Violation of Article 14+P1-1-1 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property;Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Carlo Ranzoni;Erik Møse;Mārtiņš Mits;Yonko Grozev

The first applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE and the second applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The first applicant is the natural son of PERSON , who recognised paternity DATE after his birth . The first applicant had a personal relationship with his father and worked in his business . The father died on DATE .

On DATE the first applicant applied for a certificate of inheritance attesting that he was entitled to PERCENT of the estate .

On DATE the GPE ORG granted the certificate , upon which the first applicant took the estate into his possession and disposed of it . However , on DATE ORG withdrew the certificate , stating that the first applicant , being a child born outside marriage , was not Mr H. ’s statutory heir . The first applicant appealed against that decision , but on DATE ORG upheld it .

On DATE the first applicant again applied for a certificate of inheritance stating that he was entitled to PERCENT of PERSON estate , referring in particular to ORG in the case of PERSON v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL , CARDINAL DATE ) .

In a decision of CARDINAL DATE the GPE ORG dismissed the first applicant ’s application , holding that the judgment in PERSON ( cited above ) was not applicable to his case . Instead , it granted certificates of partial inheritance to the first applicant ’s CARDINAL - sister and to the grandchildren of the deceased ’s wife .

On DATE the first applicant appealed to ORG , arguing that under LAW of LAW , which states that children born outside marriage must be provided by legislation with the same opportunities as are enjoyed by children born within marriage , there were no reasons he should be treated differently from children born within marriage . He stated that if he was refused the certificate the NORP ORG would be liable for compensation claims .

NORP In a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG upheld ORG decision , holding that the first applicant was not a statutory heir . ORG referred to a decision by ORG of DATE , in which section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of the Children Born outside ORG had been found to be in conformity with LAW . The principles developed in PERSON ( cited above ) were not applicable to the present case . There was a need to protect the legitimate expectations of the deceased and other heirs . ORG also considered that an interpretation of the relevant provision of the Children Born outside Marriage ( Legal Status ) Act in conformity with the case - law of ORG was not possible as the domestic law was clear and therefore not open to any interpretation .

On DATE the first applicant appealed to ORG , arguing that the application of the first sentence of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of the Children Born outside Marriage ( Legal Status ) Act would discriminate against him and breach his inheritance rights and therefore violate his right to equality before the law under LAW and his rights under LAW . The first applicant stressed that ORG reasoning disregarded the ORG ’s judgment in PERSON ( cited above ) and was therefore unlawful . The first applicant further noted that he had maintained a close relationship with his father until the latter ’s death and had even worked in his business . The first applicant ’s father had assumed that the first applicant would be his sole heir .

In a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed the first applicant ’s appeal on the grounds that it was bound by the decisions of ORG and that it had found that the first sentence of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of the Children Born outside Marriage ( Legal Status ) Act was in conformity with LAW . ORG judgment in PERSON ( cited above ) did not require a change of position because NORP courts were not bound by the decisions of that court . ORG added that interpreting domestic law in the light of the Convention was restricted when domestic law was clear and therefore not open to interpretation . That was the case with the first sentence of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of the Children Born outside Marriage ( Legal Status ) Act . ORG of Appeal further noted that the first applicant ’s appeal had been an appeal on points of law only . The first applicant ’s argument , therefore , that he had had a close relationship with his father , which was a statement of fact , could not be taken into account when deciding on the appeal because it had been submitted for the first time before ORG .

The second applicant is the natural son of a Mr B. and was born in the former GPE , where he lived until his flight from the country in DATE . In DATE Mr B. was ordered by the GPE - Blankensee ORG to pay maintenance for the applicant . He met his father on CARDINAL occasions , but was asked by the latter not to get involved in the lives of his wife and daughter . The father died on DATE , naming his daughter as sole heir in his will .

NORP In DATE , after ORG had issued its judgment in PERSON ( cited above ) , the second applicant brought an action for a compulsory portion of the deceased ’s estate ( Plichtteilsklage ) with ORG .

On DATE ORG dismissed the second applicant ’s claim , holding that under the first sentence of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of the Children Born outside Marriage ( Legal Status ) Act the second applicant was not a statutory heir . That provision was in conformity with LAW . ORG referred to ORG judgment of DATE . It noted that PERSON ( cited above ) was not applicable to the case at hand because there had been no regular contact between the second applicant and his father , the deceased had a natural daughter and the second applicant had not lived in the former GPE for most of his life .

The second applicant appealed to ORG , arguing that ORG in PERSON ( cited above ) obliged the NORP courts to grant children born outside marriage the same inheritance rights as those born within marriage . The special circumstances of PERSON ( cited above ) , which were referred to by ORG , were not conditions that had to be present in order to apply the principles laid down in that judgment .

In a decision of DATE ORG upheld ORG decision , endorsing its reasoning . It referred to ORG case - law , arguing that there was a need to protect the legitimate expectations of the deceased .

The second applicant appealed to ORG , which confirmed ORG reasoning in a decision on DATE . ORG argued that neither the old nor the amended first sentence of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of the Children Born outside Marriage ( Legal Status ) Act discriminated against children born outside marriage before DATE because the difference in treatment was based on legitimate grounds . Regarding the amended first sentence of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of the Children Born outside Marriage ( Legal Status ) Act , expanding the retroactive scope of the reform beyond the one adopted was not necessary as the basic principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations had to be respected . Those principles were also necessarily inherent in the LAW , meaning that even though the inheritance rights of children born outside marriage fell within the scope of the protection of LAW , a ORG was dispensed from reopening legal acts or reviewing situations that pre - dated the delivery of a court judgment . ORG also noted that the facts at issue did not fall within the ambit of Article CARDINAL or that of LAW .

On DATE the first applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with ORG . He claimed discrimination and therefore a violation of LAW by applying the first sentence of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of the Children Born outside Marriage ( Legal Status ) Act because there were no reasons why children born outside marriage should be treated differently from those born within marriage . The case - law of ORG , which considered that provision to be valid , disregarded ORG in PERSON ( cited above ) and was therefore unlawful . That led to a violation of LAW .

The second applicant also lodged a constitutional complaint with ORG . Relying on the judgment in PERSON ( cited above ) , he complained that the application of the amended version of the first sentence of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of the Children Born outside Marriage ( Legal Status ) Act discriminated against him compared to children born within marriage . As a consequence he had been denied his inheritance rights .

In a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed both applicants’ constitutional complaints ( file FAC . CARDINAL BvR CARDINAL/CARDINAL and CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) .

ORG noted that the judgment in PERSON ( cited above ) had led the NORP legislature to pass LAW of DATE ( Zweites Gesetz zur erbrechtlichen GPE nichtehelicher Kinder ) . The first sentence of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of the Children Born outside Marriage ( Legal Status ) Act of DATE had been changed retroactively , with the effect that the difference between children born outside marriage before and after DATE had been set aside in cases of successions after CARDINAL DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) .

Even though the first applicant ’s claim of a close relationship with his father had only been made for the first time in his appeal to ORG , ORG noted that that statement of fact was not relevant for the issue before it . It declared both applicants’ constitutional complaints admissible .

The Federal Constitutional Court confirmed the conformity of the amended first sentence of section CARDINAL(CARDINAL)(CARDINAL ) of the Children Born outside Marriage ( Legal Status ) Act with LAW . It reiterated that the cases at hand only needed to be examined under LAW of LAW and not under LAW , which contained the right to protection of property . The difference between children born outside marriage before and after DATE had been abolished by LAW of DATE . The general discrimination against children born before and after that date therefore no longer existed . The time - limit in the new provision was not linked to personal characteristics but to a coincidental external event ( zufälliges , von außen kommendes LOC ) . Any discriminatory treatment was therefore of a lesser degree .

Making the reform retroactive was not necessary as the conformity of the relevant provision of the Children Born outside Marriage ( Legal Status ) Act had been repeatedly confirmed by ORG . The PERSON case ( cited above ) had not changed that position because ORG had clarified in ORG v. GPE ( DATE , Series A no . CARDINAL ) that the principle of legal certainty , which was necessarily inherent in the law of the Convention as in NORP Law , dispensed a ORG from reopening legal acts or reviewing situations that predated the delivery of a judgment by ORG .

ORG concluded that the domestic courts in the proceedings at issue had interpreted the relevant provision in accordance with LAW . ORG Human Rights’ judgment in PERSON ( cited above ) did not necessitate a different interpretation , particularly because the first applicant ’s submission about a close relationship with his father had been made belatedly while the second applicant had not claimed any relationship with his father at all .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-2 - Information on reasons for arrest);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-5 - Compensation);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Nebojša Vučinić;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE . He was detained at the Gaziantep Foreigners’ Removal Centre ( “ the Gaziantep Removal Centre ” ) at the time of the events giving rise to this application . His current address is unknown .

In DATE the applicant fled to GPE because he was being searched for by the NORP authorities . It appears that shortly before his escape , he had lost his right leg in a bomb attack that struck a mosque in GPE .

