG headquarters : CARDINAL men , CARDINAL women and QUANTITY children . Upon arrival , registration took place and the status of each person was examined using computers which had been specially installed DATE . The Government submitted that during this period the protesters had not been handcuffed or put in cells but had been assembled in rooms and given food and drink . It appears from the documents submitted by the Government that by TIME the identification of CARDINAL of the group had been completed and that the whole operation had ended by CARDINAL p.m.

It was ascertained that CARDINAL of the adults , along with their CARDINAL children , were in the Republic unlawfully . Their asylum applications had either been dismissed or their files closed for failure to attend interviews . Those who had appealed to ORG had had their appeals dismissed . Some final decisions dated back to DATE . A number of people had also been included on the authorities’ “ stop list ” . PERSON orders had already been issued for CARDINAL of them ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

The authorities deported CARDINAL people on DATE at TIME ( CARDINAL adults and QUANTITY children ) . CARDINAL people ( QUANTITY men and QUANTITY women ) , including the applicants , were arrested . The persons against whom deportation and detention orders had been issued on DATE were detained under these orders . The remaining persons , including the applicants , were charged with the criminal offence of unlawful stay in the LOC under section LOC ) of the Aliens and Immigration PERSON ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . They were all arrested and transferred to various detention centres in GPE . The applicants were placed in the immigration detention facilities in LOC ( FAC and CARDINAL respectively ) . Further , on humanitarian grounds , QUANTITY women whose husbands were detained pending deportation and who had a total of CARDINAL children between them were not arrested themselves .

According to the Government the applicants and their co - detainees were informed orally that they had been arrested and detained on the basis that they had been staying in the ORG unlawfully and were thus “ prohibited immigrants ” ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . They were also informed of their rights pursuant to ORG Detained Law CARDINAL ( LAW ) ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) and , in particular , of their right to contact by phone , in person and in private , a lawyer of their own choice . The applicants submitted that they had not been informed of the reasons for their arrest and detention on that date .

On DATE letters were sent by ORG of ORG to the Director of ORG and ORG , recommending the issuance of deportation and detention orders . The letters contained a short paragraph in respect of each person with information as to his or her immigration status . This included the date of rejection of the asylum application or the closure of the asylum file by ORG and the date of dismissal of the appeal by ORG where lodged . Some letters also referred to the date the asylum application had been lodged and the date some of the individuals concerned had been included on the authorities’ “ stop list ” . The Government submitted copies of letters concerning CARDINAL people ( most of these letters referred to groups of people ) .

Deportation and detention orders were also issued in NORP on DATE in respect of the remaining CARDINAL people detained ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , including the applicants , pursuant to section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of the Aliens and Immigration PERSON on the ground that they were “ prohibited immigrants ” within the meaning of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(k ) of that PERSON . These were couched in identical terms . In respect of CARDINAL people the orders also mentioned sections CARDINAL ) and CARDINAL ) of the PERSON .

Subsequently , on DATE , letters were prepared in LANGUAGE by ORG informing all the detainees individually , including the applicants , of the decision to detain and deport them . The Government submitted CARDINAL copies of these letters , including those addressed to the applicants , the text of which was virtually identical , a standard template having been used .

The text of the letter reads as follows :

“ You are hereby informed that you are an illegal immigrant by virtue of paragraph ( k ) . section CARDINAL , LAW law , LAW , as amended until DATE , because you of illegal entry [ sic ]

Consequently your temporary residence permit / migration permit has been revoked and I have proceeded with the issue of deportation orders and detention orders dated DATE against you .

You have the right to be represented before me , or before any other ORG and express possible objections against your deportation and seek the services of an interpreter . ”

The only differences was that some letters referred to illegal stay rather than illegal entry and that the letters issued earlier referred to DATE as the date of issuance of the deportation and detention orders ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On the copy of the letters to the applicants provided by the Government , there is a handwritten signed note by a police officer stating that the letters were served on the applicants on DATE but that they refused to receive and sign for them . The other letters had a similar note or stamp on them with the same date , stating that the person concerned had refused to sign for and/or receive the letter . In a letter dated DATE the Government stated that the applicants had been served on DATE . In their subsequent observations the Government submitted , however , that this was the second attempt to serve the letters , the first attempt having been made on DATE , that is , the day of the arrest .

The applicants submitted that they had never refused to receive any kind of information in writing . They claimed that it had only been on DATE that they had been informed orally that they would be deported to GPE on DATE but that the deportation and detention orders were not served on them on that date or subsequently . They submitted that they had eventually been informed by their lawyer , following the receipt of information submitted by the Government to the ORG in the context of the application of Rule CARDINAL of ORG , that deportation and detention orders had been issued against them .

From the documents submitted by the Government , it appears that CARDINAL of the detainees were to be deported on DATE ( this figure is stated in documents submitted by the Government with no further details ) .

On DATE , DATE , the applicants , along with CARDINAL other persons of NORP origin , submitted a Rule CARDINAL request in order to prevent their imminent deportation to GPE .

On DATE the President of the First Section decided to apply Rule CARDINAL , indicating to the respondent Government that the detainees should not be deported to GPE until ORG had had the opportunity to receive and examine all the documents pertaining to their claim . The parties were requested under LAW ( a ) of ORG to submit information and documents concerning the asylum applications and the deportation .

On DATE the President of the First Section reconsidered the application of Rule CARDINAL in the light of information provided by the parties . He decided to maintain the interim measure in respect of CARDINAL cases , including the present ones . Rule CARDINAL was lifted with regard to the CARDINAL remaining cases ( for further details see PERSON , cited above , § DATE ) .

Rule DATE was subsequently lifted with regard to CARDINAL cases , but remained in force in the present CARDINAL applications .

On DATE the applicants filed habeas corpus applications with ORG claiming that their continued detention from DATE had violated LAW CARDINAL/CARDINAL/EC of ORG and of ORG on common standards and procedures in Members states for returning illegally staying third - country nationals , “ the EU Returns Directive ” . The applicants , relying on the ORG ’s judgment in PERSON v. GPE , DATE , ( Reports of Judgments and Decisions DATE ) and the ORG ’s report in PERSON v. GPE ( no . ORG report of CARDINAL DATE ) also claimed that their detention had breached LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW and LAW ( see GPE , § DATE , cited above ) .

ORG set the applications for directions for DATE . On that date the ORG asked for DATE so they could file an objection to the applications . They were given until DATE and the habeas corpus applications were set for hearing on DATE . The parties were also requested to prepare a short note with the issues they would address and to produce it on DATE of the hearing .

The Government filed their objection on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the parties appeared before the court and submitted their written addresses . The hearing of the applications was held . Judgment was reserved on DATE .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applications . With regard to the preliminary issues raised , ORG first of all held that it had the competence to examine the applications as it was called upon to examine the lawfulness of the applicants’ protracted detention and within the context of a habeas corpus application , examine the conformity of their detention with LAW ) of ORG and LAW ( CARDINAL ) not the lawfulness of the deportation and detention orders . The applicants were not estopped from bringing a habeas corpus application just because they had not challenged the deportation and detention orders issued against them . Even if the lawfulness of the detention was assumed , detention for the purpose of deportation could not be indefinite and the detainee left without the right to seek his release . ORG also rejected the argument that the applicants were estopped from bringing the application because their continued detention had been brought about by their own action , that is , by their application to ORG for an interim measure suspending their deportation .

ORG then examined the substance of the applications . It noted that the EU Returns Directive had direct effect in the domestic law , as the period for transposition had expired and the Directive had not been transposed . It could therefore be relied on in the proceedings . However , it went on to hold that the DATE period provided for in the Directive had not yet started to run . The applicants had been arrested on DATE with a view to their deportation but had not been deported by the Government in view of the application by ORG on DATE of Rule DATE and the issuing of an interim measure suspending their deportation . Consequently , the authorities had not been able to deport them even though , as they stated before the court , they had been ready to do so from DATE . As the applicants themselves had taken steps to suspend their deportation , the ensuing time could not be held against the Government and could not be taken into account for the purposes of LAW ( CARDINAL ) and ( CARDINAL ) of the Directive . The DATE period would start to run from the moment that the interim measure had been lifted . From that moment onwards the Government had been under an obligation in accordance with LAW to proceed with the applicants’ deportation with due diligence . The situation would have been different if the deportation had not been effected owing to delays attributable to the authorities .