Subsequent to his departure from GPE , criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant by the NORP authorities before ORG on the following charges : ( i ) participation in an armed insurrection and membership of an armed organisation with the purpose of overthrowing the constitutional order and violating the territorial integrity of GPE and ( ii ) possessing firearms and ammunition . It appears that ORG issued a detention order in respect of the applicant in his absence .

On DATE the applicant was taken into police custody in GPE in the context of an operation against ORG . He was subsequently taken to Gaziantep , where he was placed in pre - trial detention at ORG upon the order of ORG .

On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were commenced against the applicant before ORG .

On DATE ORG ordered the applicant ’s release from ORG . There is no further information in the case file as regards the outcome of the criminal proceedings .

Following his release from prison on DATE , the applicant was placed in detention at FAC , which is attached to ORG .

On an unspecified date the NORP authorities requested the extradition of the applicant . On DATE the ORG refused that request , holding that the offences in question were of a political nature and that under international and national laws , alleged perpetrators of such offences could not be extradited .

On DATE the applicant applied to the LAW governor ’s office with a request for asylum . On DATE the applicant was notified that his request had been rejected .

In the meantime , on DATE the applicant submitted a petition to ORG ( “ the Ministry ” ) , where he requested to be released and to be granted a residence permit . The applicant ’s requests were dismissed by ORG . The applicant ’s objection to that decision was further dismissed by ORG on DATE .

On DATE the applicant was released from ORG , on the condition that he leave GPE within DATE . It appears that the applicant left GPE shortly after his release .

According to the information in the case file , the applicant met with his lawyer a total of CARDINAL times DATE and DATE during his detention at ORG .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)

Marko Bošnjak;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Georges Ravarani

NORP The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention . In application no . CARDINAL , the applicant also raised another complaint under LAW .


Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for correspondence;Respect for private life);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

Julia Laffranque;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Georges Ravarani;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

NORP In response to a request from the police , on CARDINAL DATE the ORG Attorney ’s ORG suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta ) asked an investigating judge of ORG ( Županijski sud u GPE ) to authorise the use of special investigative measures , namely tapping the telephone conversations of the applicant and several other individuals on the grounds of their suspected participation in organised drug trafficking , customs evasion , and the abuse of power and authority .

On DATE the investigating judge granted the request and issued an order for the use of secret surveillance measures . His statement of reasons read as follows :

“ The State Attorney ’s Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime asked the investigating judge to authorise the use of phone tapping measures under LAW ( CARDINAL ) of LAW in respect of ... PERSON [ and others ] on the grounds that a preliminary [ police ] investigation suggested that these individuals were engaged in criminal activity involving the commission of offences under Articles CARDINAL § § CARDINAL and CARDINAL , CARDINAL § CARDINAL , CARDINAL and CARDINAL of LAW .

Having assessed the [ ORG Attorney ’s ] request , and in view of [ the request from the police ] , it is established that there is probable cause for believing that the criminal offences have been committed and that the requisite investigation in the present case could not be carried out by any other means , or would be extremely difficult . In addition , given that the matter concerns the offences enumerated in LAW , the request has been granted and it was decided as indicated in the operative part of this order . ”

In the course of the investigation , the investigating judge issued several further secret surveillance orders to the same effect . In addition to the phone tapping , the investigating judge also authorised the covert monitoring of the suspects .

On the basis of the evidence obtained by the aforementioned use of secret surveillance measures , on DATE the police lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant and CARDINAL other persons with the Slavonski GPE State Attorney ’s ORG ( GPE državno odvjetništvo u PERSON ) in connection with suspected drug trafficking and customs evasion .

On DATE the applicant was brought before an investigating judge of ORG PERSON ) , who questioned him in connection with the charges brought against him . The applicant decided to remain silent and not give any evidence .

On DATE the investigating judge opened an investigation in respect of the applicant and the other suspects in connection with suspected drug trafficking . She also ordered the applicant ’s pre - trial detention .

After the completion of the investigation , on DATE PERSON State Attorney ’s Office indicted the applicant and CARDINAL other persons in LOC on charges of drug trafficking .

On DATE the applicant asked PERSON to exclude from the proceedings the evidence obtained by means of secret surveillance as being unlawfully obtained . He argued that the secret surveillance had been carried out on the basis of orders which had been issued contrary to the relevant domestic law and practice of ORG ( Ustavni sud PERSON ) in that they contained no reasoning justifying the use of secret surveillance .

At a hearing on DATE PERSON dismissed the applicant ’s request as unfounded . At the same hearing the applicant pleaded not guilty to the charges held against him , whereas CARDINAL other defendants pleaded guilty . The trial bench heard several witnesses and an expert witness and examined the reports in the case file .

A further hearing was held on DATE at which the applicant reiterated his request for the exclusion of the evidence obtained by secret surveillance as being unlawfully obtained . The applicant further contended that his exact location at the moment of the alleged commission of the offence at issue should be established by obtaining the location tracking data of the mobile phone which he had allegedly used .

The trial bench dismissed the applicant ’s request as unfounded and decided to continue with the examination of evidence . It heard CARDINAL witnesses and an expert witness and adjourned the proceedings in order for the defence to obtain copies of the secret surveillance recordings .

At a hearing on CARDINAL DATE the applicant argued that a list of incoming and outgoing calls for the mobile phones allegedly used by the defendants should be obtained doubts as to the identification of CARDINAL of the speakers as CARDINAL of the applicant ’s co - accused .

At a hearing on DATE the trial bench heard further secret surveillance audio recordings . The defence had no particular objections to the recordings but requested that some additional evidence and recordings be examined at the trial .

Further hearings were held on CARDINAL and DATE at which the trial bench examined the secret surveillance recordings . The applicant reiterated his request for an expert telecommunications report to establish the location of his mobile phone at the moment of the alleged offence . The defence also challenged the credibility of a police report concerning the applicant ’s surveillance , expressing doubts as to the reasons why there were no recordings accompanying that report . In this connection the trial bench heard evidence from the police officer in charge of the operation , PERSON , who explained that no recordings had been made for fear that , in the circumstances , the suspects might have noticed that they were being followed . The trial bench also heard evidence from another police officer , ORG , who explained the method of identifying the mobile phones used by the defendants . Following ORG ’s questioning , the trial bench dismissed all further requests for the examination of evidence and adjourned the hearing for the preparation of the defendants’ closing statements .

On DATE the trial bench heard the parties’ closing arguments .

By a judgment of CARDINAL DATE PERSON found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to MONEY imprisonment . As to the applicant ’s arguments concerning the alleged unlawfulness of the secret surveillance orders , that court held that the orders had outlined reasons for believing that the applicant had probably participated in the commission of the offence at issue and that the investigation could not have been conducted by other means .

The Slavonski Brod County Court further held that all doubts on the part of the defence as to the accuracy of the recordings had been clarified by questioning the police officers , who had explained the manner in which the recordings had been obtained and documented . It also found that the available police reports on covert monitoring provided sufficient information as to the defendant ’s location at the moment of the commission of the offence and that there was therefore no need to obtain further evidence , such as mobile phone location data , in that respect . It therefore dismissed the applicant ’s objections to the use of the evidence obtained by secret surveillance and proceeded with its detailed assessment when determining the applicant ’s guilt .

On DATE and DATE , relying on the case - law of the ORG ‒ according to which secret surveillance orders needed to be properly reasoned in order to satisfy the requirement of lawfulness under the relevant domestic law ‒ the applicant lodged an appeal against the first - instance judgment with ORG ( PERSON ) . He also complained about the use of the evidence thereby obtained in securing his conviction .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s appeal and upheld the first - instance judgment . It stressed in particular that the alleged lack of reasoning justifying the secret surveillance orders could not result in the unlawfulness of the evidence obtained by the use of such secret surveillance . ’s conviction had been based on a proper and convincing assessment of evidence and the relevant facts .

On DATE the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with ORG complaining that his right to respect for private life and confidentiality of correspondence , as guaranteed under LAW and CARDINAL § CARDINAL of the LAW , had been breached by the unlawful and unjustified secret surveillance , and that his right to a fair trial under LAW had been breached by the use of the evidence thereby obtained in the criminal proceedings against him .

On DATE ORG dismissed the applicant ’s constitutional complaint as unfounded , endorsing the reasoning of ORG . It considered in particular that the criminal proceedings against the applicant , taken as a whole , had not been unfair . The decision of ORG was served on the applicant on DATE .


Aleš Pejchal;Kristina Pardalos;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Pauliine Koskelo

NORP The applicant , Mr PERSON , is an NORP national who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . He was represented before the ORG by Mr A. Pagliano , a lawyer practising in GPE .

NORP On DATE ORG ( GPE di Informazione Finanziaria , hereinafter “ the ORG ” ) , the national authority responsible for combatting money laundering , ordered the temporary freezing of bank accounts ( mentioned below at paragraph CARDINAL ) at CARDINAL named NORP banks , which were traced back to the applicant .

Pursuant to the relevant law , the ORG informed the investigating judge ( PERSON della PERSON ) of the freezing order and provided him with all the information in its possession . A criminal investigation was thus opened against the applicant and CARDINAL others for the continuous offence of money laundering under LAW and CARDINAL bis of LAW .

By a decision of DATE , served on the applicant ’s counsel on DATE , the investigating judge , relying on LAW bis and ter of LAW ( see relevant domestic law below ) preventively seized , inter alia , the following assets , which were all traced back to the applicant : ( i ) bank account No . CARDINAL ; ( ii ) bank account No . DATE ; ( iii ) securities portfolio ( dossier titoli amministrati ) No . CARDINAL/CARDINAL/CARDINAL ; ( iv ) bank account No . CARDINAL/CARDINAL/CARDINAL ; ( v ) the financial product ( prodotto finanziario ) No . CARDINAL/CARDINAL/CARDINAL ; and ( vi ) the insurance product ( prodotto assicurativo ) No . CARDINAL/CARDINAL/CARDINAL . The judge also ordered the seizure of any credit balance or other assets ( including any safe deposit boxes ) traced back to the accused persons . A judicial notice was issued on DATE by the investigating judge and served on the applicant ’s legal counsel .

According to the prosecution , the accused persons had DATE laundered assets which were the product of fraudulent bankruptcy committed by a certain PERSON ( CARDINAL of the co - accused ) to the detriment of various NORP companies ( company ORG , company ORG and others ) , which had been traced back to PERSON and of which he had been the director and liquidator . Other laundered assets were the product of other offences ( such as embezzlement , fraud and tax fraud ) , also committed by PERSON The laundering had been carried out in CARDINAL different episodes ( all set out precisely in the judicial notice ) and the applicant had taken part in CARDINAL of them . In particular , the accused persons had carried out several bank operations , consisting , inter alia , of repeated withdrawals and deposits of money , the issuing and cashing of cheques on behalf of fictitious persons or the other co - accused persons and the use of bank accounts ( sometimes held by other co - accused persons , by relatives or foreign companies ) to transfer money within the country or abroad for the purposes of concealing its criminal origin .

Except for the assets related to the alleged fraudulent bankruptcy by PERSON , the alleged criminal origin of the other assets was indicated in the seizure decision by means of references to the legal classification of some of the offences allegedly committed by PERSON The second page of the decision specified offences such as “ bankruptcies , embezzlement , fraud and tax fraud ” , while page CARDINAL gave more generic indications such as “ acts of fraud and tax offences ” . The decision gave no further details regarding the factual basis for such predicate offences .

In the detailed seizure decision , the investigating judge reconstructed in precise terms all the above - mentioned bank operations and expressly referred , inter alia , to the applicant ’s financial situation . He noted that a customer due diligence test carried out on DATE by one of the banks involved had shown that the applicant did not have any administrative role or shareholdings in any NORP companies which could produce any income . According to the judge , after that period , from DATE , the applicant had been a partner and advisor in a named management consultancy firm . He had not carried out any other business or professional activities and was not on the list of professionals who had received legitimate payments from the bankrupt companies , P. and C. In the light of that information , the judge considered that the applicant ’s financial resources were not consistent with the financial , business or professional activities he had declared he carried out .

Furthermore , the investigating judge considered that there had existed a periculum in PERSON ( danger in delay ) in not issuing a seizure order , as the consequences of the offence could have been aggravated or prolonged . Indeed , the assets could have been withdrawn and/or concealed by the accused persons , thus frustrating the possibility for confiscation at the end of the proceedings . Moreover , the laundering was allegedly still ongoing at the time of the ORG ’s temporary freezing order . By the same decision the judge also summoned the applicant for questioning .

On DATE the applicant and CARDINAL other accused persons represented by the same counsel lodged a complaint against the seizure decision with the Judge of ORG ( GPE d’Appello GPE ) under LAW .

The applicant primarily requested the lifting of the decision in toto or alternatively a reduction in the amount of money seized to MONEY ( ORG ) . The grounds he gave included the fact that : ( i ) the judge had violated the principle of nullum crimen sine lege since he had applied a wording of LAW bis and ter of LAW which had been introduced only in DATE and had therefore not yet been in force at the material time . According to the applicant , prior to the amendments introduced by LAW . CARDINAL of DATE , the domestic law had not provided for a precautionary seizure with the aim of the future confiscation of items other than the price , product or profit of a crime or which had been used to commit a crime – the seizure had therefore been disproportionate ; ( ii ) the alleged offences at the origin of the laundered money had been indicated by the investigating judge in a very generic way DATE he argued that such a lack of specifics was not sufficient to provide CARDINAL of the prerequisites for the seizure , namely the fumus delicti ( the presumption of a sufficient legal basis ) ; ( iii ) the only predicate offence which had been mentioned in sufficiently precise terms in the seizure decision had been that of fraudulent bankruptcy to the detriment of company P. , for which PERSON had been found guilty , at first - instance , in NORP criminal proceedings . However , in that connection and in relation to his alternative request , the applicant noted that the NORP court , in GPE , had found that PERSON had taken LAW from the assets of company P. ( which had then gone bankrupt ) and that only a part of that money ( EUR CARDINAL,CARDINAL ) had then been transferred to GPE . Thus , there was a disproportion between the money seized ( approximately ORG CARDINAL ) and the money having an ascertained ( or at least a precisely indicated ) criminal origin ( EUR CARDINAL ) . The applicant argued that the judge had failed even to give a summary description of the alleged actions or factual background constituting such offences and that such lacunas had made it impossible for him to adequately defend himself .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE , served on the applicant on CARDINAL DATE , the Judge of ORG rejected his requests .

NORP In particular , the judge held that there had been no violation of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege since that rule was applicable only to substantive criminal provisions not procedural ones . The latter were subject , instead , to the tempus regit actum principle ( the legality of an act can only be judged according to the law in effect at the time of the act ) .

According to the judge , preventive seizure ( either probative or preventive with the aim of eventual permanent confiscation ) could be ordered regardless of a final finding of guilt concerning an offence . Such a measure was aimed at preventing the commission of further offences or making sure that future measures were not frustrated . Moreover , contrary to the opinion of the defence , preventive seizure had been applicable at the material time ( before the amendment of DATE ) as section CARDINAL of Law No . CARDINAL of DATE had expressly provided for it .

As to the difference between the sums seized and the alleged product of the offence , the court stated that Articles CARDINAL bis and ter of LAW did not set any limits on seizures or state that the seized amount had to be limited to funds belonging to the accused , or to the price , product , or profit of an offence . According to the judge , a proportionality test had to be carried out only at the stage of applying permanent confiscation following a finding of guilt , not at the stage of precautionary measures , given the different purpose of the measures .

With regard to the alleged general nature of the reference to the offences which had been at the origin of some of the assets , it had already been established in domestic case - law that in order to find someone guilty of money laundering it was not necessary to determine the type of predicate offence , the perpetrator , or the victim . It sufficed instead to have evidence of the criminal origin of assets which had been transferred , concealed or substituted – thus the burden of proving the illicit origin was satisfied if such an origin emerged clearly from a logical and coherent interpretation of the evidence . Hence , the investigating judge ’s reasoning had sufficed for applying the seizure order since he had described in detail the bank operations carried out by the accused – the suspicious and unreasonable complexity of the operations , the relevant amount and their lack of transparency DATE elements which had spoken for themselves . Moreover , the investigating judge had highlighted the close relations between PERSON ( the person who had allegedly collected the funds ) and all the other accused persons and indicated the respective role of each in carrying out the laundering .

On DATE the applicant lodged a complaint with ORG ( PERSON ) , reiterating his earlier submissions and requests . In addition , he complained that the judge had reversed the burden of proof in connection with the lack of a precise indication of the fumus delicti in the seizure decision .

On DATE the Attorney General ( ORG ) filed submissions against the applicant ’s appeal .

By a decision of CARDINAL DATE , served on DATE , the judge rejected both of the applicant ’s requests . The judge stated that third - instance criminal proceedings were only interim proceedings aimed solely at reviewing the legality of precautionary measures and not the merits of a case . They could not be regarded as a sort of preliminary assessment of an accused ’s guilt on criminal charges ( since such an assessment was for trial courts ) . When a Third - Instance Criminal Judge was called on to review the legality of a precautionary measure , the judge had to assess the existence of fumus delicti , namely the plausibility of the investigator ’s suspicions ( ipotesi investigativa ) concerning the commission of an offence and the possibility to trace it to the accused . The judge also had to review whether the substantive provisions that had been applied reflected the factual circumstances described in the notice of the offence ( notizia di reato ) and whether there had been a correct application of the procedural provisions concerning the admissibility and the assessment of evidence . In addition , the judge had to check whether the rights and duties of the parties had been adhered to ; ensure that the requirements and limits of the measure had been correctly applied ; and ascertain the existence of adequate reasoning justifying the measure .

The judge found that the submissions related to the existence of the fumus delicti , the reversal of the burden of proof and the problem of the assessment of the criminal origin of the assets were inadmissible on the grounds that they concerned the merits of the case and not the legality of the procedure .