In so far as the ORG complaints under LAW ) of LAW and LAW were concerned , ORG distinguished the applicants’ situation from those in the cases they relied on and in which responsibility for the protracted detention lay with the authorities . Further , it held that it had not been shown that the continued detention of the applicants had been arbitrary , abusive and contrary to the ORG ’s case - law ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

The applicants lodged CARDINAL separate appeals with ORG ( appellate jurisdiction ) on DATE . Another CARDINAL appeals were lodged at the same time by PERSON ( see GPE , § § DATE , cited above ) and another NORP of NORP origin ( see GPE v. GPE , no . CARDINAL , § DATE , DATE ) .

The applicants sent a letter dated DATE to ORG requesting that the appeals be fixed for pre - trial within a “ short period of time ” and then for hearing .

The applicants were released on CARDINAL DATE following revocation of the deportation and detention orders of DATE by the Permanent Secretary of ORG . They were informed on CARDINAL DATE by a letter dated CARDINAL DATE that they would be issued with a special residence / employment permit under the Aliens and Immigration PERSON and the relevant LAW for a period of DATE from the date of their release with a possibility of further renewal . However , prior to the issuance of this permit they were obliged to sign a contract of employment with an employer indicated and approved by ORG . The applicants were also asked to report to the police once DATE .

On DATE ORG informed the applicants that one of the other appeals that had been filed at the same time as theirs was set down for hearing for DATE .

On DATE the applicants’ lawyer filed an application for joining the CARDINAL appeals ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE ORG issued an order joining the appeals and also instructed the parties to file their written addresses . The applicants submitted that on this date the court was informed that they had been released .

On DATE the applicants filed an application requesting an extension of DATE for filing their written addresses . These were filed on DATE .

On DATE the appeals were set for directions .

On DATE the Government filed an application requesting the parties to appear before ORG and requested a DATE extension for filing their written address . This was granted and the appeals were set down for hearing on DATE .

In the meantime , the Government filed their written address on CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the hearing was held and judgment was reserved .

The appeals were dismissed on DATE . ORG held that as the applicants had , in the meantime , been released , the application was without object ( see PERSON , cited above , § DATE ) .

The applicants submitted that following their release on CARDINAL DATE the authorities did not grant them residence permits . The applicants were not able to fulfil the terms and conditions imposed by ORG in order to have residence permits . Their issuing was subject to finding an employer approved by ORG and to present to the immigration authorities an approved contract of employment . The applicants could not find and/or were not referred by ORG to an approved employer despite their numerous attempts to that effect . Their situation was explained to the competent authorities in a letter dated DATE to which they never received a reply . As a result they were not able to regularise their stay in GPE and had no access to any rights apart from a tolerated residence status .

DATE . On DATE , at TIME , the applicants , along with another NORP couple who had CARDINAL children , were stopped at GPE airport while they attempted to take a flight to ORG in GPE by using false NORP passports . During passport control , the police officer in charge suspected that their passports were false because the colour of the page containing the biometric data differed to that used in genuine passports . The applicants were then requested to give a sample of their signatures . These did not correspond to those in the passports they had presented . After having being questioned by the officer they admitted that the passports were not their own and revealed their true personal details . An immigration officer carried out a search of their immigration status and ascertained that they were failed asylum seekers as their appeal to ORG been dismissed and they did not have valid residence permits .

According to the statement of the police officer taken on DATE , the applicants were arrested for committing the flagrant offences of personation and unlawful stay in GPE see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) . The second applicant was arrested at TIME and the first applicant at TIME . In his statement the police officer stated that he had drawn their attention to the law and that the second applicant replied “ I made a mistake ” . The officer also noted that their legal rights had been explained to them in the LANGUAGE language by an interpreter . The other couple was also arrested and the social welfare office was contacted concerning the children . Around TIME they were all taken to ORG ( ORG ) .

The second applicant along with the other man , was then arrested by virtue of an arrest warrant issued by ORG at TIME the same day pursuant to section CARDINAL of LAW ( PERSON . CARDINAL ; see paragraph CARDINAL below ) on the ground that there had been reasonable suspicion based on evidence that he had been involved in a conspiracy to commit a felony , forgery , circulation of a forged document , personation and unlawful stay in GPE DATE and DATE . There is a handwritten signed note on the warrant by the arresting police officer stating that he arrested the second applicant at CARDINAL TIME at GPE ORG and that with the assistance of an interpreter he had informed him of the reasons for his arrest , had drawn his attention to the law and that the second applicant had replied “ I did it for a better life ” .

The second applicant also signed a document containing his rights to communication as set out in sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of Law DATE ( see paragraphs CARDINAL above and CARDINAL below ) . The copy of the document signed by him was in LANGUAGE .

ORG The second applicant was then questioned by a police officer with the assistance of an interpreter and gave a written statement . The statement was then translated into LANGUAGE . The first part of the statement contains the information given to him by the police officer which reads as follows :

“ I inform you that I am investigating a case of conspiracy to commit a felony , forgery , uttering false documents and personation and unlawful stay on the territory of the Republic , offences that were committed DATE and DATE in GPE , for which I have evidence which gives me reasonable suspicion that you are implicated . I wish to question you and to take your statement . You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so but anything you say may be written down and used as evidence ” .

The second applicant signed next to this paragraph .

In his statement the second applicant stated that he had decided to leave GPE , as following his release and the expiry of DATE , he was not given another residence and work permit ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . He also admitted that he had bought the passports from a NORP national for the amount of QUANTITY ( ORG ) and explained how these were secured . The applicants intended to leave GPE and go to GPE through GPE . He also apologised for what happened “ DATE ” and that he had done it because he could no longer live in GPE . The statement was read to the applicant by the interpreter ; he confirmed it and signed it . A statement was also given by the interpreter .

According to the relevant police report of GPE ORG , the first applicant and the other woman stated that they did not know anything about the passports and that their husbands had organised everything .

DATE . At around TIME both women were released from custody as they were both pregnant and the one also had CARDINAL children .

The following day , CARDINAL DATE , the second applicant was taken to ORG and was remanded in custody for DATE for the purposes of further investigation of the alleged commission of a number of offences by the applicants under LAW and the Aliens and Immigration PERSON ; in particular , the offences of conspiracy to commit a felony , forgery , uttering false documents and personation ( sections CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW , PERSON . CARDINAL ) and unlawful stay in GPE ( section CARDINAL ( l ) ( l ) of the Aliens and ORG paragraphs DATE , CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) .

On DATE , following the conclusion of the police investigation , the case file was transmitted to the office of the Attorney - General for the purposes of deciding whether the applicants would be subject to criminal prosecution . The Attorney - General at the time , decided not to prosecute the applicants because of the particularity of their cases . He gave instructions to the police to proceed with the deportation of the applicants when the situation in GPE would allow it .

On DATE , upon expiry of the second applicant ’s remand , detention and deportation orders were issued pursuant to section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the Aliens and Immigration Law on the ground that the second applicant was a prohibited immigrant within the meaning of section CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) ( k ) and ( l ) of that law ( see GPE , § DATE , cited above ) . On DATE the second applicant was served with a letter informing him of the decision to detain and deport him on the ground that he was an illegal immigrant as he had stayed unlawfully in the Republic . It also informed him that he had the right to file a recourse against these orders before ORG .

The Government submitted that on DATE the execution of the deportation order was suspended as “ it transpired ” that the ORG ’s interim measure under Rule DATE was still in force .