After a detailed examination of the evolution of the provisions concerning seizures in the domestic law , the judge found no violation of the nullum crimen sine lege principle in the case or , in particular , of the principle of the non - retroactivity of criminal provisions . Moreover , the judge had not had to find any periculum in ORG or make any other consideration concerning the accused ’s wealth , his personal situation or financial needs , in order to apply a seizure order with the aim of future confiscation .

As to any lack of proportion in the seizure , the judge reiterated that the relevant Articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure applied by the investigating judge ( Article CARDINAL bis and ter ) did not set any limits and the seizure order had therefore been in accordance with the law .

The judge also dismissed all the other grounds of appeal . In conclusion , he held that the investigating judge had not made any mistakes in applying or interpreting the relevant laws or in using his powers of discretion in his assessment . The seizure had therefore been necessary , inevitable and proportionate .

The offence of money laundering , Article CARDINAL bis of LAW , reads , in so far as relevant , as follow :

“ ( CARDINAL ) A person is guilty of money laundering where , except in cases of aiding and abetting , he conceals , substitutes , transfers or co - operates with others to so do , money which he knows was obtained as a result of crimes not resulting from negligence or contraventions ( misfatto ) , and with the aim of hiding its origins .

( CARDINAL ) or whosoever uses , or cooperates or intervenes with the intention of using , in the area of economic or financial activities , money which he knows was obtained as a result of crimes not resulting from negligence or contraventions ( misfatto ) . ”

Sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of Law No . CARDINAL of DATE , which were applicable until amendments to LAW in DATE ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , in so far as relevant , read as follows :

“ ( CARDINAL ) The PERSON della PERSON shall by a reasoned decision order the seizure of the corpus delicti and of items pertaining to a crime ( cose ad esso pertinenti ) which he deems necessary for the establishment of the facts .

( CARDINAL ) Items on which or through which the crime has been committed , and items which constitute the product , profit or price of the crime , shall be considered corpus delicti .

( CARDINAL ) The judicial authority or the judicial police ( Polizia Giudiziaria ) can examine and make a copy of acts , documents , mail , data and information contained in the computer software of financial institutions and seize acts , documents , mail , securities , funds , sums of money and all other items , even if they are contained in safe deposit boxes , when they have good reason to believe that such things pertained to the crime even if [ such things ] do not belong to the accused or are not registered in his name . ”

“ ( CARDINAL ) The PERSON della PERSON shall by a reasoned decision order the seizure of items pertaining to a crime if the consequences of such a crime could be aggravated or prolonged or where the commission of other crimes could be facilitated .

( CARDINAL ) The PERSON della PERSON may also order the seizure of items for which confiscation is allowed , as well as things to which those items may have been transformed or converted , and of things with which they may have been merged ( delle cose a cui sono state mescolate ) and [ the seizure ] of the profits obtained therefrom . ”

The provisions of Law No . CARDINAL were replaced by ORG CARDINAL bis and QUANTITY of Criminal Procedure by means of LAW . CARDINAL of DATE . Article CARDINAL bis and ter , concerning probative and precautionary seizures , are virtually identical to sections CARDINAL and CARDINAL of Law No . CARDINAL of DATE . The only difference concerns precautionary seizure : whereas Law No . ORG stated that the application of a preventive seizure with the aim of confiscation was not mandatory and depended on the judge ’s discretion ( “ may order ” - puo’ disporre ) , Law No . CARDINAL considered it as mandatory ( “ shall order ” - dispone ) . Moreover , the latter provision also stated that judges must not only order seizure in cases that have a view to a “ direct ” confiscation , but also in those aimed at “ confiscation by equivalent means ” ( confisca per equivalente ) .

Article CARDINAL of the Code of Criminal Procedure , in so far as relevant , reads as follows :

“ Decisions concerning coercive measures or seizures against persons or assets and their subsequent confirmation may be challenged before the Judge of Criminal Appeals by the accused or the Attorney General within DATE of notification or enforcement of the measure ... ”

According to established domestic case - law ( for example , the decision of DATE by the Judge of ORG in criminal proceedings no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ; decision of DATE by the Judge of ORG in criminal proceedings no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL ; decision of CARDINAL DATE by the Judge of ORG in criminal proceedings no . DATE ; and the decision of DATE by the Judge of ORG in proceedings concerning letter of request no . CARDINAL ) , a complaint under LAW is inadmissible if the Judge of ORG is asked to review in general terms all the activities carried out by the investigating judge during the investigation . A Judge of ORG can only intervene during an investigation in the specific cases expressly provided for by law , namely in order to review decisions applying precautionary measures , searches and seizures or in the case of aberrant decisions .

Law No . CARDINAL of DATE sets out the procedure to challenge the legitimacy of precautionary measures , such as seizures .

According to section DATE ( in the light of section LAW . CARDINAL of DATE ) , a third - instance judge is competent to decide such challenges and such a challenge does not suspend the enforcement of the measure . Section CARDINAL states that such a challenge can be lodged by interested parties or the Attorney General within DATE of notification of the seizure decision to the parties . The appeal is then sent to the relevant body , which allows the parties to make submissions within DATE .


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy)

Egidijus Kūris;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

NORP The list of applicants , their representatives and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table .

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention and of the lack of any effective remedy in domestic law . In application nos . CARDINAL and GPE , the applicants also raised complaints under other provisions of the Convention .


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Deprivation of liberty;Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 9 - Freedom of thought conscience and religion (Article 9-1 - Manifest religion or belief);Non-pecuniary damage - award

Dmitry Dedov;Erik Møse;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Ksenija Turković

The applicants are GPE ’s Witnesses belonging to various congregations in GPE . In DATE , the GPE courts banned the local religious organisation of GPE ’s Witnesses in GPE .

NORP In DATE , the applicant PERSON , acting on behalf of ORG of GPE ’s Witnesses , signed a rental contract with ORG for the purpose of holding religious meetings in the academy ’s assembly hall ( актовый зал ) DATE . By the time of the events , the meetings had been being held for DATE .

The most solemn and significant religious meeting for ORG , their families and supporters , known as the DATE celebration of FAC Evening Meal , was scheduled to begin at TIME , after sundown on DATE . CARDINAL people , including the CARDINAL applicants , gathered for the service .

At TIME police officers , led by the chief of the FAC police station , arrived in substantial numbers at the building . The building was cordoned off by the police units whose deployment included ten police vehicles , QUANTITY minibuses , an armed unit of ORG ( ORG ) and CARDINAL of other officers in uniform .

NORP The police chief went on stage , took over the microphone and announced that the meeting was unlawful and that the participants were to disperse . Those in attendance complied with the order . The police officers segregated the male individuals from the rest of the group and made them stand in the corridor behind the hall . CARDINAL male members of the congregation were escorted into the minibuses waiting outside . The police then proceeded to search the LOC and took away a few boxes of religious literature and some documents from the notice board .

The applicants were brought to the FAC police station where they were placed in a holding room and collectively photographed . Their identity documents were taken away . Their lawyer , PERSON , was not allowed to visit them at the police station .

The applicants were released shortly after TIME .

On DATE , CARDINAL press agencies , including a federal television channel , reported on the disruption of the service and the detention of participants .

NORP The CARDINAL applicants brought proceedings before LOC of GPE , seeking a declaration that the police had unlawfully disrupted a service of worship , removed religious literature , taken them to the police station , photographed and detained them and hindered the work of their counsel . They claimed compensation in respect of non - pecuniary damage .

On DATE the ORG gave judgment , making the following findings of fact :

“ It was established that the NORP ] and CARDINAL fellow believers ... had gathered for a service of worship on DATE in the assembly hall ... The service was stopped by police officers of the FAC police station who declared the meeting illegal and demanded that the hall be vacated . PERSON , PERSON , PERSON PERSON and Mr Anorov were detained and escorted to the NORP police station to give statements .

These circumstances , including the curtailment of the religious service ... were confirmed by the representative of [ the FAC police station ] . His arguments that the plaintiffs were not detained , but went of their own accord , are unfounded . The fact of detention is corroborated by the testimonies of witnesses ... the entries in the register of persons detained or escorted to the police station ... which read that the plaintiffs were escorted to the police station [ for the reasons contained in ] report no . PERSON , and the written statements of the detainees . Records of the detention and escorting to the police station were not compiled . ”

ORG held that the police had lawfully stopped the service of worship :

“ Pursuant to section QUANTITY and CARDINAL of LAW ... religious organisations shall conduct religious services ... in religious buildings ... and in other places provided to religious organisations for such purposes ...

In other cases , public religious services ... shall be conducted in accordance with the procedure established for conducting meetings , marches and demonstrations .

The assembly hall of ORG ... does not meet the requirements established by the above - mentioned legal provisions for buildings , structures and other places provided for conducting religious rites by religious organisations . That is , since the plaintiffs belong to a religious organisation , the public religious service [ they held ] in a secular establishment should have been carried out in accordance with the procedure established by LAW , as provided for by LAW ...