The second applicant was detained at FAC until DATE when he was released following a decision by the Permanent Secretary of ORG to revoke the deportation and detention orders . The conditions attached to his release were set out in a letter dated DATE given him on the date of his release . In particular , the second applicant was requested to hand over his passport to the NORP and NORP police . He would be given a certified copy of the passport which would allow the issuance of a residence permit or any other permit . A special residence / employment permit would then be issued for a period of DATE . Prior to the issuance of this permit , however , the second applicant would have to sign a contract of employment with an employer indicated and approved by ORG . The second applicant was also obliged to report to the nearest police station once DATE and to inform the authorities of a change of address .

The second applicant submitted that although he found employment he was informed by ORG that the employer in question did not fall within the categories entitled to employ him . ORG did not refer him to an eligible employer . The first applicant submitted that she was not given any terms or conditions of residence . They both therefore remained in an irregular situation .


No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Expulsion;Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;George Nicolaou;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Johannes Silvis;Luis López Guerra

The applicants were born on DATE and CARDINAL DATE respectively and live in GPE .

On DATE , the applicants , who are cousins , contracted a religious marriage in GPE , where they were residing illegally . At the time , the first applicant was DATE and the second applicant DATE . Their religious marriage was not registered in GPE .

On DATE the applicants applied for asylum in GPE , which they had entered from GPE on an unspecified date . Both applicants had been already registered as asylum seekers in GPE .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE ORG ( the “ LAW ” ) rejected the applicants’ asylum request , considering that GPE was the responsible ORG by virtue of Regulation no . PERSON ( the “ FAC ” ) .

On DATE , the first applicant had a legal guardian appointed by ORG ( ORG tutélaire , now ORG protection de l’adulte et de l’enfant ) .

On DATE ORG ( the “ FAC ” ) rejected the second applicant ’s appeal against the ORG ’s decision . The ORG noted that the applicants had failed to submit a certificate of marriage and that in any event their alleged religious marriage could not be validly recognised in GPE , pursuant to LAW , because it was illegal under the relevant provision of LAW , which contained an absolute prohibition on marriage for women DATE , while the first applicant was DATE . In any case , independently of the applicable NORP law , the applicant ’s marriage was manifestly incompatible with NORP ordre public , since having sexual intercourse with a child under DATE was a crime under LAW . The first applicant could therefore not be qualified as a member of the second applicant ’s family under LAW and the applicants could not claim any right to family life under LAW .

The decision against the first applicant entered into force on DATE , as the second applicant had not appealed against it .

On CARDINAL DATE the ORG decided to reexamine the first applicant ’s asylum request in GPE . Following this decision , the second applicant requested that his own asylum request be also reexamined in order to preserve the family unity . The second applicant ’s request was rejected by the LAW on procedural grounds : as the applicant ’s claim was deemed without prospects of success , he had been asked an advance judicial fee of MONEY ( “ CHF ” ) , which he had failed to pay .

The second applicant was expelled to GPE on DATE . However , on DATE he returned illegally to GPE , where he could see the first applicant “ intermittently ” , in the applicants’ own words .

On DATE the applicants lodged the present application before this Court .

On DATE the second applicant again requested the reexamination of his asylum request , which was rejected by the LAW on ORG DATE because the second applicant had again failed to pay the CHF CARDINAL advance judicial fee .

On DATE , the applicants requested the recognition of their religious marriage in GPE . The first applicant was then DATE and DATE .

On DATE , the FAC examined the second applicant ’s appeal against the ORG ’s decision of DATE and ruled in favour of the second applicant . The FAC considered that the ORG had wrongly imposed on the second applicant the payment of an advance judicial fee because by then the first applicant was DATE and the applicants could therefore claim to be a family within the meaning of LAW as interpreted by this Court and by ORG .

On DATE , the Government requested that the application be struck out of the list of cases pursuant to LAW .

On DATE , in reply to the ORG ’s request , the applicants submitted that their application included a complaint about a past violation , not only a prospective one , namely that on CARDINAL September CARDINAL the second applicant had been expelled to GPE and thus separated from the first applicant . Such forcible separation constituted a violation of the applicants’ right to respect for their family life .

On DATE , ORG of the GPE of GPE recognised the validity of the applicants’ religious marriage contracted in GPE .

On DATE the applicants informed the ORG that they had been granted asylum in GPE by a decision of DATE .

On DATE , referring to their submissions of DATE , the applicants informed the ORG that they wished to maintain their application , considering that as the alleged past violation of their right to respect for family life had neither been acknowledged nor remedied they had not lost victim status even if they had now obtained asylum in GPE .


Aleš Pejchal;Armen Harutyunyan;Kristina Pardalos;Ledi Bianku;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paul Mahoney;Pauliine Koskelo

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He is represented before the Court by Mr S. Cottingham of O.H. Parsons & Partners , a firm of solicitors practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) are represented by their Agent , PERSON of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP In DATE ORG ( “ ICO ” ) uncovered a database managed by an organisation known as ORG ( “ ORG ” ) . The database held details of the trade union membership and trade union activity of CARDINAL industrial workers , predominantly from the construction sector .

NORP In return for an annual fee , companies who subscribed to the database could access the workers’ details and add information to it . The database was therefore used to “ blacklist ” workers . In other words , companies could use it to vet job applicants and refuse employment to those listed on it . The workers on the database were named , but the companies who provided or accessed the information were listed by code number . The ICO has identified and released some of the names of these companies but not all of them .

The applicant is a bricklayer who has worked in the construction industry for DATE . During that time he was an active member of an independent trade union and DATE he served as a union shop steward representing his fellow workers’ interests vis - à - vis their employer and organising industrial action .

On DATE the applicant discovered that his name was on the ORG database .

The first entry is dated DATE . It notes that on DATE a company identified as “ CARDINAL ” reported the applicant to be a “ militant troublemaker ” . The same DATE entry records that on CARDINAL DATE another company identified only as “ CARDINAL ” also reported the applicant to be a “ militant troublemaker ” .

The next entry , which is also dated DATE , records that a company identified as “ CARDINAL ” checked the applicant ’s details and that “ QUANTITY informed company ” .

CARDINAL further entries on DATE and CARDINAL DATE record that the applicant ’s details were checked by companies identified as “ CARDINAL ” and “ CARDINAL ” .

The ICO was unable to identify the companies referred to as DATE . Nor could it confirm the identity of CARDINAL . However the CARDINAL companies that checked the applicant ’s details in DATE were identified .

DATE and DATE the applicant had been out of work . During this time he had applied for jobs with both of the companies identified by the ICO . In both cases his application was unsuccessful .

There is no record of any contemporaneous complaints about the applicant ’s work , professional performance or conduct .

Following the ICO disclosure the applicant brought a claim against the CARDINAL identified companies under LAW DATE ( “ the DATE LAW ) on the ground that they had unlawfully refused to offer him employment because of his trade union activities and/or membership .

Both respondent companies submitted , inter alia , that the claim was brought out of time as LAW required all claims to be brought within DATE of the relevant incident , unless the limit was extended by ORG .

The application was heard on DATE . At the hearing the respondents raised a further argument : that section CARDINAL of the DATE Act had only come into force on DATE and , as such , the actions complained of had not been unlawful at the material time . The applicant ’s representative conceded the point and the claim was struck out on that basis . The applicant was ordered to make a contribution towards the respondents’ costs of ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL .

On DATE the applicant sought leave to appeal against the order to ORG ( “ EAT ” ) . In the application he alleged that there had been a violation of his rights under LAW .

The application for leave to appeal was refused on the papers on CARDINAL DATE . The judge held that :

“ The argument in LAW was not raised before ORG and can not therefore be raised on appeal .

In any event , the failure [ if it be that ] on the part of the Government to legislate to give effect to an LAW right could not give the [ applicant ] a cause of action against the Respondent . ”

The applicant did not pursue any further appeal , although the possibility did exist for a further oral hearing under Rule CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) of the EAT Rules .

Limited protection was first introduced under LAW DATE which made it unlawful to refuse a person employment on the grounds of their membership of a trade union . This provision was consolidated in ORG DATE ( “ the DATE LAW ) , the relevant provisions of which came into force on DATE .