As follows from the statements of the plaintiffs , they are not members of ORG of Jehovah ’s Witnesses – the religious organisation whose activity was banned in GPE by the judgment of ORG dated DATE and they exercise their right to freedom of religion ... having united not as a religious organisation but as the ORG and GPE religious groups . In light of the above , the court considers that , in accordance with section CARDINAL of LAW , only premises provided for the use of the religious group by its members could be used for conducting services of worship ...

The court considers that the actions of the police officers in stopping the religious ritual in the building of ORG ... in which CARDINAL people were participating , without having observed the [ notification ] procedure for conducting meetings , marches and demonstrations , were well grounded . ”

Nevertheless , ORG considered that the police officers had acted unlawfully in detaining the applicants :

“ In accordance with LAW , violations of the established procedure for organising or conducting meetings , marches and demonstrations is a ground for instituting administrative offence proceedings . However , as follows from the testimony of [ the representative of the police station ] , no elements of an administrative offence were established in the actions of the plaintiffs and no records of an administrative violation , detention , escorting to the police station and administrative arrest were compiled . That is , there were no grounds for detaining [ the plaintiffs ] or escorting them to the police station . ”

ORG summarily rejected the remainder of the claims :

“ The claims concerning the removal of religious literature and passports , the photographing [ of the applicants ] or impediments caused to counsel are unsubstantiated . The applicants’ and their ORG statements in that connection are contradictory , thus making it impossible to establish the relevant facts ... ”

The applicants lodged an appeal , submitting that ORG had misinterpreted the law in that the LOC for the service of worship had been legally provided under a rental contract entered into by ORG of GPE ’s Witnesses , a registered legal entity , of which the local religious groups were structural divisions .

On DATE ORG quashed ORG judgment in the part concerning the finding of unlawfulness in the actions of the police :

“ It appears from the register of persons detained or escorted to the police station that the plaintiffs were taken to the police station to give statements ... and spent TIME at the police station , which can not be considered as detention .

Thus , the actions of the police patrol unit of the FAC police station in escorting the plaintiffs to the police station were carried out within the framework of LAW , and there is no basis for pronouncing unlawful their actions in stopping the unlawful religious service and escorting the plaintiffs to the police station for the purposes of taking their statements and inspecting [ their ] identity documents . ”

ORG upheld the remainder of the judgment and dismissed the applicants’ arguments in a summary fashion :

“ The fact that the service of worship held by the ORG and GPE religious groups , which are part of the centralised religious organisation ‘ ORG [ sic ] , was conducted on behalf of that organisation and on premises paid for by it does not in itself exempt it from [ the need to meet ] the requirements [ applicable to ] religious groups when conducting religious services , since the activity of that organisation is banned in GPE .

The court has considered the other arguments in the appeal ... [ They ] involved in essence a different interpretation of the law and a re - evaluation of evidence ... and these can not constitute grounds for reversing a court decision on appeal ” .


Violation of Article 14+8 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for private life;Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life);No violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of application);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Alena Poláčková;Dmitry Dedov;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Johannes Silvis;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE . He is represented before the ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

In DATE , Mr Novruk and PERSON , a NORP national , started living together as a couple in GPE . In DATE , a boy was born to their union ; he acquired NORP nationality by birth . DATE O. and their son moved to the Primorskiy region of GPE , where most of her family lived . In DATE Mr Novruk joined them in GPE , and in DATE they married . They divorced in DATE .

NORP In DATE , Mr Novruk met PERSON , a NORP national . In DATE , he travelled to GPE to renew his passport , where he discovered that he was HIV - positive . DATE Mr Novruk returned to GPE and on DATE he and PERSON married . PERSON has a daughter from her previous marriage and she is also a foster parent to CARDINAL orphaned children , some of whom are HIV - positive .

NORP In DATE Mr Novruk applied to ORG for a temporary residence permit . By a letter of DATE he was informed that his application was refused by reference to section CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW , which restricted the issue of residence permits to foreign nationals who could show that they were HIVnegative .

On DATE the ORG of GPE , dismissed a challenge by the applicant to that decision , finding in particular that ORG had been required by law to reject his application for a residence permit . On DATE the Primorskiy Regional Court upheld that judgment on appeal .

The applicant PERSON is a NORP national who was born in DATE . She is represented before the ORG by Ms PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

NORP In DATE , PERSON married Mr NORP , a NORP national . They started living in GPE . During her pregnancy she was diagnosed as ORG . On DATE her son PERSON was born . He acquired NORP nationality by birth .

In DATE , PERSON applied for a temporary residence permit . By a letter of CARDINAL DATE ORG refused her application by reference to section CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW and ordered her to leave GPE within DATE or face deportation . Ms PERSON challenged the refusal with the courts .

On DATE the ORG , GPE , found for PERSON , noting in particular that ORG had decided on her application without taking into account that her minor child and husband were both NORP nationals . It directed ORG to reconsider the application .

Further to the ORG decision , PERSON lodged a new application for a residence permit . On DATE ORG rejected it , referring to the same provision of LAW .

PERSON applied again for a judicial review . By a judgment of QUANTITY DATE , ORG of GPE granted a stay of enforcement of the ORG decision and ordered it to reconsider the matter in the light of ORG decision of CARDINAL DATE and the Convention principles . PERSON appealed ; she submitted that ORG should have ruled that ORG refusal had been unlawful .

On DATE ORG dismissed PERSON appeal against ORG judgment , finding that “ there were no grounds to vary the judgment , because the GPE division of ORG had actually complied with it ” .

The applicant , Mr PERSON , is a NORP national who was born in DATE . He was granted legal aid and is represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE .

In DATE , PERSON married PERSON , a NORP national . Their children , a girl A. and a boy PERSON , were born in DATE and DATE respectively . The family were living in GPE .

NORP In DATE Mr PERSON took a blood test with a view to obtaining a health certificate to support his application for a temporary residence permit . He was found to be HIV - positive . The hospital reported the results of his test to the GPE division of ORG , which issued a decision of DATE on the undesirability of Mr GPE ’s stay in GPE because he would pose a “ real threat to public health ” . On DATE the director of ORG ratified that decision .

On DATE the decision was notified to PERSON ; he left GPE DATE , in compliance with the law . He took up residence in GPE in the “ NORP Republic of Transdniestria ” .

On DATE following the pronouncement of the Kiyutin v. GPE judgment ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , ECHR DATE ) , PERSON , acting on Mr PERSON ’s behalf , applied to the GPE division of ORG , asking it to set aside the decision by which his presence in GPE had been pronounced undesirable . She submitted medical documents showing that PERSON posed no danger to public health because he was receiving appropriate treatment . Her request was forwarded to the legal department of ORG for review . In a letter of CARDINAL DATE addressed to the deputy director of the visas and registration department of ORG , the director of the legal department acknowledged that the decision of DATE had not taken fully into account Mr PERSON ’s family ties in GPE . Nevertheless , on DATE the deputy director of the GPE division of ORG informed PERSON and PERSON that their applications for review of the decision of DATE had been refused . His letter did not specify the grounds for refusing the request .

Mr GPE complained to court . On DATE ORG of GPE dismissed his complaint , finding firstly that his rights and freedoms had not been interfered with , and secondly that the director of ORG was not empowered to review or set aside a decision by which an individual ’s presence in GPE had been declared undesirable . That judgment was upheld on appeal on DATE by ORG . On DATE the Presidium of ORG rejected PERSON cassation appeal .

Mr GPE also challenged the compatibility of section CARDINAL of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act with the LAW , in that it allowed an executive agency to pronounce his presence undesirable solely because of his HIV - positive status . By decision no . CARDINAL-O of CARDINAL DATE , ORG declared his challenge inadmissible , finding that the impugned section was needed for the protection of public health from infectious diseases , including HIV . ORG reiterated that its decision of CARDINAL DATE ( cited in paragraph CARDINAL below ) remained valid and applicable , and that the decision pronouncing someone ’s presence undesirable must take full account of humanitarian considerations and the factual circumstances of each case , including the family links and state of health of the individual concerned .

On DATE Mr GPE ’s representative asked ORG to review the undesirability decision and to allow him to visit his children in GPE . By a letter of CARDINAL DATE the deputy head of the CPA replied that it did not have the authority to reverse a decision issued by ORG .

The applicant , PERSON , was born in DATE in LOC of the NORP GPE of the GPE . She is represented before ORG by PERSON , a lawyer practising in PERSON .

In DATE her parents took PERSON and her sister to live in the NORP GPE of the GPE . In DATE PERSON got married and gave birth to a boy . DATE her sister also married and moved back to GPE . Following the collapse of the GPE , Ms Ostrovskaya acquired NORP nationality .

After the death of her parents and husband and her son ’s move to GPE in DATE , PERSON remained in GPE alone . In DATE she decided to move to GPE to share the flat occupied by her son ’s and her sister ’s families . PERSON sister and her husband are NORP nationals ; her son and his family are NORP nationals with valid NORP residence permits .

In DATE PERSON applied for a temporary residence permit . During a medical examination she tested HIV - positive .

By decision of CARDINAL DATE , the PERSON division of ORG refused her application for residence permit by reference to section CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW , and informed her accordingly . On DATE a further notification to the same effect was sent by ORG .