Under section CARDINAL of the DATE Act it is unlawful to refuse a person employment for reasons related to the fact that he or she is a member of a trade union . Pursuant to subsection ( CARDINAL ) any person who alleges that he or she was unlawfully refused employment can complain to an ORG . Section CARDINAL of the DATE Act allows ORG to order such a remedy as it considers “ just and equitable ” , including the payment of compensation or a recommendation to the respondent employer .

Under section CARDINAL of the DATE Act a complaint under section CARDINAL must be presented to ORG before DATE from the date of the conduct to which the complaint relates . The ORG has a power under subsection ( CARDINAL ) to extend the period by any further period that it considers reasonable . This power may be exercised where the ORG is satisfied that it was not “ reasonably practicable ” for the claimant to present the complaint before the end of the DATE period .

Pursuant to section CARDINAL of LAW , a person can bring proceedings against a public authority for acting incompatibly with a Convention right . However , such proceedings can not be brought in ORG . Moreover , the ORG does not have jurisdiction to make a declaration of incompatibility under LAW . Nevertheless , pursuant to section CARDINAL of LAW the Tribunal is required “ so far as possible ” to read and give effect to primary legislation in a way which is compatible with Convention rights . Furthermore , it is required to take into account any judgment , decision or opinion of the ORG insofar as it is relevant to the proceedings when determining a question which has arisen in connection with a LAW right ( section CARDINAL of LAW ) , and it is unlawful for the ORG , as a public authority , to “ act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right ” ( section CARDINAL of LAW ) .


Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 37-1 - Striking out applications);Violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Right to free elections-{general} (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Stand for election);Violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The applicant was nominated by the coalition of ORG and PERSON parties to stand as a candidate in the parliamentary elections of CARDINAL DATE and applied for registration as a candidate in the singlemandate ORG No . DATE .

As LAW required that each nomination as a candidate for parliamentary elections be supported by a minimum of CARDINAL voters , on CARDINAL DATE the applicant submitted to ORG ( “ the ConEC ” ) CARDINAL signature sheets containing CARDINAL voter signatures collected in support of his candidacy .

Before the DATE ’s decision on the question of the applicant ’s registration as a candidate , the accuracy of the signature sheets and other registration documents submitted by the applicant were to be first examined by a special working group ( işçi qrupu ) established by the ConEC . Although the applicant had requested to be present during the process of the examination by the working group , this took place without him .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE the ConEC refused the applicant ’s request for registration as a candidate . The NORP found that , according to the opinion of the working group , a number of submitted supporting signatures were invalid , and that the remaining valid signatures numbered CARDINAL . In particular , CARDINAL of the CARDINAL signatures had been examined , and it was found that CARDINAL of those signatures were invalid .

The following reasons were given in the PERSON working group ’s examination record dated DATE : ( a ) CARDINAL signatures were “ repeat signatures ” ; ( b ) CARDINAL signatures were invalid because there were uncertified corrections of them on the signature sheets ; ( c ) CARDINAL signatures were invalid owing to incorrect personal information provided concerning those voters ; ( d ) one signature was invalid because it was on the wrong line ; ( e ) CARDINAL signatures were not authentic because they had been made repeatedly by the same individuals who had already signed the signature sheets ; and ( f ) CARDINAL signatures were invalid for “ other ” ( unspecified ) reasons .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) against the PERSON decision to refuse registration . He complained , inter alia , of the following :

( a ) CARDINAL signatures were deemed invalid on the basis of a mere visual examination , without any additional adequate investigation ;

( b ) the members of the ConEC working group were not real experts . The head of the working group was a school gym teacher , while CARDINAL other members were an employee of a statistics committee and an employee of the passports department of a local police office ;

( c ) there was no explanation as to what constituted “ other ” reasons for declaring CARDINAL of the signatures invalid ;

( d ) NORP contrary to the requirements of LAW , the applicant had not been invited to participate in the process of examination of the signature sheets by the ConEC working group , and thus had been deprived of the right to give the necessary explanations to the experts ;

( e ) NORP contrary to the requirements of LAW , he had not been provided with a copy of the results of the examination of the signature sheets CARDINAL prior to the PERSON meeting to decide on the applicant ’s registration ;

( f ) the applicant ’s presence at the PERSON meeting of DATE had not been ensured .

Enclosed with his complaint to the ORG , the applicant submitted written statements by CARDINAL voters whose signatures had been declared invalid , affirming the authenticity of their signatures . However , according to the applicant , those statements were not taken into consideration by the ORG .

The ORG conducted another examination of the signature sheets using members of its own working group . The applicant was not invited to participate in this process . According to the working group ’s findings , a total of CARDINAL signatures were considered to be invalid . It appears that CARDINAL of those were considered inauthentic because they had allegedly been made repeatedly by the same persons in the name of other persons , and CARDINAL were found to be invalid owing to the voters’ incorrect personal information .

The applicant was not invited to the ORG meeting dealing with his complaint against the PERSON decision of DATE .

By a decision of DATE the ORG dismissed the applicant ’s complaint and upheld the ConEC decision of DATE . It found that , on the basis of the findings of the ORG ’s own working group , CARDINAL out of CARDINAL signatures submitted by the applicant were invalid and that the remaining CARDINAL valid signatures were below the minimum number required by law .

The applicant was given copies of the ORG decision and the working group opinion on DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged an appeal against the ORG decision with ORG . He reiterated his complaints made before the ORG concerning the PERSON decision and procedures . Moreover , he raised , inter alia , the following complaints :

( a ) NORP contrary to the requirements of the electoral law , the ORG had failed to notify him of its meetings and to ensure his presence during the examination of the signature sheets and the examination of his complaint ;

( b ) the ORG had ignored the written statements by CARDINAL voters confirming the authenticity of their signatures and had failed to take them into account ; and

( c ) the ORG had failed to provide any reasoning and had not addressed any of the applicant ’s arguments in its decision .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal . The court dismissed the applicant ’s arguments as irrelevant or unsubstantiated , and found that there were no grounds for quashing the ORG ’s decision .

On DATE the applicant lodged a further appeal with ORG , reiterating his previous complaints and arguing that ORG had not carried out a fair examination of the case and had delivered an unreasoned judgment .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal as unsubstantiated , without examining his arguments in detail and finding no grounds for doubting the findings of the electoral commissions and ORG .

In addition to the applicant in the present case , at the material time the applicant ’s representative Mr PERSON was representing twentyseven other applicants in cases concerning the DATE parliamentary elections and a number of applicants in other cases before the ORG . Mr GPE has also lodged an application on his own behalf in a case relating to the DATE elections ( application no . CARDINAL ) .

In DATE the prosecution authorities launched an investigation into the activities of a number of NGOs , including ORG , an NGO headed by Mr PERSON .

On DATE ORG issued a search warrant authorising the search of Mr PERSON ’s office in ORG and seizure of “ legal , financial , accounting and banking documents , letters and contracts , reports on execution of grant contracts and tax documents relating to [ the organisation ’s ] establishment , structure , functioning , membership registration , receipt of grants and other financial aid , and allocation of granted funds , as well as computers , disks , ORG keys and other electronic devices storing relevant information ... ”

On DATE Mr PERSON was arrested after questioning by an investigator of ORG in connection with the criminal proceedings instituted against him under Articles CARDINAL ( illegal entrepreneurship ) , CARDINAL ( large - scale tax evasion ) and CARDINAL ( abuse of power ) of LAW . On DATE , ORG ordered his detention pending trial . He remains in detention while the criminal proceedings against him are pending . The circumstances relating to Mr PERSON ’s arrest and detention are the subject of a separate application brought by him before the ORG ( application no . CARDINAL ) .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the investigation authorities conducted a search of Mr PERSON ’s home and office pursuant to ORG search warrant of CARDINAL DATE , seizing , inter alia , a large number of documents from his office , including all the case files relating to the pending proceedings before the ORG , which were in Mr PERSON ’s possession and which concerned over CARDINAL applications in total . The file relating to the present case , which , it appears , included copies of all the documents and correspondence between the ORG and the parties , was also seized in its entirety . No adequate inventory of the seized document files relating to the ORG proceedings was made in the search and seizure records of CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE .

On an unspecified date Mr PERSON lodged a complaint with ORG , claiming that the search had been unlawful . He complained that the investigator had failed to register each seized document as required by the relevant law and had taken the documents without making an inventory . He further complained about the seizure of the documents and files relating to the ongoing court proceedings before the ORG and the domestic courts .

On DATE ORG dismissed PERSON PERSON ’s claim . It held that the searches had been conducted in accordance with the relevant law . As to the seizure of the documents relating to the cases pending before the ORG and the domestic court , it found that they could not be returned to the applicant at this stage of the proceedings . Following an appeal , on DATE ORG upheld the first - instance court ’s decision of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the investigation authorities returned a number of the case files concerning the applications lodged before the ORG , including the file relating to the present case , to Mr PERSON ’s lawyer . The investigator ’s relevant decision specified that “ since it has been established that among documents seized on CARDINAL and CARDINAL DATE there were files concerning applications by a number of individuals and organisations lodged with ORG , which have no relation to the substance of the criminal proceedings [ against Mr PERSON ] , [ those files ] have been delivered to [ Mr PERSON ’s lawyer ] Mr PERSON ” .


Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Prohibition of torture);Respondent State to take measures of a general character (Article 46 - Pilot judgment;Systemic problem;General measures);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Helen Keller;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Nebojša Vučinić;Robert Spano

The applicants were born in DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE , DATE and DATE , respectively . When introducing the applications , they were detained in prisons in GPE , PERSON , GPE , PERSON , PERSON and GPE , respectively .

On DATE the NORP prisons accommodated altogether CARDINAL inmates ( that is , an overcrowding rate of PERCENT ) , out of which CARDINAL people were in pre - trial detention .

Mr PERSON was held at FAC which , he claimed , was severely overcrowded at the time of his detention lasting from CARDINAL January to CARDINAL DATE . In particular , the cell in which he was detained measured QUANTITY and accommodated CARDINAL prisoners ( that is , QUANTITY gross living space per inmate ) . The quality and quantity of the food provided were poor , as a result of which he claimed to have lost QUANTITY .

From DATE he was kept in solitary confinement for DATE as a disciplinary measure . He submitted that he was kept in a cell of QUANTITY and in poor sanitary conditions , without adequate running water . This led to problems of hygiene and a skin infection , for which he did not receive adequate treatment . Throughout this confinement he had outdoor stays of TIME a day .

Mr PERSON was held from DATE until an unspecified date in DATE at ORG in a cell that measured QUANTITY and accommodated CARDINAL inmates including him ( that is , QUANTITY gross living space per inmate ) . As of DATE , he was transferred to PERSON Prison where he has been held in a cell measuring QUANTITY and housing CARDINAL inmates including him ( that is , QUANTITY gross living space per inmate ) . He claimed that at the latter facility there was no ventilation and the toilet was only separated from the living area by a curtain , offering insufficient privacy .

Mr PERSON was placed in pre - trial detention on DATE . On DATE he was transferred to ORG where he was held until DATE in a cell of QUANTITY together with CARDINAL other detainees ( that is , QUANTITY gross living space per inmate ) . Only a curtain was used as a partition between the toilet and the living area .

He was subsequently transferred to ORG ( FAC ) where the cell in which he was held DATE and DATE was QUANTITY in size ; he shared it with CARDINAL other inmates ( that is , QUANTITY gross living space per inmate ) .

Since DATE he has been detained with CARDINAL other detainees in a cell measuring QUANTITY ( that is , QUANTITY gross living space per inmate ) . He claimed that the toilet is separated only by a curtain from the living area . The bed linen is changed only once every DATE .

The applicant started to serve his prison sentence in DATE at FAC . He shared his cell with CARDINAL to QUANTITY inmates and the surface available was QUANTITY ( that is , a maximum of QUANTITY gross living space per inmate ) .

On DATE he was transferred to FAC where his cell measures QUANTITY and is occupied by him and another man ( that is , QUANTITY gross living space per inmate ) .

On DATE Mr Fakó was placed in pre - trial detention at ORG ( PERSON GPE ) . On DATE he was transferred to FAC , where he shared a cell with CARDINAL other inmates . Without specifying the size of the cell , he submitted that the gross living space per person varied CARDINAL QUANTITY .

He had a DATE TIME - long outdoor exercise and spent the remainder of his time in the cell . He submitted that in DATE the summer temperature in the cell rose to CARDINAL˚C because of poor ventilation . He asserted that he was allowed to take a shower once a week for no longer than TIME each time . Furthermore , the cell was infected with bed bugs , lice and cockroaches , but the prison administration did not address this issue .

From DATE Mr GPE has served his sentence at FAC . Throughout his detention he has been held in CARDINAL different cells . The size of those cells was CARDINAL and QUANTITY , respectively . The occupancy rate in the cells measuring QUANTITY was often CARDINAL persons ( that is , QUANTITY gross living space per inmate ) . In the cells of QUANTITY the occupancy rate was CARDINAL persons ( that is , QUANTITY gross living space per inmate ) . In the cells measuring QUANTITY it was often up to QUANTITY persons ( that is , QUANTITY gross living space per inmate ) .

The applicant claimed that the toilets in those cells had been separated from the living space DATE , and their ventilation remained unresolved . Furthermore , some of the bunk beds had been welded together , so detainees were obliged to sleep right next to each other .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Helena Jäderblom

The applicants , who are husband and wife , were born in DATE and DATE , respectively , and live in LOC , GPE .

In DATE the applicants emigrated from the GPE to GPE and obtained NORP nationality . Before emigrating , they were receiving old - age pensions from the NORP authorities . Once the applicants left the GPE , the payments were discontinued in accordance with the GPE pension law in force at the material time .

On DATE the applicants brought civil proceedings against the competent regional department of ORG of GPE ( Пенсионный Фонд Российской PERSON ) ( hereinafter “ the ORG ” ) seeking reinstatement of their right to the pension payments .

On DATE ORG of GPE found in the ORG favour and ordered ORG to set up DATE pension payments backdated to DATE .

On DATE ORG upheld the judgment on appeal and it became binding and enforceable .

On DATE ORG lodged an application for supervisory review , seeking to have the judgments quashed . The application was addressed to the President of ORG .

On DATE a judge of ORG requested the case file from ORG and subsequently suspended enforcement of the judgment of DATE .

On DATE another judge of ORG sent the case for supervisory review to ORG .

On DATE ORG dismissed the supervisory review application and endorsed the judgment of DATE , as upheld on DATE .

On DATE ORG lodged another application for supervisory review , again addressed to the President of ORG .

On DATE a judge of ORG sent the case for supervisory review by ORG of ORG .

On DATE ORG quashed the judgment of DATE , as upheld on DATE , and rejected the ORG claims .


Violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 - Freedom of movement-{general} (Article 2 para. 2 of Protocol No. 4 - Freedom to leave a country)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

On DATE ORG , GPE ( “ the ORG ” ) , awarded MONEY to ORG , to be paid by the applicant . The judgment of CARDINAL DATE entered into force on DATE .

On DATE ORG issued a writ of execution .

By a ruling of DATE a bailiff with the ORG service , GPE ( “ the bailiff ” ) , initiated enforcement proceedings . The applicant was invited to voluntarily comply with the judgment debt within DATE of the date on which he received a copy of that ruling .

On DATE the bailiff issued a ruling restricting the applicant ’s right to leave the country for a period of DATE on the grounds that the judgment creditor had asked for such a restriction to be imposed on the applicant . The ruling was based on the DATE LAW ( sections CARDINAL , DATE , DATE , DATE , CARDINAL and DATE ) and the DATE LAW on Leaving and Entering the Russian Federation ( Procedures ) ( section CARDINAL ) ) .

On DATE the bailiffs’ service sent copies of the rulings of DATE to the applicant . The applicant only received them on DATE .