By a letter of CARDINAL DATE the PERSON division of ORG notified PERSON that she should leave GPE by DATE or face deportation . The letter indicated that on CARDINAL DATE the director of ORG determined that her presence on NORP territory was undesirable by virtue of section CARDINAL of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act .

On DATE PERSON complained to court , relying on humanitarian grounds in her claim that she should be allowed to stay in GPE . By a judgment of DATE , upheld on appeal on CARDINAL DATE , LOC and ORG held that the decision to refuse her a residence permit had been lawfully given by ORG within its jurisdiction and in compliance with LAW and its internal regulations . ORG declared that it would not take any humanitarian considerations into account because PERSON had missed the DATE time - limit for submitting her claim , and she had a receipt of notification as early as DATE . The undesirability decision had been issued by ORG rather than by its PERSON division ; since PERSON had designated the latter , but not the former , as the defendant in her claim , the courts refused to review what they described as an “ actually non - existent decision ” .

On DATE ORG refused her leave to appeal to a cassation instance .

The applicant , PERSON , is a national of GPE who was born in DATE and lives in GPE . The ORG granted the applicant ’s request for his identity not to be disclosed to the public ( Rule CARDINAL § CARDINAL ) .

V.V. came to GPE in DATE to study at a medical college . Since DATE he has been living with his partner PERSON , who also represented him in the present proceedings before the ORG . They have maintained a common household , shared expenses and travelled together . They have met each other ’s parents . PERSON submitted copies of travel documents and family photographs .

On DATE PERSON applied to the GPE division of ORG for a temporary residence permit . He committed himself to producing an HIV certificate within DATE . On DATE the FAC Treatment certified him to be HIV - positive .

On DATE ORG refused his application for a residence permit by reference to section CARDINAL § CARDINAL ( CARDINAL ) of LAW . GPE challenged the refusal before a court .

On DATE the Verkh - Isetskiy District Court of PERSON upheld the refusal , finding in particular that GPE ’s HIV status amounted to an “ actual threat to the health of the NORP population ” and that GPE ’s living with a same - sex partner was not equivalent to having a family .

On DATE the GPE Regional Court heard an appeal by GPE against ORG decision and , referring in particular to the PERSON judgment , held that GPE ’s HIV - positive status could not on its own be a ground for a restriction on his rights . Since ORG did not cite any other grounds in its decision , ORG enjoined it to carry out a new assessment of the application for a residence permit . The judgment became final and enforceable .

NORP In the meantime , on DATE the GPE division of ORG forwarded a copy of ORG ’s diagnosis to ORG , with a view to pronouncing his presence in GPE undesirable . On DATE the federal authority asked the regional division to re - administer the HIV test . On DATE PERSON again tested positive for HIV .

On DATE ORG pronounced PERSON ’s presence in GPE undesirable in accordance with section QUANTITY of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act . The decision stated that GPE had been infected with HIV and had avoided treatment . It cited in evidence medical certificates dated DATE and DATE . ORG representative challenged the decision before a court .

On DATE GPE travelled from GPE to GPE . On his way back DATE , he was refused entry into GPE by reference to that decision .

On DATE ORG allowed the challenge , finding that the undesirability decision had been unlawful because it did not refer to any grounds other than V.V. ’s HIV - positive status . It also granted a stay of enforcement of that decision , enabling GPE to return to GPE , which he did .

However , on CARDINAL DATE ORG reversed ORG decision and dismissed the claim . It held that the ban against ORG had been put in place not only because he was infected with HIV but also because he had refused to give contact details of his former partners during an “ epidemiological investigation of the HIV infection ” , that is when filling out a questionnaire at the hospital . ORG also examined GPE ’s personal circumstances and found that he was single , that his next of kin lived in GPE , that he did not have a family relationship with any NORP nationals , that he lived in a student hostel rather than in a rented flat , and that he had no resources to pay for HIV treatment .

On DATE ORG refused leave to appeal to the cassation instance . It found in particular :

“ The facts which , in the claimant ’s view , are of legal significance but which the appeal court failed to take into account , including ... his voluntary compliance with the obligation to inform his former partners about a possible HIV infection , his being in a steady sexual relationship ... can not be established on the basis of the claimant ’s and his representative ’s statements alone .

The court did not see any evidence of any social links the claimant has in GPE . The claimant and his representative merely confirmed that they have a sexual relationship , which does not equate to social links .

A threat to public health ... could result from the fact that the claimant has a registered place of residence and actually lives in a hostel , which is a public place ; this fact alone put the health of the other residents of the dormitory at risk because the claimant may use the same public facilities ... ”

On DATE a judge of ORG refused him leave to appeal to ORG .

After notice of the case had been given to the Government , on DATE PERSON informed the Court that the Government Representative ’s office had forwarded the case materials to ORG with a request to inquire whether or not PERSON was lawfully present in GPE , whether or not he was continuing his studies , and whether his representative before ORG could have been his partner . The request contained full personal details of V.V. The Prosecutor General sent the request to the local prosecutor ’s office in GPE . As it happened , Mr X was a former employee in that prosecutor ’s office . A prosecutor summonsed PERSON for an interview and put questions about the nature of his relationship with GPE , whether PERSON was still present in GPE , and where they lived . Law - enforcement officers also visited their neighbours and asked them how long GPE and PERSON had lived together and whether they had girlfriends .

The Government submitted a copy of a statement from a prosecutor in charge of human rights and federal law compliance , dated DATE , from which it appears that on DATE PERSON had been asked to attend the GPE regional prosecutor ’s office in his capacity as GPE ’s representative . He was interviewed about “ the exercise by PERSON of his labour , family and migration rights ” . The interview was conducted “ tactfully ” ( в корректной форме ) , and no pressure was put on him . The police and migration authorities had established that no one lived at the address which ORG had listed as his registered place of residence . The Government also produced a copy of the statement signed by Mr X on DATE . PERSON clarified that PERSON had been living in a stable same - sex relationship since DATE . He refused to name ORG ’s partner or to say whether he was ORG ’s partner : in his capacity as ORG ’s representative he was not required to disclose any information about his own private life . He also briefly described PERSON ’s education , employment and migration status .


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Impartial tribunal;Independent tribunal)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Ledi Bianku;Paul Lemmens

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in GPE .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

On DATE the applicant was dismissed from ORG due to non - compliance with disciplinary rules .

On DATE the applicant brought an action before ORG and requested the annulment of the decision to dismiss him .

On DATE ORG rejected the applicant ’s case , taking into account the “ secret documents ” submitted by ORG . These documents were not disclosed to the applicant .

On DATE the applicant ’s request for rectification was rejected by the same court .


No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention)

Guido Raimondi;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney

The applicant was born in DATE and lives in PERSON .

On DATE he was arrested on suspicion of committing a number of offences connected with handling drugs and psychoactive substances .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) remanded the applicant in custody for DATE , until DATE . The court relied on a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed offences of serious nature and on the likelihood that a severe penalty would be imposed on him . The court did not share the prosecutor ’s view that there was a reasonable risk that the applicant would obstruct the proceedings or that he would go into hiding . At this stage of the proceedings the applicant was not suspected of being a member of an organised criminal group .

The applicant ’s lawyer appealed against the decision to detain him on remand .

On DATE ORG ( PERSON ) upheld the challenged decision . It agreed with the applicant ’s lawyer ’s view that the applicant had not engaged in any activity that might obstruct the proceedings . It found however that the severe penalty likely to be imposed on the applicant might create a risk that he would attempt to impede the proper conduct of the proceedings .

On DATE the applicant ’s detention on remand was extended by ORG until DATE . The court referred to the applicant ’s previous convictions which made the imposition of a severe penalty on him more probable . It also noted that , taking into consideration the complexity of the case in which CARDINAL persons had already been apprehended , the proceedings had been conducted properly and without undue delays . The trial court had obtained expert witness opinions and it was still necessary to hear further evidence .

The applicant appealed and requested to vary the preventive measure applied to him .

On DATE ORG ( FAC ) amended the challenged decision and ordered the applicant ’s detention until DATE . The court agreed with the arguments relied on by ORG . It found however that since the prosecutor had requested that the detention be extended until DATE , ORG had had no right to extend it beyond that date .

On DATE the ORG again extended the applicant ’s detention for a further DATE . The court still relied on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant committed the offences with which he had been charged and on the likelihood that a heavy penalty would be imposed on him . The prosecutor who requested extension of the detention relied on , among other things , the reasonable fear that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings . ORG referred to this part of the request and found that there were no grounds which would justify invoking this argument for the extension of the applicant ’s detention .

The applicant appealed .

On DATE ORG upheld the challenged decision .

On DATE the charges against the applicant were extended to include participation in an organised criminal group .

On DATE the ORG extended the applicant ’s detention until DATE . The court relied on the grounds previously invoked and , additionally , on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant might tamper with evidence and obstruct the proceedings which was based on the extended charges of being a member of an organised criminal group . The court further stressed that the proceedings had been conducted properly and without undue delays and their duration was attributable to objective reasons , namely the particular complexity of the case and the necessity to obtain evidence as regards organised criminal group consisting of numerous members .

On DATE a bill of indictment against the applicant and several other coaccused was lodged with ORG ( case no . II K CARDINAL/CARDINAL ) . The applicant was charged also with being a member of an organised criminal group .

On DATE ORG extended the applicant ’s detention for DATE , until DATE . The courts relied on the same grounds as previously . They noted however that the charge of being a member of an organised criminal group justified the extension of the applicant ’s detention with an additional reason , namely suspicion that he might obstruct the proceedings .

Further extensions of the applicant ’s pretrial detention were ordered by ORG on DATE and CARDINAL DATE and by ORG on DATE . ORG examined the course of the proceedings before the trial court and found that since DATE QUANTITY hearings had been held , they had been properly planned and each hearing had lasted DATE . The court concluded that extending the detention beyond the statutory period of DATE had proved necessary in view of the objective difficulties in concluding all indispensable activities in time .

On DATE , CARDINAL DATE and DATE ORG granted further extensions of the applicant ’s detention . Each time ORG examined the conduct of the proceedings , found no undue delays on the part of the trial court and concluded that extension of the detention beyond the statutory time - limit had been justified by the objective necessity of hearing further evidence .

The applicant ’s lawyer appealed against the decision of CARDINAL DATE . He claimed that the court had failed to examine whether a less severe measure would be capable of securing the proper conduct of the proceedings . In this respect he referred to the fact that in DATE the court had ruled that the CARDINAL other co - accused could be released on bail .

On DATE ORG granted the applicant ’s lawyer ’s request and amended the decision of DATE finding that the detention could be lifted if a bail of MONEY was paid .

On DATE the bail was paid and the applicant was released from detention .

On DATE ORG convicted the applicant and sentenced him to DATE and DATE of imprisonment . The charge of being a member of an organised criminal group was confirmed in the first instance judgment .

The criminal proceedings against the applicant are pending before the secondinstance court .


Guido Raimondi;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicants , PERSON and PERSON , are NORP nationals , who were born in DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE . They were represented before the ORG by Mr PERSON and PERSON , lawyers practising in GPE .

ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented by their Agents , PERSON and PERSON , of ORG .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

NORP The applicants’ mother owned a building and a plot of land of QUANTITY in GPE . The property was expropriated in DATE , against the payment of monetary compensation of CARDINAL old NORP levs ( ORG ) . Initially , the plot was designated for the creation of a public garden and in DATE it was allocated for the construction of a street . However , none of these projects took shape . In DATE the municipal authorities rented the property to ORG of GPE .

On DATE , following the adoption of the DATE LAW ( see paragraph CARDINAL below ) , the applicants requested the mayor of GPE to quash the expropriation order and restore their property rights to the plot of land and the building on it . On an unspecified date the mayor rejected their request , reasoning that the building previously owned by the ORG mother had been pulled down and that a new building used as a church had been erected in its place , and that the area around this new building had been developed .

The applicants sought judicial review of the above decision .

NORP In a decision of CARDINAL DATE ORG set aside the mayor ’s decision and quashed the DATE expropriation order , finding that the preconditions for restitution under LAW had been met . None of the projects for which the property had been taken , namely the creation of a public garden and the construction of a street , had been pursued . The domestic court noted in addition that the expropriated building existed and , in so far as in DATE it had been reconstructed to serve as a church , such reconstruction had not been envisaged by the respective urban development plans .

In the meantime , on DATE the applicants paid back the sum received in compensation at the time of expropriation , to allow the quashing of the expropriation order to take effect . As a result of inflation and the depreciation of NORP currency , at that time the sum represented about MONEY ( DEM ) . On DATE the mayor of GPE ordered the strike out of the plot of land from the register of municipal properties , in accordance with the decision of ORG , but refused to do so in regard of the “ building erected by permission no . CARDINAL of DATE ” .

The applicants were thus unable to take possession of the property , which continued to be occupied by ORG of GPE . On DATE , the applicants brought a rei vindicatio action against the ORG . Initially the claim was also directed against ORG in GPE ; however , subsequently the proceedings in respect of it were dropped .

In the course of the proceedings , ORG ( and , in the beginning , ORG ) argued that the preconditions for restitution had not been met , in particular because the building formerly owned by the applicants’ mother had been demolished as it had been entirely “ worn out ” , and the ORG had built a completely new and bigger building , through donations from its parish and according to the approved construction plans . In order to establish these facts , the ORG presented plans and called witnesses . Still , the ORG conceded that the land and the building it was using were municipallyowned and that it rented the property . In the event that the courts would find that the property was to be returned to the applicants , the ORG claimed that the applicants had to be ordered to reimburse the cost of the improvements made by it , and requested to be allowed to retain the property until payment .

On DATE ORG , which examined the case at first instance , allowed a request by ORG of GPE for the GPE municipality to be joined to the proceedings as a third party . The municipality also argued in the course of the proceedings that the building claimed by the applicants was a new one , which meant that the preconditions for its restitution were not satisfied .

On DATE ORG allowed the ORG claims , finding , first , that they were the owners of the plot of land on the strength of the decision of CARDINAL DATE , and , second , that they were also the owners of the new building , which had been erected without the requisite re - allocation of the plot for that purpose and all necessary authorisations , and property to which had to follow property to the land . It found further that the defendant church was occupying the property without any valid legal basis .

On DATE ORG quashed that judgment and remitted the case to ORG , which once again allowed the ORG claim in a judgment of DATE . Again , it found that the applicants were the owners of the land and the building and that , after the restitution , the defendant church was occupying them without any legal basis .

Upon an appeal by the defendant church , on DATE ORG quashed ORG judgment and allowed the ORG claim in part . It found that in DATE , when it had been rented out to the defendant church , the building taken from the ORG mother had been pulled down and a much bigger , entirely new building had been built ; it had become the property of the ORG , later of the municipality . It was irrelevant under LAW whether the new building ’s construction had been duly authorised or not . Accordingly , the new building , the land on which it was standing , and the necessary adjoining land , totalling QUANTITY , could not be subject to restitution . On the other hand , the applicants’ property rights had been validly restored in respect of QUANTITY of the land and the defendant church had to vacate that part of the property .

As to the decision of CARDINAL DATE , ORG noted that “ it did not have res judicata effect as regards the property dispute ” .

The applicants appealed on points of law . In a final judgment of CARDINAL DATE ORG dismissed their appeal . It confirmed ORG finding that the building claimed by the applicants was not the CARDINAL taken from their mother , but a new one , erected in DATE and thus not subject to restitution . It held in addition as follows :

“ The main issue in the case , as raised in the appeal on points of law is : what is the significance for the legal dispute of the [ decision of DATE ] ? ORG finds that ORG was right to reach the conclusion that the decision at issue had been given in administrative proceedings concerning the revocation of the expropriation . It does not have res judicata effect in respect of the dispute concerning the ownership of the property at issue ... Of course , in the present litigation the court is obliged , on the basis of the evidence presented , to establish all the circumstances related to the alleged property rights disputed by the parties . ”

The Restitution of Property Expropriated under Building Planning Legislation Act ( ORG за възстановяване на собствеността върху някои отчуждени имоти по ORG , ORG , ORG , ORG и ЗС , “ the LAW ” ) entered into force in DATE . Its most relevant provisions have been summarised in the ORG ’s judgment in the case of ORG and Others v. GPE ( no . CARDINAL/CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) .

The provisions of domestic law concerning the res judicata effect of court judgments have been summarised in the ORG ’s judgment in the case of ORG and Others v. GPE ( nos . CARDINAL and CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) .

According to settled judicial practice under LAW , third parties claiming property rights could not intervene in the ex parte proceedings under that LAW or challenge any decision restoring the former ORG rights , but could have their claims examined in separate judicial proceedings , in which the courts exercised “ indirect judicial review ” ( косвен контрол ) of the restitution decision . The scope of that review was discussed in an ORG of DATE of ORG , which noted that a third party claiming rights to a restituted property was not bound by a decision given under LAW and could dispute all preconditions for restitution as provided for under LAW , as this was its sole means by which to defend its rights ( ORG CARDINAL от CARDINAL г. на ORG по т. гр. д. № CARDINAL/CARDINAL г. ) .

The relevant provisions of domestic law concerning remedies in respect of the length of proceedings have been summarised in the ORG ’s decisions in the cases of GPE and Others v. GPE ( ( dec . ) , no . CARDINAL , § § DATE , DATE ) and ORG and PERSON v. GPE ( ( dec . ) , nos . CARDINAL and GPE , § § DATE , DATE ) .


Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Luis López Guerra

The applicants are CARDINAL NORP nationals , Mr PERSON ( “ the first applicant ” ) , PERSON ( “ the second applicant ” ) , PERSON ( “ the third applicant ” ) and Ms PERSON ( “ the fourth applicant ” ) .

The applicants were represented by Mr PERSON , a lawyer practising in GPE . ORG ( “ the Government ” ) were represented initially by PERSON PERSON , the Representative of GPE at ORG , and then by his successor in that office , Mr PERSON .