NORP The applicant , not having been aware until DATE of the travel restriction imposed on him , decided to visit his DATE daughter , who lived in GPE . However , on DATE , the applicant was stopped by border guards as he was attempting to board a plane .

On DATE , after having received copies of the rulings of CARDINAL DATE , the applicant paid the judgment debt .

On DATE the applicant complained to the Chief Bailiff of GPE about the actions of the bailiff . He submitted that the bailiff had sent him copies of the rulings of DATE only after the expiry of statutory time - limits . Furthermore , the bailiff had imposed the travel ban on him on DATE as that on which the enforcement proceedings had been initiated . This indicated that the bailiff had not had at his disposal any information as to whether he ( the applicant ) had been evading voluntary compliance with the writ of execution .

On DATE the bailiffs’ service lifted the travel restriction and terminated the enforcement proceedings .

On DATE the Deputy Chief Bailiff of GPE examined the applicant ’s complaint of DATE . He acknowledged that the rulings of CARDINAL DATE had been sent to the applicant outside the statutory timelimits and allowed the applicant ’s complaint in that part . However , he found , with reference to CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of the DATE LAW , that the travel ban had been imposed on the applicant in accordance with law .

On DATE the applicant challenged in court the bailiff ’s ruling of DATE imposing a travel ban on him . He submitted that the ruling had not been duly reasoned since he had never evaded the obligations imposed on him by the judgment of CARDINAL DATE . Furthermore , in breach of statutory requirements , he had not been duly informed of the travel restriction imposed on him since he had only received the bailiff ’s ruling on DATE .

On DATE ORG examined and dismissed the applicant ’s complaint . ORG held , in particular , that the bailiffs had imposed the travel restriction on the applicant under LAW , which allows the imposition of such a restriction ( upon the request of a judgment creditor ) before the expiry of the time - limit set for voluntary payment of the judgment debt .

In his appeal against the judgment of CARDINAL DATE , the applicant submitted that ORG , in taking its decision , had not applied section CARDINAL of the DATE LAW on Leaving and Entering the Russian Federation ( Procedures ) , which provided that the right of a NORP citizen to leave GPE could be temporarily restricted only when it had been established that he or she had evaded obligations imposed on him or her by a court .

On DATE ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) upheld the judgment of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE the applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the ORG of ORG .

On DATE a judge of ORG refused to refer the applicant ’s cassation appeal to the cassation court .

On DATE ORG refused to accept for examination the applicant ’s complaint concerning whether section CARDINAL ) and section GPE ) of the DATE LAW were compatible with LAW ( Ruling no . PERSON ) .

NORP In particular , ORG held that section GPE ) of that Act could not be applied in the course of enforcement proceedings independently from the general provisions on the application of temporary travel restrictions set out in section CARDINAL(CARDINAL ) and in the absence of confirmation that the debtor had been notified of the enforcement proceedings instituted in respect of him and of his obligation to voluntarily comply with the writ of execution within the time - limit set by the bailiffs’ service . The bailiffs’ service was entitled to impose travel restrictions only in cases in which the debtor had not complied with the writ of execution within the statutory fiveday period , running from the date on which the debtor received the decision to initiate enforcement proceedings .

Having regard to the above , ORG concluded that the closely linked provisions of section CARDINAL ) and section GPE ) of the DATE LAW did not provide for the possibility that the bailiffs’ service could grant the judgment creditor ’s request for the imposition of a travel ban on the debtor at the same time as it took the decision to initiate enforcement proceedings ( that is to say , before the expiry of the deadline set for voluntarily enforcement of the writ of execution ) and also before it received confirmation that the debtor had been aware of the enforcement proceedings initiated in his respect and had evaded voluntary compliance with the writ of execution . Therefore , the legal provisions challenged by the applicant could not be regarded as having breached the applicant ’s constitutional rights .

Following the Constitutional Court ’s decision the applicant lodged a request with ORG for it to review its judgment of CARDINAL DATE under the procedure for re - opening of cases due to new circumstances .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s request , having found that the provisions referred to by the applicant had not been declared incompatible with the LAW by ORG and that the interpretation by LAW of those provisions could not be considered as constituting new circumstances .

On DATE ORG upheld that decision .

On DATE a single judge of ORG declined to refer the applicant ’s cassation appeal for consideration by ORG .

On DATE a single judge of ORG of the Russian Federation refused to refer the applicant ’s cassation appeal for consideration by ORG .


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Carlo Ranzoni;Egidijus Kūris;Ganna Yudkivska;Marko Bošnjak;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicants were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE .

On DATE GPE sold a plot of forest land measuring QUANTITY to the applicants . The purchase agreement categorised the land as forest .

NORP In DATE a registration certificate was issued for the plot of land . It categorised the land as forest and determined special conditions on use of the plot , namely , that restrictions applied to the use of the whole plot and that there were surface water protection zones .

On an unspecified date , the first applicant asked FAC to establish as a legal fact that there used to be some buildings on the ORG plot . On DATE the ORG established as a legal fact that there used to be some buildings ( a cattle shed and a storehouse ( galvidė ir klojimas ) there . The court noted that the first applicant was the owner of a plot of forest land on which construction of new buildings was prohibited , unless it was a reconstruction of a former residential property . The court found that a former residential property had been situated outside the boundaries of the first applicant ’s plot but held that if the requested legal fact was established , he would be able to reconstruct the buildings previously sited there ( nustačius prašomą faktą , pareiškėjas įgis teisę atstatyti jo valdomame žemės sklype buvusius statinius ) . A representative from the LOC environmental protection department of ORG ( hereinafter “ the PERSON environmental protection department ” ) had no objections to the establishment of the legal fact .

In DATE the first applicant asked the authorities to issue him with the relevant documents necessary for construction . The PERSON environmental protection department stated that the construction of a building had to comply with ORG ; the existing flora had to be preserved and the method of waste collection had to be decided on . The permanent committee on construction of LOC verified the documents submitted by the first applicant and recommended that he be issued with a building permit .

On DATE LOC issued the first applicant with the documents necessary for construction , in accordance with the domestic regulations , in particular with ORG no . DATE ( see paragraph DATE below ) . It was indicated that anyone intending to carry out construction work was required to preserve existing flora , and was not allowed to block the shore of the lake or interfere with the existing landscape .

On DATE GPE issued the first applicant with a permit to build a DATE house ( non - residential building ) . The permit was valid for DATE .

NORP In DATE the plan of the building was specified ( the facades were modified ) and the amendments were verified by the PERSON environmental protection department .

In DATE ORG issued a certificate about the DATE house PERCENT finished and following that , on DATE the house was registered in ORG ) as PERCENT finished .

On DATE ORG received a report via a hotline for allegedly illegal construction work . On DATE the authorities estimated the distance between the house and the lake at QUANTITY , and between the terrace of the house and the lake at QUANTITY .

On DATE the prosecutor ’s office started court proceedings and asked the domestic courts to revoke the recommendation to grant the first applicant building permission ; to annul the building permit and oblige the applicants to demolish the building at the expense of the established guilty parties , that is the applicants , LOC , and the PERSON environmental protection department . The prosecutor claimed that the building permit could not have been issued in accordance with the relevant provisions of domestic law ( see paragraphs CARDINAL , CARDINAL , DATE and DATE below ) .

On DATE ORG dismissed the prosecutor ’s complaint , holding that the legal facts had been established in DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . It had not been until DATE that ORG had held that the sole fact that the storehouses had been sited on a specific plot of land , without any proof that a residential building had been sited there , did not mean that there had previously been a residential property there ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . ORG further held that in accordance with relevant legislation in force at the time , it was possible to construct new residential buildings in the place of former buildings , as well as to reconstruct existing residential buildings and construct necessary storehouses ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Moreover , it had been established that any construction work in the forest could only be started after having received building permission and in accordance with the relevant plans . That legislation had been repealed after ORG had declared that the domestic regulations were in breach of the laws and , by extension , of LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The court thus held that the case - law on construction in the forest had been established after the building permit had been issued to the first applicant . The court further held that the applicants had built the building lawfully , there was no evidence as to any negative consequences of the construction for the environment or the public interest . The court also observed that in the applicants’ case it would be unreasonable and unjust to apply the measure established in LAW to oblige the applicants to demolish the buildings ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . Moreover , the court was not convinced that the environment would be restored to its previous state if the buildings were demolished because the demolition would also cause some environmental damage .

The prosecutor appealed . On DATE ORG allowed the prosecutor ’s appeal . The court held that LOC had established as a legal fact that there used to be a cattle shed and a storehouse on the applicants’ plot of land ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) . A DATE house could not be constructed as it did not fall within the category of buildings that could be constructed in the forest . Even the ORG had emphasised that the construction of new buildings was prohibited on that plot . The building permit had obviously been issued to the first applicant unlawfully and , in the appellate court ’s view , the latter had asked the court to establish a legal fact for the sole purpose of constructing a house . The court also held that neither the PERSON on ORG nor the PERSON on Land provided for any exceptions , so the right to construct buildings on the plot of forest land had never existed . The court thus ordered the first applicant to demolish the buildings at the expense of the applicants , LOC and the PERSON environmental protection department . ORG did not explain how the costs of demolition had to be divided between the CARDINAL parties .

The applicants , LOC and the PERSON environmental protection department lodged an appeal on points of law . The applicants claimed that the appellate court had breached the principle of lex retro non agit by assessing the documents , issued in DATE , in view of the ruling of ORG . They also claimed that the appellate court had breached their legitimate expectations to execute their proprietary interests in accordance with the domestic regulation in force at the time .

On DATE ORG held that relevant laws provided that the only buildings that could be constructed in the forest were timber storehouses and other buildings for forestry equipment . There were no provisions allowing construction of residential or commercial buildings in the forest . It was in certain cases possible to change the purpose of the land , but as the land in question was situated in a surface water protection zone , any such change was prohibited . The court held that although the applicants referred to ORG ( see paragraph DATE below , hereinafter the “ Regulation ” ) , none of the provisions of that Regulation could be interpreted as allowing construction of the buildings in question . There was no argument that the buildings in question had been constructed where farm buildings had previously been sited , thus the provision of the Regulation allowing construction where residential buildings had previously been sited did not allow the applicants to construct a summer house . The court thus held that the construction had been illegal . As regards the removal of the consequences of illegal construction , the court held that it was crucial to assess the consequences of the illegal construction for the environment and the public interest , the consequences of the demolition of the buildings , the possibility of restoring the environment to its state before the illegal construction , and whether the persons who had acquired property rights had acted in good faith . In cases where the construction was in breach of the territorial planning documents and/or the imperative requirements of environmental protection , heritage protection and protection of protected areas , a decision to legalise the illegal construction could not be taken . The court thus had to assess whether the construction in question should have been carried out at the relevant time . It held that legalisation of the buildings in question was impossible and that demolition had to take place ( see paragraphs CARDINAL and CARDINAL below ) . As to the applicants’ argument that the appellate court had breached the principle of legitimate expectations , the court held that the construction in question had been prohibited by the relevant domestic legislation in force at the time . Even if the applicants had misinterpreted the provisions of the ORG , ORG had found the ORG to be inconsistent with the law , and , by extension , with LAW on DATE , DATE after the building permit had been issued to the first applicant . The applicants should therefore have been able to understand the consequences of constructing illegally and to avoid them . Although the authorities were partly responsible for the illegal construction , that fact per se did not mean that all illegal construction had to be legalised in order to protect the legitimate expectations and proprietary interests of the owners . The legal regulation established the responsibility of the authorities for the unlawful issue of the construction permit . As a result , the court upheld the decision of ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On an unspecified date the bailiff asked LOC to explain the order to enforce ORG decision . On DATE ORG dismissed the bailiff ’s request because she had failed to provide specific details as to what required clarification .

It appears that the applicants asked the bailiff to suspend the execution of the judgment and that their request was refused .

On an unspecified date the applicants applied to ORG to overrule the bailiff ’s refusal to suspend the execution of the judgment and to suspend it until the case had been examined at ORG . On DATE ORG held that domestic law did not oblige the bailiff to suspend the execution of judgments if the applicants had lodged an application with ORG . However , LAW provided that there would be grounds for reopening the proceedings if ORG found that a domestic court decision had breached an applicant ’s rights under the Convention or one of its Protocols ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) . The court held that if the national court ’s order to demolish the building was executed , the possibility of reopening the proceedings after a positive outcome for the applicants in ORG would become complicated . On the other hand , if ORG adopted a different decision , the demolition of the buildings would still be possible . The court observed that the applicants’ building did not infringe the rights of third persons as it was sited on a plot of forest land that belonged to the applicants . As a result , ORG suspended the execution of the judgment pending a decision by ORG .

ORG lodged a separate complaint , but on DATE ORG upheld the first - instance decision .


Alvina Gyulumyan;Ján Šikuta;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national , who was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

NORP The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP In DATE the applicant was sentenced to DATE in prison . He served his sentence in various NORP prisons . From DATE to CARDINAL DATE and from CARDINAL DATE to CARDINAL DATE he was detained in ORG .

While in prison the applicant was diagnosed with a behavioural disorder and was regularly prescribed sedatives , neuroleptics and antidepressants .

On DATE the applicant fell asleep during the evening roll - call because of the medication he was taking ( ORG ) . As a result , he was taken to the doctor ’s office , where the nurse ordered him to swallow salt water . He refused to do so and the intervention squad was called in . CARDINAL men wearing balaclavas beat him up and forced him to drink QUANTITY of salt water .

He was then taken to a room for dangerous detainees where his hands were handcuffed and his legs chained to the bed . He could not move , and as he was vomiting , he could not breathe .

He remained in this room all night and was seen in TIME of DATE by a doctor , who ordered prison staff to remove his handcuffs .

During TIME , the applicant noticed blood on his left ear and when he lit a cigarette he saw smoke coming out of his ear . He could not hear with that ear . He sought medical help and was given an appointment with PERSON , an ear , nose and throat specialist . He was then treated for DATE but he did not fully recover hearing in the left ear .

On DATE the applicant fell asleep during the TIME rollcall because he had taken an overdose of antidepressants in an attempted suicide . It was not his first suicide attempt .

Prison staff noted that the applicant was not responsive , informed their superiors and ordered that the applicant be taken to the doctor ’s office . The applicant was not able to move by himself and was helped by CARDINAL cellmates .

The nurse on duty ordered the applicant to drink salt water to make him vomit up the pills he had taken . The applicant refused to drink the water and the intervention squad moved him to the GPE arrival room ( punct primire deţinuţi , “ the LOC ” ) for better supervision .

In TIME of DATE the applicant was seen by PERSON , a psychiatrist , and was then taken back to his cell .

According to an information note of DATE , the director of ORG acknowledged the following entries concerning the applicant in the ORG medical register : on DATE the applicant had received treatment with a saline solution and medical charcoal because of an overdose of tablets , and was kept under supervision TIME . On DATE Dr PERSON , a psychiatrist , noted that the applicant had blood on his left ear . On DATE the applicant was diagnosed with a perforated eardrum . On DATE he received medication and local treatment on his ear , which was repeated on CARDINAL , DATE and DATE .

In the same information note the cause of the applicant ’s perforated eardrum was indicated as unknown , and the possibility that he had selfharmed by inserting an object in his ear was suggested .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with the judge responsible for the execution of sentences in LOC . He complained that he had been beaten up by the intervention squad in LOC , and that he had been handcuffed and forced to drink salt water . On DATE , the judge referred the complaint to ORG for investigation . The judge ’s decision was upheld by ORG on DATE .

On DATE and CARDINAL DATE the applicant lodged similar complaints with ORG attached to ORG ( “ the prosecutor ’s office ” ) . He also alleged that due to that incident he had lost the hearing in his left ear as well as sight and smell .

On DATE the prosecutor ’s office decided not to prosecute , on the ground that the matters alleged did not constitute criminal offences .