The facts of the case , as submitted by the parties , may be summarised as follows .

The applicants were born in DATE , DATE and DATE respectively and live in GPE , GPE - Balkariya . They are the father , mother and the sisters , respectively , of PERSON . At the material time the applicants lived in PERSON .

NORP In DATE PERSON took part in a brawl in which a certain PERSON was fatally wounded , his death occurring shortly afterwards . While nobody was prosecuted for the death , it appears that PERSON ’s relatives considered that PERSON PERSON was responsible for it .

PERSON was shot several times in DATE but survived . According to the applicants , CARDINAL of S. ’s brothers carried out the attack in an attempt to avenge PERSON ’s death . Nobody was prosecuted for it .

On DATE PERSON was shot dead by an unknown person . The attack happened in the street around TIME while the victim was taking his DATE nephew to a playground .

On DATE the ORG town prosecutor ’s office opened an investigation into the shooting . The crime scene was inspected on DATE and CARDINAL cartridges were found and sent to a ballistics expert . Several people , including the first and fourth applicant , were questioned . They alleged that the murder had been committed by somebody from PERSON ’s family in revenge for his killing .

On DATE the prosecutor acting in the case questioned GPE , PERSON ’s father , who stated that his second son had unsuccessfully tried to kill PERSON in DATE to avenge PERSON ’s death . However , it had been his nephew , PERSON , who had killed PERSON because his second son had died in DATE . In his view , the killing had been just as it had been part of a blood feud . He added that the gun which had been used in the killing was at his home .

On DATE GPE was questioned again . This time he stated that he was not sure who had killed PERSON but confirmed that it must have been CARDINAL of his relatives as revenge for the killing of his son . On DATE he testified in similar vein that he did not know who exactly had killed PERSON but that it must have been CARDINAL of his relatives as part of a blood feud by applying the principle of “ a death for a death ” .

On DATE the investigator at the ORG prosecutor ’s office who was in charge of the preliminary investigation was questioned by a senior prosecutor after the first applicant alleged that he had promised PERSON ’s family that he would not arrest the murderer . The investigator admitted that it was true that he had spoken to S. ’s family and had asked them to tell him who had killed PERSON . In exchange , he had promised not to arrest the murderer . However , in his view , that did not mean that he absolutely would not have arrested the murderer and , moreover , he had always intended to act in accordance with the law .

On DATE a new investigator put in charge of the case issued an arrest warrant for PERSON because he had not responded to several previous requests to appear for questioning .

On DATE the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case .

On DATE GPE was charged with inducing PERSON and another unidentified person to murder PERSON to avenge the death of his son .

On DATE GPE was questioned as a person charged with a crime . He stated that he had asked PERSON to kill PERSON to avenge his son . He had bought a gun for that purpose that he had given to PERSON He had visited PERSON after the killing and he had informed him that he had fulfilled the terms of the blood feud . GPE , however , denied that he had incited any other person to carry out the killing .

On DATE the investigator separated the case against GPE from the rest of the investigation . The decision noted that the other suspect , PERSON , was in hiding .

On DATE the ORG prosecutor ’s office sent the case against GPE to ORG of GPE .

Following the launch of a military operation in the territory of GPE in DATE , the first applicant took the criminal case file from the prosecutor ’s office in order to save it from destruction . According to the first applicant all the physical evidence in the file had been lost during its transfer to court .

Shortly thereafter the applicants left GPE and went to GPE .

GPE died on DATE .

On DATE the first applicant resubmitted his criminal complaint about his son ’s killing to the PERSON town prosecutor ’s office .

On DATE the PERSON town prosecutor ’s office again opened criminal proceedings concerning the death of PERSON . The criminal file from DATE was joined to the new case as material evidence . On DATE first applicant was again granted the status of the victim of a crime .

On DATE PERSON was arrested . He was placed in detention DATE .

On DATE PERSON was charged with the murder of PERSON under LAW of LAW . During his questioning , PERSON denied any participation in the crime . He said that he had been approached by GPE and another person to help avenge S. ’s death , which he had refused . As far as he knew , GPE had killed PERSON .

NORP Over DATE several of ORG relatives were questioned as witnesses . They all stated that GPE had killed PERSON . In particular , PERSON , CARDINAL of GPE ’s daughters , testified that her father had accepted the blame for killing PERSON and that PERSON had had nothing to do with it .

On an unspecified date thereafter the prosecutor questioned ORG , a friend of PERSON and the only direct witness of the crime . He stated that CARDINAL young men had carried out the killing , however , he was unable to describe them owing to the passage of time . When shown a photo of PERSON he did not recognise him .

On DATE , a local imam and a relative of the PERSON family , testified that PERSON had been killed by members of PERSON ’s family in a blood feud over the death of S. That act of vengeance had been in accordance with traditional practices and local customs so their family had decided not to make any claims against NORP family . GPE had taken responsibility for the killing upon himself . There was therefore no reason to suspect PERSON was the killer .

Similar testimony was given the following day by ORG , the first applicant ’s brother , who was head of the family in DATE , and DATE , another relative of the applicants . DATE added that he had tried to discourage the first applicant from pursuing the case as it was not in accordance with their customs because the killing of PERSON had been justified as part of a blood feud .

On an unspecified date in DATE ORG informed ORG in reply to an enquiry that all the medical files from DATE and DATE had been destroyed during the military operation .

A forensic expert ’s opinion produced on DATE concluded that it was not possible to give a definite answer as to the cause of PERSON death as his body had never been examined . However , based on the findings of the investigators and doctors from DATE it was possible to say with a high degree of probability bordering on certainty that he had had CARDINAL bullet wounds in the chest . Such wounds could be characterised as lethal and could consequently have caused his death .

On DATE the first applicant stated that he opposed the exhumation of his son ’s body for religious reasons .

On DATE the prosecutor for the case at ORG town prosecutor ’s office terminated PERSON ’s prosecution and released him from pre - trial detention . He held that the evidence that had been collected proved that PERSON had not participated in PERSON killing .

On CARDINAL DATE the prosecutor informed the first applicant that the investigation had been suspended for failure to establish the identity of the alleged perpetrator .

On DATE the deputy prosecutor dismissed a complaint by the first applicant that the investigation up to that date had been biased in favour of the suspects .

In DATE the first applicant sent several complaints to various authorities , in particular the PERSON town prosecutor ’s office and its investigations department , alleging that the investigation had been ineffective .

On DATE the investigations department of the ORG prosecutor ’s office informed the first applicant that the investigation into the killing of his son had been resumed .

The first applicant received the same information on DATE .

On DATE the investigation was suspended again . Following a complaint by the first applicant , it resumed again , only to be suspended on DATE .

On DATE ORG informed the first applicant that the decision of CARDINAL DATE to suspend the investigation had been set aside as unfounded because of a failure to take all the necessary investigative steps and to establish all the circumstances of the crime . The prosecutor acting on the case for the PERSON town prosecutor ’s office was ordered to carry out an additional investigation .

On DATE the investigation resumed .

On DATE the first applicant lodged an appeal with ORG ( “ the ORG ” ) under LAW complaining of inactivity on the part of the investigative authorities .

On DATE ORG dismissed the appeal , noting that the investigation had reopened in the meantime and that measures were being taken with the aim of establishing the circumstances and the perpetrators of the crime . The first applicant appealed against that decision to ORG of GPE ( “ the Supreme Court ” ) .

In the meantime , on DATE the investigator in the case once again suspended the investigation as it had been impossible to establish the identity of the perpetrator .

On DATE ORG quashed the decision of DATE and remitted the case to ORG . It noted that copies of the relevant documents concerning the resumption of the investigation were not in the file . The court was thus unable to endorse ORG decision .

On DATE ORG decided anew to dismiss the first applicant ’s appeal . The prosecutor and investigator submitted copies of the relevant documents from the investigation file . On DATE the investigation was suspended under LAW of LAW for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrator . The court considered that by obtaining the copies of the relevant documents it had eliminated the shortcoming indicated in ORG judgment of CARDINAL DATE .

On DATE ORG quashed that decision . It held that ORG had not substantiated its ruling and had failed to take all the material in the case file into account .

On DATE ORG granted the first applicant ’s appeal , considering the ORG inactivity to be illegal . It held that the prosecutor had closed the investigation on DATE without taking testimony from several witnesses and had failed to conduct the other investigative steps ordered by ORG ( see paragraph CARDINAL above ) .

On DATE the Deputy ORG quashed another decision ( of unspecified date ) to suspend the investigation .

According to the information available to the ORG the investigation is still ongoing .

Until DATE criminal - law matters were governed by DATE Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR . On DATE the old Code was replaced by LAW .

Article CARDINAL of the new Code provides that a decision by an investigator or prosecutor to dispense with or terminate criminal proceedings , and other decisions , acts or omissions which are liable to infringe the constitutional rights and freedoms of parties to such proceedings or to impede ORG access to justice are subject to appeal to a district court , which is empowered to review the lawfulness and grounds of the impugned decisions .