On the basis of disciplinary reports on the applicant , his prison medical file , and statements by his cellmates , the prosecutor found that the applicant was dependent on ORG , a medication prescribed for his psychiatric condition . With regard to the DATE incident , the prosecutor held that he had been somnolent because of a pill overdose , had not responded to the TIME roll - call and had been taken to the medical wing , where :

“ ... the nurse on duty requested the applicant to drink salt water to make him vomit and to facilitate the elimination of the pills . As the applicant refused , the intervention squad was called to the medical wing and they took the applicant to the ORG room [ see paragraph CARDINAL above ] where they immobilised and handcuffed him and made him swallow salt water to eliminate the harmful substance . ”

The prosecutor also relied on an expert report issued by ORG ( “ INML ” ) on DATE . The report found that drinking a large quantity of salt water could not cause eardrum perforation or sensory loss . The report also established that in cases of intoxication with tranquillisers and sedatives evacuation of the gastric matter by water ingestion and induced vomiting was necessary if the patient was conscious . The prosecutor also held that on DATE the applicant refused to be examined by forensic experts .

NORP The prosecutor concluded that the nurse on duty had acted in accordance with the usual medical procedures in cases of medicine intoxication . With regard to the members of the intervention squad , the prosecutor found that because of the applicant ’s refusal to be examined there was no clear evidence of a causal link between the DATE incident and his sensory loss . The prosecutor held in particular that the members of the intervention squad had used force against the applicant and had forced him to drink salt water , but that their actions had been authorised by PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , since they had been seeking to save his life and preserve his physical integrity .

On DATE the general prosecutor confirmed the decision not to prosecute .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint against this decision with ORG , arguing that the investigation had been unprofessional and partial . He claimed that medical procedures had not been followed during the DATE incident , since he had not been intubated by a doctor but rather forced to drink salt water by masked members of the intervention squad . He also claimed that his handcuffing during the incident lacked a legal basis , since PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL was not in force at the time of the events .

He described the DATE incident as follows :

“ After I was handcuffed , CARDINAL of the CARDINAL masked men stood beside me holding on to my hands ; the third pressed the bottom of my ears with his fingers so that I opened my mouth ; the fourth bent my head back poured the contents of a QUANTITY bottle of water into my mouth , and held my mouth and nose closed with his hands ... this was repeated several times , for TIME ... ”

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s complaint , on the grounds that the authorities had given plausible explanations of his injuries and in particular that it had been necessary to immobilise him with handcuffs for his own protection . Relying on the ORG v. GPE case ( DATE , Series A no . CARDINAL ) , ORG found that such a measure was authorised by the case - law of ORG , which was directly applicable .

The applicant appealed . On DATE ORG allowed his appeal and quashed the ORG ’s office for further investigation .

ORG also held that the applicant had not refused to undergo a medical examination , and criticised the INML report of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) on the ground that it had ignored the applicant ’s allegations that his eardrum had been perforated because he had been beaten up by members of the intervention squad .

On DATE the prosecutor ’s office referred the case to ORG , ORG ( “ the police ” ) and indicated that the applicant ’s cellmates , the members of the intervention squad involved and the medical staff concerned should be identified and statements taken from them , and that the applicant should undergo a medical examination .

On DATE , the prosecutor ’s office asked the INML to issue an expert report in the case . In particular , they asked the INML to determine whether ingestion of a large quantity of water could lead to loss of hearing , sight and smell , and what the standard procedures and treatments were in cases of ingestion of a large quantity of pills .

In DATE and DATE the police took a statement from the nurse in PERSON , PERSON , members of the intervention squad , and other prison staff who had been on duty at the time of the events . The nurse acknowledged that the applicant had refused to drink the saline solution and denied that he had been forced to do so . PERSON declared that she had noticed blood on the applicant ’s left ear on DATE but that he had not complained at that time that he had been attacked . The members of the intervention squad and the prison staff denied that the applicant had been subjected to ill - treatment .

On DATE the applicant was examined by experts from the INML .

On DATE INML issued their expert report based on their first report of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) , the applicant ’s medical file , various other medical documents and the applicant ’s examination . They found that the applicant ’s loss of hearing and smell had not been documented by objective medical tests . With regard to the perforation of the eardrum , they dismissed that possibility on the ground that the applicant had not remained scarred . They also held that ingestion of warm salt water was a traditional treatment that was recommended during TIME following ingestion of toxic substances .

On DATE the police referred the case back to the prosecutor ’s office and advised against prosecution . The police assessed the circumstances as the same as those in the prosecutor ’s decision of DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

Relying further on PERSON no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , the police found that the intervention squad had handcuffed the applicant and forced him to drink salt water , but had done so in order to save his life . The police also found that the applicant had abused his petition rights , that he had made numerous complaints with the purpose of “ having fun and keeping busy ” ( “ recreere şi ocupare a timpului liber ” ) and “ spending time elsewhere ... than in prison ” ( “ să - şi petreacă timpul şi în alte locuri ... decât în interiorul penitenciarului ” ) . The police concluded that he had shown a provocative attitude , that he had delayed the investigation by his actions , and that his intention was to create arguments for a possible case against ORG before ORG .

During the domestic proceedings , the applicant applied to various authorities seeking a speedy resolution of his case . In letters addressed to the prosecutor ’s office on DATE and DATE the applicant particularly drew the prosecutor ’s attention to the fact that due to its excessive duration the prosecution could become statute - barred .

The domestic proceedings are still pending .

The relevant provisions of the Criminal Code concerning illtreatment by agents of the ORG are described in GPE v. GPE ( ( dec . ) , no . MONEY , DATE ) .

The Criminal Code sets out in LAW the time - limits by which criminal responsibility for various offences becomes statute - barred . These time - limits vary : DATE for torture and similar offences , and DATE for offences such as abusive conduct , negligence at work or ill - treatment .

LAW does not set up a time limit for lodging a criminal complaint ( plângere penală ) before the domestic authorities ( Article CARDINAL ) .

The findings of ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) with regard to the NORP prison authorities’ practice of employing special intervention units are described in PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , § DATE , CARDINAL DATE ) . The ORG particularly found during its visits to several NORP prisons in DATE that special intervention units wearing masks were dispatched to surveillance departments in order to control violent and/or unmanageable and rebellious detainees . The ORG recommended that the NORP authorities remind the members of the special intervention units that all forms of ill - treatment against detainees are unacceptable and are to be severely sanctioned , and that the use of force to control violent and/or recalcitrant prisoners must be limited to occasions when it is strictly necessary .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

NORP In CARDINAL final judgments of CARDINAL DATE and DATE ORG awarded the applicant pecuniary damages in respect of breach of contract for construction works which she had carried out . The awarded damages comprised ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL for the principal amount , plus ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL in default interest and ORG CARDINAL,CARDINAL in costs and expenses , or a total amount of ORG , the equivalent to MONEY ( ORG ) . The damages were awarded to the applicant against ORG and Science ( “ FAC , a ORG body subsidised by ORG and ORG and exercising certain functions delegated by ORG ) .

By an order of CARDINAL DATE the Minister of ORG closed down the ORG and ordered that its remaining property be managed by ORG . ORG then established a ORG - owned jointstock company with part of the ORG ’s property , including the real estate in which the applicant had carried out the construction works .

On CARDINAL DATE and DATE the applicant was issued with CARDINAL writs of enforcement for the amounts awarded in the final judgments of DATE and DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) and on DATE she presented the writs to ORG asking it to pay .

The ORG replied in writing that it was not the successor to the ORG and did not owe payment to the applicant . In DATE the applicant reiterated her request but received a similar reply by ORG . ORG also pointed out that payment could not be sought from the ORG - owned joint - stock company either as it had a legal personality separate from that of the ORG . By a letter of DATE , the Minister provided a similar explanation to the applicant .

The applicant brought judicial review proceedings challenging the Minister ’s refusal . In a final decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG rejected the appeal as inadmissible .

As of DATE , the date of the applicant ’s last communication to the ORG , no change in the above circumstances had been reported .